



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines


Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:


- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>







1832 - 1803

THE LIBRARY
OF THE



Periodical Collection

CLASS

BOOK

C

INT

FROM

NOTED BY 1
PAGE 10
COPY 1.2
G. HART
J. MOG

Col^d New York.

COBBETT'S
POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI.

FROM JULY TO DECEMBER

1809.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY T. C. HANSARD, PETERBOROUGH COURT, FLEET STREET:

PUBLISHED BY RICHARD BAGSHAW, BRYDGES STREET, COVENT-GARDEN;

SOLD ALSO BY J. BUDD, PALL-MALL; W. AND J. RICHARDSON, ROYAL EXCHANGE;
BLACK, PARRY, AND KINGSBURY, LEADENHALL STREET; J. MERCER, DUBLIN;

J. MORGAN, PHILADELPHIA; AND E. SARJEANT, NEW-YORK.

UNIVERSITY OF
MINNESOTA
LIBRARY

TO YITRANNU
ATQZBNN
YRAGG

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

	Page
PROCEEDINGS IN COUNTIES, CITIES, BOROUGHES, &c. RELATIVE TO THE LATE INQUIRY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, RESPECTING THE CONDUCT OF THE DUKE OF YORK.	
County of Essex	18
Common Council of London	19
Austria—Nineteenth Bulletin of the French Army, Vienna, June 16, 1809	150, 179, 215
Twentieth, Vienna, June 20	21
Twenty-first, Vienna, June 22	53
Twenty-second, Vienna, June 24	55
Twenty-third, Vienna, June 28	77
Twenty-fourth, Vienna, July 3	82
Twenty-fifth, Wolkersdorf, July 8	126, 154
Twenty-sixth, Wolkersdorf, July 9	159, 223
Twenty-seventh	223
Twenty-eighth	225
French Army in Portugal, Bulletin, dated June 22	23
Portugal—Official Communication from Marshal Beresford to the President of the Regency, April 25	25
Letter from General Kellermann, March 31	26
Russia—Declaration, dated April 25	29
Proclamation of Prince Gallitzin, May 11	30
Ukase to the Senate, May 7	31
America—Message of the President, May 23	49
Sweden—Proclamation of the New King, on his ascending the Throne, June 6	52
Spain—Bulletin of the French Army, June 29	56
Spain—Letters from Captain Hotham to Admiral Lord Gambier	57
Austria—Account of the Battle of Aspern, May 21	60, 84, 227
Lower Canada—Speech of the Governor General on dissolving the Provincial Parliament, May 16	68
America—Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, on the State of the Finances	71
Vienna—Proclamation to the Inhabitants of, June 27	73
Poland—Proclamation to the Poles, June 24	74
Spain—Battle of Talavera, from the London Gazette, Aug. 15	234
Expedition to Holland—From the London Gazette, Aug. 7	246, 350, 415, 509
Austrian Account of the Battle of Wagram	317
Spain—Proclamation of King Joseph, August 10	379
Sweden—Message relative to the Pension of the late King, August 15	381
America—Proclamation of the President, August 10	382
Spain—Proclamation of Marshal Augereau, July 2	384, 414
Spain—General Cuesta's Account of the Battle of Talavera	559
Spain—Royal Decree, August 31	607, 691
France—Address of the Arch Chancellor to the Conservative Senate, Oct. 3	695
France—Report of the Minister of War to the Emperor, September 15	696
France—Report of the Motives of the Projet of the Senatus Consultum, relative to a Levy of 36,000 Conscripts	701
America—British Deserters	702

698985

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

	Page
Austria—Treaty of Peace between France and Austria, Oct. 15	726
Sweden and Russia—Treaty of Peace between, Sept. 5	766, 830, 949
Italy—Proclamation to the People of the Tyrol, Oct. 26	896
Sweden—Abstract of the New Constitution	931
Spain—Manifesto respecting the Meeting of the Cortez, Oct. 28	954, 984
City of London Address, Dec. 20, 1809	983
France—Speech of the Emperor Napoleon, on opening the Meeting of the Legislative Body, Dec. 3	985
Spain—Account of the Battle of Ocana, Nov. 19	988
Spain—Proclamation of the Junta, Nov. 21	991, 1013
Brazils—Decree of the Prince Regent of Portugal, July 6	1014
France—Divorce of the Empress Josephine	1016
France—Exposé of the State of the French Empire	1023

MISCELLANEOUS.

John Bull on the Clergy	14
An old, half-starved Subaltern, on Military Sinicures	15
Meeting of the Creditors of the Princess of Wales, July 14	65
Mr. Wardle—Proceedings of the Common Council of London, respecting Mr. Wardle, August 1	150, 179, 215, 311, 719, 760
Parliamentary Reform—Proceedings of the Middlesex Meeting, August 9	203
Mr. Worthington's Letter to Major Cartwright on Parliamentary Reform	268
Mr. Townsend on Tythes	308
D. D. on the Edinburgh Reviewers and Parliamentary Reform	348
An Englishman of the Old School, to S. Whitbread, Esq.	408
Britannicus on the State of the Country	435
C. L.'s Proposal for a Jubilee	440
Philalethes on the State of Spain	501
S. on the Edinburgh Reviewers and Parliamentary Reform	444
A Scotchman on the Edinburgh Reviewers and Parliamentary Reform	449
W. F. S. on Special Juries	457
Jubilee—Proceedings of the Common Council of London	461
B. on Foreign Ministers	502
Varius, in defence of Mr. Wardle	504
Lord Castlereagh's Letter to Mr. Canning—Mr. Canning's Answer	516
Z. on the Jubilee	534
Mr. Bernard on Jacobin Guineas	536
Major Cartwright on Parliamentary Reform	540
R. on the Edinburgh Reviewers	547
B. C. on the State of Spain	554
A. B. on the Situation of the Merchants of St. Thomas	555
Correspondence between Mr. Perceval, and Lords Grey and Grenville	556
Notes on the Battle of Talavera; From the Moniteur	567
Notes on the Expedition to Holland; From the Moniteur	571, 603
Mr. Worthington, on the Pistolling Privy Counsellors	587
Answer to the Edinburgh Review, on the subject of Parliamentary Reform: From the Glasgow Sentinel	596
Mr. Canning's Defence	609
D. R. on the Jubilee	654
Truth in Obscurity, on the Jubilee	657
Decius, on Jacobin Guineas	658
Mercator, on West Indian Custom House Fees	668
C. S. on the High Price of Provisions	671
W. Y. on the Edinburgh Reviewers	677
Mr. Newenham on Parliamentary Reform	679
City Jubilee—Address to the King	691

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

	Page
D. I. on the Jubiles	713
W. F. S. on Jacobin Guineas	716
Address to the Citizens of London	800
S. on Special Juries	805
Verax, on Mr. Wardle and the Edinburgh Reviewers	810
Mr. Shepherd's Speech at the Celebration of the Anniversary of Mr. Roscoe's Election	814
Affidavits read in the Court of King's Bench, in the Case of Wright against Mr. Wardle	822
Letters from the Right Hon. George Canning to the Earl Camden	847, 943
Edinburgh Review, on the Conduct of the War and Parliamentary Reform	852
Phocion, on a Change of Ministry	924
The Author of "An Impartial Examination of Sir F. Burdett's Plan of Parliamentary Reform," to Major Cartwright	928
T. R. on the Edinburgh Review	931
W. F. S. on Special Juries	934
An Economist, on Banking	937
Z. on Paper Money	944
Meeting at the Crown and Anchor, for the purpose of indemnifying Mr. Wardle for the Losses and Expences to which he has been exposed	973
Major Cartwright on Parliamentary Reform	977
M. B. on High Prices	983
City of London Address, on the failure of the Expedition to Holland—The King's Answer	983
Mr. Worthington's Address to the Inhabitants of Southampton, respecting Col. Wardle	1005
H. on the Scarcity of Gold	1008
A. B. on the Edinburgh Review	1012
Table of the Number of Christenings and Burials; of the Prices of the Quatern Leaf; of the Prices of Meat, Sugar, Salt, and Coals; of the Prices of the English and French Stocks; and of the Number of Bankruptcies; —from June to November, 1809	vii
List of His Majesty's Ministry, as it stood in July, and in December, 1809	viii

ARTICLES BY THE EDITOR.

Essex Meeting	1
Mr. Wardle's Speech, on saving Eleven Millions annually—Crown Lands—The Wrights and Mr. Wardle—Suppression of Mrs. Clarke's Book	6
First Letter to the King, on the Maritime War against France	33
Austria	47
Letter to the Independent People of Hampshire—The Pauper's Action	97
Austria	120
Second Letter to the King, on the Maritime War against France	129
Mr. Wardle and the Common Council of London	150
Mr. Wardle and the Common Council of London	161
Spain	169
Expedition to Holland	173
Naval Prizes	178
Battle of Talavera	193
Middlesex Meeting for a Reform of Parliament	203
Duke of Brunswick	214
Battle of Talavera	257
Lord Gambier	266
Austria	266
Battle of Talavera	289
Depreciation of Bank Notes	307

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

	<i>Page</i>
Talavera, its Viscount, and the Consequences of his Victory—Arrival of the Marquis Wellesley in Spain—Celebration thereof, by a Dinner—The Marquis gives the Health of his Holiness the Pope	321
Talavera's Campaign—Humanity of the French towards their Prisoners of War—Horrible Cruelties of the French, Napoleon an Imperial Sanguinary Tyger!—The Lord Talavera allows Sir Robert Wilson to be "an Intelligent Partizan"	353
Walcheren Expedition	373
The Whigs all alive at the Prospect of a Change of Ministry—Baseness of their Conduct to Mr. Wardle—Nothing can save this Country but Reform	375
Jacobin Guineas	377
Talavera's Campaign, and the Jubilee	385
Walcheren Expedition	397
Jacobin Guineas	401
Ministerial Duel	417
Change of Factions	424
The Jubilee	434
Pistolling Privy-Counsellors—Original cause of the Duel	481
The Change of Ministry	487
Talavera's Battle	491
America	500
The Jubilee	513
Pistolling Privy-Counsellors—Lord Castlereagh's Letter to Mr. Canning—His Answer	515
Talavera's Campaign	520
Jacobin Guineas	524
Letter to Richard Goodlad, Esq. on the Jubilee	577
Pistolling Privy-Counsellors—Mr. Canning's Defence	609
Talavera's Campaign	627
Spanish Revolution	631
The Jubilee	636
Letter to William Bosville, Esq. on the Jubilee	641
Letter to the Citizens of London, on the approaching Elections	705
Austria	737
The Jubilee	745
Change of Ministry	750
Letter the Fourth, to the Independent People of Hampshire, on Parliamentary Reform	769
State of France	773
Change of Ministry	784
Change of Ministry	833
Lord Wellesley	841
Mr. Canning, and his long Exculpatory Epistle	842
Danger to Ireland	865
Covent-Garden Theatre	890
Mr. Clifford's Action against Brandon	897
Edinburgh Review	907
Conduct of the War	909
City of London Elections	911
Covent-Garden Theatre	911
Mr. Wardle, and the Trial of Mrs. Clarke and the Wrights	920
Spain—Arms for the Spaniards	961
Oxford Chancellorship	968
Crown and Anchor Meeting, for the purpose of indemnifying Mr. Wardle	973
Catholic Claims	993

TABLES.

TABLE of the Number of CHRISTENINGS and BURIALS within the Bills of Mortality, from June to November 1809, inclusive.

Epochs.	CHRISTENED		BURIED.																Total Buried.	
	Male.	Female	Under 2 Years.	2 to 5	5 to 10	10 to 20	20 to 30	30 to 40	40 to 50	50 to 60	60 to 70	70 to 80	80 to 90	90 to 100, &c.						
June	987	949	397	159	68	58	110	151	137	118	93	67	23	4	701	701				
July	687	658	298	126	45	36	65	100	103	76	67	70	24	7	519	438				
August	1059	975	434	172	76	64	94	122	145	121	78	69	27	6	728	690				
September	718	687	385	122	49	40	71	86	102	71	57	54	19	5	553	508				
October	765	735	390	127	52	37	87	106	115	87	75	58	16	2	565	527				
November	1068	1005	525	216	86	54	135	165	201	152	148	112	48	5	978	869				
	5,284	5,009	2,429	922	376	329	562	730	803	625	518	430	157	29	4,044	3,733				
Total Christenings...10,293			Total Burials... 7,777																	

Table of the Prices of MEAT, SUGAR, SALT, and COALS, in LONDON, from June to November 1809, inclusive.

	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	
Beef	s. d. 5 6	s. d. 5 6	s. d. 5 4	s. d. 5 4	s. d. 5 0	s. d. 5 4	per Stone of 8lb. to sink the offal.
Mutton	5 2	6 0	5 4	5 4	5 4	5 8	
Pork	6 0	6 4	7 0	7 4	6 8	6 8	
Sugar	36 8	40 11	45 3	47 7	52 4	49 7	Cwt.
Salt	1 0	1 0	1 0	1 0	1 0	1 0	Bushel
Coals	37 3	63 0	65 0	63 0	72 6	72 0	Chald.

Table of the Prices of the QUARTER LOAF in LONDON, from June to November 1809, inclusive.

June		July		Aug.		Sept.		Oct.		Nov.	
Day.	Price.	Day.	Price.	Day.	Price.	Day.	Price.	Day.	Price.	Day.	Price.
6	$1\frac{1}{2}$	4	$1\frac{1}{2}$	1	$1\frac{1}{2}$	5	$2\frac{3}{4}$	3	15	1	$4\frac{1}{2}$
13	$1\frac{1}{2}$	11	$1\frac{1}{2}$	8	$2\frac{3}{4}$	12	$2\frac{3}{4}$	10	15	8	$4\frac{1}{2}$
20	$1\frac{1}{2}$	18	$1\frac{1}{2}$	15	$2\frac{3}{4}$	19	4	17	$4\frac{1}{2}$	14	$4\frac{1}{2}$
27	$1\frac{1}{2}$	25	$1\frac{1}{2}$	22	$2\frac{3}{4}$	26	$4\frac{1}{2}$	24	$4\frac{1}{2}$	22	$4\frac{1}{2}$

Table of the Prices of the English Three per Cent. Consols, from June to November 1809, inclusive.

Day.	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.
1	68 1/2	69 1/2	68	68	—	69 1/2
2	68 1/2	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69 1/2
3	68 1/2	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69 1/2
4	—	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	—
5	—	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	—
6	68 1/2	67 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	—
7	69 1/2	67 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	—
8	69 1/2	67 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69 1/2
9	69 1/2	67 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69 1/2
10	69 1/2	67 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	—
11	—	67 1/2	—	68 1/2	68 1/2	70 1/2
12	69 1/2	67 1/2	—	68 1/2	68 1/2	70 1/2
13	69 1/2	68	68	68 1/2	68 1/2	70 1/2
14	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	70 1/2
15	69 1/2	68 1/2	67 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	70 1/2
16	69 1/2	68 1/2	68	68 1/2	68 1/2	70 1/2
17	69 1/2	68 1/2	67 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	70 1/2
18	—	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	70 1/2
19	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	70 1/2
20	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	70 1/2
21	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	70 1/2
22	69 1/2	67 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69	70 1/2
23	69 1/2	67 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69 1/2	70 1/2
24	—	67 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69	70 1/2
25	—	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69	70 1/2
26	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69 1/2	70 1/2
27	69 1/2	67 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69 1/2	70 1/2
28	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69 1/2	70 1/2
29	—	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69 1/2	70 1/2
30	69 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69 1/2	70 1/2
31	—	68 1/2	68 1/2	68 1/2	69 1/2	70 1/2

Table of the Prices of the French Five per Cent. Consolidés, from June to November 1809, inclusive.

Day.	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.
1	—	—	—	—	—	—
2	—	—	—	—	—	—
3	—	—	—	—	—	—
4	—	—	—	—	—	—
5	—	—	—	—	—	80.30
6	—	—	—	—	—	—
7	—	—	—	—	—	—
8	—	—	—	—	—	—
9	82.70	—	82.15	—	—	—
10	—	—	—	—	78.10	—
11	—	—	—	—	—	—
12	—	—	—	—	—	—
13	—	—	—	—	—	—
14	—	—	—	—	—	—
15	—	—	—	—	—	—
16	—	—	—	—	—	—
17	—	—	—	—	—	—
18	—	—	—	—	—	—
19	—	—	—	76.80	—	—
20	—	—	—	—	—	—
21	83.10	—	—	—	—	—
22	—	—	—	—	—	—
23	—	—	—	—	—	—
24	—	—	79.75	—	—	—
25	—	—	—	—	—	80.50
26	—	—	—	—	—	—
27	—	—	—	—	—	—
28	—	—	—	—	—	—
29	—	—	—	—	79	—
30	—	—	—	—	—	—
31	—	—	—	—	—	—

Table of the Number of BANKRUPTCIES in England, from June to Nov. 1809, inclusive.

June..... 86	July..... 94	August..... 78	September..... 97	October..... 82	November..... 69
--------------	--------------	----------------	-------------------	-----------------	------------------

LIST OF HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTRY,

AS IT STOOD

In July, 1809.

In December, 1809.

CABINET MINISTERS.

Earl Camden	<i>President of the Council</i>	Earl Camden.
Lord Eldon	<i>Lord High Chancellor</i>	Lord Eldon.
Earl of Westmoreland	<i>Lord Privy Seal</i>	Earl of Westmoreland.
Duke of Portland	{ <i>First Lord of the Treasury (Prime Minister)</i> <i>Chancellor and Under Treasurer of the Excheq. and also Chanc. of the Duchy of Lancaster . . .</i>	Right Hon. Spencer Perceval.
Right Hon. Spencer Perceval		
Lord Mulgrave	<i>First Lord of the Admiralty . . .</i>	Lord Mulgrave.
Earl of Chatham	<i>Master Gen. of the Ordnance . .</i>	Earl of Chatham.
Earl Bathurst	<i>President of the Board of Trade .</i>	Earl Bathurst.
Lord Hawkesbury	<i>Sec. of State for Home Department</i>	Hon. Richard Ryder.
Right Hon. Geo. Canning.	<i>Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs .</i>	Marquis Wellesley.
Lord Castlereagh	{ <i>Sec. of State for the Department of War and the Colonies . . .</i>	Earl of Liverpool.

NOT OF THE CABINET.

Rt. Hon. R. Saunders Dundas	{ <i>President of the Board of Controul for the Affairs of India . . .</i>	Rt. Hon. R. Saunders Dundas
Right Hon. George Rose	{ <i>Vice-Pres. of the Board of Trade, and Treasurer of the Navy . . .</i>	Right Hon. George Rose
Sir James Pulteney, Bt.	<i>Secretary at War</i>	Viscount Palmerston.
Lord Charles Somerset	{ <i>Joint Paymaster-General . . .</i>	{ Lord Charles Somerset, Right Hon. Charles Long.
Right Hon. Charles Long		
Earl of Chichester	{ <i>Joint Postmaster-General . . .</i>	{ Earl of Chichester, Earl of Sandwich.
Earl of Sandwich		
William Huskisson, esq.	{ <i>Secretaries of the Treasury . .</i>	{ Richard Wharton, esq. Charles Arbuthnot, esq.
Hon. Henry Wellesley		
Sir William Grant	<i>Master of the Rolls</i>	Sir William Grant.
Sir Vicary Gibbs	<i>Attorney-General</i>	Sir Vicary Gibbs.
Sir Thomas Plomer	<i>Solicitor-General</i>	Sir Thomas Plomer.

PERSONS IN THE MINISTRY OF IRELAND.

Duke of Richmond	<i>Lord Lieutenant</i>	Duke of Richmond.
Lord Manners	<i>Lord High Chancellor</i>	Lord Manners.
Sir Arthur Wellesley	<i>Chief Secretary</i>	W. Wellesley Pole.
Right Hon. John Foster	<i>Chancellor of the Exchequer . .</i>	Right Hon. John Foster.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 1.] LONDON, SATURDAY, JULY 8, 1809.

[Price 1s.

"IT is with yourselves, and not with the House of Commons, that a Reform in Parliament must originate."—SIR HENRY ST. JOHN MILDMAI'S Speech, at the Essex Meeting, 1st July, 1809.

1]

[2

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

ESSEX MEETING.—It was my intention to have published, this week, my FIFTH LETTER to the *People of Hampshire*, containing a practical view of the sort of Reform in the House of Commons, which is so manifestly wanted, and which is so loudly called for by all the uncorrupted part of the nation; but, there are several other topics, which will not well admit of delay, amongst which is the late Meeting in the County of Essex, which will, indeed, be found to be very closely connected with the subject of Reform, but which it would not be desirable to introduce into the series of Letters devoted exclusively to the discussion of that subject. Next week, and the week after, I intend to publish two Letters, addressed to the King, upon subjects of the greatest importance to him as well as to his people, and in which Letters I shall, I am convinced, state such facts as will surprize and fill with indignation all those who do not profit from the monstrous abuses I shall develop.—At page 1010 of the foregoing volume, will be found two very interesting documents relative to the conduct of the SHERIFF of Essex, who refused to call a County Meeting, first, upon the ground of the subscribers not having designated themselves *freeholders*, and of the *inhabitants* having been summoned as well as the *freeholders*; and, second (when the first objection was removed) upon the ground of "an application conveyed to him, from a great number of persons, in various parts of the county, expressing an opinion, that such Meeting was unnecessary and *inexpedient*." In my last, I observed upon the effect of conduct like this, if it was permitted to have any weight in preventing meetings of the people. If it was necessary to have the assent of the Sheriff to hold a meeting of the people, it is manifest, that there would be no meetings, except such as were held at the desire, or command, of the ministry; the Sheriff being, now-a-days, appointed, in fact, by the ministry, who, of course, take care to

appoint to that office none but those who are decidedly of their own politics, and, indeed, who are their own partizans.—The Meeting in Essex, owing to the good sense and resolution of the gentlemen and yeomen of the county, and especially owing to the perseverance of Mr. BURGOYNE, did, however, take place, on Saturday last, the 1st instant; and, from all that I can learn of it, it appears to have been one of the most respectable, as well as most numerous meetings, which has been held in the kingdom.—The Resolutions which were passed, will be found, under the proper head, in another part of this sheet. The discussion of them seems to have been very animated and able; and, it is with great satisfaction that I see that Sir Henry Mildmay was in the chair. His conduct will be greatly blamed by the venal tribe in Hampshire, and particularly by the political parsons, who will, I dare say, take off t'other bottle in drinking to his perdition; but, even upon principles of self-preservation, he is evidently right. If, indeed, the chances were great against his living more than a couple of years, it might be thought hardly worth while to give himself any trouble about a Reform of the Parliament; but having, in all probability, forty or fifty years to live, and a family to bring into the world and to support, and not having in view any means of getting back again, in place or pension, any portion of what is taken from him in taxes; thus situated, and foreseeing, as every man, in his senses, must foresee, that, if this system of taxation go on, the property will, in the course of another twenty or thirty years, all pass from the hands of the St. Johns and the Mildmays into those of the Huskissons, the Robert Wards, the Cannings and the Hunns; foreseeing this, and desirous to be able to keep a horse to ride as long as he lives, he must naturally wish for such a Reform in Parliament as will prevent the said transfer of property, or, rather, put a stop to it, the thing being actually now going on. Only observe how it works. Sir Henry Mildmay pays 500*l.* a year, for instance,

A

in *property-tax*; that is to say, 500*l.* worth of his property is taken from him every year, in this one sort of tax; and the two HUNNS, Mr. Canning's sisters, take off just that sum annually, and are so to take it off for life, unless a reformation take place. This is precisely the same as if the two Hunns had a mortgage upon Sir Henry's estate to the principal amount of 10,000*l.*; and, must he not, then, be a downright fool, as to his own plain common-sense interests, not to see, that a Reform would be a good thing? I know that we shall be told, that it is not Sir Henry alone, who pays the Hunns; but, that, according to our means, we all contribute towards their maintenance, in the same manner; that the people of a parish contribute towards the maintenance of paupers. Very true; but, I have supposed a case of transfer in the shape of *property tax* only; and, as it has been *proved* to the satisfaction of every reasonable man, that the *whole* of *that tax* may be saved, it matters not whether we consider Sir Henry's share of the property, thus taken from him, as being distributed amongst a thousand persons, or as being all transferred to two. It has been proved, that the whole of the property tax might be saved; the pension of the Hunns would, most assuredly, form one of the objects of curtailed expence; and, therefore, it is quite fair to consider Sir Henry Mildmay as maintaining the two Hunns. So that, whatever the political parsons may say; however they may lift up their eyes and hands at this "strange" conduct in the young Baronet; however deeply they may deplore his having been seduced from the good path in which they hoped to have led him, and from those principles which would have enabled them to extract half a dozen fat bucks from him every season, together with the suitable accompaniments; however they may, when they find him escaped from their clutches, bestow upon him their curses in the form of blessings; whatever they may say, and whatever they may do, he will hardly be persuaded to abandon his present line of conduct. In vain would the political parsons (who are all well patronized), persuade him, that they *share* with him in the loss of property; that they pay their quota towards the maintenance of the Hunns; for, he cannot fail to perceive, that what the church loses in this way it gains in *grants*. It has its tythes and its glebes and its estates taxed; but, it comes to parliament, as it has done *twice within these*

four years, and obtains a grant from the public purse to make up for what it pays in taxes. Well may the church cry out against those, who object to heavy taxes, and say: "*we are very well as we are.*" The benefited clergy are, indeed, very well; because most of them have livings heaped upon them; and, because they can come to the House of Commons for grants to make up for what they pay in taxes; but the *we* does not apply to the people, who are compelled to pay the share of the parsons and their own share too.—The Resolution, respecting *Parliamentary Reform*, which, it appears, was moved by Mr. HOLT WHITE, does him and the meeting who adopted it very great honour. There are few men, very few indeed, better qualified for such a task than Mr. White, and I am very happy to see, that he has taken an active part in Essex.—I state, upon unquestionable authority, that, for a week before the meeting, a hot canvass had been carried on to keep people from attending it. That the stewards of placed and pensioned landlords; that Magistrates and Militia Officers, Revenue Officers, Stamp-Distributors, and all the numerous swarm employed in the Barracks and Contracts of various descriptions, had been on the alert for many days before the meeting took place; but that, notwithstanding these precautions, the Shire Hall was crowded, and also the great entrance to it as far as any one could hear or see.—It is worthy of remark, that the resolution respecting a Reform of Parliament received more applause than any of the rest. This was, indeed, quite natural; but, it is pleasing to find, that the cause is every where so well understood.—In Sussex, it is said, the same game of a *counter-requisition* (as they have the effrontery to call it), is, now playing to prevent a meeting, and that *their* Sheriff, too, has refused, under this pretence, to call one; but, the enemies of corruption will, doubtless, follow the example of the people in Essex; and call a meeting without the Sheriff.—It is good to remark, that in Sussex as well as in Essex, the *party-men*, on both sides, are equally opposed to a meeting, and most strongly reprobate the intention to call one.—Mr. Burgoyne stated, at the Essex Meeting, that the names to the "*counter-requisition*," he found, upon examination, to be, in many instances, false; in others, improperly obtained; some by the abuse of the *clerical character* to political purposes, and that,

too, *even in the church or vestry*. The Clergy really appear to have thrown away the scabbard. They seem to have made up their minds rather to see the whole thing go to wreck, than to suffer a Reform to take place. It would, perhaps, not be difficult to find out the reason; but be the reason what it may, the *fact* manifestly is, that, of all the various descriptions who dread a Reform of the parliament, none appear to dread it so much as the Clergy. But, need we wonder at this, when we see how Dr. O'Meara and Mr. Beazeley and others were working for preferment? How many of those, who have obtained benefices, have obtained them by similar means, it is impossible for us to say; but, this we do *know*, that there has not been one single *sermon* published against the corruptions and other abominations that have recently come to light. Nothing is more unjust than to condemn men by *classes*; but, what are we to do, when we meet with so many of the clergy amongst our bitterest enemies? There are some, and even many, of the clergy who are friends of Parliamentary Reform; I have a letter of one before me at this moment; I know many more of the same description? but, we must follow the rule, and not the exception. The conduct of a *few* might be passed over in silence for the sake of the *many*; but, it is the many who are our enemies, and, therefore, if our expressions of resentment are, in some cases, too general, the fault is with the clerical profession, and not with us.—The sentiment, expressed by Sir Henry Mildmay, as quoted in my motto, is, to be sure, so just, that every one must agree to it; yet the public-robbers have been continually publishing against it, as if it contained something of a *sedition* and even of a *rebellious* nature. But, is it not downright stupidity to suppose, that a reform of any abuse, be its nature and extent what they may, will originate with those who are practising the said abuse? The party so practising may, possibly, upon being applied to, discontinue an abuse; but, if *left to itself*, is it not foolish in the extreme to expect it to reform? Apply this doctrine to Buonaparte; and who is brute enough to suppose, that he will give up any part of his conquests, until he be *forced* to do it? But our public-robbers would fain persuade us, that the House of Commons will reform itself without even being *asked* to do it. I am for asking them to reform themselves; but, I am for doing it through a channel

which would give weight to my application; and this, I trust, when the time for the application arrives, will be the opinion of the whole nation.

MR. WARDLE'S SPEECH, on the subject of saving eleven millions annually, has been published in a pamphlet. It is too long for insertion here, and, therefore, for the present, I shall content myself with inserting from the pamphlet a recapitulation of the several sums he proposes to save.

RECAPITULATION OF SAVINGS ON

Household troops, two regiments	£73,317	0	0
Dragoon guards, dragoons, and light ditto	340,000	0	0
Foreign corps	1,005,017	0	0
Subsidy annually paid Count Mearon for continuing his regiment in his Majesty's service	3,000	0	0
Militia of the United Kingdom	300,000	0	0
Staff of fifteen small Militia corps reduced	10,000	0	0
Local Militia	700,000	0	0
Volunteers of the United Kingdom	1,000,000	0	0
Royal Wagon Train	48,993	0	0
Manx Fencibles	24,184	0	0
Staff of the Army	200,000	0	0
Recruiting Staff, Levies and Bounties	200,000	0	0
Army Agency	51,075	0	0
War office	24,000	0	0
Pay office	24,000	0	0
Contract horses	299,083	0	0
Fortifications and repairs at home	500,000	0	0
Medical department and annual loss of men	200,000	0	0
Commissariat	500,000	0	0
Barracks	350,000	0	0
Army clothing	270,000	0	0
On the collection of the revenue in Great Britain	1,051,930	0	0
On ditto ditto in Ireland	388,367	0	0
Commissioners and Auditors of Public Accounts	70,000	0	0
Bank, the sum charged for the Management of the National Debt	210,594	0	0
Pensions and Offices executed by deputy	200,000	0	0
Bounties	150,000	0	0
Colonies	500,000	0	0
Catholic Emancipation	2,000,000	0	0
	10,693,563	0	0

Expenditure of the Navy for the year ending Jan. 5, 1809, 17,467,892*l.* one third of which is..... 5,822,630 13 4

Total Savings..... 16,516,193 13 4

Now, it appears from this, that the proposed sum might be saved without any saving at all in the *naval department*, which is one of the great heads of expenditure, and in which there is, it is, on all hands,

agreed, incredible waste.—Mr. Wardle, in his speech, made particular mention of the article of *canvass*, which was supplied by the very person, who received a salary, as *inspector of canvass*. In answer to this, he was told, that, if he had gone to the Admiralty and pointed out this abuse, it would have been corrected. So; a member of parliament was to go and kick his heels in Mr. Robert Ward's Anti-chamber, till the great man was at leisure to hear his complaints! But, who ever heard of any redress being obtained in this way? Who is foolish enough to suppose, that such applications would afford the smallest chance of redress? If any one is foolish enough, let him look at the fate of ATKINS, the Barrack-Master in the Isle of Wight.—The public robbers now say, in their several publications, that they did not want to be told, that a great saving of expence might be made, provided we would *disband a considerable part of our forces, and thereby expose ourselves to the consequences of invasion*. This is their grand fallacy; it is what they are circulating in all directions. But, from the foregoing recapitulation, it will be seen, that, supposing the troops, which Mr. Wardle would disband, to be necessary to our safety, the saving from that source makes but a comparatively small part of the whole of the savings proposed to be made. There is 80,000*l.* a year paid to people for *over-looking accounts*, when it is evident that it is the business, the great and peculiar business of members of parliament to examine into the manner in which the public money is expended. What are they sent to parliament for, if it be not for that? And, after being elected for the purpose of guarding the public purse, they pay 80,000*l.* of the public money to others to examine into public accounts; and, notwithstanding this enormous expence, it is stated, that there are, at this time, accounts to the amount of **FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTY UNSETTLED!** Why, this very circumstance alone proves, and must prove, to any man at all conversant in business, that the *loss and waste* must be immense.—The consequence of keeping in tow this mass of floating accounts, is, that the accountants are, all the while, held in a state of *most abject dependence upon the ministry of the day*; a dependence, which, at this hour, many a man inherits from his *grandfather*, all his property being answerable for what was done thirty or forty years ago. This seems to be almost

too much to believe; but the fact is so. I remember, that, in 1800, an American, a friend of mine, came to England in order to assist in getting passed the accounts of General Dalrymple, who had been Quarter-Master-General in America, during the American war, which began in 1776; and I know, that these accounts were not finally passed till some time in 1803; that is to say, till twenty years after the close of the American war. This is a trifle to the age of some accounts, I am told. Is it not impossible that a nation should not be ruined at this rate of going on? Or will the public robbers attempt to make us believe, that these unsettled hundreds of millions, and an endless train of dependents growing out of this abuse; will they attempt to make us believe, that these constitute part of our *forces*, part of what is to defend us against invasion? An instance of the loss sustained by this system of accounts has recently come to light in the case of JOHN BOWLES and his brother Dutch Commissioners, who, it now appears, snacked *ten thousand pounds each* the first year; that is to say, *fifty thousand pounds*. These are a part of the "*forces*," that Mr. Wardle wishes to disband, and will the robbers pretend, that *these* are necessary to defend us against Buonaparté?—Then there is a good quarter of a million to be saved by the cutting off of unmerited sinecures, pensions, and reversions. And will the public robbers attempt to persuade us, that LADY LOUISA PAGET, *alias* LADY LOUISA ERSKINE, who is a pensioner at 300*l.* a year, *under the former name*, upon the English list, and at another 300*l.* a year, *under the latter name*, upon the Scotch list; will the public-robbers attempt to persuade us, that this pensioned daughter of the earl of Uxbridge, or that the two HUNNS, or Mrs. EMILY HUSKISSON, or Mrs. What's her name WARD, or any of the endless list of those who are fastened upon us without any reason assigned; will the public-robbers, either in town or country, have the impudence to reckon these amongst the *forces*, which Mr. Wardle wishes to disband, and which are *necessary to defend the country against invasion*? Will they tell us, that the enormous sinecures of Lords Arden, Buckinghamshire, Camden, Bathurst, Liverpool, Marquis of Buckingham, Marquis Wellesley, and those of the Seymours and Wellesleys and De Blaquieres, &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. to the filling of a book larger than the New Testament; will

the robbers tell us, that these are part of our forces, and that to *disband* them will expose us to the danger of invasion? Will the robbers have the impudence to tell us this? I rather think they will.—There was one head, which Mr. Wardle did not touch upon, and which calls for the attention of the public, without delay; namely, that of the *Crown Lands*, that is to say, lands, houses, manors, and royalties belonging to the public. These lands, &c. formerly supported the king and royal family. They formed the hereditary estate of the kings of England and Scotland; and, upon that estate they lived, never coming to the people for any money, except for extraordinary national purposes, such as war, or any great undertaking. Latterly the thing has been changed. The parliament gave the king and his family money out of the taxes, and took the income of the hereditary estate for the use of the public. The estate still goes under the name of *Crown Lands*; but, the fact is, that it is a real estate belonging to the public, and of which the parliament may dispose as it pleases.—Now, then, let us see what this estate yields us annually. Let us see what it brings into the Exchequer, that is to say, into the pocket of the public. It used formerly to maintain, in great part, at least, the royal family and all the household and officers of the king. In lieu of it the public allows the king an immense sum of money annually, and to the different branches of his family the sum is not much less. Well, what does this famous estate yield us? What do we get annually out of all these buildings, streets, farms, manors, forests, and royalties, the very list of which occupies many pages in folio? What do they all yield us? Why, 966*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* No more. The same sum every year. Let us see the items of the account for one year; the year ending on the 5th of January, 1805. The fifth of January, you will perceive; for the accounts of our stewards are like those of no other mortal.

CROWN LANDS.

Balance in hand last year..... £21,543 13 9½
(See, they reckon with us to a farthing.)

Gross receipt within the year.....35,168 9 1

Total.....56,712 2 10½

Deduct.

Charges of management 2,345 5 9½
Pensions and stipends paid out of the land revenue10,008 18 4½
Expenses incurred in securing and im-

proving his Majesty's Woods and Forests!!!12,517 10 5

Balance remaining in the hands of the Receiver

30,873 14 11½
55,745 9 6½

Paid into the Exchequer, or, Pocket of the public

—966 13 4

There it is; and, the sum paid into the pocket of the public is precisely the same for the three years succeeding, that is to say, from January 1805 to January 1808, notwithstanding many new leases have been let since that time, and notwithstanding the immense quantity of timber and bark that has been sold, and the high prices at which they have been sold, or at least might have been sold. What! is the gross receipt from this estate but 35,000 and some odd pounds a year? I should suppose that it might be made to bring a hundred times the sum. Let the property be sold; it would, including the timber, fetch twenty millions of money at the hammer; and if sold year after year, in a judicious manner, I should not be surprised if it brought three times that sum. But, only think of its yielding clear to the public the pitiful sum of 966*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* a year! Why give us that sum? Why not carry that along in the balance? Twelve thousand pounds in one year for "securing and improving the woods and forests!" What! And no credit given us for timber and bark cut and sold? Or, is that included in the 966*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.*? Oh! these are brave stewards that we have! You see, though the estate is so large, they bring their accounts to balance to a farthing. We, who live in Hampshire, see a little about the management of "woods and forests." There is, for instance, a pretty smash of timber this year, in the Holt Forest. Will that bring us, poor fellows, only 966*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.*? Is the amount of timber and bark not included in these accounts? Where, then, is it to be found? If it does not come under the head of *Crown Lands*, it comes no where. Some timber may be sent to the Dock Yards; but, the bark, I presume, is not; and that is worth nearly as much as the timber. Besides, we see, every year, advertisements for the sale of timber as well as bark in the public forests. —Upon the whole this is a very pretty concern. It is, I think, a fact worth bearing in mind, that an estate, in lieu of which the public gives hundreds of thousands a year, yields to that public exactly

966*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* a year. Tell me not of the *balance* in hand. What is the balance to us, if it be never paid to us? We see it has been kept in hand for four succeeding years; and, why should we suppose, that it is ever intended to be paid us? Upon referring back, I find, that, from the year 1803 (which is as far as I have the accounts now at hand) the sum paid into the Exchequer has been this precise 966*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* and that a balance has always been carried on in the hands of the Receiver, as above-stated. Is not this pretty work? And why, except to puzzle and confuse, fix upon this odd sum of 966*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.*? Why not give us a thousand a year, for the estate? Was there ever any thing so absurd as this altogether? What should we think of any individual, who was to suffer his affairs to be so managed? Should we not, without a dissenting voice, pronounce his approaching ruin? Why mock us with this payment of 966*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.*? Why not keep the whole under the name of *balance*? Good God! the "CROWN LANDS" to yield no more than 966*l.* 13*s.* 4*d.* a year!—This, however, is but a *specimen*, I am clearly convinced, of what will come forth, if Mr. Wardle pushes on his inquiry; if he does not, as indeed I have no fear that he will, suffer himself to be *wearied* and *disgusted* by the base attacks, which the public robbers are making upon him, through the means of their daily and other publications.—This is, however, what he has to expect. No man ever, in such a state of things, did any public service without experiencing the bitterness of their enmity; and, therefore, that man is a fool who undertakes any thing for the public without making up his mind to the meeting with every thing that assassin-like malice, joined to the most barefaced falsehood, can invent and execute.—The very existence of those who live by deceiving and robbing the people, depend upon the destruction of the reputation, at least, of such a man as Mr. Wardle, and especially since he has pledged himself to prosecute the great inquiry above-mentioned. If he *persevere* in that, he will succeed; and if he succeed, all public robbery is at an end. No wonder, therefore, that they assail him; no wonder that they abuse him; no wonder that they set all their engines to work in order to blast his reputation; no wonder that a corrupt press is constantly engaged in the work of defaming him.—As to the TRIAL, which has taken place, during

the last week, that, indeed, is another matter; because there we have *evidence* legally given. From the proceedings, as published in the STATESMAN, where I find the trial the most fully reported, it appears, that one WRIGHT, an Upholsterer, brought an action against Mr. Wardle for the amount of goods furnished Mrs. Clarke by Mr. Wardle's order. The giving of this order Mr. Wardle denies, and, of course, defends the action. Mrs. Clarke, and Wright (*a brother* of the plaintiff), are the witnesses to the order being given; and the jury, with some exceptions as to the charges, find a *verdict for the plaintiff*.

—Upon the supposition, that the evidence given be the *truth*, then Mr. Wardle stands convicted of having made a promise to Mrs. Clarke, or, rather, to Wright, which he did not fulfil. In short, of having broken his word. That he was right in giving her either goods or money, in order to get her to divulge the secrets she possessed, there can be no doubt. The government openly invite us, by pecuniary rewards, to give evidence against one another, and even to betray one another; as in the cases of the receipt-duty and the card-duty. The question, therefore, is simply a question of *breach of promise*, and of this Mr. Wardle has most positively asserted, that he will *prove* himself not to have been guilty.—There were, it appears, two or more witnesses, which he wished to have called, and whom his lawyers did not call, notwithstanding his pressing request to have them called.—Mr. Wardle will, doubtless, not delay to publish, in some way or other, a detailed statement of all that has taken place, relative to this transaction. Until that is done we should be commenting in the dark; but, the public will not fail to have perceived, that the *Attorney General* was selected by Wright to conduct the cause against Mr. Wardle; nor will they fail to call to mind, the description which that gentleman gave of her, as a witness, when she was examined before the House of Commons. He now seems to have thought her a *very good witness*!—For my part, I shall not pretend to say more upon the matter, than to express my *decided* conviction, that Mr. Wardle will be able to prove, that what he has asserted is true. If what I have been told be correct, some most curious facts immediately connected with this case, will now be communicated to the public. If our enemies erred at first, they, at last, appear to have seen their error, and to have

done their best to retrieve it. When they agreed to purchase the suppression of Mrs. Clarke's book at the price of eight or ten thousand pounds in cash down to herself, besides an annuity of four hundred pounds a year for life, with reversion for the lives of her two daughters, and to provide for her brother; when they came to the point to make such a purchase and she to make such a sale, it was plain, that there were few things at which either party would stick. It was the signal, too, of reconciliation between her and her old associates; and, such reconciliations are usually attended with some act of vengeance upon those who have been the cause of the rupture. It is said, that Mrs. Clarke has demanded large sums of money from Mr. Wardle, on her own account. This I can scarcely believe; for, of all vices, one would not suspect such a woman of the vice of greediness of gold; and pure greediness, or the instigation of others, it must be to prompt her to attempts at such extortion, after she had got so large a sum from the corruptors. There can be no doubt, I think, of her having been instigated by others to make these demands upon Mr. Wardle. I cannot believe it possible, that she would have done it of her own head; but, be that as it may, Mr. Wardle must now have no reserve with the public. He must publish all that he possesses proof of, especially about the money that she promised for her book, and about the contents of that book. This is the thing in which the nation is interested more deeply than in any thing else, and this is what Mr. Wardle should, if possible, recover from the flames. —A correspondent observes to me, that it is "*pity* Mr. Wardle did not pay the money." It would be a great pity if he had, unless, indeed, he promised to pay it. If he did not, it would have been a most cowardly act to pay it. Besides, it would have been folly in the extreme; for, in the case supposed, he might be sure, that demands would never cease, while he had a shilling left. —I am not much surprized at any part of the transaction; nor shall I be surprized, unless the demands upon Mr. Wardle, and the machinations against him, should now cease. Let the public bear in mind what weighty reasons there exist, in the breasts of thousands, for hating this gentleman; for bearing towards him a deadly hatred; and let us not forget the *cunning*, the *experience*, the *industry*, the *monk-like malignity*, and the *extensive means*, of the wretches, who bear him this hatred. There is, probably, nothing that can be named, that

they would not do, in order to destroy him. Assassination they have not the courage to commit; but, if they could catch him asleep and pour boiling lead into his ear, so that their own carcasses were safe from the consequence, my sincere opinion is, that there is scarcely a man of them who would scruple to do it. And, as to the instigating of others, they would consider the crime of the instigated as an act of godliness, and would with ready finger, turn to the memorable instance of RAHAB the harlot. —My last words upon this subject are: give us, Mr. Wardle, the contents of the intended book of Mrs. Clarke. This is the way to pay off your and our enemies. You must, I should hope, have seen some of those contents. If possible give us those contents; and, if you could get us, at the same time, a copy of another work, of *somewhat the same sort*, printed privately about two years and a half ago, it would add to the value of the collection. People may say what they will, but these are the things, and the *only* things, which this nation wants at this time. These books would be of much more real service to England than all the horse and foot in the country, not excepting the German Legion. I beg, Sir, to press this upon your mind. It is impossible, that all the copies can be destroyed. Let us but have these books, and whole years of labour will be saved. The people will then see things as they are, and as they ought to be known to be.

N. B. Some papers, sent me by M. are excellent; but I shall not, for *some time*, be able to use them to advantage. M. is perfectly right in all he says. Yes; that is the *true doctrine*. Every thing short of it is base and stupid compromise, alike inimical to the king and the people. The thoughts had struck me before; but I do not know, that I could so well have expressed them. The proposition respecting "*THE WORTHIES*" is self-evident. I long for the day, when it shall be stated in the proper place, and in good earnest. —If M. has any further reflections to send me, upon that interesting subject, I shall be very happy to receive them.

Botley, 5 July, 1809.

THE CLERGY.

SIR;—At a time when all honest and independent Englishmen are standing forward, to declare their abhorrence of those corruptions which have recently be-

proved to exist in so many departments of the state; and when we are, from all parts of the kingdom, sending up testimonials of praise and gratitude to those sincere friends of their country, who had the courage to expose before Parliament the most shameless abuse of power in the people who have been entrusted with the resources of the nation; it may be of service to the cause of truth and honesty, if you, Mr. Cobbett, through the medium of your Register, which is so universally read and admired, do give a friendly caution to those men whom gratitude for past favours, or hopes of good things to come, induce, contrary to the plainest common sense, and in opposition to the principles they profess, to become the abettors of iniquity, and the champions of every thing immoral, indecent, and corrupt.—I wish you, sir, particularly to caution such of the time-serving ministers of our holy religion, as take an active part in politics, not to suffer their zeal in so unworthy a cause, to expose them to contempt and ridicule.—It is a disgraceful fact, that there are not wanting abundance of these ministers who descend to busy themselves at meetings and elections, in a manner totally arbitrary and unconstitutional; looking, no doubt, to preferment and reward at the hand of their worthy benefactors.—But these gentlemen must recollect, it is not for such labours that the people of England consent to give them so large a portion of the fruits of their labour; and if they hope to continue to enjoy an easy independence, with the respect of the people, they will endeavour to present us, in their own lives, an example of piety, disinterestedness, and moral excellence; and leave the work of party and faction to those in whom ambition, and the vanities of the world, may with less show of inconsistency be allowed to prevail.—I am, Sir—Your great admirer and humble Servant,

JOHN BULL.

P. S.—I avoid the mention of names, or of place, as I think the good proposed may be effected without wounding the feelings of any individual particularly, not being actuated by a spirit of party or malice, but only anxious to see reformation complete and effectual.

MILITARY SINECURES.

MR. COBBETT;—You will much oblige a constant reader by inserting the following facts, and thereby exhibiting to the

public a specimen of some of the "Errors," which in modern times are "Excepted" in giving evidence on Military Promotion, I was going to say, Sinecure Appointments, which, by the bye, I think the most proper term in such cases.—On looking over a New Army List for last month, published by Mr. Egerton, and dated at the top, "War-office"—then, under this date "By Authority," I am, of course, to consider the contents as authentic, coming from that great Depôt of Military Information, sanctioned and so authorized by this official organ of power—I found (under the head of garrisons,) the name of Richard Leonard as a half-pay lieutenant, (I believe drawing the half-pay from the 54th regt.) annexed to the situation of a Fort-major at the city of St. John, New Brunswick; with a stated salary of 86*l.* 8*s.* 9*d.* per ann. exclusive (of course) of lodging money, coals, candles, and all the other et ceteras the public pay to servants of this description. In the same page (what a bare-faced thing!) I observed the same Richard Leonard (lieut. on half-pay) holds the appointment of Fort-major at Fredericton also, one hundred miles distant from Fort Home at the city of St. John, and which last place should be his residence on the former appointment as Fort-major.—But what surprised me not a little was, to observe another stated salary annexed to the second appointment of 91*l.* 5*s.* per annum, and of course the usual supply of candles, coals, lodgings, &c. &c. drawn on these occasions and paid by the public.—But will you think it possible, Mr. Cobbett, you, who have been in all those places as well as myself, and who have observed the peculations at Fredericton barracks, which you detected there on a certain occasion, will you believe it, that the same Richard Leonard (a lieut. on half-pay of the 54th regt.) is now actually on whole pay, and receiving it too, as a captain in the present New Brunswick regt. the pay being ten shillings per diem, or 184*l.* 10*s.* per ann. with *bau* forage, or *bat* forage, or some of these hard named things, and contingent allowance, for paying his company, 36*l.* per annum, with lodging and fuel, &c. &c.

Now, Mr. Cobbett, it will almost appear incredible, that the same Richard Leonard is also the Town-major (what a number of these majors there are) at Fredericton, for which he receives, I have heard, 15*s.* per diem, or 276*l.* 15*s.* per annum, with an allowance for horse forage or bait forage (I never can remember these serviceables' names) of 2*s.* 3*d.* per day—

20l. per annum also for an office!!! with coals, candles, &c. &c. &c.—and no doubt a good round sum allowed him for postage and stationary, by the burthened people of England.—Here are the “Errors,” Mr. Cobbett, and it would be well if these were an “Exception;” but bless you, I fear they are numerous, for instance, there is a Mr. Harris Wm. Hailes in the same province, who is (so over-grown with good things, and so fat, as not to be able scarcely to walk) a Brevet-major, and a Brigadier-major also, an Adjutant-general to the militia, and a Captain in the New Brunswick regiment besides:—what this cheap bargain to the public receives, in toto, I know not; but if we may judge of things by appearances, he seems to have fattened in the service.—I had nearly forgotten to say, that this well-grown gentleman is a half-pay officer also, and I think it a pity he was not kept on his half-pay, for it would be a great sin, in my opinion, to march him with his company round the parade ground at his barracks. Indeed, I fear much whether it would not endanger his valuable life, to fatigue him in the slightest degree whatever, and the more particularly, as this servant of the crown was never a mile distant from Fredericton, on military duty, in the course of his services.—Now, Mr. Cobbett, let us return to Fort-major, and Fort-major-Town-major, Captain, and Half-pay Lieut. Leonard, and consider whether all these situations are necessary or not; if they are not, why burthen the public with so many useless salaries; and if they are, why not render each appointment effective, by taking from the half-pay list officers of known merit, and placing them in the different situations. This would relieve the half-pay list, and permit the said capt. Rich. Leonard to be and appear at the head of his company at his regiment, where the rules of the service require he should be, and deduct one from the many unexceptionable errors so prevalent in the British army at the present day.—This rule would be equally beneficial in the case of Harris Wm. Hailes, and relieve a veteran of his description from too much toil, while the public purse would be saved in the general aggregate. Should you honour this with insertion in your valuable and patriotic “Register,” you shall hear frequently on similar subjects, from an

OLD, HALF-STARVED,

RAGGED SUBALTERN

OF THIRTEEN YEARS STANDING.

June 21, 1809.

PROCEEDINGS

In COUNTIES, CITIES, BOROUGHs, &c. relative to the recent INQUIRY in the House of Commons, respecting the Conduct of the DUKE of YORK. (Continued from vol. xv. p. 1012.)

COUNTY OF ESSEX.

At a Meeting of the Freeholders and Inhabitants, convened this day, July 1, 1809, at the Shire-Hall, at Chelmsford, by public advertisement.—SIR HENRY ST. JOHN MILDMAY, bart. in the Chair, It was Resolved unanimously,

1. That the right of the people to meet and discuss public measures, to consider the conduct of their representatives, and to prefer any Address, Petition or Remonstrance, to the King or either House of Parliament, should be asserted and maintained by every friend to the liberties of England.

2. That the refusal of the Sheriff to convene a Meeting of the County, in consequence of the interference of individuals, ought not to prevent the exercise of this right.

3. That the extraordinary application made to the Sheriff, by persons who intruded on him their advice to withhold his assent to the Requisition for assembling the County, is an unwarrantable attempt to prevent the people of Essex from expressing their opinion on subjects most important to their best interests.

4. That the Thanks of this Meeting be given to G. L. Wardle, esq. for his having instituted the late Inquiry, in the House of Commons, relative to the Conduct of the Commander in Chief, and for the firmness which he displayed in discharge of his duty, in defiance of the threats of ministers and the artifices of the Crown-Lawyers.

5. That the Thanks of this Meeting be given to sir Francis Burdett, bart. who seconded Mr. Wardle's motion for the Inquiry; and to lord visc. Folkestone and Samuel Whitbread, esq. for the able and zealous assistance which they afforded him during this investigation.

6. That the Thanks of this Meeting be given to the one hundred and twenty-five Members who supported Mr. Wardle's motion for an Address to his Majesty.

7. That the Thanks of this Meeting be given to the Minority of the House of Commons who voted against the motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to negative the Charges preferred against the Commander in-Chief.

8. That this Meeting has witnessed with the deepest regret various decisions in the House of Commons upon corrupt practices, which have been exposed, or in proof of which evidence has been offered to be adduced at the bar, but refused to be heard; and do declare their decided conviction, if measures are not adopted in the next session effectually to prevent their recurrence, the honour and character of Parliament will be extinct, and the safety of the country endangered.

9. That this Meeting, whilst they are willing to make any sacrifice in defence of the safety and independence of the Country, feel that it is highly necessary that a rigid system of economy should be established; and that the Thanks of this Meeting are due to those Members of the House who have exerted themselves to obtain a retrenchment of the public expenditure, and such a diminution of the burthens of the people as are compatible with the means of national security.

10. That C. C. Western, esq. one of the members in Parliament for the Borough of Maldon (and the only member returned from the County of Essex who supported col. Wardle, or has declared in the House of Commons his conviction of the necessity of a speedy and effectual Reform,) by the uniform, upright and independent conduct which he has invariably observed upon public questions, has highly merited the Thanks and approbation of this Meeting.

11. That the Thanks of this Meeting be given to lord Cochrane, the hon. T. Brand, sir F. Burdett, bart. S. Whitbread, W. A. Madocks, G. L. Wardle, T. Creevey, C. C. Western, and Wm. Smith, esqrs. and to every other member of either House of Parliament, who has, in the course of the last session, declared himself friendly to a Reform in the representation of the people.

12. That the Thanks of the Meeting be given to sir Henry St. John Mildmay, bart. for his readiness in taking the Chair, and for his impartial and judicious conduct this day.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRENCH ARMY IN AUSTRIA.—*Nineteenth Bulletin, dated Vienna, June 16.*

The anniversary of the Battle of Marngo has been celebrated by the victory of the Raab, which the right wing of the army, under the command of the Prince Viceroy, has obtained over the united corps of the Archduke John, and the

Archduke Palatine.—Since the battle of the Piave the Viceroy has pursued the Archduke John at the point of the bayonet.—The Austrian army hoped to canton itself on the banks of the Raab, between St. Gothard and Kormond. On the 5th June, the Viceroy advanced from Neustadt, and established his head-quarters at Edenburgh, in Hungary. On the 7th he followed up his movements, and arrived at Guns. Gen. Lauriston, with his corps of observation, formed a junction with his left wing. On the 8th, gen. Montbrun, with his division of cavalry, effected the passage of the Raabnitz, near Sovenyhaga, routed 300 cavalry of the Hungarian insurrection, and drove them towards Raab. On the 9th, the Viceroy proceeded towards Sarvar. The cavalry of gen. Grouchy fell in with the enemy's rear-guard at Vasvar, and made some prisoners. On the 10th, gen. Macdonald arrived from Gratz at Kormond. On the 11th, gen. Grenier came up at Karako with a column of the enemy's flank corps which defended the bridge. He, however, passed the river in force. Gen. Debroc made a brilliant charge with the 9th hussars upon a battalion of 400 men, 300 of whom were made prisoners. On the 12th the army passed the bridge of Merse near Papa. The Viceroy, from a height, observed the whole hostile army in battle-array. Gen. Montbrun debouched in the plain, and charged the enemy's cavalry, which he completely overthrew, after having made many skilful manœuvres. The enemy had already begun to retreat; the Viceroy passed the night at Papa. On the 13th, at five A.M. the army marched towards Raab. Our cavalry and the Austrians shewed themselves near the village of Szanach. The enemy were defeated, and we took 400 prisoners. The Archduke John having united with the Archduke Palatine, took a fine position upon some heights, the right wing rested upon Raab, a fortified town, and the left covering the road of Comorn, another strong place in Hungary.—On the 14th, at 11 P. M. the Viceroy drew up his army in order of battle, and with 35,000 men attacked 50,000 of the enemy. But the zeal of our troops was animated by the recollection of the memorable victory which had sanctified this day. All the soldiers shouted with joy when they saw the enemy, who were placed in three lines, consisting of from 20 to 25,000 men of the remains of the fine army of Italy which had already

self masters of Italy; of 10,000 men. Haddick; of 5 or 6,000 remains of Jellachich's corps, troops of the Tyrol which had army through the passes of of 10 or 12,000 of the Hungarian. The Viceroy placed Murat's cavalry, the brigade of Albert, and the cavalry of gen. Suchy, on his right wing; the corps of Grenier formed two platoons, whereof Serres's division was the right one. In the advanced guard an Italian division, commanded by gen. Baraguay d'Hilliers, formed a third platoon. The reserve of gen. Puthod formed the reserve; gen. Lauriston, with his corps of observation, supported by gen. Sahuc, formed the extremity of the left wing, and watched Raab.—At two in the afternoon the cannonade began. At three our second and third platoons were engaged. The fire from the musketry was severe. The first line of the enemy was overthrown; but the second withstood for a moment the shock of our first division, which being speedily reinforced, also overthrew the line of the enemy. The enemy's reserve then appeared. On his side the Viceroy, who followed all his movements, advanced with his reserve. The fine position of the Austrians was taken, and at four the victory was decisive. The enemy, who were in complete disorder, could not easily unite, so that in no way was the movement of our cavalry obstructed. Three thousand prisoners, six pieces of cannon, and four standards, are the memorials of this achievement. The enemy left 3,000 dead on the field of battle, among whom is a major-general. Our loss amounts to about 900 killed and wounded. Among the first is col. Thierry; and among the latter, brigadier-gen. Valentine and col. Expert.—The field of battle had long been pitched upon by the enemy, who had determined to make a stand in that fine position. On the 15th he was closely pursued on the road of Comorn and Pest. The inhabitants of the country remain tranquil, and take no part in the war. The Emperor's Proclamation has set men's minds reflecting. It is known that the Hungarian nation always desired its independence.—The part of the Insurrection which is now with the army was raised by the last Diet; it is in arms and does duty.

Twentieth Bulletin, dated Vienna, June 20.

When the news of the victory of Raab

arrived at Buda, the Empress immediately left it.—The enemy's army was pursued during the 15th and 16th. It passed the Danube over the bridge of Comorn.—The town of Raab has been invested; we hope to be masters of it in a few days. We have taken the entrenched camp of Raab, which will contain 100,000 men.—The enemy inundate the country with false reports; this is part of the system adopted for stirring up the lower classes.—M. De Metternich left Vienna on the 18th. He will be exchanged for M. Dodun and the officers of the French Legation.—Prince Gallitzen entered Galicia on the 3rd, in three columns.

Imperial Decree, dated Vienna, 17th May, 1809, proclaimed in all the public squares and market-places of the city.

Napoleon, emperor of the French, &c. taking into consideration that when Charlemagne, emperor of the French, and our sublime predecessor, endowed the bishops of Rome with various lands, they were given as fiefs to maintain the peace of his subjects, and that Rome did not therefore cease to form a part of his empire: Considering further, that since that time the union of spiritual and temporal power has been, and still is, the source of dissension; that the popes have but too frequently availed themselves of the one, to support their pretensions to the other; and that with spiritual concerns, which are in their nature immutable, have been confounded worldly affairs, which change with the circumstances and politics of the times:—Considering finally, that it is in vain to attempt to reconcile with the temporal pretensions of the Pope, all that we have concerted for the security of our army, the repose and prosperity of the nations over which we reign, and the dignity and inviolability of our empire,

We have decreed, and do decree as follow:—

Art. 1. The Papal Territory is united with the French Empire.—2. The city of Rome, illustrious for the recollection it recalls, and for the monuments which it contains, is declared to be a FREE AND IMPERIAL CITY. Its government and administration shall be fixed by a particular decree.—3. The monuments of Roman greatness shall be maintained and preserved, at the expence of our treasury.—4. The public debt is declared to be the debt of the Empire.—5. The revenue of

the Pope shall be fixed at two millions of francs, free from all charges and contributions.—6. The property and palaces of his Holiness shall be subject to no imposition, jurisdiction, or visitation, and shall besides enjoy especial prerogatives.—7. An extraordinary Consulta shall, on the 1st of June, take possession in our name of the Papal dominions, and adopt measures that on the 1st of January, 1810, the Constitutional Government take effect.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

Another Decree of the same date establishes an Extraordinary Consulta, consisting of the following members: Miollis, governor-general, President; Salcette, minister of the King of Naples; Degerando, Jannet, Del Pozzo, and Debalde, Secretaries. This Consulta is ordered to take possession of the Papal territory, so that the transition from the old to the new order of things may be unperceived.—Then follows a Proclamation of the Consulta after its installation to the Romans, congratulating them upon the change in their situation.

FRENCH ARMY IN PORTUGAL.—*Bulletin, dated Paris, June 22.*

Alex. Girardin, colonel of the 8th regt. of dragoons, and M. Brun, aid-de-camp to the duke of Dalmatia, have passed through this city on their way to the head-quarters of his Imperial Majesty in Austria, with dispatches from their excellencies the dukes of Dalmatia and Elchingen, copies of which have been delivered to the war minister. We now shall anticipate the details which will be given out of the dispatches forwarded to the Emperor, by stating all the particulars respecting the second corps of the army of Spain since the month of January. They have been so misrepresented, as well in France as in Spain, by relations taken from English papers, and by erroneous rumours, to which the interruption in the communication between the various corps of the army had given birth, that it becomes necessary to relate them in the order which their date naturally points out.—After the embarkation of the English at Corunna, Jan. 17th, his excellency the marshal duke of Dalmatia marched towards Portugal through Santiago and Vigo. The difficulties which he experienced in endeavouring to cross the Minho so near its junction with the sea, compelled him to ascend its banks as far as Orense, where he arrived

the 5th of March, and from thence began his operations.—The 6th of March he crossed the bridge over the Minho, at Orense, and on his way to Chaves met with Romana's army, which he defeated at Iuzo, Allaritz, and Osogne, near Monterey, destroying the rear-guard, consisting of 3,000 men, and taking 2,000 prisoners and some standards. The enemy then retreated in the greatest disorder to the vale of Oez.—The 13th of March, the duke of Dalmatia appeared before Chaves, on the frontier of Portugal, and invested this place, which capitulated three days after. Its garrison, composed of several thousand peasants and some militia, were sent back to their habitations.—The 16th March, his excellency marched against Braga, where the army of the Portuguese insurgents had taken a position. The badness of the roads delayed the arrival of the artillery until the 19th, when the enemy were attacked. Their force was estimated at 20,000 men, which were entirely overthrown. They lost 6,000 and all their artillery, and retreated upon Oporto.—The 24th, the second corps arrived before Oporto, where all the Portuguese northern armies were collected in an intrenched camp flanked with redoubts, and defended by a numerous artillery.—Two days were spent in skirmishes, and the French troops found in the redoubts, of which they took possession, a shelter from the cannon of the enemy.—The 29th, the duke of Dalmatia fought a battle as glorious as memorable, in which the French displayed their usual enthusiastic valour. Upwards of 10,000 Portuguese were killed or taken, and the enemy lost not only the artillery planted on their intrenchments, but their field pieces. This day put the second corps of the army in possession of more than 200 pieces of cannon.—From the 30th of March to May 10, the 2nd corps was employed in establishing in that part of a country not wholly conquered, his communication with the 6th corps that remained in Galicia; large detachments were sent to Guimaraens and Valencia, in order to bring the magazines which had been left at Tuy, and to scour the country. General Loison, whose death the English had falsely published, was detached with the same intent against Amarante, Villa Real, and the adjacent country, with 2,500 infantry and 600 horse. The 10th of May, the vanguard of the duke's army was on the Vouga. It was attacked by several thousands of foot, 1,500 horse, and 6 pieces of cannon, which

formed a part of gen. Wellesley's army, lately landed in Portugal. The vanguard retreated behind Feyra, and on the 11th re-crossed the Douro, with the division of gen. Mermet. The increase of the British force in Portugal, and that of the Portuguese insurgents, through the influence of British gold, had as early as the 10th, determined the duke of Dalmatia to effect his retreat through Amarante, Villa Real, and Braganza, ascending the right bank of the Douro. But a numerous corps of English and Portuguese having compelled gen. Loison to evacuate Amarante, the duke found it necessary to pass through the defiles of Salamonde, and in order to gain two marches on the enemy, to sacrifice a few pieces of cannon and their caissons, which he ordered to be destroyed, and the remains of which could prove of no use to the English.—The latter not having been able to gain any advantage on the second corps during the retreat, the only action which took place was with our rear-guard at Oporto, the English having found means to convey on the right bank of the Minho about 1,000 infantry and 50 horse, they have swelled this trifling engagement into a battle; the pompous relation of which (in no point of view a military one) has had no other end than to deceive the people of London, and perhaps the ministers themselves, in order to repay them for the immense sums of money which this expedition must have cost the British Treasury.—On the 19th of May, the duke of Dalmatia was at Allaritz: the 20th he crossed the Minho at Orense; and the 23d forned a communication with the duke of Elchingen himself and the corps under his command.—The arrival of the duke of Dalmatia's army into Galicia has been useful under every point of view. It has dispersed the bands of armed peasants, who profiting by the movements of the duke of Elchingen against Oviedo, had endeavoured to take possession of Santiago and Lugo, assisted by the few English troops who still occupy Vigo.—Such was the state of things in Galicia and on the banks of the Minho, during the first days of June, and the English seemed little inclined to try their courage with the 2d and 7th corps, after their junction.

PORTUGAL.—*Official Communication from Marshal Beresford to the President of the Regency. From the Lisbon Gazette of April 25, 1809.*

Head Quarters, Tomas, 21st April.

HAVING been informed that general Soult makes it his business to spread false accounts of the near arrival of considerable reinforcements, and Buonaparté himself at the head of 80,000 men, and that he has succeeded in deluding by similar falsehoods part of the Portuguese forces. I have thought it right to order the enclosed Proclamation to be printed in Coimbra, and to publish the intercepted Letter which general Kellerman wrote to him, and which fell into my hands, in hopes that it will tend to counteract the intrigues of the enemy, for which purpose the above Proclamation has been distributed in Oporto, and all other places where its circulation appeared necessary. God preserve your Excellency many years.—W. C. BERESFORD.—Marshal and Commander in Chief.

PROCLAMATION.—Whereas Marshal Soult (who styles himself Governor of Portugal) although he is perfectly aware of the critical situation in which he has placed himself, but which he endeavours to conceal from the unfortunate troops whom he sacrifices to the boundless ambition of a tyrant, circulates false reports and intelligence of the near arrival of Buonaparté, at the head of a French army of 80,000 men, in order to deceive the public with regard to the dangers by which he is threatened. Marshal Beresford, in order to undeceive the people of the North of Portugal, and the French army, and convince them of the falsehood of the above reports, thinks it right to publish the following intercepted letter, written to Marshal Soult by general Kellerman, who says that he commands the French force in Upper Spain. When it is ascertained that a General publishes falsehoods in one case, his army and the public at large will know how to appreciate his accounts on other occasions. Marshal Soult is perfectly aware of the danger of his situation, but endeavours to conceal them from his troops; and the couriers of whose arrival he boasts, did probably arrive from some part of the position of his corps, two or three leagues distant. They could not at least come either from France or Spain, his communication with these countries being entirely intercepted.

Letter from General Kellerman, dated Valladolid, March 31, 1809.

SIR; His Imperial Majesty having ordered the duke of Istria to join him, has

entrusted me with the command of the French forces in Upper Spain. I received the letters which you wrote him from Berin. I sent copies thereof to his Imperial Majesty, and the prince of Neufchatel, and transmitted the letter which was addressed to the duke, to his highness. Marshal Bessieres set out for Germany on the 16th instant, and the Imperial Guard, with every person belonging to the Imperial household. On the 20th war against Austria was declared; but it is not yet known whether the Emperor will proceed to the Inner Tagliamento. My position in Spain is rather critical; but I occupy the plain country with a considerable body of horse, although I am destitute of infantry. I am watching the movements of the army of Asturias, and of the troops of Romana, who obstruct our communication with the provinces they occupy. I am not able to do what I could wish, but send strong reconnoitering parties to Braganza and Miranda, and do all I can to keep the people between this place and Madrid in order, whom I know to be disaffected. Your brother has arrived here, but I do not see how he will be able to rejoin as he wishes. The war in Germany, produced by the intrigues and gold of England, cannot but be attended with the most dreadful consequences for us, and must for the present render our situation extremely critical. You cannot expect any reinforcements, unless the duke of Elchingen should be able to send you some, of which I cannot judge, as I have not the least communication with him; and all Galicia is in a state of insurrection. I send you this letter by a person in whom I place much confidence, and who is worthy of yours, &c. (Signed)—KELLERMAN.—P. S. Turkey has made peace with England; there are insurrections in every part of Germany.

SOLDIERS, who compose the French army, such are the reports which your Commander spreads among you, and such is the true intelligence which the French Generals endeavour to conceal from the people, who are so unfortunate as to be subjected to their power.—Head-Quarters, Tomas, the 20th April, 1809,—(Signed)—W. C. BERSFORD, Marshal and Commander in Chief.

From the Lisbon Gazette Extraordinary, June 1.—Letter from D. Manuel De Uria Y Llano, to his Excellency Senor Francisco De Silveira.

Most Excellent Sir,—I have received a dispatch from gen. de Valdeorras D. Jose Ranaon de Quiroga e Vria, dated in Cosoyo, the 23d current, which is as follows:—

“I just receive from the Secretary of the Junta of Monforte a letter of the 21st instant, of which the annexed is a Copy:—
“Iraao, governor of Quiroga, informs me, that the French have been engaged with our army during three successive days. The principal action was at Ponte-vicevo, between Meira and Lugo, in which the enemy lost 3,000 men in killed and prisoners, and 2,000 Germans who abandoned his standard. The firing ceased on the 20th, at ten in the morning, when a capitulation was proposed. I could not prevail upon myself to delay communicating to you rexcellency intelligence so agreeable. You will have the goodness to inform their excellencies the English and Portuguese generals of these events.”—To which I have to add the following:—

The army of the marquis de la Romana attacked the French on the side of Meira, and pursued them to Paraday. From thence the enemy retreated to Clemente, where he was surrounded, and a terrible fire of artillery and musquetry was opened upon him. Not until many were killed, he fled towards Lugo, leaving in our hands three pieces of cannon among the other spoils of our victory. Our troops followed up to the gates of the city, in the full expectation that the place would be taken either by capitulation or force. By good fortune the Apostle Mazarredo who so often has sworn on the Evangelists, fealty to his king in Astorga, happened to be in Lugo in company with Lot. Ney has escaped, and we are assured that he entered Asturias with 2,000 men, and for our consolation he will probably there remain.—The English are in sight of Corunna and Ferrol with a great number of vessels, and have determined to disembark at those places —Farreira, 21st of May, 1809.

The same general writes me also as follows:—At seven o'clock this evening, I received an official dispatch of the capture of Lugo, by marshal Don Nicholas Mahi, general second in command of the Army of the Left, in the absence of his excellency marquis de la Romana, commander in chief. This action was glorious, not only from its important effects but on account of the obstinate resistance of the enemy, who, in the sequel, was conquered with the loss of 4,000 men in prisoners, wounded, and killed. I cannot express too

strongly my praises of the determined valour of the Spaniards, from whose exertions I expect the best results, and which have already acquired for us in this affair six pieces of artillery, and a quantity of ammunition.—I hope you will communicate these acceptable articles of information, with the applause due to the brave, to generals Beresford, Silveira, and whomsoever else they may concern, accompanied also by my best acknowledgments.—Seeing Lugo has been taken, and that gen. Carrera, with a division of more than 6,000 men, is in Ponte de Talevada, between the roads of St. Jago and Orense, hopes may be entertained that the armies of Ney and Soult will be destroyed.—God preserve your excellency, &c.—Five A. M. May 25th, 1809. (Signed)

MANUEL DE URUA Y LLANO.

Russia.—*Declaration, dated 25th of April (5th May.)*

THE peace between France and Austria, which has long been wavering, is at length entirely at an end. By the last advices, the Austrian troops have entered the Duchy of Warsaw, and the States of Saxony and Bavaria.—It is thus that the flames of war which had been so lately extinguished upon the Continent have just been rekindled, and, by the force of circumstances, it is necessary that all the powers of Europe should take up arms again.—The preparations for war on the part of Austria were the first cause of this misunderstanding. Russia could not see these with indifference, every means were employed from the beginning to put an end to them: the guarantee of Russia of the integrity of the Austrian States was even offered, and at the same time it was declared, that in virtue of the existing alliance with France, every attack upon the present order of things would be considered as a violation of the rights stipulated by treaties, which ought to be maintained by the force of arms. Austria not rejecting the pacific insinuations made to her, pretended at first that her measures were only defensive; that they were occasioned only by the fear of the danger which threatened her; that her intention was not to undertake an offensive war, and that she would not break the peace.—Facts have proved of how little value these assurances were. The measures of defence which progressively increased have changed into offensive measures. In the room of the fear that was expressed, ambitious plans have

been developed, and the war was broken out by the invasion of foreign states, even before any declaration of war in the accustomed form. Austria, who knew perfectly well the conduct which Russia would hold under the present circumstances, has determined to renounce her friendship, and rekindle the flames of war even upon our frontiers, rather than desist from her projects.—In consequence orders have been given to the Russian ambassador at Vienna to quit that capital immediately, and it has been declared to the Austrian ambassador at this court, that from this moment his diplomatic functions have ceased, and that all relations are broken off, with him and his court.

Proclamation of Prince Gallitzin, who has the Command of the Russian Army which has penetrated Galicia, addressed to the Inhabitants, in the Russian and Polish Languages, dated May 11, 1809.

RUSSIA could not behold, with indifference, the war that has broken out between France and Austria.—Russia did every thing to prevent the commencement of these hostile operations. She declared even to the court of Austria, that, pursuant to articles of treaty between the emperors of Russia and France, and to the close alliance entered into by those two powers, she should be obliged to act in concert with France. Austria listened to none of these remonstrances; but long endeavoured to conceal her warlike preparations under pretence that she was obliged to adopt necessary measures for her security and defence, till she at last, by open hostilities, betrayed her designs, and kindled the flames of war.—Russia has no longer hesitated to take a part in a war in which she is bound to engage by the most solemn treaties. As soon as she learned that hostilities had commenced, she broke off all relations of friendship which had subsisted between her and Austria, and gave orders to her army to advance into Galicia. The Commander in Chief of the army entering that province to oppose the views of Austria, and to resist force by force, has received from his majesty the Emperor express orders solemnly to assure the peaceable inhabitants of Galicia that the views of Russia are not hostile; that amid all military operations, the security and safety of persons and property shall be most strictly respected.—The Commander in Chief shall prove, by his conduct, that the principles recommended by his Sovereign are

also consonant to his own inclinations and feelings.

PRINCE GALLITZIN,
Commander in Chief.

*Ukase to the Senate dated St. Petersburg,
May 7, 1809.*

It is known to the whole world, with what firmness the trade of neutrals has been protected by Russia, when the powers of Europe were at war; it is known with what valour she has guarded the interests of trading nations in the time of peace, against the events of war. Following up this invariable principle, also during the present rupture with Britain, we entertained the fullest hopes that the trade with friendly powers would not be carried on by forbidden means; but as experience during last season has proved to us, that the enemy has found it practicable, by means of neutral vessels, to supply himself with such produce as he stood in need of, and to gain strength by exchanging his own produce, we have at present been compelled to order two vessels to be seized. For these reasons, and to prevent various subterfuges and artifices, we have deemed it necessary to establish some rules, and hereby order,

1. That all masters of neutral vessels, arriving at our ports, are to prove the property being neutral, by the following documents of the ship, viz. a pass, ship's register, muster-roll, log-book, cockpit, manifest of the cargo, the charter-party, bills of lading, certificates of origin, whether the cargo, or part of the same, belonging to the captain, and by the invoices of such vessels as come from America or the Indies, or are bound there. In case, however, the master is not provided with any one of the documents, the ship is to be sent out of our ports, and not to be permitted to discharge.—2. In case of neutral ships being partly loaded with merchandize which can be proved to be of the manufacture or produce of the enemy, the same to be stopped, the goods to be seized and sold by public auction, for the benefit of government; but, if more than half of the cargo consists of such goods, then not only the cargo, but also the ship is to be seized.—3. A pass granted the ship, by a neutral, friendly, or allied power, is not to be considered legal, as soon as it appears that the master has acted contrary to the same; or if the ship is named in the pass differently to what she is in the rest of her documents, unless the alteration

made is proved by documents, attested by legal authority, at the place from which the vessel departed, and produced before the magistracy of said place; in this instance the master is not to be considered guilty.—4. A pass is not to be considered valid, if it should appear that the vessel to which it is granted was not, at the very time it is dated, at one of the ports of the power by which it had been given.—5. If the supercargo or master, or more than one-third of the crew, of a neutral vessel, should be subjects of powers at war with us; or if such a vessel is not provided with a muster-roll of the crew, duly attested by the magistracy of such neutral ports from which the same departed, then both ship and cargo are to be seized, but the crew to be set at liberty.—6. If it should appear that the pass produced by the master has been counterfeited or altered, ship and cargo are to be seized for the benefit of government, and the master to be brought to trial, and to be dealt with as is prescribed by the laws for those who make false documents; the crew to be set at liberty.—7. If it should appear that a vessel is provided with double documents, with different destinations, such a vessel and her cargo to be seized for the benefit of government. In case the master wishes to justify himself, by having lost his documents, and cannot produce any proofs, his vessel to be detained, granting him time for procuring the same proportionate to the distance, if he wishes it; else, if the master cannot wait so long, ship and cargo are immediately to be sent off; but if at the expiration of the period fixed, the master does not produce the needful proofs, ship and cargo are to be seized for the benefit of government.—8. No ship built by the enemy is to be considered neutral, unless amongst other documents, a duly attested document is found, proving the sale or transfer to have taken place, before the declaration of the war; else ship and cargo are to be seized for the benefit of government.—9. If the owner or commander of a neutral vessel happen to be a native of a nation at war with us, and are provided with passes of a neutral power, in such a case the pass is not to serve as a clearance, as long as they cannot prove having become subjects and residents of such a power previous to the declaration of war; else, they are to be sent off, with their ships, not allowing them to take in return cargoes.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 2.]

LONDON, SATURDAY, JULY 15, 1809.

[Price 1s.

33]

[34

TO THE KING.

On the Maritime War against France.

LETTER I.

SIR ;

When every eye in the nation, at the end of sixteen years of a war which has given rise to the Income Tax, which has caused a part of every man's estate to be alienated under the name of Redemption of Land-tax, which has banished guineas from the land and made Bank-notes a legal tender, which has seen the Habeas Corpus or Personal Safety Act for many years suspended, which has drained the kingdom of its youth and its vigour, leaving the next generation to be the offspring of decrepitude, deformity and imbecility, which has thus entailed upon the nation ugliness and weakness and disease, and which, while it has robbed the land of thousands upon thousands of the best of its labourers in order to convert them into defenders of Sicily and other foreign countries, has introduced thousands upon thousands of foreigners to defend this same land ; at such a time, when every eye in the nation is anxiously fixed upon the great, and, in all probability, the last, attempt, about to be made against the enemy, it appears to me, that it may be useful publicly to state certain facts, relating to the mode of carrying on a war of such wearisome length and such desolating consequence ; and that this statement may, from its manner, lose none of its intrinsic importance, I, for the second time in my life, presume to address myself directly to your Majesty, taking care, that in this instance, no keeper of official papers shall, as in a recent one, have it in his power to garble, or to suppress, any part of that which I write.

That your Majesty is not well informed as to the great and interesting matters, upon which I am addressing you, I, without the smallest hesitation, conclude ; first, because the measures of your servants, through whom your information must come, are, in no wise, calculated for the real state of things ; and, secondly, because, supposing those servants to possess both talents and zeal sufficient for all the

purposes of their respective stations, their time has, from the moment they entered those offices, been almost wholly engrossed by endeavours to defend themselves, and to annoy and degrade their own political enemies and your Majesty's late servants. As men may be blinded by too much light, so a people may be kept in error, may be deceived and ruined, by the means of *the press*, which, unperverted, is so well calculated to insure the constant triumph of truth ; and, I have, for my part, no doubt, that, with all our parade of publicity, with all our ostentation of unreserve, there is, in the whole world, no people, who, in proportion to their magnitude, understand so little of their public affairs as is understood by the people of this kingdom. Were not this the case, Sir, it would be impossible, that the enemy should be in his present flourishing state, with respect to his internal and other resources, while England possesses such means of cutting off those resources.

The general opinion, in this country, is, that France is in a miserable state ; that the people are starving ; and, that, as to *commerce*, there is no more of it going on in the dominions of Napoleon, than upon any of the islets in the Thames about Windsor or Hampton Court. This, too, I conclude to be the opinion of your Majesty ; because, as I before observed, your information, as to such matters, must be derived from your servants, and those servants prove, by their express declarations as well as by their conduct, that such is their view of the situation of the empire of France. As to whether the subjects of Napoleon like, or dislike, his government ; or, whether they be better or worse off now than they were under their former sovereigns ; these are questions, which we can discuss to no profit, because we possess no facts whereon to reason ; but, with regard to the *commerce* of France, and that sort of commerce which is the *only valuable one*, I possess, from the *best possible source*, quite a sufficiency of facts to shew, that, upon that subject, at least, this has been the most deceived of nations, and your Majesty the most deceived of sovereigns.

B

The sort of commerce, to which I allude, is what we, in England, call the *coasting trade*; but, in the dominions of Napoleon, or countries under his sway, it is to be considered as something much more important than it is with us. There is no doubt, that the trade between London and the coal-mines is of a million times more value to England than all her foreign commerce put together. But, if we cast our eye over the map of Europe, we shall see, that the coasting trade of Napoleon embraces *climates*; and that a maritime communication between his several countries must be, not only of vast benefit to him, but in some cases, necessary to the existence of the people. Some of these countries must supply the others with corn. Without the oil and the wine and the silks and the cotton these countries *might* exist; but the southern countries could not, in many cases, possibly exist without the necessities of life from the North; and of carrying on this commerce there are no means other than those of a maritime nature.

The extent of this commerce, in the dominions of Napoleon, is scarcely to be credited by those, who are not acquainted with the facts. Along the coasts of Naples, Tuscany, Genoa and Piedmont; from the Southern Provinces of France and Marseilles, through Cette, and the grand canal of Louis XIV., to Bourdeaux, and thence along the Atlantic coasts of France, the whole of the coasts of Holland, and into the Elbe; in short, from the Baltic to the southern point of Italy, all the countries are connected by a chain of commercial intercourse as complete, perhaps, as ever existed in the world, and as advantageous as it is extensive. This commerce is, by your Majesty's servants, spoken of under the degrading appellation of "a mere coasting trade;" but, this is precisely that trade, which is *really* advantageous to a nation. If England were cut off from all communication with foreign nations, she would, in point of strength and of happiness, suffer nothing at all. But, cut off the communication between London and the coal-mines, and the inhabitants of London must perish or disperse. There are several branches of our coasting trade, of a degree of importance, not, indeed, approaching nearly to this; but, still of greater importance to us, than all our foreign commerce put together. If, for instance, only one year's interruption were to take place in the exchange of coals for timber

between Cumberland on the one part, and Hampshire and Sussex on the other part, the woods of these latter counties must be burnt to keep the people from perishing, whereas by the exchange now going on, these woods are preserved, the people have fuel in plenty, and that fuel, after having given comfort in that capacity, becomes a valuable manure for the land. One year's interruption of this exchange would do England more harm than would be done by the sinking of all foreign countries to the bottom of the sea. This is, however, only one instance out of hundreds which might be enumerated; and, without any thing more being said, it must, I think, be as clear as the sun at noon day, that, if the enemy were able to put a stop to our coasting trade, it might be at once asserted, that he had it in his power to reduce us to his own terms, be they what they might. Is it not, then, worth the while of your Majesty's servants; is it not worth the while of those, who are entrusted with the conducting of the war, to enquire what is the extent of the coasting trade of the French empire, and to inform themselves as to the means of destroying, or, at least, interrupting that trade? To attack, or to oppose, Napoleon in Spain, Naples, Sicily, Sweden, Denmark, Hanover, or in the East or West Indies, is what it would be for an enemy to attack us in Nova Scotia, Canada, or in any of our colonies, where, though a defeat might produce mortification, it would not seriously affect us, either in our comforts or in the sources of our national strength. We should regret the loss of Canada, perhaps, or of a West India island; but, the loss, like that of a child out of a numerous family, would not be felt in our affairs. We should still be as rich and as strong as before; but, cut off the means of sending corn and timber and iron and tin and coal along our coasts, from one part of the kingdom to the other, and the distress is instantly felt. In fact, the different parts of this kingdom can no more dispense with the coasting trade, than the farmer can dispense with the aid of the blacksmith and the wheelwright.

This, it will, perhaps, be said, is not the case with the countries under the dominion of Napoleon. But, will it, then, be asserted, that those countries, though extending almost across the whole of the European continent, and including such a variety of climates, are, nevertheless, so

circumstanced as to be able to exist, and contentedly too, without any commerce with each other; that is to say, without any exchange of natural productions, or of manufactures? The truth is, however, that the commerce between the several parts of this vast empire is so great, that convoys of *eighty*, a *hundred*, and even of *two hundred sail*, are frequently seen, and by your Majesty's fleets too, carrying on this trade in perfect security. These consist chiefly of Luggers, or Zebecks, of a light draught of water, from eighty to a hundred and twenty tons burthen, and are navigated by a proportionate number of seamen. There are employed in this commerce, from the river of Bourdeaux alone, *thirty three thousand seamen* and upwards. The coasts of the Mediterranean teem with this commerce. Its ports and bays swarm with vessels; and, at no time was the commerce so great between France and Italy on the one side, and between France and Holland and the North, on the other side, as it is at this moment, while your Majesty's servants are boasting, that they have a navy which scours the ocean, and that "England engrosses the commerce of the world." While they amuse themselves and the nation with this empty vaunting, the commerce of France, and her vassal states, carried on almost within the reach of the naked eye of our admirals, far exceeds, in the means of contributing towards national strength, the commerce of England and of all her allies. The general persuasion here, is, that all the people, under the sway of France, are suffering from causes almost similar to those which affect the inhabitants of a besieged town; that the people of the North can get no wine or oil, and that those of the South can get no corn; that there are no materials to make goods of any sort, that all is decay and misery, and that, *surely*, the poor, beggared, pinched people must, *surely*, they must soon be pushed to desperation; must revolt, and must tear Napoleon and his government to morsels. This has been the expectation for years, in like manner as, for years before, Mr. Pitt and the foreign pensioner Sir Francis D' Ivernois kept alive the constant expectation, that France would become a *bankrupt*, and would then be compelled to submit to her enemies. As the nation was deceived then, so it is deceived now; and so, I greatly fear, it will continue to be deceived, until a knowledge and a belief of the truth will come.

too late. One thing, indeed, has staggered many of even the credulous part of the nation; and that is the fact of France being able still to renew her squadrons and her maritime expeditions. For, this astonishing power of creating a maritime force is altogether incompatible with the assertions of your Majesty's servants respecting the ruined state of the commerce of France. The commerce of France being "*annihilated*," we cannot help wondering that the ports of Brest and Rochefort should be continually sending forth their squadrons; we cannot help being surprised and somewhat vexed at seeing a squadron of ten or twelve sail of the line come out of the ports of France, in the space of a few months after we have been congratulated upon the destruction of the *last* of the enemy's ships. The fleet in Basque Roads is said, by the prints of your Majesty's servants, to have been worth *several millions of pounds sterling*, and that the Calcutta alone was worth six hundred thousand pounds, being full of military and naval stores. To have effected the destruction of the whole of this fleet would have been a subject of great joy; to have effected the destruction of part of it was a subject of joy; but, in our haste to express such joy, we forgot to ask, how all these stores came to be found in the port of Rochefort, so many years after we had "*so completely annihilated* the commerce of France," agreeably to the ten-thousand-times-repeated assurances of your Majesty's servants. The fact is, that, not only from the Elbe and the Scheldt are the ports of France supplied, by the means of the coasting trade, with an abundance of naval stores, but also from that part of Spain lying near the Atlantic coast, whence they receive iron, pitch, tar, rosin and ship-timber, of various sorts, and in vast quantities, and at a rate much cheaper than some of these articles can possibly be brought to the arsenals at Portsmouth or Plymouth. If this be the case, and I scruple not to assert that it is the case, what are we doing? What is the *use* which your Majesty's servants are making of the immense means, which the industry and patience of your people put into their hands? If there be a commerce, such as I have described, carried on between the different parts of the dominions of Napoleon, of *what use*, as the means of keeping him in check, are the thousand ships of war, now employed? Of *what use* is it, if this commerce is to go on un-

interrupted; of what use is it, that the sea is covered with your Majesty's ships, and that history will record the valour of your seamen? Of what avail is it, that we destroy French ships of war, while we leave, in full vigour, all the means of creating others to supply their place? If this be the way of making war, it must be clear to every one, that we can never have peace, without being exposed to imminent danger; for, it will require but a short space of time, for France to raise a navy equal, in numbers at least, to any that we can possess.

The security of this extensive and most valuable commerce of the French dominions arises, in great part, from the use of land signals, or telegraphs, so constructed, placed, and managed as to keep the vessels upon the coast at all times correctly informed of what is passing upon the whole line of coast. From Flushing to Bayonne a report is exchanged *four times a-day*; at day-light, ten o'clock in the forenoon, two o'clock, and just before sunset. So that, at Flushing, they know, four times during the day, what is passing at sea, within sight of the highest hill in the neighbourhood of Bayonne, and, of course, they are informed of what is passing near all the intermediate parts of the coast. The same system is established along the coast of the Mediterranean, from the Gulph of Spezzia to Rosas. The coasting vessels, thus instructed how to move; thus kept constantly in a state of perfect knowledge as to the situation of our fleets or cruizers, and able to sail in safety, carry on their trade in as much security as if those ships were not in existence; and this only, as I shall hereafter prove to your Majesty, from causes which prevent the necessary exertions from being made, and which causes may instantly and easily be removed.

The advantages to the *nations* (for they are many), which carry on this commerce, are not greater than they are to Napoleon himself, in his views of conquest and dominion. From this commerce, notwithstanding our opinions to the contrary, he derives no small part of his revenue, through the means of a stamp-tax, imposed upon every article exported or imported; and hence he is able to dispense with *direct taxes*, which are always odious, and which are, indeed, those which have uniformly ended in exciting the feelings and producing the acts, under which so many governments have perished. This is a great

point. By the means of this commerce, he disguises from his people the burdens which they bear. It is, indeed, a gross imposition to tell a people, that *commerce* pays taxes, the fact being, that those taxes still fall upon the people themselves; but, as your Majesty must have observed, it is an imposition, it is a fraud, it is an act of duplicity and knavery, the success of which in *other countries* warrants the belief that it must be greatly useful to your Majesty's implacable and powerful enemy. Very much, then, are your Majesty's servants deceived, when they suppose, that the Emperor Napoleon has no Custom-house, whereat to collect duties. His scale, indeed, may not be so noble as to afford him Counts and Dukes for receivers; he may not have Marquises for collectors, Barons for wharfingers, and Knights of the Eagle for wine-tasters; but, I am of opinion, that his Custom-house yields him a much greater *clear* revenue than is derived from any similar establishment in the world, and that it affords him the means of drawing upon other sources of taxation with so sparing a hand, that his people, especially within the ancient boundaries of France, have reason to congratulate themselves upon the comparative lightness of their burthens. A great many of your Majesty's subjects, including some in high stations, have, at different times, expressed their astonishment, and, indeed, their vexation, that the people of France should be so slow in *rebell*ing against their Emperor, with whom your Majesty made a treaty of peace and "*amity*," only about seven or eight years go; but, if they had been informed of the facts here stated, relative to the commerce of France, and especially relative to the revenue yielded by that commerce, together with the relief thereby given to all the other sources of taxation, itself not appearing as a tax; if they had been duly informed of these facts, and had been possessed of but a very moderate portion of that sort of knowledge, which enables men to trace popular discontents to their real causes, they never would have entertained a hope of seeing a rebellion in France.

But, great as are the financial advantages of this commerce, Napoleon derives from it the still greater advantage attending such a *nursery of seamen*. It has been most clearly proved, over and over again, that, for our navy, the nursery is our *coasting* trade. There requires, therefore, no-

thing more to satisfy us, that, from a coasting trade such as I have described, the advantage to Napoleon is so great as to excite well-grounded alarm in the mind of every reflecting Englishman. It is from this copious source, that the Emperor of France has drawn those hundreds of thousands of seamen, with whom he has manned his fleets and squadrons for many years past, and which fleets and squadrons, though always hitherto defeated, and, in many instances, captured and destroyed, by the superior skill and valour of your Majesty's fleets, answer the terrible purpose of causing us to keep up a force by land as well as sea so immense, so disproportionate to our population and our pecuniary means, that the country is stripped of its youth and its vigour, the fields are left to be tilled by the decrepid, and the taxes are so general and so heavy, and the anticipations upon them so large, that *hope*, which alleviates all other burthens, here refuses her sustaining hand. Year after year, we not only see the taxes and the tax-gatherers increase; we not only feel their immediate pressure, but, we see mortgaged, deeper and deeper, the very seeds of property; we see taken from us, for the purposes of current expence, that which was held out to us as the sure pledge of permanent relief. Could we once be sure, that it was out of the power of Napoleon to send a fleet to sea, how different would be our situation! But, this assurance we can never have, so long as he has the command of the seamen, necessarily employed in such a commerce. How often, within the last fifteen years, have we "annihilated" the navy of France; how often have we "swept the ocean;" but, still France, in the midst of all this annihilation, finds the means of sending out fresh squadrons and fleets; and proves, beyond a doubt, that she possesses, in spite of all we have hitherto done, the means of forming a navy in a very short space of time.

The parliament has recently been told, in your Majesty's name, that the aid you are giving to the enemies of France, upon the continent of Europe, is given with a view of keeping Napoleon from our own shores. The expressions are somewhat different, but, this is the substance, this is the real meaning of the words. Does it not, then, become me, if I have it in my power, to prove to you, that this is *not* the way to keep the conqueror from the shores of England? That this is a waste of our

means? That it has no other effect than that of augmenting at once our debts and our taxes, and of hastening the day, when the cries of the widow and the orphan shall proclaim, whether or not "a national debt be a national blessing?"

In *what way*, I should like to ask of your Majesty's servants, their subsidies to the enemies of France upon the continent are to keep Napoleon from our shores? Is it by giving him *employment* upon the continent? That, of course, must keep him from our shores for a while; but, the *possibility*, at least, is, that, by all the means we can contrive, by all the wars we can excite, and by all the treasure we can squander, he cannot, for any long time, be thus employed; and, consequently, when he can no longer be so employed, we, upon the very principle on which this aid is given to his enemies, must be in imminent danger. Therefore, by our present line of politics, by our present system of defence, by our present explicit avowal, if Napoleon succeed in subduing all his enemies upon the continent, we have very little hope of being able to resist him.

This, Sir, though neither very consoling nor very honourable to the country, is the conclusion to be drawn from the declarations as well as the acts of your Majesty's servants, who appear to have given up all hope of England being able, if left to herself, to provide even for her safety, leaving her honour totally out of the question. And this opinion is, indeed, very reasonable, upon the supposition, *that the present is the only system of naval warfare that can be adopted*. Upon the supposition, that we have it not in our power to prevent Napoleon from carrying on an uninterrupted exchange of products, the most valuable of all commerce, between all the countries from Naples to Marseilles, and from Bayonne to Hamburg; that we are unable to prevent him from connecting all these countries, and consolidating them under his sway, by ties of convenience and of interest as well as by the power of his arms and of his civil and political establishments; that we are unable, with all our endless list of ships, to counteract the operations of signal posts, defended each by a couple of invalids; that, in spite of all we are able to do, France will teem with seamen, naval stores, and all the means of speedily creating a navy: Upon *this supposition*, it is, indeed, perfectly reasonable to conclude, that, when Napoleon has put down all his enemies upon the conti-

ment, when he has removed the possibility of there meeting with further hostility excited by our gold, *we ourselves shall be unable to resist his power for any great length of time.* Upon such a supposition, this conclusion is natural; but, as I think I shall be able to shew, in my next letter, such a supposition is not founded in truth, and that we *have the ability* to do with respect to the commerce of France, with respect to that fruitful source of power to her and of danger to us; that we have the ability to do all those things, which are necessary to our safety, permanent as well as present, and with a comparatively small portion of expence.

When one looks at the navy of England; at the quarter of a million of people whom, in various ways it employs; at the fifteen or seventeen millions of money (a *fifth* part, I believe, of the *rental of the whole kingdom*) that it annually costs; when one looks at this wonderful power, this mass of means, this focus of the fertility of our soil and of the industry, ingenuity, valour, and patriotism of the nation; when one contemplates all this, and reads the history of the war, for several years past, one cannot help being struck with the disparity between the means and the effect. For *what purpose* are all this preparation and all the sacrifices which it occasions? What does this immense navy *accomplish*? If, for many years past, all its prizes and all the mischief it has done to the enemy were estimated, they would not amount to enough to pay the expences of finding the navy in water. The navy is *our defence*, it may be said; but, that cannot be said, without acknowledging, that we are deficient either in the strength or the courage or the will to defend our country by land. As the means of *mere defence*, either the army or the navy must be considered as superfluous, or else we acknowledge ourselves to be inferior to our enemy in point of valour, or of disposition to defend our country. To consider the navy as the means of mere defence, is, in fact, to acknowledge, at once, that Napoleon has it always in his power to put us to an expence of seventeen millions a year, without any other expence on his part than that of the paper and ink, composing a paragraph in one of his *Moniteurs*. The navy should be made the means of *attack*, the means of annoyance, the means of distress through the empire of our enemy. The taking or destroying of ships at sea, the capturing of colonies, will avail us

nothing, while the ever-fertile source of naval power exists unhurt in the dominions of France.

In war, as well as in every thing else, those difficulties and dangers, of which we can foresee *no end*, are most powerful in subduing the mind; in producing weariness, disgust, relaxation of efforts, and finally, a disposition to give up the contest. And, I beseech your Majesty to consider, what prospect there is, or can be, of an end to our difficulties and dangers, while Napoleon possesses, undisturbed, the means of building and manning fleets of ships of war, though England, at the same time, maintains a navy at the expence of seventeen millions a year; what prospect there can be of peace and safety to England, while France, insensible of the calamities, and almost of the existence, of war, is able to impose upon your Majesty's subjects burthens such as were never before heard of, and which, with the duration of war, must necessarily increase. To me, therefore, it appears evident, that unless our mode of warfare be changed; unless our immense means be made use of to annoy and distress the enemy, and particularly to cut off his naval resources, we shall fail in this contest, which is not only for honour but for independence.

The *facts* which I have stated, relative to the commerce carried on in the dominions of Napoleon, are stated upon *such authority*, that I have no scruple in vouching for their truth. So minute, indeed, is my information, that I could have named *times* and *places* and other particulars, in confirmation of every fact, relative to this commerce, that I have stated in general terms. That such a commerce, so extensive, so beneficial to the parties concerned in it, forming so complete a chain of connection between the several countries whose means Napoleon must wish to unite and bring under his controul, so fertile in all the means of restoring or creating a vast naval power; that such a commerce existed I know that the people of England could not have supposed possible, and I verily believe, that your Majesty's servants were, in this respect, little better informed than the nation at large; for, to believe otherwise would be to suppose them guilty of a heinous offence against their master as well as against his people. To believe, that they knew of the existence of a commerce, carried on in the dominions of Napoleon, and employing, perhaps, two hundred thousand mariners; to believe that they knew of the existence

of such a commerce while they were congratulating us upon the annihilation of the maritime power of France, would be to accuse them of hypocrisy unparalleled in the history of human depravity. Of this knowledge, therefore, I acquit them, and shall be well satisfied, if they now, though late, adopt measures calculated to remove from us that danger, which, if their present system be adhered to; can, as far as I can perceive, never terminate but in the subjugation of our country, and, of course, in the subversion of your Majesty's throne.

In my next, I shall endeavour to shew, that the commerce of France *may be destroyed*, and, of course, that her vast means of creating a naval force, *may be cut off*. The real causes of the inefficiency of our navy, in this respect, will be found to lie much deeper than is generally imagined, and where, I am sure, your Majesty does not suspect, because, supported as your Majesty would be by the unanimous voice of your people, you possess the power of removing for ever the most mischievous of those causes. The war upon the continent *may* prove very embarrassing to Napoleon; it *may* produce his overthrow: but it *may* produce exactly contrary effects; it may not only relieve him from all those embarrassments which he has hitherto experienced, but may end in the complete overthrow of every thing that calls itself our friend. This accomplished, as far as relates to the East, how quickly will the wings of revenge, united with those of ambition, bear him to the South! And, if he once obtain secure possession of the whole of the coasts of Portugal and Spain, what, if we persevere in our present mode of warfare, is to prevent him from sitting himself quietly down, and seeing us exhaust ourselves, wear ourselves out, torment ourselves with continual alarm, while his dominions have only to support a flotilla at Boulogne and an army of England, at an expence, perhaps, not greater than that which we are put to for the maintenance of the Local Militia? Where, then, should we look for an *end* of our danger? There never more, while that state of things lasted, could be *peace*, united with *safety*, for England.

If this paper should (which I greatly doubt) reach the ear of your Majesty, I hope, that, by this concluding paragraph, I shall prevail upon you to distrust those, who flatter you with the prospect of seeing the people of France revolt against their Emperor, to do which there has not

appeared, in any shape, the smallest inclination. I beseech your Majesty to consider, that all those persons, in France and her new dominions, who are now from twenty to forty years of age; that is to say, all that part of the population, which, in times of disturbance, decide the fate of governments, have been reared up in principles, which must make them hazard their lives a thousand times over, rather than see their country return to the ancient order of things; and that, supposing principle and prejudice to have no weight, still *self-interest*, that all-powerful stimulus, will never suffer a nation consisting, in great part, of those who are styled usurpers of the soil, to permit any thing which shall expose them to the chance, however small, of being ousted from their usurpations. I trust, therefore, that your Majesty will be induced to place no reliance upon any such events; and, of course, that you will be the more disposed to adopt such measures as shall tend to bring into fair operation the naval power of the country, and thereby to keep alive the hopes of your people. Hitherto there has always been some ground for hope, or the people have, at least, imagined such ground. But, if Austria should fall; and if, which would be the almost certain consequence, the Southern Peninsula should follow, where then, *if the means of suddenly forming a navy be still suffered to exist in France*, will be our ground of hope? The gloom of despair will pervade, and must pervade, the political horizon: to *submission* alone we can look for any alleviation of our burthens, and, though the thought will, at first, be accompanied with horror, to that submission we shall, in time, fashion our minds.

Such, sir, is my view of this subject. For the truth of my *facts*, I vouch with as much confidence as if they had come under my own eyes; and my reasoning upon them is, as I believe, correct. I have sometimes been wrong in my opinions, but I have much oftener been right; and, in this instance, the greatest favour I would presume to ask from your Majesty would be, that your *war-ministers*, by sea and land, should be called upon to prove the erroneousness either of my premises or my conclusions. The sending out of 40,000 men, the *selecting of proper persons to command them*, the planning of operations for such an army; all this is of great consequence in itself, but it is nothing at all when compared to the object which I

have submitted to the consideration of your Majesty; to the evil which I have pointed out, and to the remedy which I shall hereafter have the honour to submit.

I am, &c. &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, 13th July 1809.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AUSTRIA.—Upon what grounds I know not, but it is certain, that an opinion is generally prevalent, that the emperor of Austria is getting the upperhand of his brother of France. The news-papers appear to be so full of this notion, and so gay and lively and even witty, upon the occasion, that I have been earnestly endeavouring to find out some reason for believing their hopes and expectations to be built on solid foundations. After long and diligent inquiry, however, I can find no such foundations. I still see Napoleon at Vienna, and I know, that, if he were in London, the wretches, who now pretend to believe, that he is in a state of disgrace, would lose not a moment in hastening to swear allegiance to him, or, if required, to his horse. How men are to be found impudent enough to argue, that merely because he lies in the capital of the country a month without making any great advances, he must, *therefore*, be in a fair way of being defeated, is sufficiently astonishing; but, how any body, any six people in the world, can be found to believe them, to look upon such reasoning as sound, surpasses one's utmost notions of credulity. Were I, indeed, to hear of his having actually *fallen back* some score or two of leagues, I should begin to listen to hopes of his final defeat; but, while I see him still in the capital of the Austrian empire, with a part of his army pushing on into Hungary, must I not be a beast to believe; to persuade myself, or to suffer others to persuade me, that he is in a fair way of being defeated, and driven back in disgrace? My decided opinion is, that Napoleon, so far from being upon the eve of a defeat, is upon the eve of totally annihilating the authority of the House of Austria; and this opinion is founded upon the same reasoning, whereon, if Napoleon were in London with a conquering army, I should be of opinion that he was upon the eve of totally annihilating the authority of the House of Brunswick. He *may* be defeated: his present situation

may be perilous; and the French fleet, when it comes out again, *may* beat the English fleet; but, as to likelihood, one is, at present, just as likely as the other.

—If indeed, the philosophers, who conduct the Morning Post and the Courier, could assure me, and convince me of the truth of their assurances, that Buonaparté's army was officered with pimps, buffoons, bastards, harlot's bullies and brothers, uncles and cousins; if, indeed, they could prove to me, that Buonaparté did not look upon *brains* as being necessary in the composition of a general, and was content to take any creature that was brought to him, provided it had a pair of eyes just to keep itself out of the fire, and a hole in its face wherein to put victuals and drink; if they could prove to me, that Napoleon did not see with his own eyes, but with the eyes of that many-headed monster, his *Corps Legislatif*, who, by their deeds, have proved themselves to be the most stupid as well as the most corrupt assembly that has ever been heard of in the civilized world; if, indeed, Buonaparté were once to fall into the practice of suffering the high stations in his army to be filled up with the booby sons and other relations of these fellows, or of their wives and their mistresses, or, which would be more likely, by the paramours of their wives and mistresses; if I could be assured, that he had exchanged the Dukes of Rivoli, Dantzick, Abrantes, and the rest of his generals, for an equal number of besotted animals, one half of whose life has been spent over the bottle and the other half in bed; if I could be convinced, that his army was under the command of known, proven, notorious fools, and speculators, many of whom united the two characters in the same person, and who, on account of their ideology, had a subaltern speculator sent with them to take care of their pillage; if, in short, I could be convinced, that, all of a sudden, the character of Napoleon's army was totally changed, and, that, instead, of exciting fear in the enemies of France, it was become *formidable only to France herself*; if any thing like this, which goes almost beyond the bounds of imagination, could be proved to me to exist, then, indeed, I should begin to expect, in good earnest, to see Napoleon retreat in disgrace, and though pursued like a hare, bragging that his pursuer was afraid to face him; and, when caught, at last, and beaten to a mummy, I should expect to see him, by an impious mockery

of religion, singing *Te Deum* for the victory he had gained. But, not being able to perceive any such change in the French army; seeing no proof, that the interest and honour of the French nation are likely to be sacrificed to the interests of any hungry individual or greedy family; seeing no proof that the war against Austria has been fomented and kept up for the purpose of providing for the relations of the *Corps Legislatif* or for those of any body else; not being able to perceive any change of this sort, and particularly not seeing the smallest symptom of the poisonous influence of that most corrupt assembly, the *Corps Legislatif*, I really do not, and cannot, see that there are any good grounds for believing, that the French army will, in the present case, be compelled to get off in disgrace, and that they will go skulking back to France, slipping in by half-dozens at a time, as the philosophers of the *Morning Post* seem to expect they will.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICA.

Washington, May 22.—EXTRA SESSION.—This day both Houses of Congress assembled in their respective chambers. In Senate twenty-one Members attended. In the Lower House, at the first call, 120 Members appeared.—General Varnum is re-elected Speaker.—

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

At twelve o'clock, the President of the United States communicated, by Mr. Graham, the following Message to both Houses of Congress:—

Washington City, May 23.

Fellow Citizens of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives;—On this first occasion of meeting you, it affords me much satisfaction, to be able to communicate the commencement of a favourable change in our foreign relations; the critical state of which induced a Session of Congress at this period.—In consequence of the provisions of the Act interdicting commercial intercourse with Great Britain and France, our Ministers at London and Paris were, without delay, instructed to let it be understood by the French and British Governments, that the authority vested in the executive, to renew commercial intercourse with their respective nations, would be exercised in the case specified by that act.—Soon after these instructions were dispatched, it was

found that the British Government, anticipating, from early proceedings of Congress at their last Session, the state of our laws, which has had the effect of placing the two belligerent Powers on a footing of equal restrictions, and relying on the conciliatory disposition of the United States, had transmitted to their Legation here provisional instructions, not only to offer satisfaction for the attack on the frigate *Chesapeake*, and to make known the determination of his Britannic Majesty, to send an Envoy Extraordinary with powers to conclude a treaty on all points between the two countries; but moreover, to signify his willingness, in the mean time, to withdraw his Orders in Council, in the persuasion that the intercourse with Great Britain would be renewed on the part of the United States.—These steps of the British Government led to the correspondence and the proclamation now laid before you; by virtue of which, the commerce between the two countries will be renewable after the 10th day of June next.—Whilst I take pleasure in doing justice to the counsels of his Britannic Majesty, which, no longer adhering to the policy which made an abandonment by France, of her Decrees, a pre-requisite to a revocation of the British Orders, have substituted the amicable course which has issued thus happily; I cannot do less than refer to the proposal heretofore made on the part of the United States, embracing a like restoration of the suspended commerce, as a proof of the spirit of accommodation which has at no time been intermitted, and to the result which now calls for our congratulations as corroborating the principles by which the public councils have been guided during a period of the most trying embarrassments.—The discontinuance of the British Orders as they respect the United States, having been thus arranged, a communication of the event has been forwarded, in one of our public vessels, to our Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris, with instructions to avail himself of the important addition thereby made, to the considerations which press on the justice of the French Government a revocation of its Decrees, or such a modification of them, as they shall cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States.—The revision of our commercial laws, proper to adapt them to the arrangement which has taken place with Great Britain, will doubtless engage the early attention of Congress. It will be worthy, at the same time, of

their just and provident care, to make such further alterations in the laws, as will more especially protect and foster the several branches of manufacture which have been recently instituted or extended by the laudable exertions of our citizens.—It will rest with the judgment of Congress to decide how far the change in our external prospects may authorise any modifications of the laws relating to the army and navy establishments.—The works of defence for our sea-port towns and harbours have proceeded with as much activity as the season of the year and other circumstances would admit. It is necessary, however, to state, that the appropriations hitherto made being found to be deficient, a farther provision will claim the early consideration of Congress.—The whole of the eight per cent. stock remaining due by the United States, amounting to 5,300,000 dollars, had been reimbursed on the last day of the year 1808. And on the 1st day of April last, the sum in the Treasury exceeded nine and a half millions of dollars. This, together with the receipts of the current year, on account of former Revenue bonds, will probably be nearly, if not altogether sufficient, to defray the expences of the year. But the suspension of exports and the consequent decrease of importations, during the last twelve months, will necessarily cause a great diminution in the receipts of the year 1810. After that year, should our foreign relations be undisturbed, the revenue will again be more than commensurate to all the expenditures.—Under the existing aspect of our affairs, I have thought it not inconsistent with a just precaution, to have the gun-boats, with the exception of those at New Orleans, placed in a situation incurring no expence beyond that requisite for their preservation, and convenience for future service; and to have the crews of those at New Orleans reduced to the number required for their navigation and safety.—I have thought also, that our citizens detached in quotas of militia, amounting to 100,000, under the Act of March 1808, might not improperly be relieved from the state in which they were held for immediate service. A discharge of them has been accordingly directed.—The progress made in raising and organizing the additional military force, for which provision was made by the Act of April, 1808, together with the disposition of the troops, will appear by a Report which the Secretary of War is preparing, and which

will be laid before you.—Of the additional frigates required by an Act of the last Session to be fitted for actual service, two are in readiness, one nearly so, and the fourth is expected to be ready in the month of July. A Report which the Secretary of the Navy is preparing on the subject, to be laid before Congress, will shew, at the same time, the progress made in officering and manning these ships. It will shew also the degree in which the provisions of the Act relative to the other public armed vessels have been carried into effect.—Aware of the inconvenience of a protracted Session at the present season of the year, I forbear to call the attention of the Legislature to any matters not particularly urgent. It remains, therefore, only to assure you of the fidelity and alacrity with which I shall co-operate for the welfare and happiness of our country, and to pray that it may experience a continuance of the Divine blessings by which it has been so signally favoured.

(Signed) JAMES MADISON.

SWEDEN.—*Proclamation issued by the new King, on his ascending the Throne.*

We, Charles XIII. by the Grace of God, King of Sweden, &c. to all our faithful subjects, &c. &c. greeting.—When, under Divine Providence, we assumed some time ago, the Provisional Government of our beloved native country, committed to us by the States of our Realm, we immediately called the attention of the Diet to the indispensable and important task of framing a new Constitution, calculated to promote the prosperity, tranquillity, and welfare of the country, by an irrevocable union between the mutual rights and duties of the King and People of Sweden.—The States having informed us that they have not only performed the important task committed to them by us, and the confidence of their fellow subjects, but also that they have chosen us King of Sweden, and of the Goths and Vandals, requesting our approbation of that choice, the cordial and loyal manner in which that election was made, did not allow us to decline its acceptance. Relying on the Omnipotent, who explores the inmost recesses of the human heart, and knows the sincerity and purity of our sentiments, moved by the most fervent love and zeal for our native land, which can only cease with our existence, and trusting we shall be most powerfully supported by the loyal attach-

ment of the noble Swedish nation, we have therefore accepted the Crown and Sceptre of Sweden.—It is far more gratifying to our feelings, to have been called upon by the free and uncontrouled voice of the people—to become their King, their Protector, and Defender, than if we had ascended the ancient Swedish Throne merely by right of Hereditary Succession. We shall govern the kingdom and people of Sweden, as an indulgent parent does his children; with implicit confidence in the honest; with forbearance towards those who err undeliberately; uprightness towards all; and when the day arrives, the near approach of which is announced by our advanced age, which shall put an end to our worldly cares, we will hail our last moments with the pious resignation of the just, and close it by blessing you all.

(Signed)

CHARLES.

GUST. SUYDSJELKD, Aulic Chancellor.
Council Hall, Stockholm Castle,
June 6, 1809.

FRENCH ARMY IN AUSTRIA.—Twenty-first Bulletin, dated Vienna, June 22.

An aid-de-camp of prince Joseph Poniatowsky is arrived at the head-quarters of the army of the Grand Duchy. On the 10th of this month, prince Serge Galitzin, was to be at Lublin, and has advanced to Sandomir.—The enemy pleases himself in spreading ephemeral Bulletins, in which he always boasts of victory.—According to his account he took 20,000 muskets, and 2,000 cuirassiers in the battle of Essling. He says, that, on the 21st and 22d, he was master of the field of battle; he has caused to be printed, and circulated an engraving of that battle, in which we see him striding over both shores, and his batteries traversing the islands and the field of battle in every direction. He also imagines a battle which he calls the battle of Ketsee*, in which a number of French have been killed or taken. These childish reports, hawked about by small columns, like that of Schill, are tactics employed to unsettle and rouse the country.—General Marziarus, who was made prisoner in the battle of Raab, has arrived at the head-quarters. He says, that since the battle of the Piave, the Archduke John has lost two-thirds of his army; that he afterwards

received recruits, which scarcely filled the vacancies, and who do not understand the use of arms.—He reckons the loss of the Archduke John, and Palatine, in the battle of the Raab, at 12,000 men. According to the report of the Hungarian prisoners, the Palatine was on that day the first to take to flight.—Some persons seem to wish to put in opposition the force of the Austrian army at Essling, estimated at 90,000 men, with the 80,000 men which have been made prisoners since the opening of the campaign!—They have shewn very little reflection. The Austrian army entered upon the campaign with nine corps of 40,000 men each; and they had in the interior, corps of recruits and landwehrs; so that Austria really had more than 400,000 men under arms.—From the battle of Abersberg, to the taking of Vienna, they reckon that in Italy and Poland we have taken 100,000 prisoners from the enemy, and he has lost 100,000 men in killed, deserted and dispersed. There still remains therefore to him, 200,000 men, distributed as follow:—The archduke John had, in the battle of Raab, 50,000 men. The principal Austrian army was, previous to the battle of Essling, 90,000 men. There remained 25,000 men with the Archduke Ferdinand at Warsaw, and 25,000 men were dispersed in the Tyrol and Croatia, and spread in bands on the confines of Bohemia.—The Austrian army at Essling, was composed of the first corps, commanded by gen. Bellegarde, the only one which had not been engaged, and which was still entire, and the wrecks of the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th corps, which had been crushed in the preceding battles. If these corps had suffered no loss, and had united such as they were at the commencement of the campaign, they would have formed 240,000 men. The enemy had no more than 90,000 men; thus we see how enormous the losses are which they have suffered.—When the Archduke John entered on the campaign, his army was composed of the 8th and 9th corps, amounting to 80,000 men. At Raab he had only 50,000. But in these 50,000 were comprised 15,000 Hungarians of the insurrection. His loss was therefore really 45,000 men. The Archduke Ferdinand entered Warsaw, with the 7th corps, consisting of 40,000 men. He is reduced to 25,000. His loss is therefore 15,000 men. We will see how these different calculations are made and verified.—The Viceroy has, with 30,000 French, beaten at Raab, 50,000 men. At

* Ketsee is situated on the right bank of the Danube, and a league in the interior.

Essling 90,000 men have been beaten and restrained by 30,000 French, who would have completely routed and destroyed them, if the carrying away of the bridges had not caused a want of ammunition.—The great efforts of Austria have been the result of paper money, and the resolution of the Austrian government to risk all. In the danger of bankruptcy, which would have brought about a revolution, she has preferred to add 500 millions to the mass of her paper money, and try a last effort to have it circulated through Germany, Italy, and Poland. It is very probable that this consideration has influenced, more than any other, her determinations.—Not a single regiment has been drawn from Spain, except the Imperial Guard.—Gen. count Lauriston continues the siege of Raab with the greatest activity: the town has been on fire for twenty four hours, and this army, which at Essling has gained so great a victory, that she took 20,000 muskets, and 2,000 cuirasses; that army which at Ketsee, killed so many, and made so many prisoners; that army which, according to its apocryphal Bulletins, has gained such great advantages at the battle of Raab, tranquilly sees its principal places besieged and burnt, Hungary inundated by parties, and to save its empress, its dicastus, all the precious effects of government, have removed them to the frontiers of Turkey, and to the utmost extremity of Europe.—An Austrian major had the temerity to cross the Danube at the mouth of the Marck, in two boats. Gen. Villy Vieux met him with some companies, drove him into the water, and made 40 prisoners.

*Twenty-second Bulletin, dated Vienna,
June 24.*

Raab has capitulated. This city forms an excellent position in the centre of Hungary; it is defended by bastions; its ditches are full of water, and an inundation covers a part of it. It is situated at the confluence of three rivers; it resembles, on a small scale, the reduction of the grand entrenched camp, where the enemy hoped to assemble and exercise the Hungarian insurrection, and where he had constructed immense works. The garrison, 1,800 strong, was insufficient. The enemy intended to have left 5,000 men, but by the battle of Raab, his army was separated from that place. The city has suffered considerably from a bombardment of eight days, which has destroyed its finest edi-

fices; all that could be said as to the utility of a defence was ineffectual: it was misled by the hope of being relieved.—Count Metternich, after having remained three days at the advanced posts, is returned to Vienna. The secretary of embassy, Dudon, and the persons attached to the allied legations who had not withdrawn previous to the capture of Vienna, were set free on the confines of Hungary, when intelligence of the loss of the battle of Raab reached Buda.—Two battalions of landwehr, two squadrons of uhlans, and one battalion of troops of the line, forming together 2,500 men, have entered Bayreuth. They have, as usual, distributed proclamations, and endeavoured to excite insurrections. At the same time, general Amende entered Dresden with three battalions of the line, three battalions of landwehr, and a collection of men raised by the duke of Brunswick, and some squadrons of cavalry drawn from different corps, forming in the whole from 7 to 8,000 men.—The king of Westphalia has joined the 10th corps, and is on his march. The duke of Valmy has put in motion the advanced guard of the army of reserve which he commanded.

[Here follows the capitulation of Raab, consisting of eleven articles, dated 22nd June, by which it is agreed, that the garrison shall march out with the honours of war, and deposit their arms on the glacis, if not relieved by 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 24th; they are afterwards to proceed to Comorn, and are not to serve against France or her allies during the war, or till regularly exchanged; the officers to retain their horses and swords, and the soldiers their knapsacks.

(Signed) MERGEZ, Adj. Commandante.
DORRE, Major.

(Approved) LAURISTON.
Ditto PECHY, Col. Com. of Raab.]

*FRENCH ARMY IN SPAIN.—Bulletin, dated
Paris, June 29.*

The necessity of investing Gerona, and afterwards covering the operations of the siege of that place, had obliged the seventh corps to draw near to it. At the same time the third corps had detached one of its divisions for the purpose of co-operating in the enterprise against the Asturias, and gen. Suchet, who commands it, thought proper to concentrate the remainder of his troops in the vicinity of Saragossa, along the Huerba, and on the Gallego.—

The Spanish gen. Blake thought it a favourable moment to make a movement on the side of Arragon, and having united his troops with a great number of armed peasants, he began his march on the 13th June towards the Huerba, and the same day made several attempts against different points, without success. On the 15th he advanced in considerable force on the side of Santa Fe, where gen. Suchet had collected about 6,000 men, and expected that the enemy, emboldened by his apparent inactivity, would push forward into the plain, and afford an opportunity of attack. —After several movements on both sides, gen. Suchet was enabled to make a decisive attack about five o'clock in the evening. It was attended with the desired success; and the enemy's line, broken in all points, was completely routed. The pursuit of the cavalry was rapid, and those who escaped were indebted for their safety to the rocky mountains, to which they fled for refuge. —The results of the action were, at the departure of the courier, 20 pieces of cannon, with their caissons, three standards, and upwards of one hundred horses; a general of cavalry, three colonels, five lieutenant-colonels, two captains, and more than 400 men were taken prisoners. The enemy left 3,000 dead on the field of battle, and fled in the greatest disorder. The most complete tranquillity prevailed in Saragossa during the battle; and gen. Suchet speaks in high terms of the conduct of the inhabitants of that city.

SPAIN.—*From the London Gazette, July 8. — Letters from Capt. Hotham to Adm. Lord Gambier, dated from the 22nd to the 30th June.*

In consequence of the defeat sustained by the enemy's army under marshal Ney in the action against the Spanish forces at the bridge of Payo, that general fell back on Corunna on the 13th June, and immediately began to take measures for relinquishing the position of that place and Ferrol, removing his forces by divisions to an encampment three leagues in advance from Betanzos towards Lugo. The last divisions of the French left Ferrol on the 21st, and Corunna on the 22nd, after having in both places spiked the guns and destroyed the defences on the land side, together with the magazines and stores of every kind, and completely disarmed the places and their inhabitants. —The proximity

of the enemy's position continuing to hold the authorities established by the French at Corunna in subjection through the fear of his return, no communication being suffered with the British ships but by flag of truce, and the state of defence in which the batteries and lines on the sea side were left, rendering it dangerous for the British to land or approach the coast in the event of the re-appearance of any of the enemy, capt. Hotham, on the 24th, ordered a detachment of seamen and marines to land, disable the guns on the different batteries bearing on the anchorage, offering, at the same time, to the governor the services of the detachment in rendering any assistance that might be in its power to the cause of the Spanish Patriots. The cannons and mortars on the sea lines at Corunna, and in the forts commanding the bay, were accordingly dismounted on the same day, leaving untouched those on the lines towards the land which had been spiked by the enemy. —On the 26th capt. Hotham sent capt. Parker, of his majesty's ship Amazon, to Ferrol, where he was received by the people with the loudest acclamations of joy, and received from the higher orders of the inhabitants the strongest possible marks of attachment to the English, and happiness at seeing once more amongst them an officer of that nation. The castle of San Felipe, however, was still under the command of a person appointed by marshal Ney, and attached to the French interest, with a garrison composed of a detachment of a legion, raised by the enemy during their possession of Ferrol and Corunna; and on the 27th capt. Hotham received information that the above commandant had given orders to fire on any English ships or boats that might attempt to pass the castle. In consequence, capt. Hotham repaired to Ferrol in the Defiance, and landed the marines of that ship and the Amazon, with a party of armed seamen, under the direction of capt. Parker, who entered the castle without opposition, preceded by a flag bearing the name of king Ferdinand VII. and the Spanish colours. The detachment then proceeded to the town of Ferrol, where it was received in the most affectionate manner by the inhabitants, and having arrested the commandant of the castle in the name of king Ferdinand, sent him on board the Defiance. The governor of Ferrol not having any means of garrisoning the castle, the guns in it were spiked, and the powder

removed to the arsenal, and the place left under the command of the former governor, who had been suspended by the enemy.—On the 28th, capt. Hotham entered the port of Corunna, where he was informed by the governor that he had received instructions from the marquis de la Romana, dated at Orense on the 27th, to proclaim his catholic majesty Ferdinand VII., with advice that he had dispatched a regiment from his army to attend the ceremony and garrison the place; the governor at the same time gave capt. Hotham assurances that the port was from that hour to be considered under the controul and authority of the lawful king of Spain; and the captain placed himself, and every assistance that the ships under his orders might be able to afford, at the governor's disposal.—On the 29th, major-gen. the conde de Norona, capt.-gen. of Galicia, arrived at Corunna from St. Jago, and was followed on the next day by gen. Carrera with about 11,000 men, forming the Conde's division of the marquis Romana's army.—The French army under marshal Ney, moved from its camp near Betanzos on the 22nd, taking the road to Lugo and Astorga. It was reported, previously to its breaking up the camp, it destroyed its baggage and heavy artillery.—On the 27th the marquis de la Romana was stated to be at Orense with gen. Mahi and 30,000 men.—Marshal Soult's position on the 16th was said to have been at Monforte and Quiraga.

Letter from Capt. M'Kinley to the hon. W. Pole, dated Lively, Vigo, June 2.

Sir; I have the honour of inclosing to you, for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a Copy of a Letter I received from brigadier-general Carrera, commanding a division of loyal Spanish troops, giving an account of his taking from the French the city of St. Jago Compostella; by which their lordships will see the spirit and gallantry of the brigadier-general, and the ardour of the troops under his orders.—I have the honor to be, &c. (Signed) GEO. M'KINLEY.

Head-quarters Santiago, May 23.

Santiago is in our possession:—the enemy, consisting of 3,000 infantry, with 14-pieces of artillery, and 300 horse, came out to meet us, and attacked us on our march in the plain called De la Estrella. Our scouts having fallen in with their voltigeurs, and exchanged some firing,

brought me the information, and I ordered the division to form in the best position that could be taken. The enemy attacked with vigour, but were unable to gain the smallest advantage.—Our artillery was as good as their's was bad, not a man being wounded on our side by a cannon ball. After an hour's firing we became impatient of suffering it, and I ordered Don Pablo Murillo to charge them on their right flank, whilst I advanced in front with the three other columns. The enemy twice took up positions, and were as often dislodged. The unevenness of the ground favoured their escape; in effecting which they shamefully blew up two ammunition chests; two others, with two of clothing, upwards of 600 muskets, and some horses and other articles, which I have not yet examined, fell into our hands. Murillo entered the city, and pursued the enemy through the streets to the distance of more than a league from hence. I am not yet informed of the number of slain, nor of that of the prisoners, of whom there are many. The general, Maquian, has been severely wounded by two musket shot; the second in command was killed in the field, whose insignia have been brought to me by the soldiers. Our loss has been trifling; the troops are in high spirits, and I may expect much from them.—I am, &c.

MARTIN DE LA CARRERA.

AUSTRIA.—*Supplement to the London Gazette of the 11th July.*

Account of the BATTLE fought near ASPERN, on the March-field, on the 21st and 22d of May, between the Archduke Charles of Austria, Generalissimo of the Imperial Austrian Armies, and the Emperor Napoleon, Commander in Chief of the French and Allied Armies.

The Emperor Napoleon having, after some sanguinary engagements near Abensberg, Hausen and Dinzligen, in which the fortune of war favoured the Austrian arms so as to force the French garrison at Ratisbon to surrender, succeeded in cutting off the left wing of the Austrian army, and driving it back to Landshut, and afterwards in advancing by Eckmühl with a superior corps of cavalry, taking the road of Eglofsheim, and forcing to retreat those Austrian corps that were posted on the heights of Leikepont and Talmessing, the Archduke on the 23d of April crossed the Danube near Ratisbon, and joined the corps of Bellegarde, who had opened the

campaign by several successful affairs in the Upper Palatinate, had reached Amberg, Neumarkt and Hemau, and had by this time approached Stadt-am-Hof, in order to execute its immediate junction with the Archduke. The Emperor Napoleon ordered the bombardment of Ratisbon, occupied by a few battalions who were to cover the passage of the Danube. On the 23d in the evening he became master of it, and immediately hastened along the right bank of the Danube to enter the Austrian States, in order, as he openly declared, to dictate peace at Vienna. The Austrian army had taken a position near Cham, behind the river Regen, which was watched by some of the enemy's divisions, while the Emperor Napoleon called all his disposable troops, in forced marches, from the north of Germany to the Danube, and considerably reinforced his army with the troops of Wurtemberg, Hessa, Baden, and some time after with those of Saxony. Near Kirm and Nittenau, some affairs had happened between the out-posts, which, however, had no influence upon our armies. However easy it would have been for the Archduke to continue his offensive operations on the left bank of the Danube without any material resistance, and however gratifying it might have been to relieve provinces which were groaning beneath the pressure of foreign dominion; the preservation of his native land did not permit him to suffer the enemy to riot with impunity in the entrails of the monarchy, to give up the rich sources of its independence, and expose the welfare of the subject to the devastations of foreign conquerors. Those motives induced the Archduke to conduct his army to Bohemia, by the way of Klentsch and Neumarkt, to occupy the Bohemian forest with light troops and part of the militia, and to direct his march towards Budweis, where he arrived on the 3d of May, hoping to join near Lintz, his left wing, which had been separated from him, and which was under the command of lieutenant-general Hiller. But the latter had been so closely pressed by the united force of the French armies, that, after several spirited engagements, and even after a brilliant affair, in which he had the advantage, near Neumarkt, and in which the troops achieved all that was possible against the disproportionate superiority of the enemy, he indeed was able to reach Lintz, but was incapable of crossing the Danube, and obliged to content himself with destroying the commu-

nication with the left bank, and taking up a position behind the Traun near Ebersberg. This was the occasion of an extremely murderous engagement, during which the enemy in storming the bridge lost near four thousand men: Ebersberg was set on fire, and lieutenant-general Hiller continued his retreat, till he got so much the start as to pass the Danube near Stain without being disturbed by the enemy, and to wait the approach of the Archduke, who, after having in vain attempted the junction of the army near Lintz, had marched from Budweis to Zwettel; still hoping, by a quick passage of the Danube, to arrest the enemy's progress towards the metropolis. Meanwhile a corps of Wurtembergers had advanced from Passau along both the shores of the Danube, had occupied Lintz and the bank opposite to it; had restored the bridge, and signalized itself by destroying the defenceless villages and castles which could not be protected by the small advanced guard proceeding by the side of the main army. The enemy, by marching through the valley of the Danube in the straightest line, had got so much ahead, that all hopes of coming up with him in front of Vienna vanished: still, however, if that city had been able to hold out for five days, it might have been relieved; and the Archduke resolved on venturing the utmost to rescue that good city, which, by the excellent disposition of its citizens, its faithful attachment to its sovereign, and its noble devotion, has raised to itself an eternal monument in the annals of Austria. All his plans were now directed towards gaining the bridges across the Danube near Vienna, and endeavouring to save the imperial residence by a combat under its very walls.—Vienna, formerly an important fortress, was in vain besieged by the Turks, and would even now, from the solidity of its ramparts, the strong profiles of its works, and the extensive system of its mines, be capable of making a protracted resistance, had not, for upwards of a century back, the luxury of a large metropolis, the wants of ease, the conflux of all the magnates in the empire, and the pomp of a splendid court, totally effaced every consideration of military defence. Palaces adorn the rampart, the casemates and ditches were converted into workshops of tradesmen, plantations mark the counter-scarpes of the fortress, and avenues of trees traverse the glacis, uniting the most beautiful suburbs in the world to the corps de la place.—

Although under such circumstances no obstinate resistance of the capital was to be expected, yet from the unexampled loyalty of the inhabitants it was confidently hoped that Vienna might for a few days serve as a tête-de-pont to cover the passage of the river; whence all preparations amounted to no more than to secure the place against a coup-de-main; and for this reason the Archduke had some time before directed field-marshal Hiller to send part of his corps along the right bank towards the capital, in the event of his (the Archduke's) passage to the left shore.—Field-marshal Hiller now received orders to burn the bridge near Stain in his rear, to leave a small corps of observation near Krems, to hasten by forced marches with the bulk of his army to the environs of Vienna, and, as circumstances would permit, by occupying the small islands, to keep up the communication with the city and the débouché across the bridges.—The army of the Archduke now advanced without interruption, by Neupolla, Horn, and Weikendorf upon Stockerau; and, in order to overawe such enterprizes as the enemy might project from the environs of Lintz, part of the corps of the general of artillery count Kollowrath, which till then had remained near Pilsen with a view to secure the North and West frontier of Bohemia, was ordered to march to Budweis.—Napoleon had used so much expedition on his march to Vienna, that on the 9th of May his advanced troops appeared on the glacis of the fortress, whence they were driven by some cannon shot. From three to four thousand regular troops, as many armed citizens, and some battalions of country militia, defended the city; ordnance of various calibre was placed upon the ramparts; the suburbs were abandoned on account of their great extent; and the numerous islands and low bushy ground behind the town were occupied by some light troops of the corps of Hiller as well as by militia.—The corps itself was posted on what is termed "the Point" on the left shore of the river, waiting the arrival of the army, which was advancing in haste.—The occupation of Vienna formed too essential a part in the extensive plans of the French Emperor; its conquest had been announced by him with too much confidence, and was of too great importance towards confirming the prejudice of his irresistible power, for him

not to employ every method of taking it before the assistance which was so near could arrive.—For the space of twenty-four hours the howitzers played upon the town: and though several houses were set on fire, the courage of the inhabitants remained unshaken. But a general devastation threatened their valuable property, and when at length the enemy, availing himself of the numerous craft which he found there, crossed the smaller branches of the Danube, dislodged the troops from the nearest islands, and menaced their communication with the left bank, the city was justified in capitulating, while the troops retreated by the great bridge of Tabor, which they afterwards set on fire.—The Archduke received this intelligence in head quarters, between Horn and Meissau, and though it was scarcely to be expected that this city, surrounded as it was, should continue its resistance, the Archduke proceeded on his march without interruption, flattering himself that he might be able to execute his favourite project by a bold attempt to pass the Danube near Vienna.—This city capitulated on the 13th of May, so that there was no farther occasion to expose the army to hazard by crossing the Danube, for which no sufficient preparation had been made, and which must have been effected in the face of the enemy, and under local circumstances of the greatest disadvantage. By the surrender of Vienna the army had also lost a point of support on which to rest its military operations.—In this situation of affairs the Archduke resolved to collect his army at the foot of the hill Bisamberg, and allow it a few days of rest, which, after so many forced marches, it urgently wanted. The cavalry, for the convenience of water, was posted along the Russ, a small rivulet, which is concealed by ground covered with bushes, and the advanced guards pushed forward to the Danube, in order to observe the movements of the enemy, and prevent his passing the river, which he had already attempted to do from Nussdorf, to what is called the Black Lake, but with so little success, that a battalion of his advanced guard was taken. The chain of the outposts extended on the left side as far as the March, and on the right to Krems; this place and Presburg were occupied by some battalions;

(*To be continued.*)

LONDON :—Printed by T. C. HANSARD, Peterborough - Court, Fleet - Street ;
Published by R. BAGSHAW, Brydges-Street, Covent - Garden :—Sold also by J. BUDD, Pall-Mall.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

Vol. XVI. No. 3.] LONDON, SATURDAY, JULY 22, 1809.

[Price 1s.

65]

[66

TO THE PUBLIC.

*Winchester, Thursday Evening,
20th July, 1809.*

For one week in seven years, I may, I think, be excused from writing for the press. I have not, however, been idle, even in the way of politics; and shall, I hope, be able to make, in my next, amends for what I am now prevented from doing by want of time.

WM. COBBETT.

MEETING OF THE CREDITORS OF HER ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCESS OF WALES.—*From the Morning Chronicle, July 17, 1809.*

We have been favoured by a Creditor with the following Account of what passed at a Meeting of the Creditors of the Princess of Wales, held on Friday last, at the York Hotel, Bridge-street, Blackfriars, in consequence of a Letter circulated by Messrs. Blagrove and Walter, their Solicitors, intimating that Mr. Adam, the Prince's Chancellor, and Mr. Gray, his Royal Highness's Deputy Treasurer, would attend, when the Plan which the Prince had adopted to, pay their Debts, and secure them in future; would be laid before them.—Mr. Adam stated to the Creditors, that the Prince had taken their case into his most serious and gracious consideration in every point of view. That his Royal Highness's object was not merely to pay the Debt in the manner already settled and accepted, but to secure them in future as far as the law would enable him; that the affairs of his Royal Highness were all administered under an Act of the 35th of the King, which rendered it illegal for the Prince to grant any bond or obligation, and protected him against personal action; but rendered his revenue liable, if the Creditors followed out the provisions of the Act, by delivering in their bills signed within ten days after the quarter, and provided they sued

on them within three months from that delivery. Mr. Adam then stated, that the Prince's Treasurer had uniformly and regularly every quarter paid the allowance of 12,000*l.* a year to the Officer of her Royal Highness; that this had never been in arrear one instant from 1802 to the present time; that Mr. Gray (who was present) was the person who paid it; that the Prince had always paid this sum to the Princess without deducting the Income Tax, although there was 12,000*l.* per annum deducted from him at the Exchequer on that account. That his Royal Highness had now increased the Princess's income to 17,000*l.* a year, to be paid quarterly without deducting the income tax. That the Princess was paid for personal expences at the Exchequer, 5,000*l.* a year, making in all an income of 22,000*l.* Mr. Adam then stated, that it was upon this increased income of 17,000*l.* a year nett, that the Prince had devised the security for the Creditors in future, having made it a condition, that the Princess should appoint an officer to receive that income, who was enjoined in the settling the accounts, to follow the course prescribed by the Act of Parliament for regulating the Expenditure of the Prince. Mr. Adam said, that a paper to this effect had been accordingly signed by the Princess, so that the Creditors had now only to observe the forms of the Act of Parliament to ensure their payment; but the Prince did not stop here, but in providing for his own future indemnity, the particulars of which Mr. Adam said he did not enter into, as not belonging to that place or meeting, the Prince had taken care that if this voluntary regulation did not effectuate the object, the legislature was to be applied to. Mr. Adam then said, that the Prince had by economical regulations appropriated as large a sum as his circumstances would admit, to discharge this debt, greater in proportion than he had been enabled to apply to his own, which he was sure his own Creditors would justify, as from the moment he undertook the payment of the Debts of the Princess, they were to be considered as debts of honour. Mr. Adam then said, that the regularity of the pay-

C

ments might be depended upon. There was an event, however, of which some of the Creditors had expressed a dread, the calamity of being deprived of the Prince, Mr. Adam assured them that that event had not been unthought of by his Royal Highness. The Prince could not by law bind himself by deed or note, but he had property and rights which might be rendered available in case of the event alluded to, and these would be so regulated that his Royal Highness had the heartfelt satisfaction to think, that no person would suffer ultimately any loss by him.—Mr. Adam said, this nearly comprised the whole matter which he had to lay before them, which would be most satisfactory, he had no doubt, to them, and would convince them that every thing that could be done for their benefit within the Prince's power was done, and that without his Royal Highness's intervention they could never have received any thing. That their petition, without the consent of his Majesty, signified by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, would never have been received in the House of Commons; and Mr. Adam said he knew that such consent would have been refused. So that unless the Prince had spontaneously undertaken for the arrangement of their debts, the Creditors would have had no redress. In doing this the Prince stipulated, that he should be fully indemnified against future demands, a claim which his Royal Highness was held to be justified in making, because, to the 41,000*l.*, there was to be added the sum of 34,000*l.*, which the Princess had received from his Majesty's Droits of Admiralty, making together 75,000*l.* of debt contracted by her Royal Highness; which divided on the number of years, exceeded by many thousand pounds a year the greatest income ever proposed for her Royal Highness; that after the payment of 41,000*l.* had been undertaken by the Prince, and a guarantee against future demands arranged to his satisfaction, Mr. Adam said, that towards the conclusion of the business, it was stated to him by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to be by him (Mr. Adam) laid before the Prince, that the debt was 8,000*l.* more than the 41,000*l.* This his Royal Highness took also into his most gracious consideration, and gave his commands to Mr. Adam to represent to those of the King's Confidential Servants, who were engaged in the transaction;—“That the main and principal object which had uniformly directed his Royal

Highness's determination, and which he had never for a moment lost sight of in any one part of this transaction, had been to prevent (in these times of great and necessary expenditure) any debt of his own or any other for which he might be considered liable, becoming either directly or circuitously a burden upon the country. That he had been likewise greatly influenced by the desire of seeing justice done to the Creditors of the Princess, although under no legal obligation whatever to pay those Debts.—On these grounds the Prince of Wales gave it to be understood to those of his Majesty's Ministers concerned in the transaction, that his Royal Highness would spontaneously take upon himself the payment of the sum of 8,000*l.*, in addition to the sum of 41,000*l.*, formerly undertaken to be liquidated by his Royal Highness upon the indemnity being given to him; and by so doing, his Royal Highness had the satisfaction of preserving the public from any burden, directly or indirectly, and of seeing justice done to the Creditors of the Princess, who had no other means whatever of being relieved, but through the voluntary interposition of his Royal Highness.”—Mr. Adam then observed, that the whole debt of 49,000*l.* being thus assumed by his Royal Highness, the Prince gave directions to Mr. Gray and himself (Mr. Adam,) to make the instalments as liberal as possible. In consequence of which 10,000*l.* has now been paid, and the second instalment would be paid in the first week of January.

LOWER CANADA.—*Speech of the Governor General*, on dissolving the Provincial Parliament. From the Quebec Gazette, May 16, 1809.*

Gentlemen of the Legislative Council, and Gentlemen of the House of Assembly; The advanced state of the season, your private convenience, and the happy change that has taken place in the relations between his Majesty's Government and that of the United States, from which we may reasonably look for a permanence of the public tranquillity, together with other circumstances, have induced me to put an end to this Session: and upon a full consideration of the events by which it has been marked, I feel it to be a duty which I owe to his Majesty and to the Province,

* Lieut. Gen. Sir James Henry Craig, K. B.

to recur, as speedily as circumstances will permit, to the sense of his subjects, by calling a new Parliament.

Gentlemen of the House of Assembly; When I met you at the commencement of the present Session, I had no reason to doubt your moderation or your prudence, and I therefore willingly relied upon both. Under the guidance of these principles, I expected from you a manly sacrifice of all personal animosities, and individual dissatisfaction, a watchful solicitude for the concerns of your country, and a steady perseverance in the executing of your public duty, with zeal and dispatch. I looked for earnest endeavours to promote the general harmony of the Province, and a careful abstinence from whatever might have a tendency to disturb it; for due, and therefore indispensable attention to the other branches of the legislature, and for prompt and cheerful co-operation and assistance in whatever might conduce to the happiness and welfare of the colony. All this I had a right to expect, because such was your constitutional duty; because, such a conduct would have been a lasting testimony, as it was the only one sought for by His Majesty's Government, of that loyalty and affection, which you have so warmly professed, and which I believe you to possess, and because it was particularly called for by the critical conjuncture of the times, and especially by the precarious situation in which we then stood, with respect to the American States. I am sorry to add, that I have been disappointed in all these expectations, and in every hope on which I relied.—You have wasted in fruitless debates, excited by private and personal animosities, or by frivolous contests, upon trivial matters of form, that time and those talents, to which, within your walls, the public have an exclusive title; this abuse of your functions you have preferred to the high and important duties which you owe to your sovereign and to your constituents; and you have, thereby, been forced to neglect the consideration of matters of moment and necessity, which were before you, while you have at the same time virtually prevented the introduction of such others, as may have been in contemplation. If any further proof of this misuse of your time were necessary, I have just presented it, in having been called on, after a session of five weeks, to exercise his Majesty's prerogative of assent, to only the same number of Bills, three of which were the

mere renewal of annual acts, to which you stood pledged, and which required no discussion.—So much of intemperate heat has been manifested in all your proceedings, and you have shewn such a prolonged and disrespectful inattention to matters submitted to your consideration by the other branches of the legislature, that whatever might be the moderation and forbearance exercised on their parts, a general good understanding is scarcely to be looked for without a new Assembly.—I shall not particularly advert to other acts, which appear to be unconstitutional infringements of the rights of the subject, repugnant to the very letter of that statute of the Imperial Parliament, under which you hold your seats, and to have been matured by proceedings, which amount to a dereliction of the first principles of natural justice; and I shall abstain from any further enumeration of the causes by which I have been induced to adopt the determination, which I have taken, because, the part of your conduct to which I have already referred, is obviously and in a high degree, detrimental to the best interests of the country, such as my duty to the crown forbids me to countenance, and as compels me to have recourse to a dissolution as the only constitutional means, by which its recurrence may be prevented.

Gentlemen of the Legislative Council, and Gentlemen of the House of Assembly; I shall give the necessary orders for calling the new Provincial Parliament, as soon as convenience will permit, and having no other object, and confident that no other will be attributed to me, but to preserve the true principles of the free and happy constitution of the Province, and to employ the power intrusted to me by his Majesty, to the only end for which I have received it, the good of his subjects. I have an entire confidence in the electors, to whom I shall recur, trusting that by the choice of proper representatives further mischiefs may be obviated, and the important interests of the colony considered in the next Session, with less interruption and happier effect.—I will not conceal from you that it has been very much with the view to obviate misrepresentation, if possible, and to enable the people to judge of the grounds which have been afforded me for the conduct I have adopted, that I have entered into any detail upon the subject; the task has been painful to me in the extreme, and I turn from it with peculiar satisfaction to

offer to you, Gentlemen of the Legislative Council, the acknowledgments that are due to you for that unanimity, zeal, and unremitting attention, which you have shewn in your proceedings. It rests not with you that so little has been accomplished for the public good. To a considerable portion of the House of Assembly my thanks are equally due. I trust they will believe, that I do them the justice of a proper discrimination, in the sense I entertain of their efforts to avert that conduct, of which I have so much reason to complain. By this, Gentlemen,* you have truly manifested your affection to his Majesty's Government, and your just estimation of the real and permanent interests of the province.

Then the Honourable Speaker of the Legislative Council said,

Gentlemen of the Legislative Council, and Gentlemen of the House of Assembly; It is his Excellency the Governor-in-Chief's will that this Provincial Parliament be prorogued until Wednesday, the 21st of June next, and this Provincial Parliament is prorogued until the 21st day of June next, accordingly.

FINANCES OF AMERICA.—*Report of the Secretary of the Treasury to both Houses of Congress, 1809.*

In obedience to the directions of the Act supplementary to the Act entitled, "An Act to establish the Treasury Department," the Secretary of the Treasury respectfully submits the following Report:

The net Revenue arising from duties on merchandize and tonnage, which accrued in the year 1807, amounted, as it appeared by the last annual statement, to 16,060,000 dollars.

A correct statement of that Revenue for the year 1808 cannot be prepared at this time, but may be estimated, as will appear by the estimate A, to about 10,270,000 dollars.

The Revenue arising from the same sources which accrued during the first quarter of this year, did not much exceed one million of dollars; and although considerable importations may be expected

* It was observed that at this part his Excellency turned towards and addressed himself particularly to Judge De Bonne, Messrs. Blackwood, De Salaberry, Denicheau, and one or two other of those gentlemen who acted and voted with them, and who were standing together.

from Great Britain and the West Indies during the last six months of this year, yet, considering that there will be no arrivals from China and the East Indies, and the situation of the commercial intercourse of the United States with the rest of the world, it is not probable that the Revenue accruing during the year 1809 will exceed that of the year 1808.

	Dollars.
The specie in the Treasury on the 1st of Oct. 1808, amounted to	13,845,717 52
And the receipts during the last three months of that year, as appears by the statement (B) to	3,537,316 99
	<hr/> 17,483,034 51

The disbursements during the same period have amounted, including 6,103,000 dollars paid in reimbursement of the principal of the public debt, to	7,491,339 79
Leaving a balance in the Treasury, on the 1st of Jan. 1809, of ...	9,941,694 72.
	<hr/> 17,433,034 51

The Cash in the hands of the Collectors and Receivers, and the outstanding Revenue Bonds, amounted, on the 1st of Jan. 1809, to	9,880,000
From which, deducting for the Expences of Collection, and for the Drawbacks payable during the year 1809	3,000,000.
Leaves for the probable Receipts of the year 1809, exclusively of the inconsiderable sums which may be received on account of the Revenue accruing during that year, a sum of	6,880,000
Making together with the Balance in the Treasury on the 1st of Jan. 1809, the sum of	9,941,000
	<hr/> 16,821,000

An aggregate of 16,821,000 dollars applicable to the expenditure of this year.

The Expences of the year 1809 are in conformity with the existing appropriations, estimated at 14,500,000 dollars, consisting of the following items:—

Civil List (including the expences of this session of Congress) miscellaneous expences of foreign intercourse	1,242,000
Military and Indian Departments, viz.	
Appropriation for the army and departments	2,795,000
Ditto for fortifications	475,000
Arms and military stores ..	550,000
	<hr/> 3,820,000
Naval Departments, this year's appropriation	2,915,000
Public debt (1,517,000 dollars of the appropriation of 8,000,000 dollars for the year 1809, having been paid in advance in the year 1808, in order to effect the reimbursement of the whole of 8 per cent. stock)	5,453,000
	<hr/> 14,430,000

It must, however, be observed, that the estimate of the sums payable in the course of this year on account of the drawbacks, is conjectural, and that the exportations, particularly of colonial produce, would, if the restrictions laid by the continental powers of Europe on neutral commerce were removed, produce a much greater defalcation in the net receipt into the Treasury than the sum assumed in the preceding estimate. In order to guard against any inconveniency arising from that contingency, and for the purpose of keeping always a moderate sum in the Treasury, it may be necessary to borrow a sum equal to the amount of the principal of the public debt, which will be reimbursed during the year, and which will exceed three millions of dollars.

Vienna, June 26.—A sadler of Vienna was shot on the glacis, convicted of having buried in his house three pieces of cannon before the French entered the town. To prevent fresh examples of severity, the governor-general has just renewed the orders already published, relative to the declaration respecting arms and ammunition, by the following Proclamation:—

“INHABITANTS OF VIENNA!—It is some time since the spirit of disorder has misled the multitude. This seditious spirit had manifested itself in popular groups and meetings; Austrian prisoners of war have been taken away in some measure by force; fire-arms, weapons, ammunition, and articles belonging to the artillery, were still hid; insults, provocations, acts of violence, the inevitable consequence of perfidious instigations, and illusory or criminal hopes, threatened the tranquillity of the city, and safety of peaceful citizens, which safety they owe to the special protection of his Majesty the Emperor and King. The clemency of his Majesty has not been exhausted; but a longer impunity would be fatal; and he has ordered that these acts of temerity should be checked by examples of rigour. Two guilty persons have been condemned, and have undergone their sentence. Severe, but just measures, will further repress the audacity of the seditious, if they should dare to shew themselves. These will also strike those, who, not obeying the laws which have been promulgated, would have to reproach themselves with crimes against the public safety.—Every inhabitant, who has in his house Austrian prisoners of war, shall instantly make a declaration of it, as well as

concerning all arms, powder, ammunition, and articles belonging to the artillery, which were formerly in the Austrian arsenals.—Three days are granted for the execution of the last article; after this period, the offenders shall be seized, and punished according to the rigour of the law.—Inhabitants of Vienna! Your own interest calls upon you to repel the perfidious insinuations of instigators: it is that class of persons who, having nothing to lose, excite sedition in the hope of gaining by pillage. Exercise the closest watchfulness over the evil disposed; concur in maintaining the general tranquillity, and you will render yourselves worthy of the benevolence his Majesty the Emperor and King is always ready to evince towards you, and of which he has already given you the most striking proofs.

(Signed)

“ANDREOSSY,

“General of Division, &c.”

“*Vienna, June 27, 1809.*”

Proclamation to the Poles.

Frederic Augustus, King of Saxony, &c. Poles!—Already has the army, which had invaded our duchy of Warsaw, been forced by the victories of our great regenerator, and the valour of our troops, to abandon the capital and return to its own territory.—After having rendered thanks to Divine Providence for the signal protection it has granted us, it becomes our duty to employ the first moments of the re-establishment of our government, in expressing the sentiments which have been raised in us by the patriotism and attachment with the nation has so splendidly displayed in that moment of calamity.—The enemy had entered the country with a numerous army. It appeared scarcely possible to resist him; but he soon learnt the power of courage, when led by a chief so brave and able as our minister of war, prince Poniatowski.—Poles! Your battalions, which the great hero has created, and in whom he has inspired that valiant spirit, the best proofs of which are before his eyes, have shewn they were worthy their creator. Inferior in number, they not only resisted the enemy, but successfully attacked him.—They have carried victory into his provinces, and have every where covered themselves with glory.—The whole nation have on their part shewn that the valour and patriotism of the ancient Poles is theirs.—The invasion of a numerous enemy, far

from intimidating them, has only stimulated them to voluntary and extraordinary offers to sacrifice their private fortunes. They have wholly devoted themselves to the defence of their country. The departments have emulated each other, in filling the ranks of the armies, and furnishing the necessary contributions. They have proved that the love of their country is a national quality, and have rendered themselves worthy to become models of that quality. Providence has also crowned those generous efforts with success.—Our council of state has, by its zeal and wisdom, seconded by all the other constitutional authorities, succeeded in maintaining the measures of the government, as far as circumstances would permit.—Poles! Your country owes its safety to you; it owes to you the approbation of your great regenerator, whose notice the brave conduct of the army, and the ardent zeal of the nation, will not have escaped. It owes to you increased respect among its neighbours, and the glory which the sovereign feels in reigning over such a nation.—Though at a distance, our heart has ever been with you. Your situation was ever present to us. Your fidelity and attachment to us, has increased, if possible, our's to you; and we have been unable to afford you the assistance our heart desired: it was with pain we were prevented by circumstances.—Polish people!—Tranquillity is restored to you, and the constitutional government. Our great solicitude shall be to endeavour to heal the wounds the war has occasioned, reward merit, and restore order; which your future happiness requires. On your part you will contribute to this by entire confidence in the government; which will be guided by our paternal intentions.—Given at Frankfort, on the Maine, June 24, 1809.

• “FREDERIC AUGUSTUS.”

PROCLAMATION, dated Frankfort, June 24.

Frederic Augustus, by the grace of God, King of Saxony, &c.—Divine Providence has been so beneficent to us, that since we have been called to the government, we have had only the agreeable duty of offering him the homage of the sincerest gratitude; and we have discharged this duty with so much the more ardour, as our heart feels no greater joy than in knowing that they are happy whose felicity is entrusted to us. We had last year especially reason to bless the goodness of God, when a generous conqueror restored to us our es-

tates, which were already lost; and this felicity became more precious, when a personal acquaintance with this great man, added to affection and the sincerest gratitude, our admiration and our veneration of his great qualities, which have never been sufficiently appreciated; and fixed the basis of a genuine esteem, on which our mutual alliance is as firmly established as on treaties, and which renders it doubly indissoluble.—Even at the present moment of trouble, it was for me a great consolation to behold our country enjoy an almost perfect tranquillity, while the torch of war was enkindled in other states, and there spread its ravages anew. We believed it necessary to abandon for a time our good city of Dresden, and fix our abode at Leipsic, which is no great distance. We hoped that we could continue there, to apply our labours to the government of our faithful subjects; the more so, as, according to the course the war had taken, an hostile invasion of our country was by no means probable.—We were so much the more painfully affected at beholding this hope vanish, and being obliged to remove from Leipsic to a considerable distance, in order to place ourselves out of danger, by avoiding the route in which the troops which were advancing from Bohemia, upon Saxony and Franconia, might seize our person and royal family.—But we live in the entire confidence that Divine Providence will bless our efforts for the deliverance of our country, and that, supported by the forces of his majesty the king of Westphalia, our faithful neighbour and ally, we shall return.—We believe it to be our duty, faithful and beloved Saxons, to impart this confidence to you, removed as we are from you, in order to tranquillise you. In the mean while we thank you publicly for supporting your situation with tranquillity and dignity, that you have lent no ear to the enemy, and in this given new proof of that love and attachment towards us which are our felicity, and which we feel equally for you.—It is therefore with confidence that we exhort you to attach yourselves more and more to our principles, which, hitherto, thanks to God, have always constituted the happiness of the country, and at the same time to consider and avert the evils which the ill-intentioned might seek to scatter among you, by propagating an erroneous doctrine.—For it cannot be unknown to you, that there are in our dominions, people weak, seduced, or wicked, who not only do not approve of our sys-

tem, and the principles on which we have only from conviction adopted it, but who dare to avow and even act in a contrary manner.—We seriously enjoin by these presents all the authorities of our kingdom to observe with great attention those who render themselves suspicious by a like mode of thinking, and especially those who disturb peace by rash discourse, or by open acts, as well as those who spread intelligence which may disquiet well-intentioned citizens, and deprive our constant efforts for the permanent tranquillity of our subjects, of a part of their effect; and, in general, we charge them to neglect nothing in order that our subjects may conduct themselves according to the principles above announced, and that our benevolent intentions may be entirely fulfilled.—In testimony of which, we have signed these presents with our hand, and annexed our royal seal. Given at Frankfurt on the Maine, June 18, 1809:

FREDERICK AUGUSTUS.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRENCH ARMY IN AUSTRIA.—*Twenty Third Bulletin, dated Vienna, June 28.*

On the 25th of this month his Majesty reviewed a great number of troops on the heights of Schoenbrunn. There was observed a fine line of 8,000 cavalry, of which the guard formed a part, and in which there was only one regiment of cuirassiers. There was also a line of 200 pieces of cannon. The appearance and martial air of the troops excited the admiration of the spectators.—On Saturday the 24th, at four o'clock in the afternoon, our troops entered Raab; on the 25th, the garrison, prisoners of war, set out. According to an estimate made, they are found to amount to 2,500 men. His Majesty has given to the general of division, Narbonne, the command of this place, and of all the Hungarian states surrendered to the French arms.—The duke of Auerstadt is before Presburg. The enemy works at the fortifications: it was intimated to him to cease from his works, unless he wished to draw upon the peaceable inhabitants the greatest misfortunes; he took no notice of it; 4,000 bombs and obuses have compelled him to renounce his project, but the fire broke out in this unfortunate city, and several quarters have been burnt.—The duke of Ragusa, with the army of Dalmatia, passed the Drave on the 22d, and marched to Gratz. On the 24th gen. Vandamme em-

barked 300 Wurtemburghers, commanded by major Kichler, at Molli, in order to throw themselves upon the opposite shores and gain intelligence. The debarkation has been effected. These troops routed two companies of the enemy, and took two officers, and eighty men of the regiment of Mitrowski prisoners.—The prince of Ponte Corvo, and the Saxon army, are at St. Polten. The duke of Dantzic, who is at Lintz, ordered gen. Walle to reconnoitre on the left bank. All the enemy's posts were driven in; several officers and twenty men were taken. The object of this reconnoitering was also to procure intelligence.—The city of Vienna is plentifully furnished with meat; the supply of bread is more difficult, on account of the impediments in grinding. In respect of the subsistence of the army, it is secured for six months; it has wine and vegetables in abundance. The wines of the cellars of the convents have been placed in a magazine, to furnish distributions to the army. Several millions of bottles have there been collected.—On the 10th of April, at the very time when the Austrian general prostituted his character, and spread a snare for the king of Bavaria, by writing a letter which has appeared in all the public papers, gen. Chastellar excited the Tyrol to insurrection, and surprised 700 French conscripts who were going to Augsburg, where their regiments were, and who were marching in the confidence of peace—obliged to surrender and made prisoners, they were massacred. Among them were 80 Belgians, born in the same town as Chastellar.—Eighteen hundred Bavarians made prisoners at the same time, were also massacred. Chastellar, who commanded, was witness to these horrors. He not only made no opposition to them, but he is accused of having smiled at the massacre, hoping that the Tyrolians, having to dread the vengeance due to a crime which they could not hope would be pardoned, must be more firmly engaged in their rebellion.—When his Majesty was made acquainted with these atrocities, he found himself in a difficult situation. If he had chosen to have recourse to reprisals, 20 generals, 1,000 officers, and 80,000 men, made prisoners during the month of April, might have satisfied the manes of the unhappy French, so cowardly butchered. But prisoners do not appertain to the power for whom they have fought; they are under the safeguard of the honour and generosity of the nation which has disarmed them.

His Majesty considered Chastellar as acting without being authorized; for, notwithstanding the furious proclamations and violent language of the princes of the House of Loraine, it was impossible to believe they could approve such crimes; his Majesty, in consequence, published the following

Order of the Day.

"Imperial head-quarters, Ens, May 5, 1809.—By orders of the Emperor, the person named Chastellar, stiling himself a general in the service of Austria, the mover of the insurrection in the Tyrol, charged with being the author of the massacres committed on the Bavarian and French prisoners by the insurgents, shall, upon being made prisoner, be carried immediately before the military commission, and if judged guilty, be shot within 24 hours. The Prince of NEUFCHATEL, Vice Constable. Major-general ALEXANDRE."

At the battle of Esling, gen. Durosnel carrying an order to an advanced squadron, was made prisoner by 25 uhlands. The emperor of Austria, proud of so easy a triumph, caused to be published an Order of the Day, conceived in the following terms:—

Copy of a Letter from his majesty the Emperor of Austria, to Prince Charles.

"Wolkersdorf, May 25, 1809.

"My dear brother; I have learned that the emperor Napoleon has declared the marquis of Chastellar out of the protection of the law of nations. This unjust conduct, contrary to the usages of nations, and of which there is no example in the latter periods of history, obliges me to have recourse to reprisals, and in consequence I order, that generals Durosnel and Foulers shall be kept as hostages, to undergo the same fate and same treatment as the emperor Napoleon shall make gen. Chastellar suffer. It is repugnant to my feelings to give such an order; but I owe it to my brave warriors, and to my brave people, who may be exposed to a similar fate, while fulfilling their duties with ardent fidelity. I charge you to make known this letter to the army, and to send it by a flag of truce to the major-general of the emperor Napoleon. (Signed) FRANCIS."

"As soon as this Order of the Day came to the knowledge of his majesty, he ordered the arrest of the prince Colloredo, prince Metternich, count Pergett, and count Hardick, and that they should be conveyed to France, to answer for the

lives of generals Durosnel and Foulers. The major-general wrote to the chief of the staff of the Austrian army, the following letter:—

To the major-general of the Austrian army.

"Schoenbrunn, June 6, 1809.

"Sir—His majesty the Emperor has been made acquainted with an Order given by the emperor Francis, which declares that the French generals Durosnel and Foulers, whom the circumstances of war have placed in his power, shall answer for the punishment which the laws of justice may inflict on monsieur Chastellar, who has put himself at the head of the insurgents of the Tyrol, and who has permitted the murder of 700 French prisoners, and between 18 and 1900 Bavarians, a crime unheard of in the history of nations, and which might have caused a terrible reprisal on 40 field-marshal lieutenants, 36 major-generals, more than 300 colonels or majors, 1200 officers, and 80,000 soldiers, if his majesty did not consider prisoners as placed under his faith and honour, and had not besides proofs that the Austrian officers in the Tyrol have been as indignant at the action as ourselves.—His majesty, however, has ordered that prince Colloredo, prince Metternich, count Frederick Hardick and count Pergett, shall be arrested and conveyed to France, to answer for the safety of generals Durosnel and Foulers, threatened by the Order of the Day of your sovereign: these officers may die, sir—but they shall not die without being revenged—this vengeance shall not fall on any prisoners, but on the relatives of those who shall order their death.—As to M. Chastellar, he is not yet in the power of the army; but if he should be taken, you may be assured that he will be delivered* to a military commission, and that his trial will take place.—I request your Excellency to believe the sentiments of my high consideration.

(Signed) ALEXANDRE."

The city of Vienna and the states of Lower Austria solicited the clemency of his majesty, and requested to send a deputation to the emperor Francis, to convince him of the impropriety of the proceeding with respect to the generals Durosnel and Foulers, to represent that Chastellar was not condemned, that he was not arrested, but only accused before the tribunals, that the fathers, wives, children and property of the Austrian generals were in the hands of the French, and that the French

army was determined, if a single prisoner was put to death, to make an example, of which posterity should long preserve the remembrance. The esteem which his majesty entertains for the good inhabitants of Vienna and the states, determined him to accede to this request. He granted permission to M. M. Colloredo, Metternich, Harddick and Pergen to remain at Vienna, and to the deputation to set out for the head-quarters of the emperor of Austria. This deputation has returned. The emperor Francis has replied to these representations, that he was ignorant of the massacre of the French prisoners in the Tyrol, that he pitied the miseries of the capital and the provinces, that his ministers had deceived him, &c. &c. &c. The deputies reminded him, that all prudent men saw with pain the existence of a handful of intriguers, who by the measures they advised, the proclamations, orders of the day, &c. which they caused to be adopted, endeavour only to foment passions and hatred, and to exasperate an enemy who is master of Croatia, Carniola, Carinthia, Styria, Upper and Lower Austria, the capital of the Empire, and a great part of Hungary—that the sentiments of the emperor for his subjects ought to incline him to calm rather than irritate the conqueror, and to give to war the character natural to it among civilized nations, since it is in the power of the conqueror to render more heavy the evils which press on the half of the monarchy. It is said that the emperor Francis conceived that the greater part of the papers mentioned by the deputies were fictitious, and that those, the existence of which was not denied, were more moderate; that the editors were besides French clerks, and that even when these papers did contain some inconvenient things, they were not perceived till the mischief was done. If this answer, which is publicly reported, is authentic, we have one observation to make:—It is impossible not to perceive the influence of England; for this small number of men, traitors to their country, are certainly in the pay of that power.—When the deputies went to Buda, they saw the empress. She had been obliged to leave this city some days before. They found her dispirited, altered, and in consternation at the evils which threatened her house. The opinion of the monarchy is extremely unfavourable to the family of this princess. It was that family which excited the war. The archduke Palatine, and

the archduke Regnier, are the only Austrian princes who defended the maintenance of the peace. The empress was far from foreseeing the events that have taken place. She has shed many tears; she has shewn great alarm at the thick cloud which covers the future. She spoke of peace; she requested peace; she conjured the deputies to speak to the emperor in favour of peace.—They reported that the conduct of the archduke Maximilian had been disowned, and that the emperor had sent him into the interior of Hungary.

Twenty-Fourth Bulletin, dated Vienna, July 3.

Gen. Broussier had left two battalions of the 84th regiment of the line in the town of Gratz, and proceeded to Vildon, to join the army of Dalmatia. On the 26th of June, gen. Giulay appeared before Gratz, with 10,000 men, composed, it is true, of Croats and frontier-regiments. The 84th, which was cantoned in one of the suburbs of the town, repelled all attacks of the enemy, routed him every where, took 500 men prisoners, and two standards, and maintained himself in his position 14 hours, giving time to gen. Broussier to come to his assistance. This conflict, of one with ten, covered the 84th, and its colonel, Gambin, with honour. The standards were presented to his Majesty at the parade. We have to regret, that 20 of these brave fellows were killed, and 92 wounded.—On the 30th, the duke of Auerstadt attacked one of the islands of the Danube, at a small distance from the right bank, opposite Presburg, where the enemy had some troops.—Gen. Gudin directed this operation with skill; it was executed by col. Decouz, and the 21st regiment of infantry of the line, which this officer commands. At two o'clock of the morning, this regiment, partly in boats, and partly swimming, crossed a very narrow arm of the Danube, seized the island, routed the 1500 men who were upon it, and made 250 prisoners, among whom were the colonel and several officers of the regiment St. Julian, and took three pieces of cannon, which the enemy had landed for the defence of the island.—At length there exists no longer any Danube, as far as concerns the French army. General count Bertrand has raised works which excite astonishment, and inspire admiration.—Over a breadth of 400 fathoms, and over a very rapid river; he has in a fort-

night raised a bridge formed of 60 arches, on which three carriages can pass abreast; he has built a second bridge upon piles eight feet broad; but this is for infantry only. Next to these two bridges is a bridge of boats; we can, therefore, pass the Danube in three columns. These three bridges are secured against all insults, even against the effects of fire-ships and incendiary machines, by stoccadoes, raised on piles between the islands, in different directions, the furthest of which are at 250 fathoms from the bridges. When these immense works are contemplated, they might be thought to be the labour of many years; they were, however, produced in 15 or 20 days. These works are defended by têtes-de-pont, each 1600 fathoms in extent, formed of redoubts, surrounded by palisades, frises, and ditches filled with water. The island of Lobau is a strong post; it contains magazines of provisions, 100 pieces of heavy cannon, and 20 mortars or howitzers. Opposite Essling, on the left arm of the Danube, is a bridge, which the duke of Rivoli has fixed there. It is covered by a tête-de-pont, which had been raised there at the time of the first passage of the river.—General Legrand occupies the woods in the front of the tête-de-pont. The hostile army is in order of battle, covered with redoubts; the left is at Enzendorf, the right at Great Aspern; a few discharges of musketry from the advanced posts have taken place.—Now that the passage of the Danube is secured, and that our bridges are sheltered from every attempt, the fate of the Austrian monarchy will be decided in a single battle.—The waters of the Danube were, on the 1st of July, four feet above the lowest, and thirteen feet below the highest point. The rapidity of the river at this part is, when the waters are high, from seven to twelve feet; when the water is moderate, four feet six inches, each second, and more strong than at any other point. In Hungary it diminishes a great deal; and at the place where Trajan raised a bridge, it is almost insensible. The Danube is there 450 fathoms broad; here it is only 400. The bridge of Trajan was a stone bridge, the work of several years. Cæsar's bridge over the Rhine was raised, it is true, in eight days, but no loaded carriage could pass over it.—The works on the Danube are the most beautiful military works ever formed.—Prince Gazarin, aid-de-camp general of the emperor of Russia, arrived at Schoenbrunn, at four of the morning the day be-

fore yesterday, at the moment the Emperor was mounting on horseback. He set out from Petersburg, the 8th of June. He has brought intelligence of the march of the Russian army into Galicia.—His Majesty has quitted Schoenbrunn; he has been two days encamped. His tents are very beautiful, and made in the style of the Egyptian tents."

AUSTRIA.—*Supplement to the London Gazette of the 11th of July.*—(Continued from p. 64.)

The head-quarters of the Archduke were, on the 16th of May, at Ebersdorf, near the high road leading to Brunn.—On the 19th the outposts reported that the enemy had taken possession of the great island of Lobau, within about six English miles of Vienna; that his numbers increased there every hour, and that he seemed to be employed in throwing a bridge across the great arm of the Danube behind the island. From the top of the Bisamberg, the whole of the opposite country appeared to be enveloped in a cloud of dust, and the glitter of arms evinced a general movement of troops, beyond Summering, towards Kaiser-Ebersdorf, whither, according to later accounts, the Emperor Napoleon had removed his head-quarters, and was by his presence hastening and promoting the preparations for passing the river.—On the following morning, at day-break, the Archduke resolved to reconnoitre the island, and employ for this purpose, part of the advanced guard, under the command of field-marshal lieutenant count Klenau, supported by some regiments of cavalry.—The isle of Lobau forms a convenient place of arms, which is about six English miles long, and four and a half broad, and being separated by the large arm of the Danube from the right bank, nothing prevents the building of a bridge, which is concealed by ground covered with bushes; and the great extent of the island affords the advantage of sending troops and ordnance from so many points of it, that the passage across the smaller arm to the large plain of Marchfeld, may be made good by force of arms.—It was soon perceived by the strength of the enemy's columns which advanced upon the island, and placed their cannon so as to support the second passage, that he meditated a serious attack. The advanced guard sustained a tolerably warm engagement, and the cavalry routed the

first division of the enemy, which debouched from the low grounds on the edge of the river, late in the evening; upon which the Archduke, whose intention was not to prevent the passage of the enemy, but to attack him the following day, retreated with his cavalry to Anderklau, and ordered the advanced troops to fall back to Maass, according as the enemy should extend himself.—On the 21st at day-break the Archduke ordered his army under arms, and formed it in two lines on the rising ground behind Gerasdorf, and between the Bisam-hill and the rivulet Russ. The corps of lieutenant-gen. Hiller formed the right wing near Stammersdorf; on its left was the corps of the gen. of cavalry count Bellegarde, and next to that the corps of lieutenant-gen. prince Hohenzollern, in the alignment of Deutsch-Wagram. The corps of prince Rosenberg was posted by battalions in column on the Russbach on the rivulet Russ, kept Deutsch-Wagram strongly occupied, having, for the security of the left wing, placed on the heights beyond that place a division in reserve. The whole cavalry, which the day before had advanced under the command of prince Lichtenstein by Anderklau, was called back into the line, filling, in two lines, the space intervening between the left wing of prince Hohenzollern and the right of prince Rosenberg.—The vast plain of the March-field spread like a carpet before the front of the line, and appeared, by the absence of every obstruction, to be destined to form the theatre of some great event. The grenadiers remained in reserve near Seiering, and the corps of the gen. of artillery, prince of Reuss, kept the Bisam-hill, and the low bushy ground along the Danube strongly occupied. Part of it was still left near Krems, the corps being almost broke up by having so many of its divisions detached to so considerable a distance.—At nine o'clock, the Archduke ordered the arms to be piled, and the troops to dine. The piquet of observation on the Bisam-hill reported that the bridge across the Danube behind the isle of Lobau, being now quite finished, was plainly perceivable, and that troops were, without intermission, seen filing off over it, as well as passing in boats to the isle. The outposts, likewise, gave information of the gradual augmentation of the enemy in the town of Enzersdorf, and in the villages of Essling and Aspern, and of his advancing towards Hirschstetten.—The Archduke Charles now thought

that the moment for giving battle had arrived, and hastened to Gerasdorf, where the chief of his quartermaster-general's staff, gen. baron Wimpfen, sketched out the following plan.

Plan of Attack upon the hostile Army on its March between Essling and Aspern, and towards Hirschstetten.

The attack to be made in five columns. The first column, or the column of the right wing, is formed by the corps of lieutenant-gen. Hiller. It will advance from its present position in the direction between the "Point" and Leopoldau along the nearest arms of the Danube, pass along the left bank towards Stadelau and Aspern, keep constantly near the Danube and the meadows bordering upon it, and is vigorously to repulse the enemy, who most likely will meet it on the same road, and to drive him from the left bank. This column must not suffer its progress to be impeded by the batteries which the enemy perhaps may have erected on the islands, but must endeavour to silence them by its cannon, and spiritedly continue to advance.—The second column consists of the corps of the gen. of cavalry, count Bellegarde; leaving Gerasdorf to the left, it will march towards Leopoldau, endeavour to join the first column on the right, advance upon Kagan, and then, conjointly with the third column, upon the left, push forwards towards Hirschstetten.—The third column is composed of the corps of lieutenant-gen. prince Hohenzollern. It will march by Sussenbrunn to Breitenlee, and from thence towards Aspern, and will endeavour to join on its right the 2nd column, and on its left the 4th.—The fourth column under the command of lieutenant-gen. prince Rosenberg, is made up of that part of his corps which is posted on the right bank of the rivulet Russ: it is to advance, by Anderklau and Raschdorf, towards Essling.—The fifth column is formed by that part of prince Rosenberg's corps which stands between Deutsch-Wagram and Beaumersdorf, it will cross the Russ near Beaumersdorf, leave Raschdorf and Bischof to the right, endeavour to pass to the left round the town of Enzersdorf, and secure its left flank by the archduke Ferdinand's regiment of hussars.—The cavalry-reserve under the command of gen. prince Lichtenstein, to march by the way of Anderklau, without coming in contact with the fourth column, between Raschdorf and Breitenlee, and straight to the New Inn,

keeping continually at such a distance between the heads of the third and fourth columns as, in case of necessity, to be near at hand for the purpose of repelling the main body of the enemy's cavalry.—The grenadier corps of reserve to march from Seiering into the position which the corps of Bellegarde has taken up behind Gerasdorf.—All the columns and corps will march at twelve o'clock at noon. Their second lines to follow them at a suitable distance. Every column to form its own advanced guard. The order of march, and the distribution of the field pieces, to be left to the judgment of the commanders of the respective corps. The whole will march by half divisions. Lieut.-general Klenau to form the advanced guard of the fourth and fifth columns, and, before he advances, to suffer the heads of these columns to come quite up to him, in order that he may have at hand a sufficient support of infantry.—Of the corps of cavalry, the brigade under command of Veesey to be attached to the second column, and the regiment O'Reilly to the third; and both brigades are to repair immediately, the former to Gerasdorf, and the latter to Sussenbrunn.—The principal object in view is to drive back the enemy entirely over the first arms of the Danube, destroy the bridges he had thrown over them, and occupying the bank of the Lobau with a numerous artillery, especially howitzers.—The infantry will form on the plain in battalions, with half divisions from the centre.—His imperial highness the gen. in chief recommends order, closeness during the advance, and a proper use of every species of arms. His station will be with the second column.

Gerasdorf, May 21, 1809.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.
The 1st column consisted of 19	22	
2nd — — —	20	16
3rd — — —	22	8
4th — — —	13	8
5th — — —	13	16
The corps of cavalry —	78	
The corps of grenadiers 16	—	
Total	103	148

All which amounted to 75,000 men, effective troops.

Of artillery there were 18 batteries of brigade, 13 of position, and 11 of horse artillery; in the aggregate 288 pieces of different calibres.—The enemy had availed himself extremely well of the advantages

of the ground to cover his passage. The extensive villages of Essling and Aspern mostly composed of brick houses, and encircled all round by heaps of earth, resembled two bastions, between which double line of natural trenches, intended to draw off the water, served as the curtain, and afforded every possible security to the columns passing from the Isle Lobau. Essling had a granary furnished with loop-holes, and whose three stories afforded room for several hundred men while Aspern was provided with a storied church-yard. The left side of the latter village borders on an arm of the Danube. Both villages had a safe communication with the bushy ground near the Danube from which the enemy had it constant in his power to dispatch, unseen, reinforcements. The Isle of Lobau served at once as a place of arms and as a tete-de-pont, a bridge-head for the bridge, the rear across the main arm of the river.—The enemy, with the divisions of general Molitor, Boudet, Nansouty, Legrand, Epagne, Lasalle and Ferrand, under the marshals Massena and Lasnes, as well as marshal Bessieres, together with the guards of the Wurtemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt and Baden auxiliaries, had already left this position, and was directing his march towards Hirschstetten, when the first Austrian advanced guards met him.—If it be at all permitted in war, to indulge favourable presentiments, it was certainly excusable so to do at that great moment, when, on the 21st of May, exactly at twelve o'clock the columns began to put themselves in motion for the attack. A general enthusiasm had taken possession of the troop joyful war-songs, accompanied by Turkish music, resounded through the air, and were interrupted by shouts of "Long live our Emperor, long live Archduke Charles whenever the imperial general appears who had placed himself at the head of the second column. Every breast panting with anxious desire and high confidence after the decisive moment; and the fine weather favoured the awful scene."

Battle of the 21st of May.—First Column

The advanced guard under gen. Neuman, consisting of two battalions of Glay and Lichtenstein hussars, had formed near the destroyed bridge of Tabor, leaving the villages of Kagran and Hirschstetten to the left, and Stadlau to the right, marched in the plain towards Aspern. It was followed by the column

which, having left the high road before the post-office at Stammersdorf, had marched from the right by half divisions. Its right flank along the Danube was covered by a battalion of St. Georgians, by the 1st battalion of Vienna volunteers, and by a battalion of militia, under the command of major count Colloredo.—Within a cannon-shot of Stadlau the out-posts met the enemy's piquets, which gradually retreated to their original divisions.—At this time gen. Nordman ordered two battalions of Gyulay to draw up en echelon, in order to favour the advance of the column. The enemy drawn up in large divisions, stood immediately before Aspern, having, to cover his front, occupied all the ditches of the fields, which afforded excellent breast-works. His right was covered by a battery, and his left by a broad and deep ditch (one of those that carry off the waters of the Danube when it overflows), as well as by a bushy ground, which was likewise occupied by several bodies in close order.—Though the enemy had the advantage of position all to himself, inasmuch as the freshes of the Danube were only passable by means of a small bridge, at which he kept up a vigorous fire from behind the ditches both with cannon and small arms, it did not prevent the 2nd battalion of Gyulay, immediately after the first had penetrated as far as the bushy meadows, to pass the bridge in a column, to form without delay, and with charged bayonets to attack the enemy, who precipitately retreated to Aspern, on which occasion that village, after a vigorous but not very obstinate resistance, was taken for the first time. It was, however, not long before the enemy had it in his power, by the arrival of a fresh reinforcement, to expel again the battalions of Gyulay. By this time some battalions of the column had arrived, the chasseurs of major Schneider, of the 2nd column, joined the advanced guard of the 1st; Gyulay formed again, and the enemy was a second time pushed to the lower end of the village, though he succeeded again in regaining what he had lost.—Both parties were aware of the necessity of maintaining themselves in Aspern at any rate, which produced successively the most obstinate efforts both of attack and defence; the parties engaged each other in every street, in every house, and in every barn; carts, ploughs, and harrows were obliged to be removed during an uninterrupted fire, in order to get at the enemy; every indi-

vidual wall was an impediment of the assailants, and a rampart of the attacked; the steeple, lofty trees, the garrets and the cellars were to be conquered before either of the parties could stile itself master of the place, and yet the possession was ever of short duration; for no sooner had we taken a street or a house than the enemy gained another, forcing us to abandon the former. So this murderous conflict lasted for several hours; the German battalions were supported by Hungarians, who were again assisted by the Vienna volunteers, each rivalling the other in courage and perseverance. At the same time the 2nd column combined its attacks with those of the first, having to overcome the same resistance, by reason of the enemy's constantly leading fresh reinforcements into fire. At length gen. Vacquant of the second column succeeded in becoming master of the upper part of the village, and maintaining himself there during the whole of the night.—By the shells of both parties many houses had been set on fire, and illuminated the whole country around.—At the extremity of the right wing on the bushy meadow the combats were not less severe. The left flank of the enemy was secured by an arm of the Danube; impenetrable underwood, intersected only by footpaths, covered his front; and a broad ditch and pallisadoes afforded him the advantage of a natural rampart.—Here fought at the beginning of the battle the 1st battalion of Gyulay under col. Mariassy; then the battalion of chasseurs under major Schneider; next the St. Georgians under major Mihailovich, and finally, the two battalions of Vienna volunteers under lieut.-col. Steigentesch and St. Quenten. Here also the enemy was defeated; and the first day of this sanguinary engagement terminated by the occupation of Aspern by gen. Vacquant, at the head of eight battalions of the second column, while lieut. field-marshal Hiller drew the troops of his corps from the village, placed them again in order of battle, and passed the night under arms.

Second Column.

The advanced guard, commanded by lieut.-gen. Fresnel, advanced by Leopoldau and Kagran towards Hirschstetten, and consisted of one battalion of chasseurs and two battalions of Anton Mitsovskv under gen. Winzingerode, as well as the brigades of cavalry, Klenau and Vincent, under gen. Veesey. It was followed in

the same direction by the column from its position near Gerasdorf.—The enemy having been discovered from the eminences near Hirschstetten to be near Aspern and Esslingen, the brigade Veesev was detached against the latter place, and the brigade Winzingerode to dislodge the enemy from Aspern.—The column deployed before Hirschstetten, in two lines, in order to support the advanced guard, and leaving Aspern to the right, followed upon the plain, at a proper distance.—The brigade of Winzingerode, however, met with so spirited a resistance in its attempt upon Aspern, that an attack upon the front alone was not likely to be attended with success; the cavalry, therefore, of the advanced guard was pushed forward from Aspern on the left, in order to support the attack on the flank with the two batteries of cavalry, as well as to facilitate the junction with the third column, which was advancing by Breitenlee. At the same time the regiment of Reuss Plauen was ordered to the right of Aspern, with a view to an attack on that place, the rest of the corps was formed into close columns of battalions.—Meanwhile the enemy formed his left wing, which he refused, towards Aspern, and his right upon Esslingen. Thus he advanced with columns of infantry and cavalry upon the main army, while an extremely brisk cannonade supported him. A line of 12 regiments of cuirassiers formed the centre of the second line of the enemy, giving to the whole an imposing aspect.—Meanwhile the attack of a battalion of Reuss Plauen on Aspern was repulsed, and it gave way, being thrown into consternation by the loss of its commander, but it rallied immediately after. Count Bellegard ordered gen. Bacquant to renew the attack with the regiment of Vogelsang, and to carry the village at all hazards. The latter obeyed the order with the most brilliant success, and Aspern, though defended by 12,000 of the best of the enemy's troops, was carried by storm; Bacquant being assisted by the regiment of Reuss Plauen, by a battalion of archduke Rainer, and by the brigade of Maier of the third column.—To frustrate this attack, the enemy advanced with two columns of infantry, supported by his heavy cavalry, upon the main army, repulsed the two regiments of Klenau and Vincent's light horse, and fell upon the infantry.—The latter expecting him, with their firelocks ready, and with cool intrepidity, fired at

ten paces distance so effectually, as totally to rout the enemy, upon which gen. Veesev, at the head of a division of Klenau, attacked the enemy's cuirassiers with such energy, that their retreat was followed by that of the infantry.—Hereby the army along the whole of its line was disengaged from the enemy, obtained communication on the left with the corps of prince Hohenzollern, and became possessed of the important post of Aspern. The enemy being in full retreat attempted no further attack, and confined himself merely to a cannonade. The corps remained during the night under arms. The enemy repeated, indeed, his attacks on Aspern, but they all proved unsuccessful.

Third Column.

This column, according to its destination, had began its march from its position at Seiring, by the road of Sussenbrun and Breitenlee. Some divisions of O'Reilly's light horse and chasseurs formed the advanced guard of the column, and at three o'clock in the afternoon met near Hirschstetten, the left wing of the enemy, which consisted mostly of cavalry.—As about this time the first and second columns advanced intrepidly upon Aspern, and the enemy began to fall back to his position between Esslingen and Aspern, lieutenant-general Hohenzollern, ordered up his batteries, and a very brisk cannonade commenced on both sides.—The first line formed in close columns of battalions, and advanced with the greatest resolution upon the enemy, when his cavalry suddenly rushed forward in such disproportionate numbers, and with such rapidity, that there was scarcely time to save the artillery which had been brought up, and the battalions were left to defend themselves by their own unsupported exertions. This was the remarkable moment in which the regiments of Zach, Joseph Colloredo, Zettwitz, Froon, a battalion of Stein's, and the second battalion of the Archduke Charles's legion, under the conduct of lieutenant-general Brady, and generals Buresch, Maier and Koller, demonstrated with unparalleled fortitude what the fixed determination to conquer or die is capable of effecting against the most impetuous attacks.—The enemy's cavalry turned these battalions on both wings, penetrated between them, repulsed the squadrons of O'Reilly's light horse, who were unable to withstand such a superior force, and in the confidence of victory, summoned these

corps of heroes to lay down their arms. A well directed and destructive fire was the answer to this degrading proposition, and the enemy's cavalry abandoned the field, leaving behind them a considerable number of dead.—This corps, as well as the others, passed the night on the field of battle.

Fourth and Fifth Columns.

These were both composed of the corps of lieut.-general prince Rosenberg, on either bank of the Russbach, and directed their march from their position, to the right and left of Deutsch-Wagram.—The fourth proceeded through Roschdorf straight to Esslingen. Col. Hardegg of Schwarzenberg's hulans conducted the advanced guard.—The fifth directed its march towards the left, in order to go a circuit round the little town of Enzersdorf, and drive the enemy out of the place. It was reinforced by Stipsic's hussars, under the command of col. Frolich. Lieut.-general Klenau led the advanced guard of both columns.—As this circuit round Enzersdorf obliged the fifth to describe a longer line, it was necessary for the fourth to advance rather more slowly.—Enzersdorf, however, was quickly taken possession of by a detachment of Stipsic's hussars, and of the Wallacho Illyrian frontier regiment, as it was already for the greatest part evacuated by the enemy, from whom no more than thirty prisoners could be taken.—Both columns now received orders to advance upon Esslingen.—The fourth, in close columns of battalions of Czartorisky's, archduke Louis's and Cobourg's, who were twice successively attacked by upwards of two thousand of the enemy's heavy cavalry; but these were each time put to flight by our brave infantry with considerable loss.—Of the fifth column, two battalions of Chasteler's advanced directly upon Esslingen, while two battalions of Bellegarde's were ordered to penetrate the left flank of the village, and the small contiguous wood. Two battalions of Hiller's and Sztarray's, besides the archduke Ferdinand's and Stipsic's regiments of hussars, and two divisions of Rosenberg's light horse, were in the plain in readiness to support them.—These combined attacks were made twice successively with uncommon intrepidity, the enemy's troops were repulsed at all points, and driven into the village Esslingen which had been set on fire. But as the enemy's army was drawn up in several

lines between Esslingen and Aspern, and met each new attack with fresh reinforcements, because the safety of his retreat depended on the possession of this village; our troops were obliged to abandon it at the approach of night, and to await, under arms, the arrival of morning.—The reserve corps of cavalry had marched in two columns, under the command of gen. prince of Lichtenstein, and advanced upon the New Inn between Raschdorf and Breitenlee. General count Wartensleben with Blankenstein's hussars, conducted the advanced guard.—No sooner did the enemy perceive the general advance of the army, than he placed the bulk of his cavalry, supported by some battalions of infantry, in order of battle between Esslingen and Aspern, and commenced a brisk cannonade upon the columns of Austrian cavalry as they approached.—Prince Lichtenstein directed his columns to march forward in two lines, on which the enemy detached 4 or 5000 cavalry from his position to the right, by way of Esslingen, and excited some apprehension that he would impede the progress of the fourth column, or even break through it. The Prince therefore ordered four regiments to the left, and kept the second column formed in two lines, till he was convinced that the fourth would not meet with any impediment to its march.—During this movement the remainder of the enemy's cavalry also advanced with the greatest confidence, towards the right wing of the Austrian. They were received with a firmness which they probably did not expect. The intrepidity of the cavalry which had marched up, particularly Maurice Lichtenstein's regiment, and the archduke Francis's cuirassiers; the former, headed by its gallant colonel, Roussel, frustrated the repeated assaults of the enemy by counterattacks, by which at length put a stop to his impetuous advance, and completely repulsed him with considerable loss. In these conflicts, the French general of division, Durosnel, equerry to the Emperor, was taken prisoner a few paces from him, as was also gen. Fouler, equerry to the Empress, after having been slightly wounded. Notwithstanding the fire of musquetry which now ensued, the Prince ordered a general advance, by which the enemy was straitened in the alignment between Esslingen and Aspern, but on account of the flanking fire from Esslingen, could not be pursued any further. The fire of his guns was answered

with spirit by the horse artillery. About seven in the evening 3,000 horse were again detached towards the point of union between the cavalry of the corps of reserve and the left wing of prince Hohen-zollern, and fell en masse upon the brigades of cuirassiers of generals Kroyher, Klary, and Siegenthal; but by the steady intrepidity of the Blankenstein's and Riesch's regiments, who with the utmost gallantry made a sudden attack on the enemy's flanks, his cavalry was again repulsed, and part of it, which had fallen upon some of the regiments of the new levies, placed in the third line, was cut off and there taken.—Meanwhile night came on, and it was passed by the Prince in the best state of preparation on the ground which he had gained from the enemy.—For the first time Napoleon had sustained a defeat in Germany. From this moment he was reduced to the rank of bold and successful generals, who, like himself, after a long series of destructive achievements, experienced the vicissitudes of fortune. The charm of his invincibility was dissolved. No longer the spoiled child of Fortune, by posterity he will be characterized as the sport of the fickle goddess. New hopes begin to animate the oppressed nations. To the Austrian army the 21st of May was a grand and glorious epoch, that must inspire it with a consciousness of its strength, and a confidence in its energies. Overwhelmed by our irresistible infantry, its proud opponents were extended in the dust, and the presence of their hitherto unconquered Emperor was no longer capable of snatching from the heroes of Austria the laurels which they had acquired.—Napoleon's glory was obviously at stake. New efforts were to be expected the following day; but he was also obliged to fight for his existence. By means of fire-ships sent down the Danube, the Archduke had caused the enemy's bridge on the Lobau to be broken down, and its repairs would take up several hours. Meanwhile Napoleon had already in the evening been joined by the corps of gen. Oudinot; and all the disposable troops followed from Vienna and the Upper Danube, and were transported across the river in vessels as fast as they arrived. The Archduke, on his part, ordered the grenadier corps, which had not any share

in the first engagement, to advance from its position near Gerasdorf to Breitenlee; and the short night was scarcely sufficient to complete the respective preparations for the commencement of a second tragedy.

Battle of the 22d of May.—Corps of lieutenant-general Hiller.

With the morning's dawn the enemy renewed his attacks, which far surpassed in impetuosity those of the preceding day. It was a conflict of valour and mutual exasperation. Scarcely had the French guards compelled gen. Wacquart to abandon Aspern, when the regiment of Klebek again penetrated into the burning village, drove back the choicest troops of the enemy, and engaged in a new contest in the midst of the conflagration, till, at the expiration of an hour, it was also obliged to give way. The regiment of Benjovsky now rushed in, and at the first onset gained possession of the church yard, the walls of which field-marshal-lieutenant Hiller immediately ordered the first division of pioneers to pull down, and the church, together with the parsonage, to be set on fire. Thus was this regiment, supported by some battalions, commanded by gen. Bianchi, at length enabled to maintain itself at the entrance of the village, after overcoming the resistance, bordering on despair, opposed by the flower of the French army.—Neither could the enemy produce any farther effect upon the bushy meadow, after lieutenant-general Hiller had ordered the force there to be supported by two battalions of Anton Mittrowsky's and a battery; on which the Jagers, St. George's, and two battalions of Vienna volunteers, drove him from his advantageous position, which he never afterwards attempted to recover.—At about this time the left wing of the corps was likewise placed in security by three batteries sent by the lieutenant-general to support the general of cavalry, count Bellegarde, and the latter maintained his ground against the most desperate attacks of the enemy. The lieutenant-general Hiller kept his position on the left flank of the enemy, and the victory was decided in this quarter. The corps was therefore again formed in two lines, and thus awaited the approaching events.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 4.] LONDON, SATURDAY, JULY 29, 1809.

[Price 1s.

"What mighty contests rise from trivial things!"

POPE.

97]

[98

TO THE
INDEPENDENT PEOPLE OF HAMPSHIRE.

The Pauper's Action.

GENTLEMEN,

In the poem, from which my motto is taken, you will, I dare say, recollect, that the poet records the important consequences that resulted from a gentleman's cutting off *a lock of a lady's hair*. Disproportioned as those consequences were to their cause, they are, I think, surpassed, in that respect, by the consequences, which have resulted from the *running away of a CARTER-BOY from my service*, which act has produced, probably, a greater noise and bustle, and excited more curiosity and more interest in this county, than any act or event that has taken place within the long reign of the present king; that is to say, almost half a century. Notwithstanding this, however, I should not, in this elaborate manner, have addressed you upon the subject, had the noise and bustle been confined within the county. My intention was merely to have contradicted, in the county-papers, the falsehoods, which had been spread abroad. But, perceiving that the TRIAL, which took place at Winchester, last week, relative to this affair, has been made, in the *London* ministerial prints, a subject of vast importance, the ground-work of new calumnies, and the intended means of injuring that great public cause, in the supporting of which our enemies know me to be instrumental to the utmost of my power: perceiving this, I think it necessary to enter fully into the subject in my own work, in order that the refutation may circulate as widely as the charge; that it may even go beyond it, and that, in countries where an English ministerial paper is never seen, the character of such publications may be made known.

Those amongst you, Gentlemen, who were at Winchester during the last week, and who, of course, heard the universal buzz, saw the knots of people, in all parts, laying their heads together, and who, at

last, saw the court crammed even to suffocation; and all this on account of a thing the most trifling, that the law can, when administered by a judge, possibly take notice of, and that, in spite of all that could be done by all the machinations of all the parties, high and low, concerned in the scheme, obtained from me damages to the amount of only *three pounds, six shillings, and eight-pence*; you, who were eye-witnesses of the scene, and who had the means of hearing, from my neighbours, the real state of the facts, and the real motives of the action; you must have ceased to feel any surprize whatever on the subject; but, to those, who were not at Winchester; to those whom the story has reached only through the news-papers, it must seem utterly astonishing, that all this out-cry should have been made, that all this interest should have been excited, by an act, the commission of which should call for damages to the amount of only *one-third part of ten pounds*. A London paper, called the *MORNING POST*, has filled almost the whole of its columns, of Saturday last, with an account of this trial, to the exclusion of even the *French Bulletins*, which record the battle of *Wolkersdorf*; that battle, which, perhaps, will decide the fate of the European quarter of the world. The fall of Austria appears, with these gentlemen, to be a mere trifle, when compared with a hope of bringing me down; the struggle between the Emperors Napoleon and Francis seems to be but a thing of secondary importance, while there is a struggle between me and my carter-boy. This paper, upon the face of it, seems to say: "There has, to be sure, been a battle in Austria, and the last hope of our only remaining ally seems now to be completely annihilated; but, never mind that, loyal reader, for, look here! here we have *Cobbett* in damages to the amount of *3l. 6s. 8d.*"—According to this print, the damages against the three parties, were laid at a *thousand pounds*. Pretty modest for a pauper's being held in duress during about *seven hours*; but, was it not, then, *very much*

D

like a defeat to get but *ten pounds* out of the *thousand*? I am sued for 333*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* and the jury say, that, at the most, I ought to pay the odd 3*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.*, just about the amount of the wine that almost every man drinks in a fortnight, and I drink none. The damages laid, appear to have been very well proportioned to the story. They seem to have swelled up together; and, when they came into the court, and had to face an honest and intelligent jury, who were not to be imposed upon by either *rant* or *cant*, they both together shrunk into just a *hundredth* part of the magnitude they had assumed; and, if the jury could have been informed of the *whole* of the facts, they would have shrunk into nothing, for not one farthing of damages would have been awarded; but, as we shall see, by-and-by, the action was so *contrived* as to put it out of our power to produce any of the most material facts to the jury, who were, therefore, obliged to give their verdict upon evidence brought all on one side.

That this action was not brought *for the sake of the pauper* the jury appeared to be very well convinced. Indeed, the real object of it was clear enough to every person of common discernment, the moment it was discovered whence came the *advice* to bring the action, namely, from a bench of magistrates at DROXFORD, composed as we shall by-and-by see. This object is clearly enough explained in the speech of Mr. BOROUGH, one of the counsel for the pauper, the substance of which speech has been published in the *Portsmouth* newspaper, in these words.—“The Plaintiff was a labouring man, residing in the parish of Droxford, Hants, in the service of Richard Goodlad, esq. a Magistrate for the county. The Plaintiff was of quiet and honest habits. The Defendant, *Cobbett*, was the well known Author of the Political Register; who, for the last five or six years, had been resident at Botley, in that county. He was long the pretended friend and advocate for the liberty of the subject, and the privileges of Englishmen. At the public Meetings in that county, he had taken a conspicuous part in declaiming against the abuse of power, and was then addressing weekly letters to the people of Hampshire, urging the necessity of a Reform in the state, in order to preserve the ends of freedom, and the true spirit of the English Constitution; but the character which he assumed was badly supported by his conduct in domes-

tic life. He was oppressive and severe around the whole circle which his power and influence extended to, the sequel of which would ill accord with his professions. The other Defendants were Blacksmiths.”—These are the words, attributed to the counsel for the pauper plaintiff; these are the words published as part of the speech of a man who was assigned to plead the cause of this pauper. Who, then, can be fool enough to believe, that this action was advised and carried on for the sake of the pauper? And who can refrain from admiring the good sense and firmness of the jury, who, by their verdict, defeated the real object of the scheme? The *Morning Post* has inserted a part of Mr. BOROUGH’s speech not much less interesting, which part the *Portsmouth* paper has omitted. It is that where he expresses his hope, that the jury will make a distinction between the parties; that they will take the burthen of damages off the other two, and lay it all upon Mr. Cobbett.

After this, it is hardly necessary to say to any man of common discernment, that the pauper was a mere cat’s-paw in this action; that his pretended sufferings made no part or particle of the real motive of the action; and, in short, that the whole thing, from the beginning to the end, was a mere invention for the purpose of misrepresenting my character, and of causing it to be believed, that, while I am preaching against public oppressors, I am, as to all those who are under my power, myself an oppressor. This was the point; this was the jet of the plan; this was the purpose for which a little village attorney was set to work to bring forward the pauper and his family, and to ferret out evidence even amongst the servants that were still living in my own house. But, though this conclusion must be drawn by every man of common sense, still I think it may be useful to relate minutely all the circumstances of this transaction, from which, better than from any general description, you, Gentlemen, and the public in general, will be able to form a just opinion of the conduct of the several parties concerned.

A lad, about 16 or 17 years of age, named JESSE BURGESS, was my servant in husbandry, in the month of March last, and had been so for about two months, or a little better. Some time in the latter end of February, I found fault with him for coming in to breakfast before he had cleaned out his stable; and, on the first of March, I found fault with him, and that, too, in

very sharp language, for lying in bed after I myself was up, that is to say, *after 5 o'clock*. These were the only times that I ever even *found fault* with him, as far as I can recollect.—On the 2nd of March, that is to say, the next morning, the boy got up very early and set off from his service.—His sister, Mary Burgess, who was also a servant in my house, was then sent by me to tell her parents, and the boy too, if she found him at home, that, if he came back again *that day*, I would forgive him ; but, that, if he did not, nothing upon earth should induce me to forgive him. He did not come back. I, according to my word, got a warrant for him from Mr. SMITH of Southampton, and delivered it to Mr. Astlett, the constable of Botley, in order that he might take up the boy, which he did on the 3rd of March, and having brought him to Botley, the boy escaped, which escape produced the pretended false-imprisonment of the plaintiff, Wm. BURGESS, the brother of Jesse, and which also gave a handle for the bringing of the action.—But, before we go to that, let us finish the story of Jesse, who, in the first instance, was to have all the wages he *asked*, and was told, that, if he behaved well, he should have *more*. He lived as well as I myself did ; he went to bed when he pleased ; he had a good fire to sit by ; he had every thing that heart could wish ; but, I insisted upon his getting up *early in the morning*, having full as much detestation for a sluggard as I have for a thief. Of this he had fair warning when he was hired. He was told, over and over again, that he must rise early ; that, as to other things, I might look over a good deal, but that I never would overlook his lying late in bed. Boys are, however, apt to be sleepy, and, if he had come back, when his sister went for him, I should merely have told him to get himself another master, his services being, in fact, not worth to me, the half, no, nor the fifth part, of his food, living in the manner that he lived. But, there was, in the case of a servant running away and setting me at defiance, a duty which I owed to the community, and especially to my neighbours, occupying lands, who must have experienced great injury from such an example, if this boy had been suffered to get off with impunity. There are many persons, who, in such a case, would not take the trouble, and especially if, as was really the fact here, the running away is rather a lucky thing for the master ; but, that is

not my way : I always endeavour to discharge my duty towards the community : I, in such cases, look upon the crime not as committed against *me*, but against the public ; and I act accordingly. Upon this principle it was, that, when the boy had escaped, I spared no pains or expence to recover him. He has cost me more, probably, in advertisements, than he would have earned during the year ; but, what of that ? I have caught him at last ; he has been sent to prison ; and the example will be of general utility. What a villainous thing must it be in any one to do that which shall induce people in this rank of life to set contracts at nought ; to think nothing of their engagements ; to make agreements with a fraudulent intention ; to teach them all the tricks and quirks of pettifoggers ; to make them clever in nothing but roguery ; to give that turn to their minds, which, in the end, must lead them to the gallows. What a villainous thing it must be for any one to do this ? —Before the boy was taken up and sent to prison, there might be some ground for supposing that he had been *ill-used* ; but, *after* that, there could be none, especially when the circumstances, under which he was committed, are known. I shall by-and-by speak of these circumstances, which form a sort of under-plot in the grand drama. Suffice it, at present, to say, that the boy was taken at Winchester, in the very room where the Attorney had his witness, and was, after a full examination, and a remarkably patient hearing of all he had to say, *committed to prison*. This, of itself, is a pretty good proof, that he was *used well* while at my house, and that he had no real ground of complaint, and, consequently, no reasonable cause for quitting my service. The editors of the Portsmouth paper, amongst the many falsehoods, which they have knowingly stated, have this, “ that the boy was *not* a “ servant in husbandry.” If so, what pretty magistrates must those be, who committed him to prison for quitting my service ? I mention this as one instance of the length, to which these retailers of falshood will go. In fact, they stick at nothing. There is no falshood too bold for them. They know very well, that they shall be exposed, and that all good men will despise them ; but, they value not the opinions of good men ; they make sure of the *wages* of their falsehoods and calumnies, and having those, they are perfectly dead to all feelings of shame or of conscience. It is the conduct of their

employers and prompters that would surprise one, were it not the uniform practice of such people to give way to their envy and hatred, and to turn a deaf ear to the voice of reason.—Thus, it is, I think, made manifest enough, that as far as related to my *servant*, Jesse, I acted as became a master and a public-spirited man. The mother of the boy came, a few days before his running away, and got his wages up to the 1st of March or thereabouts. It was, therefore, clear, that the intention was to get the boy away for the *spring and summer*, after having placed him in good keep during that part of the year when there was little to do. This is a very common trick through the country; my neighbours, the farmers, are plagued half out of their lives with these desertions, which always take place just as the sun begins to shine on both sides of the hedge; that is to say, when those who have been warmed and fed all the winter, are called upon to make some remuneration by their labour. Nothing is so common as the sending of people to prison for this offence: Sir Wm. Heathcote, I was told, sent a boy to prison for the same offence, only a day or two before I was at Winchester; but, Sir Wm. Heathcote was not a person capable of attracting attention; he was not a person, whom speculators and hireling writers found it their interest to misrepresent; he was not a person to excite the envy and the hatred of so many wretches, versed in the arts of cowardly calumny; in short, he had not for his enemy every public-robber, every low, dirty, hungry, pettifogging fellow in the whole county.

We must now return to the time when the boy, Jesse, was first taken up, and when the *escape*, which led to the *action*, took place.—Mr. ASTLETT, the constable of Botley, took him, at his father's house, about six miles from Botley, in the night of the 3rd of March, and brought him to Botley, to a public-house called the Dolphin, whither, by the indulgence of the constable, he was accompanied by his mother and his elder brother, WM. BURGESS, the pauper plaintiff.—In the morning Mr. Astlett, who is a blacksmith, had occasion to go to his own house, and, while away, he left his prisoner in the hands of the tything man, whose name is DUBBER. While the boy was in the custody of Dubber, this latter says, that the mother came with a pretended message from me, *desiring that the boy might be permitted to come to*

my house; that thereupon he let the boy go, and that the mother and the two sons went off together.—Be this as it may, whether Dubber was thus *deceived*, or whether he, in conjunction with people at the public-house, *connived* at the boy's escape (the latter being by far the most probable) the boy did escape; he ran away somewhere, and the mother and her elder son, the pauper plaintiff, made the best of their way towards their home.

—Mr. Astlett, the constable, finding what had taken place, set out, ordering Dubber to go with him, in pursuit of them. The boy was not to be found; but, they took up the brother and the old woman, for having aided in the escape, and these they brought to Botley.—Now, mind, all this had taken place *before I had heard even of the escape of the boy*. When this had been done, Mr. Astlett came to ask me what he should do with these people; and, my answer was this: "I have nothing to do with the matter, Astlett, nor do I know whether you have done right or wrong; but, as you *have* taken them into custody, I think your best way is to take them before Mr. Smith (at Southampton) who issued the warrant for taking the "boy up." After this, at the request of Mr. Astlett, I determined on going to Southampton myself; and, having some other business to do with the Justice's Clerk, I told Mr. Astlett that I would meet him at the office, and *get him the best advice I could*, all along telling him to recollect, that the affair was none of mine; that it was his affair; that it was to him that I had to look for my servant; and that, if the servant was not brought back, I was resolved to punish those who had let him escape.—Thus far, then, as to the *taking* of the plaintiff, I had no hand, nor had I any *knowledge*.—When I was setting off to Southampton, Mr. Astlett and Dubber were preparing to put the old woman and the plaintiff into a cart to take them thither; and I stopped opposite the place where they were, to remind Mr. Astlett again, that the affair was no affair of mine; that he might take them to Southampton or not, just as he pleased; but, that, if he did take them there, I would get him the best advice I could.—I then proceeded on to the office of the magistrate's clerk, whither I was soon followed by Mr. Astlett and his prisoners. Having waited some time for the clerk's return home, I went myself to the magistrate, and gave him a full account of what had passed. He said, that, under all the cir-

circumstances, the best way, he thought, would be for the constable to let the people go, getting them to promise to bring the boy as soon as possible. Accordingly, when I went back to the clerk's office, I told Mr. Astlett this, and, as it was Saturday, we got them to promise to bring the boy on the next Monday. They were then suffered to depart, at about five o'clock in the evening, having, at the utmost, been in duress for not more than *nine hours*, having suffered *no assault*, and having sustained no other injury than the loss of a day's work, which they would have lost, whether they had been forcibly detained, or not; seeing that they had come from home, of their own accord, and were, by their own free will, at Botley at eight or nine o'clock of the same day. Their intention was, too, to go to Southampton along with the boy; so that, if all had went on according to their own *voluntary intentions*, they would have had to walk the six miles and a half that Mr. Astlett carried them in his taxed cart, and would, of course, have suffered more than they actually did suffer. — Here, then, is, the mighty "*injury*!" Here is that "*act of oppression*," which has been blazoned through the country! And here is that, which, had we not had a jury of sensible and honest men, would have extorted a good round sum of money.

From this statement, it must be evident to you, Gentlemen, and to every one who shall read this letter, that I had no hand either in the imprisonment, or the detention, of the pauper plaintiff or his mother. Not that I think, that the constable did wrong; for, though it might not be exactly *legal*, it was quite *reasonable*, that he should take before the magistrate those who, whether by stratagem or force, had rescued his prisoner. But, though I still think that the constable did right, *I had nothing at all to do with the matter*, any more than Mr. Borough or old George Rose himself. — But now, as to the *real source* of this action. In about a fortnight after the escape of the boy and the taking up of his brother and mother, Mr. Astlett and Dubber went again in search of the boy, whom they found at his father's house. What took place in the house it is not necessary to state here. Things took this turn, that Mr. Astlett came to Botley for assistance, while Dubber was left in the garden to see that the boy did not escape. — Now, observe, the new characters that come upon the scene. — One STONE,

who was *bailiff* to Mr. GOODLAD (whose house stands at a little distance), and which STONE was also *tything-man* of the place, came to Dubber, and told him, as Dubber says, *to go away*, for that he had no business there. — Mr. Goodlad, who lives in the parish of Droxford, and who is a *justice of the peace*, was the *master* of Wm. Burgess, the pauper plaintiff, and the occasional employer of others of the family. I knew him pretty well, and he had always seemed to me to be a very harmless man. He was, as I am told, a *salt-dealer* in India, and, at his return, like most other persons who have made fortunes in that country, he built a big white house upon a hill; and the spot being in the tything of *Hill*, he called his residence *Hill Place*. — Poor Paull, told me, that, in India, he went by the name of "*honest* DICK GOOD-
"*LAD*;" and, I am ready to confess that his general conduct in our neighbourhood, has well corresponded with this appellation. He has laboured with great judgment and effect in bettering the lot of the poor in his parish, and, at the same time, greatly reducing the poor-rates; but, he knows very well, that, even in this way, *I have done a great deal more than he has*; he knows very well, that no labourer of *mine* could have *sworn himself a PAUPER*. However, he has done a great deal, and, I believe from very good motives. So well satisfied have I been of this, that I, about a year ago, joined with the farmers of the parish in a subscription for the purpose of purchasing him a piece of plate, by way of acknowledgment for the pains he had taken in arranging and conducting the affairs of the parish, particularly relating to the poor. — Such being the man, and such my opinion of him, I was very much surprised when the constable told me, that the Burgesses boasted of having the *support* of Mr. Goodlad. I accordingly wrote to him by the constable, stating to him the whole of the circumstances, cautioning him against being deceived by the stories of the Burgesses, and expressing a hope, that he, as a magistrate, who must naturally desire to see the law duly executed, would give the constable countenance and support. To my utter astonishment, the answer I received was, as nearly as I can recollect, this: — *that the whole of the fault of resistance lay with the constable of Botley, whose IGNORANCE of his duty had induced him to execute a warrant OUT OF HIS OWN HUNDRED*; and, not a single word about giving the constable

countenance and support! The answer further informed me, however, that the old woman and her son William, the pauper plaintiff, had been at the Bench at Droxford, where they had been told, that, if their story was true, they might bring an action for false imprisonment.—It was from this letter that arose the cross questions, put to the old woman in court, where it appeared that the magistrates at this Bench, sitting in their capacity as magistrates, not only told the old woman and her pauper son, that they had ground of action, but advised them to go to the Attorney (Gunner) for the purpose of commencing the action. They did not send to me, their neighbour; they did not send to Mr. Astlett, one of their peace-officers, and whose "ignorance" entitled him, in a peculiar manner, to their advice; they did not do any thing of this sort, in order to come at the real facts of the case; but, without a moment's delay, counselled an action for false imprisonment, and sent off the people to an Attorney; and, the old woman, upon being asked, whether this bench of magistrates gave her advice to take her run-away son back to his master's service, answered, that they did not.—The persons generally composing this bench are the Rev. Mr. Poulter, the Rev. Mr. Baynes, a brother of general Clavering, and Mr. Goodlad. From the old woman's evidence, it appeared, that, upon the occasion now spoken of, there were actually present, besides Mr. Goodlad, only Mr. Baynes and a Mr. Henry Minchin, the former of whom has the merit of having, from very low life (his father having kept an alehouse at Bishop's Waltham) got up to the possession of a pretty good living, after having, I believe, had the honour of being teacher to a son of the bishop of the diocese, who, it will be remembered, is a brother-in-law of Poulter. Of Mr. Henry Minchin, the public shall hear some curious particulars another time. At any rate, we are all about upon a footing in respect to birth. The pedigree of none of us need occasion much trouble at the Herald's office; so that, there was nothing, in point of *etiquette*, to prevent these magistrates from writing to me, or even to the constable, and inquiring into the truth of the matter; for, as to *family* (of which so much has been said of late) I rather think, that, if the matter were strictly enquired into, of the whole of the parties concerned, the constable would be found at the top of the tree.

Here, then, we have the origin of the action. Let us now see a little of its progress.—The Attorney was soon in motion. Botley, Droxford, Hill-Pound, Southampton, and the borders of the Forest, heard the sound of his horse's feet, and were struck with the eager countenance of the rider. He went to Mr. Astlett to learn whether *I had not a hand in the matter*, and Mr. Astlett uniformly assured him, that *I had nothing at all to do with either the imprisonment or the detention*. Since the Trial, Mr. Astlett has made, before a magistrate at Southampton, an Affidavit, of which the following is a copy:

COUNTY OF } William Astlett of the
SOUTHAMPTON. } parish of Botley, in the
said county, constable of the said parish
of Botley, personally appeared before
me, Richard Vernon Sadlier, Esq. one
of his Majesty's Justices of the Peace
for the said county of Southampton, and
made Oath,—That, of the arrest of
William Burgess, plaintiff in an action
tried at Winchester, on the 20th instant,
Wm. Cobbett, Esq. was, as far as this
deponent firmly believes, totally ignorant, until after the said arrest had taken
place;—that this deponent never spoke
to, or saw, Mr. Cobbett [after the escape
of the boy Jesse Burgess], until
about three hours after the arrest had taken
place;—that neither at that, or any
future, time, did Mr. Cobbett aid, by
advice or otherwise, in the imprisonment
or detention of the said William Burgess or
his mother;—that Mr. Cobbett, from
first to last, said he did not understand
the law in this respect, that he would
have nothing to do with the matter, and
that he (this deponent) might keep the
people, or let them go, just as he pleased;
—And that, before the action was
brought, he (this deponent) declared all
this to Mr. Gunner, the plaintiff's Attorney.
(Signed) WILLIAM ASTLETT.

Sworn at the Town and County }
of Southampton, this 25th day } R. V. SADLIER.
of July, 1809. Before me }

Here, then, Gentlemen, you plainly see the reason for making the constable and the tythingman parties along with me. By so doing the schemers deprived me of the possibility of producing evidence to prove that I had nothing to do with the matter.—As to the conduct of the Attorney, that did not at all surprize me, and would surprize nobody. The man was labouring in his vocation. He was earning his

living. It was his calling, that he was at work in; and there are different sorts of work for attorneys as well as for men of other callings. But, what shall we say to Mr. Borough, who talked of the necessity of *making an example of me*; who declared me to be the *instigator to the arrest*; who mixed up *politics* with his law; and who, with all the *affectation of sincerity*, called upon me, "*challenged*" me, to *produce a witness* to contradict what his witnesses would swear! And all this, when he *well knew*, that the *only* persons who could *possibly* disprove what the family of Burgess would swear, were made *parties along with me*, and, by that means, were cut off from being witnesses; when he *well knew*, when he must have known, that this was the scheme from the beginning!—He said, that I was the great aggressor, and that all, or most part, of the damages, *ought to fall upon me*. Well, then, *why* was the action brought against Mr. Astlett and Dubber? Why not have attacked *me alone*? Why harass and put to expence two men, whom I, as was alleged, had persuaded, if not forced, to act illegally? Why not leave them out, and *have their evidence*, which would have been so much more satisfactory against me, than that of the old woman and her daughter? If the object was to produce *truth* and general conviction as to my *oppressive disposition*, why stick me into a record along with a constable and a tything man? Why not, again I say, leave these two men to give evidence against me, *the truth of which evidence nobody could have doubted*?—It is useless to pursue these questions. Mr. Astlett's Affidavit is an answer to them all; and, I need not say another word, to enable any man of common understanding to affix to the whole of this transaction, and to the several parties concerned in it, the character they deserve, and which character, I trust, they will bear.—I will just add, that Mr. Astlett, who is a Blacksmith, is a man of considerable property; that he is not at all under my influence, but, on the contrary, has been supposed to be rather at variance with me, I having, better than a year ago, ceased to employ him, which, before that time, I used to do.

My enemies, which, Gentlemen, are *your enemies*, and the worst enemies of our country: I do not mean any poor, paltry things in the country; but our enemies, *who have power over the press in London*; these enemies, like all men who are more

under the influence of vindictive passions than of reason, have, in this, as in many other instances, contributed towards my elevation in their endeavours to pull me down.—In the first place, by the very noise, that they have made about this action, without any thing else, they confess their fear of me, and proclaim their high opinion of my consequence in the country. There is no man, who reads what they have caused to be published, who must not, from the bare magnitude of the publication, when compared with the result, conceive a high notion of the person attacked. He must without any *reasoning* at all, imbibe a high opinion of my consequence in the country.—Mr. Borough called me plain "*Cobbett*," and the Judge, in summing up, observed upon what Mr. Jekyll had said about my being a "*public character*," that he did not see any reason for giving that appellation to "*a man who wrote in a news-paper*." With all my heart. I do not want to be, or to be thought, a "*public character*;" but, the vexation of it is, my enemies, and the enemies of my country, will make me one; they will insist upon my being a public character; I must be so, in spite of all my efforts to bury myself in woods and in fields. "*A man who writes in a news-paper*" is an appellation that will do very well for me; but, they will not let me be quiet with it; they will suffer no act of mine, no office of life performed by me, to pass with that degree of notice which is bestowed upon the acts and offices of common men. If, for instance, Mr. Poulter or Mr. Sturges (who is another very near neighbour of the Burgesses) had happened to have been defendant, the other day, in my place, there would not have been twenty people present to hear the trial; and, if any notice at all of it had been taken in the news-papers, that notice would have been squeezed into three lines. They wish to sink me into oblivion; and, they have so ably managed the matter as to make even the sound of my name sufficient to call together a multitude of people, in any part of the kingdom. When the run-away boy was retaken at Winchester, and I went before the magistrate to give an information against him, the room was instantly filled with black coats and white heads. It was quite charming to see, that the poor had so many friends amongst the fat fellows assembled. I think there were four, who *gratuitously* pleaded for the boy; while "*poor boy!*" issued from the mouths

of fifty people at once, who live in laziness upon the labour of the poor.

If it were not useless to be angry, one might, and I do think, without any sin at all, wish for the power of exterminating this race of hypocrites, who, so far from believing me to be an oppressor of the poor, count, amongst their reasons for hating me, that, as far as my personal influence extends, I have made the labouring people comparatively independent. It is a shame for me, at such a time as this, when the most interesting political subjects present themselves for discussion: it is a shame for me, at such a time, to fill my pages with my own domestic concerns; but, as in the case of the Court-Martial, it is really rendered necessary for the sake of the public cause. I am informed, that, so early as Friday last, the very day after the trial, the walls in London were covered over with large bills about the "OPPRESSIONS OF COBBETT," and "COBBETT, THE OPPRESSOR OF THE POOR," &c. &c. These posting bills cost, perhaps, *fifty pounds a day!* And, by the time that this thing is done with, it will, I dare say, cause an expenditure of, at the very least, *ten thousand pounds.* This is doing pretty well for the purpose of circulating the knowledge of an action, in which I am brought in for damages to the amount of 3*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.*; nor is it amiss to bear in mind, that these publications, these wonderful exertions of philanthropy, are making by those very persons, who, from first to last, defended the conduct, all and every part of the conduct, of the *Jailor Arist!*—For these reasons, for the sake of the *public cause*, which is thus sought to be injured through me, I think I shall be excused for stating some facts, which will, much better than any general description, enable those who do not know me to judge of my character as a *master* or *employer*.—In the first place, I have made it a rule, that I will have the labour of no man, who receives *parish relief.* I give him, out of my *own pocket*, let his family be what it may, enough to keep them well, without any regard to what wages other people give; for I will employ *no pauper.* I pay poor-rates, part of which go to the maintenance of other people's labourers; but, any thing in the shape of parish relief; any thing to obtain which a man is to humble himself into a pauper, I never suffer a labourer of mine to receive.—In the next place, I give my men *constant* pay, all seasons and all weathers. My labourers

have none of those anxieties about the weather that labourers in general have; and, though I have no rule about *sickness*, I have never yet had, amongst my constant labourers, a sick man, whom I did not pay all the same as if he were well.—I have now four men whom I employ constantly, one has been with me ever since I first came to reside at Botley; one about two years and a half; and the other two about a year and a half; and to only two of these men, and that upon only one occasion, did I ever give an angry word. These men have always been *by the week*, so that, once in every seven days, they have had an opportunity of quitting me, if they chose.—I wish the hungry-looking philanthropists, who exclaimed, "*poor boy!*" over my run-away carter, could see my labourers. I wish still more that we had an opportunity of comparing them with their half-starved wretches, who, from sheer poverty of blood, are eaten up with disease. I wish all England could see my labourers and compare them with those who have hatched against me this charge of oppression. Has Mr. *Borough* labourers? If he has, I here offer to bet him the amount of the damages *he laid* against the amount of the damages *he got*, that any *three* of my labourers receive as much from me as any *five* of his labourers receive from him. Come, Mr. Goodlad, I'll offer you a bet; and that is, that I pay *one fourth more, all the year round*, to a labourer who has only *one arm*, than you pay to your labourer, William Burgess, the pauper plaintiff. No labourer of mine has, indeed, the advantage of being able to *swear himself a pauper*; no man who labours for me, no man whose sweat drops upon my land, however large his family, stands in need of any thing but what I give him in the shape, not of alms, but of *pay*; but William Burgess, a labourer of this Mr. Goodlad, one of those who advised the action, could, with only *one child*, and he an able young man, *swear himself a pauper!*—I do not pretend, that it is from a regard for my labourers that I give such great wages; for, I am convinced, that it is my interest to do it. One of my labourers is worth two or three half-famished creatures. But, my great motive is, the lessening of the number of paupers; the setting an example in this way, that may tend to raise part, at least, of the labouring people from that state of *slavery*, commonly called *pauperism.* No man that is in health, that has the use of his limbs,

and is, in all respects, able to labour, ought to be reduced to the necessity of *begging*; and what is it but begging, to go weekly for parish relief? This is the most shocking thing that ever existed in any country upon the face of the earth. That one half, or more, of the *labourers* of a country should be paupers, is really something too disgraceful to think of. I have always thought this, and now that I have it in my power to put my principles in practice, I do it as far as I possibly can. A constant state of pauperism would debase the best nature that man ever possessed. A labourer in this state is always studying deceit; he is afraid of nothing so much as of appearing prosperous, healthy, or happy; he contracts a plaintive language and manner; the worst side he always puts outwards; his children are studiously clad in rags and covered with filth; his wife is always "poorly;" and, in short, a few years robs him of every particle of spirit and sincerity. He, like slaves every where else (for to *have nothing* is to be a slave), has no regard for country, or for any thing attached to country; and all his hopes and all his wishes centre in the quantity of food to be extracted from the overseer. Is it not shocking to reflect upon the natural, the inevitable, consequences of rearing families in this way? I never should have a moment's peace, if a labourer of mine was thus rearing up a brood of hypocrites. A family, thus reared, not only is likely to be, but is sure to be, a nest of thieves and impostors. Nor is the "*comforting system*" much better; the cow-system, the child-bed-linen system, the church-going system, and the industry system, all which, like the schools of Mrs. Hannah More, do more harm than good. In fact, all the largesses that well-meaning people bestow, in any of these ways, are so many *premi-ums for hypocrisy*, which, amongst the poor in particular, is the worst of all vices. A good labourer may be in distress. Give him something, then, at once, and *say no more about it*. Let him do with it what he pleases. Make no bargains with him about his morality; for, if you do, you make him a hypocrite. It is quite delightful to see this village of Botley, when compared to most others that I know. They seem here to be quite a different race of people. They are what some people call saucy, but, they are not hypocrites. They are, in short, what Englishmen ought to be; they show their hu-

mours when they like; they give *their* labour for *your* money, and think there is *no obligation* on either side. Beautiful as is this part of the country, and this village in particular, there is nothing in either that pleases me like the spirit of the people, who are a race of men quite different from those, who, in the school of pauperism, have learnt all the arts of cringing and dissimulation.—The way, in which we have proceeded here, is really worth being made public, and may, with a little individual exertion, be turned to great and general utility. As an instance: we had two families, one of which contained *nine* children and the other *seven*, the whole of whom, drawn up in rank-intire, and set off to the best advantage, that is to say, half hung over with rags, the rest of the body being naked, were arrayed against us before a bench of magistrates. We were satisfied, that, owing to particular circumstances, they had quite a sufficient income; but, as we could not *prove* it upon oath, the magistrates were about to order them relief, when I offered to *pay* them weekly all that they *said* they earned, and, besides that, as much as they *received from the parish*, rather than suffice them to continue paupers. They declined my offer, got no relief, and have not only done without relief since, but have gradually assumed a more decent and prosperous appearance; and, for this very obvious reason, that they have no longer an *interest in being thought miserable*. Here were at once, sixteen children raised from a state of pauperism; that is to say, from all sorts of vice, but particularly of that worst of all vices, hypocrisy.—I have mentioned this, in the hope that some few persons, at least, who have the power, will try the experiment; will endeavour to lessen this terrible evil of pauperism. The fact is, that, as matters now stand, the paupers are *partners* in no inconsiderable part of the property of every farmer; and, Gentlemen, I beg you to observe, that this part of *your* property is not left to *yourselves* to dissipate, but is taken out of your hands at the will of the next bench of magistrates: a great part of whose sway consists in the disposing of that part of your property called Poor-rates; and thus, this disgraceful evil of pauperism, does, in some degree, produce *your* subjection also, of which it is impossible to get rid by any other means than these, of which I have been speaking. The power to dispose of this money frequently, and, indeed, almost always, in

this county, in the hands of those, who *pay little or no part of it*. This is, of itself, a very galling consideration; but, as I said before, there is, at present, no way of getting rid of, or lessening, the evil, without reducing, by some means or other, the number of paupers.

To return again, for a few minutes, to the subject of my treatment of labouring people, I do not know any thing more decisive that I can say than this: I do not like to throw out a *general* challenge, but I will select a few remarkable gentlemen in the county; and first there are the two County Members, Messrs. *Chute* and *Heathcote*; then there is the *High Sheriff*; then there is Mr. *Borough*, the Chairman of the Quarter Sessions; and, lastly, there is *Old George Rose*. Now, if my labourers do not, upon an average, receive from me constantly, above one fourth part more pay, than the labourers of these gentlemen, or any of them, receive from them, I will then be content to pass for a grinder of the poor.—Of all the charges that could have been invented, that of being a hard master, or employer, is the one that suits me least. All those who know me, know that I never higgles as to prices in any case whatever; that I never attempt to beat any body down; never attempt to cheapen any thing; never waste any of the precious moments of life in this sort of lying and cheating. If the public would know what I am in this respect, let them look at those who have been long employed under me. Let them look at Mr. *BAGSHAW* and Mr. *BUDD*, both of whom have been constantly employed by me, in one way or another, ever since my return to England. A young man, who was a shop-man, in America, and whom I took from being a journeyman book-binder, now has the business which I had at New York. This prosperity is not too much; it is not more than they have all merited; but, it has been invariably the case with those employed by me, that, if *sober* and *industrious*, they have rapidly risen in life, myself being to them an example of sobriety and industry. Accordingly, I have been, and I am, better served than any boy else. Those who have been long employed by me, not only like my employment, but they like me personally better than they like any other man in the world, and this, not from any wheedling or coaxing they get from me; not from any rant about humanity; not on account of any *palaverings*; but on account of that

frankness and sincerity which they always experience from me, that freedom in conversation, that unrestrained familiarity, and that absence of every thing like superciliousness or austerity, which have always marked my character, and, in all which, to the surprise of most observers, I indulge, with my children as well as with all others under me, without at all lessening the weight of my authority. That reserve, that distant behaviour, and all those arts, which are so often resorted to for the purpose of keeping up a consequence in the eyes of inferiors, I despise. I would sooner earn my bread with a mattock or a spade, than make use of such arts. In short, I do not believe, that, in the whole world, there is one man more completely happy in family and in those under his authority than I am; and, I do not believe, that there are many who deserve it more. In my house we know of no such thing as blue-devils (which, by-the-bye, are much worse than black devils); we know of no lowness of spirits; we are always sober, always industrious, always up early in the morning; and, like the Quakers, we are *never gay*, and, therefore, we are *always cheerful*. Our taste is to lay out, what we are able to lay out, upon *useful labour*; upon that the effects of which will, in one way or another, be seen and felt when we shall be no more. This is our taste, and not to exhaust our substance, and entail a life of dependence upon our children, by vain and empty attempts at show. We have too just notions of what constitutes happiness, as well as of what is our duty towards our children, to waste, in vain parade, that which may make those children as independent in conduct as we are. Our maxim is, that we have *no right* to live in a style higher than that in which we have a fair chance of enabling each of our children to live; that it would be *criminal* in us to bring our family up in a way, which would induce them to expect a life higher than the one that we can secure to them, and which might lead them to become dependents upon the government, that is to say, a *higher sort of paupers*, and tempt them to do all manner of base and infamous acts. We see too many of those miserable creatures, who, with all the outward show of ease and gaiety, lead a life of continual care and woe; we see too much of this splendid beggary; we see too many of these higher sort of paupers, to think of imitating them; and, indeed, it is because we are happy and independent, because

we care for none of them, because we despise them, because we are a living satire upon their baseness, that they hate us, and would gladly see us exterminated. They put me in mind of Milton's Devil, in the garden of Eden, looking round the bush and gnashing his fangs, at Adam and Eve.

Now, Gentlemen, it is really a shame, at a time like this, to fill a public paper (which ought to be devoted exclusively to political topics) with matter like this; but, what am I to do? I have carefully examined the news-papers, commonly called ministerial, and, I find, that, for more than two months past, more space has been occupied with ME, than with the Emperor Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, all put together; and, I could almost venture to assert, that, during that time, there have been, in various ways, not less than from *twenty to thirty thousand pounds* expended upon publications against me. The Trial, relating to this pauper, was, as I before observed, inserted in those papers to the exclusion of the account of that battle, which, in all probability, has decided the fate of continental Europe. In short, when compared to the defeating of me, the defeating of Buonaparté appears to be considered as a mere trifle. His fearful, his terrific success, really seems to have been overlooked during the tide of joy excited by the damages of £3. 6s. 8d. obtained against me at Winchester; and, all that appears to have been wanting, was, the firing of the Park and Tower guns, when the news of this famous achievement was received. This being the case, I am compelled, in spite of my natural inclination, to consider myself as a person of great consequence not only in this county, but through the kingdom; I am compelled to consider whatever relates to my conduct or my character as being of great public importance, and as being deeply interesting to all descriptions of persons. "Greatness is thrust upon me;" and, as if it were impossible to do the thing sufficiently in London, recourse has been had to the assistance of my neighbours in the country. I, therefore, have no need of any apology for this long address upon matters relating almost wholly to myself; for, the fact notoriously is, that, notwithstanding the great events that are passing upon the continent of Europe, there is, in England, no subject whatever, which excites so much public interest as the character and conduct of William Cobbett.

One word, Gentlemen, by way of conclusion, relative to the conduct of the *Judge* and the *Jury*. Some persons thought, that the Judge's summing up was *hostile towards me*. I must confess, that I did not think so. It was next to impossible that he should have any notion of the case as it must *now* appear to you and to the public. There was a buzz of calumny and falsehood against me, running through the city of Winchester. Little or much of this would naturally reach the ears of the Judge, and those ears he could not shut. But, independent of this, the *evidence* was such, that, unless the Judge had known the parties, and the whole history of the thing, I do not see how he was to draw any other conclusion than what he did. In short, I saw in the judge's conduct nothing that appeared to me at all unfair; and, I hope, that, in a similar case, I should have acted just as he did. —The *jury*, not one of whom did I know, and not one of whom lives, I think; within ten or twelve miles of Botley, would, however, naturally be better acquainted with the real nature of the case than the judge. They were, for the most part, farmers; and, as a great talk had been excited by the falsehoods which my enemies were circulating, these farmers would naturally make inquiries amongst the farmers from my neighbourhood, and would, thereby, get at something nearer the truth. They would perceive, too, that which the Judge could not be expected to perceive, relative to the *conduct of the bench at Droxford*. The moment we got the Old Woman to confess, that a bench of *magistrates*, before whom she went, did *not* recommend her to induce her run-away son to return to his master's service, but *advised her to bring an action against that master and the two peace-officers, who alone could be witnesses for him*; the moment we got the Old Woman to confess this, the jury must have seen to the bottom of the matter. Still, however, there was the *evidence*, which, owing to the circumstances before mentioned, we could not overset: and therefore, it was impossible not to give the verdict against us; but, the jury took care, at the same time, to act *justly*, and they thereby most cruelly disappointed those expectations, which many had evidently formed. Had the judge and jury seen the case in its true light, had the forms of law permitted me to produce the evidence that I could have produced, the damages would not

have been sufficient to purchase the Attorney a glass of grog, or a quid of tobacco; and yet the *bets* ran at between 300*l.* and 500*l.*; and the jury were, by some gay-dressed rabble that stood near a friend of mine, execrated almost to their teeth. The disappointment of Mr. BOROUGH, who appeared to be the favourite of the day, was the most striking. While the Jury were consulting, he, with folded brief in one hand and pen in the other, was prepared to *note down the verdict*. His body was not on tip-toe, for he sat down, but his mind manifestly was. The jury paused a little. He dipt his pen afresh, and again brought it to the attitude of making the to-be-celebrated record. His eagerness was observed. He affected to chat. A jury-man made a half turn: back came the pen, replenished with a new dip. Thus he sat, his arms upon the table, his eye fixed upon the jury-box, all his muscles strained, apparently, to their utmost stretch—when, at the sound of the words *ten pounds*, down, with a sort of fling, went the brief out of one hand and the pen out of t'other. That these workings of anxiety and disappointment were not confined to the breasts of the pauper's counsel was very evident from that longitude of face, which, at the moment when Mr. Borough dropt his pen and brief, became dolefully visible in some of the gayest and most smirking of the boxes.

Thus, Gentlemen, burst that bubble, which the envy and hatred of some, and the folly of others, had blown up till it assumed a magnitude superior to that of all the other causes brought before the court; and thus, it is possible, though by no means certain, that my and your enemies received a lesson from an honest Jury, that may be useful to them in future. Nothing so completely as this affair, and the publications that have arisen out of it, could prove to the whole nation, to what low and despicable means of calumny my enemies are capable of resorting. Gentlemen, all that my friends, that is to say, the friends of the Constitution of England, have to do, is, to put to my enemies this question: "Would YOU have advised, or pushed on, or had even the *"smallest share in, that action against Mr. Cobbett?"* Put this question to them *individually*; put this question to each man *in the face of all companies*. Ask them, then; whether they never *swear* at those with whom they are angry? And, if the blush of shame does not come upon their

cheek, if they are such double-distilled hypocrites as still to affect horror at such expressions, set them down for the disciples of some *gambling, drunken, impious, political priest*.

With every sentiment of regard,

I am,

Your friend,

W^m. COBBETT.

Botley, 26th July 1809.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AUSTRIA. —I need not remind the reader what have been my *opinions* as to the result of the war between Austria and France. He will not fail to bear in mind, that, while the philosophers of the MORNING POST and the COURIER were shouting victory; and while even the sensible men, who write in the CHRONICLE, the TIMES, and the STATESMAN, were almost ready to join in the shout, I was using the utmost of my endeavours to prevent the public from conceiving those hopes, which could do no good if realized, and which, if disappointed, must produce much mischief. From the beginning of this ill-starred war I predicted what has now taken place. I never could see the smallest reason to believe, that the war would be successful on the part of Austria; but, I found people enough ready to believe it without any reason at all. If my advice (and why, since they will have me to be so great a man, should I not offer my advice)? if my advice had been taken, the emperor of Austria might now have been safe at Vienna, and some millions, perhaps, of English money, the fruit of English labour, would now have been in our possession, instead of being expended upon this war.—It is, however, now too late to talk of this. It appears but too manifest, that my opinion expressed only the week before last, namely, that Napoleon was "upon the eve of *totally annihilating* the authority "of the House of Austria," is now likely to be speedily verified. This being the case, the *manner* of it is of little importance. It signifies not a straw, whether he do away the *name*, or whether he suffer that to exist, so that he does away, in effect, the power heretofore belonging to it.—Let us now, then, as I proposed in my first Letter to the King, *look at home*. In that letter, I anticipated what has now taken place; and, it was, because I was so fully convinced that it would take place; it was for this reason principally, that I

addressed myself to the King, in the hope of thereby exciting more attention to a subject of vital importance, not only to the interests and welfare of the people, but to the independence of the country, and, of course, to the security of his Majesty's throne.—The case supposed in that letter, the complete subjugation of the continent of Europe by Napoleon, is, I think it will not be denied, now at no great distance. For my part, I can see nothing upon the continent to prevent it; and, as to our *expedition*, I will not, I cannot talk of it!—I may be deceived. My opinion may be wrong; but, it is my opinion, that the continent of Europe is now subdued. If my opinion be erroneous, so much the better; but, at any rate, there is no man, who wishes for England to retain her independence, who will not readily agree, that we ought now to take our measures upon the supposition, that Napoleon will subdue the whole of the continent; and, of course, that he will have all its ports and all its naval means in his hands.—The question, then, is, what ought these measures to be? I have not room, at present, to discuss them; but, I cannot refrain from making a few detached observations.—And first, let me beseech those, who have the power over our national force, not to waste any portion of it, however small, upon foreign conquests of any sort. I mention this, because it is a notion very fashionable amongst the people in the city, that, "if Napoleon has all the continent, we must have all the colonies belonging to the continent;" which is much about the same thing as to say, "if you get more strength to attack me with, I will take a load upon my shoulders, in order to be able the better to resist you." This is a truth from which I never depart, that colonies *never add to a nation's means of defence*, and, indeed, that they always *diminish the strength* of a nation. I hope, therefore, that we shall not delude ourselves with the hope of finding, in the new world, "a balance," as it has been called, against the power of Buonaparté in the old world; for, I am quite certain, that such "balance" would prove to be a mill-stone about our necks.—The STATESMAN news-paper, proposes PEACE as our means of averting destruction. His words are these: "What is now to be the object of the Expedition? That is a question which we refer to the sapience of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Canning, and, though last

"not least, Lord Castlereagh. Where now are those warlike heroes who 'cast up their caps,' and 'cheered' on the Royal Exchange of the city of London, when Lord Lauderdale returned from Paris? *Peace must now be had*.—An effort on the Continent would now be more than madness.—Napoleon, delivered by the irresistible efforts of his own genius, from the imminent, but final, danger with which he could be threatened—is now firmly, immoveably, and permanently fixed.—He has vanquished all opposition—from the Peninsula he will now drive all other intruders—and the Continent of Europe will at length return to that state of repose from which it was awakened by England—and by England alone.—England began the war by breaking the Treaty of Amiens—and she must terminate it upon the best terms that can be obtained.—Of Walcheren we might possibly obtain possession—but that it can be permanently maintained, is impossible. Every port and creek on the continent will now be closed—harsh and inharmonious as the word *Peace* may sound in the ears of the War Faction—to that we must come—and, if the final result of all these disasters shall so terminate—the tears which the calamities of war have produced, will be at length wiped away by the return of *Peace*."—I am sorry to differ in opinion with this gentleman, but, really, I see not, at present, the possibility of peace; nor do I under our present system of warfare see even the seeds of future peace.—There is a little too much of party acrimony in this paragraph, for which I am sorry. If any man has reason to be resentful; if any man could possibly justify his enmity to measures for the sake of the men by whom they have been adopted, it certainly would be myself; but, I trust I shall never lose sight of my duty to my country; and, I must say, that, whoever were the cause of the war, I cannot see, at present, any hope of obtaining peace, without submitting to terms so disgraceful as to amount almost to a surrender of the crown of our Sovereign into the hands of Buonaparté; rather than see which day, there are not, I hope, many men in England, who would not, in spite of all the calumnies raised against them, literally shed the last drop of their blood.—I do not know what is here meant by the "*war-faction*;" for, I know of no man of any public consequence, who wishes for war, if he could have peace

with a common chance of *safety*. Can it be shewn to me, how it is possible; I do not say probable, but *possible* to obtain peace, at the present time, with a chance of safety? If peace is made, a part, at least, of *our* naval means must be laid aside; a part of the fleet must be dismantled; and, it is *certain*, that a peace of only *two years* would, if we were to make peace *now*, give Buonaparté a fleet of a *hundred sail of the line*. There is no doubt upon this point. No man can call the position in question. What, then, are we to do? Go to war again, with every thing to create, or repair? How long could we go on thus?—My opinion is, that Napoleon would make peace with us now, and very readily, because it would be convenient for him to get us quickly out of Spain and Portugal without either trouble or expence, and without the great dangers which his Marshals will have to encounter in facing "*the heroes of India*." He would, without doubt, make peace with us now; but, to me it is as clear as day-light, that he would not suffer us to remain at peace two years, when he would again force us forth with our means greatly diminished and his means greatly augmented.—Does it appear to the editor of the Statesman, that Buonaparté has a *settled determination to subdue this kingdom*? If he answer that question in the affirmative, as I think he must, he will then, at once, see how peculiar is our situation. We can make no peace with Buonaparté upon *equal terms*, for we have no design to subdue any part of *his* empire. Ours must in this case be a peace *upon the defensive*. No matter who it is that has brought us into this situation. In this situation we are; and if, *in this situation*, and upon such a principle, we make peace, our days are numbered; the days of our remaining independence will be but as a span long. The peace of Amiens (no matter who broke it) we shall never see again. Good God! what a change since the peace of Amiens was made! Nay, how much worse are things than they were at the Convention of Cintra, or even at the retreat to Corunna!—Can we long preserve our independence, after Buonaparté has subdued *the whole of the continent of Europe*? In my opinion we can. In my opinion England may set him at defiance for ever. But, we must have *a new system of warfare*; we must interrupt and destroy that commercial connection, that nursery of seamen; we must cut off that inexhaustible source of

naval means, mentioned in my First Letter to the King; or, my opinion is, that we shall not be able long to resist his undivided power.—"Now comes the tug of war." What we have heretofore seen has been *mère child's play* to what we must see now. This country will now become, the *sole* object of the greatest commander and the most numerous army that the world ever saw. Every single man in England should, betimes, make up his mind to the necessity of fighting for England upon English ground. Those are poltroons, or fools, who endeavour to hide the danger from others, or pretend not to see it themselves. Every man should ask *himself*, should put it home to his own heart, what he intends to do, in case a French army should land. The worst of it is, that we but too often talk of exertions in defence of the country, as if we *ourselves* had nothing to do with such exertions but to *talk* of them.—In 1804, when there was great alarm, but no *real danger*, or, at any rate, not a hundredth part of the danger that there soon will be and must be, I said, "Let us put out PITT as soon "as we can, but, in the mean while, let "us not think of him until we are *quite "prepared for beating the French*." Such are my sentiments now. Let us do all we can in order to obtain a Reform of Abuses, because that is the way to make the country sound at heart; but, at the same time, let us, without considering who is minister, do all that lies in our power, and let *each man* (for that is the thing) do all that lies in his power to prepare for the country's defence against its foreign enemies.—The measures of the ministers may be unwise, as the *Local-Militia* law, for instance, and the putting a stop to that excellent measure, the enlistment for term of years; but, still, we must not give up *the country*; we must not give up England in our resentment against Lord Castlereagh, however just that resentment may be. Those, therefore, who, at Ely, and elsewhere, have quelled the spirit of mutiny amongst the Local-Militia, are certainly entitled to the thanks of the country. No one can be pleased to see his countrymen flogged; but, when, as in this case, they have *voluntarily* entered, and that, too, for the sake of a *bounty*, I say, as I said before, "flog them," if they do not abide by their bargain, and strictly obey their officers.—My opinion is, however, that, the sure means of national defence; the safe means as well as the cheap means, is

that proposed by MAJOR CARTWRIGHT, in his work called ENGLAND'S ÆGIS.—I have not, at present, time to add to these hasty and desultory remarks, but shall not fail to return to the subject in my next. The prospect before us is most awful; but, if we are wise and brave, we shall still be happy and free.

Botley, 27th July, 1809.

COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF State Trials:

To be completed in Thirty-Six Monthly Parts, forming Twelve large Volumes in Royal Octavo.

The EIGHTH PART of the above Work will be published on Tuesday the 1st of August. One Part will appear, with the greatest regularity, on the first of each succeeding Month. Those Subscribers who have expressed their intention of taking the Work in Quarterly Volumes, are respectfully informed that the Third Volume will be ready for delivery on the 1st of September.—In order to remove all professional doubts, as to how far this new and enlarged Edition of the State Trials may, with safety, be cited as authority in the Courts, and relied on as of equal authenticity with the former, I think it right to state, that it is intended to be a literal transcript of the last edition, as far as that edition extends; that where I have inserted fuller and better reports of any Cases, or of any parts of Cases, the text of the old Edition will nevertheless be retained; and that the new matter will be distinguished in a manner not to be mistaken, and be distinctly pointed out in the Table of Contents to each volume.—In the last Volume will also be given what I call a PARALLEL INDEX, consisting of two Columns; in the first of which will be inserted, in their order, the numbers of all the Pages in the last Edition; and in the other, correspondent figures shewing in what Volume and Page of the present Work the contents of each Page of the last Edition will be found; by means of which Parallel Index, the place in this Work of any passage occurring in the last Edition, may be ascertained with nearly as much ease and expedition as if the paging of that Edition were preserved; which, it is obvious, would be perfectly impracticable,

considering the valuable mass of new matter to be introduced.

To such Gentlemen as may happen to be in possession of curious Trials, or of documents relating to Trials of the description of those to be contained in this Work, I shall be much obliged for a communication of them. If the document, or paper, whether in print or manuscript, be requested to be preserved, great care shall be taken of it.

COBBETT'S Parliamentary Debates:

The Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Volumes of the above Work, comprising the Proceedings in both Houses of Parliament during the last Session, are in the Press, and will be published with all possible dispatch.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRENCH ARMY IN AUSTRIA.—*Twenty-fifth Bulletin, dated Wolkersdorf, July 8.*

The works raised by gen. count Bertrand, and the corps he commands, had, since the beginning of the month, entirely subdued the Danube. His Majesty instantly resolved to collect his forces in the island of Lobau, open upon the Austrian army, and bring on a general engagement. It was not because the position of the French army was not a very fine one at Vienna: master of the whole right bank of the Danube, having in his power Austria, and a considerable portion of Hungary, he enjoyed the greatest plenty.—If some difficulties had been experienced in providing sustenance for the people of Vienna, this arose from an ill-organized administration, from embarrassments which were every day diminishing, and from difficulties which were naturally produced by the situation in which the country was placed, in a land in which the trade in corn is an exclusive privilege of the government. But how could the troops continue to be separated from the hostile army, by a canal of three or four hundred toises in breadth, when the means of passing over had been prepared and secured?—This would have given credibility to the impostures which the enemy had scattered with so great profusion throughout his own and neighbouring countries: this would have cast a doubt over the occurrences at Essling, and would, finally, have

authorised the supposition of there being, in fact, a substantial equality between armies so different, of which one was animated and in some measure reinforced by the multiplicity of its successes and victories, while the other was dispirited by the most striking reverses.—All the intelligence concerning the Austrian army shewed that it was considerable; that it had been recruited by numerous bodies of reserve, by the levies from Moravia and Hungary, and by all the landwhers (fencibles) of the provinces; that its cavalry had been re-mounted by requisitions in all the circles, and its draughts of artillery tripled by immense levies of horses and carriages in Moravia, Hungary, and Bohemia.—To add new chances in their favour, the Austrian generals had raised military works, of which the right was protected by Gros-Aspern, and the left by Enzersdorf, and the intervals between them were covered by redoubts, surrounded by pallisades and frizes, and defended by more than 150 pieces of battering cannon, taken from the fortresses of Bohemia and Moravia.—It was inconceivable how the Emperor, with his experience in war, could think of attacking works so powerfully defended, backed by an army estimated at 200,000 men, as well troops of the line as militia and new raised levies, and who were supported by 800 or 900 pieces of field artillery. It appeared more simple to throw some fresh bridges over the Danube, a few leagues lower down, and thus render useless the field of battle prepared by the enemy. But in this latter case it was not thought practicable to avert the inconveniencies which had already nearly proved fatal to the army, and succeed, in the course of two or three days, in protecting these new bridges from the machines of the enemy.—On the other side the Emperor was tranquil.—Works were raised upon works in the island of Lobau; and several bridges on piles, and several rows of stoccadoes, were fixed at the same place.—This situation of the French army placed between these two great difficulties, had not escaped the enemy. He was aware that his army, too numerous and unwieldy, would be exposed to certain destruction if he acted on the offensive; but at the same time, he believed

that it was impossible to dislodge him from the central position, in which he covered Bohemia, Moravia, and a part of Hungary. It is true that this position did not cover Vienna, and that the French were in possession of the capital. But this possession was, in a certain degree, disputed, since the Austrians remained masters of one bank of the Danube, and prevented the arrival of the articles most indispensable to the subsistence of so great a city. These were the reasons of hope and fear, and the subject of conversation in the two armies.—On the 1st of July, at four o'clock in the morning, the Emperor removed his head quarters to the island of Lobau, which had been already named by the engineers the island Napoleon. A small island, to which had been given the name of the duke of Montebello, and which bore upon Enzersdorf, had been furnished with ten mortars, and twenty 18-pounders. Another island called island Espagne, had been supplied with six pieces of battering cannon, 12-pounders, and four mortars. Between these two islands a battery had been raised, equal in force to that of the island Montebello, and in like manner bearing upon Enzersdorf. These 62 pieces of battering artillery had the same object, were in two hours to destroy the little town of Enzersdorf, drive away the enemy, and demolish the works. On the right, the island Alexander, with four mortars, two ten-pounders, and twelve six-pounders, battering cannon, were to bear upon the plain, and protect the operations of the bridges.—On the 2d the aide de camp of the duke de Rivoli, passed over to the Mill island with 500 voltigeurs, and took possession of it. This island was also furnished with cannon. It was joined to the continent, on the left side, by a small bridge. In the front a little fleche was raised, and this redoubt was called Petit.—In the evening the redoubts of Essling appeared to be jealous of these works; not doubting, that they were a first battery, formed to act against themselves, they fired upon them with great activity. This was precisely the intention in having seized this island.—The attention of the enemy was to be drawn to this point, in order to conceal from him the operations really proposed.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 5.] LONDON, SATURDAY, AUGUST 5, 1809.

[Price 1s.

139]

[130

TO THE KING.

On the Maritime War against France.

LETTER II.

SIR,

That event, that great source of future danger, which event was anticipated in the former Letter that I took the liberty to address to your Majesty; has now taken place. Austria has been defeated in her own territories. Her sovereign, *in the midst of nearly twenty millions of subjects*, by whom a venal press assured us he was *ardently beloved*, has been pursued to his capital, driven from his capital, beaten out of an entrenched camp in the heart of his dominions, and, after having fled before the enemy, till, in flight, he could, in all likelihood, no longer see a chance of even personal safety, he has besought, and, at last, obtained, under the name of Armistice, a respite, which no reasonable man can possibly consider as of long duration. How serious are the reflections to which this event must give rise in the mind of every Englishman, anxious for the welfare of his country, and especially in the mind of your Majesty! The delusive hopes, excited, in the minds of the uninformed, by the reiterated misrepresentations and falsehoods of a venal press, with whom the Emperor Napoleon and his army were become subjects of mockery; these hopes are now vanished, and the people are in a state of mind much more depressed, than if they had never been deceived into bright expectations. They now see the reverse of the picture: they see the immense sums of money, which this war, so fatal to your Majesty's ally, will have cost them, and it is not in nature that they should feel as much zeal in the cause of the war in general, as they felt before this event. They must hate those, by whom they have been so grossly deceived. It is impossible that they should not hate them; and, as to any belief in them in future, no one, in his senses, can entertain a hope of it. In short, public opinion, public confidence, seems now to have received a greater shock than it ever before received since I have

had any knowledge of public affairs; which, of itself, is no small evil. But, for this the *people* are not to be blamed; for, I do not believe, that, in the whole world, there were ever such arts made use of to deceive a people, to pervert the reasoning powers of man, and, at the same time, to debase and corrupt the mind. To those, therefore, who conduct, or direct the conducting, of the venal press (including, perhaps, *nine tenths* of the publications in the kingdom) belongs the whole of the blame of having produced this enormous mischief; this total want of faith, which, in an hour of real danger, will weigh, perhaps, more against the country than an enemy's army of a hundred thousand men. This is, with me, so important a point, that I cannot refrain from pressing it upon your Majesty's attention. Napoleon owes no small part of his success, and of that power, which has now become so gigantic, to his having never suffered any description of persons to delude his people with false hopes; to raise their expectations beyond what the real state of things warranted; to cajole and cheat them, to abuse their credulity, to wear out their patience with promises a thousand times made, and never once fulfilled. There is, too, something, not only disgusting in itself, but greatly injurious to the cause, in the *abuse*, the *vilifying language*, the *foul names*, which the venal press is continually bestowing upon the Emperor Napoleon, when all the world must recollect, that, during the short time that we were at peace with him, a writer was prosecuted, at the suit of your Majesty's Attorney General, who is now your prime-minister, and was convicted of a *libel*, for having *written abusively of this same Emperor Napoleon*, for whom almost every writer seems now to vie with all the rest in devising foul and abusive appellations; and, what is more, these same writers put forward claims to *loyalty*, to the utter exclusion of all those who do not join in this abuse, and who think that foul words are not the most effectual weapons wherewith to attack, or repel, an enemy so formidable as Buonaparté. The great objection, however, to this mode of warfare is, that it draws off our attention

E

from the true state of the case, the true nature of the contest in, which we are engaged. As is invariably the case with those, who vent their anger in words, our actions do not correspond with our threats; we so exhaust ourselves in violent expressions, that we appear to be satisfied with that, or, at least, our hostility seems to carry us but very little further. Words cost but little, and, therefore, there are enough to contribute in this way; there are enough, who, like the pensioned poet, Fitzgerald, are willing to make "*sacrifices*," in this way, for the support of the war, and the "*deliverance of Europe*."

In spite, however, of all these sacrifices; in spite of the volumes of abuse, which have, since the prosecution of Mr. Peltier, been, in various shapes and under various titles, published against the Emperor Napoleon; in spite of all the toasts at the Mansion-House, Guild-Hall, the London-Tavern, and else-where; in spite of all this, our enemy has not only gone on increasing in power, but has, at last, arrived at a point, whence your Majesty must naturally fear, that he has not far to go ere he arrive at the complete subjugation of the continent; but, (and this is the great danger, from the cause I am now speaking of) along with this abuse of Napoleon, is industriously spread abroad notions, whence, a great part of the people must be led to conclude, *that he is not an object of dread*. Those who abuse him, having their own selfish purposes to answer; having the passions of others to flatter and indulge, will allow to neither him nor his generals nor his army any sort of virtue, military or political. The same obstinate and perverse spirit, which ascribed the victory of *Marengo* to *DESSAIX*, and the *turning out of the Directory* to *LUCIEN BUONAPARTE*, and which maintained, that, in both cases, Napoleon exhibited all the marks of *folly* and of *cowardice*; that same spirit still prevails; it is still mighty; it still gives us accounts like that of the Austrian "*victory*" of *Aspern*; it tells us, that, at the battle of *WAGRAM*, as it told us at the battle of *AUSTERLITZ*, the Archduke "*led Buonaparté into a trap*." When this spirit will be put down; when the people of this country, will be able to get at the truth, is more than I can say; but, my opinion is, that, of all the allies that Buonaparté has, few are more faithful or more serviceable to him, than this base and foolish disposition to disparage, upon all occasions, his talents and his courage,

and especially now, when it is become manifest, that, for no great length of time, can the deception possibly prevail, even amongst the most ignorant classes of society. Leaving the morality of the thing out of the question; or, rather, supposing, that the case warrants a departure from all its rules; still, Sir, the deception is to be reprobated; because, by tending to hush the fears of the people, it must tend to retard the hour, when they shall come to that state of mind, which will be necessary to secure the independence of the country.

That the time is now fast approaching, when this kingdom will have single-handed to contend, for its INDEPENDENCE, and that, too, against ALL THE REST of Europe, under the sway of the Emperor Napoleon; this is, I think, a proposition, which no one, except one of those whose interest it may be to deceive the public, will attempt to deny, unless there be grounds for an opinion, that the mild, and christian-like, and unambitious nature of that conqueror should induce him to make no attempts against us, merely because we have discovered more enmity towards him than any other people have shewn, and because the conquering of us would be more glorious than the conquering of any other people. Those, who think thus, may see nothing new, nothing alarming, in the present state of the war; but, those who think directly the reverse; who think, that, from principles of *self-preservation*, as well as from the passions of envy and revenge, and from a love of glory, Napoleon will seek the subjugation of this kingdom; these persons must perceive, that the battles on the Danube, the subsequent armistice, and the treaty by which it will necessarily be followed, have given to the contest that decided character, which warrants the assertion, that England is now *contending for her existence*.

This being the case; or, at least, it being so in my opinion, the next thing for me to inquire into is, *How we are to maintain this contest?*—There are two modes of warfare, which we may suppose Napoleon to pursue; that of *wasting* and that of *assault*. Suppose him to pursue the former, and us to pursue the same mode of warfare that we now pursue, what, I would like to ask your Majesty's ministers, must be the consequence of his sitting down quietly, giving rest, and, in fact, *peace*, to all his dominions, while he caused us to expend *seventy millions* a year? How many years would this last? How many years

would it be possible for us to 'carry on a war of this sort, which, as far as I can see, need not cost the subjects of Napoleon a sum, which, when distributed, would amount to a farthing a head? I have before explained to your Majesty, that all the most useful commercial communications are even now carried on between the several countries, under Napoleon's sway; and that, in fact, as far as relates to the prosperity of those countries, our power, as now used, has no effect. What, then, I should be glad to know from your Majesty's ministers, should we do, were he to resolve upon a mere menacing, a mere paragraph warfare; if he were to *do nothing at all*, but merely to say: "you shall not have peace?" In this case, the question comes to this: *How long we can continue to expend seventy millions a year?*—But, it is not to be believed, that the ever-active spirit of Napoleon will suffer him to pursue this mode of warfare. On the contrary, if he should, in the course of a year, have finished his work upon the continent of Europe, will he not, as surely as he has life, set himself seriously about his last labour, the fulfilment of his pledge to Lord Whitworth? Upon this supposition, which is, indeed, the only rational one, we have next to take a view of his means of attack.—He will have in his hands, or completely at his command, all the roads and harbours and arsenals that he could wish for; and many more than he could possibly want. His means of building and fitting out and manning ships would be inexhaustible. Even during the present war, he has, I believe, *built two new ships to our one!* Having once settled the continent to his liking, how long would he be in creating a navy far superior to your Majesty's navy *in numbers*? Not equal in skill, and I hope, not in bravery; but far superior in numbers; and, unless we suppose the French totally incapable of attaining naval skill, we must allow, that experience would soon make them formidable. Painful as it may be to contemplate such truths, it would be folly in the extreme for us to shut our eyes against them. If we look, then, at the naval efforts that Napoleon has been able to make, even during his great military wars, we cannot refrain from being alarmed at those which he will be able to make, when he shall have completely gotten rid of those wars, and shall, at the same time, have added to the ports already in his possession, those of Spain and Portugal.

For my part, I can see no reason (if we pursue our present system of warfare) why Napoleon should not, in a year after he has settled the affairs of the continent, have afloat *a hundred ships of the line*, completely manned and fit for sea. Leaving the Baltic out of the question, there are quite ports and arsenals enough for this purpose; and, as to the other means, hemp, pitch, iron, copper, and timber of all sorts, he will have the greater part of them for a fourth of what they will cost us. Why, then, I would put it to your Majesty's ministers, should he not have such a fleet in the course of *one year*? But, suppose he chuses to stop *three years*? Suppose him capable of restraining, for that length of time, his eagerness to conquer this country; and, that he has 300 ships of the line fit for sea. Suppose this to be the case, in what a situation should we then be? And, if our present mode of warfare be continued, I do not, for my part, see any reason, nor can I discover any reason, why he should not have such a force, and even in *a much shorter time* than that which I have pointed out. Three years is not a long period. The present war has already endured more than six. It, therefore, becomes us to consider, whether we shall have the means of resisting such a force. But, without supposing the existence of any such force as this, no one, I should think, will deny, that, in the course of two years, at the farthest, Buonaparté, upon the supposition of his having settled the continent, will be able to send out *several stout squadrons at once*, or at nearly one and the same time. Supposing him to do this, and to have from ten to fifteen thousand men on board of each, and to make for Ireland. The chances are that *some* of them would reach their destination. To *watch* six or seven stout squadrons would require twice as great a force as we have. In fact, it would, against such a maritime force as we are now, supposing, be utterly impossible to guard all the approaches to Ireland, supposing that to be the only object to attend to. But, if Napoleon should have a stout squadron in *every considerable port*, from the *Texel* to *Cadiz* inclusive, there will be nothing, that I can see, to prevent him from engaging the attention of the whole of our force, such as it is now, upon the Eastern coasts of England, while he sails for Ireland from Ferrol, Lisbon, or any of the Southern ports. To blockade the *whole* of his ports, and especially if each contain a stout

and well supplied squadron, will be impossible, even if the weather should always be fair; and to blockade a part will be of no use; and, therefore, unless we adopt a new mode of warfare, it appears to me quite evident, that the time is at no great distance, when the safety of Ireland will depend upon the disposition of the Irish to defend their country against an invasion on the part of the French.

I trust, that no one will dare to tell your Majesty, that there is no danger *now*, because, *hitherto* the threats of Napoleon have proved harmless; that no one will dare to tell you, that, for several years, during the present war, England fought France *single-handed*, and was very far from losing in the contest. The *battle* was, indeed, single-handed, sometimes; though, during this war, France has actually had to fight Austria, Russia, Prussia, Naples, Spain and Portugal, and, by way of interlude, she has disposed of about half a dozen principalities and a popedom. But, whether she had *actually* to fight them, or not, she knew of their being *in existence*. There were, at any rate, *three great powers*, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, who, though not at war with her, *might* be at war with her at any moment, if a misfortune happened to befall her; so that, in fact, we had then all these powers on our *side*, for whatever appearances might be, they all hated France at the bottom of their hearts. —*Now* how different is the state of things! With the sole exception of Russia, there is no power, worthy of being so called, left upon the continent, besides France; and, it is but too evident, that, before Napoleon again returns to Paris, he will make himself as sure of the obedience of Russia as he is of that of Holland or Italy. He will, in that case, be freed from all apprehension. There will scarcely remain the possibility of interrupting him in his plans with regard to England; and the whole of the mental as well as other means of his vast empire will, without doubt, be directed against this kingdom. I beg your Majesty to reflect on this important change, in the circumstances of the war. Pared as the nails of Austria were in her last war, she was still a *great power*; and, if she had, by those shallow-headed politicians, who have so often urged our friends on to their own destruction; if she had remained quiet for the present, she might still have been an object of fear with Buonaparté; but, she listened to the voice of those who hit upon

the bright thought of making in Austria a *diversion* in favour of Spain, and she has paid the price of her credulity. She is no longer a *power*. It is not to be doubted, that Napoleon will use the rights of a conqueror, and bestow the territories of the Emperor Francis, or great part of them, upon those in whom he can confide. As to the *people*, it is evident that their wishes will never be consulted; nor, indeed, does it appear to be at all necessary. They seem to have been very calm and indifferent spectators of the passing events; and so they *must* have been, seeing that 200,000 Frenchmen were permitted to take possession of their capital, and to over-run their country; a lesson, one would think, well calculated to be useful to other governments, if governments were capable of receiving lessons; if any one ever *began to amend* until amendment was too late; if any one ever relied upon any thing but its *power*, till that power was swept away, and till all other means of preservation became useless; if any one ever appealed to any thing but the *sword*, till it was compelled to listen to the sentence: "he who *lives* by the sword shall *die* by the sword." This lesson is, indeed, of a nature, one would think, to strike sensibility even into a stone. *Eighteen millions* of people suffer *two hundred thousand* to take possession of their country, and that two hundred thousand being seven or eight hundred miles from home! What a *lesson*! But, what are we to think, when we are told that these eighteen millions of people were full of "*loyalty*," full of "*enthusiasm*" in the cause of their country? I beseech your Majesty to remark this well; and to bear it in mind, when you hear or read the language of courtiers, or of venal writers, or when, from lungs of contractors and jobbers, you hear those songs, healths, and sentiments, which the unprincipled retailers of news and politics have the impudence to circulate as the effusions of *loyalty*. How often, alas! were we told of the *loyal* songs and tunes at the theatres at *Berlin* and *Vienna*! How often were we told of these proofs of enthusiastic loyalty, and of hostility towards the French! How many thousands of paragraphs have, for our information, been translated from the German papers, in which the writers of that country appear almost to melt away in reading the marks of the people's attachment to their "*beloved* sovereigns." We have now seen, and the sovereigns of Germany have felt, what reliance is to be placed upon such

professions and protestations; upon this miserable cant of loyalty; while the sovereign of Spain has seen even those of his nobles nearest to his person, lead the way over to his enemy, and lend their hand to the imprisonment of him, whom they had formerly addressed on their knees.

But, if there is no hope in the dispositions of the *people* of Austria, or of any other country, and if Buonaparté should become completely master of the whole of the continent, the ports and naval arsenals included, still it may be said: "the sea is ours: let us take that and keep it, if he take and keep the land." True, and so obviously true, that it requires not a moment's reflection. It is evident, that, unless we can command the sea as completely as he commands the land, we must fall. And, then the question is, *can* we do it? If we can, *how*? Some persons may think, perhaps, that the discussion of these questions are unnecessary, seeing that *we command the sea now*; but, from the facts, stated in my former Letter, it appears, that we do *not* command the sea now; for, would it not be absurd to call that a command of the sea, which permits convoys of two or three hundred vessels of the enemy to pass unmolested, and to carry on, uninterrupted, between the countries of the enemy, all that sort of commerce which is essential to their mutual comfort and prosperity, and which furnishes that enemy with all the means of forming, in a short time, a vast naval force? Yes; it would be absurdity itself to give to this the name of *an absolute command of the sea*. We have an absolute command upon the sea where we cannot injure the enemy, unless he choose to come out to us; but, as to that sort of command, which is capable of really annoying him, and preventing the growth of his naval power, if we have it, it is manifest, that we turn it to no account.—The *expedition*, now, perhaps, in the act of attacking the enemy, *may*, indeed, do some service; that is a sort of command of the sea, which, *if the effect be proportioned to the means*, must tend to the great object, at which I aim, namely, the destruction of the enemy's valuable commercial intercourse; and, of course, of his means of rapidly raising and sending forth a navy, equal, or superior, in numbers, to that of England. But, Sir, if this mighty armament; this really great force; this, probably, more than half of the force, which

England can command, is intended to do nothing, or should be able to do nothing, but merely capture an island, to keep which will require very great strength and expence, and which, after all, is of no great consequence; if this, even adding to it the destruction of a few ships of war and a naval arsenal; if these are to be the achievements of, perhaps, 80,000 men, by land and sea, and of an expence of millions; if, not to reckon the loss of lives, *such effects* are to be purchased with *such means*, what must be our situation before this day five years? At this rate of proceeding; according to this mode of carrying on the war, the destruction of every French ship will cost us half a million of money. Besides, shall we, when Napoleon has settled the affairs of the continent, *dare* attempt such a mode of warfare? If, instead of his now having a war to carry on in Spain and another in Austria, he had no war but his war with us to attend to; should we, in that case, have attempted this Expedition? It is clear that we should not have dared to attempt it; because, while our force was bent towards the Scheldt, he would have had, from several ports to the Southward, squadrons sallying out for Ireland, or other parts of these islands. If, at a time when Napoleon has wars in Spain and Austria, and while he himself is, perhaps, seven hundred miles distant from our point of attack; if, at such a time, under such circumstances, it requires such an armament to destroy a few French ships, what can we expect to be able to do, when these circumstances shall be totally changed, and when not one circumstance favourable to us, will remain?

That the commercial intercourse between the several countries under the sway of Napoleon is capable of being interrupted, and even destroyed, there can be no doubt in the mind of any man, who is acquainted with what has been done in this way by some few officers of your Majesty's navy, and by ONE in particular, whom it is not necessary for me to name. It is not less matter of certainty, that, as long as our present general mode of warfare continues; that is to say, while our fleets and even our cruisers, lie like so many batteries, or fortresses, upon the water, the commerce of the enemy and his naval resources never can be injured. The vessels of the enemy now know, especially with the aid of the signal-posts upon the shore, the situation of each of our ships as well

as they know the situation of any rock or shoal. To station ships along the coasts of the enemy is, therefore, as useless as it would be to fix so many *buoys* along those coasts. They may, and do, cast anchor and amuse themselves in *fishing* and *shooting*, while they see the immense convoys of the enemy, moving along the shore, completely out of their reach. The expence to us is immense, while the injury, and even the inconvenience, to the enemy is scarcely worth notice. Our commerce with the East Indies costs us more to protect it, in one year, than the protection of this commerce of France would cost in a man's life-time; and, a most striking circumstance is, that the "*annihilated navy of France*" forces us into all this expence for the defence of our commerce with the East, a commerce which Napoleon is too wise to envy us, and of which, or of the dominion out of which it grows, he would not deprive us if he could, convinced, as he must be, that that commerce and that dominion are amongst the most powerful of those causes, which are working in his favour. Yet, upon this worse than worthless commerce we expend so much, while he expends scarcely any thing upon the protection of that invaluable commercial intercourse, which I have so often described. To assail this intercourse, we want no *additional force*; we want no more ships; we want nothing, that would be expensive, which we have not, in abundance, already; and, indeed, for this great purpose, the force we already have is three or four times as great as it need to be; for, what is the use of a ship lying, with her sails flapping, in the same, or nearly the same place, for months at a time, while, with the naked eye, her commander sees the crowded convoys of the enemy pass by unmolested? That one ship, employed in the *destruction* of this commerce, would be more useful to the country than a thousand ships, employed in *looking* at it, need not be insisted upon; but, to effect this destruction, there must be, besides that *skill* and *courage*, in which I shall suppose none of your Majesty's naval officers to be wanting, a *motive* sufficient to bring that skill and courage into action, and to create that perseverance in watchfulness and toil, without which the sort of warfare, here contemplated, is not to be carried on with even a chance of success. The officer, who is, to assist in destroying the commerce of France and her means of creating a navy, must make up his mind to

live amidst rocks and shoals, and, of course, to the running of continual risks. So that, to say nothing of his incessant labour, his life and his reputation must be hourly at stake. But, if these difficulties be fairly encountered, the success is by no means doubtful; and, therefore, all that is wanted, supposing our naval force to be judiciously distributed and employed, is, a *sufficient motive* for the encountering of these difficulties; and to shew to your Majesty, that such motive does not, at present, exist, is the chief purpose, for which I have undertaken to address you.

The service, of which I am speaking, is not one which admits of being performed in consequence of mere orders. It does not, like the conducting of a convoy, or the fighting of ships, or the attacking of a battery, admit of particular instructions. General instructions may be given; a latitude to cruise in may be prescribed; but, in almost every case, each single commander must be left to his own discretion, as to the place, time, and manner of the service to be performed. Now, Sir, though it might, perhaps, be no very difficult matter to find out one or two or three commanders, in the British navy, who, from a *pure love of glory*, or upon principles of *pure patriotism*, would, in spite of all the difficulties and dangers before-mentioned, undertake and go through the service of attacking repeatedly the coasting vessels of the enemy; yet, I am persuaded, that no rational man would expect to find *twenty* persons, so actuated, even amongst that very excellent class of men, the British naval officers. Indeed, such characters may be drawn by poets for the purposes of inspiring emulation; but, they are rarely to be met with in real life. It is notorious, that, in our country, men seldom become soldiers and sailors for any other reason than because they are *poor*, every man being poor, whose income is deemed, by others as well as himself, insufficient. It is therefore perfectly preposterous; men may talk as they please about it, but it is perfectly preposterous to suppose, that, in order to insure the performance of services, which necessarily imply great danger of various sorts, besides unavoidable bodily exertion and fatigue, we stand in need of no motive other than that of the *glory* or the *patriotism* of the act. Our practice indeed, our invariable practice, despises this theory; for, while we talk of the glory of having done this or that piece of service, we are pretty sure not to

forget something of a more substantial nature. In short, every thing has its worth in money; every service has its price; and, when we talk of *reward*, we always mean money, or money's worth. After viewing the list of noblemen and gentlemen, whose names are to be found amongst the pensioners and sinecure-place men, it would be miserable affectation to expect from officers of the navy in general the performance of services, such as I have been speaking of, without some motive *other than that of glory or of patriotism*, and, indeed, without the motive of gain, in one shape or another. It would be something below affectation; it would be to suppose those officers senseless brutes; creatures completely divested, indeed, of what nature teaches to all other animals, namely, a feeling of self-preservation, a love of life, of ease, and of happiness.

There are, Sir, various reasons, why this motive should be but little efficient as to the service I am speaking of, the important service of distressing the subjects of our enemy, and of cutting off the source of his naval stores; but, the principal one, and the only one, with which I shall trouble your Majesty, at this time, is the little hope, the very faint hope indeed, which, even in case of distinguished success, the practice of the *Prize Courts* leave the successful commander of deriving any advantage whatever from such success; for, I trust, and, indeed, I am sure, your Majesty will agree with me, that, to receive half a dozen pounds out of a prize worth four or five hundred pounds, ought not to be called an advantage, and that a sum so pitiful ought to be beneath the notice of any man bearing your commission. What I am now going to lay before your Majesty, will, I am certain, astonish you as it has me. I have been accustomed to look upon prizes taken by our ships, as the sole property of the officers and men of those ships, as their reward, their hard-earned reward; what was my astonishment, then, at learning, that, in many cases, much the greater part of the amount was shared amongst *lawyers*; and, that, in almost all cases, a very considerable proportion of the amount found its way into this channel. I shall now proceed, without further comment, to give some instances of the distribution of Prize-Money, and, it is, I hope, unnecessary for me to say, that I give them from authentic documents; and, from these documents it will be seen how erroneous are the opinions, which

have heretofore been generally entertained as to the distribution of Prize-Money.

—The first instance is that of a French prize:

Amount of the Sales -	£.291	11	1
The Charges, including <i>du-</i> <i>ties</i> and <i>Proctor's bill</i> -	229	1	4
Remains for the Captors! -	62	9	9

The capturing ship was a 38 gun frigate; and the shares were, according to the present regulation, as follows:

The Captain - - - -	£.10	8	0
A Seaman - - - -	0	1	6
A Landman - - - -	0	1	0

What does your Majesty think of this? Was I not right in boldly asserting, that your Majesty could know nothing of this? This was a *French* ship, about which there could be no dispute, or, at least, no litigation; and yet, out of 291 pounds, the sailor gets but *eighteen pence*, and the Captain not *ten guineas*, while the Proctor's bill alone amounts to upwards of *twenty seven* pounds.—I need not appeal to your Majesty, whether here be a motive sufficiently powerful to induce any one to enter, with zeal and alacrity, upon any service full of difficulty and danger, and having nothing of glory belonging to it.

Another instance is that of a Prize, the sales of which amounted to 1102*l.* out of which the captors had to pay 338*l.* 14*s.* 2*d.* for the *Proctor's bill* alone, consequently one third part of the amount of this prize went to be divided amongst *Judges, Advocates, Registrars, Marshals, Proctors, Surrogates*, and the like; so that, by the time that the duties and other expences were cleared, there remained, in all probability, not above twenty pounds for the Captain and about half a crown for the sailor.—I am sure, that it is not, because it *cannot be*, your Majesty's wish that your Navy should be thus rewarded.

The next Case presents us with the Gross Sales of a ship and stores to the amount of 745*l.* out of which (it being a *salvage* case) the Captors got 43*l.* 11*s.* 9*d.* as salvage, while the Proctor's Bill amounted to 233*l.* 18*s.* 0*d.*; thus the people in the courts received more than five times as much as the Captain and his Ship's Company.

The next is a *neutral* Case, where there appears to have been some litigation.

Gross sales - - - -	£.1,415	13	2
Duties - - - -	414	2	0

Carried over - - 1,001 11 2

Brought over - - - -	£1,001	11	2
Paid to neutral master -	391	0	0
	<hr/>		
	610	11	2
Other charges - - - -	44	0	8
	<hr/>		
	566	10	6
Proctor's bill - - - -	410	6	10
To be distributed between the Captain and Crew	£.156	3	8

Thus, while the Captain and his crew received *one hundred and fifty six pounds*, the Officers of the Court received *four hundred and ten pounds*; nor must it be forgotten here, that, if the prize had *not been condemned*, the Captain, whose share was, perhaps, about thirty pounds, would have had to pay, out of his own pocket, not only the 410*l.* 6*s.* 10*d.* being the amount of the Proctor's bill, but also the amount of the *damages sustained by the neutral*. Who will, who dares, run such risks?

The next is a Case, wherein the Captain, *in obeying the Orders in Council*, brought in a neutral ship, part of the cargo of which was good prize; and, your Majesty will now see what was the fruit of his obedience to those orders.

Gross sales of the part of the cargo condemned - -	£13	16	6
Divers charges -	£40	13	8
Proctor's bill -	127	18	7
	<hr/>		
	168	12	3
Gross sales, as above	13	16	6

Loss suffered by the Captain who made the Prize - -	154	15	9
---	-----	----	---

Now, as your Majesty will not fail to observe, there was no avoiding this loss, without a breach of duty towards your Majesty and the country. Not to have taken this neutral, it being manifestly in his power, would have subjected the captain to a trial for his life. Is it not, then, extremely hard, that he should suffer such a loss, he whose pay is barely sufficient to afford, what, to him, are necessities of life; is it not hard, that he should sustain such a loss, and that the amount of it should go into the pockets of those, who have risked neither life nor fortune? In such a case, surely, the law should be more merciful. In short, Sir, there needs nothing but the statement of this case to do away all our *wonder* that the sea is still covered with the ships of our enemies,

secret as well as open, and that Napoleon is able to replenish his arsenals, and to build ships of war faster than we can.

I shall cite one more Case, and that I shall give in detail, as far, at least, as I possess the materials. It is that of a ship condemned in July, 1808, the Gross Sales of which amounted to £272. 3*s.* out of which only £59. 16*s.* remained to be distributed between the Captain and his crew, leaving, in the proportion of a 38 gun frigate,

For the Captain - - £9 19 8

For a Seaman - - - - 0 1 4

For a Landman - - - - 0 0 11

while the Proctor's Bill alone amounted to £58*l.* 19*s.* 2*d.*, and while, as your Majesty will see from the Items, that the Advocate's clerk, whose business was to open his master's door twice to the Proctor, received, out of this prize, more than three of the seamen concerned in the capture.—Now to the detail:

Gross Sales of ship, stores, and cargo - - - -	£272	3	0
---	------	---	---

DEDUCT.

Pilotage - - - -	4	2	0
Warehouse rent - - - -	3	3	0
Labourers - - - -	14	12	4
Prizemaster - - - -	0	14	0
Advertisements for sales, &c. -	17	5	0
Ship-keepers - - - -	13	14	0
Brokerage - - - -	2	14	9
Agency - - - -	7	7	2
Incidents - - - -	10	9	6

Paid to private Persons for necessary Services - - -	74	1	0
---	----	---	---

Duties - - - -	18	8	6
Fees to the Custom-House	15	16	6
Fees for release from Quarantine - - - -	8	17	6

Paid in taxes, and to tax-officers appointed by Government	43	2	6
---	----	---	---

Paid to the Chest at Chatham and Greenwich Hospital -	3	2	11
--	---	---	----

Actuary's bill - - - -	26	5	0
Judges' Certificate - - - -	2	6	8
Registering the Letter of Attorney, and Amount of Sales at Doctor's Commons -	4	9	0
Proctor's bill - - - -	58	19	2

Paid to law, and other officers, appointed by the Government	91	19	10
---	----	----	----

Remains for the Captain and
his crew to share amongst
them - - - - - 59 16 0

That is to say, then, the Captain and the whole of his crew have, amongst them all, only sixteen shillings and ten-pence more than the Proctor's bill alone amounts to.—This is what neither your Majesty nor your people could have thought possible. For my part, though I was aware of the exorbitant charges of the Admiralty courts, and though I saw, in almost all of them, the offices filled by a deputy, who made a fortune, while the principal, or sinecure-place-man, made a fortune also; though I was aware of all this, even I could not have believed in the existence of what I am now laying before your Majesty.—To state more particulars may appear to be useless; but, a *Proctor's bill* must be a curiosity to a King, and, therefore, I here insert the bill, relating to the afore-mentioned prize.

	£.	s.	d.
Proctor's Fee retained - - - - -	0	6	8
Attending the Translator and ordering an Abstract of the Ship Papers - - - - -	0	6	8
Paid for same - - - - -	1	1	0
Perusing the Abstract and drawing Case for the Opinion of his Majesty's Advocate whether the Captors could proceed with any prospect of success - - - - -	0	13	4
Fair Copy - - - - -	0	6	8
Attending His Majesty's Advocate therewith, and feeing him - - - - -	0	6	8
Paid his Fee - - - - -	2	2	0
His Clerk - - - - -	0	2	6
Perusing the Opinion, Copy for the Captor's Agent, and writing him therewith - - - - -	0	6	8
Paid Carriage of Ship Papers and Examinations - - - - -	0	10	0
Attending and retaining His Majesty's Advocate - - - - -	0	6	8
Paid his Fee - - - - -	1	1	0
Attending before a Surrogate and bringing in Ship Papers and Examinations, and paying Monition, and Surrogate's Fee - - - - -	0	6	0
Registrar's Attendance - - - - -	0	6	8
Act of Court - - - - -	0	2	8
Filing Attestation - - - - -	0	2	8
Paid for Monition under Seal Stamps and Extracting - - - - -	1	17	8
Copy for Service - - - - -	0	6	8
Paid the Marshal for Service - - - - -	0	6	8
Certificate of Service - - - - -	0	3	4
Praying Publication and Act - - - - -	0	7	8
Attending in the Registry inspecting the Depositions, and bespeaking Copy - - - - -	0	6	8
Paid for Office Copy thereof, Stamps and Collating - - - - -	5	4	0

Extracting - - - - -	0	6	8
Perusing and Abstracting - - - - -	0	16	8
Copy for His Majesty's Advocate - - - - -	3	9	0
Paid for the use of the standing Commission - - - - -	0	8	6
Revising the Abstract and comparing the same with the Examinations, to enable me to draw a Case for the Opinion and directions of His Majesty's Advocate, and drawing such Case accordingly - - - - -	0	13	4
Fair Copy - - - - -	0	6	8
Attending his Majesty's Advocate therewith and feeing him - - - - -	0	6	8
Paid his Fee - - - - -	2	2	0
His Clerk - - - - -	0	2	6
Perusing the Opinion Copy for the Captor's Agent and writing him therewith - - - - -	0	6	8
Attending in the Registry inspecting the Ship Papers and selecting such as were necessary to be translated on behalf of the Captors and bespeaking Copy - - - - -	0	6	8
Paid for Translations and Office Copy thereof Stamps and Collating - - - - -	9	13	10
Extracting - - - - -	0	6	8
Perusing and Abstracting - - - - -	0	13	4
Copy for his Majesty's Advocate - - - - -	1	5	0
Paid for Office Copy Attestation as to Ship Papers, Stamps, Collating and Extracting - - - - -	0	16	8
Perusing the same, and Copy for his Majesty's Advocate - - - - -	0	6	8
Drawing Allegation for Condemnation of the Ship and Cargo and engrossing the same and Stamp - - - - -	0	11	8
Fee giving in the Allegation when the same was admitted and Act - - - - -	0	7	8
Paid filing same - - - - -	0	4	0
Attending and returning the Monition and Act - - - - -	0	7	8
Drawing Case for the Hearing on behalf of the Captors - - - - -	1	6	8
Copy for his Majesty's Advocate - - - - -	0	13	4
Attending him with the Case and Papers, and feeing him - - - - -	0	6	8
Paid his Fee - - - - -	3	3	0
Attending when the Cause was assigned for Sentence on the first Assignment and Act - - - - -	0	7	8
The like on the second Assignment and Act - - - - -	0	7	8
Trinity Term Fee - - - - -	0	6	8
Attending Informations - - - - -	0	6	8
Fee when the Judge at my Petition on motion of his Majesty's Advocate by Interlocutory Decree condemned the Ship and Cargo and Act - - - - -	0	7	8
Interlocutory Fees to Judge Registrar and Marshal - - - - -	2	18	8
Paid the Registrar for drawing the Interlocutory - - - - -	0	6	8
Attending him therewith - - - - -	0	6	8
Deputy Registrar, Marshal and Cryer's Special Attendance, being an Extra Court day - - - - -	0	19	4

Attending in the Registry and be- speaking Copy of the Interlocutory	0	6	8
Paid for Office Copy thereof, Stamps and Collating - - - - -	1	0	8
Paid the Registrar for Acts, Sportu- lage and Attendances - - - -	1	10	0
The like for Copying and Dispatch -	1	3	0
His Clerks - - - - -	0	7	6
Officers of the Court - - - - -	0	7	6
Extra-judicial Attendances and Con- sultations - - - - -	0	13	4
Proctor's Clerk - - - - -	0	7	6
Letters, Messengers and Sportulage	0	6	8

£. 58 19 2

Thus, Sir, you see, that your Majesty's *Advocate* received, (within £1. 11s. 8d.) out of the proceeds of this Prize, a sum equal to that received by the Captain who took her, and who, in taking her, did, perhaps, run great risk of losing his life, and did certainly run a risk of losing his money, if, by accident, he had any to lose.

I beseech your Majesty to look at the charges, which close this bill. After having charged separately for every attendance; after having made a distinct item of charge for every scrap of paper of every description; after having, as it would seem, rung the changes upon all the terms of separate charge, there come in, at the end, a set of general charges for *attendance and for clerks!*

Applying these statements to the great point, upon which I have been addressing your Majesty, can it be, to any one, matter of wonder, that, while this mode of distributing the amount of Prizes exists, the commerce and naval resources of Napoleon remain uninterrupted by our navy? The nature of the service is such as scarcely to admit of any *brilliant exploit*; such as scarcely to afford a chance of any of those achievements, which give officers a claim to *honours or promotion*. The service is a service of mere drudgery; of watching and fatigue and care; and, if it hold not out a pretty fair prospect of gain, in compensation for all its toils and its dangers, who will undertake such a service; and, especially what man of great skill (for great skill it requires) will so spend his time, when, without a positive breach of orders, he can avoid it?

It is a circumstance not a little galling, that, when any officer of your Majesty's navy has made a prize, the prosecution of his claim to her must be committed to persons, not of his own choosing; not to *Proctors* (who are merely *Attorneys*,) and

Advocates (who are merely *Counsellors*) chosen by himself, but to a *Proctor* and an *Advocate*, appointed by the ministers of your Majesty; to persons, in short, whom he *may* like, but whom also he may *dislike*, and in whom, however unexceptionable their character, he may have no confidence, whether as to talent or integrity. If, indeed, nothing was at stake but the prize, there might be some shew of reason in saying, that what is taken by the public force shall be committed to the management of none but public officers; but, this is not the case; for, the *private property* of the capturing commander is at stake; that property he may lose, and may, indeed, be reduced to beggary and lodged in a jail by the decision upon a prize; and, shall he not, then, be at liberty to choose his own *Attorney and Counsellor*? Shall his property, and, eventually, his personal liberty, be committed to, be wholly left, or, rather, *taken*, into the hands of attorneys and counsellors, of whom, perhaps, he has a bad opinion, however good may be the opinion which others entertain of them? It frequently happens, that a *partner* of the king's *Proctor*, as he is called, has the management of the cause for the *claimant*; so that, the capturing commander, in such case, is compelled to commit his cause, and to impart all his documents and other information, to the same persons, who have the management of the cause *on the part of his adversary*; which, were it not a fact as notorious as it is, never could be believed. This was, some-time ago, complained of in the House of Commons; but, as with respect to most other grievances, no redress was obtained, nor even proposed to be granted.

Under such discouragements, under such a system of deciding upon Prizes, it is not to be expected, that arduous services will be undertaken and prosecuted to success. It is against nature for a man to expose his life, or to harrass himself half to death, for the sake of swelling the bags of *Proctors* and *Advocates*. And why should not this evil, this great bar to the exertion, to the utility, of our naval power: why should it not be removed; why should not some mode of deciding upon Prizes be adopted, that would leave to the captors something like a fair chance of compensation for their toil and their danger? Why this *should* not be done there can be no reason; but, why it is not done, there are reasons more than sufficient. The rich offices of *judge advocate*,

proctor, surrogate, marshal, registrar, auctioneer, together with the endless list of subalterns, form one of the most important heads of *ministerial patronage*; or, in other words (and here we touch the *real source* of the evil) these offices are necessary to satisfy the demands of those, who possess that sort of influence, which it is not necessary to name, either to your Majesty or to the country; and which influence, as it has sunk this nation from what she was, will, unless speedily put an end to, complete her degradation and her ruin. How many are the ways, in which this poisonous influence is working for our destruction! But, in no way, perhaps, more visibly than in the one here pointed out, where we see it directly opposed to those exertions, which are necessary to our national safety. Its workings are to be traced to hundreds of other mischievous effects; but, here we see it, at one view, in open hostility, not only to great national interests, but to the very independence of the nation; and, yet, such is the state in which we are, such is the power of this influence, that I should feel much more indignation than surprize at hearing it asserted, that the patronage arising from the profits of the Prize-Courts was of more consequence than the destruction of the commerce and the naval resources of France. It is matter of perfect notoriety, that the far greater part of the fees imposed upon Prizes, go into the pockets of *sinecure* officers, like LORD ARDEN, for instance. Of the courts of Vice Admiralty abroad, where the charges are, as far as I have been able to ascertain, still more exorbitant than at home; of these courts, it is notorious that the officers *reside in England*, and have their business performed by deputy. It is equally notorious, that what these *sinecure* officers receive *must be so much taken from the captors of prizes*; so that, in fact, the Navy is, in part, at least, employed to gain opulence for them. Is there, Sir, any reason in this? Would it not be far better to pay these *Sinecure*-place-men out of the taxes, and leave the navy to enjoy the full fruit of its earnings? If there must exist an influence to be counteracted only by grants of places or pensions, surely it were better to take the means, at once, out of the purses of the nation at large, than thus to check those exertions, upon which our existence as a nation may soon be found to depend. I am aware, that there are those, who would rather see the Navy perish than

see this source of patronage abridged; but, if such men are not few in number, I trust they will have no influence in the councils of your Majesty.

I am, &c. &c. &c.

W^m. COBBETT.

Botley, 3rd Aug. 1809.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

MR. WARDLE.—It appears, that a man of the name of JAMES DIXON, belonging to the Common Council of London, did, some time since the TRIAL of an action, brought by Wright the Upholsterer against Mr. Wardle, *give notice*, in the Common Council, of a motion for *rescinding* the VOTE or THANKS, passed last Spring in favour of Mr. Wardle. This was done, apparently, to *feel the pulse*, not only of the Common Council, but of the nation at large. The notice was left thus, not acted upon; but, Mr. ALDERMAN GOODBEHERE, Mr. WAITHEMAN, and others, took the matter up in a very proper manner; and, in consequence of a Requisition to the Lord Mayor, a Special Court of Common Council was held on Tuesday, the 1st instant.—The Proceedings, though very interesting, are too long for insertion here. I shall therefore content myself with giving the Resolutions that were passed; and, from which Resolutions it will be seen what the *public-robbers*, those who are endeavouring to decry Mr. Wardle, have *gained* by this meeting, from which, I hear, many of them expected so much.

“ A Common Council, holden in the Chamber of the Guildhall of the City of London; on Tuesday the 1st of Aug., 1809.

“ Resolved, That this Court did, on the 6th day of April last, express its thanks and gratitude to G. L. WARDLE, esq. for his conduct in bringing forward and substantiating serious Charges against the late Commander in Chief, which, notwithstanding the majority in his favour in the House of Commons, compelled his resignation. *That no circumstance has since transpired which can in any manner lessen the importance of that investigation, impeach his motives, or affect the merits of the case.* On the contrary, his unwearied exertions, perseverance and fortitude, under unexampled threats and difficulties, have developed a scene of scandalous abuse and corruption, not only in the army, but in various departments of the State.

"That it has been discovered by the said investigation, that these abuses have extended, not only to the disposal of Church and East India Patronage, but also to the disposal of Seats in the Legislature, and charges have been brought forward and proofs offered, implicating in such corrupt and illegal traffic Lord Viscount Castlereagh, the Honourable Spencer Perceval, and the Honourable Henry Wellesley, all members of the House, and then and now holding ostensible situations in his Majesty's Government, a traffic which, in the language of the Speaker of the House of Commons, "Would bring a greater scandal upon the Parliament and the Nation than this country has ever known since Parliament has had an existence."

"That the said investigation has also led to the discovery, that the said Lord Castlereagh, one of his Majesty's Secretaries of State, and late President of the Board of Controul, did, in flagrant breach of his duty as a Minister, abuse of his patronage, and gross violation of the Constitution, place a Writership in the hands of Lord Clancarty, a Member of the same Board, for the purpose of obtaining for him a Seat in Parliament; which fact the said Lord Castlereagh has himself admitted, and notwithstanding there appeared a smaller majority in his favour, than appeared in favour of the Duke of York, in manifest injustice to his royal highness, and gross insult to the Nation, the said Lord Castlereagh still retains his official situation.

"That these attacks upon the vital principles of the Constitution have been made without punishment or censure; and motions for inquiry into such practices have been rejected, upon the alleged frequency and notoriety of them; and Parliament has thereby, as well as by passing a Bill to prevent the sale of Seats in that House, recognized and acknowledged the corrupt influence under which it has been called together, and exercised its functions.

"That it was stated by Mr. Wardle, that there was an Office publicly kept open for the Sale of Places under Government, and although such statement, when made, only excited the derision of Ministers and the House, it has since appeared that the above statement was correct; and his Majesty's Ministers

"have indicted and convicted several persons concerned therein, and such practices were declared in the said indictment to have a tendency to degrade, vilify, and traduce and bring into contempt, the Administration of the Court."

"That by various statements which Mr. Wardle has lately submitted to Parliament, it appears, that by a correction of the frauds, abuses, corruption and peculation, which have been found to exist in every branch of the public expenditure to which inquiry has extended, and a wise and honest application of our resources, the people might be relieved from heavy and oppressive burthens, if not wholly from that inquisitorial and most grievous of all imposts, the Tax upon Income. That his conduct on this occasion seems to have drawn upon him, in a high degree, the malice and rancour of those who are interested in the continuance of these abuses.

"That in the opinion of this Court, individuals who devote their exertions to wards: exposing and correcting public abuses, are at all times entitled to the support and protection of the country, particularly at the present moment, when there appears an unabating effort on the part of those notoriously under the influence of Government, or who participate in the existing frauds, corruptions and speculations, to cry down, vilify and traduce every man who has courage and integrity to expose such practices, in order to mislead the public, and divert their attention from these great evils."

"WOODTHORPE."

This concluding Resolution contains sentiments peculiarly adapted to the moment. It is the duty of us all, as far as each is able, to stand by Mr. Wardle. An attempt has been made, and is making, to cry down the public cause through him. The villainous language, the atrocious falsehoods, of the hireling press, though certainly surpassing what has ever been heard before, is no more than what was to be expected. It must be thus before the thing be at an end. It always has been so, in all such cases. The state our enemies are in, resembles that of a foot-pad, just when he is mustering up courage to add murder to robbery. Guilt engenders fear; his courage proceeds from cowardice, which is always bloody. These dastardly writers tremble as they attack, and can scarcely prevent their shout from becoming a howl; and, in

short, with the sole exception of those by whom they are prompted, they are the most wretched as well as the most despicable of mankind.

Several topics, owing to the length of the foregoing Letter, must be postponed. —I do not agree with my correspondent, that the country "*vermin*," as he emphatically calls them, are *beneath my notice*; for though I agree with him, that it is most probable, from what we have recently seen, that they were "*blown*" at me by "their masters in town, as the beggars in Ireland blow lice at those against whom they have a spite;" still, to follow up the comparison, he will agree, I suppose, that it is necessary to *squeeze* the said lice, and not to pretend that they are beneath your notice.

COBBETT'S

Parliamentary Debates:

The Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Volumes of the above Work, comprising the Proceedings in both Houses of Parliament during the last Session, are in the Press, and will be published with all possible dispatch.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRENCH ARMY IN AUSTRIA.—*Twenty-fifth Bulletin. (Continued from p. 128.)*

Passage across the arm of the Danube to the Island Lobau.

On the 4th, at ten in the evening, gen. Oudinot caused 1,500 voltigeurs to be embarked on the great arm of the Danube, commanded by gen. Conroux. Col. Baste, with ten gun-boats, conveyed them, and disembarked them beyond the little arm of the island Lobau, in the Danube. The batteries of the enemy were soon silenced, and he was driven from the woods to the village of Muhleuten.—At eleven in the evening, the batteries raised against Enzersdorf received orders to begin their firing. The howitzers set this unfortunate little town on fire, and in less than half an hour the enemies batteries had ceased to operate.—The chief of battalion Dessales, director of the bridges, and —, engineer of the marine, had prepared in the island

Alexander, a bridge of 80 toises, of a single piece, and five great ferry boats.—Col. St. Croix, aide-du-camp of the duke de Rivoli, embarked in barges with 2,500 men, and landed on the left bank.—The bridge of a single piece, the first of the kind which has hitherto been made, was fixed in less than five minutes, and the infantry passed over it with great rapidity. Capt. Bazelle fixed a bridge of boats in an hour and an half. Capt. Payerimoffe formed a bridge of rafts in two hours.—Thus, at two o'clock in the morning, the army had four bridges, and had debouched on the left 1500 toises below Enzersdorf, protected by the batteries, and the right upon Vittau. The corps of the duke de Rivoli formed the left; that of count Oudinot, the centre; and that of the duke of Auerstadt, the right; the corps of the prince de Ponte Corvo, the Viceroy and the duke of Ragusa, the guard; and the cuirassiers formed the second line and the bodies of reserve. Utter darkness, a violent storm and rain, which fell in torrents, rendered this night as frightful as it was propitious to the French army, and was about to be glorious to it.—On the 5th at day-break, every one perceived what had been the project of the Emperor, who was then, with his whole army, arranged in order of battle at the extremity of the enemy's left, having turned all his entrenched camps, having rendered his works useless, and thus obliging the Austrians to abandon their positions, and come and offer him battle on the spot that was convenient to him. The great problem was thus resolved, and without passing the Danube on other points —without receiving any protection from the works he had raised, he forced the enemy to fight three quarters of a league from his redoubts. From that moment the greatest and happiest results were presaged.—At eight in the morning, the batteries, which had played upon Enzersdorf, had produced such an effect that the enemy was obliged to let that town be occupied by no more than four battalions. The duke of Rivoli dispatched his first aide-de-camp, St. Croix, against it, who did not meet with a great resistance, and took prisoners all who remained in it.—Count Oudinot surrounded the castle of Sachsengang, which the enemy had fortified, forced 900 men who defended it to capitulate, and took 12 pieces of cannon.—The Emperor then caused the whole army to spread itself along the immense plain of Enzersdorf.

Battle of Enzersdorf.

In the meanwhile, the enemy, confounded in all his projects, gradually recovered from his astonishment, and endeavoured to regain some advantages in this new field of battle. For this purpose he detached several columns of infantry, a considerable number of pieces of artillery, and all his cavalry, as well of the line as the new levies, in order to attempt to out-flank the right of the French army. In consequence he occupied the village of Rutzendorf. The Emperor ordered gen. Oudinot to carry this village, to the right of which he sent the duke of Auerstadt, in order to proceed to the head-quarters of prince Charles, going always from the right to the left.—From noon till nine in the evening the French armies manœuvred on this immense plain. All the villages were occupied, and when the French had reached the heights of the entrenched camps of the enemy, they fell of their own accord, and as if by enchantment. The duke de Rivoli caused them to be occupied without resistance. It was thus we seized the works of Essling and Gros-Aspern, and the labour of 40 days was of no use to the enemy. He made some resistance in the village of Raschdorf, which the prince de Ponte Corvo caused to be attacked and carried by the Saxons. The enemy was every where overwhelmed by the superiority of our fire. This immense field of battle was covered with his remains.

Battle of Wagram.

Strongly alarmed by the progress of the French army, and the great successes which it obtained, with scarcely any effort, the enemy put all his troops in motion, and at six in the evening he occupied the following position:—his right from Stadelau to Gerasdorf, his centre from Gerasdorf to Wagram, and his left from Wagram to Neusiedel. The French army had its left at Gros-Aspern, its centre at Raschdorf, and its right at Glenzindorf. In this position, the day was nearly at a close, and we had necessarily to expect a great battle on the morrow; but this was to be avoided, and the position of the enemy to be intersected, so as to prevent him from forming any plan, by taking possession in the night, of the village of Wagram. In this case, his line, already of an immense length, being suddenly assailed, and exposed to the chances of combat, the different bodies of his army

would be dispersed without order or direction, and we should succeed at an easy rate and without any serious engagement. The attack on Wagram took place, and our troops took possession of the village; but a column of Saxons and a column of French mistook each other in the dark for enemies, and this operation failed.—We then prepared for the battle of Wagram. It appears that the dispositions of the French general and the Austrian general were inverted. The Emperor passed the night in accumulating his forces towards his centre, where he was in person, within cannon shot of Wagram. With this view, the duke de Rivoli moved upon the left of Aderklau, leaving at Aspern a single division, with orders for it to fall back, in case of necessity, upon the island of Lobau. The duke of Auerstadt received orders to leave unoccupied the village of Grosshoffen that he might approach the centre. The Austrian general, on the contrary, weakened his centre, to secure and augment his extremities, which he still farther extended.—On the 6th at day break, the prince de Ponte Corvo occupied the left, having the duke of Rivoli in a second line. The Viceroy connected him with the centre, where the corps of count Oudinot, that of the duke of Ragusa, those of the imperial guards, and the divisions of cuirassiers, formed seven or eight lines.—The duke of Auerstadt marched from the right to reach the centre. The enemy, on the contrary, put Bellegarde's corps in motion for Stadelau. The corps of Collovrath, Lichtenstein, and Hiller, connected their right with the position of Wagram, where prince Hohenzollern was, and with the extremity of the left at Neusiedel, where the corps of Rosenberg debouched in order also, to out-flank that of the duke of Auerstadt. The corps of Rosenberg, and that of the duke of Auerstadt, moving in opposite directions, encountered each other, with the first rays of the sun, and gave the signal of battle. The Emperor instantly repaired to this point, ordered the duke of Auerstadt to be reinforced by the division of the duke of Padua's cuirassiers, and the corps of Rosenberg to be attacked in flank by a battery of twelve guns, of the division of count de Nansouty. In less than three quarters of an hour, the fine corps of the duke of Auerstadt gave a good account of the corps of Rosenberg, defeating it, and driving it beyond Neusiedel with considerable loss. In the mean time, a cannonade commen-

ced along the whole of the line, and the enemy's dispositions were every moment discovering themselves. The whole of his left was secured with artillery.—One might have said, that the Austrian general was not fighting for victory, but was looking only to the means of improving it. This disposition of the enemy seemed so absurd, that some snare was apprehended, and the Emperor delayed some time before he ordered those easy dispositions which he had to make to disconcert those of the enemy, and render them fatal to him. He ordered the duke de Rivoli to make an attack on the village occupied by the enemy, and which somewhat straitened the extremity of the centre of the army. He ordered the duke of Auerstadt to turn the position of Neusiedel, and thence to push on upon Wagram; and he formed the duke of Ragusa's troops, and those of gen. Macdonald, in column, to carry Wagram at the moment the duke of Auerstadt should debouch.—While these proceedings were taking place, information was received that the enemy was making a furious attack upon the village carried by the duke of Rivoli; that our left was out flanked by 3,000 toises, that a brisk cannonade was already heard at Gros-Aspern, and that the space between Gros-Aspern and Wagram seemed to be covered with an immense line of artillery. There was no longer any room for doubt.—The enemy had committed an enormous fault, and we had only to profit by it. The Emperor instantly ordered gen. Macdonald to form the divisions of Broussier and Lamarque in columns of attack. He ordered the division of Nansouty to be supported by the horse-guards, and a battery of 60 guns belonging to the guards, and 40 of different other corps. General count Lauriston, at the head of his battery of 100 pieces of artillery, marched at a trot against the enemy, advanced without firing to within half gun-shot distance, and there opened a prodigious fire, which silenced that of the enemy, and spread death among his ranks. Gen. Macdonald then advanced *à la pas de charge*.—The general of division Keille, with the brigade of fusiliers and sharp-shooters of the guards, supported gen. Macdonald. The guards made a change of front, in order to render this attack infallible. In an instant the enemy's centre lost a league of ground; his right became alarmed, and perceiving the dangerous position in which it was placed, rapidly fell back. The duke of

Rivoli, at that moment, attacked it in front.—Whilst the rout of the centre struck consternation into the right of the enemy, and precipitated its movements, the left was attacked and out-flanked by the duke of Auerstadt, who had carried Neusiedel, and who having gained the elevated plain, was marching upon Wagram. The divisions of Broussier and Gudin covered themselves with glory.—It was only then ten o'clock in the morning; and those who had the least penetration saw that the fate of the day was decided, and the victory was ours.—At noon, count Oudinot marched upon Wagram, to assist the attack of the duke of Auerstadt. He was successful, and carried that important position. After ten o'clock, the enemy fought only to effect his retreat; at twelve this was manifest; it was conducted in disorder; long before dark the enemy was out of sight.—Our left was posted at Jefelsee and Ebersdorff; our centre upon Obersdorf, and the cavalry of our right extended their posts as far as Shonkirchen.—On the 7th, at day-break, the army was in motion, and marching upon Komenbourg and Walkersdorf, and had some posts near Nicolsbourg. The enemy, cut off from Hungary and Moravia, had been forced to fall back upon Bohemia.—Such is the narrative of the battle of Wagram, a battle decisive and ever memorable, in which from three to four hundred thousand men, and from twelve to fifteen hundred pieces of cannon, contended for great interests, upon a field of battle, studied, planned, and fortified by the enemy for several months. Ten pair of colours, 40 pieces of cannon, 20,000 prisoners, including between 3 and 400 officers, and a considerable number of generals, colonels, and majors, are the trophies of this victory. The fields of battle are covered with the slain; among whom are the bodies of several generals, and among others, one called Norman, a Frenchman, a traitor to his country, who prostituted his talents against her.—All the enemy's wounded have fallen into our hands. Those whom he abandoned at the commencement of the action, were found in the adjacent villages. It may be calculated that the result of this battle will be that of reducing the Austrian army to less than 60,000 men.—Our loss has been considerable; it is estimated at 1,500 in killed, and from 3 to 4,000 wounded.—The duke of Istria, at the moment when he was preparing for an attack with the cavalry, had his horse shot dead by a cannon

ball, which fell upon his saddle, and slightly grazed his thigh.—The general of division, Lasalle, was killed by a musket ball. He was an officer of the greatest merit, and one of our best light cavalry generals.—The Bavarian general Wrede, and generals Seras, Grenier, Vignolle, Sa huc, Frère, and DeFrance, were wounded.—Colonel prince Aldobrandini was wounded in the arm by a musket ball; the majors of the guard, Dausmenil and Carbeneau, were also wounded; the adjutant commandant, Duprat, was killed; the colonel of the 9th infantry of the line fell on the field of battle.—That regiment has covered itself with glory.—The officers of the staff are preparing a return of our losses.—A particular circumstance incident to this grand battle is, that the columns nearest to Vienna were only about 1,200 toises from it. The numerous population of that capital covered the turrets, the steeples, the roofs of the houses, and every elevated situation, to witness this spectacle.—The emperor of Austria left Wolkersdorf on the 6th, at five in the morning, and ascended a tower, from which he had a view of the field of battle, and where he remained until midnight. He then set off in all haste.—The French head-quarters were transferred to Wolkersdorf, on the morning of the 7th.

Twenty-Sixth Bulletin, dated Wolkersdorf, July 9.

The enemy retreated in the utmost disorder. We have collected a part of his baggage. His wounded have fallen into our hands; we have already counted more than 12,000; all the villages are filled with them. In five or six hospitals alone we have found more than 6,000.—The duke de Rivoli, pursuing the enemy by Stokeran, is already arrived at Hollabrunn.—The duke de Ragusa had at first followed on the road to Brunn, which he quitted at Wolkersdorf, in order to take that of Znaim. At nine o'clock this morning he met at Laa a rear-guard, which he routed: he took 900 of them prisoners. He will be to-morrow at Znaim.—The duke of Auerstadt is arrived to-day at Nicolsbourg.—The emperor of Austria, prince Anthony, with a suite of about 200 chariots, coaches, and other carriages, set off on the 6th at Erensbunn, the 7th at Hollabrunn, the 8th at Znaim, whence they

set out at nine of the morning. According to the relation of the country people who conducted them, their dejection was extreme.—One of the princes de Rohan was found wounded on the field of battle. Lieut. field-marshal Wursakowicz is among the prisoners.—The artillery of the guard covered itself with glory. Major Aboville, who commanded, was wounded. The Emperor has made him general of brigade. The chief of a squadron of artillery, Graner, has lost an arm. These intrepid artillerymen displayed all the power of this terrible weapon.—The horse chasseurs of the guard charged, and drove back on the day of the battle of Wagram, three squares of infantry. They took four pieces of cannon. The light-horse Poles of the guard charged a regiment of pikemen. They took the prince of Auersperg prisoner, and captured two pieces of cannon.—The Saxon hussars d'Albert charged the cuirassiers d'Albert, and took their colours. It was a very singular thing to see two regiments belonging to the same colonel fighting one against the other.—It appears that the enemy is abandoning Moravia and Hungary, and is retiring into Bohemia.—The roads are covered with the men belonging to the landwehr, and the levée en masse, who are returning to their houses.—The losses which desertion is adding, to those the enemy has sustained in killed, wounded, and prisoners, are concurring to annihilate his army.—The numerous letters which have been intercepted are a striking picture of the discontent of the hostile army, and the disorder which reigns in it.—Now that the Austrian monarchy is without hope, it would evince being ill acquainted with the character of those who govern it, not to expect that they will humiliate themselves as they did after the battle of Austerlitz. At that epoch, they were, as now, without hope, and they exhausted all their protestations and oaths.—During the day of the 6th, the enemy sent a few hundred men to the right of the Danube to make observations. They re-imbarked after having lost a few men killed or taken prisoners.—The heat was excessive on these days. The thermometer was almost constantly at 26 degrees.—There are great quantities of wine. In one village 3,000,000 pints were found. It has happily no bad quality.

(To be continued.)

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

MR. WARDLE.—In my last, I had merely time just to notice the Debate in the City of London, and to insert the Resolutions. I shall now offer a few remarks upon the subject.—It would be absurd to feel surprise at any attempt to impose upon the public, on the part of those, whose plunder, after having been so long quietly enjoyed, is now in jeopardy, and who must know, that, unless they succeed in blinding and alarming the public, that plunder must and will be taken from them. It is an old saying, "that light come a light go;" but, this only applies as to the manner of expending; it does not mean, that those who get their money lightly, are easily induced to return it to its right owners. Who ever saw a thief willing to give up what he had stolen, or less anxious than other men to keep possession of his goods?—The peculators, therefore, and public robbers of every description (and a tribe of no small number are they) are, in attacking Mr. Wardle, doing no more than every reasonable man must expect them to do; and, if Mr. Wardle was not prepared for hostility of this sort; of all the sorts that he has met with, and of every sort that public robbery, fighting for its life, is capable of resorting to, he was not, and is not, fit for the undertaking upon which he has entered, and which was of no use at all, unless it proceeded on to those effects, which would naturally lead to a state of desperation in the peculators. Nor ought he to feel any thing like *anger* against them for their attempts against him; for all their misrepresentations and calumnies, and all the base arts they have resorted to. Their peculations and robberies of various descriptions, indeed, these were, and still are, well calculated to excite his anger; but, *anger* is not the feeling to entertain against them for their conduct towards him, which conduct is, really, no more than a very natural endeavour at self-preservation. We feel anger against the house-breaker, when he disturbs our quiet and puts us in fear for our lives; but, when at the last scene, even though

he had murdered one of the most near and dear to us, we should not feel *anger* at seeing him, by an attempt to loose his arms, signify a wish to slacken the death-doing cord. We may, indeed, be unmoved to compassion by the convulsive movements of the wicked caitiff; we may say, "thou hast thy due, and the world is well rid of thee:" we may be glad to see justice done upon the wretch; but, I take it, it is, at such a moment, unnatural to feel *anger*. In cases where the punishment, actual or approaching, is less severe and awful, there is not, indeed, so efficient a cause for the quenching of anger; but, it is pretty clear, that the day cannot be very distant, when *public robbery*, of all sorts and sizes, will be punished; when, from its present enjoyments, it will be reduced to poverty and rags; and when, even by those whom it now impoverishes, it will be kicked about the streets and into the kennel. This being the case; this being its evident doom, ought Mr. Wardle to be *angry* at its efforts to take revenge on him, who is notoriously one of its most formidable, if not its most formidable, enemy? Indifference, contempt, scorn, he may feel; but, to feel *anger* against it, as such a time, is neither becoming his character nor the character of his cause; which cause, in spite of all that can be done by its enemies, and even by its injudicious friends, must prevail. Nothing can prevent this. The time may be made more or less distant; but, prevail the cause must. Events are working for it. It depends not upon the intrigues of this faction or that faction. It does not depend even upon the opinions of the public. It depends upon events, which, if it be wanted, will make a public sentiment. Events will point, and *compel*, a reform of abuses of all sorts; and that man must, I think, be blind indeed, who does not see those events fast approaching. Why, then, should those who, like Mr. Wardle, are labouring in the public cause; why should such a man fret at the calumnies that are heaped upon him? If such were not the case, he might be sure, that he merited not the praises which have been bestowed upon him. Such calumnies are the proof, and, indeed,

F

the only *indubitable* proof, of a man's power and will to assist in the destruction of public robbery. Look at the scare-crow. It has all the appearance of an enemy of the winged depredators; but, when a living man comes to the spot, you see the difference in the two by the terror which the latter excites in the thieving flock, who, in a moment, are all in commotion and uproar. It is so with the public robbers, than whom no animals in the creation are more sagacious in discovering their real from their seeming enemies.—Hence their implacable hatred against Sir Francis Burdett, for which, to superficial observers, there appears not sufficient cause. Many of them have had much more bitter enemies, to all appearance; much more boisterous, more violent, and more persevering assailants; but, still, they appear never to have cordially hated them; or, if they did, their hatred was not of long duration; there was in it nothing partaking of that fiend-like hatred which they entertain towards Sir Francis, who, by the wives and children of provincial speculators, is looked upon as a sort of savage, living upon the carcasses of murdered gentlefolks, or, at least, upon raw meat and wild roots.—There is a very solid reason for this hatred. They know, that Sir Francis's enmity to them is not a *sham*. They know it to be real. They know that it is out of their power either to drive him or to seduce him from it. They know that there is no safety for them while he is alive. In short, they hate him for the same reasons that all mankind hate pain and death. Would it not, then, argue great weakness in him, if he were to feel *anger* at them on account of this hatred?—No, no; anger is not the feeling that becomes any man so situated. He has no reason to be angry on his own account, because the hostility, which he experiences, he himself has provoked. Quite properly provoked, indeed; but still he cannot reasonably be angry with those who spit their venom at him, and who would not have done so if he had suffered them to be quiet. It is right, and it is a duty, to crush and destroy the viper, if you come athwart him; but, if, while you are endeavouring to destroy him, he should endeavour to fix his poisonous tooth in you, you could not, in reason, blame him; and, to say nothing of the folly of it, to be angry with him would really argue a want of common justice.—For these reasons it is, that I could have wished, in the

speeches of Mr. GOODBEHERE and Mr. WATTHMAN, every thing omitted, which seems to have been dictated by *angry* feelings. It is not for us, who see, as clear as daylight, the swift approach of the fall of our and our country's worst enemies; it is not for us to be angry. The day of their fall cannot be at a great distance. The day of the restoration of the constitution; the day of the confusion and destruction of infamous corruptions cannot be far off; it must be at hand; we want it to come; we see it coming; and, therefore, why should we be angry.—The Debate in the COMMON COUNCIL of London, the whole of which, from the STATESMAN Evening Paper, I have inserted below, in order, not only to add to the width of its circulation, but to put it more safely upon record than it could have been in any of those publications which never assume the shape of a book; this Debate is of as great consequence as any one that I remember ever to have read. It is, in my opinion, of infinitely more importance to this nation, than will be, or can be, the operations of the *Grand Expedition*. The latter may destroy the ships and arsenals at ANTWERP; but, the former *has* made thousands and hundreds of thousands of Englishmen think rightly upon a great point in politics, wherein they were before deceived. The ships and arsenals at Antwerp are not worth one of the topics of Mr. Goodbehere's or Mr. Wathman's speech; for, after all, what is it we are fighting for? What is it that this army and the other army and all the ships of war are employed in hostilities for? There may be people, who have other views of the matter; but, in my view of it, if they are not employed for, or, if their employment does not tend towards, the preserving, or restoring the freedom of England; that is to say, the full enjoyment, on the part of the people, of their *property* as well as their personal liberty; if the employment of our fleets and armies has not *this tendency*, my view of the matter is, that their employment is much worse than useless; and, this being the great purpose for which all rational men must wish to see fleets and armies employed, I have no scruple in saying that the proceedings in the Common Council are of more importance to the nation, than are, or can be, the operations of the *Grand Expedition*.—Seldom has there appeared, in that way, any thing more complete than the Speeches above mentioned. They em-

brace, as the reader will see, every topic ; nothing, bearing the semblance of argument, is left unanswered ; every trick, every falsehood, every attempt at deception, is exposed. Two correspondents, to whose letters it was my wish to attend this week, will have the goodness to excuse the delay ; for, there is nothing that appears to me of so much importance as these Speeches. They have, perhaps, *been read* by every body in the country ; but, they should be read again, and should be frequently referred to.—To these Speeches there is nothing to add by way of observation on the conduct of Mr. Wardle, which, with men of sense, never stood in need of any justification. One or two instances, however, of the impudence, of the sheer, barefaced impudence, of those who, upon the recent occasion, have assailed Mr. Wardle, I cannot help again noticing. They inveigh most bitterly against Mr. Wardle's *purchasing*, as they call it, the evidence of Mrs. Clarke against the Duke of York. They take it for granted, that he *did promise* to pay for the goods, and that this was one of the conditions, upon which she was to give her evidence ; and this they call *bribery*. Now, unless they agree, that what she said against the Duke of York was *true*, they cannot pretend that she ought to be believed against Mr. Wardle : and, if they do agree to this, then it was, upon their own confession, the *truth* that Mr. Wardle promised to give her goods for speaking. Their charge, then, amounts to this, that he promised to give her something, or, which is the same thing, did give her, something in order to induce her to give *true* evidence against the Duke of York as to the manner in which, in certain cases, the public's commissions, or the public's money, were disposed of. And, is this matter of *accusation* ? I put this case before to Mr. Windham, whether a man would not be blamed, and, indeed, called a *traitor*, if, having it in his power, he were not, if necessary, to promise, or to give, money to a person to get possession of proof of a *conspiracy against the life of the king* ? Would it, in such a case, be called "*bribery*" to give money for the obtaining of such proof ? If, indeed, a man, in order to gratify his political malice, or his passions of any sort, were to give, or promise, money or goods to an ignorant wretch to give *false* evidence, and were to harden the poor-creature's conscience by the catechising of a double-distilled knave

of a pettifogger, granting to the said pettifogger a share in the plunder to be extorted ; if such were the conduct of a man, he would merit universal execration ; or, rather (which would be the more appropriate punishment) he would deserve to be confined for life to the society of the said pettifogger and his half-famished race ; but, what Mr. Wardle gave his money for, if he did give any, was the *truth*. This his assailants are obliged to allow ; because, if they do not, they discredit the testimony of Mrs. Clarke altogether, and that does not *now* suit their purpose. But, what must be the impudence of these hirelings, who affect to regard it as a scandalous act in Mr. Wardle to have given, or promised to give, money or goods, to obtain the evidence of Mrs. Clarke, when the law holds out to every man of us the promise of money, if we will, in certain cases, inform against one another. You pay me five pounds, for instance ; I give you a receipt without a stamp upon it ; and, the legislature offers me twenty pounds if I will inform against you for having taken the said unstamped receipt. What impudence, then, must that man have, who pretends, and who asserts it in print, that a man is guilty of "*bribery*," who gives money to a person to become a witness, in behalf of the public, against a person employed and paid by that public ? But, as has uniformly been the case, these hirelings always proceed as it were upon a settled maxim, that nothing is foul, nothing is unfair, nothing is ungenerous, that is employed by the government against the people ; but, that every thing is ungenerous, unfair, foul, and treacherous, that any one employs against a public functionary, in behalf of the people ; insolence so gross as which never was offered with impunity to any other civilized people upon earth.—It is worthy of general remark, and it is especially worthy of the remark of the *Royal Family*, that the papers, commonly called *ministerial*, and particularly the *Courier*, which was amongst the loudest, if not the very loudest, in praise of Mr. Wardle, as long as his efforts were directed *exclusively against the Duke of York*, turned round and assailed him the moment he intimated his resolution to *direct those efforts into other departments* ; and, especially when he joined the *standard of Parliamentary Reform*. This fact, which was too evident and too striking to escape any body, ought to be had in remembrance. The truth is, that

this, and several other of the newspapers, appear to have been very well pleased at the attacks of Mr. Wardle, so long as they bore upon the royal family, or any part of it; and, in this respect, these writers are by no means singular, it being evidently the object of no small number of people, to keep that family as much in the shade as possible, the motive for which is very clearly explained, in the Speech of Sir Francis Burdett upon the subject of Parliamentary Reform.—Mr. Wardle should, I repeat it; nay, in justice to himself and the public, he must develop the history of the *Suppression of Mrs. Clarke's Book*; let the people of this country know *who paid the money for that suppression*; who was the agent or negotiator; and *what were the conditions*.—The rumour is too general; nay it has been positively stated, in these very newspapers, that the Book was suppressed, in consequence of the payment of money to Mrs. Clarke; that money is stated at £7,000 down, and the worth of eight or ten thousand in annuities upon herself and relations. This has been distinctly stated in these newspapers; and, as we know what the Book was advertised to contain, it must be of vast public importance to know the history of the suppression; the whole history of it from the beginning to the end.—Those who affect to discover, in the late Trial, great cause for blaming Mr. Wardle, will hardly deny, that they were *truths*, which Mrs. Clarke meant to publish in her book. I say, *they will now* hardly suppose, that this their *non-pareil of a witness AGAINST Mr. Wardle* had put together a bundle of *falsehoods and forgeries* and sent them to the press. No; they will not suppose this. They must suppose, that she had got *truths* in the press; and, besides, if they were not truths, why were they bought at such a price? Nobody would have given such a price for the suppression of falsehoods. However, our antagonists may take their choice. It shall be, if they like it, a book full of *forgeries* that were suppressed, and then, what becomes of the *excellence* of their witness against Mr. Wardle; for, no one would certainly place much reliance upon a person who had come reeking from the occupation of putting together a book full of forgeries. Well, then, let them be *truths*, if they choose; but, then, let them remember, that the means had been found, by the new negotiators with Mrs. Clarke, to prevail upon her to *suppress* these truths. So,

they must have her in one or the other of these characters; a *compiler of forgeries*, or a *suppressor of truths*; and that, too, for the sake of money. To leave no doubt, however, as to my own opinion upon this point, I must say, that I am fully convinced, that what she had prepared for publication, and sent to the press, was *perfectly authentic*. Strictly speaking, I do not think she had, after what had passed, a *right* to suppress the book, which suppression did, as I observed at the time, argue a great want of principle; but, she had rendered the country great services (services which will always be acknowledged by me), and, if the suppression gave her means of future happiness, that, to me, was some consolation for the loss of the book. Now, however, when she has become a witness against Mr. Wardle, and when she has become, too, his assailant in print (where, by the bye, she does not cut much of a figure); in short, when it is evident, that, if possible, she is to be made the instrument of undoing all the good, which, through her means, has been done; when this is obviously the case, it is above all things important to ascertain and expose the *source* and the *channel*, whence and through which came the means that *produced the suppression of the Book*. Let no one tell me, that this is a *private* concern. It will not do to tell me that, who see the ministerial papers giving an account of what passes between me and my servants. No: this is no *private* matter. The Book was *advertised* as being in the press; its contents (all of a public nature) were pretty fully described; those contents are now *public property*; and, if we have them not, let us know, at least, *who* it was that paid for their suppression. One of the papers afore-mentioned has observed, "that these contents relate merely *to family matters*, and are of no public consequence whatever." What! pay twenty *thousand pounds*, perhaps, for the suppression of a few *family anecdotes*? Oh, no! It never can be. It is impossible, that the anecdotes of any family can be worth so much money. But, at any rate, what harm is there in our knowing, *who* it was that paid the money, and *who* it was that conducted the negotiation? These facts are necessary. These facts, with which, one would think, Mr. Wardle must be acquainted, he owes to the public and to his own character, it being quite impossible, that we should see the real source of the machinations against him,

until we see the source of those means which procured the suppression of Mrs. Clarke's Book; therefore, again and again I say, let us have the history of this suppression. Though the Book be suppressed, or, at least, *kept out of sight for a while*; though we cannot read the book, we shall be able to draw all the useful conclusions, when we know precisely who *paid the money* and who made the bargain.

SPAIN.—Whatever degree of regret the defeat of the Austrians may be calculated to excite, it is attended with this one agreeable circumstance, namely, that, in all probability, it will occasion what so many persons have ardently wished for, a rencontre between Buonaparté and our *Indian Conqueror*, who, if the newspapers be correct, has, at last, set off for the Southern Peninsula, accompanied with his brother, famed in diplomatic lore in the East.—It will be a day of great and awful expectation, when these two great Captains meet. Napoleon has been accustomed to combat against inferiors; but, here is conqueror for conqueror. Our conqueror has conquered as many countries, I believe, and as much territory and as many inhabitants as Napoleon has ever conquered. "The Conqueror of the East," as he is called in Leadenhall Street, is now (thank God!) about to meet the Conqueror of the West face to face. Yet, some how or other, I do not perceive, amongst "the loyal," any of those exultations that one might have expected upon an occasion of such promise. They do not seem in feather. They are much more modest than I have ever known them. One thing is certain, that, if we do not beat Napoleon now, we may give the thing up, as far, at least, as relates to land operations; for, we have possession of the country before him; we can do what we please with the government there; we have the positive assurance of the king's declaration, that the "universal Spanish nation" is upon our side; and we have all the heroism and all the talents of all the Wellesleys to conduct our affairs, diplomatic as well as military. Now, then, we shall see who wins the day. We shall, I trust, listen to no *excuses* of any sort. We have an abundance and a superabundance of time for preparation. Napoleon has been obliged to leave the country for nearly eight months. It will, in all likelihood, be two months more before he will be able to re-enter Spain. We have had time sufficient, and more than sufficient, for sending troops,

warlike stores, cloathing, horses, and every thing necessary for war upon a large scale; plenty of time for forming the "universal Spanish nation" into regiments and armies; plenty of time for training a million of them to arms; and, in short, it will be impudence without example, if we should pretend that we have wanted time for any thing. Let the nation fix its eyes upon this scene, of far more importance than that upon the Scheldt, and let us take care to bear in mind, what the hireling prints *now* give us as the state of Spain. They tell us that king Joseph, when the last advices came away, was deliberating, whether he should *defend*, or *abandon* Madrid, upon the approach of the joint force of the Spaniards and the English; that Cuesta and "the gallant Sir Arthur" were driving Victor before them; that Soult's army was reduced to *five thousand* men; and, in short, that there was every reason to suppose, that the remains of the French would soon be compelled to flee from Spain, or to lay down their arms.—I beseech the reader to bear this in mind. This is the state, in which they tell us, that Lord Wellesley will find Spain. Now, then, if Buonaparté is not beaten out of Spain; if he now conquers Spain; if, after this, he becomes master of it, how shall we find the face to talk of what we are able to do against him upon land?—What, if we had pursued the right plan, might not have been done with this country! If we had acted upon that advice, which I gave, and which was given, with so many additional and such forcible reasons, by the Edinburgh Reviewers, Spain would, at this moment, have presented a forest of bayonets to the breasts of the French. But, who did not foresee, that if war was to be made for Ferdinand; if it was to be a contest for a *choice of kings*, and nothing more; who did not foresee, that, in such case, the advantage would all be upon the side of him, who presented the people with a *change*? Every man in his senses must have foreseen this; but, it was resolved, that we should, at any rate, make war for a *king*; and, in all human probability the consequence naturally to be expected will take place.—We are always talking about what Buonaparté does *against* such and such nations, never appearing to perceive, that he does any thing *for* them; but, in order to come to a correct opinion of what is likely to be the disposition of the people towards Buonaparté, we ought to inquire whether he

does any thing to *please* them, any thing for their *good*. Now, it is quite shameful for us, who have, in language so bitter and abusive, been so long writing and preaching against the *Spanish Inquisition*; for us, whose priests have made this terrible institution a topic of never-ending attack on the Roman Catholic religion; it is shameful, it is quite scandalous for us to affect not to perceive, that this institution, which we pretended to hold in such horror, and which we *made no effort to abolish*, has been abolished by *Buonaparté*. Next, there are all our out-cries against *Monkery*; all our philippics against that nest of Drones; all our various writings about their impostures, their frauds, and the numerous evils, civil as well as political, produced by their existence. Well, Buonaparté has dispersed two-thirds of these in Spain; he has done away two-thirds of this enormous evil; and, yet, we affect not to perceive it; and we have the miserable and bootless hypocrisy to appear quite astonished, that the people of Spain do not rise as one man to assassinate the French, and to demand the restoration of their former king!—The falsehoods that are told us about Spain are so palpable, that one would think it impossible for them to deceive any human being; but, really, if we can believe these falsehoods, we ought to be deceived and defrauded, and *ought*, in the end, to suffer all the consequences of our folly. What *proof* have we ever had of any zeal that the people of Spain feel in the cause, for which *we* are fighting? Can any man produce us one single *fact* in support of all the assertions relative to this zeal? If he can, let us hear him; but, until then, we may safely conclude, that there is not the shadow of a foundation for such assertions.—How long are we to be duped in this way? Though we see the Emperor Napoleon leaving nothing but a sort of *detachment* of his army in Spain, we see the joint forces of England and the Junta kept in awe by the French, and gaining, in the course of eight months, little or no ground upon them; and all this in the heart of Spain, the French being still in possession of the capital: though we have these facts clearly before our eyes, still are we insulted with the assertions, that the *people* of Spain, that the *eleven millions* of people, who inhabit Spain, mortally hate the French, and are enthusiastic in the cause of England and Ferdinand the Seventh! How long are we thus to be insulted! Are we to go on in this way even unto the end of the chap-

ter? I rather think we shall; for, though there is, in the country, quite knowledge and discernment enough to detect these falsehoods; yet, such is the chain of dependence, so firmly rivetted are the far greater part of the community, to the taxing and funding system, that they endeavour to stifle the dictates of their own senses, and, by dint of perseverance, they, at last, succeed in the self-delusive and self-destructive task. This is well known to the artful wretches, whose business it is to dress up and serve out the never-ending series of falsehoods which disgrace the public press and the nation at large; and, yet, while this is going on amongst ourselves; while it is as notorious as the existence of light or air, our public prints have the assurance, the cool and unconscionable impudence, to accuse the French press of publishing *garbled translations of English documents*. This is very decent on the part of those prints, who plead guilty to the suppressing of *twenty two documents out of twenty seven*; this is very decent in those prints, which never gave a fair translation of any one French document, wherein our *royal family*, or the *ministers*, were named; but, which, upon such occasions, have uniformly suppressed such passages, under the pretence that they were *personal and abusive*; this is very decent in those prints, which constantly omit all those parts of the French bulletins, which contain any fact calculated to produce an impression favourable to the character of our enemy. I do not pretend to decide the question, whether *all* of every such document ought to be translated and published, though, for my part, if I were compelled to choose, I should not hesitate a moment in saying, "*publish all*;" but, of this I am quite sure, that, while we omit part of the French documents, upon the ground of their being personal against our king, his family, or ministers, it is to discover a most scandalous disregard for justice to endeavour to excite a belief of a *tyranny's* prevailing in France, merely because the prints there omit those parts of our documents that are personal against Napoleon. I remember, that, when, in answer to some of our official accusations against Buonaparté, in which he was roundly charged with *usurpation* in France, and with being a *foreigner*, at the same time, he made some very ugly and unmannerly remarks, those remarks were omitted in the translations made by *our prints*. And, shall we, then; shall these same prints of ours, upon the

ground of similar omissions in the French prints, argue, that there is a grinding despotism existing in that country? They might, for me, if it were not, that it was a source of most dangerous deception, leading us to hope for some aid, on a future day, at least, from *discontents prevailing in France*, which discontents exist no where but in the wishes of the enemies of Napoleon.—It never can be too often repeated, that there is no ground for such hope, or at least, that there has not appeared the smallest proof of it.

THE EXPEDITION.—I had resolved never to write a word upon this subject; but, really, when one considers the *magnitude* of the thing, it would argue a species of political contumely to pass over its existence, in silence, and to leave thereof no trace whatever in a work entitled a Political Register.—On the supposition that it may be a subject of a future day, I will first give a succinct history of it, and then offer some reflections as to the end it appears, and is said, to have in view, proportioned to the means it contains.—It is now nearly about *two months* since the troops began to collect in order to be embarked on this undertaking. The Expedition sailed from our shores on different days; but, the time of its sailing may be considered to have been the 28th of July. Its achievements will, of course, be recorded in the proper place amongst the OFFICIAL PAPERS; and, therefore, I shall now proceed to put upon record an account of its *strength*, which, according to the best information that I am able to obtain, is as follows:—

LAND FORCES.		MEN.
Cavalry	- - - - -	2,600
Artillery	- - - - -	3,000
Guards	- - - - -	2,878
Infantry of the line	- - - - -	34,982
Waggon-train	- - - - -	140
Staff	- - - - -	100
		43,700

NAVAL FORCE.		
44 Ships of the line averaging		
600 men	- - - - -	26,400
60 Frigates and Brigs, averaging		
200 men	- - - - -	21,000
150 Armed Cutters, Revenue and Excise Cutters and Gun		
Brigs, averaging 40 men	- - - - -	6,000
600 Transports, averaging 16		
men	- - - - -	6,600

Total number of Men - - 103,700

CANNONS.		
44 Ships of the line at 74 each		3,256
60 Frigates and Brigs at 36 each		2,160
150 Cutters and Gun Brigs at 8		
each	- - - - -	1,200

Total number of Cannon, exclusive
of field-pieces - - - - 6,616

This, then, is the amount of the force; 103,700 men, 854 ships of war and transports, and 6,616 pieces of heavy cannon! Where are *now* the Morning Chronicle and his clamorous brethren, who complain of *want of vigour* in the present ministry?—Now, as to the end compared with these means, if, as is said to be the case, the Expedition is destined to *destroy thirteen ships of war*, built by Napoleon at Antwerp (and the building of ships there, was until the eve of the Expedition a subject of *ridicule* with our news-papers;) if this be the object of the Expedition, it must be confessed, that the means are quite sufficient for the purpose, or, at least, sufficiently *expensive*. The bare *provisioning* of the Expedition, the bare *food*, at the stated allowance, will cost more than 10,000*l.* a day; the hire of the transports will cost 6,000*l.* a day more; and, this is not nearly *half* the expence; so that supposing the ships to be all seventy-fours, and to have cost a thousand pound a gun, the expence of our armament already amounts to twice as much as the said 13 ships are worth.—But, there are some persons, who, so far from expecting *more* than the destruction of these vessels to be accomplished, appear to be quite satisfied with *what is already done*; and are even afraid, that for want of that astonishing foresight, prudence, caution, and wisdom, so visible in most of the officers, lately employed in Basque Roads, our Expedition may, possibly, attempt too much, and, thereby, be "*annoyed*," instead of coming back safe, sound, and unruffled.—Now, in order to remove all alarm from the minds of such persons, we have only to take a little closer view of the comparative magnitude of our force. The Island of Walcheren, the whole of which we have, by this time, captured, is said to be about 8 or 9 miles in diameter, and, as its form is nearly circular, it is, of course, from 24 to 27 miles in circumference. Now, the ships, which we have sent against it, taking them from the point of the bowsprit to that of the jib-boom, measure 22 miles, 5 furlongs, and 67 yards; so that, if they were tied fast

to one another, and placed all round the island, they would be within a very few yards of touching each other, and one might go round the island from deck to deck without the help of a boat.—That is one view of the thing. Another is, that our ships, if swung at anchor, would, with barely anchorage room enough, reach from England to Walcheren; and our men, if placed in a single rank, within arms length of one another, would reach from England to Walcheren, and round the island of Walcheren besides. The men, thus placed, would reach 124 English miles, consequently, if drawn up *three deep*, and in pretty close order, they would form a complete wall round the whole island!—Are there still those who entertain “apprehensions for the *safety* of our gallant army?” Come, then, let us set their hearts at rest. To such persons be it known, that the population of Walcheren, the whole of the population, men, women, and children, is stated at 20,000. This being the case, the enemy might, upon a pinch, supposing us to lose all our arms and ammunition, and not to possess any other mode of destruction, the enemy might, I say, be *eaten* in the space of about five or six days, as will appear most satisfactorily from the following calculation. Our men are allowed, each day, 1 lb. of meat, 1 lb. of bread, and about a couple of pounds of peas, butter, &c. besides cocoa or burgoo. Taking their food, therefore, at 4 lb. a man each day, the total weight eaten a day would be 414,800 lbs. And, if we take the inhabitants at 100 lb. each, children and all, one with another, it will be seen, that the total of their weight (2,000,000 lbs.) falls considerably short of that of the weight of *five day's eatables* for the soldiers and sailors employed by us in this expedition. —What might be done, if necessary, in the way of spoiling the harvest of the Walchereners, by shutting out the sun from their fields with the canvass of our ships, I cannot take upon me precisely to ascertain; but, my opinion decidedly is, that the whole of the *wheat* fields, at least (supposing the Walchereners to sow in our proportions) might be ruined in that way; and, certain I am, that we have, in this Expedition, a sufficiency of cordage to tie up and bring off in tow, every thing standing upon the face of the earth in the island. —Hush your fears, then, you who entertain “apprehensions” for the safety of the army, or the fleet, as long, I mean, as they confine themselves to the island of

Walcheren. I beg you to mind that; for, the moment they set their foot upon the main land, there my calculations cease. I can beat the Walchereners by computation; I can beat them either by measurement or by weight; but, if you get me upon the continent, my arithmetic is done for.—As the ministers must have had the means of *ascertaining* the situation of the Scheldt, from its mouth to Antwerp, it is not probable, I think, that, *with such a force*, the destruction of the ships and arsenal can fail, especially if, as is said to be the case, the French have no army, of any consequence, near the spot. But, mercy on us! does *such an enterprize* demand *such a force*? To take a place like Flushing, and the island on which it stands, used to be a service for a line of battle ship, a frigate, a sloop or two, and a couple of battalions of soldiers. It is, however, agreed, that this is only a *preliminary* step; but, if such a service as the destruction of the ships in the Scheldt and the arsenal at Antwerp, if such a service requires such a force, and that, too, at a time when Napoleon's armies are *all* engaged elsewhere, what is to become of us, when he has settled the affairs of the continent?—This port of Antwerp is of very great importance, I know; but, we can do no more than just demolish the ships and works? We cannot destroy the immense forests, whence the ship timber comes; nor can we by such destruction, greatly retard the progress of Napoleon in forming a navy. It is good to destroy these ships and this arsenal; very good; but the means are, beyond all bounds, too large. It is evident, that, if it requires such means to effect such an object, we must be beaten in the end. —The news-papers, calling themselves Opposition papers, affect to believe, that the ministers have sent out this superabundant force, in order to render failure impossible, lest by a failure *they should lose their places*. Oh, no! This makes no part of their motive. They kept their places safely enough in spite of the fate of the Expedition in *Spain*; in spite of such disgrace and calamity as was never before experienced by an army of any nation, in spite of such a routing, such confusion in flight, such havock and such destruction, that, from that day to this, I believe, no regular official return of the killed, wounded, and missing, has ever been published. Why, in spite of all this, the ministers had a majority of nearly two to one; aye, and

"pounds, out of which 600 pounds went in law and other charges; and that while one man of law got for the condemnation of each boat *nine pounds ten shillings*, the sailors, who were fired at by the French for five hours, did not get, for each, the price of a glass of grog."

—It really is high time, that the ministers, or the parliament, or the king, or somebody having the power to do it, should make an alteration in these matters. What, in the name of common sense, prevents the establishing of a simple and prompt mode of decision in such cases? Why should there not, in war time, be a couple of commissioners at each of the ports, with power to examine the papers and decide at once, without *fee or reward*, being paid by the *public* and not by the parties having cases before them? This system of court-fees is a thing most hostile to justice. And, besides, is there common sense in making those who take prizes pay the judges and lawyers, when the money so paid takes from the inducement not only to do services by sea, but also from the inducement to enter the navy.—This is a subject of fearful importance to the nation, and especially at this time. And what is there that stands in the way of a reform of the abuse? Is there *any* man, no matter who he be, that will say, that the thing is *right*? Will any one say, that it is not *wrong*? Why, then, not amend it?

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, Thursday, 10th August, 1809.

PROCEEDINGS of a SPECIAL COURT of COMMON COUNCIL of the CITY of LONDON.

Held in consequence of a Notice of a MOTION given by Mr. JAMES DIXON, to RESCIND the VOTE of THANKS to Col. WARDLE, passed on the 6th of April last.

On Tuesday, the 1st of August, was held by summons from the Lord Mayor, a Special Court of Common Council, in consequence of a Requisition for that purpose signed by several Members of the Court. At half past 12 his lordship took the Chair, and shortly addressed the Meeting, by stating that the Members of the Court had been summoned by his direction, in consequence of the following Requisition:—

"My Lord;—We, the undersigned Members of the Court of Common Council, deeming highly improper and de-

rogatory to the character of the Court, to suffer the Notice of a Motion to stand over, which proposes 'to rescind from the Journals of its proceedings, a Vote passed on the 6th of April last, after the fullest deliberation, expressing the thanks and gratitude of the Court to G. L. Wardle, esq. for the zeal, intrepidity and patriotism, which he so eminently evinced by exhibiting and substantiating serious charges against the late Commander in Chief,'—do hereby request your lordship to call, upon an early day, an especial Court of Common Council, for the purpose of considering the same."

[The Requisition being read, his lordship stated that he had received a letter from Mr. JAMES DIXON; a letter, the reading of which afforded no small degree of amusement to almost the whole Court.]

"New Bridge-street, 31st July 1809.

"My Lord Mayor;—I am much surprised at the summons your lordship has issued for a Special Court of Common Council, to be held to-morrow, to take into consideration the notice which I gave at the last Court, of my intention to bring forward, after the Recess, a motion to expunge from the Journals the Resolution of the Thanks of the Court, on the 6th of April last, to Mr. Wardle.—I did not at that time, nor do I wish at present, to preclude the party interested the opportunity of re-establishing himself in the good opinion of his fellow-citizens, by the appeal he intends to make to the justice of the country, in the prosecution he has publicly declared he will institute for Perjury, against the witnesses who were examined, on the part of the Plaintiff, in a recent Trial at Westminster.—As the interval of the Recess for which the Court of Common Council was, as usual, adjourned, will, as I understand, afford him that opportunity, I thought it right, under the circumstances in which the corporation was placed, by the Vote of Thanks, to give the notice, reserving to myself the alternative of bringing it forward at the first Court after the Recess, or not, intending, in that respect, to be guided altogether by the result of the prosecution for Perjury, if instituted.—I therefore beg leave to inform your lordship, that I shall not attend the Court on Tuesday. I am, my Lord, &c. JAMES DIXON."

[The laughter occasioned by the general contents of this unique production having, after some short lapse of time, subsided,]

Mr. MILLER addressed the Court, and stated, that the author of the Letter that had been just read, and of the extraordinary notice that had on a former occasion been given of a motion to rescind the Vote of Thanks passed by that Court to col. Wardle, having thought proper to desert his post, he should himself take the liberty of moving, that the Vote of Thanks to col. Wardle should be expunged. Extraordinary as such a motion might from him appear, he deemed it his duty to bring it forward, with a view of bringing to immediate decision a question, which neither the dignity of that Court, nor the justice due to col. Wardle, could with any degree of propriety, after notice of such a motion, be suffered to hang in suspense at the pleasure or caprice of the gentleman with whom it originated. The propriety of this motion, abandoned, misshapen, and hideous as to ordinary capacities it might appear, he should leave to others to decide; but he could not help thinking that the desertion of its original author was an incontrovertible proof that he never did seriously intend to persevere in it; deserted, however, as it had now avowedly been, it was his determination to persevere in endeavouring to obtain the decision of the Common Council of the City of London on so important a question. But as in thus introducing the subject it was by no means his intention to become the parent of such an offspring, he should not enlarge upon a topic on which he felt so little satisfaction; and would, therefore, conclude by moving the following Amendment on the Resolution voting the Thanks of the Court to col. Wardle, passed by the Court on the 6th of April last.—“That the Court having, on the 6th of April last, voted to Mr. Wardle a gold box, with the freedom of the City, and their thanks for his zeal and integrity in the discharge of his duties as a member of parliament, and being convinced that that Vote had been improperly entered into, now resolved to expunge the same.”—The Amendment being read,

Mr. Alderman GOODBEHERE addressed the Court:—My Lord Mayor, I lament not less that it should have become necessary to urge a decision of the question which has been created by the notice of a motion so extraordinary, than the necessity that was proved to have unhappily existed for that investigation, the result of which called forth the marked approbation of the conduct of col. Wardle, not

only by this Court, but by almost every public body throughout the kingdom: for to me I do confess this motion does appear to be most admirably calculated to lay prostrate before the good sense of the nation, the honour, the dignity, and the consistency of the Corporation of London, and I do maintain, that to effect such a purpose, no measure could have been more perfectly adapted, or more ingeniously contrived. Of the motives of the gentleman with whom the motion originated, I do not feel myself at liberty to enter upon an inquiry, and whatever may be my opinion on this point, that opinion I will not express; but I will say, that I think it would have added consistency, at least, to the character of the gentleman who has so gravely announced his determination to take no share in the proceedings of the Court this day, if he had boldly and manfully attended in person the discussion of that question, which he, and he alone, originally provoked. It does certainly appear to have been particularly incumbent on that gentleman to have attended in his place this day, in conformity to the summons of your lordship, and to have stated publicly the reasons by which he was induced to give a notice so extraordinary, of a motion so unprecedented. With respect to the suspension of any further proceeding on the notice that was given, until the presumed, or indeed merely alledged, impropriety of conduct in col. Wardle should have been decided, it appears to me that such delay were not less cruel than unjust, improper, and inconsistent with the impartiality and dignity of this Court; and I the more regret the absence of the worthy gentleman, from my utter incompetency to conjecture by what arguments a measure so irreconcilable with common sense and equal justice, could be attempted to be justified. To col. Wardle, who alone had the courage to institute the investigation, and the perseverance to bring it to that successful issue, for which he has received the Thanks of a great majority of the people of the United Kingdom, the entire merit of the result of that inquiry is unquestionably due, and for his great and meritorious exertions in that arduous undertaking, it is now incontestibly known, that he has received no consideration, or reward whatever; but that which his exalted and disinterested mind is fully capable of correctly appreciating, the sincere demonstration of the gratitude of his countrymen.

Col. Wardle had no secret purpose to answer, no private ends to gratify, and that he had no pecuniary motives, it is not possible even for the most strenuous defender of corruption to deny; for the very tendency of the accusations with which he has been assailed, is to shew that he has sacrificed not only his time but his fortune, by those patriotic and unexampled exertions which have rendered him not less the object of regard to the people, than of terror to those by whom they have so long been plundered. But, my Lord, I do hope and trust that we know how to estimate correctly the conduct of the man who has made these important sacrifices; who, influenced solely by motives of the purest patriotism, has been induced voluntarily to place himself in a public situation, most arduous, and of difficulty beyond all example; and as no circumstances have occurred since the Thanks of this Court were voted to col. Wardle, which can in the slightest degree lower him in the estimation or opinion of any fair and candid man, I think it is a duty that we owe to justice, to the country, and to ourselves, to give him our support, and thus manifest to the people of the United Kingdom, that we are not to be blindly, or tamely led away by the clamour and fury of an exasperated faction. By the adoption of that motion, we should be forging for ourselves chains and fetters, and finally must throw ourselves into the very midst of that vortex of corruption, which it is our professed and only object to annihilate. And to pass over in silence, and without decision, the extraordinary motion suggested by the notice of the worthy gentleman, would be productive of evil almost equal to that of the adoption of the proposition which it urges; for supposing that it were to be no further agitated, all further inquiry into the existence of corruption would be instantaneously checked, and the important, nay incalculable, advantages that must arise to the country from such necessary investigation would be suspended, by this notice of a motion of censure hanging up, in *terrorem*, over the head of a man whose extraordinary exertions have brought to light transactions so extraordinary, so disgraceful, and so incredible as they did appear, until actually and incontrovertibly proved. Of the transcendent merit of col. Wardle, and of the gratitude due to him from the People of England, such, my Lord, is my opinion, that I have no hesitation in avowing, that no reward

could have appeared to me too great to have been offered by a grateful people to a friend so true, so firm, and so devoted to the interest of his country. I am perfectly ready to admit that we have all political prejudices. At the same time it must be admitted, that in the degree of force and bigotry with which they operate on the human mind, the difference (in different men) is most important; and I cannot avoid remarking, that the worthy gentleman who gave the notice of this motion, has voted for very many measures that have had an undisguised tendency to bolster up the transactions of the administrations of the day; whether the ground has been substantial or otherwise, to him it seemed to matter not; he has certainly never hesitated to put the country to any expence, however great, which had for its object the support or gratification of the men to whom, for the time being, he deemed it prudent to give that support; but sorry I am to say, that for those patriotic exertions which have by the voices of a great majority of the people of the United Kingdom been most gratefully acknowledged, as of most essential benefit and importance to the vital interests of the nation, his name is not to be found in the list of those who have publicly expressed their gratitude. It has been very loudly urged by the few who are of a similar opinion with that of the worthy gentleman, that the late Trial at law appears to have implicated in its consequences the merits and character of col. Wardle; but I must positively deny that this circumstance, whatever it may have been, can form with us the smallest particle of matter for our consideration. Whether the imputation on the character of col. W. be true or false, this transaction can make no possible difference to us. It matters not a jot, and I would only ask any gentleman who now hears me, where we should have found any other man who would have undertaken that which col. W. not only undertook, but that in which he persevered with intrepidity and constancy unparalleled, and in the prosecution of which he sacrificed both his time and his property? The only point to which we have to look is the issue and effect of the Investigation. Now, as convincing proof of the charges made by Mr. W. being actually brought home to the party accused, it is certainly more immediately incumbent on us to give the strongest testimony in our power of the gratitude we feel, or ought to feel, towards col. W., than to be delibe-

rating whether he shall not be deprived of all the merit of his conduct. To those who can pretend to argue that a question of account between col. W. and any other person ought to form a subject for our consideration, I really deem it superfluous to make any reply. But, if the worthy gentleman was here to support his own proposition, I would certainly ask of him how it happened, in voting, at a vast expence, a Monument to Pitt, the well-known disregard of that Minister to all matters of personal expence, even to the total neglect of payment of all his tradesmen's Bills; that fact did not occur to the worthy gentleman as a reason for withholding so splendid and costly a testimony of approbation; and as the scrupulously delicate morality of the worthy gentleman is so extremely squeamish, and his regard for the improper distribution of the thanks of this court so accurately sensitive, it may, perhaps, with some, be a matter of no small surprize, that no foible in the private character and conduct of the great Nelson should have occurred to prevent the worthy gentleman from promoting, as he did most forwardly, the Monument voted by this Court, to the memory of that most illustrious character. But no objection in either of these instances was even hinted at by the worthy gentleman, whose sensitive part was probably at that moment asleep, but for which he might have sought in the private defects of the non-payment of his tradesmen's bills by the one, and in a suspected illicit connection by the other: precisely the same amount of objection as that which seems alone to form the basis of the motion, to rescind the Resolution passed by this Court for a Vote of Thanks to col. W.—I dare say the worthy gent. would think it somewhat extraordinary, if, upon his own grounds, a motion were to be now made to rescind the Resolutions, by which thanks were voted to Mr. Pitt and lord Nelson. It is in truth most remarkable, that in the present instance, where, from the exertions by a single individual, the country unquestionably derives advantages, tantamount to the greatest victory ever obtained either by sea or by land, the worthy gentleman's morality should be so suddenly awakened. In saying that the exertions of col. Wardle have been of equal importance with the greatest victory, I am convinced that I am perfectly correct; for if the success of the enemy depends on the final ruin of our resources, it is not possible to estimate the

advantages that must inevitably be derived from those exertions, which have so successfully tended to repress that corruption which has long been sapping the very vitals of the national resources; and most certain it is, that unless the enormous corruption that is now so irrefragably displayed in the broad face of day, be effectually checked, a country so circumstanced is in great danger of becoming finally an easy victory to an enemy.—Were any proof wanting of the effect of the exertions of col. W., the resignation of the Duke of York might satisfy the most incredulous, for by the evidence brought forward on the investigation, was that event produced. This, of itself, is a fact conclusive of the unquestionable merit of col. W. But the abuses that have been exposed by him in the patronage of the Church and in the Army, in the sale of Seats in Parliament, in the India House, and other departments, are so numerous, as to render argument on so glaring a subject wholly superfluous; and there can be little hesitation in the mind of any unprejudiced man, in admitting that the savings which might be made in the various branches of the prodigal, profuse expenditure of Government, would amount to a sum not inferior to that produced by the most obnoxious Tax to which a free country ever submitted; it is hardly necessary to say that I mean that most abominable, oppressive, and unjust (because unequal) of all taxes, the Income Tax. If we do but steadily persevere in that course of investigation and inquiry which the courageous exertions of col. W. have opened, advantages must ultimately result, which will produce incalculable amendment and amelioration in the condition of the country. Whether the gentleman who originally instigated this question, had it in view, by the carrying of his motion, to extinguish for ever all further inquiry, I will not take upon myself to say; but it is absolutely necessary to remove all doubt with the country, of what may be the sentiments of the Corporation of the City of London on so important an occasion. Perhaps it may be presumed, that if he did flatter himself with the prospect of deriving any advantage from the carrying of this motion, it must have been that of stifling that effusion of thanks to col. W. which so many persons in this kingdom are yet extremely desirous of expressing.—My Lord, the Corporation of the City of London having a political character to maintain, and hav-

ing, for many years, thought it not only important, but indispensibly necessary, to attend to the measures of the Government, the people at large of this country, do indisputably look up to our decisions with very deep interest, and with most exceeding attention; and to our determination the country at this moment looks up with a degree of anxiety, fully proportioned to the magnitude of the occasion, and the importance of the crisis at which we have arrived: the country at large waits but for our determination to support col. W. of which, if once assured, we may certainly anticipate all that weight will be added to our efforts in the Reformation of Abuses, which can be given by the support of a vast majority of the people of the United Kingdom. That the Corporation will see, in its true light, the necessity of coming to a decision at this critical moment, I, for these reasons, anxiously hope and wish, although the original mover of the question, very contrary to my expectations and wishes, is now absent. With these views of this important subject, I shall now move an Amendment, on which, I trust, and indeed take it for granted, the Corporation will see the necessity of declaring their sentiments, by a positive decision; for inasmuch as an individual cannot be expected, without great support, to effect so Herculean a task, it will not be denied that it requires the united energies of all to co-operate with him in the arduous undertaking in which he has voluntarily and so nobly embarked, and if it shall be thought that we do require Reform, a Reformation of Abuses, certain I am, that ultimate safety can be obtained only by the exertion of that auxiliary assistance which col. W. necessarily requires for the accomplishment of those objects, of which every one professes most anxiously to desire the attainment.

[See the RESOLUTIONS at page 150.]

Mr. Box perfectly agreed in the propriety of coming to a decision on the question before the Court. He was ready to hold up his hand in favour of col. Wardle, and admitted that the late Trial had nothing to do with the question: the merit of col. W. he did not mean to depreciate; but at the same time, hoped the Court would reflect before it adopted the Resolutions which had been just read, for Resolutions so extensive in their application, ought, in his opinion, to have been made a distinct question for discussion. He thought it

quite improper that gentlemen should make this a party question, and sit in judgment on such high and exalted characters as Lord Castlereagh, and others, who have served their country for a number of years. [A loud laugh.]

Mr. GRIFFITH felt, that if ever there was a question which demanded the solemn decision of the Court, it was that which was before them. The gentleman who had just delivered his sentiments had talked of party; but he trusted there was but one party, and that party would maintain the government of the country; but, if in that government there should be found men who were a disgrace to the situations which they held, he, for one, felt it to be the duty of that Court, to express its disapprobation of their conduct.—He would ask whether Corruption had not, like a snail touched on the head, shrunk into its house? Would it be contended, that col. W. had not rendered the country most important services by the various inquiries which he had instituted, independent of the original investigation? Had he not exposed the shameful practice of selling Seats in Parliament? Had he not exposed the disgraceful manner in which the patronage of the Directors of the East India Company had been disposed of? In short, had he not exposed practices of corruption all round us, and at almost every point. It must be acknowledged, and indeed, seemed to be admitted, by his friend behind him, who opposed the Resolutions of the worthy alderman, that col. Wardle had done a great deal for the country. Against that he had not yet heard a syllable, and his friend behind him had candidly admitted, that the Trial at law could not affect the merit of col. W. nor ought to have any effect upon the opinion of the Court. With respect to the introduction of the names of lord Castlereagh, Mr. Perceval, and others in high official situations, he, for his own part, thought that the higher the situations, the more necessary it became to have them filled with good servants; and certainly, in order to have good servants, it is necessary to look well after them. However high might be the situations which these men filled, he saw no reason why they should not look them in the face, and tell them of their misconduct. That man who pays the enormous rates and taxes under which we labour, and twenty shillings in the pound, ought to hand down to posterity, untarnished, these

rights and liberties which were the pride and boast of Englishmen. On all occasions his fellow-citizens might look to him as a supporter of their rights, and certainly should never look to him in vain. He would, at all times, boldly censure the high and the mighty when they deserved it, and protect, to the utmost of his ability, the weak and needy.

Mr. WAITHMAN.—Although I do not think that any arguments can be necessary to induce the Court to adopt the Resolutions of the worthy alderman, yet having taken an active part in the discussion when that Vote of Thanks to col. Wardle was passed, which it is the object of the present motion to rescind, and having had the honour of bringing forward a similar Vote of Thanks on other occasions, I cannot suffer the proposition that is now before the Court to pass without observation. I regret, exceedingly, that the gentleman who gave the notice of this motion has not thought fit to attend, and give his reasons to the Court for that extraordinary notice. But his having thus shrunk from the discussion, certainly betrays a consciousness of a want of argument to support his motion. I do not feel it necessary, or indeed possible, to say so much on this important subject in the absence of that gentleman; for were he present, I might say some things that possibly would be very unpleasant, and which I really know not how to say in his absence. Yet, I trust that I may be justified in examining the conduct of that gentleman, though absent; and of inferring from that conduct such motives as it may fairly appear to warrant. I have not the smallest hesitation in now asserting that which I would certainly do to his face if he were present; that he has stated that which is not true; namely, that he gave notice of bringing forward this motion after the adjournment; for there is no such thing as an adjournment of this Court. True it is, that for the general convenience of its members, it has at certain periods of the year been omitted to be called together; but I have never known an instance in which even one whole month has elapsed without this Court being called together. I have indeed more than once found that those who happened to have the ear of the Lord Mayor for the time being, take advantage of the interest they had with his lordship to get a convenient day appointed, in order to smuggle through certain propositions of their own. But, my

lord, with respect to the question now before the Court, I must take the liberty of remarking, that the gentleman who gave the notice of this motion must surely be the very pattern and quintessence of morality, since he deems the alledged breach of a pecuniary engagement by col. Wardle of sufficient importance absolutely to damn the whole merit to which he is unquestionably entitled, from his great and meritorious exertions; and not contented with entertaining, as an individual, an abstract notion so extraordinary, he modestly calls upon the Corporation of the City of London, on no better ground than this, to rescind its own act, passed in a very full attendance of this Court, and after having undergone a serious and very interesting discussion. My Lord, the gentleman opposite to me (Mr. Knox), at the same time that he admits, with great readiness, that the Trial has nothing to do with the question of col. Wardle's merits, thinks the Resolutions proposed by the worthy alderman too harsh in censuring the conduct of that high and exalted personage, who has served the country so long, Lord Castlereagh and also others; and this he makes the stalking horse of his opposition; but that trick I have seen too often played off to be for one moment deluded by it, and so well, indeed, am I aware of this species of stratagem, that I even signified my suspicions before I came into court, that such a trick would be attempted by those who acted with the gentleman who gave the notice of the motion now before the Court. By way of illustration of the habits of that gentleman, I shall state a fact: That gentleman (Mr. Dixon) himself came to me not long after the Trial, in which col. Wardle was interested, took place, and condoled most piteously on the piteous situation to which col. Wardle was reduced. "Oh!" says the gentleman, "What a sad sad business" is this! You can't think, Mr. Waithman, how it hurts me. Indeed I am so "hurt! And, besides, what shall we do, you know we can't let the Thanks to him stand on the Votes now. Oh! I am so hurt about this business you can't think!!!" With this cant and hypocrisy he not only tried me, but he tried the Court all round, and at length, discovering that it would not do, he silently shrunk from the attempt for that time. And this is not the only time that that gentleman has resorted to the cant of hypocrisy to carry on his desigus, for I re-

member his coming to me on the occasion of a motion of Mr. Birch. "Lord," says he, "what a foolish motion is this of Birch 'about No Popery'!! I do assert that he came to my house in the manner I have described. From his conversation I soon discovered that he had been with the ministry. He, however, assured me, that we should 'certainly negative Birch's 'foolish motion,' and away he went, leaving me in the full persuasion he felt much anxiety to negative Mr. Birch's 'foolish motion about No Popery';" and yet did this very gentleman afterwards actually vote on the same side with Mr. Birch in favour of his "foolish motion." But, notwithstanding these miserable shifts of canting hypocrisy, I will ask those who are now present, whether, in any single instance, this gentleman has expressed the slightest degree of satisfaction at that discovery of abuses which gave to every true friend of his country, the gratifying prospect of a correction of the lavish expenditure of the public money? I remember not even a solitary instance in which he has expressed any satisfaction at any such discovery of public abuses and corruptions. That this apathy is not confined to that gentleman, was abundantly clear, from the expressions used by other gentlemen in a former discussion. At that time they arrogated merit to themselves for their forbearance to oppose the measure under their consideration. "We 'have made,'" say they, "no opposition to 'the vote of thanks to col. Wardle, but 'we object to ministerial threats, and to 'declaring that the D. of Y. was unworthy of his situation.'" Such is the spirit by which those gentlemen are actuated; and I have felt conviction from repeated observations, that upon any question having for its object the correction of public abuses, it was madness to look for the support or co-operation of any contractor, pensioner, placeman, or place-hunter.—[Hear! hear!] In no instance when such a question is brought forward, do the gentleman, and those who act with him, omit to burst out into the old cry, that it is a mere party question, which is quite a wrong thing to agitate—quite improper for gentlemen to bring forward party matters. Is there then, it may be asked, a party to support corruption? In truth, if we may judge of the conduct of the public prints, such might be the infer-

ence; for all those newspapers, with very few exceptions, which during the investigation supported and commended the laudable exertions of col. Wardle, have suddenly abandoned him, for no other reason as it should seem, but that the tendency of his measures to destroy corruption, has, at the same time, an ultimate tendency to destroy the influence of both the parties in this country, the Outs as well as the Ins. The notice of this motion, I cannot but consider in any point of view as most improper; and as neither the gentleman who gave that notice, nor any other gentleman on his behalf, has thought proper to bring forward the question, I am decidedly of opinion, that such notice ought to be expunged from the record of our proceedings.—We are now called upon to enter into a consideration of circumstances, that have occurred subsequently to the Vote of Thanks, which was passed by this court to col. Wardle, on whose conduct we are required to sit in judgment, and, seriously weighing all the circumstances that make both for and against him, to express our opinion of his conduct. It will be recollected, that when col. Wardle first brought forward his charges in the House of Commons, he had not, out of the whole body of the members composing that assembly, the active support of one single individual. The difficulty and endless trouble of detecting and substantiating the existence of abuses, I happened to be personally enabled to appreciate very correctly; for in the discovery and exposure of the enormous abuses that have been practised in Christ's Hospital, I did incur a degree of trouble, labour, and anxiety, the extent of which was beyond what I could have expected to have been possible; and after all my exertions, instead of receiving the thanks of those whom it was the object of my exertions to benefit, what did I meet with? obloquy, persecution, and misrepresentation; nay, the Vicar himself has not scrupled to represent me as an enemy to all religious and political establishments. That this gentleman has so many motives for feeling sore at the institution of inquiry into Public Abuses, I did not know, until I accidentally discovered that his brother-in-law actually enjoys a pension of no less than 1,700*l.* per annum for life, [Hear! hear!] so that, between the Vicar and his brother-in-law, there are no trifling interests to protect.—(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 7.] LONDON, SATURDAY, AUGUST 19, 1809.

[Price 1s.

"The ground on which this Corruption is defended is most curious. It is necessary, say those who justify the existence of a corrupt venal Representation, that *property and influence should be represented*. What is meant by this I know not; are not property and influence represented by both the King and the Aristocracy? But mind what these ingenious knaves would add to the natural influence of the different branches of our constitution; they would, on that *natural influence*, engraft a *pur-chased, venal, and corrupt influence*, not sanctioned by the constitution, absolutely hostile to its existence. All wealthy men have a natural influence over every man who has not leisure or inclination to mix in the discussion of political subjects. This necessary and unavoidable influence no poor man grudges to the rich; it is a consequence which naturally arises out of the condition of society. But although the poor man grudges not *this influence*, it goes to his very heart to see the *children of the corrupt and venal electors of some paltry Borough* provided for by places, while his own children are doomed to the workhouse."—MR. MALLETT'S *Speech at the Middlesex Meeting*.

193]

[194

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

BATTLE OF TALAVERA.—This battle, the particulars of which will be found in the Official Dispatches, inserted below, appears, from those dispatches, to have been not less hard-fought on the side of the French, than it was glorious, in its result, to the English army and its Commander. We have here another proof (if such proof had been wanted) of the decided superiority of English over French troops, and, of course, an additional ground of confidence, that, if the battle should, at last, be to be fought here; if the independence of England should be to be fought for upon English ground, we shall, though we were to be inferior in numbers and experience, finally succeed in expelling the enemy.—There has been great loss, on our side, in this battle; and, such loss we are not well able to spare; but, the *glory*, if all things be correctly stated, and if it should hereafter appear, that we *pursue* the enemy, does, in my estimation, far exceed the loss. Sir Arthur Wellesley, if all be truly stated, has *risked* much, and, while so doing, has certainly not been under the governance of that, almost *supernatural circumspection*, for acting upon which certain commanders appear, in a recent case, to have been much applauded; but, for my part, as far as I can judge of the matter, the risk was proper; it appearing to have been one of those cases where *to risk was to be prudent*.—There is, however, besides the loss of valuable lives, something, belonging to this battle, to lament; and that is, the ground for *dispute as to comparative strength*, which is left by the dispatches of sir Arthur Wellesley. I had to complain of this gentleman before upon this same ground. The

exaggerations and diminutions upon occasions of this sort, the direct contradictions which the opposite accounts contain, are so common and so notorious, that, to say the truth, little reliance is to be placed in official accounts of a battle. Since, therefore, we had gained a triumph, and *taken some cannon and standards*; since we had these *proofs* of victory to produce, it was above all things desirable, that, if *the fact was so*, we should have been furnished with a detailed statement of *the enemy's superiority of numbers*.—Sir Arthur Wellesley says that the army under him had to fight with "more than double its numbers." It is, therefore, particularly to be regretted, that he has no where stated what the force of the enemy was; that he has no where furnished us with the means of judging of the amount of that force; that he has no where stated the amount of the Spanish force, nor afforded us any means of judging thereof; that he has not even given us one single phrase, by which we can be led to judge of the amount of his own force. The news-papers state without the least hesitation, that the French army consisted of forty or forty four thousand men, that the English army consisted of twenty thousand, which twenty thousand beat the said forty thousand, the Spanish army not having had the smallest share in the battle; and, upon the supposition of these numbers being correct, Sir Arthur confirms this very flattering statement; for, in speaking of the battle, he calls it, "this long and hard-fought action with *more than double our numbers*."—Now, I must confess, though very reluctantly, that all this does not give me satisfaction. The Morning Chronicle says:—"Whatever may be the value of the ultimate advantages to which it may lead, it is with heartfelt

G

"joy and pride that we congratulate the country upon the accession of glory which it has derived from a victory which will be for ever memorable on its annals. Sir Arthur Wellesley has in many instances eminently distinguished himself as a general, and had he done nothing before, his brilliant conduct on the late occasion would entitle him to rank in the *first Order of British Heroes*. And such an army! Oh! that we could erect a monument to every man that fell; that we had palms and crowns, wealth and honours to bestow upon each survivor. But the *immortals* need no record of their fame, and so long as the English heart beats high at the recollection of devoted patriotism, *holy* zeal, and unconquered and unconquerable valour, it will require no better passport to its affections, than *I was in the battle of Talavera*."

—I will not say any thing about "*holy* zeal," which phrase I rather dislike, as savouring a little of the wildish; but, for the rest, I cordially agree in the sentiments of the Morning Chronicle; but, then, this agreement has for its indispensable condition, that, the French army *had the advantage in point of numbers*; and that they were in fact driven from the field of battle.—It has been the constant practice of our news-papers, when a battle with the French was in expectation, to represent the force of the French as being very much *inferior* to the force expected to engage with it, whether belonging to ourselves or our allies, and, after a battle, it has been a practice not less constant, to represent the French force as being greatly *superior* in numbers to the force against which it had fought. I know of no exception; of not one solitary instance, wherein this has not been the case. It is not more than fourteen days ago, that the ministerial papers stated the amount of the Spanish army, *ready to co-operate with ours*, at 87,000 men; our own army they stated at 28,000, with sir Arthur Wellesley; while, the French army they reduced almost to nothing, or, at least, they spoke of it in a way to induce the public to believe, that it was quite unable to face the joint force, which we and the Spaniards had to bring against it. How, then, are we to account for the increase, the sudden increase, of the French force? How are we to account for this total reverse of circumstances, as to relative force, in so short a time?—But, is there not something awkward; something

very defective (not to give it any more pointed epithet) with respect to the *Spanish* force? That force must have consisted of, at least, 40 or 50 thousand men, which, joined to our 20 thousand, gave the allied army so decided a superiority over that of the French, that to talk of the "*glory*" of the victory must be ridiculous, unless the Spanish force *did not act*, did not come into the battle. Sir Arthur Wellesley says, "Your Lordship will observe, that the *attacks* of the enemy were principally, if not *entirely*, directed against the British troops. The Spanish Commander-in-Chief, his officers and troops, manifested *every disposition* to render us assistance, and those of them, *which were engaged*, did their duty; but the *ground*, which they occupied, was so *important*, and its front at the same time so difficult, that I did not think it proper to urge them to make any movement on the left of the enemy while he was engaged with us."

—This passage is, to me, totally incomprehensible. Let us see a little how the thing stands. The Spanish army were upon the *right* of the line; and, besides this, the Spanish infantry did, it seems, form two lines in the rear of the English army. The fact is, that sir Arthur's description of the position previous to the battle is not to be understood by any one, who was not there; and, all we distinctly know from his dispatch, is, that there was a Spanish army present, which was *not attacked*, and a very small part indeed of which was engaged. Well, now, how came it to be so? "The *ground* they occupied was so *important*, and its front so difficult, that he did not think it proper to urge them to make any movement while he was engaged." Bless us! How is this? Why were they placed, then, in such a "*difficult*" front? And, how could the ground be of *importance* in any way except that of being conducive to the *defeat of the enemy*? What, here are two wings of an army drawn up for battle; the left wing is attacked by the *whole* of the enemy's force; it is attacked by the whole, mind, or else away goes the statement about *double our force*;—the left wing is attacked by the *whole* of the enemy's force, *double* in number to that of our left wing; the battle lasts about eight and forty hours; it is so obstinate and bloody as to take off in killed, wounded and missing, more than every fourth man of the left wing; and yet, strange to relate, the general commanding that wing, does not

think it *proper* to urge the right wing, or any part of it, to come to his assistance! And why, because the ground occupied by the right wing was "so important" and the "front so difficult." Very true. As much of this importance and difficulty as you please, at the outset; but, *what need* was there of occupying this ground any longer; *why* keep the whole of the right wing standing upon that ground, when they could not *possibly* be wanted there, and when, for *forty eight hours*, the *whole* (mind that!) of the enemy's force was engaged in repeated attacks upon the left wing, which, in point of numbers, was not half so powerful as that enemy?—These questions should be answered. Nay, they demand an answer, especially as it appears, that we have upwards of 5 thousand men, in killed, wounded and missing, while, of the *Spanish* killed, wounded and missing, there is *no mention at all*. Why, therefore, again I ask, did not the Spanish part of the army come forward to the assistance of ours? And, if they did not seem disposed to do it without, *why* were they not urged to come forward? Again and again, I say, give me an answer to these questions.—In stating the relative force of the two armies, we are not to suppose, however, that the enemy will follow our example. He will include all those, who were *drawn up* against him, and whom, in fact, *he did attack*. He will not call it an army of 20 thousand men that he fought with; but, probably, an army of 100 thousand or upwards; for, upon the most extraordinary supposition, that the *whole* of the enemy rushed upon the left wing, paying no more attention to the right wing than if it had consisted of so many stones or clods of earth; upon this most wonderful supposition, if it should be adopted by the world, the world will give the enemy credit for having attacked the whole of the army, right as well as left. Indeed, this is so obviously just, that any attempt to produce a contrary opinion must be treated with contempt. What should we say, if the French, in giving an account of one of their victories, and in making a comparison of numbers, were to chuse to consider three fourths of their own numbers as constituting no part of their force during the battle? Should we not laugh such a statement to scorn? And if we make such statements shall not the world laugh at us?—Do we chuse to consider the Spanish troops as nothing? I much question that. But, it appears to me, that we must

either insist upon it, boldly assert and abide by it, that the Spanish troops were to be looked upon as nothing at all in the battle; or, that the French were not double our number, and in fact that the superiority of numbers, and a very great superiority too, was on our side.—This leads us to what is by far the most important consideration, connected with our military operations in Spain. If the statements now laid before us be correct, the remaining force of sir Arthur Wellesley, including General Crauford's brigade, can scarcely amount to more than twenty thousand effective men, while, allowing the French to have lost ten thousand men in the battle, their remaining force, collected near our army, amounts to about thirty thousand men. Things standing thus, either sir Arthur must change his mode of employing his *right wing*, or he must be pretty nimble in retreating with his left. We find him two days after the battle; we find him still upon the field, not having advanced an inch, and stating as one of his reasons for remaining immovable, that he was in *want of provisions*. This situation of affairs is not very promising, and I think there can be little doubt, that the fruit of this victory must be a retreat to the shores of the Atlantic. The cold manner in which sir Arthur Wellesley speaks of the conduct of the Spanish troops ought to be quite sufficient to convince the whole country, that nothing is to be expected from them, that whatever fighting there is to be done must be done by us alone; and, in short, that we are carrying on a war in Spain, in which war nobody but the French and us really take an interest. But this is our old way. We have, for some years past, taken it into our heads to become *deliverers*. There is scarcely a nation in Europe, which in its turn, has not experienced more or less of our benevolent efforts in this way; and, in every instance, as far as I can recollect, an anxiety for success, that is to say for the *deliverance*, seems always to have been entertained by the *deliverers* and never by the parties to be *delivered*. We are the universal *Médecin Mal'gré-lui*; and hitherto it has invariably happened, that, as in the case of interferences between man and wife, both parties have finally joined in kicking and cuffing us off the scene, and in sending us home loaded with reproaches and execrations. And, which is the most provoking of all, we never, even in the smallest degree, profit from experience. We

are ready still to deliver any body or any thing. Russians, Germans, Swedes, Danes, Swiss, French, Italians, the Pope, the Turk; no matter whom or what, and now we have upon our hands, the Spaniards for the second time and the Dutch for the third. The news-papers inform us, that the Dutch say, that they do not want to be delivered; but that is nothing to us; we shall not believe them; we shall impute their refusal of our offers of deliverance to the "*machinations of Buonaparté*;" and, in short, we shall believe nothing, which does not fall in with our perverse and absurd resolution to believe, that because we have good reason to fear the power of Buonaparté, all the rest of the world must necessarily fear that power also; that, because we hate him, all the rest of the world must hate him; and that, because our safety requires that we shall hazard our lives in war against him, it follows of course, that all the rest of mankind should passionately desire to expose themselves to all sorts of dangers and miseries in the prosecution of that war. This stupid way of thinking, perceived and encouraged by certain hireling writers on the Continent, has been the great cause of our warlike disasters; and, in spite of such long and such woeful experience, it appears to be at this hour as efficient as ever.—Is there, upon the whole earth, a nation besides this, who could entertain hope of success in Spain; who could persevere in the project of deliverance, after the dispatch of Sir Arthur Wellesley? What does common sense say must have been the *real* cause of the inactivity of the Spanish army? And, where was this army two days *after the battle*, when Sir Arthur was prevented from moving forward by the extreme fatigue of his troops, and by the numbers of wounded he had to take care of? Where was the Spanish army on that day, until when the French had, it seems, kept a rear-guard of ten thousand men in the sight of our army? Where was the Spanish army then? It had undergone no fatigue, nor had it any wounded to take care of. Why did it not then pursue the French? A translation of the Spanish Gazette, which, by the bye, gives the Spanish army a full share of the victory; this Spanish Gazette, of which the Morning Chronicle has published a translation, says "that the enemy were totally defeated, and compelled to retreat in *the greatest consternation*, taking the road *to Toledo, without the means of subsisting,*

"having left in our possession 15 cannon, "many waggons, baggage, cars, and a "great number of wounded and prisoners; "among which is a General Officer, and "the field of battle *covered with dead "bodies.*"—Now, either this is not true or there never could be a more favourable opportunity for pursuing and destroying an enemy. What, then, was the Spanish army at, that it did not pursue this enemy, who was fleeing in such consternation, and who was without the means of subsisting? But, it is useless to continue these questions; for the real fact must be evident to all the world.—We must not, however, pass over unnoticed, the very material difference between the statements in the English gazette and those in the Spanish gazette, as far as relates to *the part which the Spanish army had in the battle.* We have seen what Sir Arthur Wellesley says upon the subject, and we will now see what is said upon it in the Spanish gazette, a translation of which was published in the Morning Chronicle of the 15th instant:—"The General Cuesta "writes on the 28th from the camp at "Talavera, that the enemy, amounting to "40,000 men, intended an attack upon "him; he re-passed the Alberche to take "up the position agreed upon by the "General in Chief of the English.—At "five in the evening of the 27th, the "enemy appeared, and attacking with "impetuosity with the bayonet, were repulsed with much loss, and the action "concluded at eight o'clock at night. "On the 28th, the enemy repeated their "attacks until seven in the evening, and "were again repulsed by the English *and "Spanish armies*, with that valour which "distinguishes the *two nations*. The pretended King, who was present in person, retiring upon Santa Ollala, with "98 waggons of wounded soldiers. The "division of brigadier-gen. Lacy is near "Toledo, and the army of gen. Vanegas "was entering Aranjuez, with a determination to occupy Madrid.—Gen. Cuesta "writes from the camp at Talavera, on the "29th, at ten in the morning, that the "enemy, after attacking the greater part "of the night.—He cannot express himself "sufficiently to celebrate the admirable "courage of the English army and its excellent general, *and of our own troops also.*"—Here we see no distinction whatever made between the Spanish army and the English army, as to the share in the battle and the *glory* gained at Talavera.

This difference in the two gazettes is not the less awkward, because the French, in their account of the battle, will, in all likelihood, avail themselves of the advantage which it offers them of setting us and the Spaniards together by the ears. At any rate, both accounts cannot be true; one of them must be false, either in act or omission; and as each party will like to be the owner of the true account, we need not be much surprised, if, in different parts of the world, both should be discredited.

—In offering another observation or two upon the result of this battle, one cannot help noticing, that the public have laid before them *extracts* only, of letters from Sir Arthur Wellesley, written two days after the battle. Now, why give us *extracts*? In the title of the dispatches, as published in the London gazette, they are called "Dispatches, of which the following are copies and *extracts*, were this day received at the office of Lord Viscount Castlereagh, &c. &c. &c." But, why not give us the *whole* of one letter as well as the whole of another? It can hardly be supposed, that Sir Arthur Wellesley would not write very fully upon the subject of his prospects after such a victory; and yet, of the whole of his two letters, written on the first of August, we get but fifteen or sixteen lines of a newspaper column. It is impossible, therefore, for us to believe, that those letters contained what the ministers looked upon as good news.—The public, who have been so often deceived, will bear yet a great deal more in the way of deception; and those, who attempt to undeceive them in time, must expect to bear yet a great deal more in the way of reproach, and that, too, from many of those, whom they endeavour to undeceive. People love to be cheated, and especially to be cheated into notions of security. The lazy and luxurious man has no resentments except against those who would rob him of his ease; and the coward hates not a thousandth part so much the enemy who assails him and aims at his life, as he does the friend, who would urge him to resistance. Of this sort are the feelings of this nation at this time, whether as to foreign or domestic concerns. The great and general desire is to put off the evil day. All is *expedient*; there is nothing calculated for duration; and, I would stake my life against the damages of Mr. Borough's pauper client, which would hardly pay for the repair of an old mare's tail wig; I would stake

my life against this precious prize, that the question has never yet been agitated, How far it is practicable for England to preserve peace with Napoleon, in case he should become master of the whole of the continent of Europe? There is no system; there is no fixed principle of action; all is left to the spur of the moment; every thing bends to circumstances; and hence it is, that, with such mighty means of all sorts, and clad, as this nation is, in power of every description, our measures are marked by the wavering and faltering of inherent imbecility.—Had it not been for this want of principle of action, we never should have seen an English army fleeing before a French army in Spain, at the beginning of the year, and another obliged to remain as it were in a *stunned* state, after a *victory*, in the same country, in nine months afterwards.—When the war between France and Austria began, there was but one thing to do, and that was to make a powerful *diversion* in favour of Austria, which diversion was to be made with effect no where but in the territory of France herself. If an attack had been made upon Brest, Bourdeaux, Marseilles, Toulon, and Cette, and some other places, not only must the French army have evacuated Spain and Portugal, but large detachments must have been sent from Germany and Italy. But, as Marshal Victor and another or two chose to invite us into Spain, into Spain we went, though it was directly against the opinion of every Spaniard that I have heard of. Spain, between us and the French, is half-devoured. There is a shocking want, in many places, of the necessaries of life. The people are harrassed out of their lives; and, as we shall by-and-by be officially informed, it is impossible, in the present state, to make them, in any considerable degree, contribute towards their own *deliverance*.—I have been assured, by persons of undoubted veracity, and very competent judges, that, if the people of Spain had been offered a free government; if they had been distinctly called upon to fight for their freedom; if it had been made clear to them, that they were not called upon to shed their blood for the support of *abuses* and *corruptions*; if this had been the case, I am assured, that they would have wanted nothing from us but *arms* and *ammunition*. The making of Ferdinand VII. the object of the war; the making of the contest a contest for a *choice of masters*; this appears to have been the great destroyer of the

cause. But, it is not now; it is not even now too late for us to retrieve our error. Whatever delicacy there might be at first, there can now be none. The cause, without some new resource, is manifestly desperate. Why should our government, then, hesitate to propose to the Junta an immediate assembling of the CORTEZ, of the *real representatives* of the people? There is yet time, but none to lose.

MIDDLESEX MEETING.—Of far greater importance than the foregoing subject, or any other subject that can be agitated in this country, is the subject agitated in the county of Middlesex, on the 9th of this month, at as full a meeting as ever was seen, I believe, of even that county.—The meeting took place in consequence of a requisition, signed by a great number of persons, at whose head stood the name of that venerable patriot, MAJOR CARTWRIGHT; and the object was to take into consideration the propriety of petitioning for a *Reform of Parliament*.—Major Cartwright opened the business of the day, and, apparently, with even more spirit than usual, though he is always remarkable for spirit as well as for sense. I regret very much, that I cannot give the *whole* of the Speeches, which their great length renders impossible; but I strongly recommend them to the perusal of the reader, who will find the fullest, and, of course, the best report, in the STATESMAN of the 10th instant; and, here I cannot help observing, that, owing to many circumstances, this is certainly the best Evening Paper now published.—The Proceedings at this Meeting are worthy of being preserved. Every Speech has in it something strikingly important. I will, if possible, at a future day, insert the whole of them; but, with the great mass of matter that I have now on hand, I must here content myself with inserting the *Resolutions*, the *substance of the Petition*, and with subjoining a few of the many observations, which naturally occur to one in the perusal of this most interesting Debate.—The Resolutions, moved by MAJOR CARTWRIGHT and seconded by MR. HARE TOWNSEND, were as follows:

1. That in a Petition presented to and entered on the Journals of the House of Commons on the 6th of May, 1793, it was averred, and offered to be proved at their Bar, that 154 individuals (Peers and others), did, by their own authority, appoint or procure the return of 307 Members of that House (exclusive of those from

Scotland), who were thus enabled to decide all questions in the name of the whole people of Great Britain.

2. That in a Report lately presented to the said House, it appears that a large proportion of the Members thereof are Placemen and Pensioners, dependent on the Crown.

3. That in a Petition presented to the said House, and entered on its Journals, on the 9th of December, 1790, it was averred, that "Seats therein were as notoriously rented and bought as the standings for Cattle in the Fair," which assertion was then resented in that House as "*scandalous and libellous*." But when Lord Castle-reagh was, on the 11th of May last, accused of having sold a Seat, he was screened from punishment on the plea of the *extreme notoriety of the practice*; a practice which various of its Members unblushingly justified.

4. That when Seats in the Commons House of Parliament are bought and sold, the people, their laws and liberties, are bought and sold.

5. That while these corruptions continue to exist, the People are deprived of their lawful share of the Government, by Representation in the Commons House of Parliament, which share has been usurped by a corrupt and unconstitutional oligarchy of Borough-mongers.

6. That Reform on Constitutional Principles encourages us to hope that the expences, disorders, and tumults attending Elections would be avoided; the Rights and Liberties of the People secured; Taxes reduced; the unequal and grievous impositions of the Property Tax removed, and future burthens prevented. Corruption then would be no longer necessary, much less avowed to be necessary for the administration of public affairs.

7. That the King and his People have but one interest, but Borough-mongers have an interest separate from each, and inimical to both; and as a complete Reform in the Representation is the only means of destroying the corrupt influence of the latter, so it is particularly requisite in these times for the preservation of both King and People.

8. That the Thanks of this Meeting be given to Sir F. Burdett, Bart. for calling on the House to take into consideration the necessity of Reform in the Representation; that he be requested to renew his motion early in the next Session. And that we recommend to Counties, Cities, large

Towns, and Boroughs, to press the subject on the attention of the House of Commons, by respectful and earnest Petitions.

9. That the Petition now read be signed by the Sheriffs and Freeholders, and delivered to George Byng, Esq. to be presented to the House.

10. That George Byng and William Mellish, Esqrs. our Representatives in Parliament, are hereby instructed to support the same.

11. That the Thanks of this Meeting be given to the Sheriffs for their promptitude in calling this Meeting, and for their impartial conduct in the Chair.

12. That the Thanks of this Meeting be given to Major Cartwright, for his perseverance and ability in the cause of Parliamentary Reform.

The last Resolution was moved by some other person.—As to the *Petition*, which was afterwards agreed to, it was, in substance, the same as the Resolutions, and, therefore it need not be particularly noticed here.—The *arguments*, made use of at this Meeting, in favour of Reform, could not be *new*; but the light thrown upon the subject during the last most memorable Session of Parliament, by facts then so completely exposed, and which facts neither the Army in Spain, nor the Grand Armada, nor the Battle of Aspern, will efface from the minds of the people of England; this memorable exposure, afforded new *illustrations* in abundance, which were not forgotten by the several speakers.—I like *facts*, and as several curious ones were stated, I shall notice some of them for the information of such of my readers as are not in the habit of reading the *STATESMAN*.—MR. TOWNSEND read a copy of a Letter from himself to the Lay Rector of Godalming, where, it appears, he owns and occupies a farm. In this letter, he, in answer to the Rector's application for an advance in the tythes, shows how heavily the land is burthened with taxes, and makes it clearly appear, that the *taxes* and *rates* and *tythes*, exceed the amount of the *rent*, which, of the farm in question, is stated at 160*l.* a year.—Mr. Townsend's mode of illustration is one that I like above all others, as the public must have frequently perceived. But, I think he fell into an error in his detail; that he confounded items of charge, very different in their nature. The items were as follows:

	£.	s.	d.
Land-tax	16	8	5
Property-tax	31	6	4
Poor-rate	47	5	0
Highway-rate	10	17	3
Church-rate	1	13	6
Great Tythes	39	2	6
Small Tythes	11	5	0
Total	157	18	0

Which, together with the additional tythe demanded, would certainly exceed the amount of the rent.—But, surely, Mr. Townsend cannot look upon the *high-way-rate* as a tax laid on by the government, or indeed, as a *tax* at all; no, surely, nor as a *burthen*, in any sense, in which that word can be taken. Surely Mr. Townsend, who in his letter, makes a representation of the expences of horses and tackle, must know, that, of all the money expended by a farmer, that is the best laid out, which goes to the insuring to him *good roads*; and, at any rate, the government receives no part of this money; the road rate is a mere parish concern; its utility is to compel those to help to keep the roads in repair, who otherwise would use them without; and in fact, to reckon it as a *burthen* appears to be no more reasonable than it would be so to reckon the expence of ploughing or reaping.—No, surely, the government is not to be blamed for passing a law to compel each man to assist to keep the public roads in repair, in proportion to the wear and tear, which those roads experience from him? Surely, Mr. Townsend does not want a Parliamentary Reform for the purpose of doing away those regulations, without which there would be no communication between town and town for any carriage, or, indeed, for any animal much heavier than a cat?—The *poor-rates* is an item to be reckoned; because the general burthen of taxes create paupers. They *necessarily* create paupers, as it has been clearly proved upon former occasions. But, it seems not very reasonable for a farmer to complain of the amount of the poor-rates, at the same time that he complains of “the *increased price of labourer's wages*,” seeing that what the labourer does not get in wages, he must have in poor-rate; or, he must perish for want, which I am very sure, Mr. Townsend is the last man upon earth to wish for. The truth is, that the labourer's wages are *too low*; and, it is at Godalming, perhaps, as in many other

places, a rule to make a *stated weekly allowance* to the labourers, according to the number of their children, so that, whether well or ill, old or young, every labouring man, having more than a couple of children, becomes a *pauper*, and all his family along with him; than which any thing more unjust, more degrading, more directly tending to a general destruction of industry, of independence of mind, and of the few remaining traits of the English character, it is impossible for even the Devil to discover.—Observe how it works. Let us suppose, that 12 shillings a week is supposed to be sufficient for a family where there are only two children. Well, then, that is the *stated wages*. Where there are more than two children, an allowance is made of so much a head for the *additional children*. So that, in fact, the farmers pay part of their labourer's wages under the name of *poor-rates*, and, therefore, a very considerable part of the sum, which Mr. Townsend puts down as the amount of poor-rates, he should put down as *wages to labourers*. But is it not an abominable system of parochial management, which gives to one man *low wages*, because necessity calls for high wages to another man to keep him from starving? You say to every man, "we will give you no more than just enough to keep you alive." If a law were passed to annihilate industry, care, oeconomy, and all those virtues which lead to abundance of means and independence of mind, I defy it to operate more effectually than this levelling system of parochial relief, which, in effect, says to the sober and industrious man, "You shall not lay up against sickness or old age," and to the drunkard and the sluggard, "You shall never suffer from want."—As to *tythes*, too, I am sorry Mr. Townsend included them in the *burthens* upon a farm, and especially in the burthens to be removed by a Parliamentary Reform. What he says, towards the conclusion of his letter, about the *application* of the tithes, has, indeed, something in it; but unfortunately, no part of it applies to his case, which is that of a *Lay Rector*. It really gives me pain to continue these comments; but, the cause of Parliamentary Reform scorns the aid of *popular prejudice*, and especially that prejudice which, generally speaking, is evidently linked with self-interest; and, besides, from the well-known manly character of Mr. Townsend, I am certain he will be glad to see any error, into which he

may have fallen, corrected by one, who yields not to him in zeal for the cause, however inferior he may be in other respects.—What, then, I fearlessly ask, has *Parliamentary Reform* to do with the *Lay Rector's tythes at Godalming*? Does Mr. Townsend mean, that a Parliamentary Reform would produce an *abolition* of these *tythes*? He cannot mean that; for, the Lay-Rector of Godalming has just as good a title to his tythes as Mr. Townsend has to his land. The one, as well as the other, is *private property*. One, like the other, is property every day bought and sold; and, it is very well known, that no small part of the property of the Duke of Bedford is of this sort. Whether, in a national point of view, it be *desirable* that this sort of property should exist, is another question; and the same question may be raised respecting all the various remains of feudal authority and tenure; but, I am sure Mr. Townsend will find, that, if the abolition of tythes be amongst the objects to be effected by Parliamentary Reform, the arguments, upon which that abolition is to be justified, will apply to all other sorts of property.—He does not mean this, however. I know, he does not mean this. But, *what* does he mean, then? Why, that a Parliamentary Reform would make the *tythe-owners* more *moderate* in their demands. This must, I think, be his meaning; but, surely, when he reflects, he will see cause to change this opinion; for, why should Parliamentary Reform tend to limit the demands of the *tythe-owner*, any more than the demands of the *land-owner*? *Why* should it interfere with one sort of private property, any more than with another sort of private property? Tythe is a *charge* upon an estate, and so is a mortgage, or a rent-charge, or an annuity. Oh, no! this will never do. We must not suffer so good a cause, the cause of *common-sense*, to be blurred by such a strange confusion of ideas. Mr. Townsend has only to make the case of a *tythe-owner* his own, for a moment. The *tythe* is *taxed*, he will find, as well as the land; it pays all the same sort of taxes that the land pays, and in the same proportions; the *tythe-owner* is, in fact, a *land-owner*, as much as he is who has a rent-charge upon land; and, when Mr. Townsend complains of the Rector's *compelling* the farmer to pay the *poor-rates* upon the *tythe*, is it possible, that he can have discovered any difference whatever, in this respect, between the conduct of the *Rector*

that of the *Landlord*, the latter of which always "compels" the farmer to pay the rates?—It was sad work thus to be for want of taking time to reflect, and narrow notions upon matters of national economy, with the great question of Parliamentary Reform; but, it having been done, I could not suffer the promulgation of those notions to pass under a silence, which might seem to give them a share of that general approbation, which I am so anxious to express in the strongest possible manner.—The main ground, upon which we stand, is, that we ask for no *innovation*. All questions of this sort ought to be left untouched. They are, in fact, merely speculative; and have nothing at all to do with our object. But, I have a particular dislike to this *attack upon tythes*; because it falls in with a vulgar error; an error growing out of a grovelling feeling; a feeling no more connected with a *love of liberty*, than the feeling which operates with any of the Jews or Jewish Christians, who occasionally sing God-save-the-King, at the London Tavern, is connected with *loyalty*.—That the Clergy, as a body, have not recently behaved so well as I could have wished, I am ready to avow; and that some of them have behaved very ill is notorious. It is also a shameful and crying abuse, that so few, comparatively, of the incumbents reside upon, or near, or ever see, their livings, which is the inevitable consequence of those pluralities, which, in their turn, are the consequence of that partial distribution of patronage, and which, like all the other great national evils, arises from that state of the representation, which places all power in the hands of the *Bores* and *rough-faction*. That this abuse exists I know; but, I want a Parliamentary Reform to *correct it*, and not to *abolish tythes*; that is to say, to abolish one sort of landed property, and the Church along with it. I wish to see a *reformation* in the Church; and that I should see, if I saw a reformation of the Parliament; but, I no more want to *abolish* the Church than I do to abolish the Parliament; nay, I am as clearly convinced of this, as I ever was of any thing in my life, that the way to prevent the Church from being abolished, is to reform the Parliament.—"We want no *innovation*: we want *nothing new*." These are the words of him, who has laid down the principles of Parliamentary Reform, and without whom our cause loses half its support. I, therefore, dislike exceeding-

ly to see any novelty of notion mixed with arguments in favour of a Reform of the House of Commons; and, as to the effect which *tythes* have, or are likely to have, upon the civil or political liberties of the nation, we cannot but recollect, that *tythes* existed at, and long *before*, the time of *Magna Charta*; they have existed *ever since*; so that, if there ever was a time, when Englishmen enjoyed freedom, it is pretty clear, that the existence of *tythes* is not very inimical to freedom. Indeed, why should it? The *tythe* upon Mr. Townsend's farm, for instance, is stated at about 50*l.* a year. Now, suppose *tythes* to be abolished; that is to say, suppose this 50*l.* a year to be taken from the *tythe-owner* and given to Mr. Townsend; it would, I believe, puzzle Mr. Townsend to make it out that such a *reform*, though it were to be general, would operate much in favour of the liberties of the people. The great fallacy is, that it is the *farmer* and not the *landlord* who pays the *tythe*; nor should Mr. Townsend have spoken of his case as to that of a *farmer*. He should have met the question fairly, and told the meeting, that the Lay Rector of Godalming had a charge upon his estate, which charge was upon it *before he bought it*, and that he wished for a Reform of Parliament in order to get rid of the said charge. No: he certainly did not mean this. From all that I have heard of his character, he is not a man to covet his neighbour's goods, or to grudge to pay any thing that he owes. I have always heard him described as a very liberal-minded man, and such I believe him to be; but, at the same time, he has promulgated errors, which, when brought into such close connection with the leading efforts in the cause of Parliamentary Reform, I could not suffer to pass unnoticed or unrefuted; for, as no cause ever yet finally triumphed without having truth on its side, so delusion, though of temporary advantage, must, in the end, be injurious to any cause.—MR. MALLEY, from whose speech I have selected my motto, advanced what I look upon as unanswerable argument against petitioning the *parliament*, of which I always disliked the idea. Not that there is any difference to be expected as to the *practical* effect; but, there has always seemed to me to be an unfitness in the thing, to petition a body of persons to *reform themselves*, and that, too, while the petitioners are governed by laws of their making. It is true, that the measure of Reform must finally come from

the House; but, the application to it for the purpose appears to me to go much more naturally from the King, *representing to them the complaints of his people, and requesting their early attention to those complaints.*—MR. BENTLEY, who was for a Petition to the Parliament, stated some most curious facts, in order to show the necessity of a Reform in that body, who had the guardianship of the public purse, of which we will just take a specimen.—“Gentlemen, a few years ago a Board for the Encouragement of Agriculture was established in this kingdom; than which no measure could be more *laudable*, or more congenial with the inclinations of the people. That Establishment gave universal satisfaction, and excited the most lively hope of the improvement of that art, the vigorous prosecution of which has ever been found to be the fundamental strength of all nations. By an address from the House of Commons, the annual sum of 3,000*l.* was directed to be placed at the disposal of this society, for the purpose of promoting the *best views of the country*. And such was deemed its importance, that it was thought worthy of the privilege of a *patent*, by which it was established as a regular Board. Letters Patent were accordingly directed to be issued; the forms of office were regularly gone through; the Letters Patent were fairly transcribed on vellum, and finally receiving the sanction of the Great Seal, they were perfected. There then remained only the usual, but in all cases indispensable ceremony, even those in which the national interest is concerned, of satisfying the demands of the officers through whose hands these Letters Patent had passed in their progress towards perfection. Now what do you think, gentlemen, was the amount of those charges for writing out fairly on a skin of vellum these Letters Patent, and passing them through the offices established for that purpose? only ELEVEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINE POUNDS ONE SHILLING AND TWOPENCE!!!—[*Scandalous! impossible! considerable agitation.*] Gentlemen, if you doubt the fact, I have it in black and white; printed by the king’s own printer!!! [*Go on, go on.*] The next instance to which I beg leave to draw your attention, is that of the justly celebrated Dr. Jenner, whose grand discovery, by which not only the people of England, but the whole human race will be

“ultimately delivered from the scourge of one of the most loathsome diseases to which humanity is incident, you, doubtless, all remember. For that discovery, the sum of 10,000*l.* was voted by the unanimous voice of parliament to Dr. Jenner; and certain I am, that the friends of humanity, of science, and of their country, did not think that remuneration more than adequate to the transcendent merits of Dr. Jenner. Gentlemen, it happened that the doctor luckily had a friend in the House of Commons, who knowing something of the nature of these transactions, observed, with affected carelessness, when the 10,000*l.*s were proposed as a remuneration, ‘I suppose you mean the Doctor to have the *clear sum* of 10,000*l.*’ Certainly. ‘Why, then, it had better be *specifically so expressed* in the Grant.’ And so it was expressed; a few weeks after the Doctor had received this sum of 10,000*l.*, down comes the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the House of Commons, with his annual list of items, required to be made good by that house—and what do you think was the *official charge for paying this sum to Dr. Jenner*? Only 735*l.*!! Is it possible that the People of England can any longer preserve silence. In the name of God, what could the Clerks in the Public Offices have to do in the payments of this sum, granted by the House of Commons, but to ascertain the authenticity of the grant, and the identity of the party to whom it was granted? Why, gentlemen, there was no more difficulty in effecting this simple operation, than in the payment by any of yourselves of a Butcher or a Baker’s bill! [*not a bit more,—not so much.*] And yet the enormous sum of 735*l.* is charged for this simple operation.”—Through a speech of considerable length, abounding in facts such as these, MR. BENTLEY appears to have received almost continual applause, which was certainly well merited; for a speech better calculated for the purpose never was uttered.—MR. BENTLEY was followed by MR. WAITHMAN, and MR. CLIFFORD; and, before the conclusion of the proceedings, MR. BYNG not only declared his readiness to present the Petition, but also his perfect agreement in all the sentiments and wishes it expressed.—He concluded in these words: “These three parts united, form our constitution; and if they do not form the best

"theoretic form of government that the genius of man could suggest, they form that which is of greater importance, the best practical form of government now upon the face of this earth; it is, however, imperfect in its Representation; and I shall never rest satisfied until I see a perfect Reform in the Representation of the People in Parliament. That is a blessing to which I look with an earnest anxiety; a blessing which can alone be effected by the members of the House of Commons being fairly chosen by the people themselves, and not nominated by the servants of the Crown, or composed of the Livery of the Aristocracy of the country. Representation is a valuable deposit of the rights of the subject; a sacred trust reposed in the Representative, and was not meant to become matter of profit to individuals, to which, I am sorry to say, it has been in too many instances converted; for now, many individuals have the means of returning more members to Parliament, and thereby possess much more influence in the councils of the nation than whole counties have, superior as they ought to be to any individual, of whatever consequence he may be in the country. With regard to the different modes of Reform which have been mentioned at various times, I have no difficulty in confessing, that I feel attached to the form which was stated in the year 1793; by which it was proposed, That the right of voting for a Member to serve in Parliament, should be allowed to all Freeholders, to all Copyholders, and to all Householders, paying direct taxes to the State.—With regard to the duration of Parliament, I think it of but little importance whether it be annual or triennial. We have not been deprived of triennial Parliaments for more than 90 years; it was settled by the Revolution, by which, and by which alone, the family now on the throne of Great Britain hold their situation, that we should have triennial Parliaments. We have a right to demand a restoration of that practice, so well adapted as I think it is, for the protection and security of our rights and liberties, a benefit which we have only lost ninety years. Thus much, at present, for my sentiments on the duration of Parliament; but the great object is, that every honest man, should come forward and support a system of Reform in Par-

liament, in order that all corruptions and all abuses whatever may, in time, be entirely swept away."—Of this mind, I trust, the whole nation will be, before many months have passed over our heads. In the counties it will, probably, be soon enough to meet after the harvest is in; but, no more time than is absolutely necessary should be suffered to pass away, before we make a solemn expression of our sentiments upon this subject; this subject, compared to which all the wars upon the continent are not worthy of a moment's notice. *Seventy millions of money a year!* How are we to support that! Is it not manifest that no man can long, under such a system, have any thing to call his own?—But, it is useless to be impatient, or anxious; a Reform must come; for, I will not believe, that England is destined to sink under the arm of an invader.

DUKE OF BRUNSWICK.—The Duke of Brunswick, of whom we have lately read so much as one of the formidable enemies of Buonaparté, is, it would seem, arrived in England, and, what is odd enough, the very same ministerial news-papers, which announced his arrival, contained a *Hanoverian* account of his being engaged in bloody fights against Jerome Buonaparté's troops! This is a pretty good specimen of the frauds, which these hireling prints practise upon us.—This Duke has brought his army with him, too, it seems, amounting to 1,700 men! What a number of foreign princes we shall have here by-and-by! Pitt used to call England the world's last hope. He might, if he were (Lord preserve us!) alive now, call it the world's last shift. Before Buonaparté, who hunts down kings and princes with as little remorse as sportsmen hunt down foxes, all the game seems to be fleeing into a corner.—The news-papers tell us, that the Duke has "very large mustachios, and whiskers on his upper lip and side of his face." But, how came his army with him? This is the most interesting part of the question. Who brought the army? Who gave orders for its being brought to England? Or, is it all a newspaper fabrication?—Well, time will tell us all about it.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, Thursday, 17th August, 1809.

PROCEEDINGS OF A SPECIAL COURT OF COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF LONDON;

Held in consequence of a Notice of a MOTION given by Mr. JAMES DIXON, to RESCIND the VOTE of THANKS to Col. WARDLE, passed on the 6th of April last.—(Continued from p. 192.)

[Mr. Waithman, *in continuation.*]

The great ground of accusation against colonel Wardle appears to be, that he has paid for that Evidence on which the Duke of York has been convicted of connivance. Admitting now, for the sake of argument, that fact in the fullest latitude; in the name of common sense, what has that to do with the important service that has been thus rendered to the country by col. W.? I would ask those gentlemen, whose morality is so awakened at this alledged discovery, whether it was not generally, if not universally believed, at the time when we passed our vote of thanks to col. W. that he actually lived, cohabited with Mrs. C.? For my own part I candidly confess, that such was my belief; and such, I dare say, was at that time the opinion and belief even of the gentleman himself who gave the notice of this motion. Yet, though we all believed the existence of the fact at that time, no man, whatever he thought, breathed a doubt of the propriety of our Vote of Thanks to col. W., notwithstanding the reputed and believed existence of the important fact, that he was living in a state of adultery. It is most strange, that the morality of the gentleman did not at that time take the alarm, and state his moral objections to the passing of the Vote of Thanks! From this imputation Mrs. C. has fortunately delivered col. W. by the publication of her Letter, in which she corrects the mistake into which the public had fallen; and for thus clearing the character of col. W. from so gross an imputation, it is impossible not to feel grateful; that such are my feelings, I very freely confess, for it is my opinion that in every public character it behoves us not to be utterly regardless of the private character of the individual; although it cannot be denied, in strictness of reasoning, that the defective private character of an individual should diminish the value of his public conduct is a species of prejudice. It is, however, a weapon that has frequently been used by the friends of corruption, and that too with great success, to destroy the influence, and paralyze the exertions of men of public virtue. This renders it most extraordinary that so formidable a

weapon should have been suffered to lie idle when we passed our Vote of Thanks. Nothing is more common than for the friends and participators of corruption on the discovery of facts that are clearly indefensible; to turn short round and accuse the accuser of using that language called seditious, thus attempting to silence the arguments they cannot answer, by knocking every man on the head who exposes their corruptions. Is, or is it not true? Has it, or has it not been proved, that there did exist a traffic for seats in the House of Commons? If this important fact cannot be denied, where is the man who will have the hardihood to say, that it is not the duty of every man who pays the enormous taxes, imposed on the individuals of this nation, to expose even the immaculate Lord Castlereagh, or the conscientious Mr. Perceval, who have "served the country so long?" [Hear! Hear!] The salutary Bill brought into the House of Commons by Mr. Martin, was opposed, because it was thought necessary to have the power of rewarding services. Of reward for services, Mr. Perceval enjoys, in addition to those of which he is in the actual possession, the pleasant reversionary prospect of 46,000*l.* per annum, which his brother now receives. It is not a little extraordinary, that among the almost innumerable motions that have been brought forward, by the absent gentleman and his friends, it should never have occurred to them, in any one instance, to have suggested a single proposition for the reformation of abuses in any department whatever. It cannot be that they are not accustomed to interest themselves in public matters, for it might seem that they are not a little fond of popularity, from the forwardness with which they have been found ready to vote away the City money in swords and monuments, and the City thanks to the no-popery ministers, for turning out their predecessors. Yet upon any measure that is proposed for the amelioration of the general condition of the community by the suppression of abuses, and the eradication of corruption, they seem to hang their heads. At such unlucky periods their dejection is so extreme and so apparent, as to excite even our pity and compassion. In fact, the depth of this dejection can only be equalled by the height of arrogance that was displayed when col. Wardle stated in the House of Commons, that an office actually existed in Threadneedle-street, for the

have acted, than to have come with a whining, pitiful, and hypocritical, canting pretence, of being "so hurt," and of not wishing to hurt col. Wardle. I think I know all the circumstances from the beginning to the end of col. Wardle's proceedings in the prosecution of the investigation, and *a more honourable man*, I do declare, from the bottom of my heart, I firmly believe *never did exist*. However, for the sake of argument, I will allow him to have broken his word, to have bribed Mrs. Clarke; in short, to have done whatever the absent gentleman might please; let him have done what he will, his conduct cannot have altered the nature of the thing. The accusation against the Duke of York has been fully proved by the concurrent testimony of unwilling witnesses, corroborated by the irrefragable proof of written documents,—of letters under the hand-writing of the Duke of York himself. The absent gentleman has attempted to obtain a pitiful triumph over that man who so lately he durst not have faced. I have already asserted, that no act of private turpitude of col. Wardle, however flagrant or atrocious, can affect the consideration of his public conduct; but for the sake of placing this position in the strongest possible point of view, let us suppose that col. Wardle was a member of the Society for the Suppression of Vice, let us suppose that he had in this court called on his fellow citizens for protection to their wives and daughters. Let us suppose that he had attacked, and afterwards debauched the wife of his bosom friend! still I say, that infamous as must be his private character, even these circumstances can have no weight in the consideration of his public conduct. Let us suppose that col. Wardle had passed his nights in gambling, that the debts which he contracted to support himself in that scandalous practice he refused to pay, that in his progress through the streets at midnight he should be guilty of outrages against decency and in good order, by getting into midnight broils, and rescuing from the hands of justice prostitutes and their associates. Let us suppose, to form the climax of his moral depravity, that he had increased his fortune by plundering the public under the sanction of an act of parliament, passed for the accommodation of commerce in the metropolis of the empire. Still, I say, these atrocities would not alter the facts established by col. W. of the existence of corruption, or lessen the bene-

ficial consequences of their exposure. If even the conduct of col. W. had been marked by treachery, hypocrisy, and fawning meanness, by writing a letter to Lord Grenville, soliciting advancement for a relative, and adding, that much as he desired his relative's advancement, he was unwilling to accept the favour from any other hands than those of his lordship; and, if he had then had the baseness, when he found his lordship's power was tottering, to strike down the reeling Minister, in order to make court to his successor, it might be asked, where shall we find a cavern dark enough to mask such infamy? Yet even this concentrated mass of infamy heaped on the head of col. W.; nay, even his conviction for a highway robbery on Hounslow Heath, could not alter or affect the facts which he has established by his exertions in the House of Commons. But of none of these outrages upon human nature and human society has col. W. been guilty; let, therefore, no man cast stones at another, till he has looked around him! I trust I have thus convinced the Court, that so far from any circumstances having occurred which can induce us to rescind the thanks that have been offered to col. W., the facts that have since been made public entitle that exalted character to the further Thanks of the Corporation of the City of London.

Mr. S. DIXON said, he was prepared to receive any species of rebuke from Mr. Waithman, whose praise alone he dreaded. On proper occasions, he should be at no loss to justify his conduct; with respect to the denial of Mrs. Clarke, of the cohabitation of col. W. with her, all that he could say was, that Mr. Waithman was very anxious to prove the chastity of col. W., but, "for my own part," said Mr. Dixon, "if I had been with her at the Martello Towers, I certainly should have had more intimate connexion with Mrs. C., than col. W. states himself to have had."

Mr. MAWMAN would have voted against rescinding the motion, but was averse to concurring in Alderman Goodbehere's Amendment, on the principle of its being foreign to the purpose of the day, and taking the Court by surprise.

Mr. STOKES did not approve of the language which had been held to-day respecting placemen and place-hunters: he thought it unnecessarily personal, although it did not affect himself; for he disclaimed all connection with Government, and as-

sured the Court, that he never begged any favour of any minister. He objected to the proposition of the worthy Alderman, because new matter was brought up by it, such as suited not the purpose for which the Members of the Court had been summoned; to that purpose, and to that only, should its attention be directed.

Mr. WAITHMAN explained, what he felt to have been misconceived of what he had said concerning some persons: he had cast no reflection upon individuals. He then proceeded to support the proposition moved by his worthy friend, Mr. Alderman Goodbehere; "I am surprised (said he) that my worthy friend (Mr. Mawman) declines to assist us on the present occasion: he says he would do so on another occasion but will not on this. But why not? Every fact stated in my friend's Amendment is as undisputed as it is indisputable, there is not a single proposition stated in the Amendment, that is not founded on a public document, and therefore gentlemen who complain of the statement, pass the truth of it over; they are judicious in so doing; it is the best way of effecting their purpose; they fly to something else, they complain that the Amendment of the worthy Alderman involves new matter, is brought upon them by surprise. There is no foundation for that complaint; and I will venture to say, that there is no individual in this Court less liable than the worthy Alderman, or myself, to the imputation of taking this Court by surprise; we never took any body by surprise. In the present instance there is no pretence for gentlemen to complain of surprise. The object of the motion of which the worthy member gave notice, and which he has shrunk from, is, to take into consideration circumstances which have transpired since our Resolution of the 6th of April, upon the subject of the merit of Mr. Wardle, and the services he has rendered to his country by his exertions in the House of Commons in various departments of the state. That is the professed object of the author of the notice of the motion. He conceived that the circumstances which have transpired since our Resolution of the 6th of April, are such as to call upon us to rescind that Resolution. My worthy friend and myself think that the circumstances which have since transpired are so far from detracting from the merit of Mr. Wardle, that they add to his claims upon the gratitude of his countrymen, and demand further approbation:

this not only gives us a right, but naturally calls upon us to state what the circumstances are which have transpired since the time of passing our Vote of Thanks to that gentleman:—that is the object of the Amendment of my worthy friend. If that be so, I ask of this Court, can we do better than state those facts? I say can "we" do better, for I do not disguise any thing; I avow that I have had some concern in the framing of this motion, and which, therefore, it is natural that I should support. Nor does the motion go so far as it might with truth, for there are facts, not stated in it, from which I can prove Mr. Wardle's further claims to Thanks. Let us recollect that Mr. Wardle was charged with having represented things as grievances, which did not exist, and which are proved, by the subsequent conduct of the ministers themselves, to have existed. Mr. Wardle stated in the House of Commons, that there were three branches of the public expenditure in which there were great abuses, and in which there might be introduced great savings, without detriment to the public service. He descended to particulars, stated facts on which his assertion rested. He was contradicted by ministers, they denied his statement of the facts. But how has it turned out upon those facts? Why, my Lord, ministers have, by their own acts, subsequent to that statement, proved the existence of the very facts which they denied in the House of Commons, upon the statement of them by Mr. Wardle. The facts stated by Mr. Wardle, and to which I am now alluding, were these:—that in the manner of conducting the business of the Local Militia, there was much abuse, and there might be great alteration and a great saving, without detriment to the public service. Ministers denied the existence of any such abuse in that branch of the public service, but, since the discussion, how have they acted, for that is the test? They have given orders there shall be "no further proceedings in the affairs of the Local Militia," thereby admitting, I say, the existence of the abuses stated by Mr. Wardle, and denied by them in the House of Commons. The next head of public service in which Mr. Wardle stated there was much abuse which might be corrected without detriment, was in the Cloathing of the Volunteers. Ministers denied the existence, of that abuse also. How have they acted upon it? They

have given orders, "that there shall be no further proceeding on the subject of the Cloathing of the Volunteers." The next head of service was that of "a supply of the article of Canvass:" in which Mr. Wardle stated there was great abuse, and might be much retrenchment without injury to the public service. Ministers denied the existence of any such abuse. Look at the actions afterwards; They have discharged the Inspector of Canvas! Such, my Lord Mayor, are the facts; and after this, are we to be told that what has transpired since our Vote of Thanks to Mr. Wardle has been such as ought to induce us to rescind that Vote. I say that what has transpired since, calls upon us, in the discharge of our public duty, to enlarge and to extend those Thanks to a man who has rendered such essential service to his country. I say, it is high time for us to make a stand against the torrent of Corruption, when it is become notorious, that no less than 200,000*l.* of the public money is given to individuals in Pensions, as I have already described; when we see that one individual has, in nine months, defrauded the public of 90,000*l.*; and shall we, after this, say that these matters come upon the Members of the Court by surprise? Why should the statement of them surprize any of us, since we all know of their existence? but it seems that in some persons the existence of these things is not so shocking as the statement is—who cannot bear to hear any thing said to the discredit of our Governors.

(To be continued.)

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRENCH ARMY IN AUSTRIA.—*Twenty Sixth Bulletin.*—(Continued from p. 160.)

Twelve of the most considerable villages in the beautiful plain of Vienna, such as are seen in the neighbourhood of a great capital, have been burnt during the battle. The just hatred of the nation is loud against the guilty men who have drawn upon it all these calamities.—The general of brigade, Laroche, entered Nuremberg on the 28th of June, with a corps of cavalry, and proceeded towards Bayreuth. He met the enemy at Besenetheim, charged him with the first provisional regiment of dragoons, and cut in pieces all who opposed him, and took two pieces of cannon.

Twenty-Seventh Bulletin.

On the 10th the duke of Rivoli beat the

enemy's rear-guard before Hollabrun.—At noon on the same day, the duke of Ragusa, who had arrived on the heights of Znaim, saw the enemy's baggage and artillery filing off towards Bohemia. Gen. Bellegarde wrote to him that prince John of Lichtenstein would repair to the Emperor with a mission from his master, for the purpose of treating for Peace; and in consequence desired a Suspension of Arms. The duke of Ragusa replied, that it was not in his power to accede to such a proposition; but that he would acquaint the Emperor with it. Meanwhile he attacked the enemy, took from him an excellent position, made some prisoners, and took two colours.—On the morning of the same day, the duke of Auerstadt had passed the Taya opposite Nicolsbourg, and general Grouchy had beaten prince Rosenberg's rear, taking 450 men of prince Charles's regiment.—At noon on the 11th instant, the Emperor arrived opposite Znaim. The battle had begun. The duke of Ragusa had attacked the town; and the duke of Rivoli had taken the bridge, and had occupied the tobacco manufactory. In the different engagements this day, we had taken 3,000 men, two colours, and three pieces of cannon. The general of brigade, Bruyeres, an officer of very great promise, has been wounded. The general of brigade, Guiton, made a fine charge with the 10th cuirassiers.—The Emperor, informed that prince John of Lichtenstein, who had been sent to him, was arrived within our posts, ordered the fire to cease. The annexed Armistice was signed at midnight, at the prince of Neufchatel's. The prince of Lichtenstein was presented to the Emperor in his tent, at two o'clock in the morning.

Suspension of Arms between his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria.

Art. 1. There shall be a Suspension of Arms between the armies of his majesty the Emperor of the French, king of Italy, and of his majesty the Emperor of Austria.

2. The line of demarcation shall be on the side of Upper Austria, the frontier which separates Austria from Bohemia, the Circle of Znaim, that of Brunn, and a line drawn from the frontier of Moravia upon Raab, which shall begin at the point where the frontier of the Circle of Brunn touches the March, and descending the March to its conflux with the Taya; from thence to St. Johann and the road to Presbourg;

Presbourg and a league round the town; the great Danube to the mouth of the Raab; the Raab to the frontiers of Stiria; Stiria, Carniola, Istria, and Fiume.

3. The citadels of Brunn and Gratz shall be evacuated immediately on the signature of the present Armistice.

4. The detachments of Austrian troops which are in the Tyrol and the Voralberg, shall evacuate those two countries, and the fort of Sachsenbourg shall be given up to the French troops.

5. The magazines of provisions and clothes, which shall be found in the countries to be evacuated by the Austrian army, and which belong to it, may be emptied.

6. In relation to Poland, the two armies shall take the line which they at present occupy.

7. The present suspension of arms shall continue for a month, and fifteen days notice shall be given before hostilities recommence.

8. Commissaries on either side shall be named, for the execution of the present articles.

9. From to-morrow, the 13th, the Austrian troops shall begin their evacuation of the countries marked out by this suspension of arms; and shall retire by daily marches.—The fort of Brunn shall be given up to the French army on the 14th of July; and that of Gratz on the 16th.

Made and concluded between us the undersigned, charged with full powers from our respective sovereigns, the prince of Neufchatel, major-gen. of the French army, and M. Baron Wimpffen, major-gen. of the etat-major of the Austrian army, at the camp before Znaim, July 12, 1809.

Twenty-eighth Bulletin.

The Danube has risen six feet. The bridges of boats which had been constructed before Vienna, since the battle of Wagram, have been broken by the effects of this rise; but the bridges at Ebersdorff are solid and permanent; none of them have suffered. Those bridges, and the works of the island of Lobau, are the admiration of the military persons of Austria. They avow that such works are without example since the time of the Romans.—The Archduke Charles having sent major gen. Weissenvof to compliment the Emperor, and since that, the baron de Wimpffen and prince John of Lichtenstein having come upon the same courteous errand in his name, his majesty has thought

proper to send to the Archduke, the duke of Friuli, grand marshal of the palace, who found him at Budweis, and passed part of yesterday at his head-quarters.—The Emperor left his camp at Znaim yesterday, at nine o'clock in the morning, and arrived at the palace of Schoenbrunn at three in the afternoon.—His majesty has visited the environs of the village of Spitz, which forms the tete-de-pont of Vienna. Gen. Bertrand has been charged with the execution of different works, which must be marked out and begun this day.—The bridge of piles at Vienna will be re-established with the least delay possible.—His majesty has named as marshals of the empire, gen. Oudinot, the duke of Ragusa, and gen. Macdonald. The number of marshals was eleven; this nomination will make it 14. There still remain two vacancies.—The places of col. gen. of the Swiss, and col. gen. of the chasseurs, are also vacant. The col. gen. of the chasseurs, is, according to our constitution, a Grand Officer of the empire.—His majesty has testified his satisfaction with the manner in which the Surgery has been served, and particularly with the services of the principal surgeon, Heurteloup.—His majesty passing through the field of battle on the 7th, caused a great number of the wounded to be taken off; and left there the duke of Friuli, grand marshal of the palace, who remained all day.—The number of wounded Austrians in our hands, amounts to 12 or 13,000.—The Austrians have had 19 generals killed or wounded. It has been remarked as a singular fact, that most of the French officers, whether of old France, or of the new provinces, who were in the Austrian service, have perished.—Several couriers have been intercepted, and among their letters has been found a regular correspondence of Gentz with count Stadion. The influence of this wretch in the leading determinations of the Austrian cabinet, is hereby materially proved. Such are the instruments which England employs, like a new Pandora's box, to raise storms and spread poisons on the Continent.—The duke of Rivoli's corps encamps in the circle of Znaim; that of the duke of Auers-tadt in the circle of Brunn; that of the duke of Ragusa in the circle of Korn-Neubourg; that of marshal Oudinot before Vienna at Spitz; that of the Viceroy on Presbourg and Gratz. The imperial guard returns to the environs of Schoenbrunn.—The harvest is very fine, and

H

abundant every where. The army is cantoned in a beautiful country, and rich in provisions of all kinds, wine particularly.

AUSTRIA.—*Supplement to the London Gazette of the 11th of July.*—(Continued from p. 96.)

Corps of the General of Cavalry count Bellegarde.

Count Bellegarde having received a message from gen. Wacquant, that the enemy was assembling in force before Aspern, towards the bushy meadow, and apparently had in view an assault upon that point, was just going to throw a fresh battalion of Argenteu's into Aspern, when the enemy, in heavy columns of infantry and cavalry, supported by a numerous artillery, began to advance upon the centre of the corps in the plain.—The troops stationed at Aspern, exhausted as they were with the incessant fire kept up during the night, were unable to withstand the impetuosity of the attack; their ammunition, both for artillery and musquetry, began to fail, and gen. Wacquant retreated in good order to the church-yard. This post, gained at so dear a rate, was again taken from him, after several attacks sustained in conjunction with lieutenant-gen. Hiller; the place was alternately taken and lost, till at length the superiority of our fire obliged the enemy to abandon the house, and a last assault of Hiller's corps prevented all further attempts.—From the moment of the retaking of Aspern it became possible to oppose an offensive movement to the enemy advancing upon the centre, and to operate upon his left flank and communication. The defence of Aspern was therefore left entirely to Hiller's corps, and while count Bellegarde appuied his right wing on Aspern, he formed his left and the centre in the direction of Esslingen, in such a manner that, by degrees, he gained the right flank of the enemy, compelled him to retreat, and, by the complete effect of the artillery, brought to bear upon the left wing, which commanded the whole space from Aspern to Esslingen, gave him a most severe defeat.

Corps of lieutenant-general the prince of Hohenzollern.

The dawn of morning was with this corps also the signal for the renewal of the gigantic conflict. The enemy's infantry was drawn up in large divisions, and be-

tween it the whole of the heavy cavalry was formed in masses. The general of cavalry, prince Lichtenstein, on observing this order of battle, perceived the necessity of keeping up a close communication with the infantry placed near him: he therefore drew up his right wing en echiquier behind the corps of infantry, but kept his left wing together, with reserves posted in the rear.—A prodigious quantity of artillery covered the front of the enemy, who seemed desirous to annihilate our corps by the murderous fire of cannon and howitzers. Upwards of two hundred pieces of cannon were engaged on both sides, and the oldest soldiers never recollect to have witnessed so tremendous a fire.—Vain was every effort to shake the intrepidity of the Austrian troops. Napoleon rode through his ranks, and according to the report of the prisoners, made them acquainted with the destruction of his bridge, but added, that he had himself ordered it to be broken down, because in this case there was no alternative, but victory or death. Soon afterwards the whole of the enemy's line put itself in motion, and the cavalry made its principal attack on the point where the corps of cavalry of prince Lichtenstein communicated with the left wing of lieutenant-gen. the prince of Hohenzollern. The engagement now became general; the regiments of Rohan, D'Aspre, Joseph Colloredo and Stain, repulsed all the attacks of the enemy. The generals were every where at the head of their troops, and inspired them with courage and perseverance. The Archduke himself seized the colours of Zach's, and the battalion, which had already begun to give way, followed with new enthusiasm his heroic example. Most of those who surrounded him were wounded; his adj.-gen. count Colloredo, received a ball in his head, the wound from which was at first considered dangerous; a squeeze of the hand signified to him the concern of his sympathizing commander, who, filled with contempt of death, now fought for glory and for his country.—The attacks of our impenetrable corps, both with the sabre and the bayonet, so rapidly repeated and so impetuous, as to be unparalleled in military annals, frustrated all the intentions of the enemy.—He was beaten at all points, and astonished at such undaunted intrepidity, he was obliged to abandon the field of battle.—About this time lieutenant-gen. the prince of Hohenzollern observed on his left wing, near Esslingen, a chasm, which had been

formed during the heat of the engagement, and afforded an advantageous point of attack. Frelich's regiment, commanded by col. Mecserry, was ordered thither in three corps, and repulsed four regiments of cavalry, accompanied with infantry and artillery. The corps remained in the position which they had taken, till the grenadiers of the reserve, which the Archduke had ordered forward from Brientelee, arrived to relieve the battalions exhausted with the sanguinary conflict, and continued the attack upon the centre of the enemy's position. Lieut.-gen. D'Aspre penetrated with the four battalions of grenadiers of Przezinsky, Puteany, Scovaux, and Scharlach, without firing a shot, to the enemy's cannon, where he was flanked by such a destructive fire from Esslingen, that nothing but the presence of the Archduke, who hastened to the spot, could have induced his grenadiers to maintain their ground. Captain count Dombasse had already reached the enemy's battery, when he was wounded by two balls, and quitted the field.—About noon the Archduke ordered a new assault upon Esslingen, which was immediately undertaken by field-marshal-lieut. D'Aspre with the grenadier battalions of Kirchenbetter and Scovaux on the left, and Scharlach and Georgy in front. Five times did these gallant troops rush up to the very walls of the houses, burning internally and placed in a state of defence; some of the grenadiers thrust their bayonets into the enemy's loop-holes; but all their efforts were fruitless, for their antagonists fought the fight of despair.—The Archduke ordered the grenadiers to take up their former position, and when they afterwards volunteered to renew the assault, he would not permit them, as the enemy was then in full retreat.

Corps of field-marshal lieutenant prince Rosenberg.

Both divisions of this corps, which in advancing to the engagement, had composed the fourth and fifth columns, were formed before break of day for a new attack, for which the enemy likewise made preparation on his side, but with a manifest superiority in numbers.—Prince Rosenberg resolved to attack the village of Esslingen with the Archduke Charles's regiment of infantry, to push forward his other troops in battalions, and in particular to go and meet the enemy, who was advancing in the open country between

Esslingen and the nearest arm of the Danube.—The village was already gained, and battalions advancing on the left, obliged the enemy, drawn up in several lines, to yield. The most violent cannonade was kept up incessantly on both sides, and it was sustained by the troops with the greatest fortitude.—Favoured by a fog which suddenly came on, the enemy's heavy cavalry ventured to attack on all sides the corps formed by Sztarray's and Hiller's regiments of infantry. These brave fellows received him with fixed bayonets, and at the last moment poured in their fire with such effect, that the enemy was compelled to betake himself to flight with considerable loss. Five times were these attacks on Sztarray's and Hiller's regiments repeated, and each time were they repelled with equal courage and resolution. The cavalry contributed all that lay in their power to the pursuit of the enemy and the support of the infantry.—Coburg's, the Archduke Louis's, and Czartorisky's regiments, belonging to the division of lieut.-gen. Dedovich, stationed on the right, renewed the exertions of the preceding day with the same distinction and the same success. After this severe conflict, the enemy seemed to have no inclination to expose himself to any fresh disaster, and confined himself merely to the operation of his superior artillery.—About eleven A. M. prince Rosenberg received orders from the Archduke, Commander in Chief, to make a new attack upon Esslingen, and a message to the same effect was sent to lieut.-gen. Dedovich, who commanded the right division of this corps.—Prince Rosenberg immediately formed two columns of attack under the conduct of lieutenant-generals princes Hohenloe and Rohan, while lieutenant-general Dedovich advanced against the citadel of the place, and the magazine surrounded with walls and ditches.—The attack was made with redoubled bravery, and our troops rushed with irresistible impetuosity into the village. Still, however, they found it impossible to maintain this post, into which the enemy kept continually throwing new reinforcements, which was of the utmost importance for covering his retreat, which he had already resolved upon, and which he defended with an immense sacrifice of lives. Prince Rosenberg therefore resolved to confine himself to the obstinate maintenance of his own position, to secure the left flank of the army, and to encrease the embarrass-

ment of the enemy by an incessant fire from all the batteries.—In the night between the 22d and 23d the enemy accomplished his retreat to the Lobau, and at three in the morning his rear-guard also had evacuated Esslingen and all the points which he had occupied on the left bank of the Danube. Some divisions pursued him closely, and took possession as near as possible of the necessary posts of observation.—Thus terminated a conflict of two days, which will be ever memorable in the annals of the world, and in the history of war. It was the most obstinate and bloody that has occurred since the commencement of the French Revolution.—It was decisive for the glory of the Austrian arms, for the preservation of the monarchy, and for the correction of the public opinion.—The infantry has entered upon a new and brilliant career, and by the firm confidence it has manifested in its own energies, has paved the way to new victories. The enemy's cavalry has seen its acquired but hitherto untried glory dissipated by the masses of our battalions, whose cool intrepidity it was unable to endure.—Cavalry and artillery have surpassed themselves in valour, and in the space of two days have performed achievements sufficient for a whole campaign.—Three pieces of cannon, seven ammunition waggons, 17,000 French muskets, and about 3,000 cuirasses fell into the hands of the conqueror. The loss on both sides was very great: this, and the circumstance that very few prisoners were taken by either party, proves the determination of the combatants either to conquer or die.—The Austrian army laments the death of 87 superior officers, and 4,199 subalterns and privates.—Lieutenant-generals prince Rohan, Dedovich, Weber, and Frenel, gen. Winzingerode, Grill, Neustadter, Siegenthal, Colloredo, May Hohenfeld, and Buresch, 663 officers, and 15,651 subalterns and privates, were wounded. Of these, field marshal lieutenant Weber, 8 officers and 129 men, were taken prisoners by the enemy.—The loss of the enemy was prodigious, and exceeds all expectation. It can only be accounted for by the effect of our concentric fire on an exceedingly confined field of battle, where all the batteries crossed one another, and calculated by the following authentic data.—Generals Lasnes, D'Espagne, St. Hilaire, and Albuquerque, are dead; Massena, Bessieres, Molitor, Boudet, Legrand, Lasalle, and the two brothers Legrange,

wounded; Durosnel and Foulér taken.—Upwards of 7,000 men, and an immense number of horses were buried on the field of battle; 5,000 and some hundred wounded lie in our hospitals. In Vienna and the suburbs there are at present 29,773 wounded; many were carried to St. Polten, Enns, and as far as Lintz; 2,300 were taken. Several hundreds of corpses floated down the Danube, and are still daily thrown upon its shores; many met their death in the island of Lobau, and since the water has fallen in the smaller arms of the river, innumerable bodies, thus consigned by their comrades to everlasting oblivion, have become visible. The burying of the sufferers is not yet over, and a pestilential air is wafted down the theatre of death.—His imperial highness, the Generalissimo, has indeed undertaken the duty so dear to his heart, of acquainting the monarch and the country with the names of those who took the most active share in the achievements of these glorious days; but he acknowledges with profound emotion, that, amidst the rivalry of the highest military virtues, it is scarcely possible to distinguish the most valiant, and declares all the soldiers of Aspern worthy of public gratitude.—His imperial highness considers the intelligent dispositions of the chief of his staff, gen. baron Wimpffen, and his incessant exertions, as the foundation of the victory.—The officers commanding corps have rendered themselves deserving of the highest favours by uncommon devotedness, personal bravery, warm attachment to their sovereign, and their high sense of honour.—Their names will be transmitted to posterity with the achievements of the valiant troops who were under their direction. Col. Smola, of the artillery, by his indefatigable activity in the proper application of the ordnance, and his well-known bravery, rendered the most important services.—The commanding officers of corps and columns have furnished a list of the generals, staff, and superior officers, who particularly distinguished themselves.

Lieut. gen. count Klenau, who exhibited fresh proofs of his well known valour, both in the reconnoissance of the 20th, and in the engagements of both days, bestows particular commendations on the conduct of col. Trapp of the staff, of col. Hardegg of Schwarzenberg's hussars, of major Scheibler of Rosenberg's light horse, of lieutenant-col. Lutz and lieutenant Laghetty and Manz of the first battalion of jagers.—Lieut.

gen. baron d'Aspre, at the head of his brave grenadiers, whom he led with the most determined intrepidity into fire, deems lieutenant-col. Bissingen and majors Puteany, Kirchenbetter and Winiawsky, worthy of particular commendation. Sub-lieutenant count Rezewusky distinguished himself in a manner that does him the highest honour. This young man was captain in the Austrian militia, and being afraid at the commencement of the war that he should be obliged to remain with his battalion in the interior, he endeavoured to procure his removal to a regiment of light horse; and as there was no vacancy, he entered as cadet and volunteer into Kienmayer's hussars, in which he was soon promoted to a sub-lieutenancy.—On the attack of the grenadiers he voluntarily accompanied lieutenant-gen. D'Aspre into the thickest of the fire; and when the field-marshal's horse was shot under him, he sprang from his, and presented it to him with these words—"You want him more than I." He then joined on foot in the assault made by the grenadiers, till a wound which he received put an end to his exertions. As a reward for such extraordinary zeal, his imperial highness has appointed sub-lieutenant count Rezewusky captain in the hussars.—Many individual traits of heroism are not yet known, and consequently cannot be recorded. Thus corporal Prager of Zettivitz's, took prisoner one of the enemy's chefs d'escadron before the mass of his battalion. Corporals Donner and Horner, and the privates Pressich, Herma, and Schmerha, of the battalion of prince Kinsky's legion, were cut off by a fire of musketry from their corps, and surrounded by the enemy's cavalry, they fought their way through, and rejoined their battalion.—The Oberjager Fickerberger and the Unterjager Schaffer of the second battalion of jagers, penetrated into the French emperor's guard, and seized one of the enemy's captains in the midst of his ranks. The private Larda, of duke Albert's cuirassiers, retook a six-pounder which had fallen into the enemy's hands, and brought it back with its equipage. Serjeant Pap, of Chasteler's, snatched the colours of his battalion, from the hands of the dying first lieutenant. Cazan, who had himself taken it from the ensign who had been killed, and headed his troop with the most exemplary intrepidity. Among the artillery there are few but what highly distinguished themselves by deeds of the most daring

and contempt of every danger.—But a grateful country will not fail to hold in honourable remembrance the departed heroes who found death in the arms of victory. In this number those particularly worthy of mention are, col. de Fiennes, of Bellegarde's—major Danzer, of O'Reiley's—major Gerdech, of Froom's—capt. Charles Kaiser and Konovsky, of Rosenberg's—capt. Surgeant, of Reuss Greyz's—first lieutenant. Cazan, of Chasteler's—and lieutenant. Zakazill, of the artillery, who displayed the most extraordinary proofs of valour, and with his dying breath recommended his widow to the paternal care of his majesty.

BATTLE OF TALAVERA.—*From the London Gazette Extraordinary, Tuesday, Aug. 15, 1809.*

Downing-street, Aug. 15, 1809.—Dispatches, of which the following are Copies and Extracts, were this day received at the office of lord viscount Castlereagh, one of his majesty's principal Secretaries of State, from lieutenant-gen. the right hon. sir Arthur Wellesley, k. b., dated Talavera, 29th July, 1809.

Talavera de la Reyna, July 29, 1809.

My Lord; General Cuesta followed the enemy's march with his army from the Alberche on the morning of the 24th as far as Santa Olalla, and pushed forward his advanced guard as far as Torrijos. For the reasons stated to your lordship in my dispatch of the 24th, I moved only two divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry across the Alberche to Casalegos, under the command of lieutenant-gen. Sherbrooke, with a view to keep up the communication between gen. Cuesta and me, and with sir R. Wilson's corps at Escalona. It appears that gen. Vanegas had not carried into execution that part of the plan of operations which related to his corps, and that he was still at Daniel, in La Mancha; and the enemy in the course of the 24th, 25th and 26th, collected all his forces in this part of Spain, between Torrijos and Toledo, leaving but a small corps of 2,000 men in that place.—His united army thus consisted of the corps of marshal Victor, of that of gen. Sebastiani, and of 7 or 8,000 men, the guards of Joseph Buonaparté, and the garrison of Madrid, and it was commanded by Joseph Buonaparté, aided by marshals Jourdan and Victor, and gen. Sebastiani.—On the 26th gen. Cuesta's advanced guard was attacked near Torrijos, and

obliged to fall back, and the general retired with his army on that day to the left bank of the Alberche, gen. Sherbrooke continuing at Casalegos, and the enemy at Santa Olalla. It was then obvious, that the enemy intended to try the result of a general action, for which the best position appeared to be in the neighbourhood of Talavera, and gen. Cuesta having consented to take up this position on the morning of the 27th, I ordered gen. Sherbrooke to retire with his corps to its station in the line, leaving gen. McKenzie with a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, as an advanced post in the wood on the right of Alberche, which covered our left flank. The position taken up by the troops at Talavera extended rather more than two miles; the ground was open upon the left, where the British army was stationed, and it was commanded by a height, on which was in echelon and in second line a division of infantry under the orders of major-gen. Hill. There was a valley between this height, and a range of mountains still further upon the left, which valley was not at first occupied, as it was commanded by the height before mentioned; and the range of mountains appeared too distant to have any influence upon the expected action. The right, consisting of Spanish troops, extended immediately in front of the town of Talavera down to the Tagus. This part of the ground was covered by olive trees, and much intersected by banks and ditches. The high road leading from the bridge over the Alberche, was defended by a heavy battery in front of a church, which was occupied by Spanish infantry. All the avenues to the town were defended in a similar manner; the town was occupied, and the remainder of the Spanish infantry was formed into two lines behind the banks, on the roads which led from the town and the right, to the left of our position.—In the centre, between the two armies, there was a commanding spot of ground, on which we had commenced to construct a redoubt, with some open ground in its rear. Brig.-gen. Alexander Campbell was posted at this spot with a division of infantry, supported in his rear by gen. Cotton's brigade of dragoons, and some Spanish cavalry.—At about two o'clock on the 27th, the enemy appeared in strength on the left bank of the Alberche, and manifested an intention to attack gen. Mackenzie's division. The attack was made before they could be withdrawn; but the troops, consisting of gen. Mac-

kenzie's and col. Donkin's brigades, and gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry, and supported by gen. Payne with the other four regiments of cavalry, in the plain between Talavera and the wood, withdrew in good order, but with some loss, particularly by the 2d battalion 87th regiment, and 2d battalion 31st regiment, in the wood.—Upon this occasion, the steadiness and discipline of the 45th regiment, and the 5th battalion 60th regiment, were conspicuous, and I had particular reasons for being satisfied with the manner in which major-gen. Mackenzie withdrew his advanced guard. As the day advanced, the enemy appeared in larger numbers on the right of the Alberche, and it was obvious that he was advancing to a general attack on the combined army.—General Mackenzie continued to fall back gradually upon the left of the position of the combined armies, where he was placed in the second line, in the rear of the Guards, col. Donkin being placed in the same situation further upon the left, in the rear of the King's German Legion.

The enemy immediately commenced his attack in the dusk of the evening by a cannonade upon the left of our position; and by an attempt, with his cavalry, to overthrow the Spanish infantry posted, as I have before stated, on the right. This attempt failed entirely. Early in the night he pushed a division along the valley, on the left of the height occupied by gen. Hill, of which he gained a momentary possession, but major-gen. Hill attacked it instantly with the bayonet, and regained it.—This attack was repeated in the night, but failed, and again at day-light in the morning of the 28th, by two divisions of infantry, and was repulsed by major-gen. Hill. Major-gen. Hill has reported to me in a particular manner the conduct of the 29th regiment, and of the 1st battalion 48th regiment in these different affairs, as well as that of major-gen. Tilson and brig.-gen. Stewart.—We have lost many brave officers and soldiers in the defence of this important point in our position; among others I cannot avoid to mention brig.-major Fordyce, and brig.-major Gardner; and major-gen. Hill was himself wounded, but, I am happy to say, but slightly. The defeat of this attempt was followed about noon by a general attack with the enemy's whole force upon the whole of that part of the position occupied by the British army.—In consequence of the repeated attempts upon the height on

our left by the valley, I had placed two brigades of British cavalry in that valley, supported in the rear by the Duc d'Albuquerque's division of Spanish cavalry.—The enemy then placed light infantry in the range of mountains on the left of the valley, which were opposed by a division of Spanish infantry under lieutenant-general De Bassecourt.—The general attack began by the march of several columns of infantry into the valley with a view to attack the height occupied by major-general Hill. These columns were immediately charged by the 1st German light dragoons and 23d dragoons, under the command of general Anson, directed by lieutenant-general Payne, and supported by general Fane's brigade of heavy cavalry; and although the 23d dragoons suffered considerable loss, the charge had the effect of preventing the execution of that part of the enemy's plan. At the same time he directed an attack upon brigadier-general Alex. Campbell's position in the centre of the combined armies, and on the right of the British. This attack was most successfully repulsed by brigadier-general Campbell, supported by the King's regiment of Spanish cavalry, and two battalions of Spanish infantry; and brigadier-general Campbell took the enemy's cannon.—The brigadier-general mentions particularly the conduct of the 97th, the 2d battalion 7th, and of the 2d battalion 53d regiments, and I was highly satisfied with the manner in which this part of the position was defended. An attack was also made at the same time upon lieutenant-general Sherbrooke's division, which was on the left and centre of the 1st line of the British army. This attack was most gallantly repulsed by a charge with bayonets, by the whole division, but the brigade of Guards, which were on the right, having advanced too far, they were exposed on their left flank to the fire of the enemy's battery, and of their retreating columns; and the division was obliged to retire towards the original position, under cover of the 2d line of general Cotton's brigade of cavalry, which I had moved from the centre, and of the 1st battalion 48th regiment. I had moved this regiment from its original position on the heights, as soon as I observed the advance of the Guards; and it was formed in the plain, and advanced upon the enemy, and covered the formation of lieutenant-general Sherbrooke's division. Shortly after the repulse of this general attack, in which apparently all the enemy's troops were employed, he com-

menced his retreat across the Alberche, which was conducted in the most regular order, and was effected during the night, leaving in our hands twenty pieces of cannon, ammunition, tumbrils, and some prisoners.—Your lordship will observe by the inclosed return the great loss which we have sustained of valuable officers and soldiers, in this long and hard-fought action, with more than double our number. That of the enemy has been much greater. I am informed that entire brigades of infantry have been destroyed, and indeed the battalions that retreated were much reduced in numbers. By all accounts their loss is ten thousand men. Generals Lapisse and Morlot are killed; generals Sebastiani and Boulet wounded.—I have particularly to lament the loss of major-general Mackenzie, who had distinguished himself on the 27th; and of brigadier-general Langworth, of the King's German Legion; and of brigade-major Beckett, of the Guards.—Your lordship will observe, that the attacks of the enemy were principally, if not entirely, directed against the British troops. The Spanish Commander in Chief, his officers, and troops, manifested every disposition to render us assistance, and those of them which were engaged did their duty; but the ground which they occupied was so important, and its front at the same time so difficult, that I did not think it proper to urge them to make any movement to the left of the enemy, while he was engaged with us.—I have reason to be satisfied with the conduct of all the officers and troops. I am much indebted to lieutenant-general Sherbrooke for the assistance I received from him, and for the manner in which he led on his division to the charge with bayonets.—To lieutenant-general Payne and the cavalry, particularly general Anson's brigade, to major-generals Hill and Tilson, brigadier-generals Alex. Campbell, Rd. Stewart, and Cameron, and to the divisions and brigades of infantry under their commands respectively, particularly the 29th regiment, commanded by colonel White; the 1st battalion 48th, commanded by colonel Donnellan, afterwards when that officer was wounded, by major Middlemore; the 2d battalion 7th, commanded by lieutenant-colonel sir Wm. Myers; the 2d battalion 53d, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Bingham; the 97th, commanded by colonel Lyon; the 1st battalion of detachments, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Bunbury, and the 2d battalion 31st, commanded by major Watson, and

of the 45th, commanded by lieutenant-col. Guard, and 5th battalion 60th, commanded by major Davy, on the 27th.—The advance of the brigade of Guards was most gallantly conducted by brigadier-gen. Campbell, and when necessary, that brigadier retired, and formed again in the best order. The artillery, under brigadier-gen. Howorth, was also, throughout these days, of the greatest service, and I had every reason to be satisfied with the assistance I received from the chief engineer lieutenant-col. Fletcher, the adj.-gen., brigadier-gen. the hon. C. Stewart, and the quarter-master-gen. col. Murray, and the officer of those departments respectively, and from col. Bathurst and the officers of my personal staff. I also received much assistance from col. O'Lawlor, of the Spanish service, and from brigadier-gen. Whittingham, who was wounded when bringing up the two Spanish battalions to the assistance of brigadier-gen. Alex. Campbell.—I send this by capt. lord Fitzroy Somerset, who will give your lordship any further information, and whom I beg leave to recommend. I have the honour to be, &c. ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Return of the Numbers of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the Command of lieutenant-gen. sir A. Wellesley, k. b., in action with the French army, commanded by Joseph Buonaparté in person, in front of the town of Talavera de la Reyna, on the 27th of July 1809.

General Staff; 1 officer killed.—14th Light Dragoons; 1 rank and file wounded.—1st Light Dragoons King's German Legion; 2 rank and file killed; 1 officer, 1 rank and file wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—Royal British Artillery; 2 rank and file wounded.—Royal Engineers; 1 officer wounded.—1st Bat. Coldstream Guards; 1 officer killed; 1 officer, 2 rank and file wounded.—2d Bat. 24th Foot; 1 rank and file killed; 6 rank and file wounded; 5 rank and file missing.—1st Bat. 29th Foot; 10 rank and file killed; 1 officer, 42 rank and file wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—2d Bat. 31st Foot; 1 officer, 1 serj., 22 rank and file killed; 4 officers, 3 serj., 85 rank and file wounded; 2 rank and file missing.—1st Bat. 45th Foot; 4 rank and file killed; 1 officer, 13 rank and file wounded; 7 rank and file missing.—1st Bat. 48th Foot; 8 rank and file wounded.—2d Bat. 48th Foot; 3 rank and file wounded.—5th Bat. 60th Foot; 3 rank and file killed; 1 officer, 4 rank and file wounded; 1 dmr., 18 rank and file missing.—1st Bat. 61st Foot; 3 rank and file killed; 1 officer, 3 rank and file wounded.—2d Bat. 87th Foot; 1 officer, 26 rank and file killed; 10 Officers, 3 serjeants, 124 rank and file wounded;

1 serjeant, 83 rank and file missing.—1st Batt. 88th Foot; 2 officers, 7 rank and file killed; 25 rank and file wounded; 30 rank and file missing.—1st Batt. Detachments; 1 officer, 1 serjeant, 13 rank and file killed; 2 serjeants, 38 rank and file wounded; 3 officers, 13 rank and file missing.—1st Line Batt. King's German Legion; 2 rank and file killed; 7 rank and file wounded.—1st and 2d Light Batts, and file wounded.—1st and 2d Light Batts, ditto; 4 rank and file killed; 2 officers, 2 serjeants, 23 rank and file wounded; 5 rank and file missing.—2d Line Batt. ditto; 3 rank and file wounded.—5th ditto, ditto; 6 rank and file killed; 2 serjeants, 32 rank and file wounded; 11 rank and file missing.—7th ditto, ditto; 19 rank and file killed; 1 officer, 5 serjs. 1 dmr. 43 rank and file wounded; 1 dmr. 76 rank and file missing.

Total—7 officers, 2 serjs. 122 rank and file killed; 24 officers, 17 serjs. 1 dmr. 465 rank and file wounded; 3 officers, 1 serj. 2 dmrs. 202 rank and file missing.

Names of the Officers killed, wounded, and missing, of the Army under the command of lieutenant-gen. sir A. Wellesley, k. b. in action with the French Army, commanded by Joseph Buonaparté in person, in front of the town of Talavera de la Reyna, on the 27th July, 1809.

Killed.—General Staff; capt. Fordyce, 81st reg. deputy adj. gen.—Coldstream Guards; lieutenant-col. Ross.—2d Batt. 31st Foot; capt. Lodge.—1st Batt. 88th Foot; lieuts. Graydon and M'Carthy.—1st Batt. Detachments; lieutenant M'Dougal, 91st reg.—2d Batt. 87th Foot; Eusign La Serre.

Wounded.—1st Lt. Drags. King's German Legion; lieutenant Heimbruck, severely in the arm.—Royal Engineers; capt. Boothby, severely in the thigh.—1st Batt. Coldstream Guards; capt. and adj. Bryan, severely.—20th Foot; lieutenant Popham, severely.—2d Batt. 31st Foot; capt. Coleman, lieutenant Geo. Beamish, severely; ensigns Gamble and Sorden, slightly.—1st Batt. 45th Foot; lieutenant-col. Guard, severely.—5th Batt. 60th Foot; capt. Wolf, severely.—1st Batt. 61st Foot; major Coghlan, ditto.—2d Batt. 87th Foot; capt. Macrea, severely; capt. Sommersall, slightly; lieutenant Kavanagh, ditto; lieuts. Bagnall, Kingston, Johnson, and Carroll, severely; ensign Moore, slightly; ensigns Knox and Butler, severely.—Rifle Corps, King's German Legion; captain During, slightly; lieutenant Holle, severely.—7th Line King's German Legion, adj. Delius, severely.

Missing.—1st Batt. Detachments; captain Poole, 53d Foot; capt. Walsh, 91st Foot; and lieutenant Cameron, 70th Foot.

Return of the numbers, killed, wounded, and missing, of the Army under the command of lieutenant-gen. sir A. Wellesley, k. b. in action with the French Army, commanded by Joseph Buonaparté in person, at Talavera de la Reyna, on the 28th July, 1809.

General Staff; 4 officers killed; 9 officers

wounded.—3d Drag. Guards; 1 officer, 1 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—4th Dragoons; 3 rank and file killed; 2 serjs. 7 rank and file wounded.—14th Lt. Dragoons; 3 rank and file killed; 6 officers, 6 rank and file, wounded.—16th Lt. Dragoons; 6 rank and file killed; 1 officer, 5 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file missing.—23d Lt. Dragoons; 2 officers, 3 serjs. 44 rank and file, killed; 4 officers, 2 serjs. 1 dmr. 43 rank and file, wounded; 3 officers, 7 serjs. 2 dmrs. 96 rank and file missing.—1st Lt. Dragoons King's German Legion; 1 dmr. killed; 2 officers, 1 serj. 2 dmrs. 29 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file, missing.—Royal British Artillery, 1 officer, 7 rank and file, killed; 3 officers, 21 rank and file wounded.—Royal German Artillery; 1 serj. 2 rank and file killed; 3 serjs. 27 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—Royal Engineers; 1 officer wounded.—Royal Staff Corps; 2 officers wounded.—1st Batt. Coldstream Guards; 1 officer, 33 rank and file, killed; 8 officers, 11 serjs. 1 dmr. 239 rank and file, wounded.—1st Batt. 3d Guards; 5 officers, 4 serjs. 45 rank and file, killed; 6 officers, 11 serjs. 1 dmr. 249 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—3d Foot, or Buffs; 1 serj. 25 rank and file, killed; 2 officers, 5 serjs. 102 rank and file wounded; 7 rank and file missing.—2d Batt. 7th Foot; 1 officer, 6 rank and file killed; 3 officers, 1 serj. 2 dmrs. 51 rank and file wounded; 1 rank and file, missing.—2d Batt. 24th Foot; 2 serjs. 42 rank and file, killed; 10 officers, 13 serjs. 255 rank and file, wounded; 21 rank and file, missing.—1st Batt. 29th Foot; 1 serj. 25 rank and file, killed; 6 officers, 98 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file missing.—2d Batt. 31st Foot; 1 serjeant, 20 rank and file, killed; 3 officers, 5 serj., 97 rank and file, wounded; 5 rank and file missing.—1st Batt. 40th Foot; 7 rank and file killed; 1 officer, 2 serj. 47 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—1st Batt. 45th Foot; 9 rank and file killed; 2 officers, 4 serj. 130 rank and file wounded; 1 officer, 1 serj. 1 dmr. 10 rank and file missing.—1st Batt. 48th Foot; 22 rank and file killed; 10 officers, 3 serj. 132 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—2d Batt. 48th Foot; 1 serj., 11 rank and file killed; 2 officers, 3 serj., 50 rank and file wounded; 1 officer missing.—2d Batt. 53d Foot; 6 rank and file killed; 2 officers, 1 serj. 29 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—5th Batt. 60th Foot; 1 dmr., 6 rank and file, killed; 6 officers, 1 serj., 24 rank and file, wounded; 2 serj., 10 rank and file, missing.—1st Batt. 61st Foot; 3 officers, 1 dmr. 42 rank and file, killed; 10 officers, 10 serj. 183 rank and file, wounded; 16 rank and file missing.—2d Batt. 66th Foot; 1 serj. 15 rank and file, killed; 11 officers, 5 serj. 83 rank and file, wounded; 1 serj. 10 rank and file, missing.—2d Batt. 83d Foot; 4 officers, 1 serj., 37 rank and file, killed; 11 officers, 11 serjeants, 2 dmrs., 189 rank and file, wounded; 28 rank and file missing.—2d Batt. 87th Foot; 1 serj., 8 rank and

file, killed; 3 officers, 3 serj. 40 rank and file, wounded; 5 rank and file, missing.—1st Batt. 88th Foot; 1 officer, 1 serj. 11 rank and file, killed; 3 officers, 60 rank and file, wounded.—1st Batt. 97th Foot; 6 rank and file killed; 25 rank and file, wounded; 1 officer, 21 rank and file, missing.—1st Batt. Detachments; 26 rank and file killed; 9 officers, 6 serj. 1 dmr., 159 rank and file, wounded; 1 dmr., 1 rank and file missing.—2d Batt. Detachments; 7 rank and file, killed; 13 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—1st Line Batt. King's German Legion; 2 officers, 1 serj. 36 rank and file, killed; 10 officers, 13 serj., 1 dmr., 227 rank and file, wounded; 1 rank and file missing.—1st and 2d Light Batt. ditto; 6 rank and file killed; 3 serj. 34 rank and file, wounded.—2d Line Batt. ditto; 4 serj. 57 rank and file, killed; 14 officers, 14 serj. 3 dmrs. 271 rank and file, wounded; 24 rank and file missing.—5th ditto, ditto; 3 officers, 1 serj. 1 dmr., 25 rank and file killed; 6 officers, 8 serj., 1 dmr., 109 rank and file, wounded; 1 dmr., 100 rank and file, missing.—7th ditto, ditto; 2 serj., 15 rank and file, killed; 4 officers, 7 serj. 28 rank and file, wounded; 3 serj., 2 dmrs., 49 rank and file, missing.

Total; 27 officers, 26 serjeants, 4 dmrs., 613 rank and file, killed; 171 officers, 148 serj. 15 dmrs., 3072 rank and file, wounded; 6 officers, 14 serj., 7 dmrs., 418 rank and file missing.

Return of Ordnance, &c. taken in the Battle of the 28th July.

4 eight-pounders, 4 six ditto, 1 four ditto, 1 six-inch howitzer, 2 tumbrils, complete in ammunition; taken by brigadier-general A. Campbell's brigade.—6 pieces of ordnance, 1 six-inch howitzer; left by the enemy, and found in the woods.—1 standard, taken by the 29th regiment; 1 ditto, destroyed by ditto.—3 standards, taken by the King's German Legion.

CHARLES STEWART, Brig.-Gen. Adj.-Gen.

Names of the Officers killed, wounded, and missing of the Army under the command of Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley, k. b. in the Action with the French Army, commanded by Joseph Buonaparte in person, at Talavera de la Reyna, on the 28th July, 1809.

Killed.—General Staff; major gen. Mackenzie and brigadier gen. Langworth.—Coldstream Guards; capt. Becket, brigade major to brigade of Guards.—43d Foot; capt. Gardner, brigade major to brigadier gen. Stewart.—23d Light Dragoons; lieuts. King and Powell.—1st Batt. Coldstream Guards; ensign Parker.—Royal Artillery; lieut. Wyatt.—1st Batt. 3d Guards; capt. Walker, Buchanan, Dalrymple; ensign Ram; adj. Irby.—2d Batt. 7th Foot; lieut. Beaufoy.—1st Batt. 61st Foot; major F. Orpen; capt. H. James; lieut. Dan. Haimes.—2d Batt. 83d Foot; lieut. colonel Gordon; lieuts. Dahman, Montgomery, Flood.—1st Batt. 88th Foot; capt. Blake.—1st Light Batt. King's German Legion; capt. Versalle, capt. Henry Hodenberg.

Wounded.—Major gen. Hill, slightly; bri-

gadier gen. A. Campbell, slightly; ditto H. Campbell, severely, but not dangerously.—13th Light Dragoons; capt. Whittingham, deputy-assistant quarter-master general, slightly.—91st Regiment; capt. Blair, brigade major to general Cameron, severely.—Coldstream Guards; capt. Bouverie, aid-de-camp to sir A. Wellesley, slightly.—92d Foot; Ulysses Burgh, ditto, ditto.—1st Bat. Line, King's German Legion; capt. Zerssen, aid-de-camp to gen. Langwerth, severely.—Sicily Regiment; capt. Craig, aid-de-camp to gen. Sherbrooke, slightly.—3d Dragoon Guards; capt. Bryce, severely.—14th Light Dragoons; col. Hawker, slightly; capt. Chapman and Hawker, severely; lieutenant Ellis, ditto; lieuts. Wainman and Smith, slightly.—16th ditto; lieutenant Bence, slightly.—23d ditto; capt. Howard and Frankland, severely; lord W. Russell, slightly; cornet Dodville, ditto.—1st Light Dragoons, King's German Legion; lieutenant. Potem; severely; cornet Teuts, slightly.—Royal Engineers; lieutenant Stanway, slightly.—Royal Brit. Artillery; lieutenant. col. Framlingham, slightly; capt. Taylor and Baynes, ditto.—Royal Staff Corps; capt. Todd, slightly; lieutenant. Shancham, ditto.—1st Bat. Coldstream Guards; lieutenant. col. Stibbert, and sir W. Sheridan, severely, but not dangerously; capt. Millman and Christie, ditto; capt. Collier and Wood, slightly; capt. Jenkinson, severely; ensign Sandilands, ditto, but not dangerously.—1st Bat. 3d Guards; lieutenant. col. Gordon, slightly; major Fotheringham, ditto; capt. Geils, ditto; ensigns Acheson, Towers, and Scott, ditto.—1st Bat. 3d Foot, or Buffs; lieutenant. col. Muter, severely, since dead; major Drummond, brevet lieutenant. col. slightly.—2d Bat. 7th Foot; lieuts. Kerwan and Muter, severely; adj. Page, slightly.—2d Bat. 24th Foot; lieutenant. col. Drummond, severely; major Popham, ditto; capt. Collis, ditto; capt. Evans, ditto, since dead; lieutenant. Vardy, slightly; ensigns Grant, Skene, and Johnson, severely.—2d Bat. 24th Foot; ensign Jessamin, severely; adj. Topp, slightly.—29th Foot; capt. Gaundlett, severely; lieuts. Stanns, Leslie, Stanhope, ditto; lieutenant. Nicholson, slightly; capt. Newbolt, ditto.—2d Bat. 31st Foot; capt. Nicholls, slightly; lieutenant. Tirdleston, slightly; lieutenant. A. Beamish, severely.—1st Bat. 40th Foot; capt. Colquhoun, slightly.—1st Bat. 45th Foot; major Gwyn, slightly; lieutenant. Cole, ditto.—1st Bat. 48th Foot; lieutenant. col. Donellan, severely; brevet major Marston, slightly; capt. Wood and French, ditto; lieuts. Drought, Page, and Cheslyn, severely; lieuts. Giles and Cuthbertson, slightly; ensign Vandermeulen, severely.—2d Battalion 48th Foot; lieutenant Johnson, slightly; ensign Kenny, severely.—2d Bat. 53d Foot; major Kingscote, slightly; capt. Stowell, ditto. 5th Batt. 60th Foot; capt. Garliff, b. major, slightly; capt. Andrew, ditto; lieuts. Zulke, Ritter, and Mitchell, severely; ensign Altenstein, ditto.—1st Batt. 61st Foot; capt. Furnasse, Laing, Goodsman, and Hartley, slightly; lieuts. McLean and Tench, ditto; lieutenant. Collins, severely; lieutenant. Gwan, slightly; ensign

Brackenbush, ditto; adj. Drewe, severely.—2d Batt. 66th Foot; capt. Kelly, slightly; capt. Stuart, severely; capt. Adams, brevet lieutenant. col. ditto; lieuts. Morris, Dudgeon, Humbly and Steel, severely; lieutenant. Shewbridge, slightly; lieutenant. Morgan, severely; ensign Cotter, ditto; ensign Macarthy, slightly.—2d Batt. 83d Foot; capt. Sommerfeld, slightly; capt. Reynolds, leg amputated; lieutenant. Nicholson, severely; lieuts. Baldwin and Johnson, slightly; lieutenant. Abell, severely; lieutenant. Pyne, slightly; ensigns Buggie and Carey, severely; ensign Letoller, slightly; adj. Braham, ditto.—2d Batt. 87th Foot; major Gough, severely; lieutenant. Rogers, slightly; ensign Pepper, ditto.—88th Foot; capt. Brown, severely; lieutenant. Whittle, ditto; ensign White-law, ditto.—1st Batt. Detachments; major Ross, 38th regt. severely; capt. M'Pherson, 35th ditto, ditto; capt. Bradley, 28th ditto, slightly; capt. Chancellor, 38th ditto, ditto; lieutenant. Gilbert, 28th ditto, severely; lieutenant. M'Beth, 42d ditto, ditto; lieutenant. Fullerton, 38th ditto, slightly; lieutenant. Munroe, 42d ditto, ditto; lieutenant. Brown, 43d ditto, ditto.—1st Batt. Line, King's German Legion; major Bodeker, severely; capt. Marshal, ditto; capt. Saffe, slightly; capt. Petersdorf, ditto; lieuts. Gorbien, senior, Ernest Hohenberg, and Fred. Hohenberg, severely; lieuts. Saffe, and Schluter, senior, slightly; ensign Allen, ditto.—2d Line Batt. King's German Legion; lieutenant. col. Brauns, severely; major Bellaville, slightly; capt. Bergman, severely; captain Heldrith, slightly; capt. Shamhorst, severely.—2d Line Batt. King's German Legion; lieuts. Beuerman, Winkstern, Wessell, Woek, Halle, severely; ensign Tinch, slightly; ensigns Schmidt, Billeb, Blumenhagen, severely.—5th Batt. Line King's German Legion; capt. Hamelberg, severely; capt. Gerber, slightly; lieuts. Linsingen and During, severely; ensign Brandes, slightly; ensign Kohler, severely.—1st Batt. King's German Legion; major Berger, slightly; lieutenant. Volgee, ditto; lieutenant. Freytag, severely; ensign Offen, ditto.—23d Dragoons; capt. Allen and Drake, wounded and missing; lieutenant. Anderson, ditto.—45th Foot; capt. Leckey, brigade major, missing.—48th Foot, 2d Batt.; ensign Reeves, missing.—97th Foot; lieutenant. Shipley, ditto.

Return of the Numbers of killed, wounded, and missing, of the Army under the command of Lieut. Gen. sir A. Wellesley, k. b. in action with the French Army, commanded by Joseph Buonaparté, on the 27th and 28th of July, 1809:

27th July.—Killed; 7 officers, 2 serjts., 124 rank and file.—Wounded; 24 officers, 17 serjts., 1 dmr., 465 rank and file.—Missing; 3 officers, 1 serjt., 2 dmrs., 202 rank and file.

28th July, 1809.—Killed; 27 officers, 26 serjts., 4 dmrs., 613 rank and file.—Wounded; 171 officers, 148 serjts., 15 dmrs., 3072 rank and file.—Missing; 6 officers, 14 serjts., 7 dmrs., 418 rank and file.

Total.—Killed; 5 gen. staff, 2 lieut. cols., 1 major, 7 caps., 15 lieuts., 3 cornets or ensigns, 1 adj., 28 serjs., 4 dmrs., 735 rank and file.—Wounded; 9 general staff, 10 lieut. cols., 12 majors, 53 caps., 71 lieuts., 34 cornets or ensigns, 6 adjts., 165 serjs., 16 dmrs., 3537 rank and file.—Missing; 5 caps., 3 lieuts., 1 cornet or ensign, 15 serjs., 9 dmrs., 620 rank and file.—Total 5367.

Return of Horses killed, wounded, and missing, on the 27th of July, 1809.

14th Light Dragoons; 9 killed, 2 missing.—23rd ditto; 3 wounded.—1st ditto, King's German Legion; 7 killed, 6 wounded.—Total, 16 killed, 9 wounded, 2 missing.

Return of Horses killed, wounded, and missing, on the 28th of July, 1809.

3rd Dragoon Guards; 2 killed; 4 wounded, 8 missing.—4th ditto; 9 killed, 4 wounded.—14th Lt. Dragoons; 21 killed; 3 wounded, 13 missing.—16th ditto; 21 killed, 2 wounded, 2 missing.—23rd ditto; 70 killed, 25 wounded, 129 missing.—1st ditto, King's German Legion; 32 killed, 27 wounded, 5 missing.—Royal Artillery; 40 killed.—Total, 195 killed, 65 wounded, 157 missing.

Return of the Horses killed, wounded, and missing, on the 27th and 28th of July, 1809.

27th July.—16 killed, 9 wounded, 2 missing, 28th July.—195 killed, 65 wounded, 157 missing.—General Total, 211 killed, 74 wounded, 159 missing.

Extract of a Letter, from Lieut. Gen. Sir A. Wellesley, k. b. to Lord Viscount Castlereagh, dated Talavera, Aug. 1, 1809.

Since I had the honour of addressing you on the 29th July, the enemy have continued to keep a rear-guard of about 10,000 men, on the heights on the left of the Alberche.—The extreme fatigue of the troops, the want of provisions, and the numbers wounded to be taken care of, have prevented me from moving from my position.—Brigadier-Gen. Craufurd arrived with his brigade on the 29th in the morning, having marched twelve Spanish leagues in little more than 24 hours.

Extract of a Letter, from Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. Wellesley to Lord Visc. Castlereagh, dated Talavera, Aug. 1, 1809.

When I addressed you this morning, I had not received the report from the outposts. It appears that the enemy withdrew the rear-guard, which was posted on the heights on the left of the Alberche last night at 11 o'clock, and the whole army marched toward St. Olalla; I conclude with an intention of taking up a

position in the neighbourhood of Guadarama.

EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND.—*From the London Gazette Extraordinary, Monday August 7, 1809.*

Downing street, August 7, 1809.—Dispatches, of which the following are copies, were last night received at the Office of lord viscount Castlereagh, one of his majesty's principal Secretaries of State, from lieut. gen. the earl of Chatham, dated Middleburgh, 2d and 3d Aug. 1809.

Head quarters, Middleburgh; 2d August, 1809.

My lord; I have the honour of acquainting your lordship, that having sailed from the Downs early in the morning of the 28th ult. with rear-admiral sir Rd. Strachan, in his majesty's ship Venerable, we arrived the same evening, and anchored in East Capelle Roads, and were joined on the following morning by the division of the army under lieut. gen. sir John Hope. It blew in the course of that day a fresh gale from the Westward, which created a heavy swell, and the small craft being much exposed, it was determined to seek shelter for them in the anchorage of the Room Pot, where lieut. gen. sir John Hope's division was also directed to proceed, in order to possess such points as might be necessary to secure the anchorage; as well as with a view to future operations up the East Scheldt.—The left wing of the army, under lieut. gen. sir Eyre Coote, particularly destined for the operation against Walcheren, arrived on the 29th and morning of the 30th, but the wind continuing to blow fresh from the Westward, and occasioning a great surf on the beach, both on the side of Zoutland, as well as near Domburg, it became expedient, in order to effect a landing, to carry the whole fleet through the narrow and difficult passage into the Vere Gat, hitherto considered impracticable for large ships; which being successfully accomplished, and the necessary preparations for debarkation being completed, I have the satisfaction of acquainting your lordship, that the troops landed on the Bree-Sand, about a mile to the Westward of Fort der Haak, without opposition, when a position was taken up for the night on the sand hills, with East Capelle in front. Lieut. gen. Fraser was detached immediately to the left, against Fort der Haak and Ter Vere, the former of which, on his ap-

proach, was evacuated by the enemy, but the town of Vere, which was strong in its defences, and had a garrison of about six hundred men, held out till yesterday morning, notwithstanding the heavy and well-directed fire of the bomb-vessels and gun-boats during the preceding day, and until the place was closely invested.—Early on the morning of the 31st, a deputation from Middleburgh, from whence the garrison had been withdrawn into Flushing, having arrived in camp, terms of capitulation were agreed upon, copies of which I have the honour herewith to inclose, as well as that of the garrison of Ter Vere; and the divisions of the army, under the orders of lieutenant-general Paget and major-general Graham, moved forward, and took up a position with the right to Maliskirke, the centre at Gryperskirke, and left to St. Laurens.—On the morning of the 1st instant, the troops advanced to the investment of Flushing, which operation was warmly contested by the enemy. In this movement he was driven by major-general Graham's division on the right, from the batteries of the Dykeshook, the Vygeter, and the Nole, while brigadier-general Houston's brigade forced the enemy posted on the road from Middleburgh to retire, with the loss of four guns, and many killed and wounded. Lieutenant-general Paget's division also drove in the posts of the enemy, and took up his position at West Zouberg.—Nothing could exceed the gallantry of the troops throughout the whole of this day, and my warmest praise is due to the several general officers for their judicious disposition in the advance of their respective columns. To lieutenant-general Sir Eyre Coote I feel much indebted for his exertions in this service, and the prompt and able manner in which he has executed my orders. The light troops under brigadier-general Rottenburg have been admirably conducted; and with the officers commanding the several corps engaged I have every reason to be most perfectly satisfied. The 3d battalion of the Royals and flank companies of the 5th regiment, maintained the right under difficult circumstances, with great gallantry, and killed and wounded a great many of the enemy.—Ter Vere being in our possession, lieutenant-general Fraser's division marched in the evening upon Ruttern, detaching a corps for the reduction of Ramakins, which, when effected, will complete the investment of Flushing.—I have to regret the temporary absence of brigadier-general Browne,

who was wounded late in the day, but I trust not to be long deprived of his services.—I have the honour to inclose a return of the killed, wounded, and missing. Deeply as the fall of every British soldier is at all times to be lamented, the loss will not appear to have been great, when the serious impediments it was in the power of the enemy to oppose to our progress are considered, as well as the formidable state of the batteries of Flushing, to which the troops were necessarily exposed.—The pressure of circumstances has prevented the commanding officer of artillery from furnishing a detailed account of the guns and ordnance stores taken in the several batteries, and fortress of Ter Vere, but which will be hereafter transmitted, with the return of the prisoners taken since our landing, supposed to amount to 1,000. Commodore Owen's squadron, with lieutenant-general the marquis of Huntley's division, remains at anchor in the Wieling Passage, and the divisions of lieutenant-general the earl of Rosslyn, and lieutenant-general Grosvenor, are arrived at the anchorage in the Vere Gat.—I cannot conclude without expressing, in the strongest terms, my admiration of the distinguished ability with which the fleet was conducted through the passage into the Vere Gat, nor can the advantages resulting from the success of this operation be too highly estimated, as by it we were not only enabled to effect a disembarkation, which, in the then state of the wind, was impracticable in any other quarter, but also that the enemy, probably relying on the difficulty of the navigation, was less prepared for resistance. I must also warmly acknowledge the great assistance the service has derived from the zealous exertions of the officers of the navy, and of the seamen employed in drawing a considerable proportion of the artillery through a heavy sand, and without whose aid, the advance of the army must necessarily have been suspended, the strength of the tide rendering the landing of the horses for a time extremely difficult. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) CHATHAM.

P. S. Since writing the above letter, I have received intelligence from lieutenant-general Sir J. Hope, that the reserve of the army had effected their landing on South Beveland, and that a detachment had occupied the town of Goes. (Signed) CHATHAM.

ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION entered into for the Surrender of the Town of Mid-

dleburgh, to his Britannic Majesty's Forces, in consequence of a Deputation from the Prefect and Burgomasters for that purpose.

Art. 1. Security to be granted to every person, public functionaries, private persons, citizens, and inhabitants, whatever their political opinions may have been or now are.—Answer. Granted, provided they conduct themselves as peaceable citizens, and conform to such regulations as will be hereafter established by the authority of the British Government.

Art. 2. Protection to all property, without exception whatsoever.—Answer. Granted, as far as relates to private property; all public property to be accounted for to such commissioners as will be named by the general commanding his Britannic majesty's forces.

Art. 3. The armed citizens or other inhabitants who may have taken up arms, or done military duty to maintain public tranquillity, to be protected in their persons and property, and permitted to return to their dwellings.—Answer. Granted, upon condition that their arms are given to such persons as will be duly authorised to receive them.

Art. 4. Public functionaries and their families to be permitted, if they desire it, to return to any other part of the kingdom of Holland.—Art. 5. Inhabitants, who are absent from their houses, to be permitted to return with their property.—Answer. Granted, subject to the restriction specified in the first Article.

Art. 6. The troops to be quartered in barracks.—Answer. This must be determined according to circumstances, but every care will be taken to render the quartering as little burdensome to the inhabitants as possible.

Art. 7.—Should any misunderstanding take place relating to the foregoing Articles, they will be explained in favour of the town and inhabitants.—Answer. Granted.

Art. 8. The above Article to be also extended to all parts of this department, which may not have obtained equally favourable terms.—Answer. This Article to apply in the present instance to the town of Middleburgh alone; but no difficulty will be made to grant the same advantageous terms to any town that will surrender in like manner without opposition.

Additional Article.—All military sick in hospital, to remain where they are at present, and to be taken care of; on reco-

very to be permitted to return to their corps.—Answer. The sick are to be taken care of by their own medical people, but must be considered as prisoners of war.

(Signed) C. G. BEDRERELD.

P. G. SCHORER.

J. M. VANKHOOR.

H. VAN DE MERDENE.

Agreed to by me, conformably to the powers vested in me by lieutenant-general the earl of Chatham, K. G. Commander of his Britannic majesty's forces; (Signed) EYRE COOTE, lieut. gen.—Heights of Bree Sand, 31st day of July, 1809.

PROPOSAL of a CAPITULATION, by the commandant of the Fortress of Vere, to his Excellency lieutenant-general M. Fräser, commanding the besieging army before Vere, and to captain Richardson, the senior Naval Officer on shore.

Art. 1. The garrison of Vere shall be allowed to quit one of the gates of the town with all the honours of war, and ground their arms upon the glacis, and they shall not be allowed to serve against his Britannic majesty or his Allies, until they have been regularly exchanged, and the troops shall be sent to some Dutch place in Holland, at the expense of his majesty. The officers shall keep their swords, horses, and property, and the soldiers their knapsacks.—Answer. Agreed to; excepting that the garrison is to be considered generally as prisoners of war, and shall be disposed of as the British government shall think proper, and as is customary on such occasions.

Art. 2. From this moment, until the evacuation of the fortress, the troops of both armies shall remain in their present position.—Answer. Granted.

Art. 3. All hostilities shall cease from both sides, and no preparation of attack or defence shall be carried on.—Answer. Granted.

Art. 4. All the artillery and stores shall be delivered over by the commissaries appointed from both sides.—Answer. Agreed to, considering that in this Article, the surrender of public property of all description is included.

Art. 5. All the sick and wounded shall be left to the humanity of the general, until their recovery.—Answer. Granted.

Art. 6. The inhabitants of the town of Vere shall continue to enjoy all their privileges, and their particular property shall be respected, and shall, if they choose, be allowed to leave the place. This privi-

lege shall likewise be granted to all the women of the garrison.—Answer.—Granted. (Signed) A. M. FRASER, lieut.-gen. commanding the troops before Vere.—CHA. RICHARDSON, Senior Naval Officer.—(Signed) V. BOGART, Commandant of the garrison of Vere.—(A true Copy.) (Signed) T. CAREY, lieutenant colonel, Mil. Sec.—Vere, Aug. 1, 1809.

Prisoners taken at Ter Vere.—Artillery, 1 lieut. col. 1 captain, 4 lieutenants, 7 sergeants, 9 corporals, 6 fire-workers, 5 artificers, 65 gunners, 1 drummer.—Infantry, 4 captains, 4 first lieutenants, 5 second lieutenants, 4 serjeant-majors, 13 sergeants, 4 fouriers, 10 drummers, 3 pipers, 328 soldiers.—Naval of the French gun-brig Gawlen, 1 captain, 1 master, 17 sailors, 1 boy; 1 serjeant, 1 corporal, 13 privates (serving as marines.) Total, 519. (A true Copy.) T. CAREY, lieut. col. Military Sec.

Return of the Rank and Names of Officers, and of the number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Rank and File, killed, wounded, and missing, in the Island of Walcheren, from the time of landing on the evening of the 30th July, to the 1st of August inclusive.

Middleburgh, 2d August, 1809.

Royal Artillery, 3 rank and file wounded.—3d batt. 1st foot, 1 lieut., 1 drummer, 6 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 1 lieut., 6 sergeants, 75 rank and file, wounded; 6 rank and file missing.—1st batt. 5th foot, 4 rank and file killed; 3 sergeants, 16 rank and file, wounded; 10 rank and file, missing.—1st batt. 26th foot, return not received; supposed to have none.—1st batt. 32nd foot, 1 serjeant, 1 rank and file, killed; 2 sergeants, 5 rank and file, wounded.—2d batt. 35th foot, 4 rank and file killed; 2 captains, 14 rank and file, wounded; 11 rank and file missing.—51st foot, 1 rank and file killed; 1 rank and file wounded.—68th foot, 1 drummer, 10 rank and file, killed; 1 capt. 2 lieutenants, 24 rank and file, wounded.—1st batt. 71st foot, return not received; supposed to have about 25 killed and wounded.—2d batt. 81st foot, 2 rank and file killed; 1 rank and file wounded.—2d batt. 82d foot, 11 rank and file, killed; 2 lieutenants, 2 sergeants, 1 drummer, 21 rank and file wounded.—85th foot, 1 serjeant, 2 rank and file killed; 1 lieutenant, 2 sergeants, 1 drummer, 19 rank and file, wounded; 7 rank and file missing.—95th foot, 5 rank and file wounded.—Embodied detachments, return not

received.—Staff 26th foot, 1 captain wounded.—40th foot, 1 brigadier-general ditto.—62d foot, 1 captain ditto.—Total 1 officer, 2 sergeants, 2 drummers, 41 rank and file, killed; 13 officers, 15 sergeants, 1 drummer, 184 rank and file, wounded; 34 rank and file missing.

Names of Officers killed and wounded.—Killed, 3d batt. 1st foot, lieut. D. M'Lean.—Wounded, 3d batt. 1st foot, capt. John Wilson, lieut. Jackson, and volunteer J. P. Drury, slightly.—2d batt. 35th foot, capt. Tisdell, slightly; capt. Frederic, dangerously.—68th foot, the names of the three officers wounded, not specified in the return.—2d batt. 82d foot: lieut. Reed, slightly; lieut. Pratt, dangerously.—85th foot: The name of the officer wounded, not mentioned in the return.—Staff 26th foot, capt. Fotheringham, deputy assistant adj.-general, slightly.—40th foot, brig.-gen. Browne, slightly.—62d foot; capt. Browne, aid-de camp to brigadier-gen. Houston, slightly.

ROBERT LONG, Col. Adj. Gen.

Middleburgh, 3d August 1809.

My lord: Since my letter of yesterday's date, I have received intelligence from lieut.-gen. sir John Hope, of his having occupied Bathz, and taken possession of the whole island of South Beveland:—I have also the satisfaction to acquaint your lordship, that upon the batteries being prepared to open, the fortress of Ramakins surrendered this evening, and I have the honour to inclose the Articles of Capitulation. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) CHATHAM.

To the lord visc. Castlereagh, &c. &c.

TERMS OF CAPITULATION of the Fortress of Ramakins, 3d August, 1809.

Art. 1. The garrison surrenders prisoners of war, with every thing that belongs to the fortress, whether ammunition, cannon, or government stores, belonging to the French and Dutch, of every sort and kind.—Art. 2. The garrison will lay down their arms this moment; and are to be disposed of as the British government chooses, and as has been the custom of war.—Art. 3. The officers will be allowed to keep their swords, and will, with their soldiers, be permitted to keep their private baggage.—(Signed) ALEX. M. FRASER, lieut.-gen. commanding his Britannic majesty's troops before Ramakins.—WOUNIER, Captain-Commandant. — (A true copy) T. CAREY, lieut.-col. Mil. Sec. *Strength of the Garrison*—2 captains, 1

lieutenant, 4 sergeants, 7 corporals, 2 drummers, 111 privates.—Total 127.

Admiralty Office, August 7, 1809.—Lieut. James Duncan, commanding his Majesty's hired cutter the *Idas*, arrived yesterday evening at this office, with dispatches from sir R. J. Strachan, bart. and k. b. rear-admiral of the white, &c. addressed to the hon. Wm. Wellesley Pole, of which the following are copies:

Venerable, off the Vere Gat,
August 4, 1809.

Sir;—You have been already acquainted that I had hoisted my flag in the *Amethyst*, and that it was my intention to have preceded the Expedition, in company with the *Venerable*, on board which ship lord Chatham had embarked; but finding the public service might suffer from the commanders in chief being separated, I therefore shifted to the *Venerable*, and sailed from the Downs at day-light on the 28th ult.—I have now to acquaint you, for their lordships' information, of my arrival on the evening of that day in the Stone Deep, with the *Amethyst* and several smaller vessels, where I was joined by the *Fisgard*, capt. Bolton, who had with great judgment placed vessels on the various shoals off this coast. After dark, lieut. Groves, of this ship, with some skilful pilots, in Deal boats, were dispatched to sound the Roompot Channel, and to station vessels at its entrance.—Early next morning, the 29th, the division of lieut. gen. sir John Hope, conducted by capt. Bathurst, in the *Salsette*, joined me, as did also rear-adm. sir R. Keats, in the *Superb*. This zealous officer had the command of the blockading squadron off the entrance of the Scheldt, but observing the armament pass, he, with his usual promptitude, left that squadron under the orders of lord Gardner, and resumed the charge of sir John Hope's division; I therefore directed the rear-admiral to shift his flag to the *Salsette*, and to proceed to the Roompot.—The entrance to that channel is very narrow, and as I was aware of sir Home Popham's local knowledge of the insular navigation before me, I entrusted to that officer the service of leading sir R. Keats's division in, and which he did with great skill in the *Sabrina*, capt. Kittoe; the whole were anchored in safety opposite Zeerickzee, situated between the islands of Schowen and North Beveland.—That afternoon rear-adm. Otway, with the left wing of the army, under sir Eyre Coote, joined me in the Stone

Deep, but it blew too fresh to have any communication.—On the morning of the 30th, sir Home Popham returned with a letter from sir R. Keats, acquainting me, that the division under his charge were all safely anchored; and I was likewise informed, that there was sufficient space in the Roompot to contain all the ships, to which anchorage sir H. Popham undertook to conduct them; and as it blew fresh, with all the appearance of an approaching gale, the squadron was instantly got under sail, and led in by the *Venerable*, when they all came to in safety off the Vere Gat.—As soon as the ships were secured, measures were instantly taken to prepare to land the army on the island of Walcheren. I did not wait for the gun-boats coming up, but ordered those who happened to be near the *Venerable*, together with the mortar brigs, to push inshore to cover the landing, and to force the Derhaak Battery.—At half past four the boats put off under the direction of lord A. Beauclerc, of the Royal Oak, and capt. Cockburn, of the *Belleisle*, and the troops were landed in excellent order, without opposition; the firing from the mortar and gun-vessels having driven the enemy completely from the Derhaak Battery.—Having thus accomplished this first object, I lost no time in directing the bombs and gun-vessels to proceed up the Vere Gat, off Camvere, and having given sir H. Popham, who, at the request of lord Chatham, had remained on shore with his lordship, permission to employ them as the service might require, he, the next morning, began to cannonade Camvere, which had been summoned, but held out. The fire of the gun-boats was exceedingly well directed, and did much damage to the town.—The officers and crews engaged in that service, had a great claim to my admiration for their conduct. Three of our gun-boats were sunk. In the afternoon it blew fresh, and, as the strength of the tide prevented the bombs from acting, I directed the flotilla to fall back, preserving a menacing position.—At night, capt. Richardson, of the *Cæsar*, who was in the dyke on shore, threw some rockets at the nearest battery of Camvere, and soon after, the commanding officer of the town sent out an offer to surrender. A copy of the terms acceded to by lieut. gen. Fraser, and capt. Richardson, the senior naval officer on the spot, accompanies this letter. [See the dispatches from lieut. gen. the earl of Chatham.] The army

under sir J. Hope landed at South Beveland on the 1st of this month, and, by a letter from sir R. Keats, of yesterday's date, I find the whole of the island is in our possession; the enemy's ships are all above Lillo, and those most advanced, as high up as Antwerp.—We are getting our flotilla through the Slough into the Western Scheldt, to prevent succours being thrown into Flushing by the canal of Ghent.—When the Ramakins Battery is taken, we hope to pass the lighter vessels to the Western Scheldt, for the purpose of following up the other objects of the expedition.—I cannot conclude this letter without acknowledging the assistance I have received from rear-adm. Otway; and how much I approve of the arrangement he made for landing the division under sir Eyre Coote, which was carried into effect by lord A. Beauchamp, and capt. Cockburn, with much skill and activity. Sir R. Keats, in the execution of the arduous duties he has had to perform, has shewn his accustomed zeal and judgment.—The captains, officers, and crews of his majesty's ships are indefatigable in the execution of their respective duties, and I have much pleasure in adding, that there is a most perfect co-operation of the army and navy.

I have, &c. R. J. STRACHAN.

P. S. I send this by lieut. Duncan, whose cutter, the *Idas*, was close in-shore, and covered the landing.

Venerable, off the *Vere Gat*,
5th August, 1809.

Sir—It is with great satisfaction that I am enabled to inclose, for their lordships' information, a copy of the capitulation of the fort of Ramakins, [See the dispatches from lieut. general the earl of Chatham] which surrendered to his majesty's forces, under lieut. gen. Fraser, yesterday afternoon.—The possession of this post is of great importance to our further operations in the West Scheldt, as it will enable me, without molestation, to advance the whole of the flotilla, together with the *Camilla* and *Pallas*, by the Slough, and which I trust will effectually prevent any succours being thrown into Flushing, either from Cadsand, or by the Ghent Channel.—I have also the honour of forwarding copies of sir R. Keats' accounts of his proceedings in South Beveland, by which their lordships will perceive that the operations of the combined force under the Rear-Admiral and sir John Hope have been very

successful, and that the important post of Bathz has been evacuated by the enemy.—I came here to forward this dispatch to England, and shall leave the command of this division with rear-admiral Otway, and return to the flotilla, which, I conclude, is now investing Flushing.—It is my intention to hoist my flag in one of the small vessels in the Slough, that I may be near the head-quarters of lord Chatham, and to conduct the various services in the West Scheldt. I am, &c.

(Signed) R. J. STRACHAN.

Honourable W. W. Pole.

Sabrina, off South Beveland,

August 1, 1809.

Sir—I have the satisfaction to inform you, that sir John Hope and 7,000 of his division of the army were landed on South Beveland this afternoon, since which I have been informed by message from him, that he was met on his approach towards Goes, by the Magistrates, into which place he is at liberty to enter whenever he pleases. Three of the enemy's ships of the line, and six brigs, are at anchor off the east end of South Beveland, the others I conclude have moved higher up the Scheldt.—Three of the four sloops I brought up with me struck in coming up. I have hoisted my flag in the *Sabrina*, and am not without hopes of getting the remaining parts of the division on shore, and most part of the army supplied to-morrow. I have, &c.

(Signed) R. G. KEATS.

Half-past seven, p. m.—The substance of this letter was sent by telegraphic communication, from the *Sabrina*, at five o'clock. The six brigs are getting under sail, and moving up the Scheldt, apparently, but the ships of the line are still fast.

Sabrina, off Wemeldinge,

August 3, 1809.

Soon after I landed I was informed by letter from sir John Hope, that Bathz had been evacuated in the night; and as he informed me the communication was open between Walcheren and this Island, and he had sent to lord Chatham an account of the evacuation, I concluded you would hear it from hence, and went on to Bathz with a view to make observations, and from which I am this moment returned.

R. G. KEATS.

Rear-Admiral Sir R. J. Strachan,
Bart. &c. &c. &c.

as to what is called a Revolution principle, my opinion was this; that whenever those evils, which usually attend and follow a violent change of Government, were not in probability so pernicious as the grievance we suffer under a present power, then the public good will justify such a Revolution."

SWIFT.

257]

[258

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

BATTLE OF TALAVERA.—From the tenor of Sir Arthur Wellesley's dispatch published last week, it was very easy to foresee, that, when the French account of the Battle came to be published, a doubt, at least, would be excited with respect to the party to whom the victory was due. The French account has now appeared under the heads of Talavera and of Paris, and is as follow: "*Talavera, July 29.*—The English army which was in Portugal under general Wellesley, after having joined the insurgents under Cuesta, had marched against the first corps, hoping, with triple numbers, to beat it, and effect its junction with the troops under Venegas.—Already had the English flattered themselves with getting to Madrid; but the events that have passed during the three days that have elapsed, have a good deal deranged the plan of the campaign. His majesty, after the affair of the 28th, continued to pursue the enemy, who arrived on the fine position of Talavera, and intrenched themselves. His dispositions announced an intention of maintaining himself to the last extremity; yet, after having been vigorously attacked by the French army, having lost a part of his infantry and a whole regiment of cavalry, he abandoned his position. In these circumstances the French have proved, as they have always done, that, whatever be the position and number of their enemies, they can overcome all obstacles. The English and insurgents sustained great loss: ours is inconsiderable.—General Latour Maubourg's division entered Talavera this morning.—*Paris, Aug. 9.*—We have letters from Santa Ollala, of the 29th ult. at ten p. m. which mention the new victory gained over the English, Portuguese, and insurgents. The loss of the English is enormous. We took 800 infantry prisoners, and a whole regiment of cavalry. This regiment was

"taken by one of ours which opened its ranks to receive the charge, and then cut off their retreat. The rest of the English column, which constituted the whole force of the enemy, is in full retreat."—The Morning Chronicle, which, for reasons best known to itself, is become apparently an ardent admirer of the Wellesleys, says of this French account, "Paris papers contain a most curious account of the battle of Talavera, which we have introduced into our columns for the amusement of our readers." Now, for my part, I must confess, that this extract from the Paris papers does appear to me to afford very little of what is generally called amusement; that is to say, to those who feel a strong desire, that our claim to the victory may be established.—It is true, that the French account may be false; nay, it is pretty certain, that, in some respects, it must be false. The Paris account and that of Talavera seem, also, to clash with one another. But, the worst of it is, that in the most material point of all, the French account agrees with that of Sir Arthur Wellesley, as nearly as was to be expected. I allude to the account of the prisoners made by the French; or rather, those which the French call *prisoners*, and which we call *missing*. The French say that they have taken 800 prisoners, and Sir Arthur Wellesley tells us, that there were in his army, 653 missing, together with 159 horses.—There is something in this account of Sir Arthur Wellesley, which I extremely dislike. He tells us, that he has taken "*some prisoners*;" but, he does not tell us how many; though he certainly had it in his power to give us information of the exact number; and, which is singular enough, while he omits to give us an account of what was within the reach of his own knowledge, he is very particular in giving an account of what he could know, only from rumour. He tells us that the loss of the enemy has been much greater than his own loss; that he is informed, that ene

ture brigades of infantry have been destroyed; that, by all accounts, the enemy has lost ten thousand men; and adds, in positive terms, that generals Lapisse and Morlot are killed, and that generals Sebastiani and Boulet are wounded. Now, it does appear very strange to me, that he should be able to speak so much in detail upon these matters, while he was unable, or, if not unable, unwilling, to give us any account at all of either the rank or number of prisoners whom he had taken from the enemy.—I also greatly dislike the word *missing*, as used in this dispatch, unless it had been accompanied with some explanation as to what was become of the persons missing. If, indeed, our army had been obliged to flee, after, or during the battle, then men might become missing from various accidents; or, they might desert, and so become missing. But in the present instance, Sir Arthur Wellesley kept possession of the field of battle; and, therefore, had it completely in his power to verify how many of the enemy he killed; while it was impossible that any of his people could be *lost*, except from *death* or *desertion*; that is to say, unless they were taken *prisoners*. It appears to me, therefore, that, under such circumstances, it is rather unjust to the parties missing, not to accompany the statement with a proper explanation. Amongst the missing, there are five *captains*, three lieutenants, and one cornet; and, ought it not to be stated, that these gentlemen are, in all probability, prisoners with the enemy? The word *missing*, thus used without any explanation, seems to convey an idea, that the Commander does not know what is become of the persons so described; which is hardly fair, especially when we consider, that the persons thus missing, have, in all likelihood, become prisoners from their having been more adventurous, that is to say, more brave than the generality of the army.—The French, as it was very easy to foresee they would, give us the *superiority of numbers*. They assert indeed, that we had triple their numbers. This I do not believe; but, we must allow either that we had *double* their numbers, or that the accounts published in England, previous to the news of the battle, respecting the force of Cuesta and of Sir Arthur Wellesley, were shamefully false.—Be this as it may, the world will never be persuaded, that the united force of the Spaniards and the English was not superior to that of the French. This is

what the world will never believe, though we were to fire the Park and Tower guns till there was not a single cartridge left in the kingdom. And, though I am fully persuaded, and the public is fully persuaded, that the whole of the hostility of the French was directed against the English in this battle; yet, we must allow, either that the Spaniards ought to be considered as part of the force opposed to the French that day, or that there is no reliance to be placed upon the Spaniards; and, of course, that we are fighting in a cause, as we often have been before, in which no one but ourselves feels any interest. To one of these propositions we must assent, and I much question, whether Buonaparté cares a straw which of them we chuse.—Respecting an event of so doubtful a nature in itself, and the consequences of which were far from being promising, our government might surely have been less hasty to speak in a tone of exultation. There is nothing more injurious to any cause than premature boasting. Would it not have been as well to suspend the firing of guns and the making of illuminations, until we could have ascertained what had become of the 653 officers and men of our army, who were missing, and until we had received an account of the rank and number of those whom we had made prisoners?—Nevertheless, the hireling prints inform us, that Sir Arthur Wellesley is, on account of this *victory*, to be made a peer! I wonder what the Spaniards, what the French, what all other nations will say, if this should be the case?—As to the consequences of this battle, I am of opinion that they cannot be favourable even to the further operations of our army, which, as far as one can judge from information so very imperfect as that which we have recently received from Spain and Portugal, appears to be in a very ticklish situation; and, as to the general cause of Spanish independence, what do we want more to convince us of the state in which that is, than this one plain, undeniable, and undeniable fact, that, for nine months past, about one *tenth part* of the French army has been stationed in the peninsula, and that the "*universal Spanish nation*," united with the universal Portuguese nation, and both assisted by a British army commanded by an officer, who, the Morning Chronicle says, is "entitled to rank in the first order of British *heroes*," and, even unto this day, the

said tenth part of the French army remains in the heart of Spain, and even in the capital of that kingdom? What more do we want to convince us that the cause of Spanish independence is not in a state to warrant any of those expectations which the editors of the hiring prints would have us entertain? In the eyes of these wretches, it is not only to be ignorant; it is to be criminal, to doubt of the truth of any of those assertions, respecting the fair prospects in Spain, which assertions have, in the end, invariably proved to be false. With them, not to believe every exaggerated statement, either in our own favour or against our enemy, is to be the friend of that enemy; for any one to anticipate disaster is to wish it, and to doubt the existence of success is to mourn its reality. The wretches, who conduct these prints, seem to sigh for nothing so much as for grounds of accusation against a part of the people; and, when they communicate to their readers an account of any success on the part of our army, our fleet, or on the part of our allies, they are sure not to forget to mention, amongst its consequences, *the mortification of the factious at home*, which epithet, *factious*, they apply to every man, who wishes for a reform of any abuse, or the reduction of any public expence. Now, this class of persons is very numerous; it is notoriously very numerous; and, if these publications have any sense in them, it is this, that a very considerable part of the people of England are mortified, when they hear of the reverses of Napoleon, and pleased when they hear of his success. That this is abominably false we know; but, if it were possible so to change the people as to make it true, those who write in the afore-mentioned prints would certainly produce that change. The *insolence*, which they never fail to discover, when they communicate any thing which has a tendency to create a belief that Napoleon will finally be overthrown; the *insolence*, which, *upon such occasions*, they discover; the intolerance; the persecuting doctrines they preach; all these are calculated to produce the worst possible effect; to imbitter the minds of the people; to implant in their hearts a feeling of resentment too deeply rooted to be removed even by common calamity; and, indeed, to make them think nothing of any calamity, when compared with the ground of that resentment. And these, too, are the wretches, who, when the ague-fit is on them, talk of

unanimity; as if a nation were to be rendered unanimous by representing five sixths of them as traitors in their hearts! —I know, that the answer of these vipers is, that those, whom they so represent, are "*a mere handful of jacobins*." Are they, then, jacobins? And, was it a *handful* that was seen, the other day, assembled in the City of London and in Middlesex? Was this a "*handful*?" Insolent, and empty wretches, was this a *handful*? —I do hope, however, that these infamous endeavours to divide the people will be attended with no consequence other than that of the disgrace of those who make use of them; and, that, in our resentments, no one will be so unjust, or so foolish, as to confound the cause of these wretches with the cause of his country. —For my own part, I am resolved, that nothing shall induce me to suppress my opinions of any actual event of the war, or of any event that I anticipate; and I am also resolved, that, in speaking of the actions and character of Napoleon, I will take no liberties that I am not allowed to take with any persons in this country; and, indeed, how dare I, seeing that, if peace were to come, I might be prosecuted for such liberties, though taken many years before. There is, perhaps, no state in which you can possibly exist so humiliating to you as that, which freely permits you to assault a person for certain alledged offences to-day, and which punishes you for the same assault to-morrow, a change having taken place in nothing but in the connection between the person assaulted and your rulers. It is precisely the life of a dog, let loose to-day upon him, for only barking at whom the poor cur would have been whipped but yesterday. This dog's life I will not live. I will say nothing of Buonaparté in time of war that I dare not repeat in time of peace; but, if I live to see that time, I will not fail to remind the hirelings of what they now are saying of him. I can remember when these same hirelings found him full of all manner of good qualities; aye, and I can remember, when they abused Spain for hesitating to give up to us a part of her territories, which Buonaparté, without the consent of Spain, had given to us. I can remember when these hirelings abused Spain for this; and, yet, they now abuse Buonaparté, because he is interfering in the affairs of Spain! We complain of the MONITEUR; we affect to believe nothing that it says; but there is nothing in the Moniteur a millionth part

so base as is the conduct of *our* hiring prints. The *Moniteur*, notwithstanding what it might have done, has really done nothing worth speaking of in the way of exposure of certain acts and persons in this country. It has passed all over in silence, or in saying but very little indeed. This is, too, no weak proof of the security which Napoleon feels himself to possess in the hearts of his people. He does not stand in need of any attacks upon other rulers. He is not afraid, that his people will sigh for any change; or, at least, he is so confident of his power over them, as to be under none of those apprehensions, with which our hirelings choose to represent him as being continually haunted.

THE EXPEDITION (for that is the name it is known by) has, at last, taken *Flushing*, and made its garrison prisoners of war.

—As its further movements must so very soon be known, it would be useless to offer thereon any conjectures; but, one may venture to assert, without waiting for any further particulars, that, if *more*, and a great deal more, be not done, this Armada will be the laughing stock of the world.

—The dispatches, giving an account of what has hitherto been done, are *very long* and *very insipid*. More than two thirds of the matter consists of *praises* and *compliments*, without it being possible for any one to discover an adequate cause. Why, what has been *done*? What is it that all this talk is about? What *occasions* have there been for drawing forth all this wonderful stock of merit? In the taking of a place like Flushing, with such an immense force, except by *storm*, it appears next to impossible that there can be any ground for the bestowing of high praise on many persons. To the Engineer, who constructed the batteries, and to a small number of persons engaged in resisting the sallies, some particular mention may be due; but, we have here as long a list of praises as might have been expected after a battle like that of Blenheim, and, indeed, a much longer list than did actually accompany the account of that battle. The naval dispatches, upon this occasion, are of the same character. "Much a-do about nothing." *Every* body who is named, is praised. The thing, by being so common, becomes little worth. It is like the firing of the Park and Tower Guns, and the illuminations at Whitehall and the Gaming-Houses. Surely, it is no such great thing for any of our admirals or captains to perform this or that branch

of service with ability and zeal? To swell out dispatches with praises in such a strain is not calculated to add to the reputation of the navy, whose officers never, except upon occasions where their merit appears in a very conspicuous light, ought to be the object of particular praise; because to praise them for trifles is to check, instead of encouraging emulation. In such a service a man ought to feel that to be *any thing* at all, he must be *greatly* meritorious; but, according to the new system, there are degrees of praise to suit all sizes of zeal, talents, and courage; so that if a man has but *moderation* in his views of fame, he need never despair of being satisfied. But, the worst of it is, this moderation is not at all calculated to produce that sort of deeds, which support the reputation of the service and the renown of the country, and which, by those means, tend to the preservation of the country's independence. —There is some talk of an intention to keep *possession* of the island of Walcheren, and to retain it at the peace. When we speak of *peace* it is like speaking of posterity; but, whether in war or in peace, I cannot think it possible long to hold this island. The garrison must be very numerous; the *provisions* must be sent from England; the *fuel* to cook them must be sent from England; and, I think it not unlikely, that no small part of the *water*, for certain purposes, at least, must be sent from England. The permanent possession of the island would, therefore, be attended with an enormous expence, and that, too, without a probability, as far as I can see, of producing any proportionate good effect. It would, perhaps, prevent the port of Antwerp from sending forth ships of war against us; but Napoleon has so many other ports, that this would be no great injury to him, and could not much retard his naval projects, unless, indeed, we were able to block up closely all his other ports. All that he wants to do, at present, is to *build ships* and get them *fit for sea*. He may build a fleet of a hundred sail of the line in the Scheldt, in spite of our possession of Walcheren, or of the whole of Zealand. The hemp grows in abundance in the North of France and in the whole of Belgium. Oak and other timber, of all sorts, is to be had in plenty upon the banks of the Scheldt, as well as upon those of the Meuse and the Rhine. The countries which these rivers run through are covered with forests of hard wood; and, from the mountains of the

Vosges and of the Schwartzwald, the foot of which is washed by the Rhine, there are pines as good, perhaps, as any in Norway. Hence will come the pitch and tar also; and, in short, without receiving a single article by sea, Buonaparté may build in the Scheldt, and at a comparatively trifling expence, a number of ships of war equal to that of the English fleet. Indeed, the fact of his having actually built *thirteen ships of the line*, in the port of Antwerp, while we most firmly believed, that he had not the means of building a ship of the line any where, and while our immense naval force was employed in blockading his ports, and cutting off his commercial communications; this fact alone ought to be sufficient to convince us, that the naval resources of the Scheldt are very great.—The possession, therefore, of Walcheren by us will not prevent Napoleon from building ships, from building a navy, in the Scheldt; and, unless we could be certain of being able to *keep* the island, the possession can be only of temporary use; for, the moment we give it up, or are driven from it, that moment out comes a French fleet.—Some say, that Walcheren is accessible by means of the ice. If so, it cannot be tenable against a power like that of Buonaparté. But, this point ought to have been *ascertained*, before any expensive attempt had been made upon it; for, if it be accessible by means of the ice, it may probably be in the hands of the enemy before next Christmas, and that, too, with great loss on our part. In short, if the possession of it be at all dependant upon the frost, it would be greatly criminal in any minister to leave a garrison in it at any time later than the month of November.—I dare say, that the public in general have been much surprized to find, that there were thirteen new ships of the line in the Scheldt, not dreaming that there were so many in all Napoleon's dominions, and not having, three times in their lives, heard the *port* of Antwerp mentioned. There are not a few other things existing, of which the people of England hear nothing; but, of which they *will* hear by-and-by.—At the peace of Amiens, I, assisted by a gentleman who was more conversant in the affairs of the continent, foretold what this port of Antwerp would become, if left in the hands of the French. The prediction was treated as a dream; but, it has been realized; the "dream is out," as the old women

say; and, a most fearful dream it is. It does, in short, with other circumstances, render it next to impossible, that the battle for the independence of England should not be *finally fought upon English ground*. To this, after all our endeavours to avoid it; after all our attempts to disguise the fact even from ourselves, it is evident that we must come at last. In this view of the war, every proof of the valour of our army is greatly valuable to us; and, as far as the army has had opportunities of shewing its excellence, it has, I believe, shewn it upon this occasion.

LORD GAMBIER.—The news-papers state, that "the enemy's fleets and squadrons this side of Gibraltar, *being either destroyed or rendered useless*, LORD GAMBIER and Sir John Thomas DUCKWORTH have arrived in town; their ships not being now kept in an efficient state for sea, their crews have been put into smaller vessels." So! So! What, then, the enemies' fleets were all destroyed in *Basque Roads*, I suppose? I have heard of no destruction of his fleets since the destruction caused by LORD COCHRANE and his gallant crew.—The view, with which the above quoted paragraph has been published, is plain enough. There is scarcely any one so dull-eyed as not to see the bottom of. But, it will not, and must not, succeed.—The COURT-MARTIAL at Portsmouth must not be passed over in that silence, in which some persons are so anxious to see it buried. The *Evidence* there given (that most curious Evidence!) requires to be laid before the public in a shape more clear and less expensive and cumbrous than it now is. This task I shall endeavour to perform in the course of two or three Numbers.

AUSTRIA.—The public cannot but have observed the high-flown praises, which the hireling prints have constantly bestowed upon the ARCHDUKE CHARLES, as often as the Austrians have been at war with France. These very prints, the *SUN*, the *COURIER*, the *MORNING POST*, and others, are now attacking this same Archduke, with the utmost virulence of language. Upon this subject the STATESMAN news-paper asks: "Are the people of England prepared to acquiesce in that degradation—that destruction of character, which is now manifestly meditated against this illustrious Commander, on whose individual talents and exertions we were, but a few short weeks ago, taught to believe the fate of Europe rested?" Why,

no: I do not believe, that the *people* of England are prepared for this; but, if the Archduke Charles advises peace with France; if he prefers saving a remnant of power for his family, rather than expose the last stake to certain destruction for the sake of favouring the views of the ministers of England, we may be sure, that there are some persons, who are prepared for this, and, if within their power, for a great deal more.— Oh! monstrous! To accuse this Archduke of folly, of imbecility, and almost of treason, when, only a few weeks ago, he was almost a God in their eyes, and when it cannot be forgotten, that he was a subject of praise even in the last *Speech from the throne*! “By presuming,” says the Morning Chronicle, “that he desires “peace with France, sufficient is known “for the principle which regulates the “praise or censure of these sagacious politicians. They take it for granted that “*all foreigners ought to join with us in supporting our interests*, and to consider the “interests of their own countries only as “*secondary objects*. He who is *for us* has “a title to their unqualified praise; but “the moment any one ceases to act as “*we would have him*, be the cause what it “may—good or bad—no matter, he must “be an object of unqualified abuse.”— This is very true. It has been their invariable practice. Every foreign prince, or individual, no matter what his rank or character, becomes an object of abuse the moment his conduct is such as these hirelings deem hostile to *our* interests. They really seem to think, that all the world is made to be subservient to our interests, or imaginary interests; or rather, to the politics of the English ministry.— Why, have not the Austrians ventured enough? What would we have more of them? What would we have the Archduke or any other man do with such an army as he has described in his Orders, issued after the battle of Wagram? An army that he accuses of every species of unsoldierlike and *cowardly* conduct?— Yet, the hireling prints, are now endeavouring to persuade the public, that this same army is capable of effecting the “*deliverance of Europe*.” Was ever infatuation equal to that which can induce a people to listen to such gross attempts at deception!—That these hirelings speak from any *authority*, upon this occasion, is scarcely credible; and yet, what should have given them their cue? What

should have made them, all at once, open, full cry, upon the poor Archduke? They must have had something like certain information, that he is *in favour of peace with Napoleon*. That, we may be assured, they firmly *believe*, at any rate; and, in all probability, the fact is so.

PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.—Below, the reader will find a Letter from Mr. WORTHINGTON to Major CARTWRIGHT, in reply to Lord SELKIRK's Letter to the Major. His lordship is here completely answered as far as relates to *France*; and, as to *America*, besides what Mr. Worthington has said respecting *universal suffrage*, what analogy is there in the two cases? Lord Selkirk might as well have cited the government of the Indians or the Negroes. Have they any *King in America*? Have they any *House of Lords*? In short, what similarity is there in the state of the two countries? In America the Governors and President are elective; and, as *Judges* may become Governors, *they act upon the bench* with a view to their future elections; they canvass in their *charges, judgments, and decisions*. This is truly abominable. It is the very worst system of tyranny. But, *what has this to do with us and our question of Parliamentary Reform*, my Lord Selkirk? Have we any Governors and Presidents? Can our Judges or Chancellors ever become our chief magistrates?—I shall continue this subject in my next.

MR. TOWNSEND's Letter, in explanation of what was said at the Middlesex Meeting about *tythes*, as connected with *Parliamentary Reform*, shall appear in the next Register. It should have been inserted in the present; but I am sure that when Mr. Townsend has read the Letter of Mr. Worthington, he would be very sorry if any part of it had been left out.

W^M. COBBETT.

Botley, Thursday, 24th August 1809.

A LETTER TO

JOHN CARTWRIGHT, ESQ.

In Reply to the Earl of Selkirk's Letter to him, on the subject of Parliamentary Reform.

DEAR SIR,—A venerable and excellent friend of yours, my neighbour, here, has just put into my hands the Earl of Selkirk's Letter to you, containing his own account of his reasons for declining to act as

ward, at the late Meeting for Promotion of Parliamentary Reform; from whose well-merited celebrity my expectation I own, was highly excited.—I was very anxious to know what more could be said on the other side; I therefore looked from the pen of Lord S. for a novel exhibition, either of powerful argument, which might stagger, if not convince; or for a defence in some theory at all events ingenious, if not firm and sound, for the universally acknowledged corruptions. In short if, owing to Lord S.'s unfortunate side of the question, I should be disappointed of a solid joint, I yet expected the savoury remains of the late Edinburgh Reviewers, served up again with superior skill in a high seasoned curry or haggies, exquisite at least, if not digestible. In both these respects my expectation has been balked; and I have got up hungry and disappointed—yet not dissatisfied.—There is one point, however, at starting, in which I claim a full concurrence with the noble writer—Where, stating his defection from himself, as well as from his deceased father and brother, he offers in their names the just tribute of respect to your character. Those names are venerable; that of his brother especially is dear not only to those who knew his candid nature, but for his enlarged and philanthropic spirit is dear to his country, and would have been equally dear, if he could have been equally known, to the universal world. I will add, that in the entertainment of the great question now before us, the best part of the public will with me regret, that their heir as well as successor in talent, should, in expatiating upon their political opinions, have expunged with his own hand this quarter from the shield of his descent.—I must begin with a rapid synopsis of the Letter. Lord Selkirk accounts for this his change of opinion, both from his family and from himself, on the ground of the opportunity (page 6) which he had, but “which they never had, of seeing the practical application of those principles, from which they expected consequences so beneficial.”—He then instances America as the scene of this application (pages 6 & 7) but expressly declines on the score of their length, (page 8) to go into the reasonings, which have occurred to him, “as to the source of the fallacy,” (now indeed pretty prevalent, if it is one, in England) that a Parliamentary Reform would have the effects, which its most sincere and zealous friends anticipate.” Alas!

these “reasonings,” long, or short, are the very things we wanted! He then proceeds (pages 9 & 10) to the common places of corrections endangering benefits, of our enviable mass of public happiness, &c. &c. till he ends at the end of page 9 in the (as himself allows) “hacknied topic” of the French Revolution;—which continues to page 14, where “the necessary tendency “of elections purely democratical” are ably pointed out. Then (page 15) come the Edinburgh Reviewers, or “commendable representation by family influence,” &c.—until page 16, where the noble writer returns to his favourite topic, America, again, and to “Peter Porcupine,” (pages 18 and 19) wherein it is contended, when we translate the passages into plain English, that it is more important to remove abuses, than their causes; followed by an apostrophe or avowal on the part of Lord S. himself, which, as the opponent of so honest and popular a measure as Parliamentary Reform, he seems to have thought necessary, and to which the reader will of course give credit, “that he is the decided friend “of every just measure of æconomical “reform.” Pages 20, 21, & finis, contain an appeal to the friends of Reform, deprecating their efforts, by a suggestion, that this bustle about Parliamentary Reform will defeat all other salutary reforms.—Yet are we convinced (probably by our malevolence) that it is the apprehension excited in the minds of the government by this question, or bustle, solely, which has put the ministry upon the *qui vive*, on the subject of any sort of Reform whatsoever!—Having taken this rapid view of the grounds on which Lord S. has chosen to rest the argument, and which certainly are neither new, nor striking, I proceed to follow him upon those grounds, which, after all, afford but a mere argument of analogy, leaving the principle, as I trust to shew, intirely undecided and even untouched. I regret that a man of Lord S.'s abilities should have *blinked* the principle; I would far more willingly have met him in the noble field of general argument. For I want to know from a man of his capacity, what connection there is between Rotten Boroughs and any of the valuable privileges (yet extant) of Englishmen. A case in point just occurs. I am writing this, not in my own house, but in the Isle of Wight; now I long to know from Lord S. by any induction, however ingenious, in what way the protection of the Liberty of the Subject, the purity of the distribution

of justice in this Island, or the security in which every man in it may enjoy the fruit of his industry (pages 9 & 10) are or possibly can be, in any the remotest way, indebted to, or promoted by a *reverend* gentleman (these *Sacred Politicians* jostle us every where!) returning 4 members of parliament for two boroughs just under my nose; while another borough has its members returned by two persons, the whole Island being, in fact, represented by three persons.—I wish a reason why the properties and rights, personal and judicial, of the inhabitants of this Island, would not be as well preserved by permitting the substantial inhabitants themselves in this Island to chuse the guardians, whom they might think the fittest to preserve them, as they are likely to be preserved by allowing one person to have the nomination of four of these guardians, and two other individuals, in like manner, the nomination of the remaining two. And again, if it shall further appear that these guardians of the whole, so nominated by individuals, shall exercise a right of taxing the properties of the whole of the inhabitants, and shall, all or any of them, (I mean these guardians) receive out of the produce of such taxes, money in any shape, offices, or honours, for themselves or families, wherewith to indemnify themselves for the sums which they may have paid to those individuals (the creators of our guardians!) for their nomination, I shall be glad to be informed, how, in such a predicament as this, the right of nominating such guardians can be lodged so, or more, dangerously than in the hands of such individuals, that is, in other words, in close or rotten boroughs; or how worse guardians for their properties, &c. could, under any imaginary system of appointment, be appointed. Until those can be answered, I shall esteem every conclusion drawn, analogically, from America, France, or elsewhere to be puerile and inconsequent, even did such analogies as Lord S. assumes, really exist. Which I now proceed to attempt to shew have no existence whatever, but in his lordship's imagination and assumption.—First, then, to America; and herein I have, in common with other gentlemen, to complain of a serious misrepresentation of our avowed principles. Lord S. has imputed by implication to the Stewards of the Meeting in promotion of Parliamentary Reform an object, not only which they never had, but which they distinctly and unanimous-

ly disavowed; I mean *universal Suffrage*.—I will very readily agree with Lord S. (page 6) that universal suffrage and frequency of election may prove no bar to the misconduct of representatives, that a political adventurer, raised to power by popular favour, is fully as likely to abuse that power, as is the purchaser of a rotten borough.—In short, I will go much farther than Lord S. for I will assert that political adventurers raised to power by any means whatsoever are the great bane of our government. I further contend and insist, that rotten boroughs are the nurses and cradles of these adventurers; and it is expressly to extinguish such adventurers, that we wish to extend the rights of suffrage to solid Householders and Tax-payers, and allow no others to manufacture Members of Parliament, as journeymen do pins and buttons, for their private emolument! Granting then, that the American government, founded (as Lord S. says it is) on universal suffrage, to be as bad as Peter Porcupine shews, or Lord S. for the sake of his argument can wish it to be, still, as universal suffrage is absolutely exploded by the Reformists in England, who met at the Crown and Anchor, and the two cases consequently without analogy, I must contend, in opposition to the noble author, that the practical results of the government of America, founded on universal suffrage, do not furnish any conclusion which could properly have caused a change in the opinions of the late Lords Selkirk and Daer, had they been now living, as to the actual tendency of a Reform of the House of Commons in England; a Reform which is to be principally accomplished by cutting off the close franchises and rotten boroughs, and extending the rights of suffrage, of which, in every instance whatever, property is proposed to be the basis and qualification. I need say nothing as to the proposed shortening of the duration of Parliament, as such proposition is not only strictly constitutional, but is conformable to the actual practice of the best periods of our government; it is moreover absolutely impotent to any mischief and alone potent to good. For if the conduct of the representative is what it ought to be, his constituents can, and of course will reelect him, and if it is *not* what it ought to be, why, then, the shorter the period allowed him to misbehave himself the better.—Having shewn then, as I conceive, that Lord S.'s argument can derive no benefit whatever from his instance of Ame-

rica, I proceed to his next instance of France in 1789, reserving to myself, if I still have room, a few remarks (in concluding) on the subject of America, which has been dragged forward, so irrelevantly as I conceive, into this discussion.—Now, with respect to France, the analogy is still more unfortunate, I mean that Lord S.'s objection to the conduct of the then French Patriots is still more unreasonable and inapplicable than is his instance from America.—To show which, it will be necessary, whilst considering the historical fact which Lord S. has cited, to refer to two or three authentic contemporary as well as former facts, which Lord S. has not cited, and which certainly would not at all have suited the noble author's argument.—Before entering into this discussion respecting Revolutionary France, I must beg to premise, that it is a topic, which of all others I would have deprecated, as I thoroughly and seriously do its results. It has nothing in it in common with the situation of England, which can identify the tendency of any of the acts of the two nations, and it necessarily leads into digression at least useless, if not acrimonious.—To the point; "The king of France in 1789 did," I will grant as Lord S. assumes, "offer the important concession That no taxes should for the future be levied without the authority of the States General, *under the condition that it should be constituted according to its ancient form in three Chambers;*" but did the king distinctly offer that the dissent of the Tiers Etat should disable the acts or votes of the other two orders *under his controul*, in case they should vote taxes to which the Tiers Etat would not assent? In a word, was it's assent made the essence of taxation, as in England, where Money Bills not only originate with the Commons, but are never allowed to be in any the slightest respect altered elsewhere?—And even if the King (Louis xvi) had promised this, who was to compel the Court, or his Ministry, by whom he was governed, to fulfil the promise? Or if he had fulfilled it himself, and in his own government, who was to compel his successor, who had made no such promise to imitate his fidelity? Was there in France any extant volume containing the asserted Rights of the Subject, with the example of one monarch capitally punished, and another deposed and driven out of the country by popular indignation for violation of such Rights?—In short, was there any Code of Rights

then extant in France, dear to the people by inheritance, and familiar to them by inalienable and imprescriptible enjoyment, which the Government, backed by a mercenary army, would not thereafter have dared to attack? and this, not only without any prospect of probable success; but with the certainty of calling the whole nation upon its legs into the field against them in defence of its notorious privileges? Was there no Bastille in France, no Lettres de Cachet? Even granting that the substantive assent of the Tiers Etat to the levy of taxes could have been indefeasibly secured to that order (which is a very liberal concession on my part) can Lord S. shew that the Freedom of the Election of its members would never have been violated? Has Lord S. forgotten that a King was driven from the British throne "for having violated the Freedom of Election of Members to serve in Parliament; for divers arbitrary and illegal courses; for having caused to be returned of late years partial, corrupt, and unqualified persons to serve on Juries on Trials, and particularly divers Jurors on Trials for High Treason, who were not Freeholders; for having required excessive Bail of persons committed in criminal cases to elude the benefit of laws made for the Liberty of the Subjects; and for having imposed excessive Fines, and illegal and cruel Punishments, &c. &c.?" Has Lord S. forgot that this is the declaratory part of the Bill of Rights of Englishmen? and does the noble author in principle deny these Rights? Does he think that a Frenchman, by the Being who created Man, was not invested with the same Rights as an Englishman? Does he contend, that an hereditary despotism can on that account prescribe against the imprescriptible rights of mankind? Had the French nation then, I repeat, any guarantee in any of its actual circumstances, that the Freedom of Elections would not have been violated? Had they a constitutional security against any arbitrary and illegal courses? Had they any Juries whatsoever, Freeholders or others, in State Trials? Was not the administration of justice as partial, corrupt, and dependant as it pleased, and who could make it otherwise, or call it to account? and with respect to excessive Bail, Fines, and illegal and cruel Punishments, were they not inflicted at the arbitrary will of every ministry? Perhaps Lord S. may be of opinion, that this is the way, in which,

the mass of mankind ought to be governed; and that, except as to the contribution of their money, (a matter much regarded in Scotland) they have no other rights! The noble lord in fine must either admit this to be his opinion and political principle, or he must abandon his argument. For, if the French nation had any right to something more than a mere vote as to taxation, they ought not to have been satisfied with that offer of the King, which Lord S. argues ought to have satisfied them. Leaving, then, his lordship to take his election between the abandonment of his argument, or of those principles, detestable to an English ear, which he must maintain, if he does not abandon his argument, I will now cite to the reader a few of the acts of the French Government, contemporary with the offer of Lewis the xvith, to abandon the levy of taxes without consent of the States General; by which he may judge of the spirit of that Government, and of the probable value to the nation of that Right which in words was so offered to be conceded. When M. Calonne assembled the Notables, although they were all nominated by the king, it was determined to have them still more humbly devoted to the views of the Government, than even such a nomination, if at all respectable in the eyes of the country, would have made them. Calonne therefore, by a stratagem, that of dividing the whole body into seven Committees of 20 Members each, and in making the decision, to depend upon a *majority of Committees*, contrived that a majority of four of the Committees, being only 44 persons, should be a majority of 140 persons, which was the number of the Notables, and this number he reasonably assumed, either by consulting his own experience, or possibly by information from England; might be always obtained in any assembly in favour of a court. But, although an able financier, Calonne miscalculated; and this body, even so constituted, would not impose any taxes; (a matter scarcely to be believed in England!) concurring in the opinion that it had not authority. It however recommended two new taxes to be enregistered by the Parliament, a Stamp and a Land Tax. On the Parliament replying, in words which should be written in gold, "that with such a revenue as the nation then supported, the name of Taxes ought not to be mentioned unless for the purpose of reducing them," what was the answer of that Court, which was so benignly about to offer to the peo-

ple of France, what Lord S. commends, and thinks they ought to have accepted; the right of imposing their own Taxes? Why, the answer was, a compulsory enregistering of the Taxes in question! and when the Parliament struck this out at their next free meeting, all the members were served with *lettres de cachet* (a practice which M. Fayette observes a majority of the Nobles at the Séance of the Notables appeared in favour of) and exiled to Trois.—Continuing there inflexible, it was soon after recalled to Paris, when, in some further contests, which arose with the Court, the Parliament at last declared, that the Right of enregistering Edicts for Taxes belonged only to the States General, and therefore they would no longer continue even to debate upon it. It was very soon after this that the King came to Paris, and held a personal meeting of eight hours with the Parliament, in which he promised them, in a manner that appeared to proceed personally from himself, that the States General should be convened; which is the origin of the offer, to which Lord S. has referred. What however was the result of this? Why, his ministers discovering that in his promise of convening the States General the King had mentioned no time, they contrived an expedient calculated to elude the promise, without appearing to break it. For this purpose a factitious sort of new Constitution was constructed, called a *Cour Pleniére*, "in which were invested all the powers that government might want, and in which the contended Right of Taxation was to be given up by the King to the members, whom he himself appointed; a new Criminal Code, &c., was substituted, and in many points, the whole certainly exhibited a melioration of the principles of the Government; still the *Cour Pleniére* itself was no more than a medium through which despotism was to pass, without appearing to act directly from itself."—The Parliament refused to enregister the Edict for establishing this *Cour Pleniére*, and it was generally contended, "that the right of altering the Government was a national right, and not a right of the Government itself, which might otherwise be perpetually innovating; and finally, that the *Cour Pleniére* was nothing more than a larger Cabinet." The ministry brought this to issue by sending a regiment of soldiers to surround the Parliament house; and, on the members sending for beds and

sions the commanding officer was ordered to enter, and seize, (which he did) principal members, and shut them up in different prisons! This was the Parliament of Paris. A deputation at the same time arrived from the province of Brittany to remonstrate against the establishment of the *Cour Plénier*; and these the King, or his ministers, sent to the Bastille! The spirit of the nation however was not to be then overcome: the *Cour Plénier* was obliged to be given up, and the Ministers followed its fate. M. Neckar was recalled to office, and the convening of the States General was no longer resisted. They did not meet till May 1789, which is about the period of Lord S.'s assumption of the King's offer. The States General had not been convened since the year 1614, when they had deliberated in their distinct orders; and, as Lord S. has laid a stress "on the King's important concession, that no Taxes should for the future be levied without the authority constituted according to its ancient form in 3 chambers," and follows this up by assuming, that, had it been accepted, it would have corrected all the despotism and vices of the government, I will just cite the words of an eminent French author, who wrote before any Revolution was dreamed of in France, and who, speaking of the States General of 1614, says, "They held the public in suspense 5 months, and by the questions agitated therein, and the heat with which they were put, it appears that the Great (les Grands,) thought more to satisfy their particular passions than to promote the good of the nation," (one would think it was an assembly of our own times!) "and the whole time passed away in altercations, ceremonies, and parade."—They were consequently never called again. To the reader of these pages it is then left to determine, whether such an assembly, of tried inutility, even before the corruptions had taken root, in its anciently constituted state of three distinct chambers, where two of these chambers representing the privileged orders, and emanating from the Crown, had either each a negative upon every measure for the People, or by combining could have kept the *Tiers Etat*, or universal nation, in a perpetual minority, would have supplied the wants of the then French nation, where all these corruptions had thriven to a gigantic maturity? A nation groaning under every description of abuse, the com-

bined results of a systematised monarchical, ecclesiastical, feudal, aristocratical and municipal Tyranny! In what way was a constitution of equal rights, such as we theoretically enjoy in England, to have been established by the States General, in fact by the *Tiers Etat*, when the Clergy and the Noblesse arrogated for themselves a pretty general exemption from burthens, with a maintenance of privileges which rendered every man a slave, who was not of that class. How were these rights to have been constitutionally secured which Lord S. says we enjoy so exclusively now in England? How was the fruit of the industry of the people to have been protected, under a system of unequal taxation and feudal oppression, or who would have made it equal? How was the purity of the distribution of justice to have been guarded, where the Judge was the Jury, and where the right to administer justice was bought and sold? And how was personal liberty to have been enjoyed under the *regime* of *Lettres de Cachet* and the *BASTILLE*! In a word, how were these incompatibilities with any Constitution of Liberty to have been won, or wrested for the *Tiers Etat* from the Crown, which had the key of the Bastille, or from the privileged orders, which deliberating in their separate chambers had their respective negatives upon every measure of general equalization and of national utility? But, if Lord S. or any reader can yet have a doubt upon the importance of the *Tiers Etat* not having yielded in that respect, and of the complete restoration of the old regime, which would have followed it, let him look at two more facts, which are absolutely decisive of this question. The one, the stand, that the Court and Aristocracy made, when, unable to obtain the absolute separation of the three Chambers, the King in a bed of justice accorded the deliberation and vote *par tête* upon several objects; but specially reserved the deliberation and vote upon all questions respecting a Constitution to the three Chambers separately.—The other, that when the Court could not accomplish this, it drew 30,000 foreign troops under Broglio round Paris; and shut up, and guarded, by troops, the doors of the National Assembly at Versailles, which produced the memorable meeting at the Tennis Ground, the Oath never to separate, &c. the capture of the Bastille, and the whole explosion of the Revolution.—Contemplating the matter,

then, with the light of these historical facts, I cannot agree with Lord S. that the verbal concession of the Right of Taxation by the King to the *Etats Generaux* could ever have produced for France those happy consequences which he foresees. Nor can I conceive it possible in a nation, whose abuses were interwoven with its very social existence, and which had not the guide of a single land-mark of liberty, how a Constitution, without a Civil War, could ever have been established by three deliberative Chambers, each operating with a negative, and each claiming privileges absolutely irreconcilable with the privileges of the other; nay, further, privileges, which in the nature of things could not have a concurrent existence; where the very enjoyment of those of the one must have been the extinction of those of the other. A Government is a very different thing from a Constitution; a Government may very well and very salutarily perform its functions through organs like our own, whose interests are distinct, and even opposed to each other; perhaps it is the best way in which civil government can perform its functions; but, in order to frame a Constitution, the interests must concur.—If then, I cannot with Lord S. see or admit any likelihood, that the happiness and freedom of a British Constitution would have followed the simple acceptance by the *Etats Generaux* of the King's concession respecting the Taxes. I can still less discern any of the steps in that *Echellon* of proof, or probability, by which it must be presumed that Lord S. arrived at his conclusion, how the restoring the practice of the English Constitution to its principles, which admit of no dispute, can have a tendency to produce any thing like the horrors of a French Revolution.—On the contrary, it appears, by every reference to the subject of France, that her Revolution was occasioned solely by the abuses of her government; and how the maintainance of the abuses, which have crept into our government, is to be the preservative for England against a Revolution, into which, if the example of France has any analogy at all, her abuses precipitated her, is to me utterly incomprehensible; or rather appears a conclusion drawn in direct contradiction to the clearest inferences of reason.—It would be preposterous, at this time of day, to set about drily to prove that the bad blood too frequently attendant on changes of government proceeds, not from

any thing inherent in the nature of these changes, but from the tenacity with which abuses and corruptions, when inveterate, are upheld by those who subsist upon them. If governments would remedy their corruptions in time, political changes would never be sanguinary. But, when they are of long duration, the very subsistence of a great mass of a nation becomes identified with their continuance; and who can expect such persons quietly to give up all they have? One of the strongest arguments, then, for immediate Reform of political corruptions, is the bloodshed which must necessarily be the consequence of their long course. It is in the name of mercy and humanity, therefore, and not in that of ferocity and cruelty, that I contend for an immediate Reform of our Parliament, and, through that, of our Government. The French Revolution, as it broke out, was the consequence of the most inveterately protracted system of bad government.—The Spanish bloodshed and desolation is solely ascribable to the same cause. Nothing but the most detestable tyranny in Spain could have suggested to Buonaparte the practicability of a change of Tyrants; and nothing but that has prevented the attempt from annihilating its projector.—In the foregoing, for the sake of meeting Lord S., I have gratuitously admitted his assumption, that the dreadful excesses committed by the French Revolutionists, and their resulting tyranny, which now threatens the civilized world, were the natural, and as it were inevitable, offspring of the political change or Reform of their Government; and that of course therefore a Reform in England, which might probably have similar consequences, is of all things to be deprecated. The historical fact is nevertheless in the very teeth of this assumption; and the interests of truth and of liberty, whilst the language of either dare yet be uttered in Europe, require it to be incontestibly stated by a spectator of these events on the stage where they were acted, that the enormities which sullied the very character of mankind, in the sequel of the Revolution of France, did not even derive the germ of their existence from the Reformation, however radical, which took place in the Government. The tenacity with which the privileged orders adhered to their usurpations, which were incompatible with any just Government, and the more than suspected insincerity of the Court, in its divesting itself of its despotic prerogatives, both which have been

ady shewn, together with some interm-
 nance on the part of a few of the leaders
 the Revolution, did unquestionably be-
 tween them create a ferment, to which
 several lives fell an unavoidable sacrifice;
 and which in the event, had they been
 left to themselves, *might* have produced a
 Civil War, with its usual terrible conse-
 quences. This is the ultimate and (pro-
 tract it as long as you will) the inevitable
 termination of bad government, and re-
 sisted melioration, either in France, or
 any other country; and this to a certain
 degree did, and to an indefinite degree
 might have happened in France. But,
 although the combinations of the few
 within the country against the interests of
 the many, might have produced a Civil
 War with conceivable consequences, they
 would have been quite inadequate to the
 production of the inconceivable, and blood-
 freezing horrors of the subsequent stages
 of the Revolution. These, like all other
 consequences, were nevertheless produced
 by co-extensive and adequate causes.
 They were produced by the combinations
 of all the trembling despotisms in Europe
 leagued against the cause of freedom and
 mankind. It was into this conspiracy
 that Mr. Burke and Mr. Pitt so fatally
 precipitated England, to the entailment of
 consequences which Lord S. so naturally
 regrets; to which all these Governments,
 except our own, have already fallen sa-
 crifices, and of which no human wisdom
 and foresight can yet discover the end!
 To these regrets of the noble writer I
 heartily unite my own; and the more so,
 because, having been on the spot at the
 time, I know that no national sentiment
 was ever more sincerely or universally
 (I might say unanimously) felt and ex-
 pressed, than that of a desire on the part
 of the French nation for lasting peace and
 amity with England; but regrets are un-
 availing, and the only good which we can
 derive out of this evil must result from
 reasoning justly upon its causes, in order
 that we may avert its consequences from
 ourselves.—It was not, then, the change in
 its Government, or political Revolution in
 France, as Lord S. assumes, but the ensu-
 ing Continental War, which produced, as
 it were, and solely raised to power the
 most atrocious of the revolutionary char-
 acters. The Girondists in part were
 patriots and philosophers; but the despe-
 rate crisis of the war and the country su-
 perseded those men, and called for cha-
 racters, which, happily for mankind, peace

neither wants nor produces. There was
 then a demand for remorseless and violent
 energies, and the demand created its sup-
 ply of this, as it does of every thing else.
 These men, however detestable their cha-
 racters, and deplorable the actual conse-
 quences, did, in one respect, nevertheless,
 the work they were called for.—They ex-
 tricated their country from the dangers
 that assailed it, and they defended it
 against the world; but in doing this, they
 eventually, and inevitably laid the founda-
 tion of that military predominance,
 which has fatally alike triumphed over
 their own liberties, and those of mankind.
 It is from this career of glory that the
 French nation derives some consolation
 for the free destinies it has lost; whilst the
 rest of Europe, which endeavoured to sup-
 press them, can find no consolation.—Con-
 trary, then, to the assumption of Lord S. I
 trust I have shewn, both that the horrors
 of the French Revolution were not even
 the natural, far less the necessary, conse-
 quences of mere political change or reform
 of government; but that they were the di-
 rect consequences of the imprudent com-
 bination of the governments of Europe
 against her liberties, and that that actual
 military scourge, also, whose successes
 Lord S. so feelingly deprecates, did not na-
 turally arise out of the French Revolution,
 but was the offspring of the same ill-fated
 Conspiracy. In pointing out the atroc-
 ities committed during the Revolution, Lord
 S. has accidentally overlooked one little
 matter; an omission the more surprising
 as his lordship seems to have thought the
 national purse of so much consequence, as
 to have been anxious that the French
 should have foregone every security for
 public liberty in consideration of the
 check upon Taxation, which was offered
 by the King to the *Etats Generaux*. The
 little omission to which I allude, is that of
 the National Assembly having in its first
 year reduced nine millions sterling of the
 annual Taxes! somewhat, it is true by a sale
 of national domains, but more by retrench-
 ment; and this upon a revenue and ex-
 penditure quite trifling, when compared
 with the sum of British Taxation. A final
 reflection here suggests itself to us upon
 this topic, which Lord S. had better not
 have introduced; and this is, that a go-
 vernment, after half a score of centuries'
 continuance, must have very ill answered
 the purposes of one, when its subjects
 either shewed so much hatred to it, or
 had been so little humanized by it, as to

make war upon it in a way which would disgrace the history of cannibals and savages! The Revolutions of France and of Spain, which I have touched upon, are examples of the *violent* Reforms, the natural and necessary results of abuses; I hope they are the last of the chapter! On the other hand, two or three changes of federal Government, as well as of provincial Constitutions, which have quietly taken place in America through the means of Conventions, assembled for that express purpose, exhibit bloodless and salutary examples of *timely* Reforms. I will merely allude to the most important, which assembled in Philadelphia in 1787, for the alteration of the Federal Constitution of America, where the Convention, having performed that business, having recommended its alterations to the consideration of the separate States, and having fixed the period, at which, if these alterations obtained their approbation, the new Constitution should begin to operate, the members peaceably dissolved the Meeting, dispersed, and went home. Thus was a National Reform quietly accomplished by the people, or nation, the Government not having been party, or actor in the whole transaction. I have merely cited the case as a proof (though I think it superfluous) that there is no necessary connection, as some suppose, between an amendment of political Constitution, and Civil War—far less between Reform and the horrors of a French Revolution; and that, when Civil Wars are produced by these occasions, it is the sinister interference of an Aristocracy, of a Court, or of some Cabal, with interests different from those of the Nation, which produces them. Mankind in fact, (for it is ridiculous to suppose otherwise) agree always in what is right and reasonable, on its being shewn to them when their selfish passions do not make them do otherwise; and never quarrel, and cut each others throats, in matters which regard their temporal concerns, unless where their interests clash.—I have now, I conceive, given a satisfactory answer to the specific points in Lord S.'s Pamphlet of Analogy; it remains but to take a look at his general conclusion and scope, which appears to me to be impartially this, viz. that because frightful excesses followed the train of the French Revolution, therefore a corrupt representation of the people is to be perpetuated in England! Now, had Lord S. without feeling himself called upon to give any

reasons for his change of opinion, merely said that his former opinion in this respect was changed, the public might have received such notification with the deference due to his lordship's talents and character; and would have naturally concluded that the noble author had solid reasons for the change. But when a man of his lordship's talents condescends to come before the public to assign the grounds of his change of opinion, and, in doing so, assigns no grounds which can warrant a change, the public will necessarily conceive that his lordship, in the hurry of composition, may have omitted the real motive of the change, which they would be peculiarly gratified at seeing supplied in a more copious edition. And this is the more necessary for his lordship to do, because, in the posture in which this agitated question now stands, the opponents of Parliamentary Reform have gained but the Name of the Earl of Selkirk appended to a pamphlet, which does not contain one trait of those qualities, which have deservedly made that name a favourite of the public. In the means then of which the government has so assiduously and inauspiciously availed itself for strengthening its own side in the contention about Reform, it has, as in a late proceeding in Parliament, contrived materially to corroborate the cause of its assailant, by exhibiting to a train of apologies, or reasonings, which can convince nobody, a name which has never hitherto been annexed to a position which it did not elucidate and establish. The reader will necessarily draw his own, (which can be but one,) inference. Lord S.'s apology then for his desertion of his political tenets resolving itself into a mere *dictum*, or solitary matter of opinion, that Governments should never radically reform their abuses for fear of consequences, I shall oppose to his lordship's the opinions of two other illustrious men, who appear to have thought that a restitution of the securities for Liberty did warrant some considerable risks; the one, Dean Swift, the cement of the Tory Ministry of Queen Anne, the friend of Harley and of Bolingbroke. The other, the most eminent Lawyer of his day, Lord Ashburton. It is true neither of these men witnessed the French Revolution; but the opinion of Swift, which I am going to cite, was written about 30 years after the English Revolution, of which he had been a mature observer, and which unfortunately, as Lord S. will think, for it is very unfortunate indeed

for his argument, occasioned no bloodshed at all; and the opinion of Dunning was nearly contemporary with the Revolution of America which established her grandeur and independence; an event, which, standing as an encouraging example to all resisters of tyranny, Lord S. may also, by parity of reasoning, think very unfortunate. It was many years after Swift had retired from party, and from politics, that he wrote to Pope, as follows: "As to what is called a Revolution principle, my opinion was this; that whenever those evils, which usually attend and follow a violent change of Government, were not in probability so pernicious as the grievance we suffer under a present power, then the public good will justify such a Revolution." "As to Parliaments, I adore the wisdom of that Gothic institution, which made them annual; and I was confident our liberty could never be placed upon a firm foundation, until that ancient law was restored among us. For who sees not, that while such assemblies are permitted to have a longer duration, there grows up a commerce of Corruption between the Ministry and the Deputies, wherein they both find their accounts, to the manifest danger of liberty? Which traffic would neither answer the design, nor expence, if Parliament met once a year." He then proceeds to "his antipathy to standing armies in time of peace, the abomination of the scheme of Government of setting up a monied interest in opposition to the landed, his incapability of discovering the necessity of suspending any law, upon which the liberty of the most innocent person depended, &c." with other matters equally *irrelevant* to our times. Mr. Dunning's opinion was as follows: "If ever a period should arrive, when the three branches of the legislature should unite in a scheme to destroy the Liberties of the People; or if the House of Commons, forgetting their origin and their duty, should become the mere creatures and slaves of the Crown, it would then be no longer illegal for the Commonality of England to resume their just share in the legislature, and the means whereby they accomplished this, whether by association, by remonstrance, or by force, would be not only right but laudable; It would be an honourable imitation of the conduct of their ancestors, by which the Constitution had been wrested from the

"rapacity and from the violence of pre-rogative." Lord Chatham's opinions to this purport are so well known, that it would be superfluous to quote them.—An opportunity is only now afforded me for a flying word or two on the Jobs and political profligacy of America, which Lord S. asserts far to exceed our own! and therefrom deduces an argument against the meliorations, which we conceive would be accomplished by a purer state of representation. I can readily take for granted, even without Lord S.'s authority for it, that very dirty Jobs are transacted and disgraceful acts committed by politicians every where; but comparisons are odious; and candour really obliges me to suspect that the noble writer, at the instant of a virtuous indignation, may have omitted to make those allowances for America, which she will reasonably require. If America be so full of despicable faction, from which, happily for us, we are exempt, we should on the other hand take into account what we pay to allay faction.—Again, acknowledging, as every Englishman must do with pride, the superior redundancy of our crops of political virtue, let us not, in describing America, reproach her soil with sterility, because it does not spontaneously produce what we force! Lord S. certainly has not treated the Americans fairly, or he would never have drawn a parallel between their wretched, and our happy Government; he ought to have compared them with Kamptschatka or Otaheite. Why, the Grenvilles and the Percevals have offices amongst them of four times the emolument of the salary of the President of the United States; and Mr. Perceval has reversions and possessions in his person of more than double the amount. Even Lord Liverpool, whose eminent services I am as free to acknowledge as his gracious master, has as much emoluments as the President of the United States!—Is not this a bounty on political virtue? And can one wonder at its abounding; and when we can so well afford to pay this encouragement, which we besides so cheerfully pay, does it become us in our fine equipage to lord it over and taunt our beggarly neighbours? Lord S. will see that I very cheerfully admit his account of the disgraceful proceedings of the American legislature, hardly to be conceived by us. But still it appears to me that his lordship has not shewn the natural or necessary connection, (which of course must exist) between effective re-

presentation, and political profligacy.—I have no doubt of the fact, but I own I do not see how corruption in the constituent body must unavoidably produce integrity and virtue in the representative; or even (for I am naturally dull) how the public morals of a nation can have been meliorated by transactions between the elector and the elected, which, even in the Edinburgh Reviewers' opinion, "stain" them both with dishonour." In good truth, justice compels us to make vast allowances for the Americans. Is it not obvious, that every one should be bred to the calling which he is to practice if he ever hopes to practise it with dexterity? The episode of Sancho's government is admired and approved by every body; and did not Teresa Panza desire her husband to breed his son a Governor for that reason? Can it be expected, that a man born a farmer, or a shop-keeper, or a private land-holder, can ever legislate like another, who is born and bred a legislator? Can an unpractised private man, of between 40 and 50, when bad habits are inveterate, and obstinacy incurable, ever act the prince or the sovereign, like another, who has been born one, and bred to great things, and high contemplations? And as to representation, are not three or four persons who may not know the candidate's name, more likely to be impartial in choosing a fit person to send to legislate for the nation at large, than his neighbours and acquaintances, who are so apt to be biassed by malice, or affection; and who, it is notorious, never see each other but through a medium of prejudice? But if there is one thing above another, wherein the Americans are never enough to be blamed and pitied, it is their blindness, in having lately let pass them the most delightful occasion for going to war, that ever occurred to any nation! I mean, when they passed their famous Non-Importation Act. What would not a war have done for them? It would have raised a debt, and embarked the fortunes of individuals in the stability of the Government; it would have put an army and navy at the disposition of the executive, with commissions, offices, promotions, and jobs, innumerable! all which, with other advantages, are lost. But the thing for which they are the most to be despised, is their having borrowed their Non-Intercourse measure, (in lieu of "a just and necessary war") from the institutions of the visionary Uto-

pia of Sir T. More; a writer of reveries, whom every one knows not to have possessed a single grain of political judgment, or practical wisdom.—But, to be serious over the jobs both of the Government of America and our own, (which have enough in them to make us so) when one considers that the American Government has paid off all its debts; has kept the peace with very bad neighbours; that it rules over a country ten times as large as England, at one fortieth of the expence; that infancy and age there do not go to the poor house, and youth to the gallows; but on the contrary, that a decent and universal independence prevails, without a vestige of any sort of civil, or political monopoly, or religious intolerance; I say, when one contrasts this, on the one hand, with the Jobs Political, Jobs Ecclesiastical, Jobs Military, Jobs Parliamentary, Jobs Oriental, Jobs Official, and finally the Job of Jobs, or Jobometer (as sir F. Burdett pleasantly called it) on the other, one must imagine, that the noble Earl is indulging in an irony, of which we do not see the drift, or else, that he has just this moment arrived from an Island where Flappers, like those in Swift's Laputa, may be indispensable for some time, to those who have lately left it, and that his lordship had written his pamphlet without one. Before concluding, I must thank the noble writer for having omitted one common-place—that of *time*. The language of the plausible and artful, but inveterate Anti-Reformists, used to be that of Felix: "When I have a convenient season, I will call for thee." A better time, however, for reforming than the present, can never recur; for corruptions must and will encrease, and the dangers of Reform, as I have shewn, be proportionate. The only time for accomplishing a Reform is the time, be it when it may, when the nation comes forward, and says, *we must have it*.—This is the time, and there is no other. I conclude with the apostrophe of the most eminent philosopher that our country or any other has produced; who, after laying down that "Time is the greatest innovator," adds, "and if Time, of course, alter things to the worse, and wisdom and counsel shall not alter them to the better, what shall be the end!!!"—I have the honour to remain, Dear Sir, with high esteem and respect, yours, J. C. WORTHINGTON.

Isle of Wight, 20th August, 1809.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 9.] LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1809. [Price 1s.

" And for their beating giving thanks,
" They rais'd recruits, and fill'd their banks."

HUDIBRAS.

259]

[290

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

BATTLE OF TALAVERA.—When writing upon this subject, in my last Number, little did I imagine, that we should so soon hear of the retreat of our "victorious" army; and still less, that the General, who commanded it, and who had, of course, led it into such a perilous situation, would, in good earnest, be made a peer on account of that "victory." The hireling prints had, indeed, asserted, that he was to be peered; but, still, I could not believe it. The next day, however, when I came to see the "GENERAL ORDERS," issued, by the Commander in Chief, to the army, and dated on the 8th of August; when I came to see this extraordinary and *unprecedented* document, I began to think, that the hirelings were correct, and that it really was intended to make SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY a peer; but, even then, how was I to believe it possible, that he was to be made a *viscount*?—Let us, before we proceed any further with our own remarks, take a look at this singular ORDER, which, as the reader will not fail to perceive, was at once, an Order to the Army, and a sort of Declaration to the People.—I shall number the paragraphs for the sake of reference.

—I. The Commander in Chief has received THE KING'S COMMANDS to notify to the army the *splendid victory* obtained by his troops in Spain, under the command of Lieutenant-General the Right Honourable Sir Arthur Wellesley, on the 27th and 28th of last month, at the battle of Talavera de la Reyna.—II. His Majesty is confident that his army will learn with becoming exultation, that the enemy, after *escaping by a precipitate retreat*, from the well-concerted attack with which Sir Arthur Wellesley, in conjunction with the Spanish army, had threatened him on the 24th of July, concentrated his force, by calling to his aid the corps under the French General Sebastiani, and the garrison of Madrid; and thus reinforced, again approached the allied army on

" the 27th of July; and, on this occasion, " owing to the local circumstances of its " position, and to the deliberate purpose " of the enemy to *direct his whole efforts* " *against the troops of his Majesty*, the British army sustained *nearly the whole weight* " *of this great contest*, and has acquired the " glory of having *vanzquished a French army* " *double their numbers*, not in a short and " partial struggle, but in a battle obsti- " nately contested on two successive days " (not wholly discontinued even through- " out the intervening night) and fought " under circumstances which brought both " armies into close and repeated combat. " —III. The King, in contemplating so " glorious a display of the valour and " prowess of his troops, has been graciously " pleased to command that his royal ap- " probation of the conduct of the army " serving under the command of Lieute- " nant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley shall " be thus publicly declared in General Or- " ders.—IV. The Commander in Chief " has received the King's commands to " signify, *in the most marked and special* " *manner*, the sense his Majesty entertains " of Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wel- " lesley's *personal services* on this memor- " able occasion, not less displayed in the " result of the battle itself, than in the con- " summate *ability, valour, and military re-* " *source*, with which the many difficulties " of this arduous and protracted contest " were met, and provided for, by his ex- " perience and judgment.—V. The con- " duct of Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke, " second in command, has entitled him to " the King's marked approbation. His " Majesty has observed with satisfaction " the manner in which he led on the troops " to the charge with the bayonet, a spe- " cies of combat, which on all occasions so " well accords with the dauntless character " of British soldiers.—VI. His Majesty " has noticed with the same gracious ap- " probation, the conduct of the several " General and other Officers.—All have " done their duty; most of them have had " occasions of eminently distinguishing

K

"themselves, the instances of which have not escaped his Majesty's attention.—VII. It is his Majesty's command, that his royal approbation and thanks shall be given in the most distinct and most particular manner, to the non-commissioned officers and private men. In no instance have they displayed with greater lustre their native valour and characteristic energy, nor have they on any former occasion more decidedly proved their superiority over the inveterate enemy of their country.—VIII. Brilliant, however, as is the victory obtained at Talavera, it is not solely on that occasion that Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, and the troops under his command, are entitled to his Majesty's applause. The important service effected in an early part of the campaign by the same army, under the command of the same distinguished General, by the rapid march on the Duero, the passage of that river, the total discomfiture of the enemy, and his expulsion from the territory of one of his Majesty's ancient and most faithful allies, are circumstances which have made a lasting impression on his Majesty's mind; and have induced his Majesty to direct, that *the operations of this arduous and eventful campaign shall be thus recorded*, as furnishing splendid examples of military skill, fortitude, perseverance, and of a spirit of enterprise calculated to produce emulation in every part of his army, and largely to add to the renown, and to the military character of the British nation.—Now, though all this is said in his Majesty's name, I shall consider it, as we do a Speech from the throne, to be the words of his ministers, or advisers, be they who they may; and, so considering it, I shall, without the least reserve, proceed to make it a subject of commentary.—Paragraph II. is first to be considered in a grammatical point of view. What does it mean then? "The king is confident, that his army will learn with becoming exultation," what? What is he confident, that they will learn with becoming exultation? Why, first, that the enemy concentrated his forces, by calling to his aid the corps under the French General Sebastiani and the garrison of Madrid." Really, there does not appear, in this, any great ground for exultation. Well, but, secondly, they will learn with exultation, that "thus reinforced, the enemy approached the allied army on the 27th of July." Here again

does not seem to be much ground for exultation. Come, then, what next? Why 3rdly, they will learn with becoming exultation, that, on this occasion, owing to local and other circumstances, "the British army sustained nearly the whole of this great contest." Still, what ground is there for exultation? At last comes the fact of the victory, and that, supposing it to be correct, is a ground for exultation; but, the paragraph, taken altogether, is a confused mass of words having no definite meaning; or, rather, having, when it comes to be examined, a meaning that is grossly absurd.—The facts, however, of this paragraph, are of much more consequence than the grammar of it. First it states, that the enemy, that is to say, the French army, under Marshal Victor (the Duke of Belluno) had, on the 24th of July, "escaped by a precipitate retreat from a well-concerted attack, with which sir Arthur Wellesley had threatened him."—Let us bear in mind this word *escape*. Let us bear in mind, that, when the French do not wait till we come up with them, his Majesty is said to call it an *escape* on the part of the French. When pursued, and not stopping to accept of offered battle, the French *escape*: mind that, because we shall have to view situations of this sort on both sides, I am afraid. Well, then, the French *escaped*? They escaped, too, it seems, from "a well-concerted attack?" Who knows that? Who told the king that? His Ministers? How did they come by the knowledge? Sir Arthur told them so, perhaps; but, where is the *proof* of it? Where is the proof, that the attack was "well-concerted?" The usual proof of a well-concerted attack is the *defeat of the enemy*; but, in this case, there was not only no defeat, but there was no battle; there was, in fact, *no attack* at all; the attack never had any existence but in idea and intention. At this rate meritorious services can never be wanting to any man, who has interest enough to get himself appointed to a command. He has only to tell you, that, on such a day, he *intended* to perform such or such an exploit, but that, from some circumstance or other, he was prevented from fulfilling his intention. "The gallant sir Arthur," in the present case, intended to attack the Duke of Belluno, but the Duke of Belluno would not let him. "The gallant sir Arthur" failed in his project; the project did not succeed; and, good souls, we are

to believe, that it was delightfully "*well-concerted*!" As the Duke of Brunswick is reported to have said, we are a *good-natured people*! Like the Catamaran and the Carr project, it *failed*; but it was *well-concerted*.—The next fact, stated in this paragraph, under the authority of the King's name, is, that, "owing to the *de-liberate* purpose of the enemy to direct his *whole efforts* against the troops of his Majesty, the British army sustained *nearly the whole weight of this great contest*."—Something like this was said by sir Arthur Wellesley in his dispatch; but, this the Spanish general's reports to his government deny. He claims, for himself and his army, a full share of the "*victory*." General CUESTA issues his "*Orders*," as well as we; but as to the feats of the battle, they differ very materially from ours. We say, that "the British army sustained nearly the whole weight of the contest." *Nearly the whole* can leave to the Spaniards but very little indeed; scarcely any; and, especially when we consider the delicacy, which, *one would think*, must have been felt by the English ministry, when writing and proclaiming upon such a subject. Well, then, what says Cuesta in his Orders to his army?—"Soldiers of the Army of Estremadura! On the 27th and 28th days of July you fought bravely; you repeatedly repulsed the enemy, who was compelled to fly, leaving the field of battle covered with his dead; this glorious victory is due to your firmness and union, to your incessant and well-supported fire, and to confidence in your Officers and Chiefs; if you always observe the same, you will always be invincible. The French troops are not men except where they find no resistance; that which they met with in the valiant English troops, our Allies, routed and put them to flight. We know that the French soldiers now refuse to enter into action after seeing their best troops destroyed. Soldiers! I am satisfied with your valour and firmness; I congratulate you on your triumph, and I rely on your union and discipline. I do not call Soldiers, nor consider as a part of the army, those base cowards who abandoned their regiments on the days of battle, flying in the moment of danger, and with the design of producing disorder; such wretches, besides the infamy which covers them, shall be decimated as soon as they are apprehended."—Now, does this Order

contain gross and most impudent falsehoods? Is it a tissue of bragging and lies? Doubtless not; but, then, how are we to account for the language of sir Arthur Wellesley, and that of the above-quoted Order, from which it manifestly would appear, that the Spaniards had *no share in the battle worth mentioning*? I put it to the reader, whether this be not the plain meaning of those documents; whether they be not so understood? And, if this be so, what are we to think, when we compare them with the Order of Cuesta? Which are we to believe?—Cuesta, in his official letter to the Spanish government, dated on the 29th of July, says: "The Spanish troops, and especially those which had the greatest share in the action, left me nothing to wish for with respect to their courage and gallantry. The fierce and well supported fire of our infantry repulsed the repeated attacks of the enemy; and the charges of our cavalry caused them much loss. The King's regiment has, in particular, covered itself with glory; and in conjunction with the English took several pieces of cannon, and made prisoners a General, a Colonel, and several Officers: and I request that its Colonel, Brigadier Don Joseph Maria de Lastres, may be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General, for having attacked at the head of his regiment, giving the best example."—Thus, you see, that, as we proceed our difficulties increase. To reconcile our publications with those of the Spanish General is a task, I should fear, too much even for Messrs. Huskisson and Ward, or, for Lord Castlereagh himself.—Here the Spanish General, in an official report, which he knew would be published, and be read by the English army, talks of those of his troops, who had "*the greatest share*" in the action; of the *fierce and well-supported fire* of his infantry; of their *repeatedly repulsing* the attacks of the enemy; and of the *charges of his cavalry*. Could there be all this, and yet Sir Arthur speak of the Spanish assistance in the manner that he does?—But, what shall we say to the concluding part of this paragraph of Cuesta? He gives to his troops a share, not to say the *principal* share, in *taking the cannon*, which fell into our hands, and of which Sir Arthur Wellesley speaks as having been taken by his troops, without any particular mention of the Spaniards; nay, CUESTA here talks of PRISONERS, whom his army assisted in taking, and amongst whom were "*a Ge-*

"*neral, a Colonel, and several officers.*" How is all this? We heard, through Sir Arthur Wellesley, of no officers of the *enemy* being made prisoner. He drily told us; quite drily, that he had made "*some prisoners*," but, not a word does he say about the *number* of them; much less about their *rank*, though he had plenty of time for all this before the 1st of August, when, it seems, he wrote his last dispatches. Is it possible, that Cuesta was humming the Junta? Is it possible, that he should put such a barefaced falshood in black-and-white? I think not; and, yet, how can we reconcile his statement with either the language, or the *silence*, of Sir Arthur Wellesley?—Upon the whole, however, as to the part, which the Spaniards had in the action, it is impossible that *both* accounts can be true; and, as long as this impossibility exists, I shall continue, not to doubt, but to disbelieve, the fact, that, on the 27th and 28th of July, our army had to contend *with double its numbers*. In plain English, I do not believe that fact. I believe, that our army had to contend with *superior* numbers, because I do not believe, that, with equal numbers, the French would have attacked them; but, including the Spanish army under Cuesta, which, *before* the battle, was stated at 52,000 men, we had double the numbers of the French, according to the report of Cuesta himself, who states the French force at from 35,000 to 40,000 men, which is not contradicted by Wellesley, who gives no statement at all of the French force.—The aid we got from the Spaniards, was, I dare say, not great; but, it must have been *something*; and, as the force of Wellesley, before the battle, was stated here at 26,000 men, the disparity in point of numbers, actually engaged, could not have been so very great. Still, I am convinced, that we had to contend with superior numbers, actually engaged; and, I am, for my part, quite satisfied with that, without any exaggerations of any sort.—But, who that rightly considers the matter, and that has viewed the *result* of this battle, can possibly approve of the word "*vanquished*," as applied to the French army at Talavera? This army was *repulsed*, at the most; it was merely a repulse; at the very most, it was nothing more. To *vanquish* is more than to *defeat*; it is to *subdue*; and, is it modest, is it decent, for us to say, that we subdued the French at Talavera? We lose greatly; we greatly injure our character by these exaggerations. The account of the con-

tending forces, published in our newspapers no longer ago than the 9th of August, said: "On the 8th of July Cuesta was at Miravete, and Sir Arthur Wellesley at Placentia; there was to be an interview between them on the 9th, and we conclude the junction was effected on the 11th or 12th. The French, under Victor, were, on the 7th, at Talavera; they are repairing that bridge. By a letter from Victor to King Joseph, dated Oropera, the 25th of June, and taken by a party of our horse beyond Talavera, *his army appears to have been in a sad condition* at that time, though not so bad as that of Soult, in Old Castile, whose letters, taken on General Franceschi, draw a *deplorable picture of that division of Vandals*." These were the accounts, with which the people of England were amused but a very few days before the news of the battle arrived. Now, it seems, however, that Victor had an army of sufficient force to *attack* the united Spanish and English army, which, if the last accounts be correct, is retreating before the "*vanquished*" army of Victor; yes, retreating, absolutely retreating, before that very army, which it "*vanquished*" at Talavera, and for *having vanquished* which our general commanding is, in future, to bear the title of *Viscount of Talavera*! Aye; that is the way that *we* do things!—Oh! but our army is not getting away from the Duke of Belluno's alone; there is Soult, the "*cursed*" Soult" (the Duke of Dalmatia) pushing across from Placentia, to take us in front, while the Duke of Belluno comes upon our rear. Sure! What, Soult, the "*cursed*" Soult," with his "*division of Vandals*," who, only on the 9th of August, we were told were in so "*deplorable*" a state, and which division was, we were before told, reduced to 4,000 men! All this, if not very wonderful, ought to teach the people of England to shut their ears against the statements of these hiring writers, whose calling it is to deceive and to cheat them.—It will be remembered too, that it is for having *defeated* this same "*cursed* Soult," on the river Douro, in Portugal, that the title of *Baron Douro* has been given to Wellesley. The titles are thus:—"The King has been pleased to grant the dignities of Baron and Viscount of the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, unto the Right Hon. Sir Arthur Wellesley, Knight of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, and Lieutenant General of his Majesty's Forces, and to

theirs male of his body lawfully be-
 ten, by the names, styles, and titles of
 on Douro of Wellesley, in the county
 Somerset, and Viscount Wellington of
 Talavera, and of Wellington, in the said
 county," and the GENERAL ORDER, upon
 which we are observing, and which ap-
 pears to have been intended principally
 for the purpose of preparing the public
 mind for the grant of the titles; this ORDER
 says, that, upon the Douro, Sir Arthur
 Wellesley "*totally discomfited* the enemy."
 Mr. Whitbread, with political courage pos-
 sessed by very few, observed in parlia-
 ment, that it was not a battle with Soult's
army, but merely with his *rear guard*. At
 any rate, we *now* are told, that it is this to-
 tally discomfited force, this division of
 Vandals in the most deplorable state, of
 whom Baron Douro is so much afraid, that
 he is getting off as fast as possible towards
 Cadiz. We are a good-natured people, as
 the Duke of Brunswick says; a remarka-
 bly believing people; a people whose faith
 puts to shame that of the worshippers of
 the Dutch Dolls.—Some people seem to
 be of opinion, that Baron Douro of Wel-
 lesley, in the county of Somerset, and Vis-
 count Wellington of Talavera de la Reyna,
 and of Wellington in the said county, is in
 imminent danger of being captured with
 all his army. This is an apprehension ex-
 pressed in the news-papers, upon what
 foundation I know not; but, if it should be
 well-founded, and the event take place,
 there surely will be no end to the laugh-
 ter and mockeries of the French and of all
 Europe. We shall, indeed, pass for able
 deliverers, if this should be the case; if
 the man, who bears the title of places
 where he has "vanquished" one army and
 "totally discomfited" another, should be
 captured, with all his army, by one or both
 of those same armies, even before his titles
 get out to him! Things can hardly be so
 bad as this. I do not see, as yet, any rea-
 son to fear a result at once so melancholy
 and so ludicrous; but, if the accounts
 from Spain be true, he was, when the last
 advices came away, *retreating* as fast as
 possible before that very army, for having
 "*vanquished*" which he is titled, and had
 started, on his retreat, from the very spot,
 the name of which he and his descendants
 are to bear. This, without any thing more,
 is a curious fact, and quite characteristic
 of the times in which we live, and of the
 use which is now made of honours and ti-
 tles.—The GENERAL ORDER expresses,
 in the most marked and special manner,

the sense which the king entertains of the
personal services of sir Arthur Wellesley,
 and speaks highly of his *ability, valour, and*
military resource, displayed *during this event-
 ful campaign*.—Now, in the first place, the
 campaign is *not yet over*; and, though I
 shall pass no opinion upon the *valour* of
 Baron Douro and Viscount Talavera, 'till
 I possess something like a knowledge of
 its existence, I shall not restrain myself
 from saying, that, during the campaign, as
 far as I have heard any thing of it, I have
 discovered no marks of *ability, or military*
resource, in the Viscount; and, if those
 who advised the GENERAL ORDER, had
 thought it a fit occasion to make a grate-
 ful allusion to those with whose blood the
 defence at Talavera was purchased, to
 glance at the 653 officers and men and
 the 159 horses, *missing*, and to hint at the
 subsequent retreat of our army, they
 would, I imagine, have found it necessary
 to cite some *proof* of the ability and mili-
 tary resource of the Viscount, other than
 that to be found in the history of this
 "eventful campaign."—Why did he
 not pursue the "vanquished" enemy?
 He wanted *provisions and rest*; and did not
 Victor want them too? This excuse will
 never do. It is well known, that a *re-
 treating* army always experiences more
 suffering in this way than a pursuing
 army. But, why did he not wait for *pro-
 visions*? Why did he push on in such a
 manner as to put it out of his power to
 pursue the enemy, though he should beat
 him? Why did he so manage matters as
 to be unable to pursue a vanquished en-
 emy? Pursue did I say? Nay, to be *un-
 able to keep his ground* before a *vanquished*
enemy! Good heaven; to be unable to
 stay and *look a vanquished enemy in the face*!
 "He thought, that Victor would not be so
 "strong as he was." Oh; he did, did he?
 Why, then, he thought wrong, and a man,
 who is entrusted with the lives of other
 men and with the honour of his country,
 should not think wrong. "Any man may
 "make a mistake." Very true; but, it is
 not the luck of every man to receive
 thereupon greater honours, or, at least, a
higher title, than was bestowed upon the
Hero of the Nile.—The hireling writers
 in London appear, from the following pa-
 ragraph, to be disposed to maintain, that
 the Viscount intended to pursue and to
 fight Victor with an inferior army, *knowing*
 that Soult was in his (the Viscount's) rear,
 with an army equal in numbers to his own.
 —"Come, all you who are so *fearful*

"considering every thing as so wisely planned, and so well executed, on the part of the enemy! who can find no terms sufficiently strong to express your admiration of Buonaparté and his generals, come and behold a contrast!—Compare the achievements of four French Marshals with the achievements of *one British General*! Behold, on one side, under one of Buonaparté's best Marshals, between 40 and 50,000 men advancing against the *British General* in front, and, on the other, three Marshals, equally celebrated, Ney, Soult, and Mortier, advancing with 20,000 in his rear—a total force of 70,000 men! To have merely effected a retreat would have been thought a singular merit; but the British General, confident in the British hearts and arms which he commanded, *risks a battle* with more than double his force, and gains a brilliant victory; disappoints the project of placing him between two fires, and effects his *retreat in the best order*."—Do not "hollow before you are out of the wood," is an old saying. The retreat, in the best order, is not yet effected, that we know of; and, if it should be, what could possibly justify the act, which these parasites, these brutally ignorant parasites, impute to the general, whom they think they are praising? To suppose, that, while he was pursuing Victor, he did not know the extent of Victor's force, and the extent and local situation of Soult's force; to suppose this is, indeed, to suppose him greatly deficient in point of intelligence; but, to suppose, that he *did* possess this knowledge, is to suppose him guilty of something very little short of treason, unless you set him down for an ideot.—I will not here dwell upon the baseness and impudence of these hirelings, who, to answer their own mercenary purposes, choose to represent the British army as being alone, and to have but *one* general; nor will I stop to notice the acknowledgment of the existence of a French army in Spain to the amount of 70,000 men, when, only three weeks ago, the people were told, by these same writers, that, in a few months, there would not be a Frenchman in the Peninsula; I shall leave these things for the present; but, I cannot refrain from saying another word or two upon the subject of the Viscount's ability and "military resource," during this "eventful campaign."—This "*military resource*" is an unmeaning, coxcomical phrase, tak-

ing its rise, amongst most of our other despicable fooleries, in the enervating and stupefying air of St. James's and Bond-street, where our heroes have so many times defeated, routed, and "*vanquished*" the French; but, the meaning it is intended to convey is, I suppose, that which used to be expressed by the word *generalship*; and, taking it in this sense, all I have further to dispute is the *fact*. I should be glad to hear any one state the grounds, upon which it has thus, in the face of the world, been proclaimed, that Wellesley has shewn great generalship, during this campaign. I should like to hear the grounds of this assertion stated; but, I never shall; for those who have made it are not apt to trouble themselves with grounds.—Viscount Talavera and Baron Douro was not sent out until Napoleon had withdrawn the greater part of his troops from the Peninsula. How many times have we been told, that the French were upon the point of entire expulsion? But, at any rate, Talavera had a force superior to the French in Portugal; he pursued the French out of Portugal; and, he, at last, formed a junction with a large Spanish army. Having done this, he (supposing him now to be the directing head and animating soul of every thing near him, which is the supposition we are taught to proceed upon) set forth in pursuit of the army under Victor. No matter, for the present, what Victor's strength was; Baron Douro pursued him; and, after some time spent in the pursuit, he caught him. The consequence was a battle, in which, taking all for gospel, the French were "*vanquished*." Well, what happened now? Why, in the first place, the Baron lost one *fourth* part of his army, and about an *eighth* part of that loss consisted of *missing*. Aye, of *missing*! though he kept, he says, the field of battle. Aye, this "*vanquished*" enemy ran away; not only took themselves off, but took off 653 of our officers and soldiers, and 159 of our horses, along with them. If this was not *catching a Tartar*, never did Pat catch a Tartar in the world. "I have caught a Tartar," said he to his Captain, during a rencontre in the dark. "Well done, my boy," said the Captain, "bring him hither."—"He won't come," says Pat; "Why, then," said the Captain, "come hither yourself."—"But he won't let me," replied Pat, as our 653 officers and soldiers must have replied, if they had been addressed in the same way.—Very

well; but, let us, in spite of this most glaring fact, allow Victor to have been "*vanquished*," what was the *consequence*; what effect upon the state of the war was produced? For, where every fourth man of an army is lost; where victory is purchased so dearly, it ought to answer some purpose beyond that of procuring a title, and a pension, most likely, for the Commander. What, then, was the *consequence* of this battle? Did it tend to drive the French out of the heart of Spain, where it was fought? Did it shake Joseph Napoleon upon his throne at Madrid? Did it enable our army to pursue and destroy that of France; that which it had "*vanquished*"? No, none of these; but, on the contrary, if the last published advices be correct, our army, was unable to pursue the "*vanquished*," even for the purpose of recovering its missing; and, in two days after the Battle was fought, it was compelled to retreat before that *vanquished* army, some of whose generals it had killed and some wounded, and "*entire brigades*," of which it had annihilated! Observe, the French army could have received *no augmentation* after the battle; no succours after it was "*vanquished*;" because Talavera tells us in his dispatch, that Joseph Napoleon had come out with his troops to Victor's assistance, and that the whole of the French force in this part of Spain was collected together for this battle. The French army could not, therefore, be augmented. It was the very same "*vanquished*" army, which had been so cut to pieces, and cowed down but two days before. This army it was, before which our "*victorious*" army began its retreat, in less than 48 hours after its "*glorious*" "*victory*." This is pretty *fruit* of victory. It was different at Blenheim and at Trafalgar. This *fruit* was hardly worth the lives of about 5,000 men.—If the French army, which had been "*vanquished*" only 48 hours before, had not, then, received any reinforcements, what made it either prudent or honourable to retreat before it? I should first ask, why it was not *pursued*; but, that has been anticipated by the Baron's dispatch of the 1st of August, where he attributes his inactivity to *want of provisions* and to *fatigue*. Now, as to provisions, why did he go on beyond his provisions. Had he been the pursued party indeed, the excuse might have been good; but, being the pursuer, he had to choose his distances. But, if he wanted provisions, was not the enemy in the same plight?

And, as to *fatigue*, oh! it will never do to tell us, that an army, which has "*vanquished*" another, and annihilated "*entire brigades*," is unable, from *fatigue*, to pursue that "*vanquished*" army. This will never do. It is what never was before heard of. And, besides, there were the Spaniards, who, according to the Baron's account, had had little share in the battle, and who could know no other fatigue than what arose from want of something to do.—This is all nothing, however, till we see the French, see the "*vanquished*" French, in spite of all the slaughter they had experienced, in spite of the killing and wounding of their generals, and the 87 waggons of wounded men, which Cuesta says they had; till we see them, in spite of all this, coming again to the attack, and actually taking up the ground of our army, which now thinks proper to retreat before them with Talavera at its head. Yes, we see this same "*vanquished*" army becoming the assailant of those, who, only 48 hours before had obtained a "*glorious* victory" over it; and, not only that, but we see this French army coming on over that very country, where *ours* could find *no provisions*! This is wonderful. If ours could not advance for want of provisions, how is the French army to live, in the same country, and upon the same line of march, and that, too, after our army has passed over it again; after our army has given it another bite down? Want of provisions prevents us from moving forward after a "*vanquished*" army; but the "*vanquished*" army is not prevented from moving forward after us, even into the country, where we experience this debilitating and benumbing want of provisions.—But, there is given us another reason for Talavera's retreat, more powerful than the former; for, indeed, to plead *want of provisions* and *fatigue* in justification of a precipitate retreat would be too barefaced even for the meridian of St. James's Street. This other reason is, that SOULT, whom the Spaniards appear to have surnamed "*the cursed*," was pushing on, with an army of 20,000 men, in order to get upon the rear of Baron Douro; and, that, in order to avoid being placed between two fires, the Baron was compelled to hurry back, though this movement was accompanied with the mortification of seeing himself pursued by an army, that he had "*vanquished*." This is a very good reason for retreating; and I am not a little pleased to perceive, that, though *want of*

provisions, and fatigue, prevented the allied armies from *advancing*, it had no such effect upon their powers of *retreating*, in which, indeed, the two armies appear, from the reports in the news-papers, to have carried their rivalry in zeal to a very high degree. So far from standing in an attitude to thrust each other on foremost, they appear, if these accounts be true, to have thought of nothing but excelling one another in alacrity. It would seem, that our army was willing to take the lead, and to leave the Spaniards to *come after at their leisure*; but whether from that *affection* for our army, which the Morning Chronicle supposes to have been so strong, or, from some other cause, not less delicate and more powerful, it does appear, that our army was hardly got out of sight, when the Spaniards set off after it, like a foal after its dam.—Be this as it may, the reason for the retreat is quite sufficient; and, it only remains for my Lord Douro, or some of those who talk of his “*military resource*,” to furnish as good a reason for the advance of our army to Talavera, while “the cursed Soult” lay at Placentia; or while he lay any where, he or any other French commander, with a force capable, when joined to that of Victor, or co-operating with Victor’s force, to place our army between two fires, and possibly to capture it. We want a sufficient reason for this. The advance into the heart of Spain has lost us many thousand of lives; it has sent some hundreds of our countrymen into French prisons, there to remain, perhaps, for several years; it will cost us many a hundred thousand of pounds; and shall we not be entitled to ask, *why* it was undertaken; especially when the commander is asserted to have displayed great generalship, and when he is loaded with titles for his achievements? Was he not acquainted with the strength, or the situation, of “the cursed Soult’s” army? *Why*, then, was he not? It is one part, and a material part, of generalship to know what and whom you have to attack or to defend yourself against. Either Talavera knew what he had to encounter, or he did not: if the former, he wanted the judgment necessary to enable him to weigh his means against his undertaking; and if the latter, he ought not to have advanced. In short, the advance into Spain and on to Talavera was of his own choosing; there was nothing that compelled him to leave Portugal: he was safe in his rear, had an abundance of

means for keeping his ground, and, of course, should not have moved forward till he had been able to form a rational hope of success. The advance was his own work; no one else had any thing to do with it; and, if it end in a flight before the French, after having cost us so much in blood and in money, shall we still be told, that he has great “*military resource*?” Shall we still patiently hear this? Shall we still shout when the Park and Tower guns are fired? Shall we, indeed, verify the words of my motto? And; yet, shall we have the impudence, the inane assurance, to mock at the French people on account of their credulity?—When I take a view of the Battle of Talavera, I can see in it no marks of generalship on the part of Wellesley; but, of his conduct during that battle we can, in fact, *know* very little. We *know* what his conduct in the *campaign* has been, as far as it has hitherto gone; that is to say, the campaign considered as consisting of important movements and measures; and, if we find him wanting in these; if we find these movements and measures productive of loss of ground as well as loss of lives and money, our decision must be against the generalship of the campaign.—There is one, and, in my opinion, but one ground of apology for the advance of our army into Spain, so far as Talavera: I mean, that Douro did not find either the Spanish *army* or the Spanish *people* or the Spanish *provinces* what he expected to find them. With respect to the two latter, however, the people and the supplies, any one could have told him what the country afforded, and sir John Moore had told him what the people were made of. With regard to the *army* he could not so well judge. He must, after what he had heard of in the corps under Romana and Blake, have had his suspicions, and it became him to take care how he exposed an English army to the probable consequences of a reliance upon the co-operation of such associates. Yet, on the other hand, it was for him to judge, whether the effect of *English example* upon so considerable a body of Spanish troops as that under Cuesta, was not worth a trial, even at the risk of a lost battle. This appears to me to be the only ground of apology, or at least, of justification; and, I do not say, that, under similar circumstances, I should not have judged in favour of such risk. I am of opinion, indeed, that a great part of the public think, that, at bottom, the true

cause of the apprehended flight towards Cadiz, is, Wellesley's disappointment in the Spanish troops. Why not *say* this, then? Why disguise this fact, the knowledge of which removes, at once, all the doubts respecting the cause of inactivity after the battle, and of the precipitate retreat, which is said to have followed that inactivity? Why not declare openly a fact so necessary not only to the justification of our general, but to the reputation of our army?—The reason is, that the greater part of those, who have got hold of the public ear, wish to deceive that public in almost every thing; but, in nothing so much, as in what relates to the disposition of the people and the armies of Spain, who, until the last verse of the last chapter, we are to be told, are ready to shed their blood for FERDINAND VII. In vain do facts, multitudes of facts, flatly contradict this assertion; in vain have we read the letters of sir John Moore; in vain have we seen whole corps run away from their commanders; in vain even now, in his Orders respecting this very battle, does CUESTA speak of his run-aways, and threaten to *decimate* them, when he catches them; that is to say, to put every tenth man of them to death: in vain do we see and hear all this; for we seem resolved to make no use of our senses, but still to believe the hirelings, who assure us, that the universal Spanish nation is "bent upon the restoration of their beloved Ferdinand;" that the people, of all ranks and degrees, are *enthusiastic* in his cause; and, in short, that the nation will suffer itself to be butchered to the last man, rather than submit to the sway of Joseph Napoleon. This is what we are told to believe; and this is what *proofs* innumerable to the contrary do not make every one disbelieve. We have now before us our army in precipitate retreat; we know that they have left some hundreds of *missing*; and, what is still more to be lamented, that they have left some thousands of *wounded* and of *sick* to the mercy of those whom our hireling prints call "*Vandals*," that is to say, *barbarians*. Yet, though we have this picture before our eyes; though we know that this exists in the heart of Spain, in the midst of a nation consisting of ten or twelve millions of people, still are there amongst us many thousands, who believe, or affect to believe, that the whole Spanish nation is *enthusiastic* in our cause, and that they hate and loath the French. There is no accounting for this but upon the principle of Burke:

"let a man tell you his story every day for a year, and, at the end of it, he will be your master." These hireling prints tell their story every day; and at last, they, by mere dint of repeated assertion, get the better of the sense and the reason of their readers.—While my Lord Douro is retreating in one part of Spain, his brother, Lord Wellesley, is, the hireling prints tell us, making his diplomatic entry into another part of that devoted country, accompanied by another brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley. I believe there is a fourth brother, and would to God they were all in Spain; for, it has long been a saying about Whitehall and St. James's street, that nobody but the Wellesleys are capable of encountering the Buonapartés. Well, there are *three* of them in Spain. They have nothing to do but to draw upon the resources of England, and, unless their eulogists are liars, they have the universal Spanish nation on their side. There they are then, in the cabinet as well as in the field. They are fairly pitted against the Buonapartés, and we shall see, before many months have passed over our heads, which gains the day.—The Marquis, we are told in the London news-papers, stepped on shore, at Cadiz, *upon a French flag*, brought and spread out for the purpose. Whether this idea was borrowed from that of the bed of honour, which Marshal Vandome made for the king of France, or whether it be of Oriental origin, I know not; though I should rather suppose the latter; and, at any rate, it must be confessed, that there is in it something vastly manful, dignified, and sublime. The circumstance of *where* or *how*, the flag was obtained, whether it was taken from the French, during a desperate conflict on sea or land, whether it came from one of the French ships detained in the harbour of Cadiz, whether it was bought in a pawn-broker's shop, or, whether it was hooked off from some wall, where, under the name of bunting, it had kindly sheltered blossoms or fruits, the historical philosopher who narrates the occurrence has omitted to mention; but, he has told us, and it is a fact that I wish all the people in England to know and to bear in mind, that, when the Marquis Wellesley landed at Cadiz, a French flag was laid upon the ground, that he might walk over it, that he might trample it under foot, that he might *thus* triumph over Buonaparté. I wish this to be borne in mind by every man in England.—I sincerely hope that

neither of the three brothers will come home, till the contest is fairly at an end. I wish to see the thing fought out between them and the Buonapartes. They took to the war when it was in the most promising state. Napoleon was in Austria; only a handful, comparatively, of his army was left in Spain and Portugal; not yet even have any reinforcements been sent to his army; the Wellesleys have had an abundance of time to make all sorts of preparations; and, if they do not beat the Buonapartes, there will be left to them not the shadow of an excuse.—We have heard and read and seen enough of Lord Wellesley's Oriental wars. Some people were ill-natured enough to suppose, that these wars with the blacks were nothing. We shall now see what he will do against white men; and, for the honour of Old England, let us hope, that he will keep up his habits of triumph; for, really, it would be shocking to find, that when he came to be opposed to whites, he fell off in his career of glory. What would the Nabob Vizier of Oude say to that?—Well, come; let us leave them a while, and see what they will do; but, this I certainly shall do, whenever the result is known, make a comparison between the wars of the Wellesleys in Spain, and their wars in India.

It was my intention to have offered some remarks upon an article, which has been published in the Morning Chronicle, upon the subject of *depreciation of bank-notes*, that depreciation being now openly acknowledged to exist; but, I thought it my duty, before I proceeded to any other subject, to place upon record my opinions, relative to the battle of Talavera, and the extraordinary transactions connected with it.—This Bank-Note work is going steadily on, and so it ought; but, I can remember when I was accused of a wish to overthrow the government, because I insisted, that bank-notes had depreciated. They have, it would appear from this article, now depreciated nearly 20 per cent., and this is stated, too, in the public prints, to which I will add, that I am very far from thinking the depreciation an unpromising sign for the country. The bank notes are the funds, and the funds are the bank notes. It is a pleasant concern altogether; but it is what I feel no interest in, and what, if annihilated to-morrow before breakfast-time, would not at all endanger the safety of England. This being my opinion, the author of the article in question must excuse me if I smile at his alarms, and especially

at his remedies. No, no: for a paper currency, once debased, to be restored to credit, is as impossible as for honesty to work its way into the heart of a pettifogger, bred to the forging of wills, and the tutoring of false witnesses.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, Thursday, 31st August 1809.

MR. TOWNSEND ON TYTHES.

Busbridge, Aug. 20, 1809.

Sir; Your Political Register of yesterday is now before me, and as you are the last man in the world by whom I would wish any thing that was said or written by me to be misunderstood, your observations on my Letter concerning the Godalmin Tythes, (to use your own words) "demand an answer." So, indeed, do your questions concerning Sir Arthur Wellesley's dispatches, and I wish the one may be answered as satisfactorily as I trust I shall answer the other. But, before I enter on the subject of the Tythes, I must tell you, Sir, that I take an uncommon degree of interest in every thing that comes from your pen; for we often think alike, and upon some occasions, I have found the opinions published in your Register, correspond exactly with those I had in private expressed: which was the case in regard to the late dispatches from Sir Arthur Wellesley. For my friends know that I had made every observation respecting them, which in yesterday's Register was made by you: particularly the misunderstanding which the dispatches were likely to produce betwixt the Spaniards and us. When one feels that a man really loves his country, when one knows that in consequence, he is deservedly looked up to by that country, one must be anxious that he should upon all occasions view things in the right light. For if he sees things through a false medium, let his intentions be ever so good, he would never be able to apply a remedy to the existing evil; and he would be sure to split on the rock, on which so many have struck before.—I will confess to you, Sir, that your Summary of Politics, which I have read to day, has relieved me from some alarm, by convincing me that the "zeal" you feel for the public cause, will be directed in the proper way. Yes, Sir, it is the "Médecin malgré-lui, it is a stupid way of thinking received and encouraged by certain hireling writers on "the continent, (and you might have

ed in this country) that has been the cause of our public disasters," and he with you that "In spite of long and woeful experience, it appears to me this hour as efficient as ever." And I also agree with you that "The public, who have been so often deceived, will bear yet a great deal more in the way of deception: and that those who attempt to undeceive them in time, must expect to bear yet a great deal more in the way of reproach." To bear a share of that reproach I am most willing, and for no other reward than the satisfaction of handing down to my son, unsullied, that character for political disinterestedness, and integrity, which my father bequeathed to me. And I trust, by seeing a good example, my son will never prostitute those abilities, his schoolmaster tells me he possesses, to the destruction of that rational liberty, which Englishmen ought at all times to be ready with their lives to defend, and against which no Englishman either abroad or at home ever ought to lift up his hand.—And now, Sir, after so long a digression, I must return to the dull subject of Tythes, respecting which you have quite misunderstood me; for I had not the most distant idea of abolishing Tythes altogether; I might as well have thought of abolishing Taxes altogether; both the one and the other, if kept within due bounds, and properly applied, (to use the words of that distinguished Patriot, Sir Francis Burdett) when collected, would descend like the dews of Heaven to occasion a general benefit.—Now, Sir, I fancy the words that gave you an idea that I wished for the abolition of Tythes were these: "The present system of taxing and tything, if persevered in, will in a short time prevent the farmer from selling his corn, except at a price, as I have observed before, which none but the affluent can afford to pay." Now, Sir, what I meant by the present or immediate system was this; the Tythe-valuer came to me, and told me that the weight of the taxes, and dearness of the times, obliged his employer to raise the Tythes. He did not know what the present system might lead to, but that whilst the price of corn kept up, he thought I could afford to pay 50*l.* per year. Now, Sir, my object was to lower, not to keep up the price of corn, and that, I assure you, entirely upon patriotic, not selfish, feelings. I then, Sir, began to consider, where is this race betwixt the government, rector, and farmer

to end. The government lays on taxes, the rector raises the tythes, the farmer the price of corn; but what is to become of the public at large? and what remedy can be applied to the frightful prospect that now presents itself to my mind?—A Parliamentary Reform—that may put a stop to the shameful profusion of the public money which has existed for the last sixteen years! If the public money were properly managed, thought I, the taxes might be reduced, and then there would not be a necessity for the parson's raising his tythes, or the farmer the price of corn. But as a Parliamentary Reform might be a long time in taking place, if it ever took place at all, I proceeded to consider, whether there might not be some act, some regulation respecting Tythes, that might be immediately applied to, for the purpose of keeping down the farmer's outgoings, and therefore the price of corn. In searching the Statutes at large, I found an Act that particularly applied to my case, and which I now transcribe for your perusal. It is a statute enacted 15 Ric. II. c. 6, and which was renewed and enforced by Statute 4 Hen. IV. c. 12.

"In appropriation of Benefices there shall be provision made for the Poor, and the Vicar.

"Item, because divers damages, and hindrances oftentimes have happened, and daily do happen to the parishioners of divers places, by the appropriation of Benefices of the same places; it is agreed and assented, that in every licence from henceforth to be made in the Chancery of the appropriation of any parish Church, it shall be expressly contained and comprised that the diocesan of the place, upon the appropriation of such churches, shall ordain according to the value of such churches a convenient sum of money to be paid and distributed yearly, of the fruits and profits of the same churches, by those that shall have the said churches in proper use, and by their successors, to the poor parishioners of the said churches, in aid of their living and sustenance for ever; and also that the vicar be well and sufficiently endowed."

Now, Sir, I trust I have convinced you, that the raising of the Tythes at Godalmin, has to do with Parliamentary Reform, for I have no doubt that the same rise of Tythes, and the same reason for raising them, (that is, the weight of the taxes) goes from one end of the kingdom

to the other ; and I cannot help repeating that it is my opinion if we were properly represented in Parliament, which can only be by means of a Parliamentary Reform, that some salutary regulation, some modification would be adopted in respect to Tythes ; as the present mode of taking them in kind, is a complete bar to the cultivation of a great deal of poor, waste ground, and often most shocking to humanity. I was lately in Essex, where the parson having some Glebe land, would not come to any composition with his parishioners, except for the small Tythes, and those, the farmer and his wife told me, they compounded for at an enormous price, for that they could not bear the moaning of the calves, when deprived of every tenth meal of milk.—As my only object in addressing you was to explain my reasons for connecting the rise of the Godalmin Tythes with a Reform of Parliament, I shall abstain from entering into your arguments at length, but in justice to myself I must observe, that I never meant to complain of the highway rate, or the rise in labourers wages, but to shew the various outgoings on a farm, some necessary and unavoidable ; and that therefore any unnecessary burthen should not be laid on the farmer, as it must inevitably produce a rise in the price of corn, and thereby materially affect the public good. You would oblige me by giving my letter a place in your Register, as I shall think it necessary to send a copy of this defence of my conduct, to those who had my letter concerning the Tythes.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant
and sincere admirer
HENRY HARE TOWNSEND.

PROCEEDINGS of a SPECIAL COURT of COMMON COUNCIL of the CITY of LONDON.
Held in consequence of a Notice of a MOTION given by Mr. JAMES DIXON, to RESCIND the VOTE of THANKS to Col. WARDLE, passed on the 6th of April last.—(Continued from p. 223.)

[Mr. Waithman, in continuation.]

But it has been asked, with an air of triumph over Mr. Wardle, how he comes to complain of corruption in the Sale of Seats in the House of Commons?—Whether he did not purchase his own seat there? To which I answer, I do not know how that fact stands ; but this I know, that Mr. Wardle, like any other individual, has a right to

shift for himself in that respect, while the market, I say, while the market remains open. I have had fifty seats offered to myself in that assembly, upon certain terms: the very individual who is stated to have negotiated that concern under my lord Sligo, told me he would procure me a seat, if I would procure for him a writership under the East India Company. These are indeed abuses, and they are monstrous abuses, but they are only few of the abuses under which this country labours, and which bear hard on the honest part of the community in which we live. Since they have been proved to exist ; since they are admitted to exist, and are avowed by those who feed upon them, will any man lay his hand upon his heart, and say those things ought to continue ; or say, that he who exposes them is unworthy of the thanks of the public. Will any man say that a great saving may not be made in the public expenditure of this country, by the introduction of a little more common honesty into some of the departments of the state? I believe what Mr. Wardle has said upon that subject, that the savings would be very nearly to the amount of the Income Tax.

Mr. TADY admitted that others had known, and had talked of “abuses,” but nobody had acted so efficiently towards their prevention, as well as Mr. Wardle, and therefore that gentleman was a very fit subject for the thanks of the public.

Mr. Alderman ATKINS wished the Resolution of the worthy Alderman to be withdrawn, because it embraced matter for the discussion of which the Court was not convened. He had no idea of rescinding the Vote of Thanks to Mr. Wardle, for nothing could be more unjust to that gentleman, than to condemn him before he has been heard. Mr. Wardle, said the worthy Alderman, has committed himself to the public over and over again, that he will prove that the matter which has been stated to his prejudice, and upon which the verdict of a jury has been obtained against him, has been the effect of perjury. Until that be ascertained, we should suspend our judgments ; meanwhile, do not let us withdraw from Mr. Wardle the Thanks we have given to him for his exertions in the service of the public. That would be treating ourselves, as well as Mr. Wardle, unhandsoinely. If we had been unfortunate enough to place our esteem or bestow our bounty upon an unworthy object, that might be reason why

might regret our mistake, without being reason for our retracting the donation. I before wish, by all means, that we should rescind the Vote of Thanks which we passed in favour of Mr. Wardle ; I cannot help recommending, most strongly, to the worthy Alderman to withdraw his proposition, because it embraces matter, for the discussion of which we were not, this day, convened ; it tends to cast, unnecessarily for the present purpose at least, reflections on his majesty's ministers. We are now called upon to vote charges against persons who have not been heard upon them before us ; charges upon which we ourselves have had no time for consideration. We are called upon to come to a conclusion before we have had time to deliberate upon a great deal of criminating matter. Surely we should pause before we come to such a conclusion : speaking for myself, I have no hesitation in confessing that my ability is not equal to the task of proceeding with that celerity which is proposed by this Resolution, to censure in the mass ministers who have not been heard before us. Besides, it is not the purpose for which this Court is professedly assembled ; we did not come here to-day, to pronounce philippics upon the king's ministers, but to consider the propriety or the impropriety of rescinding our own vote respecting an individual. And now we are called upon, by a side wind, to vote quite another matter. Indeed, my Lord Mayor, I cannot help asking, whether this is not a trap laid to catch the votes of gentlemen who were not aware of it ? This seems to me to be running riot with things. I am ready to say, that the Vote of Thanks to Mr. Wardle ought not to be rescinded on account of any thing that has yet transpired ; but I cannot assent to the proposition which goes the length of extending our thanks to that gentleman on account of his statement in the House of Commons, of matter in which there may be a saving in the public expenditure, because that matter is not, at present, before us, nor does it follow that every saving is economy. If you diminish your establishment, you may diminish your expence ; but it does not thence necessarily follow that you improve your condition. If I put down my carriage, which, as far as regards myself, I might do, because, thank God, I can walk, I might save some expence, but I do not think it would improve the condition of my family ; and so it may be with some

parts of the expenditure of this country, the particulars of which I am not now discussing ; they are topics which we are not called upon to discuss ; and the Court will pardon me if I doubt its competence to such a discussion. The great objection I have to it is, that we were not brought here for this purpose ; if we pass this Resolution, it will appear to the public that we were brought together for one purpose, and have been entrapped into another. I came here to enter my protest against rescinding the Vote of Thanks to Mr. Wardle, but I must likewise protest against the Resolution now proposed.

Mr. CLARK admitted that the Vote of Thanks to Mr. Wardle ought not to be shaken, but thought the present Resolution went to approve of the whole of his subsequent conduct, a proposition to which he did not assent, and therefore wished it to be withdrawn.

Mr. MILLER said, that taking the whole of the conduct of Mr. Wardle subsequent to the Vote of Thanks of this Court to him, in the light of debtor and creditor with the public, there was a very large balance in favour of that gentleman.

Mr. MAWMAN contended that this Resolution was such as ought not to be sanctioned by this Corporation under the present circumstances. He never would give his support to a Resolution so drawn ; the sense he had of the dignity of the Corporation ; the regard he had for his own individual character, forbade his assent to it. He objected to the manner in which it was brought forward ; it came by surprize ; notice should have been given of it manfully, that the Court might have been convened for the purpose of discussing it ; this was indirect and insidious ; he must protest against it as an individual.

Mr. Alderman GOODBEHERE said, that the general opinion was now manifest as to the Vote of Thanks passed in favour of Mr. Wardle ; that such Vote ought not to be rescinded ; but, said the worthy Alderman, I have assigned reasons to this Court for thinking that it has not gone the whole length which it ought to go in favour of Mr. Wardle, for I have stated facts to the credit of Mr. Wardle, which he stated in the House of Commons to the advantage of the public, which have been verified by subsequent events, and from his conduct on that occasion, several beneficial alterations have already taken place, and the consideration of which, I say, calls on us to mark his conduct with additional

approbation. [Bravo, bravo! Silence, silence!] I must, therefore, persist in my Amendment, notwithstanding the discouragement of my worthy friend upon the floor (Mr. Mawman); I esteem his friendship highly, and I should wish to court his assistance. He would, at any time, be a very useful auxiliary to any one whose measure he should be pleased to espouse; but if I cannot have his valuable aid, I must go on as well as I am able, without it; and he must allow me to differ from him in opinion upon the present occasion, and to say, that it is my privilege to decide on what course I shall take now, without dictation from any quarter, however respectable that may be; and I am so well convinced of the propriety of what I now offer, that I not only trust the Court will adopt it, but I persuade myself, that if I had the pleasure of meeting that worthy member, and of discussing this matter with him in private, I should have obtained his assent to it. [No, no, said Mr. Mawman.] Mr. Alderman Goodbehere proceeded—I still retain my opinion; for I know his feelings, and I know how grateful he is to those who serve the public, and we all know that gratitude in good men is a feeling that will not bear compression; it is of spontaneous growth as well as of expansive nature, and delights in exercise. Then would my worthy friend wish to check its growth, or destroy its lustre? No. There is a beauty in deserved praise, which I am confident my worthy friend would not diminish; and yet he now appears to wish to do away the effect of those praises which Mr. Wardle has so well deserved, and this would have a very unfavourable effect on the minds of those who are not much in the habit of thinking for themselves, unless we took care to counteract it; I say, then, that Mr. Wardle stands in a situation peculiar to himself; that he came forward, and for a while, stood alone; had no party, and hardly an individual to support him, in his endeavour to expose corruption in the management of our public affairs. I say that he has had no other reward for all his labours, successful as they were, than the approbation and esteem of the public. He has had neither place nor pension, nor the reversion, nor the promise of a reversion, of place or pension. He therefore stands before us with peculiar claims to our countenance and support; he has indeed high claims, not only on our generosity, but on our

justice; let us encourage him to perseverance in his object. I therefore, with that view, shall persist in recommending my proposition to the adoption of this Court. — Here the worthy Alderman's Amendment was read by the Recorder, as already stated.

MR. MAWMAN then expressed his astonishment that the worthy Alderman persisted in what appeared to him (and, he hoped, to the Court) a very extraordinary course of proceeding. All that he had left to do, with a view of counteracting it, was to move an Amendment upon this Resolution, which was to move, that after the word "That," all be left out, and the following be inserted in their stead:— "This Court doth not see any reason for rescinding the Vote, passed on the 6th of April last, of Thanks and Gratitude to Gwyllm Lloyd Wardle, esq."

MR. SAMUEL DIXON said, that this Amendment was so plain, that the meanest capacity in the Court must understand it, and it had his assent in preference to that which it was its object to supersede; a proposition so long, so complex, so bewildered, such a farrago, that he doubted whether any body understood it thoroughly; and, at the same time, foreign to the avowed purpose for which the Court met. The purpose for which the Members of the Corporation came together was, to see whether there was, or was not, ground for rescinding the Vote of Thanks to Mr. Wardle; and this proposition was, under pretence of an Amendment to another proposition, to censure the whole of the Administration of the Country under the head of a string of assertions, unconnected with the avowed purpose of the Court.

MR. WAITHMAN said, that the last Amendment, under pretence of confining the Court to the purpose of its Meeting, was much more deserving of the title of a trap than the proposition of his worthy friend, Mr. Ald. Goodbehere, for the real purpose of the Meeting of the Court was, to canvass the conduct of Mr. Wardle since the Vote of Thanks. The Court had done so, and it appeared, in the course of that inquiry, upon a recital of facts, that such conduct had been highly meritorious and beneficial to the public; and the tendency of the Resolution was to express that feeling. The tendency of the Amendment was, to prevent that justice being done to Mr. Wardle, under pretence of friendship to him. I have often been charged, said he, with being a party man; but now I am

ged with being of no party. Thus it is that we have seen party men make a great deal about corruption, until they can create discontent enough in the Public to turn out an Administration, and get themselves into it, and then they are contented, while the people are no better off than before; but if you attack Corruption itself, instead of only attacking those who feed upon it, then you have all parties upon your back, because you are destroying their food. Thus have I met my friend (Mr. Mawman) at the Whig Club (for it is not every member of the Whig Club that is a Whig, believe me)—I am a Whig certainly; I was taught in the Whig School principles which seated his Majesty's illustrious House upon the Throne of these realms. But I have met men at the Whig Club, who came there to follow Charles Fox, and would follow any Fox, if they thought they would get any thing by it; but who would not follow you an inch on the road to destroy corruption itself, although they would cry out against the thing, for the sake of turning out those who profited by it, and get in themselves. Nay, they would oppose you, as they do sometimes in the House of Commons, with professed friendship and real hatred, by the trick of an amendment upon your amendment. I care not for these half-and-half men; nay, I dislike them more, because more ungenerous than an open enemy.—[Burst of applause.]

Mr. Alderman Wood did not scruple to say that Mr. Wardle had actually saved this country, and it was impossible sufficiently to repay him; but for Mr. Wardle's exertions, the Duke of York would have been, at this moment, Commander in Chief, and at the head of the Expedition! and then!—I say, said the worthy Alderman, Mr. Wardle has saved this country.

Mr. MAWMAN had no hesitation in saying that the present Administration ought to be changed; but he saw great danger in telling the people that they were to look for no good from any other party, because it was, in effect, telling the people that they ought to take the government into their own hands. Who, and what was Mr. Wardle, that he should be looked up to as the only human being who could save this country? He saw in him no such transcendent virtue.

Mr. WAITHMAN contended for the propriety of inculcating in the minds of the people, this, maxim. That they are not to

look for any advantage by a change of men: That there must be a change of system. This was the doctrine of Mr. Fox himself; doctrine founded in true wisdom, and which, thank Heaven! was gaining ground every day; doctrine once maintained, even by Mr. Pitt.

The question was then put, and declared by the Lord Mayor, upon a shew of hands, to have been carried in favour of Mr. Mawman's Amendment; but, on a division, the numbers were—For the Amendment, 1 Alderman, 51 Commoners, 2 Tellers—54. For Ald. Goodbehere's Resolutions, 3 Aldermen, 54 Commoners, 2 Tellers—59.—Majority, 5.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Austrian Official Account of the Battle of Wagram, (no date.)

By the 4th, the enemy had completed the new bridge from the Isle of Lobau across a branch of the Danube, in which he was much favoured both by the ground and by an immense number of artillery. The imperial and royal army was drawn up on the eminence behind the rivulet Russ, extending its right wing beyond Sussessbrunn and Kagran, and its left beyond Markgrafen-Neusiedel. The centre was posted near Wagram. The enemy having, in the night between the 4th and 5th, crossed over to the left bank of the Danube, large masses appeared very early in the morning, in the plain. Not long before noon he attacked the line of the imperial and royal army in all its points. But his greatest exertions were directed against the centre, probably with a view of forcing it.—His attacks, though repeated with the greatest impetuosity, and supported by an immense number of ordnance, among which were many batteries of the heaviest calibre, proved this day abortive.—The firing ceased at ten o'clock at night. The imperial and royal army had, on the whole of its line, maintained its positions, and made a considerable number of prisoners, among whom there are many Saxon, Badenese, Italian, and Portuguese soldiers.—On the 6th, in the morning, at four o'clock, the enemy renewed his attacks with still larger masses, and greater impetuosity than on the preceding day. Even thus his efforts against the centre and the right wing were attended with so little success, that the latter had even gained such advantages as to justify the

expectation of the completest victory, when the enemy, with fresh divisions and great superiority, suddenly penetrated the left wing near Markgrafen-Neusiedel, and succeeded, after an obstinate engagement, in compelling it to retreat. One of the wings of the royal and imperial army being thereby exposed, his imperial and royal highness the Archduke and Generalissimo has directed the retreat by the way of Stammersdorf and the Bisamhill, in consequence of which the army occupies a new position, covering the communication with Bohemia. This retreat was made good in the best order and without material loss. In the centre, as well as in the right wing, the enemy suffered very considerably. Six thousand prisoners were taken from him, among whom are three generals. He likewise lost twelve cannon, with ammunition, and was in every respect so much weakened, that he has not attempted since to pursue the imperial and royal army further. Gen. Lasalle is among his dead.—The imperial and royal army has also to lament a great loss. In gen. Nordmann it has been deprived of a very eminent officer. Generals Peter Vecsai, D'Aspre, and Vukassiovitz, are without hopes of recovery. Generals prince of Hesse-Homburg, Stutterheim, and Paar, are less severely wounded. His imperial highness the Generalissimo himself, and prince Lichtenstein, received slight musket-wounds, which, however, will not be attended with any dangerous consequences. It remains to be observed, that the whole army has again afforded such proofs of courage and perseverance, as not to cloud our future prospects with any future apprehensions.

COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF State Trials :

To be completed in Thirty-Six Monthly Parts, forming Twelve large Volumes in Royal Octavo.

The NINTH PART of the above Work was published on Friday the 1st of September. One Part will appear, with the greatest regularity, on the first of each succeeding Month. Those Subscribers

who have expressed their intention of taking the Work in Quarterly Volumes, are respectfully informed that the Third Volume is now ready for delivery.—In order to remove all professional doubts, as to how far this new and enlarged Edition of the State Trials may, with safety, be cited as authority in the Courts, and relied on as of equal authenticity with the former, I think it right to state, that it is intended to be a literal transcript of the last edition, as far as that edition extends; that where I have inserted fuller and better reports of any Cases, or of any parts of Cases, the text of the old Edition will nevertheless be retained; and that the new matter will be distinguished in a manner not to be mistaken, and be distinctly pointed out in the Table of Contents to each volume.—In the last Volume will also be given what I call a PARALLEL INDEX, consisting of two Columns; in the first of which will be inserted, in their order, the numbers of all the Pages in the last Edition; and in the other, correspondent figures shewing in what Volume and Page of the present Work the contents of each Page of the last Edition will be found; by means of which Parallel Index, the place in this Work of any passage occurring in the last Edition, may be ascertained with nearly as much ease and expedition as if the paging of that Edition were preserved; which, it is obvious, would be perfectly impracticable, considering the valuable mass of new matter to be introduced.

To such Gentlemen as may happen to be in possession of curious Trials, or of documents relating to Trials of the description of those to be contained in this Work, I shall be much obliged for a communication of them. If the document, or paper, whether in print or manuscript, be requested to be preserved, great care shall be taken of it.

COBBETT'S Parliamentary Debates:

The Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Volumes of the above Work, comprising the Proceedings in both Houses of Parliament during the last Session, are in the Press, and will be published with all possible dispatch.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 10.] LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1809. [Price 1s.

"His Holiness the Pope, and may he be delivered from his actual state of bondage, as the Children of Israel were from the Land of Egypt."—LORD WELLESLEY'S TOAST. See below.

321]

[322

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

TALavera, its Viscount, and the CONSEQUENCES of his VICTORY.—It was evident, from the first, that there had been no victory at Talavera; and, it is now but too clearly proved, that the defeat has led to consequences the most disastrous; disastrous, I mean, because it has caused the loss of so many of our men, and the suffering of so many more.—The hirelings, whose business it is to deceive and cheat the English people, cannot any longer disguise the fact, that Douro and Talavera is running away, before he has hardly heard of his newly-bestowed titles. Still have they recourse to palliatives. Still do they tell lies to the public, in order to justify the bestowing of those titles. They say, that Talavera's retreat is a most masterly one. Miscreants! They would have said the same if their mothers had been left behind by him to the mercy of the "Vandals." Will these unprincipled hirelings deny, that, only the last week, they represented the French in Spain, as *ferocious barbarians*? Will they deny this; or will they deny, that this newly ennobled hero has left a great number of brave Englishmen, with festering wounds, to the *humanity* of these *ferocious barbarians*?—But, come; let us see his dispatch. Let us see this Wellesley dispatch, written by the vanquisher of Victor at Talavera. Let us see it. Let us hear what this conqueror has to say in defence of his running away from the army he had just vanquished, and for leaving his sick and wounded behind. Come, Baron Douro of Wellesley in the county of Somerset and Viscount Wellington of Talavera, and of Wellington, in the said county; come, thou man of many names; come, thou, whom the Morning Chronicle placed in the *first rank of British heroes*; come Baron Viscount, Douro and Talavera; come, and let us hear, in thine own way, thine own long and piteous story.—The Dispatch, which was published in London last Saturday, the 2nd instant, is dated at DELLYROSA, on the 8th of August, which place is at about 50 or 60 miles

distance from Talavera, the Viscount having got so far on his retreat.—The Dispatch is addressed to Lord Castlereagh. It is rich in subjects whereon to comment; and, as it will, in the end, be found to be of great importance, in many respects, I shall take it paragraph by paragraph, and observe upon each part as I proceed.

"MY LORD; I apprized your Lordship on the 1st inst. of the advance of a French corps towards the Puerto de Banos, and of the probable embarrassments to the operations of the army, which its arrival at Plasencia would occasion; and these embarrassments having since existed to a degree so considerable, as to oblige us to fall back, and to take up a defensive position on the Tagus, I am induced to trouble you more at length with an account of what has passed upon this subject."

The grammar of this paragraph I will not dwell upon, taking it for granted, that Douro and Talavera has been taught the "learned languages," which is, now-a-days, I perceive, allowed to be good plea of exemption from the obligation of writing correct English, and even from that of writing common sense.—The reader will bear in mind, that, in my first article upon the battle of Talavera (page 201) I pointed out to the public the cause of suspicion, which it was easy enough to discover in the not publishing of the *whole* of Douro's letters of the 1st of August, of which letters (two in one day) we were treated only with *extracts*. We now see the reason for giving us only extracts of those letters; for here, at the very outset, Douro reminds Lord Castlereagh, that, in those letters, he apprized him of the *probable approaching embarrassments to the operations of his army*. Not a word of this did our ministers tell us; not a word of this did they publish along with the Park-and-Tower-gun account of their victory of Talavera. The nation were bidden to *rejoice*; and rejoice they did; the hirelings of the press cut their jokes, as usual, upon the chap-fallen state of the factious; the vi-

L

gour and wisdom of the ministry were subjects of praise; Castlereagh was a war-minister without parallel, and Douró was a second Cæsar. This was going on, while the ministry had the letters of the 1st of August in their pockets. This they suffered to go on, while they knew, that, so far from advantages having been gained at Talavera, the most disastrous consequences were to be apprehended from the battle there fought and from the march thither. Nay; if this had been all, they might have found some excuse; they might have said, that they had no power over the press; and, that it was not for them to waste their time in putting a stop to public delusion. But, with the letters of the 1st of August in their pocket; with the proof in their possession, that the battle of Talavera had led to no advantageous consequence; and that, by that battle, together with his march after Victor, Wellesley had got into fearful embarrassments; being, in short, in possession of what must have convinced any men of common discernment, that what has happened would happen, and that flight and misery would be the consequence of Wellesley's operations; in possession of this, they publish, in the king's name, the unprecedented GENERAL ORDER, inserted in my last, in which Order they speak of Victor's as of a *vanquished* army, at the same time that they eulogize the generalship of Wellesley *through the whole of the campaign*; and all this with the evident view of preparing a justification for the titles they were going to confer upon him.—There was this foolish nation, for five or six days, gabbling about "the gallant Sir Arthur," and cutting their jokes upon the Spaniards, who had no share of the *glory*; and there was the Nabob's Paper, the Morning Post, telling the well-dressed rabble of St. James's street about the *three bullet holes*, that had been made in "the gallant Sir Arthur's" hat and coat, which put us, in the country, in mind of Jack Falstaff's hacking his sword and running spear grass up his nose.—All this while, the dispatches of the 1st of August lay snug in the minister's pocket; and, in the next gazette, out come the *brace of titles*, which are hardly notified to the public, when there comes another dispatch, which makes the truth known to us, but which is not, however, published till the substance of it has leaked out to us in hireling paragraphs.—Thus it is, that we are treated; thus we have long been treated; and thus, on account of our own baseness, do

we deserve to be treated.—The present dispatch is evidently looked upon by Barón Douró of Wellesley as a sort of special pleading in his *defence*; that is to say, in defence of his conduct in entering Spain, and in pushing on, in the manner that he did, till he, or at least, a considerable part of his army, overtook a Tartar. It is a set defence, accompanied with numerous proofs documentary; and, to this defence I must beg the reader to pay some little attention.

"When I entered Spain, I had a communication with general Cuesta, through sir Robert Wilson and colonel Roche, respecting the occupation of the Puerto de Banós and the Puerto de Perales, the former of which, it was at last settled, should be held by a corps to be formed under the marquis de la Reyna, to consist of two battalions from general Cuesta's army, and two from Bejár; and that the Puerto de Perales was to be taken care of by the duke del Parque, by detachments from the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo.—I doubted of the capacity of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo to make the detachment to the latter, but so little of the effectual occupation of the former, that in writing to marshal Beresford on the 17th of July, I desired him to look to the Puerto de Perales; but that I considered Banós as secure, as appears by the extract of my letter which I inclose."

The two posts, of which he speaks here, were situated in his *rear*, when he was at Talavera. He had left them in his rear when he advanced after Victor. They were two posts, which lay between his line of advance and Soult; and he is here endeavouring to explain how it happened that these posts became an annoyance to him, instead of a security, and compelled him to retreat in such haste from Talavera, which retreat, it will be observed, he is greatly solicitous not to ascribe to the *dread of Victor*, whom he had "*vanquished*" at Talavera.—Well, Baron; now let us have it.

"On the 30th (of July, the next day after the battle of Talavera) intelligence was received at Talavera, that 12,000 rations had been ordered at Fuente Dueros for the 28th, and 24,000 at Los Santos for the same day, for a French corps, which it

"was believed was on its march towards the Puerto de Banós."

That is to say towards one of the posts, to secure which he had got the Spaniards to send troops.—Now we are going to hear of the *harmony* between the English and Spanish generals. We are going to see how eager they were to fly to this post of danger. We must bear in mind that we are now about to read of what took place on the day of battle, or a day or two before, respecting this post at Banós; though from this confused dispatch, the equal of which I never read, it is very difficult to get at a clear chain of dates, whether of time or of place.

"General Cuesta expressed some anxiety respecting this post, and sent me a message, to propose that *sir Robert Wilson should be sent there with his corps*.—Sir Robert was on that day at Talavera, but his corps was in the mountains towards Escalona; and as he had already made himself very useful in that quarter, and had been near Madrid, with which city he had had a communication, which I was desirous of keeping up, *I proposed that a Spanish corps should be sent to Banós without loss of time*.—*I could not prevail with general Cuesta*, although he certainly admitted the necessity of a reinforcement when he proposed that sir Robert should be sent to Banós; and he was equally sensible with myself of the benefit to be derived to the cause, from sending sir Robert back to Escalona.—At this time we had no further intelligence of the enemy's advance, than that the rations were ordered; and I had hopes that the enemy might be deterred from advancing, by the intelligence of our success on the 28th, and that the troops in the Puerto might make some defence; and that under these circumstances it was not desirable to divert sir R. Wilson from Escalona."

Hence it appears, that our Baron was for sending Spaniards to this important post, and that the Spanish general was for sending Portuguese and English. Cuesta's reasons we do not hear; but, really, those of our Baron do not seem to have much in them. The communication with Madrid was, I should think, by this time, become of little consequence. I do not see, why sir Robert Wilson's corps should not have

been sent; and, as to the blame openly enough attempted to be thrown upon Cuesta, he *might* merit it; but the Baron's logic does not *prove* that he *did* merit it, even admitting the *facts* to be as he states them. This is, however, quite a new way of proceeding towards allies; to accuse them, in this unqualified manner, in dispatches, which, probably, they may not see for many weeks after they are published. Cuesta is here accused of being *sensible of the benefit to be derived to the cause from not sending sir Robert Wilson to Banós*, while he was proposing to send *sir Robert Wilson to Banós*. He is accused of admitting the necessity of a reinforcement to Banós, while *he refuses to send such reinforcement*.—But if it was of great importance to send a reinforcement to Banós, why did not the Baron send one from his own army?

"On the 30th, however, *I renewed my application to general Cuesta*, to send there a Spanish division of sufficient strength, in a letter to gen. O'Donoghue, of which I inclose a copy, *but without effect*; and he did not detach gen. Bassecourt till the morning of the 2d, after we had heard that the enemy had entered Bejar, and it was obvious that the troops in the Puerto would make no defence.—On the 2d we received accounts that the enemy had entered Plasencia in two columns.—The Marquis de la Reyna, whose two battalions consisted of only 600 men, with only 20 rounds of ammunition each man, retired from the Puerto and from Plasencia, without firing a shot, and went to the bridge of Almaraz, which he declared that he intended to remove; the battalions of Bejar dispersed without making any resistance."

Were not the subject so serious; could we forget, for a moment, our poor unfortunate sick and wounded, left to have their wounds dressed and their hearts cheered by "*Vandals*" at the place whence our new-made Viscount takes his title, and whence, in all probability, he will pounce upon us for a pension; if we could forget these things, for a moment, we might laugh at the confusion of ideas that reigns through this paragraph, which sends a Spanish division in a letter to gen. O'Donoghue, and encloses lord Castle-reagh a copy, but without effect.—Here, however, one thing is intelligible enough;

and, that is, that it was very foolish indeed to rely upon any defence, on the part of those who had been left to defend these important posts. What would have been the use of sending *more Spanish troops*, if such was the conduct of those already there? Cuesta appears to have been right. He appears to have known, and, probably, he said, that his countrymen *alone* would do nothing.—The same opinion, in which every event shows him to have been right, appears to have guided his propositions with respect to the future movements of the army; but, here again, we shall find his propositions rejected; and, I must confess, that, as far as I can judge, they are rejected without any good reason.—The reader will bear in mind, that the French, under Soult and others, were now known (on the 30th of July) to be coming on upon the rear of the allied army, while Victor lay, with his “*vanquished*” army in their front, and at no great distance between them and Madrid, where, as we were assured, the people were ready to rise upon Joseph Napoleon, and where sir Robert Wilson had already opened an useful communication.

“The General (Cuesta) called upon me on that day, and proposed that *half of the army* should march to the rear to oppose the enemy, whilst the other half should maintain the post at Talavera.—My answer was, that if by half the army, he meant *half of each army*, I could only answer that I was ready either to go or to stay with the whole British army, but that *I could not separate it*. He then desired me to choose whether I would go or stay, and I preferred to go, from thinking that British troops were most likely to *do the business effectually*, and *without contest*; and from being also of opinion, that it was more important to us than to the Spanish army, to open the communication through Placentia, although very important to them. With this decision General Cuesta appeared perfectly satisfied.”

This was a *refusal* on the part of Wellesley; for Cuesta meant, it is very clear, for the half of *each* army to go and the other half to stay. I am not so inclined to laugh at this proposition as some people appear to be. Cuesta knew, that his troops, when *alone*, were not to be relied on; and “the gallant Sir,” though his eulogists laugh at poor Cuesta, seems to have been full as

fond of the company of the English army as Cuesta himself was. The answer, that he would *either go or stay* does not appear to have much merit in it. It was rather a pouting answer. The Spanish General could not help having the command of forces inferior to the English; nor was there any merit at all in our General in having the command of soldiers of a superior sort. Why not divide the army? I see no reason against it. The measure afforded a chance, at least, of success at both points; whereas the resolution not to divide it seemed to leave no such chance.

—Besides, if Victor was “*vanquished*,” (here we pinch the Baron); if Victor was “*vanquished*,” why care for him or his movements? Why care about what was passing in the rear? Why not push on against the vanquished Victor, and, over him, to Madrid, where the people were ready to revolt against the tyrant and to proclaim Ferdinand? Why send back to seek a battle with Soult, especially as Marshal Beresford (*Marshal Beresford!*) was coming up in the rear of Soult? Why look back; why such a clutter about the rear, if there was nothing but a “*vanquished*” army, between them and the loyal metropolis of the kingdom? All this is to be answered by these facts, and by nothing else; namely, that the army in front was *not* “*vanquished*”; that the battle was, at most for us, a drawn battle; that the allied army dared not advance an inch; and, that it is much to be doubted, whether, even for 24 hours longer, they would have been able to keep possession of Talavera.

—The reasons which Baron Douro gives for choosing to go rather than stay do not appear to me sufficient by any means. He thought, that the British troops were “more likely to do the business *effectually*, and without contest.” What! did he think the French force so small, then, under Soult? He hardly supposed, that the very sight of our whiskers would frighten any thing of an army away. He thought, that, by going away with the whole of his army, what there was to be done, would be done “without contest.” Would it not have been better, then, to divide the armies, as advised by Cuesta, and, by having a little fighting at each end of the line, to defeat the French in both places?—Never was a worse reason than this. Our Baron seems to have fallen in love with doing the business “*without contest*.” I do not blame him for that; but, surely, I would not have taken *all* my army from

Talavera, in order to achieve a victory without contest, unless I could have taken my sick and wounded with me.—There was another reason, however, and that was, the utility of opening a communication with Plasencia; but, if this was so important, why was this communication suffered to be closed; and, besides, all the arguments against the other reason are good against this. It is manifest, that the Baron Douro of Wellesley was in violent haste to get away from Talavera; and it appears to me, that when the question was, which of the two armies should remain at that place, the army which had the place full of its sick and wounded ought to have remained. The army of Victor, though "*vanquished*," was in movement in the front; and, as it was notoriously superior in numbers to that of Soult, how could Lord Viscount Talavera imagine, that Cuesta was more fit to meet it than he was? —We now come to the movements.

"The movements of the enemy in our front, since the 1st, had induced me to be of opinion, that, despairing of forcing us at Talavera, they intended to force a passage by Escalona, and thus open a communication with the French corps coming from Plasencia.—This suspicion was confirmed on the night of the 2d, by letters received from sir Robert Wilson, of which I enclosed copies; and before I quitted Talavera on the 3d, I waited upon General O'Donoghue, and conversed with him upon the whole of our situation, and pointed out to him the possibility, that, in the case of the enemy coming through Escalona, general Cuesta might find himself obliged to quit Talavera, before I should be able to return to him; and I urged him to collect all the carts that could be got, in order to remove our hospital. At his desire I put the purport of this conversation in writing, and sent him a letter to be laid before general Cuesta, of which I inclose a copy."

From this paragraph we clearly perceive, the Baron Douro foresaw, before he quitted Talavera, that Cuesta would soon be after him.—Mark the cautious diplomatic turn, which the communications between these generals had now taken! He put the purport of the conversation in "*writing*." And, for what? For what, valiant soldier? I did not know, that fire-

and-tow soldiers had so much of precaution about them. What did you put it in writing for? "Why, you fool, to send home to my lord Castlereagh, to be sure, in order to prove, that I urged the Spaniards to collect carts in order to remove my hospital." Well; but, good Baron, what made you suspect, that such proof would be necessary? Did you actually anticipate, then, what would befall that unhappy hospital? Did you suspect, that Cuesta would, after all, leave great part of your suffering sick and wounded behind, in case he was attacked by Victor? —But, Baron, good Baron, if you really did think, that it was probable, that Cuesta would be unable to maintain his position against Victor, whom you had just "*vanquished*," why did you choose (for you tell us you chose it) to go away, and that, too, against an inferior force; a force that you expected to be able to demolish without a contest? This question I leave to be answered by the hirelings of the press.—

The putting of the conversation in writing speaks volumes. It shows, as clearly as day-light, what was anticipated. It was at general O'Donoghue's desire, it seems, that it was put in writing, in order that he might have a copy to send to Cuesta. Aye, aye! And so, as my Lord Talavera happened, I suppose, to have a copy of it left, he sent that copy to my Lord Castlereagh. It is an old saying, that you should always keep a useless thing seven years, and if you do not find a use for it in that time, throw it away. My lord Douro found, it seems, a use for this paper in just five days after it was written, though when he drew it up, he does not appear to have foreseen any use in it, as he states that he drew it up at the desire of General O'Donoghue.

"The British army marched on the 3d to Oropesa, general Basset's Spanish corps being at Centinello, where I desired that it might halt the next day, in order that I might be nearer it.—About five o'clock in the evening, I heard that the French had arrived from Plasencia at Naval Moral, whereby they were between us and the bridge of Almaraz.—About an hour afterwards, I received from general O'Donoghue the letter and its inclosures, of which I enclose copies, announcing to me the intention of gen. Cuesta to march from Talavera in the evening, and to leave

"there my hospital, excepting such men as could be removed by the means he already had, on the ground of his apprehension that I was not strong enough for the corps coming from Plasencia, and that the enemy was moving upon his flank, and had returned to Santa Olalla in his front.— I acknowledge that these reasons did not appear to me sufficient for giving up so important a post as Talavera, for exposing the combined armies to an attack in front and rear at the same time, and for abandoning my hospital; and I wrote the letters of which I enclose a copy.—This unfortunately reached the General after he had marched, and he arrived at Oropesa shortly after day-light on the morning of the 4th."

That we have here a pretty good sample of what we have to expect from the co-operation of the Spaniards is certain; but, this we did not want; we had samples enough of this sort before; it is nothing new to us; and, the only thing that surprises us is that Baron and Viscount Talavera should have determined upon leaving his sick and wounded to the defence of an army, part of which, he tells us, in this same dispatch, had, but a few days before, scampered away, at the approach of the French, without firing a shot. This is all that surprises us; and this is what ought to be accounted for.—The Spanish General's reasons, as stated by Baron Douro, are twofold; he quits his position at Talavera, first, because he is afraid, that Soult will be too strong for the Baron; and, second, because he thinks that Victor will be too strong for himself. But, surely, there must be to be found some mitigation of this? At any rate, all harmony must now be at an end between Cuesta and the Baron, the latter of whom wrote, it seems, letters to him, disapproving of his movements. The game, therefore, is up, as far as depends upon co-operation between the Spanish and English army; and, indeed, from the moment I read the Baron's dispatch of the 29th of July, I was convinced, that there could be no more cordial co-operation or communication between them, and that our army would be very lucky indeed, if only one half of it ever reached England.—What remains of this dispatch is a confused detail of the movements, which took place from the 4th to the 8th of August, on which last day

the dispatch was written, concluding (feeling this to be the tender point) with an excuse for leaving behind so many of our unfortunate and suffering countrymen, upon which there remain some remarks to be made.

"The question what was to be done was then to be considered. The enemy, stated to be 30,000 strong, but at all events, consisting of the corps of Soult and Ney, either united, or not very distant from each other, and supposed by Marshal Jourdan and Joseph Buonaparté, to be sufficiently strong to attack the British army, stated to be 25,000 strong, were on one side, in possession of the high road to the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, the bridge at which place we knew had been removed, although the boats still necessarily remained in the river. On the other side, we had reason to expect the advance of Victor's corps to Talavera, as soon as General Cuesta's march should be known, and after leaving 12,000 men to watch Venegas, and allowing from 10 to 11,000 killed and wounded in the late action, this corps would have amounted to 25,000. We could extricate ourselves from this difficult situation only by great celerity of movement, to which the troops were unequal, as they had not had their allowance of provisions for several days, and by success in two battles. If unsuccessful in either, we should have been without a retreat; and if Soult and Ney, avoiding an action, had retired before us, and had waited the arrival of Victor, we should have been exposed to a general action with 50,000 men, equally without a retreat. We had reason to expect, that as the marquis de la Reyna could not remove the boats from the river Almaraz, Soult would have destroyed them. Our only retreat was, therefore, by the bridge of Arco Bispo; and if we had moved on, the enemy, by breaking that bridge while the army should be engaged with Soult and Ney, would have deprived us of that only resource. We could not take a position at Oropesa, as we thereby left open the road to the bridge of Arco Bispo from Talavera by Calera; and after consider-

"ing the whole subject maturely, I was of opinion; that it was advisable to retire to the bridge of Arço Bispo, and to take up a defensive position upon the Tagus, I was induced to adopt this last opinion, because the French have now at least 50,000 men disposable to oppose to the combined armies, and a corps of 12,000 men to watch Vaneegas: and I was likewise of opinion, that the sooner the defensive line should be taken up, the more likely were the troops to be able to defend it. Accordingly I marched on the 4th, and crossed the Tagus by the bridge of Arço Bispo, and have continued my route to this place, in which I am well situated to defend the passage of Almaraz and the lower parts of the Tagus. General Cuesta crossed the river on the night of the 5th, and he is still at the bridge of Arço Bispo. About 2,000 of the wounded have been brought away from Talavera, the remaining 1,500 are there; and I doubt whether, under any circumstances, it would have been possible or consistent with humanity, to attempt to remove any more of them. From the treatment which some of the soldiers wounded on the 27th, and who fell into the hands of the enemy, experienced from them, and from the manner in which I have always treated the wounded who have fallen into my hands, I expect that these men will be well-treated; and I have only to lament, that a new concurrence of events, OVER WHICH, from circumstances, I HAD AND COULD HAVE NO CONTROUL, should have placed the army in a situation to be obliged to leave any of them behind."

"Oh! most lame and impotent conclusion," of a big-sounding adventure!—Reader, let us not be blinded by this confused account. Let us, while we have the thing before us, blow the dust away, and get a sight of the matter as it really stands. —Here we find the Baron and his army, or, rather, the remains of it, at a place called Deleytosa, on the banks of the river Tagus, fifty miles, perhaps, below Talavera, and, of course, so much nearer Portugal, so much nearer the spot whence he had originally started in pursuit of the Tartar, Victor, so far, in short, on his re-

treat. Well, what brought him hither? Aye, Nabob's print, answer us that question. What brought him hither?—Well, then, that question being so, full of gravel, answer us this: with *what view* did he leave Talavera? Was it not with a view of going in quest of Soult? and, did he not assign as a reason, for quitting Talavera, and leaving his hospital to the care and defence of the Spaniards, that he thought he and his army would "do the business effectually, and without a contest?" Now, what business was it, that induced him thus to quit his post and to leave his hospital? Why, the meeting and the beating of Soult, to be sure, and this he was pretty confident of doing without a contest. But, behold, having quitted Talavera, having marched from his Viscounty and his hospital with this view, and with this avowed intention, instead of going on to meet Soult, and to "do the business effectually," he turns short to his left, and gets over, with all possible alacrity, to that side of the Tagus where Soult is not, and we hear him talk of nothing but of broken down bridges, intercepted retreats, being placed between two fires; and, in short, of all sorts of dangers.—Reader, compare the two parts of the dispatch, and make use of your senses in pronouncing upon the conduct of this General, even as represented by himself. What prevented him from pursuing his original intention of going on to meet Soult? What had happened to supercede that intention? Nothing can be pretended to have happened except the quitting of Talavera by Cuesta, and even that the Baron had anticipated before he himself quitted Talavera. In short, it is to insult the understandings of my readers to suppose, that they do not clearly perceive, that the Baron is utterly unable to reconcile those two parts of his dispatch; that his marching to meet Soult was, in fact, marching from Victor; and that, from beginning to end, we have, in this dispatch, nothing but attempts to disguise the real character of the operations and the real nature of the situation of our army.—Such attempts succeed with the very ignorant, and with those who wish to be deceived; but, men of sense, after reading long and confused accounts, recur to main points; and, when they do that, in this case, these are the facts that strike them: Douro and Talavera and Cuesta chose to go in pursuit of Victor; on the 29th of July Douro and Talavera alone "vanquished" Victor, Cuesta having stood by as a spectator; from

the 29th of July to the 3rd of August Douro and Talavera and Cuesta lay at Talavera without budging an inch after the "vanquished" Victor; on the 3rd of August Douro and Talavera quits his Viscounty and leaves his hospital to the care and defence of Cuesta, in order to go and meet Soult, and to *do his business effectually and without contest*; on the 4th of August, Cuesta, fearing that his friend Douro would not be a match for "the cursed Soult," and seeing the *vanquished* Victor, like a wounded snake, beginning to stir again, went after Talavera and his army; once more united, on the 4th of August, they, instead of going on to do Soult's business effectually and without contest, join together and most cordially co-operate in getting across the Tagus, *lest their retreat should be cut off*. This is the story they tell. Here it is in a few short sentences; and, though the people in general may not, at once, see the real truth, through this confused mass of insignificant detail, they will see it in the end; but, I am by no means satisfied, that the conviction will produce any good effect, so complete is the chain of influence and of dependance.—Upon the last dispatch I observed, that our Viscount avoided to give us even any hint as to the ACTUAL NUMBERS of either the *Spanish Army* or HIS OWN, while he was wonderfully minute in his accounts of the force of the French, their losses, and all other matters relating to them. The present dispatch is still more strongly marked with that suspicious omission. Douro of Wellesley is endeavouring, he is labouring hard, to give us a satisfactory reason for his determination to get over the Tagus; that is to say, in the language of the GENERAL ORDER, applied to the French, to *escape* from Soult and Victor. They had not *actually joined*, you will observe; but, he *supposed* they *might join*, and, upon that supposition he, in order to avoid having his retreat cut off, hastened to get over the Tagus. In order to shew us, that this measure was not resolved upon without reasonable cause of apprehension, he falls to work, and has all his fingers in motion, counting the *numbers of the French*. He takes them in detail; tells us how many Soult has and how many Victor has left; and, he brings, at last, into the field, 50 thousand men, under these two generals (*both of whom he had vanquished*, observe) to fight against him and his Spanish allies. Now, I ask the reader whether it be possible for it not

to occur to Douro, upon this occasion, that his statement was not worth a straw, unaccompanied with a statement of his *own numbers and those of Cuesta*? It is a reason of numbers that he is giving us; and, could it have escaped him, that the numbers on one side were of no use without those on the other side? No: this could not have escaped him; and it is not necessary to point out to the reader *why* a statement of the numbers of our army and of that of Cuesta was omitted. The reason is too plain not to be perceived, even by this hood winked nation.—But, if our Baron does not choose to give us a statement of numbers, there are those who will do it, and who *have done it*. To be sure, it was without a parallel to be so minute, not only as to the numbers of the enemy, but as to what the *enemy said* of our numbers! He could tell us what the enemy said of our numbers, but did not think it necessary to tell us himself what they were. No thanks to you, then, Baron Douro of Wellesley, Joseph Napoleon and his war-minister will tell us, and they will tell us, too, a little more about your "*hospital*," and about your crossing the Tagus at the bridge of Arço Bispo, to *take up a defensive position*, than you have thought proper to tell us.—The following PROCLAMATION, signed by Joseph Napoleon, and the ORDER OF THE DAY which follows it, signed by BELLIARD, governor of Madrid, are both dated on the 10th of August, two days, the reader will perceive, *after* the date of Baron Douro's last dispatch.

PROCLAMATION, MADRID, AUGUST 10.
 "Soldiers! It is scarcely fifteen days since
 "120,000 enemies, consisting of English,
 "Portuguese, and Spaniards, who marched
 "from different points, rendezvoused under
 "the walls of my capital; but united on
 "the 26th of July at the bridge of Guadarrama, the 1st and 4th corps, and the
 "reserve, defeated, on that day, the enemy.
 "On the 27th he repassed, in great haste,
 "the Alberche. On the 28th, attacked
 "in a position judged unattackable, 80,000
 "men have not been able to contend against
 "40,000 French.—From that time, renouncing their chimerical project of conquest, they have thought but of safety, and have abandoned the field of battle. More than 6,000 English wounded
 "are in our hospitals.—The least of our corps,
 "the 1st, was judged sufficient to keep in
 "check this army, still so numerous in
 "spite of its losses. It remained upon the
 "Alberche, while the 4th corps and the

"reserve set out on the 29th to succour Toledo, besieged by the army of La Mancha, and that of Madrid, menaced by the same army, has forced the enemy, already within four leagues of the capital, to relinquish its prey. It has re-passed the Tagus, in the greatest haste, and flies towards the Sierra Morena, after having abandoned some thousands of killed, wounded and prisoners. The 2d, 5th and 6th corps are following the rear guard of the enemy's army. These corps formed a junction with the 1st corps at Orhasen, on the 7th August.—*The English fly in every way in disorder, and by roads hitherto judged impracticable to artillery. The 2d and 5th corps are pursuing them.*—Soldiers! you have saved my capital, the King of Spain thanks you; you have done more, the brother of your Emperor sees flying before your eagles the eternal enemy of the French name. The Emperor will know all that you have done, he will acknowledge the brave who have made themselves conspicuous among the brave, those who have received honourable wounds; and if he says to us, "I am content with you," we shall be sufficiently recompensed."

"ORDER OF THE DAY, MADRID, AUG. 10.—The First and Fifth Corps overtook, beyond the bridge of Arcobispo, the rear guard of the English Army, entirely destroyed it, and took from it thirty pieces of cannon, their caissons, a great part of their equipage, many horses, and a great number of prisoners.—It is also in pursuit of the army of Vanegas, and has made a great number of prisoners; it has retired into the mountains of Sierra Morena."

Observe again, these papers are of a date two days later than the dispatch of Wellesley. I perceive, that the hiring prints do not appear to pay any attention at all to this statement in the ORDER OF THE DAY, though corroborated by Joseph Napoleon's Proclamation, which was written, it appears, on the 9th at Toledo. The hirings do not believe a word of the flight and disorder, mentioned in the proclamation; nor of the destruction of our rear guard, beyond the bridge of Arcobispo, and the loss of some of our cannon, baggage, and horses; and the reason why the hirings do not believe any thing of this, is, that the event must have taken place before the 8th of August, and Baron Douro of Wellesley does not say any thing about it.

Now, for my part, I find quite enough to do in believing what he *does* say, and shall certainly draw no favourable conclusions from what he *does not* say. Not to waste time and paper, I believe the Order of the Day and the Proclamation to be substantially correct. Some exaggeration I always allow for on both sides; but, between Talavera's dispatches, and the publications of Belliard and his sovereign, there is this important distinction; that while the latter are issued and read upon the spot, almost upon the field of battle, and, at any rate, amongst those who are, from their local situation, able to discover any material mis-statement in them; while this is the case with respect to the French publications, the dispatches of our Baron are published where it is almost impossible to disprove their contents, and where, supposing the truth of those contents to be questionable, there are always hiring pens in abundance to defend whatever is published by authority. It must, in most cases, be some months before any statement, made in a dispatch from abroad, can be fully examined, and compared with facts; by that time, the examination becomes useless; and so it goes off. Quite different is it, and must it be, with those who have to address armies and people upon the spot. (By-the-bye, we see no Proclamation of our Viscount to his army and to the people of his Viscounty). Quite different must it be in that case. If, for instance, the English army had not been overtaken at Arcobispo and been attacked, in the manner stated by Belliard, does any one believe, that Belliard, who issues his Order at Madrid, only about eighty miles from Arcobispo, or less perhaps, would have so positively asserted such a fact? A fact, too, of such great importance, a statement entering into particulars, "30 pieces of cannon, their covered waggons, a great part of their equipage, many horses, and a great number of prisoners?" Does any man believe, that Belliard, the governor of Madrid, would have published this, if it had not had, at least, *some truth* in it? Does any man believe, that he would have published upon the spot, so gross, so glaring, so impudent, and so useless a falsehood? Yet Baron Douro of Wellesley, though he wrote four days after his passage of the bridge of Arcobispo, says not a word about so important a matter. Let us remember this; for, in the end, the truth must all come out.—Again, if the French had had but 1,500 of our sick and wounded left in their

hands, must not the impudence of Joseph Napoleon be such as to surpass even those who manufacture lies for our home-consumption? He addresses himself to his *Soldiers*. Some of these, at any rate, must know what an impudent liar he is, if there be only 1,500 of our poor souls in his hospitals; if that be the case, they must know him to be not only a liar but a braggart, and, no man likes to be known for such, or to expose himself to the risk of it, as he evidently must by making such a statement, in so solemn a manner, to those who are upon the spot, and thousands of whom must be acquainted with the real state of the case.—Yet, he does say, that there are 6,000; aye, “*more than six thousand*” “*ENGLISH* wounded in his hospitals.” There is great difference between “*more than six thousand*,” and “*one thousand five hundred*.”—Then, as to the numbers of the armies, it is singular enough, that, exclusive of the corps of Sir Robert Wilson and General Craufurd, our hirelings stated the allied army at as many within 16,000 men as Joseph Napoleon now states it at. He says 120,000 all together. Our hirelings, before the battle of Talavera, put it 104,000, exclusive of the two corps above-mentioned.—Joseph Napoleon says, we had 80,000 men in the battle of Talavera, and Victor 40,000. Victor has sent 12,000 in pursuit of Venegas, he lost (our Baron says) 11,000 in the battle of Talavera, consequently he has only 17,000 left, which number, joined to Soult’s 25,000, who were “*totally discomfited* on the Douró,” make 42,000 men; while we and the Spaniards have, according to Joseph Napoleon’s account, 70,000 men to oppose to them, supposing us to have lost *ten* thousand at Talavera. *I believe* Joseph Napoleon’s statement of numbers; and I believe it the more firmly, because Baron Douro so cautiously avoids saying anything that may lead us even to *guess* at his numbers or those of Cuesta. If all had been as it ought to be, why should he withhold from us this statement of numbers. Joseph Napoleon talks of numbers; of *his own* as well as of those of his enemy; but, Joseph Napoleon has, I am afraid, *real* victories to announce; and that it is which induces him to state numbers.—This nation, whatever other faults it may have, is never deficient on the score of compassion, and, therefore, I will not harrow up the bosoms of my readers by an attempt to describe the situation of our unfortunate countrymen, and the dearest relations of

some of us, lying in the hospitals at the mercy of an enemy whom our hirelings call Vandals, and that, too, at a place, the name of which makes part of a title for their commander, purchased with their valour! This commander tells us, indeed, that, under any circumstances, it would not have been *consistent with humanity* to attempt to remove any more of the wounded. May be so; but, was it *absolutely necessary* to leave them? The Baron says, that he had his *choice* to go, or to stay, and that *he chose* to go, and not to stay.—But, it seems, that the French are not “*Vandals*,” that they *take very good care of our wounded* that fall into their hands; and, that there is every reason to suppose, that our helpless countrymen at Talavera “*will be well-treated*.” This is a consoling discovery; and, like all other good things, though good in itself, it is the better for coming *precisely at the moment that it is wanted*. We wanted a discovery of this sort; we wanted to find out that the French were humane; this was wanted, in order to palliate the calamity, which had befallen our army, and which could no longer be disguised; we wanted the discovery, and we have made it. Now, then, let the hireling tribe stay their attacks, for a while, at least, upon the “*Vandals*,” and let that pensioned doggerel-maker, FITZGERALD, be taught by his setters-on, that though his pen is unequal to the task of arousing any good passion, it may succeed in arousing evil ones. Let the turtle-patriots, if they must meet and toast, restrain their disposition to abuse the French, merely because they fear them. Our new Viscount bears witness to the humanity of the French. Oh! what a fact to publish to the people of England! I question but it is, by some people, considered as by far the most melancholy fact in the whole of this melancholy dispatch; and, certain I am, that if any writer in England had represented the French as a humane and generous enemy, he would, by all the hirelings of the day, have been represented as a most diabolical Jacobin.—We now come to the last sentence of this dismal dispatch. I cannot help repeating it. “*I have only to lament, that “a new concurrence of events, over which, “from circumstances I had, and could have, “no controul, should have placed the army “in a situation to be obliged to leave any “of them, (the wounded) behind.”*—This is dismal, indeed. I could almost pity the man who wrote it, though half a dozen new names have been lately tacked

own. What! "*no controul*" over events! Did he not *choose* to march Spain? Did he not choose to pursue? Did he not choose to fight with the Tartar and to "*vanquish*" him? Did he not choose to remain at Talavera and not push on after the "*vanquished*" Victor? And, lastly, does he not expressly say, that he *chose* to come away from Talavera, *leaving his hospital there*, and that, too, under circumstances that made him think it necessary to have a diplomatic conversation with General O'Donoghue about the latter's collecting carts, in order to bring away our poor fellows, who were sick and wounded! You have been made a Baron and a Viscount for your deeds through the campaign, for your ability, valour, and "*military resource*;" and do you now tell us, that you had "*no controul*" over the events that have occurred? Why not the same controul *after*, as well as *before* and *during*, your success? You must take the whole of the campaign together. If you had "*no controul*" in the retreat, you had none in the advance; if none in your defeats, none in your victories.—If you mean merely to say: "*I can't help it*;" it is very well. The Archduke Charles could not help it, the other day; but, he did not pretend, that he had "*no controul*" over what was passing. He did not make use of any phrase, calculated to produce an impression, that he was, in this case, to be looked upon as having nothing to do with the matter.—It is easy to see, that the blame is to fall upon Cuesta; but, as far as I have power in this way, I shall make a point of seeing that he has fair play. I have not yet forgotten the fate of poor Sir Hugh and Burrard. Any body but a Wellesley was then to be sacrificed; and we shall, I am convinced, now see some pretty work with regard to Cuesta. The thing is now, however, a little more difficult; for, it will be necessary to include, more or less, the Spanish *army* in the blame with Cuesta; and, then, we come to the fulfilment of my predictions, when the hirelings said, that I was "*instigated by the Devil*."—Our Baron seems to have been seized with a wonderful degree of precaution, all at once. He talks of bridges and retreats, counts the numbers of his enemies, measures the distances they have to march before they can get at him, calculates all the chances of defeat with the greatest nicety; does not move a leg, without first looking all round him. There is

a time for all things; but, with due submission to the Viscount, I am of opinion, that, when he got into the situation, described towards the close of his dispatch, the time for *caution* was passed, and the time for *dashing* arrived. The time for caution was, when he *entered* Spain. It is easy to dash; it is easy to be "*a dasher*," when the enemy is forty leagues off, or is retreating before you with half your numbers. Any body can dash under such circumstances. But, the dasher that I like to see is, a dasher who *falls on upon superior numbers*, or who, when in the centre of difficulties, resolves upon *fighting*, instead of *marching*, his way through them. That is the sort of dasher that I like; and is, I believe, the sort, which, hitherto, has been generally approved of in this country, though I will not answer for it, that in complaisance to the Wellesleys the nation may not acknowledge, that its taste, in this respect, has been erroneous.—While these things are going on in the heart of Spain, the MARQUIS is at work in the southern part of that devoted country. I shall have no room, in my present number, to touch upon any other subject than that of Spain; but, I prefer finishing it to the introduction of the Expedition to Holland, or any thing else, Spain being at this moment, the great object of our hopes and our fears, or, rather, of the hopes of the foolish and the fears of the wise.—This war for Ferdinand VII. was first proclaimed by Mr. Canning, at the London Tavern, amidst the shouts of loyal contractors and stock-jobbers. Just such another set has, it seems, met to celebrate the arrival of the Marquis in Spain. The Account of this celebration is most curious, and well worthy of being recorded. I will, therefore, insert it here, just as I find it in the hireling news-papers; and, the reader may be assured, that he will often have occasion to refer to it.

CADIZ, 13 AUG.—"It is barely possible to imagine a more remarkable moment than that which hailed the appearance of his excellency the marquis Wellesley in this country; and, as if purposing to enrol his arrival among the *memorabilia of Spain*, PROVIDENCE seems to have fixed the hour, when overflowing with admiration and gratitude towards his brother, for the signal services Spain and her cause had derived from British courage and British gallantry, under sir Arthur's command, on the 28th of July. The day, ushered in by the ringing of

“bells and the discharge of cannon, was
 “closed with a most brilliant and ge-
 “neral illumination, and every other de-
 “monstration of joy the inhabitants of
 “Cadiz could display.—To enumerate
 “the honours paid to the Marquis, would
 “exceed the limits of a letter; his recep-
 “tion was distinguished by marks of enthu-
 “siastic love and veneration for the sove-
 “reign and nation he is come to represent,
 “that assuredly never have been surpassed,
 “if ever equalled, on any occasion; and
 “which must have been to his excellency,
 “individually, a source of proud and gra-
 “tifying sensation. An immense con-
 “course of persons, without distinction of
 “rank, had assembled to meet the Mar-
 “quis on his landing, and many were
 “paying him the rather unusual compli-
 “ment, in this country, of drawing the
 “carriage, the doors of which were open,
 “the box and every part occupied pro-
 “miscuously by those eager to greet his
 “arrival. His excellency selected one
 “out of the number, and gave him a purse
 “well stocked with gold, to distribute
 “among his fellow-citizens; but the hon-
 “nest Spaniard, named Justo Lobato, by
 “trade a shoe-maker, instantly returned
 “the purse, with its contents, to the Mar-
 “quis; and in the name, and amidst the
 “acclamations of the surrounding multi-
 “tude, coupled their thanks for his intended
 “princely gift, with the assurance, as an
 “apology for declining it, that the proofs of
 “respect, esteem and gratitude, he was then
 “witnessing, were the genuine and univer-
 “sal sentiment of the whole Spanish na-
 “tion, who found the only reward they
 “could most value in the opportunity of
 “thus manifesting their feelings.—The Bri-
 “tish subjects here, merchants and others,
 “were of course not behind-hand in the
 “attention due to the Representative of
 “their beloved Sovereign: through our
 “worthy and respected Consul, James
 “Duff, esq. they begged permission to
 “wait on his Excellency in a body, by
 “whom they were received with affabili-
 “ty and urbanity, at once honourable to
 “him, and flattering to them.—On Mon-
 “day, the 7th inst. the day fixed upon by
 “the Marquis, the entertainment pre-
 “pared for his Excellency was honoured
 “by his presence, that of his suite, the
 “heads of the Government, Army, Navy,
 “and other departments, the British Ad-
 “miral, and other Officers of distinction,
 “the Sicilian Ambassador, the Pope’s
 “Nuncio, several of the first Grandes,

“and other Spanish Noblemen, the prin-
 “cipal British Merchants, and others con-
 “nected in the trade of both countries,
 “&c. &c.—The dinner on the occasion
 “was in the most capacious room Cadiz
 “could afford, at the Land-gate, or Puerta de
 “Tierra; and the whole was conducted in
 “a manner that reflects the highest credit
 “on the Managers, at the head of whom
 “were James Gordon, esq. President, and
 “Duncan Shaw, esq. Vice President.—
 “Two regimental bands, Spanish and Eng-
 “lish, struck up favourite airs to welcome
 “the company as they alighted from their
 “carriages.—At half-past three the table
 “was served, and between the removal of
 “the first and the introduction of the se-
 “cond course, the President gave as a
 “toast, which was drank with three times
 “three:—

“*“ His Excellency the Most Noble the*
 “*“ Marquis Wellesley; and may the auspi-*
 “*“ cious moment of his arrival prove the*
 “*“ presage of continued successes, and of*
 “*“ perpetual amity and union between the two*
 “*“ countries.”*

“His Excellency, in a concise, but most
 “admirable speech, took occasion to ad-
 “dress the meeting; and concluded by
 “expressing, in a tone of energy and
 “confidence, in which every one present
 “sympathised, his firm belief and hope,
 “that a perseverance in the enthusiastic
 “spirit of attachment to their country’s
 “cause, which he had remarked since his
 “arrival, would afford him the gratifica-
 “tion, before he left Spain, of seeing the
 “liberty of the country firmly establish-
 “ed on the basis of their ancient institu-
 “tions, improved and perfected by the ex-
 “perience of modern wisdom.—When the
 “desert was placed, independently of the
 “plateaux, ornaments, and other devices
 “suited to the day, the table presented a
 “very pleasing, though perhaps novel
 “sight, to the British eye, the cloth being
 “decorated with graceful festoons, formed
 “by variegated coloured leaves of dif-
 “ferent odoriferous flowers, terminating
 “at each end with the Spanish motto:—

“*Vivan Fernando Septimo y Jorge.*
Tercero.” (1)

“After dinner, the following toasts
 “were given in succession, in both lan-

(1) “Long live Ferdinand the seventh and
 “George the third.”

N. B. The opposite end was reversed,
 and George the third placed first in the
 motto.

"guages, accompanied with appropriate
"popular Spanish or English airs, marches,
" &c.

" "*Ferdinand the Seventh*"—with three
"times three.

" "*George the Third*"—with three times
"three.

"The following were drank with three
"only:

" "*The Emperor of Austria, and our other*
" "*Allies.*"

" "*Spain; and may the heroic efforts of her*
" "*brave and loyal People terminate in the*
" "*complete restoration of her Independence,*
" "*Liberty, and Glory.*"

" "*His Excellency General Don Gregorio*
" "*de la Cuesta.*"

" "*His Excellency General sir Arthur*
" "*Wellesley.*"

" "*The Archduke Charles of Austria, and*
" "*success to the Austrian Arms.*"

" "*The Spanish Armies, and their gallant*
" "*Commanders.*"

" "*The British Army, and their gallant*
" "*Commanders.*"

" "*The British Navy.*"

" "*The Spanish Navy.*"

Given by the Marquis before sitting
down.

" "*His Holiness the Pope, and may he be*
" "*delivered from his actual state of bondage,*
" "*as the Children of Israel were from the*
" "*land of Egypt.*"

" "*The Supreme Central Junta of Spain,*
" "*and may the means employed by them to*
" "*place the country in its present proud situ-*
" "*ation, never fail them until they have ac-*
" "*complished the great end to which they*
" "*have pledged themselves.*"

" "*The Immortal Defenders of Saragossa*
" "*and Gerona.*"

" "*The Heroes of Baylen.*"

" "*The loyal Inhabitants of the Spanish*
" "*Colonies, and prosperity to their Commerce*
" "*and Establishments.*"

" "*The City of Cadiz, the prosperity of its*
" "*Commerce, and happiness of its worthy In-*
" "*habitants.*"

"At about eight in the evening the
"dinner party withdrew, to prepare for
"the ball that was to follow at the The-

"atre; and at which not only the nobili-

"ty, gentry, merchants, with their ladies
"resident at Cadiz, but those of Puerto,

"Santa Maria, Isla, Xerez, and every
"other place within reach of the very

"short notice that could be given, were
"invited. The Theatre was most bril-

"liantly illuminated, and so contrived,
"that the stage and pit, forming a most

"spacious saloon for the amateurs of
"dancing, left the first and second range

"of boxes for spectators who chose to ap-

"pear in full dress. The third and upper

"boxes were for the accommodation of
"those who came in the usual costume of

"the country; and the remaining parts of
"the house were appropriated for the

"other inhabitants, among whom tickets
"of admission had also been distributed.

"At the end of the saloon over the stage
"a transparency was placed, with the de-

"vice:—
" "*Viván Cuesta y Wellesley, y los bizarros*
" "*Defensores de la Patria, del día 28 de*
" "*Julio.*" (2)

"At the end opposite, and between the
"portraits of the Kings of Great Britain

"and Spain, which were surmounted by
"the Royal Standards of both Nations,

"another transparency had the following
"inscription: (3)

Ferdinando el mas amado,

Victima de traicion;

Tu pueblo ha de vengarte,

Con fe y resolucion.

Espana, Espana toda,

Su vota ha de cumplir;

Por su fe y su Rey,

De vencer o morir.

"As an attempt to do justice to the
"splendor of the scene, to the assem-

"blage of rank, fashion, beauty and ele-

"gance, that graced the Theatre, is out
"of all question, some faint idea may still

"be formed, from the fact of between
"three and four thousand persons hav-

"ing attended; and that, until seven
"o'clock on the morning of the Tuesday,

"the merry dance was kept alive with
"that vivacity so peculiar to the Spanish

"fair: at this hour the house was cleared,
"and all had retired, highly pleased,

"and in perfect good humour with each
"other."

Now, for my part, I should not be at all
surprized if this doggerel was manufac-

tered here in England, and carried out to
Spain for the occasion. The whole thing

(2) "Long live Cuesta and Wellesley, and
"the valiant defenders of the Country, on
"the 28th July."

(3) Ferdinand, most beloved,
By a treacherous foe betrayed,

Thy people shall avenge thy cause,
With firmness undismayed.

Each Spaniard's heart and hand shall join,
And shout the nation's cry,

For their Faith and their King,
To conquer or to die.

is so of a piece with the precious fooleries that are so frequently witnessed at the London Tavern, that I should not wonder, if even the toasts had been first written here and sent out, ready printed. There only wanted half a score hired singers to make the thing sterling English.—It is mightily good, to be sure, to see “the hour fixed by PROVIDENCE,” in order that the reception of the Marquis might unite, in point of time, with his Brother’s victories! By this time, the tone of the wretched parasites must be changed, I suppose, and it would be no wonder, if they were to abuse Providence as much as they have abused the French.—Along with this account of Wellesley’s reception, there has appeared, in the hireling newspapers, a letter, or pretended letter, from Cadiz, of the 14th of August, which concludes thus:—“Various reports are abroad “of Soult, with the wreck of his army, “without artillery, having reached the “Puerte de Almaraz and surrendered; but “there is nothing certain. *The Marquis* “left this on the 9th for Seville, under a “grand salute from the Muralla. *Every* “body has a good opinion of him, and anticipates great things if he is but stationary.— “Pay no attention to the reports and gloomy “stuff you will have in abundance per the “packet. Every thing is going on as well “as can be expected in a contest with such “experienced foes, and with an enemy “who has so much at stake. Intrigues “were on foot, and report says *Frere* was “made a fool of; but the Marquis has set “to work the right way.”—This is curious. The reader may be assured, that this was not written without an intended effect in England. POOR FRERE! “made a fool of,” indeed! I wonder who could be fool enough to set about that job? Poor fellow! He that used to cap such pretty verses in the Anti-Jacobin newspaper! It really grieves me to see him handled in this contemptuous way.—Well; but there is the Marquis at Seville, then? There he is. He has taken all upon him; and, we are told, he has “set to work the “right way.” He has told the Spaniards, we see, that he expects, before he leaves Spain, to see “the liberty of the country “firmly established.” What sort that liberty is of, none of us can, perhaps, precisely tell, but, this we may be assured of, that he means to include the expulsion of the French. This is the point. I want nothing more than this. He is now where I have long wished to see him. He was,

afraid, I dare say, that, when Buonaparté went away into Germany and took nine tenths of his army along with him, there would be nothing left in Spain for him to do. So was I too; for, I really did wish to see how the Marquis and his brothers would beat the Buonapartés, though, I must confess, that I had my suspicions that French armies were not quite so easily beaten as the armies of the Nabob Vizier of Oude. —I wonder if the Nabob Vizier of Oude be alive. I wish poor Paull was.—I wish the eyes of the nation to be fixed upon this scene. I wish it not, for one moment, to lose sight of the Wellesleys. This is our great family; our race of statesmen and heroes. I will not disguise my weakness: I did feel a little vexed at the thought of the Wellesleys being sent to Spain, just after Napoleon and his army appeared to be got into embarrassments in Germany. I will confess, that I was mortified at the thought of our great family being deprived of an opportunity of facing the race of Napoleons. The war in Germany is now over; and, really, if the Emperor himself should not return to Spain, it does appear that the Dukes of Belluno and Dalmatia will, for a time, at least, find employment for our family. Not for long, without doubt; for that would be a mortification indeed.—Some of the hirelings, enemies of the country, have hinted, that our Baron is coming home. What! come home! Oh, no; that will never do. There will be no coming home, I trust, for any one of the family, till the battle has been fairly fought out. No, no: they have taken to the concern, at a moment, too, when Buonaparté was hard pushed upon the Danube, and it will never do to transfer it now to other hands. The hero of Talavera and Douro has got his titles, and I hope he will remain to finish his work. The hireling prints must, however, be watched; for, I clearly see, that they are endeavouring to prepare the public for something of the sort just spoken of.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, Thursday, 7 August, 1809.

THE EDINBURGH REVIEWERS,

AND PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

SIR;—I have just read the Edinburgh Review on the subject of Parliamentary Reform. Knowing the party to which these Reviewers belong, it was easy to anticipate their sentiments on this subject; and I was

curious to learn their opinions as to the arguments by which they support them. The article is long, elaborate, and very philosophical; and need hardly mention diametrically opposite to your opinions. But, as Junius remarked, much is not always proved where much is said; and I think a very few words only will be necessary to prove the complete fallacy of their doctrines.—— In the first place we must agree with them that a vast influence must naturally follow the taxes raised to pay the interest of our overgrown debt and public establishments; and every person must admit that this is an evil which a Reform in Parliament may palliate but cannot cure. All patronage, they go on to demonstrate, is substantially vested in the majority of the House of Commons; and that this House of Commons is again chosen by “certain individuals” who, in consequence of long hereditary connection and other causes which need not be explained, have obtained the power, not only of securing their own election, but of several of their friends also. But the question of the policy of breaking down this monopoly they rather evade by saying that “the people themselves are infected with the love of place and emolument;” and that patronage naturally begets “a proclivity in them to side with the executive.” They therefore recommend to us to go on in the old way of playing off one set of the present sort of men against another.—— The simple answer to all this is, that in the present state of things, the majority of the House of Commons, by their acknowledgment, represents only certain Borough-mongers, whereas in a reformed state it would represent the nation. Few indeed know so little of human nature as to imagine that men will not always be governed by their own interest; and that the people, supposing a Reform to have taken place, would not still seek place and emolument by siding with the majority of the House of Commons, or with a ministry chosen by them, which is the same thing. But in the former case that majority would be the representatives of Borough-mongers, in the latter of the nation; and in the one case the people would have to recommend themselves by doing that which was agreeable to Borough-mongers, in the other to the nation. It cannot be conceived that any representation of the whole people, and property of the kingdom periodically responsible to their constituents, could

have motives for being corrupt themselves, or for countenancing corruption in others. When a fair representation took place, every object of ambition would be acquired more easily by legitimate than indirect means; and we would then never see a ministry endeavouring to keep their places by appointing “any person recommended by those powerful individuals” who choose the House of Commons, “however slenderly qualified, to any situation however important,” because they would have the advantage of the whole to consult, and would be necessitated to rely upon the integrity and wisdom of their measures alone, for the popularity of their administration. A few (Borough-mongers) may have an interest different from the community; but the nation could never have an interest different from its own.——They conclude by remarking “the vital necessity of a certain infusion of royal and aristocratical influence” not only in the House of Commons, but in the election of its members, “lest the control of the executive should be utterly lost and abandoned, and the government be changed into a virtual republic.” But supposing a Reform in Parliament to have taken place, is it probable that a Parliament chosen by the whole people could have any interest which the King ought to stand in the way of? Or if he did, should he not be compelled to yield? Besides, the horror of such a republic must appear not a little extraordinary after granting, that all the power of the state resides at present in the House of Commons. Would not to reform the House of Commons only be to change a bad form of republican government for a good? and is not a republic, with a king at its head, to fill the niche of royalty and keep a tyrant out of his place, not only the theory of our constitution, but the best of all forms of government? D. D.

Montrose, 31st August, 1809.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND.

From the London Gazette, Sept. 2, 1809.

A dispatch, of which the following is a copy, was yesterday morning received at the office of lord viscount Castlereagh, one of his majesty's principal Secretaries of State, from lieutenant-general the earl of Chatham, dated head-quarters, Bathz, August 29, 1809:

My Lord; Major Bradford delivered

to me your lordship's dispatch of the 21st instant, signifying to me his majesty's commands that I should convey to lieutenant-general sir Eyre Coote, the general and other officers and troops employed before Flushing, and particularly to those of the artillery and engineer departments, his majesty's most gracious approbation of their conduct; and which I have obeyed with the most entire satisfaction. I had the honour in my last dispatch of acquainting your lordship with my intention of proceeding to this place, and I should have been most happy to have been enabled to have announced to your lordship the further progress of this army. Unfortunately, however, it becomes my duty to state to your lordship, that, from the concurrent testimony from so many quarters, as to leave no doubt of the truth of the information, the enemy appears to have collected so formidable a force, as to convince me that the period was arrived, at which my instructions would have directed me to withdraw the army under my command, even if engaged in actual operation. I had certainly early understood on my arrival at Walcheren, that the enemy were assembling in considerable force at all points; but I was unwilling to give too much credit to these reports, and I was determined to persevere, until I was satisfied, upon the fullest information, that all further attempts would be unavailable.—From all our intelligence it appears, that the force of the enemy in this quarter, distributed between the environs of Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, Lillo, and Antwerp, and cantoned on the opposite coast, is not less than 35,000 men, and by some statements it is estimated higher. Though a landing on the Continent might, I have no doubt, have been forced, yet, as the siege of Antwerp, the possession of which could alone have secured to us any of the ulterior objects of the Expedition, was by this state of things rendered utterly impracticable, such a measure, if successful, could have led to no solid advantage; and the retreat of the army, which must at an early period have been inevitable, would have been exposed to much hazard. The utmost force (and that daily decreasing) that I could have brought into the field, after providing for the occupation of Walcheren and South Beveland, would have amounted to about 23,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. Your lordship must at

once see, even if the enemy's force had been less numerous than represented, after the necessary detachments to observe the garrisons of Bergen-op-Zoom and Breda, and securing our communications, how very inadequate a force must have remained for operations against Lillo and Liefkenshoek, and ultimately against Antwerp, which town, so far from being in the state which had been reported, is, from very correct accounts, represented to be in a complete state of defence; and the enemy's ships had been brought up and placed in security under the guns of the citadel. Under these circumstances, however mortifying to me to see the progress arrested of an army, from whose good conduct and valour I had every thing to hope, I feel that my duty left me no other course than to close my operations here; and it will always be a satisfaction to me to think that I have not been induced lightly to commit the safety of the army confided to me, or the reputation of his majesty's arms. It was an additional satisfaction to me to find that the unanimous opinion of the lieutenant-generals of this army, whom I thought it right to consult, more out of respect to them, than that I thought a doubt could be entertained on the subject, concurred entirely in the sentiments I have submitted to your lordship. I am concerned to say, that the effect of the climate at this unhealthy period of the year is felt most seriously, and that the number of sick already is little short of 3,000 men. It is my intention to withdraw gradually from the advanced position in this island, and sending into Walcheren such an additional force as may be necessary to secure that important possession, to embark the remainder of the troops, and to hold them in readiness to avail myself of his majesty's further commands, which I shall most anxiously expect. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

CHATHAM.

COBBETT'S Parliamentary Debates:

The Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Volumes of the above Work, comprising the Proceedings in both Houses of Parliament during the last Session, are in the Press, and will be published with all possible dispatch.

LONDON:—Printed by T. C. HANSARD, Peterborough-Court, Fleet-Street;
Published by R. BAGSHAW, Brydges-Street, Covent-Garden:—Sold also by J. BUDD, Pall-Mall.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 11.] LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1809. [Price 1s.

" Spain will be lost from the dread of liberty."

SIR F. BURDETT.

353]

[354

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

TALavera's CAMPAIGN.—The moment the *Turtle Patriots* had met, and given Mr. Canning an opportunity of proclaiming the principles, upon which the war in Spain was to be undertaken by us, that moment was it easy to foresee, that Spain would be finally subdued by the French. It was then, that Sir Francis Burdett uttered the prediction, contained in my motto, and which prediction is now in so fair a way of being speedily fulfilled.—It is my intention here to pursue the history of the Wellesley Campaign, being satisfied, that, though fatal to our arms abroad, it may become, if properly exposed to the people, of some use to us at home.—But, first, I must beg the Reader's leave to refer him back to the Register, Vol. XIV., under the head of Spanish Revolution, where he will find, that I was abused outrageously, and even considered as a traitor, because I insisted on the improbability of the people of Spain fighting for Ferdinand VII. and the Inquisition. It is, however, surely unnecessary for me to make particular references; for, during several months, I ceased not my weekly endeavours to convince the people of this country, that to make war for Ferdinand was to do all that in us lay to insure the subjection of Spain to the family of Buonaparté. In every shape did I put this proposition, in the hope, that, in some shape or other, it might attract attention. Why I did it, I know not; for, there was something so absurd in the idea of making war for Ferdinand, that I, or any one, might have been assured, that, with those who were for such a war, reasoning was perfectly useless.—Well, we are now enjoying the natural effects of this war; we are now in the height of the enjoyment of a Wellesley campaign; and let us not suffer any part of it to escape our notice.—I concluded my last remarks, at page 340. We were then speaking of the praises, which Viscount Talavera bestowed upon the *humanity of the French*. We noticed, that, until then, the French had been, by our hirelings, called *barba-*

rians; and that the new discovery, relative to their humanity, and their tenderness of our sick and wounded, was not only valuable in itself, and especially as coming from a Wellesley, but was peculiarly valuable, as coming at a time when it was so very much wanted.—Since the writing of these remarks; that is to say, since Thursday, the 7th instant, fresh dispatches have been received from my Lord Talavera, which are given us, partly entire, it seems, and partly in *extracts*; that is to say, that, as in the case of the dispatches of the 1st of August, a part of them is kept from the eye of the people.—We will, however, take what we can get. The parties concerned shall not slip through our fingers. They shall not get out of sight. We will have the whole history of this famous Wellesley Campaign in black and white, bearing in mind always, that while we had in our Army-List above *three hundred generals*, this same Sir Arthur Wellesley, this same Lord Viscount Talavera, this same Baron of Douro, was taken from his office of Chief Secretary in Ireland, to be sent to take the command in Portugal; bearing in mind, too, that, of the military part of the Expedition to Denmark, all the merit was given to him; and, always bearing in mind, that the hirelings of the London and country press boldly asserted, that, *if he had been left the chief in command in Portugal*, the Convention of Cintra never would have been made, and that Junot and his army would have been brought prisoners to England. Let us always bear these things in mind; and, let us, as we proceed in the history of this campaign, be very particular in examining into the *grounds of the blame*, which the Wellesleys, or their partizans, throw upon other persons, whether generals, soldiers, or civil authorities.—This fresh batch of dispatches begin with a letter respecting our unfortunate officers and men, who were left in the hospitals at Talavera.—This letter, signed by the new Viscount, and, of course, addressed to Lord Castlereagh, is dated at *Truxillo*, 20th of August, 1809. It is in the following words.

M

"My Lord—I wrote some days ago a letter to the French Commander in Chief, which I sent to him by lieutenant-col. Walters, to request his care and attention to the wounded officers and soldiers of the British army who had fallen into his hands, in return for the care and attention which I had paid to the French officers and soldiers, who had fallen into my hands at different times; and that he would allow money to be sent to the officers; and that officers, who should not be deemed prisoners of war, might be sent to superintend and take care of the soldiers, till they should recover from their wounds, when the officers should be sent to join the British army.—I received a very civil answer from Marshal Mortier, promising that every possible care should be taken, and every attention paid to the British officers and soldiers who were wounded; but stating that he could not answer upon the other demands contained in my letter, having been obliged to refer them to the French Commander in Chief.—Since the receipt of this letter, Mr. Dillon, the assistant commissary, has arrived from Talavera, having been taken prisoner near Cevolla on the 27th of July, previous to the action, and having been allowed to come away.—He reports that the British officers and soldiers, who are wounded, are doing remarkably well, and are well fed and taken care of—indeed he says preferably to the French troops.—I propose to send colonel Walters with another flag of truce, to-morrow morning, and a letter to the Commander in Chief of the French army, requesting that a sum of money, which I shall send, may be given to the officers; and I shall endeavour to establish a cartel of exchange as soon as possible."

This is, as I said before, the tender point. We all feel it here, except the hiring writers, who would say what they now say, if their mothers and sisters had been left wounded at Talavera. The Baron knows enough of us to make him very anxious to satisfy us upon the score of the poor creatures left behind by him at his viscounty. Hence we have a letter upon this subject alone.—But, what necessity was there for the Viscount to talk of "French officers and soldiers who had fallen into his hands, at different times"?

When, where, how, was this? How many of them? And where are they now? What occasion was there for talking of this? I do not remember to have heard of his ever having made any French Prisoners, a regular account of which was given us. He talked indeed of having made "some prisoners" in the battle of Talavera; but, he did not afford us any chance of judging of the number. There are "some"; but, such numbers as this are not worthy of notice; and, besides, why does he not say how many he has in his hands, now? He talks of prisoners who have fallen into his hands, at different times; but, not a word does he say about prisoners now in his hands; or, about prisoners, taken at Talavera. What can be the reason of this? Let the hirelings answer the question.—Oh! the British officers and soldiers, who are wounded and whom he left behind, "are doing REMARKABLY well"! Oh! "remarkably well," are they? Very lucky indeed! "Dead men tell no tales," or some of these poor fellows might enable us to contrast the facts with the account of this Mr. Dillon, the assistant commissary, who, I dare say, knew very well what sort of account would be most acceptable at head quarters. I do not wish to create a belief, that our poor countrymen are suffering more than they are; but, really, when I find the Baron, in his letter of the 8th of August, saying, that, on the 3rd, the wounded at Talavera were in so bad a way, that, under any circumstances, it would not have been consistent with humanity to attempt to remove them, I cannot help fearing, that, in so very few days, and, perhaps, few hours, afterwards, when Mr. Dillon saw them, they could scarcely be said to be "doing remarkably well." On the 8th, when the Baron of the Douro had to announce to us the fact, that he had left his wounded behind at Talavera, he seemed to think it necessary to state every thing he could call to mind, in order to shew, that the step could not be avoided. Therefore, he told us of the circumstance, that the state of those wounded persons was such, that, under no circumstances, would it have been consistent with humanity to attempt their removal. Now, it remains to assure this nation, that these unfortunate people have not suffered from the leaving of them behind; and, accordingly Mr. Dillon (assistant commissary) is so good as to bring the intelligence, that they "are doing remarkably well"!—But, the cause of this well-doing is still more in-

interesting to us; namely, that "they are well fed and taken care of;" indeed, he says, "*preferably to the French troops.*" Now, though a late Chief Secretary of Ireland, which place was kept vacant for him all the while he was at Copenhagen and at Cintra, might be asked where he found the grammatical principle or example for saying that people are *preferably well fed* and *preferably well taken care of*, we can understand his meaning, which, doubtless, is, that our wounded are better fed and taken care of, than the French wounded are; and, taking this for granted, we cannot enough admire the luck of this nation, in having made such a discovery, just at the critical moment when such a discovery was wanted. The fact, however, is this; that, as Viscount Talavera asserts, upon the authority of one of his Assistant Commissaries, our wounded are taken better care of by the French, than their own wounded are. This is excellent. Well, then, it is not true, that the French are "*Vandals*;" and what the pensioned poetaster, Fitzgerald, has said of them, in this respect, is false.

—But, what say our hirelings upon this subject? I was sure, that they would be pinched by this report on French humanity, made by one of their own heroes. Do they corroborate his statement? No; by no means. They take occasion to utter fresh charges against the French, in this respect; and that, too, though not upon my Lord of Douro's authority, upon that of English officers, made prisoners in Spain.—The *Morning Post*, of the very day when the above letter of the Baron was published, contained the following paragraph.—"*Horrible Cruelties of the French*!—The shocking excesses that have been committed in Spain and Portugal appear in their recital incredible, were they not sanctioned by the voice of Truth. A party of ENGLISH OFFICERS, captured in Spain, passed through Tours a few days ago, on the road to Verdun. They witnessed repeated instances of the French troops having *impaled women*, in a state of *nudity*; of *crucifying ecclesiastics and monks*, in a similar condition; of inhumanly *butchering helpless children*; and of various other instances of savage barbarities. In Saragossa alone, more than 60,000 unfortunate objects were victims of Lasnes's unrelenting and merciless fury; and these inhuman and dreadful acts were sanctioned and encouraged by the *Imperial Sanguinary Tiger*, whose *callous, cadaverous soul* has

"been habituated, for these 15 years past, to glut and prey on the vitals of thousands."—So then, there are, it would seem, from this, some *English officers*, who have been *captured*, that is to say, *taken prisoners*, in Spain; though this is the first time we ever heard of the fact? So, so! "*Captured in Spain*," and passing on their way to Verdun in France? These must, I presume, be part of the "*missing*," of whom Viscount Talavera speaks in his letter of the 29th of July?—And, these English officers saw, we are told, by a most desperately government news-paper; they saw repeated instances of the French having "*impaled women in a state of nakedness*; of having *crucified ecclesiastics* and "*monks*, also in a state of nakedness; of "*butchering helpless children*; and, that these acts are committed with the approbation and with the encouragement of the *Imperial sanguinary Tiger*, whose callous and cadaverous soul has been habituated "to glut and prey upon human vitals."

—It was not, then, a *casual* thing; it was not of military execution; it was not of the putting of a town to the sword; it was of "*repeated instances*;" and those by the authority of the Emperor Napoleon; it was of a settled and general practice that these English officers had been the observers. —Well, be the fact so; but, how does it square with the impression conveyed to our minds by this dispatch of my Lord of Talavera and of the Douro? Be the fact so; but, remember, then, thou hireling, that it is to the care, the kindness, of those who impale women naked, and who, in cold blood, butcher innocent children; it is, remember, thou hireling, it is to the *tender mercies of such people*, that your hero has left our countrymen, the sick and wounded at Talavera.—Such, then, are amongst the consequences of this war for Ferdinand. Let the *Turtle Patriots* (who, it appears, are about to conjure up a pretence for feasts and bonfires wherewith to amuse the rabble and dazzle the eyes of the people in general); let these *Turtle Patriots*, when they meet again, utter their curses upon the "*ferocious French*," and then sing the praises of him, who has left his sick and wounded to their humane care. Let them do this; but, I hope, that the nation in general will see the whole thing in its true light; and, if they do, it must finally lead to good.—The next dispatch relates to SIR ROBERT WILSON's defeat, and is dated at Truxillo, on the 21st of August, 1809.—After this letter, I shall insert that of Sir

Robert himself to the Viscount, dated at Mirand de Castenar, on the 13th of August. Both letters are well worthy of attention.

Lord Talavera's Letter to Lord Castlereagh, dated 21st Aug. 1809.—"My Lord; When I marched from Talavera on the 3rd inst. with a view to oppose the French corps which we had heard had passed through the Puerto de Banos, and had arrived at Plasencia, Sir Robert Wilson was detached, upon the left of the army, towards Escalona; and before I marched on that morning, I put him in communication with the Spanish General Cuesta, who it had been settled was to remain at Talavera. I understood that General Cuesta put Sir Robert in communication with his advanced guard, which retired from Talavera on the night of the 4th.—Sir R. Wilson, however, did not arrive at Valada till the night of the 4th, having made a long march through the mountains; and as he was then six leagues from the bridge of Arzo Bispo, and had to cross the high road from Oropesa to Talavera, of which the enemy was in possession, he conceived that he was too late to retire to Arzo Bispo, and he determined to move by Venta St. Julien and Centinello towards the Tietara, and across that river towards the mountains which separate Castile from Estremadura.—Some of Sir R. Wilson's dispatches having missed me, I am not aware by which of the passes he went through the mountains, but I believe by Tornavacas. He arrived, however, at Banos on the 11th, and on the 12th was attacked and defeated by the French corps of Marshal Ney, which, with that of Soult, returned to Plasencia on the 9th, 10th, and 11th, that of Ney having since gone on to Salamanca.—I inclose Sir R. Wilson's account of the action. He has been very active, intelligent, and useful in the command of the Portuguese and Spanish corps, with which he was detached from this army.—Before the battle of the 28th of July, he had pushed his parties almost to the gates of Madrid, with which city he was in communication; and he would have been in Madrid, if I had not thought it proper to call him in, in expectation of that general action which took place on the 28th of July. He afterwards alarmed the

"enemy on the right of his army; and throughout the service, shewed himself to be an active and intelligent partizan, well acquainted with the country, in which he was acting, and possessing the confidence of the troops which he commanded.—Being persuaded that his retreat was not open by Arzo Bispo, he acted right in taking the road he did, with which he was well acquainted; and although unsuccessful in the action which he fought (which may be well accounted for, by the superior numbers and description of the enemy's troops), the action, in my opinion, does him great credit."

The manner and terms of this letter, as far as relates personally to sir Robert Wilson, are very remarkable. "He arrived at Banos on the 11th, and, on the 12th, he was attacked and defeated, by the French corps of Marshal Ney." Short and dry. Very little ceremony about poor Sir Robert and his troops. "He has been very active, intelligent, and useful, in the command of Spanish and Portuguese corps; he has (lower down) shewed himself an active and intelligent PARTIZAN well acquainted with the country in which he was acting; and (lower down) although unsuccessful in the action which he fought, the action, in my opinion, does him great credit." This is the sort of praise; it is the style of praise, given to a guide; or, at best, to the commander of an escort; or, at the very utmost, to some man of very inferior rank, who accidentally has been entrusted with a command. "A partizan," indeed! Let us read his letter, and see whether it discovers, either in its composition, or in the acts which it narrates, any inferiority of talent in its writer.

Sir Robert Wilson's Letter to the now Lord Talavera, dated 13 August 1809.—

"Sir—I have the honour to acquaint you, that I was on march yesterday morning on the road of Grenadella from Aldea Nueva, to restore my communication with the allied army, when a peasant assured us, that a considerable quantity of dust, which we perceived in the road of Plasencia, proceeded from the march of a body of the enemy.—I immediately returned and took post in front of Banos, with my pickets in advance of Aldea Nueva selecting such points for defence as the exigency of the time permitted.—The enemy's cavalry advanced on the high road, and drove back my small

"cavalry posts; but a picket of Spanish infantry, which I had concealed, poured in on the cavalry a steady and well directed fire, that killed and wounded many of them.—The 200 Spanish infantry in advance of Aldea Neuva, continued, under the direction of Col. Grant and their officers, to maintain their ground most gallantly, until the enemy's cavalry and chasseurs à cheval, in considerable bodies, appeared on both flanks, when they were obliged to retreat.—The enemy's chasseurs à cheval and cavalry advanced in great numbers in every direction, and pushed to cut off the legion posted between Aldea Neuva and Banos; but, by the steady conduct of officers and men, the enemy could only advance gradually, and with a very severe loss, from the commanding fire thrown on them.—The Merida battalion, however, having given way on the right, a road was laid open, which cut behind our position, and I was obliged to order a retreat on the heights above Banos, when I was again necessitated to detach a corps, in order to scour the road of Monte Major, by which I saw the enemy directing a column, and which road turned altogether the Puerto de Banos, a league in our rear.—At this time, Don Carlos Marquis de Estragne came up with his battalion of light infantry, and, in the most gallant manner, took post along the heights commanding the road of Banos, which enabled me to send some of the Merida battalion on the mountain on our left, commanding the main road, and which the enemy had tried to ascend.—The battalion of light infantry, and the detachment of the legion on its right, continued, notwithstanding the enemy's fire of artillery and musketry, to maintain their ground; but, at six o'clock in the evening, three columns of the enemy mounted the height on our left, gained it, and poured such a fire on the troops below, that longer defence was impracticable, and the whole was obliged to retire on the mountains on our left, leaving open the main road, along which a considerable column of cavalry immediately poured.—The battalion of Seville had been left at Bejar, with orders to follow me next day, but when I was obliged to return, and the ac-

tion commenced, I ordered it to Puerto Banos, to watch the Monte Major road, and the heights in the rear of our left.—When the enemy's cavalry came near, an officer and some dragoons called out to the Commanding Officer to surrender, but a volley killed him and his party, and then the battalion proceeded to mount the heights, in which movement it was attacked and surrounded by a column of cavalry and a column of infantry, but cut its way and cleared itself, killing a great many of the enemy, especially of his cavalry.—The enemy is now passing to Salamanca with great expedition; I lament that I could no longer arrest his progress; but, when the enormous superiority of the enemy's force is considered, and that we had no artillery, and that the Puerto de Banos, on the Estremaduran side, is not a pass of such strength as on the side of Castile, especially without guns, I hope that a resistance for nine hours, which must have cost the enemy a great many men, will not be deemed inadequate to our means.—I have to acknowledge the services rendered me on this occasion by Colonel Grant, Major Reiman, Don Fermén Marquis, Adjutant-Major of the Dragoons of Pavia, Captain Charles and Mr. Bolton; and to express the greatest approbation of two companies of the Merida battalion, advanced in front, and of the Commanding Officer and soldiery of the battalions of Seville, and the Portuguese brigade. I have already noticed the distinguished conduct of Don Carlos, and his battalion merits the highest encomiums.—I have not been able to collect the returns of our loss. From the nature of mountain warfare, many men are missing, who cannot join for a day or two, but I believe the enemy will only have to boast that he has achieved his passage, and his killed and wounded will be a great diminution of his victory."

Partizan, or partizan not, it appears that the Spaniards and Portuguese, of whom our Baron seems to have no reason to boast, really fought, and fought well, too, under Sir Robert Wilson, which shews Sir Robert to be fit for something beyond services of a mere *partizan*, one of whose prominent talents or qualities was, being well acquainted with the country in which he was acting." This letter shews him

to be something more than a person a little above a *guide*; and, indeed, as far as I have had an opportunity of hearing people's opinions, this letter has excited no small degree of regret, that Sir Robert had not filled a *much higher situation in our unfortunate army*. Sir Robert might be "*defeated*;" but, he does not *say* so; nor does he say any thing to justify the laconic sentence in my Lord Talavera's letter: "he was attacked and *defeated* by "the French corps under Marshal Ney." This letter does, in my opinion, contain nothing to justify that sentence. He was compelled to *retire*; he *got off* as fast as he could; and so did our Baron from Talavera, but the Baron no where acknowledges, that *he* was beaten, or "*defeated*."

—But, the great merit of Sir Robert's letter, is, that it *accuses* nobody; *complains* of nobody; *throws the blame* upon nobody; but, on the contrary, contains high encomiums on the Spanish and Portuguese troops. Now, to me, it is, I must confess, very strange, that the troops of these nations should fight so well, when with Sir Robert Wilson, and that those in company with our army and the Baron, should incur so much blame. This is an observation that must have occurred to every one; and, really, I am persuaded, that most men will look upon Sir Robert's letter as going very far towards proving, that, if the army under Cuesta did not behave well, the fault was not *wholly* in that army.—We now come to the last of these letters, which, indeed, is not a *letter*, but an *extract* of a letter. It is dated, like the last letter of the Baron, at Truxillo, and, like that letter, on the 21st of August. Now, *why* should a commander, write from the *same place*, and on the *same day*, two letters to the *same person*? He writes a whole letter about Sir Robert Wilson; but, why not have made it *part* of a letter. Why not have put us in possession of that story along with the other story? Why separate them? Why write *two letters*?—The reader will say: "Why do you ask "all these questions, when you can see the "reason as plainly as you can see the pen "that is in your hand?" Very true; and it is idle to waste one's time in this way; for, it is absolutely impossible for us not to see the reason for thus dividing a dispatch of the same date into distinct letters.—Now, then, let us see this *extract* of a letter, and guess at what we cannot get a sight of.

"General Cuesta moved his head-

"quarters from the neighbourhood of
"the bridge of Arcobispo on the night
"of the 7th inst. to Perales de Garbin,
"leaving an advanced guard, consisting
"of two divisions of infantry, and the
"Duke D'Albuquerque's division of
"cavalry, for the defence of the passage
"of the Tagus at this point.—The
"French cavalry passed the Tagus at
"a ford immediately above the bridge,
"at half past one in the afternoon of
"the 8th, and surprised this advanced
"guard, which retired, leaving behind
"them all their cannon, as well as those
"in the batteries constructed for the
"defence of the bridge.—The General
"then moved his head-quarters to the
"Mesa d'Ibor, on the evening of the
"8th, having his advanced guard at
"Bohoral. *He resigned* the command
"of the army on the 12th (*on account*
"*of the bad state of his health*), which
"has devolved upon General Equia.
"The head-quarters of the Spanish
"army are now at Deleytosa.—It ap-
"pears that a detachment of Vanegas's
"army had some success against the
"enemy, in an attack made upon it in
"the neighbourhood of Aranjuez, on
"the 5th instant. General Vanegas
"was then at Ocana, and he had de-
"termined to retire towards the Sierra
"Morena; and, after the 5th, he had
"moved in that direction. He re-
"turned, however, towards Toledo,
"with an intention of attacking the
"enemy on the 12th; but, on the 11th,
"the enemy attacked him, with Sebas-
"tiani's corps and two divisions of Vic-
"tor's, in the neighbourhood of Almo-
"racid. The action appears to have
"lasted some hours; but the French
"having at last gained an advantage on
"General Vanegas's left, he was obliged
"to retire, and was about to resume his
"position in the Sierra Morena.—On
"the 9th, 10th, and 11th, large detach-
"ments of the French troops, which
"had come from Plasencia, returned to
"that quarter; and on the 12th, they
"attacked and defeated Sir R. Wilson
"in the Puerto de Banos, on their re-
"turn to Salamanca.—It appears now,
"that the French force in this part of
"Spain is distributed as follows: Mar-
"shal Victor's corps is divided between
"Talavera and La Mancha; Sebas-
"tiani's is in La Mancha; Marshal
"Mortier's at Oropesa, Arzobispo, and
"Navalmora; Marshal Soult's at Pla-

"sencia; and Marshal Ney's at Salamanca.—Distress for want of provisions, and its effects, have at last obliged me to *move towards the frontiers of Portugal*, in order to *refresh my troops*. "In my former dispatches, I have informed your lordship of our distress for the want of provisions and the means of transport. Those wants, which were the first cause of the loss of many advantages, after the 22d of July, which were made known to the Government, and were actually known to them on the 20th of last month, still exist in an aggravated degree; and, under these circumstances, I determined to break up, on the 20th, from Jaraicejo, where I had had my head-quarters since the 11th, with the advanced posts on the Tagus, near the bridge of Almaraz, and to FALL BACK upon the frontiers of Portugal, where I hope I shall be supplied with every thing I want."

Here we have "*move towards Portugal*;" we have "*break up*;" we have "*fall back*;" we have any thing but that phrase, which alone could convey a correct idea of the movement in question united with its cause and motive. In the ever-memorable GENERAL ORDER, intended to blazon forth the fame of Wellesley, Victor's refusing to wait for offered battle is called an "*escape*." But, when this same Wellesley himself, so far from waiting for offered battle, is pushing on as fast as possible to get quite out of the reach of the French, he calls it *moving towards Portugal*; *breaking up*; *falling back*, in order to *refresh his troops*.—To *refresh his troops*! Is that all? What, keep on marching, day and night, in order to *refresh his troops*?—But, he is in want of *provisions* also. Well! and must not the *enemy* be in want of them? This does appear to me very unaccountable; that the enemy should be able to pursue us over a country, whence we are induced to *fall back*, merely for want of provisions. If this be the case, let us give up the contest at once, for it is quite useless to attempt to maintain it against an enemy, who can live upon the *leavings* of that which we cannot exist upon.—The Spanish government is *blamed*, in unqualified terms, even in the *extract* which we are permitted to see; and, I leave the reader to judge of the manner in which they are spoken of in the *letter itself*. As to this matter, it is very plain, that a quarrel between the Viscount and the

Junta has taken place, or must soon take place. But, it appears to me, that, in whatever degree the Junta are to blame, their neglect can form no justification for our Baron. They may be to blame for not having provided food and the means of conveying it; but, he is still to blame for having moved forward, without having *previously* secured those means and that food. Besides, how does it happen, that he got *forward* so well? We heard of no fault about provisions, until after the Tartar-catching affair at Talavera. Indeed, *how could he advance so far without provisions*? I am afraid, and, to speak my mind, I am quite satisfied, that the Junta are not at all to blame; and, I shall be much disappointed, if it does not finally appear so to the satisfaction of the whole country. He must have known well, very well, that the Junta had but little power and less money; he must have known how difficult sir John Moore found it to get any supplies from the people as he passed along; and, indeed, it requires but very little reflection to be convinced, that, unless you have magazines provided before hand, or are prepared to *make free* with all you find, and even to enforce a discovery of hidden provisions, you ought not to attempt to move a mile in such a country as Spain, and particularly in the part of Spain where our poor miserable army has been. There is no excuse, therefore; and as to the Viscount's attempting to throw the blame upon the Junta, I really do not think it fair, especially as the publication of his dispatch takes place *here*, and not in Spain.—As connected with this, there is a report, stated in the news-papers of the Marquis brother having assisted in producing a very material change in the government of Spain; nothing less, indeed, than the *breaking up of the Junta*, and the erecting of a *Regency*, in the person of the Archbishop of Toledo. This is, to be sure, merely a news-paper report; but, if it should prove true, we may, I think, pretty safely calculate upon a speedy termination of the contest in Spain!—I should here offer a few concluding remarks, tending to shew what this nation has already suffered from having meddled in this contest upon a wrong principle; but, there are extracts of two letters, copies of which have appeared in the London news-papers, that I must not, upon this occasion, omit to notice, especially as, if authentic, they amply account for our being allowed to see only an *extract* of

our Viscount's last letter.—These extracts of letters are of a nature not to be inserted by me, without quoting the print, whence I take them; and therefore I state that they are taken from the *Morning Chronicle* of Saturday, the 9th instant, in which paper they were inserted with a sort of preface, as follows:

"The letters from Lisbon supply us with little intelligence in addition to what we have before received. The packet left the mouth of the Tagus, according to the log-book, on the 23d ult. At that time there were very few troops in Lisbon, the detachments having marched, as soon as they were landed, on the road to Lord Wellington. Previous to the arrival of the Cork fleet, there were only three ships in his Britannic Majesty's service in the port of Lisbon. These were transports, and on board one of them the Admiral's flag was hoisted.—The following are extracts from two of our letters:

Lisbon, August 21, 1809.

"Several Officers having arrived here lately without proper leave of absence, the Commandant of Lisbon, Colonel Peacock, of the Guards, in the General Orders of Friday last, says, that all Officers who return from the army without the Commander of the forces' leave, are to be put under arrest; and further, that in consequence of the false and unfavourable reports made by English Officers and privates of the state of the British army in Spain, that in future all Officers and privates circulating such injurious reports, are to be immediately tried by a Court-Martial, and the sentence to be put in immediate execution. It has been said, that the advance column of General Beresford's army has been taken by the French. It has been reported these three or four days, with great confidence, that General Beresford was in the rear of Soult, and that sir A. Wellesley was advancing in his front, and that it was impossible for him to get off. — Sixteen transports arrived here yesterday from Cork, with 120 artillerymen, and 300 horses.—By a vessel that arrived here yesterday from Cadiz, it is said and believed at Change, that general Stuart, with English and Sicilian troops, had taken Naples; and that the garrison were

"made prisoners of war.—Paper 23 per cent. discount.

Lisbon, Aug. 22, 1809.

"The Princess Charlotte packet which was to sail this morning is postponed until to-morrow morning; the mail is to be closed this night at eight o'clock. I have put a letter in the mail last night, with the papers of Saturday and yesterday. The only news I have now to add to what I have said in that letter, is that sir Arthur Wellesley has been under the painful necessity, (as he says himself) of breaking several Officers for their cowardly and inattentive conduct in the severe battles with the French in Spain. One Officer, who had the command of a detachment, ran away from his men, but they were led on by the sergeants, and behaved in the most heroic manner. He is named in General Orders, and ordered to be arrested wherever he is to be found. I am told he has been seen here, at Lisbon. It is useless to name him."

Now, I do not by any means say, that these are truths; but, they have been published nearly a week, and have not yet, as far as I have observed, been contradicted, either officially or non-officially.—The Orders, said to have been issued at Lisbon, are, I must confess, a little in the *Calcutta* stile; but, I should hope, that the fact is not so; I should hope, that no such Orders were ever published by a British Officer.—We have long been in the habit of laughing at the "poor French," for not daring to publish any news; but, if these Orders be authentic, the "poor French" may have their laugh in their turn. It is true, that our people are prohibited from publishing bad news only; and may vent as much as they please of good. Should this prove true, we are, indeed, come to a pretty pass; we shall be pretty fellows to make a bragging noise about liberty. Those who spread bad news; accounts unfavourable to the British army in Spain, are not only to be put in arrest; are not only to be imprisoned; are not only to be put into a state of vile durance; but, they are to be tried, and the sentence is to be put into immediate execution; that is to say, they are to be punished upon the spot, and, as the crime is one of those not particularly mentioned in the Articles of War, it will, of course, come under the comprehensive description of "Disobedience of Orders," whereon

an officer may be *cashiered*, and a non-commissioned officer or soldier *flogged*. If this does not insure them against *bad news* at Lisbon, it is hard to say what will. But, again, let me express my hope, that this intelligence is not correct, and that things are not come to this disgraceful pass.—In *Calcutta* the poor devils of printers of news-papers, previous to the publication of each Number of their papers respectively, are, or, at least, were, obliged to carry a copy to a person, appointed by the Governor General for that purpose, who, as he reads the paper over, takes his pen, and crosses out whatever parts he does not like; and amongst the articles thus crossed, you sometimes find even *advertisements*, if they contain the *titles of books*, supposed to treat freely of politics. This is an effectual way to guard against *bad news*, as far as relates to the press; and this is what there are *some persons*, who are well known to wish to see established in this country. But, even this is not so tight as what we have just been contemplating; for, this relates merely to the press; whereas the Orders, said to have been issued at Lisbon, extend to verbal, and even private, communications. Yet the Turtle Patriots, fine fellows, are carrying on war for the *liberty* of Spain and Portugal. Once more, let us hope, that this Order has no existence; and that the statement respecting it will soon be contradicted; for, really, if it has an existence, I am half afraid, that we shall be unable to match it in the annals of the administration of any one but Robespierre.—Serious, however, as this subject is, it yields, in that respect, to the other facts, stated, so boldly, in these extracts: namely, that *several officers have arrived at Lisbon, from our army, without leave of absence*; that is to say, that they have *deserted*, and that, too, from the field, when in hourly expectation of being engaged with the enemy: and, further, that *several officers have been broken for cowardice* by the commander of our army in Spain.—One would think, that these facts must be false; and yet, how are we to suppose, that an experienced gentleman, like Mr. Perry, would publish them, as he has done, without accompanying that publication with the expression of any *doubt* as to the truth of the facts? It is hard to know on which side to fix one's belief; but, if the facts are as they are stated, England, surely, never was in a state of such deep and complete disgrace as it is at this mo-

ment. We must all hope, that the facts are false; but, if they be true, they ought, without loss of time, to be made fully known to us. The parties *names* ought to be published; and, as to the deserters, theirs ought to be nailed to the several gallows in the counties where they respectively were born. If they are of the borough-monger breed, or have any Turtle Patriots for relations, we shall, however, see apologies enough made for them; but, let us have the facts clearly established; and, above all things, let us have a list of the *names* and the birth-places of them.—Already, I think, I perceive an attempt to prepare a palliative by saying, that they may have been *disgusted*, or may have been so *harrassed* about and so pinched for want of every *comfort*, that their return to Lisbon was to be expected. *Disgust!* Aye, there is a description of persons, who are very apt to feel disgust at the approach of a battle, or of danger of any sort. And, as to being "*harrassed about*," it is easy to find *hardship* words; but, did these pretty fellows think, that they were *always* to receive their pay for lounging about our paved streets, and ogling mantua-makers' and milliners' apprentices? *Comforts*, indeed! Are we, then, to pay men in red and blue coats for no other purpose than to wear muff-jackets, giant-swords, glove-wallets, and false whiskers, and to loiter about at inn-doors and assembly rooms? No, no; these gentlemen should recollect, that *they were paid a long while for doing nothing*; that they are of a profession, the business of which comes by fits and starts; that they must take the good with the bad; and that they were not enrolled in the army for the *sole* purpose of giving them the public money without any expected return in the shape of service.—All this is said, however, upon the *supposition* merely that the statement of the Morning Chronicle should prove true. Let us hope that it will not. Let us hope, that we are not fallen so low as this, which, in fact, is much lower than any of the nations, whom we affect most to despise.—Before I dismiss this subject, let me once more endeavour to direct the reader's attention to the circumstance of Lord Douro's principal dispatch having been kept from our sight, except an *extract*. The public never should lose sight of this circumstance. The *whole* of the dispatch will, perhaps, come out, when the parliament meets; but, let us bear in mind, that, at present, we have only a part of it, and, of course, only that part,

which the minister chooses to give us.—We spare not Buonaparté; we abuse him for keeping his subjects *in darkness*; but, how different is his conduct? When he enters upon a campaign, he also enters upon a *series of bulletins*, which, day by day, contain an account of the progress of that campaign, and which bulletins are, without any mutilation, published in all his newspapers.—It may be improper for the government to tell the world *all* that the Viscount of Talavera says; but why not, then, give us *from themselves*, such bulletins as they think proper? Herein consists the deception, that, by giving us *extracts*, they give us what is believed to be *the words of the General*, and which, in fact, are not his words, until they are rejoined to those of his words, which are kept out of our sight. Suppose he were to say, “To-day plenty of provisions have been sent me for a ‘couple or three days’ consumption;” and the ministers were to suppress all the words after the word *me*; is it not evident, that we should have words that were *not his*? In short, words, like individual letters, are one thing, or another, accordingly as they are combined and connected; and, of course, it is very possible to give us words out of a letter, which words do, in reality, make no part of that letter.—If the ministers would tell us the news in their *own words*; if they would say, “thus and ‘thus things stand;’” then we should know what we had before, and should, at a future day, be able to verify these accounts by comparing them with the real transactions; but, this is precisely what they do not wish us to be able to do.—At any rate I hope we shall look sharp after these “*extracts*,” and if we do so, we shall be able to trace out every fact of importance. But, every thing, relating to this campaign in the Southern Peninsula, is of great importance, especially if we bear in mind *the origin and principle of our interference* in the affairs of Spain. We took up the cause apparently for the express purpose of *preventing a radical change in the government* of that country. We saw such a change approaching; we saw the two kings abdicating the throne, and calling upon their quondam subjects to yield obedience to the Emperor Napoleon; we heard the people of Spain, as distinctly as it was possible for us to hear them, protest against this base attempt to transfer them like a herd of cattle; we heard them, from one end of the kingdom to the other, assert their right to be free, to choose another government;

and we heard them dealing out unqualified execrations on their “*late infamous government*.” While this was going on in Spain; while a radical change of the government there was in a fair way of being accomplished, and that, too (from the lucky circumstance of the abdication of the royal family) without any danger of the horrors of civil strife; and, while the people of England hailed the dawn of liberty in that long-oppressed portion of the world; in this promising state of things, the *Turtle Patriots* met, as it were for the express purpose, and from the table at this meeting, the king’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, proclaimed to the nation what they had to expect from the part we were about to take in the war; he proclaimed to us, in short, that the war was to be for FERDINAND VII, who, in spite not only of Napoleon’s decrees but of his own abdication, was to be king of Spain, and that, too, while his father was yet alive and declared the son not to have his consent to mount the throne. Soon after this an English *Embassador* was appointed to the court of this king of Spain, who was, in fact, and still is, a prisoner in the hands of Napoleon.—Was any thing but what has happened to be expected? It is notorious, that many of our people have been in danger of having their sides pierced by the Spaniards for pronouncing the name of Ferdinand VII. with approbation. We are not here under any Orders like those, said to have been issued at Lisbon, and, therefore, I will state, that an officer, who was in Sir John Moore’s army, *told me*, that, being sent out to purchase mules, he was compelled, in order to avoid being killed, to pull out of his hat the ticket, which was worn by our people, with “*Ferdinand VII.*” upon it; and, that, upon his and his companions (before they were aware of the sentiments of the people) crying out, “*huzza for Ferdinand VIIth,*” they and the object of their devotion were loaded with execrations. And that, in fact, of all the names he heard pronounced, no one appeared to be so unpopular as that under which we were carrying on the war.—This is the great point for the nation to keep in view. We should not let the failures, or even the miseries, of our armies, efface from our minds the great and original cause of all these calamities and disgraces; namely, the determination of our government to make war for a king, and not for a people, in Spain. That this cause would produce

such effects as it has produced was very evident to me and to many others; we foretold what has come to pass; but the hirelings, whose sole business it is to deceive the people, asserted that we were instigated by the devil; that we were Jacobins and levellers, and wished to see a revolution in Spain, *that the example might extend to England.* They prevailed; or, at least, there existed no where the disposition accompanied with sufficient power, to prevent the war from being carried on for Ferdinand; they prevailed, and, as it is just due, this nation has felt, is feeling, and will long feel, the consequences.—Great things are now, by some persons, expected from what is called the “energy” of the Marquis brother. My expectations are not such. I am, as I always have been, convinced, that for a *choice of kings*, named by others, the people of Spain will never fight; and that, unless we have the people with us, our exertions are of no avail.—Again, however, I cannot refrain from expressing my satisfaction; that the concern, the whole concern, in the cabinet as well as in the field, is *in the hands of the Wellesleys*; because, if the thing had not been so placed, we should always have heard some of the base insolent partizans of that family asserting, that the undertaking failed only because they were not at the head of it. The hirelings, the unprincipled conductors of no small part of the press, threw all the blame of the Convention of Cintra upon others than the Wellesley, who had a hand in it, though it was negotiated by him. We all remember how he carried that affair off; with what an air the whole of their adherents braved the just resentment of the people. There is *nobody to throw the blame upon NOW*; except, indeed, the Spanish government and armies and people; and, *then*, we come upon the ministry, and say: “What! this was your *universal Spanish nation*, who were mad “with enthusiasm for Ferdinand?” Let them get out of that if they can. Let them choose the object of their censure. They cannot choose amiss for those, who have disapproved of the principle of the war, and who have no opinion of the Wellesleys.

WALCHEREN EXPEDITION.—There is very little to say upon this subject. That has happened, which, for every reason that can be named, might have been expected to happen, and those, *who approved of the undertaking*, have not the smallest

right to complain of the result.—I said, from the first, that, if JOHN EARL OF CHATHAM (as we say, JOHN DUKE OF MAREBOROUGH) did not look sharp, some one of Napoleon’s new-made Dukes might send him back “with a flea in his ear;” and, if the Earl had not wisely resolved to stop where he did, this would, in all likelihood, have been the case.—The thing will, it is said, cost about *eleven millions of money*, for which I am not at all sorry; and, indeed, the only subject of national regret, connected with this affair, is, the *loss* and the *sickness* of the army and navy, which, if so great as they have been described, is a very serious matter. It is stated, that some thousands of our men have actually died of sickness at Walcheren, and that there are about *sixteen thousand* of them sick. The account of the deaths are truly dreadful. It is to be hoped, that there is some exaggeration in every part of these statements; but, at the same time, there can be no doubt of the loss and the suffering having been very considerable. And, *for what*? What purpose will the expedition answer? What will it effect? How will it alter the condition of any nation or any human being? It will have made some few thousands of unoffending persons in Zealand miserable for life; many it will have destroyed; and *it* will have fattened some hundreds of English commissaries, quartermasters, staff-people, paymasters, agents, and contractors! It will have *created an immense quantity of patronage*, and will have greatly added to the value of the power of the Borough-mongers. These are the purposes, which this Grand Armada will have answered. Would it not be better, at once, to give those Borough-mongers a certain portion of the national revenues, and leave the king and his servants free to choose their measures and to choose their men?—As to *keeping Walcheren*, which poor Lord Chatham denominates an “*important possession*,” it is, I am convinced, little short of madness to think of it. The *utility* of it, if practicable, is matter of great doubt with men more capable of judging upon the subject than I am; and, to effect it would, I am convinced, cost, at least, *ten millions a year*. Less than 20,000 troops, including casualties, would not do. Then there must be a fleet, and both must be fed and watered from England. In short the idea is absurd.—There appears to be much dispute, as to whether Lord Chatham be to blame, or not; and

a great deal of sarcasm has been bestowed upon him. But, really, I can discover no ground for this blame. It is impossible, that he should have acted without orders from home, in the taking of Flushing before he proceeded further; and, besides, I do not believe, that he could have got to Antwerp, *even if he had found Flushing ready captured to his hand.* We were in this, as in all other instances, told lies about the disposition of the people. The Dutch, as we are compelled now to confess, *did not want us.* They did not want to be *delivered.* They were all ready to snickersnee us; and, we have not, during the whole affair, been able to produce a single proof of disaffection towards Louis Napoleon, who appears to be as firmly seated upon the Dutch, as his brother is upon the French throne. For my part, I should not wonder if this most expensive and calamitous undertaking originated at the suggestion of some of those babbling creatures, whom, in every part of Europe, we have the folly to supply with money; and, who, for the far greater portion are, I am thoroughly persuaded, in the pay, and in the interest of Buonaparté, who could desire nothing better than what we have been doing for several months past.

THE WHIGS appear to be all alive, upon the present occasion. There are reports of *changes*; the happy dog may, perhaps, let go the bone! The Whig Oracle, the Morning Chronicle, has, for some weeks past, been hard at work endeavouring to pave the way for the return of its party, and, as the most likely means of succeeding, it has set about a deliberate attack upon Mr. Wardle, knowing that nothing will be so likely to be received as a peace-offering. *This alone*, if we could forget all their conduct while in power, would be quite sufficient as a proof of what we should have to expect from the Whigs, who, I am, at any time, ready to show, did more harm, more permanent mischief, to the country, during their reign, than was ever done, in a similar space of time, by any ministry, that the country ever knew. What! and is there a man in this kingdom, base enough, and if base enough, *impudent* enough, to bid the nation look for safety in the hands of those, who nearly doubled the income tax, who openly avowed, that they would *make perpetual war for Hanover*, and who had the merciless insolence to tell us that *Hanover ought to be as dear to us as Hampshire!* What! bid us look for help to that set, who did their utmost to deprive

us of the very faculty of calling for help. Oh, no! we have, very lately, heard that faction cordially join the other faction in defending those who stood detected in having had a hand in buying and selling places and seats in parliament; through the whole of the shameful scenes, here alluded to, we uniformly found the our faction more regardless of the people than the *IN* faction; and, as to their deeds in war, what have they to boast of? But, the main point, at present, is, would they, or would they not, have aided a *revolution* in Spain? It is clear, from all they have, at different times, said, that they would not; and, therefore, why would they have been better than the present set? In fact, does the reader believe, that they would not have done just as this set has done? Did they not, from the first, laugh at the idea of restoring liberty to Spain; And, as to the Wellesleys, were they not as much cherished by the Whigs as by the present ministry?—It is absurd; it is empty nonsense, to suppose, that the Out faction, if in power, would, or, indeed, *could*, do any better than those who now are in power. It is the *system* that is in fault much more than the men; and, therefore, those are fools, who look to any set of men, without a change of that system.—We go on from bad to worse, and this is in the very nature of the system. We see millions laid out upon enterprizes, and we see no good to us, and no hurt to our enemy, result therefrom. If, now-and-then, success attends the act itself, it is pretty sure to be followed by *no beneficial consequence*; and, thus, are we going on steadily towards that period, when we are to see Napoleon with all the force of Europe in his hands to wield against us.—Nothing, it appears to me, can save this country from subjugation by France, but that measure of *Reform*, which, while it gave heart-felt satisfaction to the people, while it put an end to all discontents, would call forth new talents and new energies.—The counsellors of the king would not then be eternally engaged in weighing parliamentary interests; their time would not be spent in the invention of excuses, and all sorts of paltry intrigues; they would have the time necessary to attend to great affairs; and, which is the great thing of all, they would be *free to choose* those persons, who were to put their plans in execution. When any such change will take place I shall not pretend to say; but, I am quite certain, that, until it does

place, any change of ministry must be useless, one set of men being just as good as another, so long as both remain in subjection to the will and pleasure of the borough-mongers. While this system remains, there will, with me, always be an objection to *any* change, general or partial; and that, if it were only for this one reason, namely, that, at every change, the borough-mongers have a fresh dip into our pockets. In short, the people of this country are sick of changes, which always add so greatly to the list of pensions and allowances, without producing any change whatever in their favour. If, indeed, the Whigs (it is truly ludicrous to call the *Grenvilles* Whigs) would give us a specific promise, that they would bring in a Bill for the purpose of insuring a fair Representation of the People; then we might wish for a change; but, so far from there being any reason for us to expect such a measure at their hands, we know that they have been, and yet are, the most loud and unqualified in their abuse of all those who profess to wish for such a measure. Therefore, I wish for no change of ministry. — It is quite monstrous to attempt, at *this* day, to amuse us with a change of ministry. It is as bad, nay to the full, as flagrant, as the invention of THE JUBILEE; but, neither will impose upon the people. A crowd of raggamuffins may be assembled, and, after being drenched in the gin-cellars, may be set to threaten the people in London into an Illumination upon pain of having their windows smashed to pieces; but the sentiment of the nation will remain the same; and so it would after a change of ministry. What! is it possible, that any man can be found impudent enough to attempt to persuade us, that we shall derive any benefit from a ministry to consist of those, who, last spring, cried out, "*make a stand!*" Oh, monstrous! I see nothing that lord Castle-reagh has done, that any of those who want him out would not do. They stood by him, they justified him, they voted for him, in the case of Quintin Dick, and why should he not remain where he is?

JACOBIN GUINEAS. — There is a curious dispute going on between two philosophers, one of whom writes in the Morning Chronicle and the other in some ministerial paper, about the *discount upon guineas*, which, it seems, is now openly confessed to exist to what one of these writers calls "an *alarming* degree," though, for my part, I see nothing alarming in

it. The philosopher, who writes in the Chronicle, has suggested a *remedy*; and what does the reader think it is? Why, nothing short of compelling the Bank of England to confine its issues to a certain reduced amount; that is to say, to the putting down of its paper altogether; for, the moment it begins to draw in, the whole thing vanishes into its native nothingness. Like the other parts of the system, the paper must go on increasing, or it falls. — This philosopher would fain have the Bank make such regulations as would *enhance the value of money*; that is to say, as would make us pay more to the fund-holders than we now pay, when every reflecting man wishes that we had to pay them less instead of more. — Besides, does this writer imagine, that the country-bankers would not make money to supply the place of any reduction at the Bank of England? He seems to imagine, that no paper money is good for any thing except that of *the Bank*, as it is called. But, have we not thousands of banks? Aye, and that make as good money as the Bank in Threadneedle street. Indeed, the Threadneedle street money will not pass only at this distance from London half so well as the money made by our neighbours, and that this writer would have plainly seen if he had been with me, last Tuesday, at Giles's Hill Fair, where he would not have got a hundred weight of cheese for a thousand pounds in the Threadneedle street money. The truth is, that the paper-money makers in the country are known to those who use their manufactory; and, what is more, the *estates* of most of them are known. If a contrary wind were to blow away the credit of all paper-money, those who hold notes of their neighbours fall upon *their land*, in default of specie; but, where are those to go, who hold the notes of the manufacturers in Threadneedle street? The country manufactory is not a *legal tender*. Its makers are under no "RESTRICTION," not to pay in gold! Oh, the pretty phrase "*Bank Restriction!*" How will our sons laugh at this? Nay, what fun shall we yet have with it ourselves! The Bank of England gets a law passed to prevent their creditors from demanding gold for its promissory notes; and then the law that lays "*a restriction*" on them not to pay gold for their promissory notes! And, because guineas will not associate with such paper; because a guinea, which has an intrinsic value, will not degrade itself by circulating

in company with such paper, calling itself money, is it to be accused of *Jacobinism*? The persons who take, as well as those who give, three or four or five and twenty shillings for a guinea (it fetched, I believe, only 22 shillings at Giles's Hill fair, owing, perhaps, to the purchase being made in *country* made paper-money) are accused of Jacobinism; but, it is the guinea's fault. It will not go for less. You cannot get it to stir without a discount. It feels its superior worth, and asserts it. But, there is nothing Jacobinical in all this; if there be, at any rate, the Jacobinism is in the guinea.—The guinea is now become an object of purchase and sale, and no longer a piece of current coin. No man ever sees a guinea *paid* away, except by mere accident; but, to the comfort of our two philosophers, be it known, that when the *trade* in guineas shall have become well established, which time is, in all probability, at no great distance, guineas will *flock back again into the kingdom*. They go abroad at present only because they *will not circulate with paper-money*, and because they are not as yet a well-known *article of commerce*. When they become the latter, back they will hasten, from all parts of the world; and, indeed, they will do well; for they will *very soon be wanted*. Then, indeed, will be a day for a *Jubilee*; then the people of England may again dance and sing; but, at present, I see no reason for a Jubilee, which, to make the thing complete, is called for by those, who have been most instrumental in driving the king's image and superscription from the land. When his Majesty's picture returns to our dwellings, then will we join in a Jubilee; but until then, let Jubilees, like Turtle Meetings, be confined to those who make contracts and loans, and who bask in the sunshine of "Bank-restrictions."

WM. COBBETT.

Batley, Thursday, 14th Sept. 1809.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPAIN.—Proclamation of King Joseph, dated Head-quarters, Toledo, Aug. 19, 1809.

Soldiers!—It is scarcely fifteen days since 120,000 enemies, consisting of English, Portuguese, and Spaniards, who marched from different points, rendezvoused under the walls of my capital; but united on the 26th of July at the bridge of Guadarama, the 1st and 4th

corps, and the reserve, defeated on that day the enemy. On the 27th, he repassed in great haste the Alberche. On the 28th, attacked in a position judged unattackable, 80,000 men have not been able to contend against 40,000 French.—From that time, renouncing their chimerical project of conquest, they have thought but of safety, and have abandoned the field of battle. More than 6,000 English wounded are in our hospitals; the least of our corps, the 1st, was judged sufficient to observe and keep in check this army, still so numerous, in spite of its losses. It remained upon the Alberche, whilst the 4th corps, and the reserve, set out on the 29th, to succour Toledo, besieged by the army of La Mancha; and that of Madrid, menaced by the same army, has forced the enemy, already within four leagues of the capital, to relinquish its prey. It has repassed the Tagus in the greatest haste, and flies towards the Sierra Morena, after having abandoned some thousands of killed, wounded, and prisoners. The 2d, 5th, and 6th corps are following the rear-guard of the enemy's army. These corps formed a junction with the 1st corps, at Oropesa, on the 7th August.—The English fly every way, in disorder, and by roads hitherto judged impracticable to artillery. The 2d and 5th corps are pursuing them.—Soldiers, you have saved my capital, the King of Spain thanks you; you have done more, the brother of your Emperor sees fly before your eagles the eternal enemy of the French name.—The Emperor will know all that you have done, he will acknowledge the brave, who have made themselves conspicuous among the brave, those who have received honourable wounds; and if he says to us, "I am content with you," we shall be sufficiently recompensed.

(Signed) JOSEPH.

Royal Order addressed to Senores Don Luis Mendoza, and Don Andres Gonzalez Pacheco, members of this Supreme Junta. Dated Royal Palace of Seville, Aug. 15.

The Supreme Junta of the government of the kingdom have seen, with the most lively interest, the observations which your Excellencies make in your memorial of the 12th inst. on the causes which have led to the want of provisions in the combined army, and the means of remedying this evil; and while it employs the necessary measures for this purpose, it charges me to inform your Excellencies that our

own security and defence requiring that the said army should be abundantly supplied with whatever it requires for its subsistence and operations, chiefly our generous allies, who, fighting for our liberty and independence with the same enthusiasm as they would defend their own, render themselves creditors, both by gratitude and justice, to every consideration and sacrifice of the nation and government. Your Excellencies will use every possible and conceivable effort, in order that the said army may want nothing; co-operating with the commission which His Majesty has given to the Member Don Lorenzo Calvo, and with the intentions of the government, which are directed exclusively toward the welfare and salvation of the country. I communicate this by Royal Order to your Excellencies, for your information, direction, and fulfilment. May God preserve your Excellencies many years!

MARTIN DE GARAY.

Answer.

Sire; With the greatest pleasure we have received the Royal Order of your majesty, of the date of the 15th, enjoining us to redouble our exertions for the supply of the English auxiliary troops. We have the satisfaction to inform your majesty, that the inhabitants here supply every thing with the greatest alacrity, and this town contributes 1,000 rations daily, and meal and oats more than could be expected from a country so ravaged by the enemy. We have used every means to collect all the grain belonging to the government of Garrovillas, which is daily grinding in the mills of Talaban. The flour is afterwards deposited on the two bridges in the said town of Garrovillas, in order that it may be in readiness whenever the intendant may apply for provisions. The oats are deposited in St. Jago del Campo, all within the distance of four leagues. If Senhor Don Lorenzo Calvo will send an order, it shall immediately be executed.—We request your majesty to be convinced that our patriotism cannot be exceeded. Provisions are daily arriving, even more, in the opinion of almost every one, than are necessary, this province being as frank and liberal as any other, if not more so.

SWEDEN.—*Message relative to the Pension which the States are to allow to the late King, Gustavus Adolphus, his Queen and children. Dated Stockholm, Aug. 15.*

The period is now fast approaching,

when a prince, who lately governed Sweden, but whose claim to the Swedish crown has been solemnly cancelled by the unanimous resolution of the States of the Realm, must absent himself from this country. His own spontaneous wish agrees, on this point, with what the public tranquillity and security require. His Royal Majesty has taken the advice of the Secret Committee on a matter of so much importance, which, however, the state of public affairs does not yet permit His Majesty to communicate to the Diet, and he, therefore, confines himself, at present, to the question—‘What pension or yearly allowance, are the States of the Realm willing to grant to their late King, his Queen, and children?’ Which question being answered, another will occur relative to the country which it will be most proper to assign for the residence of Gustavus Adolphus and his family.—His Majesty does not deem it superfluous to add some observations for the States to bear in mind in their deliberations on this subject. The States cannot but be aware, that their decision must bear that stamp of dignified generosity, which becomes a noble-minded nation; that misfortune craves respect; and that humanity itself commands forgiveness and oblivion of the past. His Royal Majesty is anxiously desirous that the States of the Realm, by deciding the subject under discussion on these principles, should meet his wishes, and thus give a pledge to Europe of the purity of the motives which induced Sweden to revise her system of government, and renew the structure of the State.

CHARLES.

AMERICA.—*Proclamation of the President to the United States of America. Dated Washington City, Thursday, August 10, 1809.*

Whereas, in consequence of a communication from his Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, declaring that the British Orders in Council, of January and November, 1807, would be withdrawn on the 10th of June last, (and by virtue of which an Act of Congress was passed, entitled “An Act to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and France, and their dependencies, and for other purposes,”) I, James Madison, President, &c. did issue a proclamation, on the 19th of April last, declaring that the Orders in Council aforesaid would be withdrawn on the 10th of June,

after which the trade might be renewed, and as it is now officially made known to me, that the Orders in Council are not withdrawn, agreeably to the declaration aforesaid, I do hereby proclaim the same, and that the Acts above still remain in force.

JAMES MADISON.

FROM THE SPANISH PAPERS.—*Minutes of Dispatches, dated August 14th, and taken on a peasant going to Avila, at Fomescus, by a detachment under Sir Robert Wilson's orders.—(The original sent on to General Cuesta.)*

A Monsieur le Colonel Hays, Gouverneur d'Avila.—You will give directions that this letter shall be forwarded with the utmost expedition to his majesty, and you will send me your receipt.—Wilson's corps is cut off. About five days ago it was between Candelario and Villa Nueva. If from your town you move a column of 1,000 men, and attack them, they will be compelled to surrender.—I communicate to you the brilliant action of the 8th inst. at P. Arzobispo. We took from the enemy 30 pieces of cannon, 40 tumbrils, with baggage, and 600 prisoners, besides a great number killed. The Royal Carbineers and Corps de Garde were cut to pieces.—Send me from your province, wine, vinegar, and brandy, which shall be paid for in ready money; and also send me news from Burgos, Salamanca, Valladolid, &c.—(Signed.)—DUKE OF DALMATIA.

Sire; the orders that you sent me are executed. The duke of Elchingen will arrive to-morrow at his destination, and the parties which have come out of Ciudad Rodrigo will be beaten.—I have the intention of besieging Ciudad Rodrigo. If your majesty sends me five corps complete, and if the duke of Elchingen comes this way, I will attack marshal Beresford's army, which is now between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, and, by news now received, between Perales and Gette, and composed of 8,000 English, the same number of Portuguese, and 4,000 Spaniards: but if this is to be executed, it must be done with the greatest expedition, because otherwise the effect of the victories at Talavera and Arzobispo will be lost.—It is probable Vanegas has already passed the Sierra Morena; and, in this case, the second corps may fall upon Cuesta, keep the Tagus, and open the communication with

this corps.—Wilson's corps is cut off. It is between Villa Nueva and Candelario; and if a column from Avila, of 1,500 or 1,000 men, should come down, it would be compelled to surrender.—(Signed.)—DUKE OF DALMATIA.—Addressed to Joseph, king of Spain, &c. &c. &c.

Proclamation of Marshal Augereau, Duke of Castiglione, &c. to the Inhabitants of Catalonia. Dated Perpignan, July 2.

"Spaniards! Catalans! I am come in the midst of you. His majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy has given me the command of his armies in Catalonia.—Spaniards, I know you and love you. Seduced by perfidious insinuations, unhappy victims and blind instruments of a Cabinet, the enemy of France and humanity, many and many of your brethren are obstinate in prolonging a war, the issue of which could never be doubtful. They deny and reject the benefits and favours which an august Sovereign provides for, and is anxious to shower upon them: an hero whom heaven created, in its beneficence, for the felicity and glory of Spain and the world.—Spaniards, the hero of France loves and esteems you; his virtuous heart requires and needs your felicity. God, who granted to Napoleon his invincible valour, gave him at the same time his goodness and tender humanity.—Napoleon sighs over your afflictions; he has a paternal heart, and as such suffers over the terrible blows which are inflicted upon you, and which will be inflicted still more upon you, by his formidable armies, if you delay long in listening to the voice of truth, and continue in your fatal blindness.—Lay aside useless hopes; a false love and a criminal honour, which, arming against a king who is truly paternal, the august brother of the great Napoleon, irritates Heaven against you, which gave him to you in his mercy. Abandon vain illusions. God protects France, a God walks with Napoleon, covers and shades him with his wings, and enchains victory to his triumphal car.—Brave Spaniards, submit. Europe is submitting and surrendering herself.—Spaniards, I know you, and you have to know me. I have long esteemed you; and when you submit you will find in me a true friend. yourselves, and your property, shall be sacred for me.—

(To be continued.)

LONDON:—Printed by T. C. HANSARD, Peterborough-Court, Fleet-Street;
Published by R. BAGSHAW, Brydges-Street, Covent-Garden:—Sold also by J. BUDD, Pall-Mall.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 12.] LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1809. [Price 1s.

" 'Twas at the feast for *Talavera* won,
 " By Well'sley's warlike son :
 " Aloft in City state,
 " The swelling hero sat
 " On his *Viscountal* Throne ;
 " The *Jews* and *Speculators* plac'd around,
 " Their brows with *Loans*, with *Jobs*, and *Contracts* bound,
 " So should the *love of self* be crown'd."

STATESMAN.

355]

[386

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

TALavera's CAMPAIGN and the JUBILEE.

—The combination of these transactions has been admirably delineated, in several articles in that excellent evening newspaper, the STATESMAN, from one of which articles I have selected my motto. I do not believe, that the boasting, the bragging, the inflated self-gratulation and commendation, of the Talavera Campaign, were equalled by any thing of the sort that ever took place in consequence of the campaigns of Alexander the Great.—It is of great consequence to us, that we should have the history of this Campaign very complete. At page 373 of the present Volume, we brought this history down to the 21st of August, when our Baron of the Douro wrote, from Truxillo, that letter, of which our ministers gave us an extract, and which extract was inserted at page 363.—It will be remembered, that, on the 3d of August, our Baron quitted Talavera, in order to go *in search of somebody to fight with*; in order to do "the business" of Soult "effectually" and "without a contest." We have seen, that, some how or other, he did not do any "business" at all with Soult; but left Soult on one side of the Tagus, while he went across to the other in order to "take up a position." We have now some accounts, through the *Moniteur*, touching this matter; and, if we are determined not to believe any thing circulated through that channel; that is to say, if we are determined not to believe any thing, which does not flatter our vanity or disguise our shame, it may not be amiss for us just to take a look at *what the rest of the world will believe*.—Let us, however, before we make this extract from the *Moniteur*, go back a little into the history of the Campaign.—FIRST,—On the 28th and 29th of July our Baron, with scarcely any as-

sistance from the Spaniards, "*vanquished*" (to use the language of the King's "GENERAL ORDERS"); yes, "*vanquished*" the French, under Marshal Victor (Duke of Belluno), at Talavera.—SECOND,—Our Baron, owing to the fatigue of his army and want of provisions, did not pursue the "*vanquished*" enemy one inch; and, the Spaniards, though they had not been engaged, did not make the smallest attempt to pursue that enemy.—THIRD,—Our Baron, on the 3d of August, resolves to quit Talavera, to take the road towards Portugal, and to leave at Talavera his numerous sick and wounded, under the care of the Spanish General Cuesta, but, before he sets out, having reason to fear that Cuesta might *not be able to maintain himself* at Talavera against Victor (the "*vanquished*" Victor), our Baron has a conversation (which he puts into writing) with a Spanish General second or third in command, whom he presses, in case of danger, to get all the carts he can, ready to carry away the English sick and wounded.—FOURTH,—Our Baron has the choice given him by Cuesta, to go or to stay, and he chooses to go, though he states, that he had reason to fear, that Cuesta would be unable to maintain his position at the place where he was leaving him.—FIFTH,—The reason our Baron gives for leaving Talavera at all, and for choosing to go while Cuesta remained, is, that Soult was advancing from Placentia towards the right bank of the Tagus; and that, as it was of great importance to go and do his "business" as quickly as possible, our Baron chose to go on that errand, because he and his army were more likely "to do the business effectually" and without a contest.—SIXTH,—Cuesta, finding the "*vanquished*" Victor in *movement* upon his flank and front, did not remain many hours at Talavera, after the departure of our Baron; but, in fact,

N

overtook him before he was able to get at the *sought-after* Soult.—SEVENTH.—Our Baron now, when one would have expected to hear of his “doing the business *effectually*,” finds that, for various weighty reasons, arising from sundry unforeseen occurrences, it will be better not to go on to meet Soult, and to “do the business *effectually*,” upon the right bank of the Tagus, but, on the contrary, to go across to the left bank of the Tagus, at the first bridge he can come at, and then to get on *towards Portugal*, where he hopes to be *supplied with whatever he shall want*.—EIGHTH.—Our Baron informs us, that he did get across the said Tagus; that he was immediately followed by Cuesta; and that, on the 7th of August, Cuesta's advanced guard was attacked by the French, who drove that guard off and took all its cannon.—NINTH.—We find him at Truxillo, on the 21st of August, “*falling back upon the frontiers of Portugal*,” where he hopes to be supplied with every “thing he wants,” never having met Soult, in search of whom he quitted Talavera, leaving his sick and wounded behind him; never having made any attack upon the enemy; and, of course, never having “done the business *effectually*,” nor, indeed, ever having even *begun* to do it at all.—Now, then, let us hear the Moniteur, of the 30th of August; let us now hear what *others* say about this latter part of the Talavera Campaign, and what it is possible, at least, the world will be so ill-natured as to believe.

“While the English, after *exposing their allies* to all the disadvantages of a pursuit, placed themselves in security against events, the Spaniards imagined that they could cover their retreat if they took a position at the bridge of Arzobispo. The fifth corps passed the Tagus, partly by a ford, and partly by the bridge, overthrew all before them, and took 30 pieces of cannon, with the powder waggons. When the Marshal the Duke of Treviso saw the enemy's army fly before him, he was satisfied with sending some detachments after it, who every moment bring in stragglers, deserters, and prisoners. Some HANOVERIAN deserters left the English army on the 8th ten leagues from the frontiers of Portugal, to which they are retreating by the way of Badajoz. That army is leaving every where its baggage, artillery, and sick behind: it is generally believed that its destination is Lisbon, in order to embark the troops there. Meanwhile they plunder on their route, and the enraged peasants murder

“all who fall into their hands.”—This conduct of the peasants is but too much like what was reported of them during the retreat of Sir John Moore's army, when, as the reader will recollect, the French hanged some of them for having murdered our people.—The truth is, that, during a *hasty retreat*, it is next to impossible, if not completely impossible, to prevent plunder and other provoking conduct on the part of the troops; and, the natural consequence is, acts of vengeance on the part of the unfortunate, the ruined, and half-maddened people, who, when they come athwart defenceless plunderers, cannot be expected to spare them, however imperious the necessity, which has made these latter do injury to the enraged parties. “Hunger,” says the proverb, “will break through stone walls;” but, hunger is as potent with the wretch, who is robbed of his dinner, as it is with those who rob him. Both are objects of *pity*, while blame, in fact, if it alight justly any where, settles upon the heads of those only, who have made them the robbers and murderers of each other.—It is truly lamentable, however, to contemplate the probability, and, indeed (if we believe this statement of the Moniteur), the fact, of our army's dropping of its baggage, its artillery, and its sick, on the way; leaving these latter, at best, to the mercy of a people, who, there is every reason to suppose, must feel enraged at our army, and that, too, from causes for which, in this immediate case, no blame can be attached, probably, to either the army or its commander. Our Baron tells us, that he is in *distress for provisions*; and we know what must be the consequence of that. He had told us before, that he took with him *some thousands of sick and wounded*. We know, that a retreat so encumbered must be terrible in its exactions upon the people of the country. It is not difficult to imagine how such a retreat would be felt across the counties of Hants, Wilts, Dorset, Devon and Cornwall, from *Alton to Penzance*. What, then, must be the effect of a similar retreat in a country, like that, over which our unfortunate army had to pass? Here it would inevitably produce general distress and a good deal of ruin; but, there, where the wretched people have scarcely ever any store of provisions to draw upon, and where the population is so thin as to render the whole stock of the country so trifling in amount, the retreat of a considerable army, unsupplied with provisions, must, if we in-

clude the unavoidable waste, produce general famine and despair. Away it sweeps not only all the human sustenance, but the hay, the straw, the horses, the mules, every animal, (whether for its flesh or its labour) at all useful; and, in short, it yields, in its destructive effects, to nothing short of one of those tornadoes, which sweep away every substance standing upon the face of the earth.—Of the *desertion of the Hanoverians* my readers will form their own opinions; but, if the fact be correct, I am not at all surprized, that we had only an *extract* from Douro's dispatch of the 21st of August. Upon the subject of desertion we must observe, that, as yet, nothing in the way of contradiction has been said of the two paragraphs, which I inserted in my last, which were very worthy of the attention of the government; for, surely, it was of importance to do away the effect of statements so outrageously degrading to the character of the army, and of the nation.—But, the great point in this article from the *Moniteur* is, that it accuses our Commander of first "*exposing our allies*," and then of "*placing himself and his army in security against events*." That is to say, of *taking the lead in the flight*, and leaving the Spaniards to bear the attacks of the pursuing French. This is the charge which the *Moniteur* prefers against us; and, certain it is, that our army, according to my Lord Talavera's dispatches, are *in front* upon the retreat; or, if you will, in the *advance towards Portugal*. This is not to be denied. We marched from Talavera for the purpose of meeting Soult; we did not meet him; we turned off over the river; we made away for Portugal; and the Spaniards came in our rear; they kept the post nearest the *enemy*. Say that our Viscount was *compelled* to do this. I hope it will appear so; but, then, I answer, let me not be told of the "*military resource*" of the man, who, not being compelled to advance into Spain, did so advance as to expose himself to this compulsion.—Besides the above article, the *Moniteur* contains two letters, one that of our Baron to the French Commander in behalf of his poor sick and wounded left behind at Talavera, and the other, the Duke of Treviso's answer to that letter.—They ought to be preserved here, especially as there is a passage in the latter, which, in his dispatches home, our Baron appears to have omitted.—The first has no date. It appears to have been sent open, addressed to the French Commander

in Chief.—"Sir; The fate of war has placed in your hands a number of English officers and soldiers. They are brave, and merit the attention and regard of those by whom courage is valued. I have the honour to recommend them to you, and to request that you will permit me to send to Talavera, for the purpose of taking care of them, some officers, who shall not be considered prisoners of war, but be permitted to return when the wounded have somewhat recovered.—I also request your permission to transmit the wounded officers small sums of money, of which they must be very much in want.—It is in the name of humanity I address these requests to you, and I have even a right to make them, since I have always paid particular attention to the French soldiers whom the chance of war has rendered my prisoners, and have even supplied the officers with money."—This letter was delivered to Marshal Mortier (the Duke of Treviso) who sent the following Answer, dated on the 10th of August.—"Sir; I have received the open letter addressed by you to the Commander in Chief, and requesting his attention to the sick and wounded whom you have been under the necessity of leaving behind you. They are treated as our own sick and wounded are, and I have studied to give all possible assistance to those that have fallen into my hands. These, General, are debts which two brave nations owe to each other.—I shall forward your letter to the Commander in Chief, who alone can answer your request to send officers to Talavera, until the sick and wounded be somewhat recovered. *In the mean time I shall do myself the pleasure to supply them with what money they may want.*"—Now, without any desire to impute to the Baron a wilful omission, it is just to observe, that he did not (in the dispatch *given to us*) make any mention of the last sentence of this letter, and which sentence was, as the reader will see, a most important one. He says, "I received a *very civil* answer from Marshal Mortier, promising that every possible care should be taken, and every attention paid to the British officers and soldiers who were wounded; but stating, that he could not answer upon the other demands contained in my letter, having been obliged to refer them to the Commander in Chief." This is *all true*, but it is not *all* the truth; for Mortier says, though he cannot answer about the suffer-

ing of our Baron to send money to our wounded officers, "he will do himself the pleasure to supply them with what money they may want." This was very important indeed, because, in all probability, the very existence of many of the officers would depend upon a supply of money; and, therefore, were it only for the sake of the relations of those officers, it should not have been omitted, though I am willing to believe that the omission was not wilful.—After reading this letter of Mortier, and duly reflecting upon the situation of so many of our countrymen, now in the hands of the French, it is impossible sufficiently to reprobate the conduct of the hired wretches, who seem, by their falsehoods against the French army in Spain, to wish to whet their knives against the throats of these unfortunate men. They seem to wish that all these poor fellows may be cruelly treated, and may be left to rot on their sick-beds, merely that their sayings may be made good against those, whom they hate only because they are afraid of them.—Leaving these wretches to their labours, which, let us hope, will not produce their intended effect, let us look at the other parts of this famous Campaign, and see what it promises us.—"While these events occurred on the banks of the Tago, the 4th corps returned to Toledo by the bridge of that town, and the division of Michaud on the same day forced the passage of the river by fording at Anaver Del Tago, which was defended by six battalions and four squadrons of the enemy. On the 10th the troops of the 4th corps formed a junction with the reserve, at Nambrova. On the same day general Vanegas concentrated his army, 30,000 strong, at Almonacid: and on the 11th, the King gave orders to attack him. An action of three hours was sufficient to drive the enemy from this strong position, to route them completely, to take a great part of their artillery, and to occasion them a very serious loss. The enemy left on the field 4,000 dead, and we have made about 4,000 prisoners. We have also taken 35 pieces of artillery, with 100 powder waggons, and 200 other waggons. Several standards are among our trophies. An incredible number of wounded increase the loss of the enemy, who, unable to re-unite, fled in every direction."—Thus is Vanegas disposed of. Then comes an article, under the date of MADRID, 16th of August.

Here we see Joseph Napoleon returning in triumph to that capital, which SIR ROBERT WILSON (good heavens!) was about to enter! Really, it would seem, that we are never again to hear a word of truth! What! that corps whom Ney met and made scamper away into the mountains, was about to enter Madrid in the face of Victor! If we were only suspected to have a grain of sense left, they would never attempt to treat us thus. But, we wish to be deceived; and they know it.—"Yesterday at noon the king returned to this capital, under salutes of artillery. He entered on horseback, at the head of his guards and corps of reserve. His Majesty proceeded to the church of St. Isidor, to be present at the *Te Deum*. When he prayed, his Majesty descended from his throne. The church was full of civil and military officers, and common people. After the ceremony his Majesty proceeded, at the head of his troops, to the Palace. In the evening the town was brilliantly illuminated."—Oh, aye, to be sure! "*Brilliantly illuminated*," just as our great town will be when the gin-drenched rabble, armed with mud and brick-bats, shall sally forth at the word of command from the Jews and Contractors, and other "Blood-suckers," as Lord Chatham used to call them, who, during the last half-century, have preyed upon the people of England.—Aye, aye; a "*brilliant illumination*;" yes, and *Te Deum* too! All the sham, all the cant, all the hypocrisy, all the baseness, and all the blasphemy, that belongs to such a transaction.—Well, but, come; do you, hirelings of the press; do you, incomparable knaves; do you pretend to say, that, when the people illuminate their houses, they are not pleased? Or, do you say, that they are pleased? Take your choice; for, if you choose the former, then away goes all your proof of English loyalty drawn from such an act; and, if you choose the latter, then you confess that the people of Madrid love their new king, Joseph Napoleon.—The truth is, that the people have no will in the matter. The illumination at Madrid was the act of the government; and, in a less direct way, so will it be in London, the sensible inhabitants of which will, one would think, keep as close to their houses as if a pestilence were raging in the streets, for it is impossible but they should be ashamed to see one another's faces by the help of a light proceeding from such a cause.—Let us hope,

however, that the king (who has certainly as good a right to issue proclamations upon the subject, as the people at Lloyd's have) will be advised to express his disapprobation of a measure, not less insulting to him than to his people. A *Jubilee*, indeed! A proposition for dancing and singing and ringing and rejoicing, while the nation is weeping over the scenes at Talavera and Walcheren! Surely no one having the common feelings of humanity about him could have suggested such a thing! I should like to know the *name* of the individual, who had the heart to conceive, and the face first to mention, first to give an articulate sound, to such an idea. There are a hundred reasons, good and solid, why such a thing should not be; but, if there were no other, the scenes now before us are quite sufficient; the melancholy fate of so many of our countrymen, during this very campaign, to say not a word of the effect which that campaign *must* have upon the character of the nation.—But, reasoning of this sort makes for the thing, instead of against it, with those who have had the impudence to set it on foot. They know very well how improper, how indecent, how unfeeling, how cuttingly insolent it is, towards the people of this country; but, they also know, that they stand in need of something to produce a diversion of the public mind; they know well, that that system upon which they thrive, stands in need of something that shall, for a while, at least, attract the attention of numbers of people, and, which is a great point, serve as a pretence for filling up a considerable portion of the public-prints with something other than accounts of those events, which, *if any thing could do it*, would bring this bewildered nation to its sober senses.—Those, who have taken the lead in this scheme, put forward great pretensions to *loyalty*. This is a word of vast use with all the tribe. It was worth 30,000*l.* at the least farthing, to each of the DUTCH COMMISSIONERS, and, perhaps, three or four times that sum to Alexander Davison, whose loyalty was of a nature so exuberant, that it broke out into the forming and clothing, I believe, of a volunteer corps, at his own expence. I used, at first, when I returned to England, to suppose, that *loyalty* meant a real attachment and devotion to the kingly government of the country; but, I found, in the course of about eighteen months, that a pension, a sinecure place, a contract, or a lucrative

job of any sort, was a vivifier of this attachment and devotion.—What has *the king* to do in this scheme? No more than his coach-horses have. These, who have set it on foot, mean him no compliment. What they wish to do is, first to advance their own pecuniary interests, by getting favour with those, in whose favour such a diversion will operate; and, next, they wish to contribute, by this means, to the propping up of that system upon which they thrive, and which is ruining the rest of the nation.—Let the loyal men, who propose this Jubilee, be told, that, on the day, on which it is held, we shall, in one respect, at least, be restored to the situation, in which we stood at the beginning of the period, which they mean to commemorate; namely, that the promissory notes of the Bank, in Threadneedle Street, shall be paid, on demand, in coin, bearing the image and superscription of the king. Let them be told this, and you will hear them talk no more about a Jubilee. The *premium* (which, through haste, I, in my last, called *discount*) upon the coin of the kingdom, would be fit matter for these wiseacres to take into their consideration; but, is it no impudence unparalleled, while the coin of the country has fled its shores, and while their own paper is made a legal tender, for them to call upon the wretched people to dance and sing?—It would be of great public utility for some one, who has the means of doing it, to make out an accurate List of the names, places of abode, occupation, place, pension, contract, job, or the like, of every one, who has taken, or shall take, an active part, in the palming this thing upon the public. Such a list would be of great use. We should be able, from it, to form a very admirable scale of loyalty; and, the day may come, when it would be of great use in other respects. I hope such a list will be undertaken.—The people of *Warsaw* are about to hold a Jubilee on the birthday of Napoleon. Well, and why not? Is this a proof of his being *hated*, then? Is this a proof of his being a *tyrant*? Is this a proof of his approaching overthrow? Oh, you hirelings, publish any of your brilliant accounts if you dare: we will immediately publish alongside of them, the brilliant accounts of the *loyal* celebrations in honour of the Buonapartés, and we will stand our chance for public opinion. If the people be gulled and cheated out of their senses, their property, and their freedom, it shall not be our fault.—This

Jubilee is connected with the Talavera Campaign inasmuch as those who are the authors of it were the authors of the Ferdinand War; and, when we contemplate the retreat of Sir John Moore and its dismal consequences; when we contemplate the miseries then experienced by our army, whom the Duke of Dalmatia was sent to throw into the sea; when we contemplate a fine army of forty thousand men, so harrassed, worn down, so famished, so bruised and emaciated, as, after having shot their horses and left their sick and exhausted to die by the way, to come tumbling on board of ship in such a way as for no man to know where his officer was, and no officer his men; when we look back, only about eight months, to the manifold miseries of that army, not to mention the disgrace of being chased, like so many hares, by that enemy, whom we had boasted of having humbled; when we contemplate these things, and think of the present situation of another army, fleeing from the same country, though, taking the Spanish army into the account, *superior in numbers* to the French; when we contemplate the crowded hospitals at Talavera, a place whence our general says he could not *advance* for want of *provisions*; when we see him appealing to the *humanity* of the French in behalf of the unfortunate souls in those hospitals, to that humanity which our hirelings assure us is displayed in the *impaling* of women and the *butchering* of children; when we consider the miseries, the disgraces, the expence, to the poor people of Spain as well as to us, then let us always bear in mind, that the real authors of this war were the faction of *Seat Mongers, Jews, and Contractors*, amidst whom it was first officially proclaimed at the Turtle Dinner. How many thousands, how many hundreds of thousands, of innocent people have suffered hunger; how many hundreds of thousands have been literally starved to death, and how many more have been set to cut each others throats, in consequence of the decision proclaimed at that *Feast*! When the *Seat-mongers, Jews, and Contractors* meet to guzzle and to gormandize, let the people tremble; for they are sure to pay the reckoning, and that, too, at a most enormous rate. But, as to our present point, let it always be borne in mind, that the war for Ferdinand VII.; that the war of the Cintra Convention; the war of Leon and Galicia, the war of the Corunna retreat; the war of Talavera; let it be always remembered,

that this war was first openly proclaimed at a City Turtle Feast, and that it was hailed by the ever-greedy audience, with that sort of delight, with which a flock of kites and crows hail the dying groans of the horse. This, I trust, we shall remember; and remember, too, that, at this horrible feast, the pensioned poetaster, Fitzgerald, recited a performance, which gave great delight, and in which were represented as "*cannibals*," those very French generals and soldiers, to whose humanity and care our Lord of Talavera has committed so many of our sick and wounded countrymen.—The fact is, that we are now, and long have been, under the oppressive claws, the merciless claws, of those *Seat-mongers, Jews, and Contractors*. It is to them that we owe the war for Ferdinand; the war in Walcheren; the Expedition after Expedition, in Europe and out of Europe; and, in short, to them we may fairly impute all that mass of misery and disgrace, under which we are now suffering. From them arises the Jubilee; and the object of the Jubilee is to amuse, to divert, the public mind; and, perhaps, it has in view the more malignant purpose of reviving the distinction of *Jacobins* and *Anti-jacobins* by imputing disaffection, and anti-royalty principles, to those who refuse to join in a celebration *professed* to be in honour of the king. The *Turtle feast* and all the toasts and songs and cheers and bel-lowings of this greedy crew were *professed* to be in honour of the *Spanish Deputies*; but, the fact was, it was a settled scheme for the purpose of giving what might seem the sanction of the whole of the City of London to a war for Ferdinand and the "*ancient order of things*;" and I have not the smallest doubt, that all the toasts were written out and discussed in divan before hand; and, in short, that all the actors had their parts as much prepared as have the actors in any dramatical piece. The sentiments were to *seem* to flow from the hearts of the people met; but, there is no doubt of the whole having been previously hatched and arranged, down to the very songs and the number of cheers.—The crew assembled upon that occasion, no more spoke the sentiments of the people of London, of the City of London, properly so called, than they spoke my sentiments; but, this was the *appearance* that the thing had to many of the people throughout the kingdom, and especially as all possible aid was given to the fraud by the truly "*infernal machine*," the *hiring press*, which

is, in great part, supported by the crew. Thus it was that this nation, as much in opposition to its opinion as to its interest, was plunged into the war for "Ferdinand VII. and the ancient order of things in Spain;" the consequences of which war we are now lamenting, and this is the moment which the Crew chuses for compelling the people of London and Westminster, upon pain of *smashery*, to illuminate their houses in sign of pleasure and rejoicing!

WALCHEREN EXPEDITION.——We shall, probably, never have a faithful account of the losses, attending this ill-advised undertaking. Some of the news-papers state the number of sick at from 12 to 17 thousand; and, indeed, from the circumstance of so many of the general officers being ill, it is clear, that the *troops* must have suffered severely.——This part of the loss is very serious indeed, especially when we consider what *pain* must have attended the illness. Nothing is so painful to think of as a military hospital, under such circumstances.——As to the *millions* of money that the Expedition has cost, and great part of which has found its way into the pockets of those, who were most loud in their praises of the enterprise, that is an evil, which, sooner or later, will bring its good; and, in the mean while, the nation are very deserving of the pecuniary squeeze. It is quite just. It is thus that its folly and baseness should be punished.——I pretend to have no knowledge whatever of what might have been done upon the Scheldt; but, I must confess, that I see no reason for *any part* of that blame, which so many of the public prints have been labouring to throw upon LORD CHATHAM, who, I would venture my life upon it, was not authorized to stir an inch without orders from home, being within four hours sail of the coast, and within six hours communication with Downing-street. If the thing *was* to be, and *was* to fail, I should have preferred its taking place under a *Pitt*; but, I will not join in throwing blame upon a commander, when I can see no reason for it.——The leading hireling news-paper, the *Morning Post*, began the attack upon Lord Chatham, in the following paragraph of the 2nd instant:——"Contrary to our expectations and predictions, founded upon the wisdom of the project, and the extensive means employed to effect its success, as well as the information we were in the habit of occasionally receiv-

"ing from intelligent officers attached to the Expedition, it is with infinite grief we understand that advices were yesterday received from Lord Chatham, stating, that from the information he had received, of the numbers which the enemy had been able to collect for the defence of Antwerp, and the extensive inundations they had effected, his lordship, in concurrence with the opinion of the lieutenant-generals, had decided not to advance from South Beveland against that city; so that the meditated attack upon its arsenal, and the French fleet, is altogether abandoned. Our readers will recollect, that about a fortnight since we expressed the serious apprehensions we felt in respect to the apparent tardiness of the proceedings, and happy shall we be to find that the delay in our operations, which we then foresaw would enable the enemy to collect the means of opposing an effectual resistance to our future efforts, was rendered unavoidable by the untoward circumstances under which our commanders found themselves placed. Never certainly was an enterprise more wisely or judiciously planned, and we cannot dissemble that it rends our heart to contemplate its failure in any particular, satisfied as we are that the most ample means were provided to ensure its complete success. The most formidable and best equipped armament that ever sailed from the shores of Britain, was upwards of a month in the Scheldt, and instead of its projected operations being simultaneously carried into execution, the greatest part of our force remained inactive during the whole of that time in sight of the enemy, who, from the *unfortunate delay*, were enabled, not only to collect numerous corps from various quarters, but effectually to inundate the country to prevent our approach. The contemplation of so unexpected a result, grieves our very soul; nor can our grief be alleviated otherwise than by our Commanders being able to give a satisfactory explanation upon the subject;—this explanation, we trust, they will be able to afford; and resting upon that hope, we shall not attempt to prejudge the question. For the present, we derive some ground of consolation from the prospect, that notwithstanding the abandonment of the enterprise against the fleet and arsenal of the enemy, means may nevertheless be found so to obstruct the navigation of the Scheldt as

"to make that river useless to the enemy." "The possession of Walcheren may enable us to effect this great object, which, if accomplished, would produce a most important effect, inasmuch as the enemy's fleet would thereby become useless, and in a great measure compensate for the failure of the enterprize against Antwerp."—Here we have a palpable attempt to throw all the blame upon the Commander, who, it is plainly enough asserted, might have *gone up the Scheldt* with a part of his force, while the rest was left to take Flushing. This, however, is bare assertion. Nothing is offered to us in support of it; either of the nature of fact or of argument. A hypocritical hireling may affect to have his "*heart rended*," and to be "*grieved to his very soul*," though, like Hudibras's Bear, such an animal would more becomingly complain, that it "*grieved him to the guts*;" a profligate hypocrite like this (one of those who aided in the suppression of 22 documents out of 27) may affect to be grieved at what has happened, and may, in order to obtain his villainous pay, accuse the Commander by saying, that our whole force remained employed against Flushing, *instead* of a part being sent forward up the Scheldt, which *unfortunate delay* enabled the enemy to collect troops to defend Antwerp. A prostituted hireling may say this, but, where is the *proof*, that, at *any time*, it would have been safe to enter the Scheldt with an army? Lord Chatham, in one of his dispatches, states explicitly, that the government had given him, or, at least, that he had gone from England with, *false information* as to the state of Antwerp, which instead of being defenceless, was in excellent order for defence; and, are we not to believe it possible, that there was false information in other respects?—When I first heard it hinted, that the armament was intended for the Dutch territories, I could not help exclaiming, "*impossible*." I did not think it possible for any man to entertain such a project; but, when it became notorious, that an army was intended to be sent up the Scheldt, I did believe, that, at last, our *guineas* (who never shew their faces at home) had paved the way for us as far as Antwerp, and never could I have dreamt of any thing so mad, so stupid, so sickening, so nauseously foolish, as to attempt to get to Antwerp *by force of arms*. I made sure, that we had made a *safe bargain*; that the armament was to be a mere measure

of disguise; and that my Lord Chatham was sent out for the express purpose of being made a Marquis. It was not 'till I heard, that MONNET (with whom, by the bye, our army appear to be very angry) was pelting us with his balls, and that, too, for several days, that I began to suspect any thing of the real state of the case; and, never was I more surprized at any thing in all my life than at the resistance of MONNET, who, of course, I looked upon as having been bought, long before a ship left Margate.—To deliver the Spaniards seemed a pretty tough undertaking, and has proved to be such; but, to deliver the Dutch, in spite of their teeth, and their snickersnees, and their dykes and their fortresses, commanded by French Engineers, is, surely, the maddest thing of the two. To deliver the Dutch, by knocking their brains out, in the defenceless island of Walcheren, was no difficult matter, but to push on, in the work of deliverance, up the Scheldt, the banks of which are well known to be bristled with fortresses, the best constructed in Europe; to lay a "*plan*" like this, and to let this *plan* be publicly talked of, for weeks before the *deliverers* sailed! . . . It is impossible to find words wherein fitly to express one's contempt of it.—This precious plan, too, was, it is said, hatched by the Crew of Jews and Contractors; or, at least, that the intelligence, whence the plan originated, came, through some of them, from their Dutch Jew correspondents, who wished to have a share, doubtless, in the guineas and dollars that such an attempt at *deliverance* would cause to be squandered. This Crew is our bane. Such expeditions are what they love, because they bring them profit. They love war generally, because it brings contracts and jobs; but they are particularly fond of this expedition sort of war; these sudden armaments; these excuses for paying them enormous sums of the public money; for enriching them at the expence of all those who labour or who have estates.—Still, however, it is the *nation's fault*. There were not a few amongst us, who were foolish enough to believe, or base enough to pretend to believe, that the Dutch were waiting with anxiety for the arrival of our armament; that they were ready to throw themselves into our arms; that they did so *hate* Louis Napoleon, and were so *eager* to get rid of his "*yoke*." Instead of this, our armament found the Dutch very well disposed to cut our throats.

with their long pointed knives, called snickersnees. In short, *every thing*, which was told us upon the subject, was false, and, there can be little doubt, that lord Chatham was deceived as completely as the nation was.—It is, besides, to be observed, that the *fever*, which has created more discontent than every other mishap belonging to the expedition, is not to be imputed to the commander; but, it may be, to the *planners* of the enterprise; because they ought to have known what sort of climate they were sending the troops to.—It is, perhaps, of little consequence, just at this time, on whose head the blame may alight; but, I think it is for the public good, that people should not be induced, *without sufficient reason*, to throw the blame upon lord Chatham, who, as far as I can see, if he had been another Marlborough, could not have done *much* more than he did; and, there is this further evil attending blame wrongfully thrown upon him, that it tends to screen those, to whom, as *suggesters* and *planners* and *urgers* and *halloosers*, the blame is really due.

JACOBIN GUINEAS.—The phrase "*discount upon guineas*," in my article upon this subject (page 377) was used in a hurry, instead of "*discount upon bank notes in exchange for guineas*."—I am pleased to see, that the philosopher, in the *Morning Chronicle*, and his opponent, in some publication not named by the *Chronicle*, seem disposed to keep up their controversy; because I am quite sure, from what they have already done, that they will do a great deal of good.—*Twenty thousand* of these JACOBINS were, the news-papers tell us, apprehended, the other day, by the police-officers, in a vessel upon the Thames, whence they were just about to set sail to the continent, and, in all likelihood, to Holland or France. But, alas! it is in vain to endeavour to stop them by coercive measures. They will go any whither, rather than remain here to circulate in company with the Thread-needle street money. Besides, *what should they be kept here for?* They have in them a *real value*; and, what should they remain here for, while we have so many shops for the making of money, which has in itself *no real value at all?*—It is folly supreme to suppose, that, in the present state of things, the guineas will remain in England. Suppose I had ten thousand of them, I should let them go with persons who wanted to carry money abroad, be-

cause these persons would give me, perhaps, eleven thousand pounds, in paper-money, for them. Is there any *law* against the emigration of guineas? Oh, no! It is nonsense to talk of it, while, if any one will go to Portsmouth, or Plymouth, when a fleet of men of war is going out, he will see a couple of hundred of subaltern blood-suckers, who wear long beards, that they may pass for Jews, selling guineas to the sailors at a price much higher than they have ever yet fetched in Smithfield market, and, by the means of which traffic, the poor fellows *lose a very considerable portion of their pay*. This is a very serious evil, and one, amongst thousands of others, that we owe to the terrible system of paper-money.—One of the wise men, who are writing upon the subject, in the news-papers aforementioned, says, that it is not the paper which has *depreciated*, but the guinea which has *risen*, in value. What a wise man! What a philosopher! So, because we can still get a loaf, at some rate or other, for the Thread-needle street money, that money has *not depreciated*; because it is not completely blown away, it is as good as it ever was! But, wise man, you should bear in mind, that the value is *relative* and not *positive*, and that, if the paper-money be not worth so much, in relation to the guinea, as it used to be, the paper-money *has depreciated*. The guinea is the standard; it is the *touch stone*; and, if the paper-money will not bear its touch, it is become debased.—*To a certain point the guinea will sink with the paper*, but it will go no farther. Whether it has already reached that point, I am not certain. I do not think it has *generally and decidedly*; because, if it had, we should see *more guineas*; and we should hear bargains openly made, making a distinction between prices in gold and prices in paper. The guineas disappear now, only because things are not *generally* come to this pass; because they have not their just value given them in our bargains: because they are insulted by the continual attempts which ignorance is making to keep them upon an equality with old rags mashed and printed into money. When they once come to be treated with proper respect and deference, they will, as the gold did in America and France, re-appear in abundance. At present they are gone, and appear to be fast going, upon their travels; but, it is surprizing how quickly they will flock back again, when once they find us generally disposed to treat them with becoming

distinction.—One of the philosophers, above referred to, has a remark, that paper is as good as gold, *as long as people have confidence in it*; aye, sure: and, *with the same proviso*, hairs out of a Hanoverian's whiskers are as good as paper. But, the fact is, that there are *events*, nay, mere rumours of events, arising from within or coming from without, any one of which would *destroy that confidence in the twinkling of an eye*; and would, of course, annihilate the paper-money; but no event, of any sort, however dreadful or calamitous, could either destroy, or lessen the value of, gold and silver; but, on the contrary, would, and must enhance their value; because it must be clear to every one, that, if the paper-money were annihilated, the guinea, which will now purchase only about five pecks of wheat, would purchase, perhaps, three bushels, as it did previous to Pitt's administration.—There is a passage in the Morning Chronicle of Wednesday, in a letter signed R, which passage I shall here insert, as well worthy of notice, particularly by my readers.—“The severity of the law, against the exportation of gold coin, prevents any one from openly selling bank-notes at a discount; not from any delicacy, as your correspondent supposes me to say, against doing an *immoral* or an unlawful act, but from the fear, that, as it is known that no one can purchase guineas, *but with a view to exportation*, he would become an object of suspicion,—he would be watched, and unable to effect his purpose. Repeal the law, and what can prevent an ounce of standard gold in guineas from selling at as good a price as an ounce of Portugal coin, when it is known to be rather superior to it in purity? And if an ounce of standard gold, in guineas, would sell in the market (as Portugal coin has lately done) at 4*l.* 13*s.* per oz. *how long would a shop-keeper sell his goods at the same price either for gold or bank notes indifferently?* The penalties of the law, therefore, have *degraded the few guineas in circulation to the value of the bank-notes*, but send them *abroad*, and they will purchase exactly what an equal quantity of Portugal coin will.”—This latter part of the paragraph says what I said about four years ago, and for saying which Mr. Sheridan attacked me by name in the House of Commons, while, “out of doors,” I was assaulted, by the whole gang of hirelings, as a wretch that aimed a blow at the vitals

of my country. Now, Mr. PERRY, pray show me, what right you have to publish such truths, any more than I had.—To be sure, if the guinea be “*degraded*,” no matter from what cause, it will not stay. It will go abroad, because it cannot get its value at home.—I am rather pleased at seeing the passage, because it has actually reached me since I wrote down to the very sentence, with which I have introduced it. I am pleased at it, because it is a proof, that there is a right way of thinking arising amongst us, as to this important matter, and because it affords room to hope, that the grand delusion is fast drawing to a close.—This writer, however, has his remedy, for which I am sorry, because he aids the delusion. He has a notion, that, by *diminishing the quantity of bank notes*, you would raise their value, and so *bring back the gold*. But, admitting that such would be the effect, would the cause produce no other effect?—Let us hear his own words:—“This is the temptation to their exportation, and operates the same as a demand from abroad. Our currency is already superfluous, and it is worse than useless to retain the guineas here. But diminish the currency by calling in the excess of bank-notes: make a *partial void*, as your correspondent justly observes was done in France and other countries, from the *annihilation of their paper-credit*, and what can prevent the effectual demand which would thereby be immediately created, from producing an *importation of gold*, and consequently a favourable exchange?”—The other effect which this diminution would produce would be this: that, *the country would have to pay much more than it now pays to the fund-holders*. Diminish the quantity of circulating medium, and you add to the value of what remains; so that the fund-holder, who now receives, in the name of a pound in money, about 15 quatern-loaves from the tax-payers in general, would, in that same pound, receive 20 or 30 quatern-loaves. Oh, no! There can be no diminution of the quantity of paper, which, on the contrary, must increase with the quantity of the taxes, and which, of course, must go on depreciating in value and driving the guineas out of its society, until the day comes, when that “*partial void*” in the currency, of which this writer speaks, shall take place. I do not, I must, however, confess, very clearly comprehend what is meant by the word “*partial*,” as here applied. He speaks of “*making a partial void*,

"as was done in France and other countries, from the ANNIHILATION of their paper-credit."—Zooks! a *void* indeed this would make; but, very far from being *partial*, I think. I will not, however, quarrel with the *name*: give me but the *thing*, and I care not how you name it.—But, is it not odd, that this writer should think of effecting, by the means of a *diminution* in the amount of the bank notes, that which, in France, it required an *annihilation* of paper-money to effect? As an argument of analogy this is certainly very deficient, and that, too, in the most essential point.—It is impossible to look at the state of the paper-money, and to consider its connection with what is called *the funds*, or *the stocks*, without feeling an anxious desire to warn people against the danger, nay, the ruin, to which, from a misunderstanding of the matter, many of them, with the best intentions, are daily exposing themselves, and many more of them are daily exposing their children.—When Pitt first became minister, a person, who received 5 pounds a year interest upon a certain quantity of stock, could buy about *two hundred quartern loaves* with it; but, that same person, with the same interest, upon the same stock, can now buy only about *seventy five quartern loaves*. Thus that person's income has sunk in *reality*, in the proportion of from 200 to 75, though it is *nominally* the same. And, indeed, we daily witness the melancholy effects of this depreciating power of paper-money, not payable in gold or silver. That the thing will go on thus, there can be no doubt. Ought not fathers and mothers, therefore, to reflect well, before they provide for their children's future support by *vesting* property in what is called *the funds*, or, by some, *the stocks*? There are numerous persons, whose income arises from this source, where the kindness of parents has placed it by way of *security*; but, surely, living parents ought to take warning from the fate of those children, whose fortunes were vested in the funds only a few years ago, and many of whom, able then to keep their carriages upon their incomes, are now scarcely able to keep a single servant of any sort or size. But, this is not all. It is not a *regular annual diminution of fortune* only that such parents ought to dread, in behalf of their children (which, however, no parent has a *right* to bequeath to his child); there is the further danger of a total *annihilation of the fortune*; for, the fact is, that *the funds*

are the bank notes, and the bank notes are the funds. From every person, who is possessed of a stock certificate, the government has, directly or indirectly, borrowed so much money. Well, what does it give as a security for the payment of the interest? Why, this same certificate. Well, and of what use is the certificate? Why, it enables the holder of it to go and draw the interest. Well, and whither does he go to get the interest? Why, to the bank in Threadneedle street. Well, and what sort of money is he paid the interest in? Why, *the paper-money, printed at that place*.—Well, then, is not here the whole thing complete? And, if any event were to destroy the paper money, would not the certificate of such stock-holder be worth less than the bit of paper upon which I am now writing?—Fathers and mothers; all those who have fortunes to leave; all those who have provision to make for children, relations, or friends, should duly consider these things.—For the same reason, people should avoid *annuities* as much as possible, the *nominal* amount being always the same, in such cases, whatever may be the depreciation in the real value. If, for instance, an annuity were now granted of a hundred a year, in twenty years time (things proceeding as they have done) it would not be worth above forty pounds a year. The life insurance offices must gain immensely from this cause. In this case, indeed, and in the case of a grant or settlement upon *private* property, the chances may be said to be reciprocal; because, though the paper-money be annihilated, and money, of course, *augmented* in value, the annuity must still be paid in its *nominal* amount. I must confess, however, that I do not think, that this *could* be, and, if it could, it ought not; for, certainly the party granting or settling never could count upon any such change, if he had, it is clear he would have provided against it. In the case, therefore, of an annihilation of the paper-money, the law must come and fix upon a mode of doing justice between the annuitant and the party who had to pay the annuity. This, too, must be the case with respect to *rents* and other payments, arising from contracts of a similar nature. Nor, can I help thinking, that very great injustice was done to landlords, mortgagees, and others, having permanent nominal demands upon real property; I cannot help thinking, that great injustice was done to them, when the act was passed, to protect

the Bank in Thread-needle street, against those, who demanded, or might demand, gold in exchange for its promissory notes. This act produced a depreciation of money, which has ever since been going regularly on. Of course, the landlord, who had then let a farm for a *hundred pounds* a year, now gets less for it than he then did. The fact is, that, though *nominally* the same, the *real* amount is not now above two thirds of what it was then. So that, this act of protection for the Thread-needle street Bank, did, in reality, produce a violation of the contract between the landlord and the tenant, to the very great injury of the former, and, if he let a 21 year's lease, to something very little short of his ruin. This act ought to have provided for the due fulfilment of all *contracts* then existing, by enabling the claimant parties to demand payment in gold which they cannot now do, or, at least, they cannot legally *enforce* their demand, in the same way as they could have done before that act was passed.—Here again it may be said, that the chances are *reciprocal*; but, no; for, depend upon it, that if the value of money was to take so sudden a rise (as it inevitably would upon an annihilation of the paper-money) as to sink wheat from 30*l.* to 10*l.* a load, a law would be passed, and a law, indeed, must be passed, to restore leases to the spirit of their covenants. For these reasons, all those who have lands to let, and who think it beneficial to let leases, for any number of years, should follow the example of LORD MALMSBURY, who (I am told so, at least), lets all his lands upon a *corn-rent*; that is to say, he covenants to receive in each year, *the market price, of that year, of so many quarters of wheat*, for each farm. Nothing can be more fair or satisfactory than this mode to both parties. Neither, as far as this transaction between them goes, need care what is the price of wheat, or what the state of the currency. The one is sure to receive the *real* amount of his rent, and the other to pay no more than the real amount of it, from the one end of the lease to the other. And, there is this peculiar excellence in it, that the amount which the tenant has to pay must always keep an exact proportion to his means of paying; and, on the side of the landlord, in dear years he receives more, in cheap years less; so that even his income too is proportioned to his necessary expenditure.—So much for *Jacobin Guineas*. They have led us into

a long string of desultory remarks, which, however, must, one of these days, become interesting to every soul in the kingdom. —As to the "*remedies*" for depreciation, for the buying up and exporting of guineas, they are all imaginary. There is no remedy. The thing must go on, and will go on, as irresistibly as the bills of mortality; and, I should think, that to convince any one that no diminution in the quantity of the Bank notes can take place, it is only necessary to point out, that one effect of such diminution would be *to augment the real amount of the taxes, now paid to the fund-holders*, unless, indeed, such person supposes, that the nation has not yet got taxes enough to pay.

THE WHIGS are all alive, apparently, upon the prospect of some change in the ministry. I can say nothing new upon the subject, and shall only repeat my wish, that *no change whatever may take place*.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, Thursday, 21 Sept. 1809.

TO

SAMUEL WHITBREAD, Esq. M.P.

"Quand les sauvages de la Louisiane veulent avoir du fruit, ils coupent l'arbre au pied et cueillent le fruit. Voilà le gouvernement despotique."
MONTESQUIEU.

"In quo lapsa consuetudo deflexit de via, sen-
simque eo deducta est, ut honestatem ab utilitate
secermens et constitueret, honestum esse aliquid,
quod utile non esset, et utile, quod non honestum:
qua nulla perniciēs major hominum vitæ potuit
afferri."
CIC. DE OFF. Lib. ii. Cap. 3.

SIR;

I address this Letter to you, because I entertain a very high opinion of your talents, and give you credit for as much rectitude and consistency in your political conduct, as, in my opinion, most of our legislators can fairly lay claim to. With respect to your private character, I have heard it well, and never ill, spoken of. This with me is an important consideration, in estimating the patriotic professions of any public man. I shall, therefore, venture to assume, that you are not vulnerable in the latter, or, I think, the patriotism of our friend John Bowles would not have with-held from the public the benefit of exposure. We all recollect his laudable industry, in collecting anecdotes of the late Duke of Bedford, in which his zeal was not the less conspicuous, because he happened to be too much in haste to ascertain the truth of what he published,

and therefore propagated scandal founded on positive falsehood.

The cause I now write to you, is my happening to see your name mentioned in the preface of a pamphlet, which the lacquies of the Treasury are circulating with prodigious activity, under the title of "Elements of Reform, by Wm. Cobbett;" this work consisting, as no doubt, you know, of quotations from his former, and intended to counteract the effect of his present writings. This is a wretched miserable attempt at delusion; for what can be so ridiculous, as to oppose self-evident truths, such as nine-tenths of the nation now feel an entire conviction of, by what either Mr. Cobbett, or any other person, formerly said, or thought about them? What an opinion these impostors must have of the understanding of those that they expect to delude by such despicable means!! But, be their opinion of them what it may, it certainly is quite favourable enough, if they can find heads so shallow, as to become the dupes of this trick. In the preface, to which I have adverted, you will perceive the honourable mention made of your recent political conduct, which, it appears, has so dreadfully alarmed and offended the whole venal tribe, that you are denounced, or rather "stand convicted" of all crimes united in one; that of associating with such men as Sir Francis Burdett, and some others of the same stamp. What, Sir, will you go so desperate a length, as to identify yourself, regardless of all party, and selfish views, with those who, like Sir Francis, have pursued an undeviating line of public duty, actuated alone by an inflexible attachment to the true principles of the British Constitution? If you have so made up your mind, I congratulate you from the bottom of my heart; for I do not think you can better evince your probity, certainly not, the soundness of your discretion; for unless I most amazingly mistake the fearful signs of the times in which we live, it is only common sense for men, situated as you are, to afford, while they have an opportunity of doing so, the most unequivocal demonstrations of patriotism. When the crisis which evidently is approaching, arrives (and which may be as sudden, as it is inevitable,) I should not choose to be in the number of the mock-patriots, who will have to face the resentment of an indignant injured nation. Perhaps I shall be told this is language calculated to inflame

the public mind. My talents are not of that order, as to effect any such mighty achievements. But, Sir, if the causes of discontent were either few, or unsubstantial in their nature, I should defy any language however forcible, any eloquence however brilliant, indeed I should completely defy the united artillery of the Press and of the Forum, to excite any thing like serious commotion, or even disaffection in the British nation. What do you, or can any rational man suppose, is the cause that the popularity of Sir Francis Burdett is steadily increasing, among all ranks in this country, opposed as he uniformly has been, by all the opprobrium and misrepresentation that enraged venality and corruption can possibly assail him with? Sir Francis might as well preach to the winds, if the melancholy evils he so feelingly deplores, and earnestly labours to avert from the country, had not found their way to Englishmen's firesides. Perhaps it is quite superfluous for me, on the present occasion, to offer any new argument on the momentous subject of Parliamentary Reform. So long, however, as common sense and common honesty, have any thing to do with human institutions, I cannot help believing that the plain English of Sir Francis Burdett will be much better understood than the metaphysical subtleties of Mr. Windham. If the latter gentleman really does consider, as he is reported to have expressed himself, that those who are asking for Reform, are either "dupes or knaves," what must be thought of the debased condition of human nature; what, in particular, of the state of society and morals in this country; when it is contended that political turpitude, that detected fraud, rapine and corruption in every department, civil and military, had better remain with impunity, than to risk a practical recurrence to those principles, upon which, all the best authorities have uniformly maintained, that, both the safety and splendour of the monarchy, as well as the liberties and prosperity of the people, essentially rest? Surely it is too much to expect the acquiescence of the people in a state of things, which is at open war with the immutable principles of truth and justice; which is vicious in practice, as it is in theory; which is directly subversive of the foundation of parliament; which, in short, is calculated to confound all distinction of right and wrong, by converting what we still deno-

minate the representatives of the people, into an assembly, of which the great majority are as much at the disposal of the Borough-Mongers, as absolute sovereignty on one side, and unconditional submission on the other, can place them. This is the state of things that we are either "fools or knaves" for opposing; this is the state of things, which, after having created such imminent dangers even to the independence of the country, in addition to the sufferings of the great body of the people, we are not to deem susceptible of any remedy!! It is this state of things (Oh God! the heart sickens at such revolting, impudent profligacy) that has stimulated some men to proclaim the "necessity of making a stand against popular encroachments."—I observed that Mr. Wilberforce, in a late debate, was reported to declare that the people of this country never more fully enjoyed the blessings of the British constitution than at present. Mr. Wilberforce may as well be superficial on this subject, as on any other. There are, however, unfortunately, such immense numbers among us, over whose minds Mr. Wilberforce has peculiar influence, that I lament the share he contributes to the general delusion. This delusion has been our deadly enemy. Good heavens! how many millions of our own money does it yearly cost us to pay those whose business it absolutely is to impose upon our understandings; to incessantly labour to establish a settled notion in the public mind that there is nothing radically wrong in the conduct of our affairs; that the sacrifices we make are positively unavoidable, that the Income and other war taxes are indispensable for the maintenance of the contest with France, and, consequently, for the preservation of our lives and liberties, indeed of all that is dear to us: whereas, I am as well convinced as I am of my existence, that all our danger, whether of subjugation to a foreign yoke, or of real unqualified despotism at home, arises from the continuance of those taxes which are asserted to be necessary for averting such calamities. Why, these taxes are a real positive curse; a millstone about the neck of the country. In the laudable work of imposing upon public credulity, I perceive Mr. Tierney has been assisting with all his might; and if any thing could astonish me, it is the assurance with which this gentleman appears to have attacked Mr. Wardle, on a recent occasion, in which he is reported to

have ironically expressed the prodigious pleasure he felt, and in which he presumed the Chancellor of the Exchequer would participate, at the discovery, by Mr. Wardle, that the INCOME TAX might be immediately got rid of by a Reform of Parliament. I know, Sir, that the party always felt a little shyness of this Mr. Tierney: you, perhaps, remember an inscription upon the back of a certain portrait which never ought to have been honoured with the station it occupied "vix ———."—Look here now! have we not a pretty sample of a consistent, firm, honest, patriot, such as this Mr. Tierney is so kind as to tell us he is!! Who would believe, without having witnessed the fact, that such was the professed abhorrence, in which the Income Tax was held by this indignant senator, that no real, or pretended exigencies of the state could ever tolerate its adoption? It was not on *any terms* to be endured by Englishmen, because it was not only dreadfully partial in its operation, but contrary to all the acknowledged principles of legitimate taxation: it was not only a most grievous additional burthen to a nation already groaning under the load of taxes, but absolutely a direct attack on the independence, domestic happiness, and constitutional rights of Englishmen. All this, and much more, appeared from time to time, in the reports of the speeches of this honourable; *right honourable*, gentleman, I should say. Nay, this Mr. Tierney was so determined in his opposition to the Income Tax, that the author of it was never to be at rest, for he promised to make a stand against it, as often as the forms of the house would admit of. Now, who would have supposed, that the complete conversion of this patriot was just on the point of taking place? Behold! he very soon stepped into office, to which I have not the smallest doubt his eyes were, and still remain, piously directed; and, no sooner had he passed the threshold, than he set all his ingenuity to work: What to do, Sir, think you? Why to make up, as he amply did, for Pitt's deficiency of invention, by rendering this (as he called it) "scourge," this "torture," this "inquisition," this "unpardonable insult" "to the liberties of the people of England," beyond comparison more efficient than the latter had been able to do. Suppose Mr. Wardle, instead of condescending to reply to his sneers in any other way, had insisted, in the name of the people of Eng-

land, on the necessity of immediately repealing this Tax, resting his demand solely on the foundation of Mr. Tierney's former arguments against its adoption; namely, that it was oppressive, vexatious, partial, and unjust: are not these as good reasons for the repeal as they were against its adoption? Pray, Sir, can you imagine, can the utmost refinement of injustice furnish any thing more repugnant, not merely to the excellence of the constitution, but to what is much more intelligible, that obvious principle of ethics: doing unto others as we would be done unto; than a Tax upon Income, which takes equally from the same amount, without regard either to the nature of such Income, or the ability or inability to pay it? For instance, one person has a precarious income, of which the whole is unavoidably consumed for the absolute subsistence of a large family; and, I think it will not be denied by many, that the expenditure itself is taxed in one way or another quite enough: another has an income of the same amount, let us say 200*l.*, derived from real property, without any one but himself to support.—In a second letter, I shall endeavour to demonstrate to you, what I wonder any one doubts, not only the safety and practicability, but also the absolute necessity, of an immediate reduction of the taxes, and a recurrence to the sound maxims of our ancestors, beginning with the extirpation of all the dangerous monopolies in the country, and especially of the Bank restriction, the parent of them all, which Bank ought to be immediately compelled to resume its payments in specie, and, at least, reduced to the purposes of its original establishment. If any proof of this is wanting, look at the course of exchange, which is now upwards of 20 per cent against us, and at the rate we are going on, we are in a hopeful way of sinking the pound sterling, to the value of a French livre, as I recollect a friend of mine emphatically saying, when the suspension of payment, in specie, at the Bank, first commenced, would be the final result of that wretched, short-sighted, contemptible expedient. Surely, the unaccountable infatuation of my countrymen, cannot remain much longer proof against the stubborn evidence of facts!! The bubble, and a very empty one it is, of our commercial greatness, aye, or as some call it, the "commerce of the whole world," will soon burst. What can have become of the sense of Englishmen, when they

hear, without reflecting on the cause, that guineas are bought up with avidity in Smithfield market, at the rate of 23 or 24 shillings each: when they hear, that they are worth 26 or 27 shillings on the continent? Unless the very nature of things has changed, and first principles become a chimera, not only in morals and politics, but also in common arithmetic, our situation demonstrates one of two evils: either our pretended commercial prosperity is a complete deception, and we are obliged to import from the continent to a most alarming extent beyond the value of our exports, or our Bank notes, if not nominally so here, are not the less, in reality, at an enormous discount. No sophistry can do away this plain deduction.

I am, Sir, &c.

AN ENGLISHMAN
of the Old School.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Proclamation of Marshal Augereau, Duke of Castiglione, &c. to the Inhabitants of Catalonia. Dated Perpignan, July 2.—
(Continued from p. 334.)

Errors and faults shall meet with indulgence: moderation, loyalty, and fidelity may be secure of our aid; but let perfidy fear and tremble. But obstinate rebels, the evil-minded, who blow up the flames of dissension, shall meet with no pardon. The lightning is ready to fall on their heads.—Erring citizens, return to your hearths; artisans, resume your labours and useful pursuits; good villagers, quit the sword; take once more the plough in your hand; come and cultivate in peace and repose the inheritance of your fathers; hasten to fertilise those fields which have been too long deserted: and you, ye faithful Spaniards, come and receive the happy fruits and rewards of your fidelity. Join your voice to ours; call to those unhappy wretches your brethren who are led astray; tell them that we love them, that Napoleon will forget their errors and their faults; and that your felicity will be the constant object of his concern as your parent; tell these wandering brethren, that they will ever find me ready to carry their cries to the foot of that Monarch's throne, who is the friend of truth; that they may depend on the protection of our arms, which, formidable against rebels and the ill-disposed, however numerous, will ever be the defenders of the faithful citizen; and that we will avenge offences committed against

them; but tell them at the same time, and above all things, that mercy has its limits, and that, at length, the day of vengeance will come. A powerful army is dispersed throughout your territory; a formidable army is coming, and woe to him that shall dare to resist me; for I shall then hearken only to a just indignation, a most just rage, and none of you will escape a terrible vengeance.—Saragossa is yet smoking; and you, ye towns of Catalonia, who please, or dare, to follow its example, behold its ashes, its ruins—tremble. AUGEREAU.

EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND.—*From the London Gazette of Sept. 2, 1809.*—(Continued from p. 350.)

Extract of a Letter from rear-admiral sir Rich. John Strachan, bart. k. b. to the hon. William Wellesley Pole, dated on board his majesty's ship the St. Domingo, off Batz, the 25th Aug. 1809.

I have now to acquaint you, for their lordships' information, that the flat-boats of every description of vessels being assembled, and every necessary arrangement made on the part of the navy, for landing the army near Sandfleet, on the beach, which had been previously reconnoitred, and not hearing from the earl of Chatham respecting his intentions, I communicated with his lordship on the 24th inst. and on the following day I found his lordship had not come to a determination, on account of the increased force of the enemy, and the army getting sickly, and that he had sent for generals to consult; I therefore, on the morning of the 20th, wrote to his lordship, and I soon after went on shore to the meeting of the lieutenant-generals of the army, taking with me rear-admiral sir Richard Keats. I found them decidedly of opinion that no operation could be undertaken against Antwerp, with any prospect of success, at this advanced season of the year, and the enemy increasing in strength, and our own forces diminished by sickness; and that, as the taking of Lillo and Liefkenshoeik would not ensure our obtaining the ultimate object of the expedition, without Antwerp being reduced, and the country near these fortresses being inundated, it was also their decided opinion, that the army ought not to make any attempt upon them.—I had already, in the most unqualified manner, offered every naval assistance to reduce these fortresses, and also in aid of every other

operation of the army.—Conceiving the subject of the deliberations of the generals perfectly military, I withdrew with sir Richard Keats. The ships of the enemy, which were above the town of Antwerp, about five miles, have come down, and are now extended along the river face of it, except two of the line lower down, in the reach above Liefkenshoeik—and four frigates went to Lillo. An immense number of small gun-boats are on the boom; behind them a crescent of sixty gun and mortar-brigs. The battery between Lillo and Frederick Hendrick is finished; it has ten guns. The enemy has been driven from that which he has constructed on the Doel side with loss, by the fire of our bombs and gun-vessels.

DUTCH ACCOUNTS.—*Dated Amsterdam, Sept. 11.*—*The following Reports have been received from Marshal Dumonceau, Commander-in-Chief of the Dutch Army in Brabant and Zealand:*—

Sire; The infantry under my command arrived here yesterday evening, at five, (at Wemeldinge), and immediately afterwards a battalion of chasseurs proceeded to Ter Goes, which the enemy had left at eight the preceding morning. To-day lieutenant-gen. Bruno took the following position: the 3d regiment of the line is at Wemeldinge, and watches the enemy's movements in Keten, and the whole line along the East Scheldt before Kallendyke; the 2d regiment possesses the town of Ter Goes, and has the guard of North Beveland, with two companies of chasseurs; the 1st regiment of chasseurs occupies Neer-Arendschurch, Nisse, and Baarland; guards the Sloe, and the whole east coast of the Scheldt, from the Sloe to Hoedkenschurch; the lieutenant-gen. Bruno has fortified himself at Ter Goes; the hussars are to take a position in the district of Ter Goes; and the whole line of fore-posts is filled with numerous patrols; while the artillery shall be quartered in reserve behind Ter Goes; the fortress of Bathz is occupied by the 6th regiment. The enemy has not yet evacuated Walcheren, but every thing announces that he will not delay in abandoning Zealand; for he does not work at the batteries, and it is imagined that he is embarking his heavy baggage.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 13.] LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1809. [Price 1s.

"The principal Council belonging to the King is his Privy Council, which is generally called, by way of eminence, *"The Council."* And this, according to Sir Edward Coke's description, is a *noble, honourable, and reverend* assembly, of the King and such as he wills to be of his Privy Council, in the King's Court or Palace."—BLACKSTONE; Book I. Chap. I.

417]

[418

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

MINISTERIAL DUEL.—"Set a beggar on horse-back, and he'll ride to the devil," is a proverb, the truth of which is daily apparent. From the scum of society, from the *casual fruition*, from the *spawn of itinerant vagrants*, one might have expected, that a long and bitter quarrel, about place and profit, would end in an attempt upon one another's lives; but, from the *great men of the realm*; from our ministers of state; from our law-givers; from the king's privy counsellors; from members of that "*noble, honourable, and reverend assembly*;" from this description of persons, one might have expected something a little better than the popping off of pistols at each other's skulls.—

The base hirelings, who conduct the Morning Post and the Courier news-papers, have not, as yet, openly asserted, that this duel arose from the influence of *Jacobinism*; they have not yet openly asserted, that Sir Francis Burdett and Mr. Wardle and Mr. Madocks were the cause of it; but, I shall be greatly surprized, if they do not, before they have done, make shift so to twist the matter as to make even this transaction appear to their beastly tribe of readers as having its origin in a Jacobin Plot; and that the actors themselves were perfectly innocent of any evil intention, and, at the time when they were cocking their eye at each others heads, felt *loyalty* bubbling up to their very throats; nay, that, as far as they were concerned, it was a mere rivalry in loyalty, that was the ground of their quarrel.—But, be this as it may, let us have the facts upon record, as those facts have been stated in the news-papers.—The fact of the Duel is stated as follows:—"We understand that there was a meeting at Putney Heath, this morning, between Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning. Lord Yarmouth accompanied the former to the field—Mr. Ellis the latter. After taking their ground, they fired by signal, and missed; and no explanation taking place, they

"fired at each other a second time, when the ball from Lord Castlereagh's pistol went through Mr. Canning's thigh, on the outer side of the bone. Thus the affair terminated.—Mr. Canning's wound is not considered to be dangerous.—The cause of this extraordinary affair is said to have originated in some official misunderstanding, the nature of which we shall not enter into at present, as we are greatly deficient in information upon the subject; and in a matter of such *extreme delicacy*, we think it our duty to avoid hazarding any statements which we do not know to be accurately correct."—What! "*Extreme delicacy!*" Delicacy towards fellows like these; towards men who set the law at defiance, who go deliberately out, and shoot at each other's heads, when not many months have passed since a man was *hanged* for a similar offence, and that, too, though every means were tried of obtaining a pardon from that king, amongst whose *advisers* these very two men were at that time, and who, of course, advised him not to spare the life of that man! Talk of delicacy, indeed, towards men like these! It is the most insolent expression; it is the grossest insult upon the public understanding and taste, that has been for a long time attempted, even by the abettors of this set, who have brought the country to the brink of destruction.—It is added, that the cause of this duel is a quarrel between the parties of long standing; or, at least, of *some months standing*.—Nothing was wanting to prove, that this nation, as to its public spirit and sentiment, was in the lowest state of degradation. The transactions at the close of the last session of parliament, the contempt with which the people were then treated; the utter disregard of all decency in this treatment; the "*making a stand against popular incroachment*," when all that was demanded was the punishment of those, who had sold or swapped Seats in Parliament; this alone proved to the whole world to what a degraded state the people of this once-high-

mind country had sunk; but, if proof had still been wanting, it certainly would have been found in the history of this duel, where we see the government committed to the hands of men, having so little sense of common decency as to forget the high rank they had been placed in, and to turn out, like a couple of brothel-heated bullies, and shoot at each other's heads.—Why, these men, besides having the principal affairs, by far the most important affairs of the nation, committed to their immediate direction and controul, were, in virtue of their office of privy-counsellors alone, *keepers* of the king's secrets; *magistrates* of the very highest order; and *judges* in many very important cases. And, in order to give them peculiar protection, the law makes it *felony* for any one to *assault* and *strike* them in the execution of their office. It was by men of this description, that Mr. Le Maitre was sent to jail and there kept for *five years*, and then discharged, without being brought to trial; without ever having any charges preferred against him; and without being able to obtain any redress, though he petitioned the parliament over and over again, and though he was daily told, in the news-papers, which, during the five years, reached him in the jail, that the war was going on for the preservation of the liberties of Englishmen.

—Such were the *powers*, which, as privy-counsellors, were committed to the hands of these men.—As *ministers of state*, the public will do well to bear in mind, that, besides their patronage and power, a law was passed, in the time of Pitt, and in the passing of which both these men assisted, to send men to *Botany Bay*, to *transport them for life*, to put them upon a level with *felons*, for writing or publishing any thing, calculated to *bring them into contempt*. These are the men, who have proposed, and passed laws like this; these very men, who, while still ministers of state, go out upon a heath, and shoot at one another's heads! For writing or printing any thing, however *true*, calculated to expose men like these to *contempt*, any Englishman was liable to be transported; aye, and to be told, at the same time, that his sentence was *just*, that it was according to *law*, and that he ought to *bless God* for having such laws to live under.—The public will also bear in mind, that, with the sole exception of Mr. Charles Yorke, these two men were the very loudest, at the first broaching of the charges against the Duke of York, in the cry about a *Jacobin Conspiracy*,

and in accusing the *press* of being the organ of that conspiracy; that these two men were the most strenuous, in the attempt that day made, to pave the way for laws, which should render the press a mere instrument in the hands of men in power, as the press in Calcutta is; and, that these two men were the loudest in the cry against what they called an "attack upon all public men," and in calling for a stand against popular encroachment. This should be now recollected by the insulted people of England; but, they have so long borne insult with unmoved gall, that they are scarcely to be either dreaded or pitied.

—Yes, these are the gentry, who complained so bitterly about the attempts to *degrade all public men*; who advised the king to recommend (in the last Speech from the throne), to the people in the parliament houses to go into their several counties and inculcate amongst their constituents an *obedience to the laws*; these are the people, during whose administration, the Crown Bar Judge at Winchester, at the last assizes, thought proper, in his charge to the Grand Jury (of which the Right Honourable old George Rose was foreman), to express his sorrow at observing, that there was a prevalent disposition to *degrade public men*, which he attributed to the *abuse of the liberty of the press*; yes, these are two of the gentry, who were in office at that very time, and who, at that very time, as it now appears, were brewing a quarrel, which has terminated in an attempt to kill, to murder each other.—When the Tinman of Plymouth was tried and punished so severely for an attempt upon the virtue of Mr. Addington, the circumstance of the latter being a *privy-counsellor* was strongly urged in *aggravation* of the offence; and, I am fully persuaded, that, if any one had said and published, that a Duel was about to take place between these two men, an out-cry would have been instantly raised against him; he would have been represented as having committed a dreadful outrage upon "his Majesty's government," in the persons of two of his Right Honourable Privy Counsellors; we should have seen all the high-sounding words of law marshalled against him; and, very likely, have seen him prosecuted to his utter ruin, and penned up in a jail, as distant as possible from his affairs and his friends. Yes, only for saying, that these men would do, or were likely to do, what they have now *actually done*, this would have been my fate, or that of any other

writer or publisher.—When we find, that these two men, the one Secretary of State for Foreign affairs, and the other the War-Secretary, have been at daggers-drawn for many months past, are our failures and misfortunes any longer a subject of wonder? For *several months past*: that is the fact stated. Is it not in human nature, that they should, during that time, have *thwarted* one another by all possible means; and, indeed, is it to be supposed, that two men, who could not be restrained from shooting at one another, would restrain themselves from doing any thing, in their official capacity, to annoy each other, and to produce each others disgrace? To what a state, then, is this nation reduced! What a shame, what a scandal, it is, that the affairs of a great nation should be thus committed! For months past, nay, for more than two years, of the most perilous part of this most perilous war, have the most important concerns, questions of war and of peace, been entrusted to these men. The expenditure of one half of those endless taxes that are weighing us to the earth; the faith and honour of the country; the lives of hundreds of thousands; and the happiness of millions, have all hung upon the breath of two men, whose malignant rivalry, or whose passions of one sort or another, have, at last, induced them to sally forth upon a heath, with the avowed intention of blowing out each other's brains! And, while this is going on, we are bidden not to attempt to *degrade public men*, upon pain of jail and pillory!

—It was this Mr. Canning; it was this son of Mrs. Hunn; indeed, it was both these men, who, as plainly as men could speak, recommended new and more severe laws against the Press, and that, too, because, as they said, the Press was the instrument of a Jacobinical Conspiracy; it was they, who cried out against those, who, as they said, were endeavouring to disturb the peace of mind of "our good Old King," whose "*age and infirmities*" it became us to consider, when we were pressing for a certain decision in parliament. Have they, then, now the impudence to reproach others with a want of consideration for the king's peace of mind? They who, to the utter degradation of all rank and office, have turned out and popped at each other's heads. They, who have brought upon his reign a stain, which no other reign, in this or in any other country, has ever received; a stain that does not belong even to the worst part of the French revolution, in all its de-

mocratical madness? That revolution, mad and bloody as it was, never exhibited two ministers of state shooting at each other.

—What a figure do we, at this moment, cut in the eyes of the world! Buonaparte's ministers are not thus employed. They are engaged in quite other sort of matters. This Mr. Canning, is he, who, above all others, has prated about the want of *decorum* and *dignity* in the proceedings of the French; it was he who talked so much about dignity, in his paper relative to the "universal Spanish nation." The world will now be able to judge of what his notions of dignity are worth.—There wanted only this scandalous occurrence, this degrading, this black-guard rencontre, to make the fitness of the *Jubilee* complete. It will, indeed, after having congratulated the king upon, and returned God, thanks for, the six to seven hundred millions of government debt and the premium upon guineas; the increase of the poor rates and the doubling of the number of paupers; the creating of the Income and Assessed taxes with a vast addition to the number of all other taxes; the adding tenfold to the number and expence of the standing army; the introduction of large bodies of foreign troops into the kingdom; the fall of Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, Italy, Naples, Germany, before our mortal enemy, and, indeed, their having become dependencies of France; the existence of a French dock-yard and fleet at Antwerp, within four hours sail of the mouth of the Thames; the late events upon the Danube, and the more important negotiations now there going on; the achievements of our army at Dunkirk, at the Helder, at Ferrol, at Buenos Ayres, at Cairo, at Cintra, in Leon and Galicia, at Walcheren, and though last, not least, at Talavera: after having congratulated the King upon all this, and taken a view of the present situation of our countrymen in the *hospitals* of Zealand and of Spain; after this it will be very fit to congratulate him upon the Duel between two of his ministers and privy-counsellors upon Putney Heath; it will be, indeed, a way to flatter him, and to smooth the latter part of his life, to thank him for having chosen, as the immediate managers of the most important of the national concerns, two men, who, after months of smothered hatred and malice, go out, and let fly a ball at each other's heads. The Jews and Seat-Mongers will, surely, not forget this topic of congratulation, when they call

upon the people to illuminate their houses in sign of joy. It will be for those Jews and Seat-Jobbers to tell us what mode was taken by the duelling ministers to transfer the papers, and the information, of their offices, to their successors. The Jobbers will be able to tell us, perhaps, what measures were taken by these Atlases of the state to shift the load upon other shoulders; and to shew us in what the case of either of these men, supposing the other to have been killed, would have differed from the case of the man, lately hanged upon a gallows in Ireland; and, when they are upon the subject of congratulation, they may go on to the fact of that man having been hanged, and having been refused to be pardoned, while these two men were amongst the advisers of the King.—After all, however, scandalous as this Duel is, disgraceful as it is to the government and to the nation, it is not, if one takes time to reflect, any thing to wonder at. What was to be expected from such men, placed in such a situation? Their appointment to such high offices, was, of itself, an unequivocal symptom of the rapid decline of the country; their continuance there was another symptom; and, that, when they became *rivals for power and ennoblement*, they should quarrel, and if they quarrelled, they should have no regard to decency, was naturally to be expected. These are, too, a brace of the "*young friends*;" a brace of the chickens that were hatched under the wing of Pitt, and for the fostering and rearing of whom this miserable nation *has paid so dearly*. These were two of the famous *Anti-Jacobins*, and Mr. Ellis (if it was *George*) was a third. These were two of the men, who rose out of the heat of Anti-Jacobinism. I know of no two like them; and, if you go and ask the *Irish*, they will tell you so too, with many and many an instance of their *feats*.—But, we deserve this, and much more. If the people of England had had common sense, they never would have fostered this numerous brood of Anti-Jacobins; and, if they had but a common portion of public spirit, they would now be taking all the lawful means in their power to guard themselves and their children against them, instead of contenting themselves, as they now do, with *silent* contempt, which never has any effect upon profligate public men.—I have but a word or two to say upon the relative merits, or, rather, demerits, of these pistolling privy-counsellors; and, that must be only

conditionally. If it be true, that the cause of the duel was, what is stated in some of the news-papers; namely, that Mr. CANNING went to the Duke of Portland, in the month of May last, just about the time of the discussion about the other's having given an Office to be swapped against a Seat in Parliament, and endeavoured to get him turned out of his place, *without acquainting him with what he was doing, or had done*; if this be true, the other had, certainly, good reason to be offended; for the act was a very underhanded one, and quite worthy of a "*young friend*" and a "*staunch Anti-Jacobin*." This I know nothing at all about; but, if the charge be true, Mr. Canning is the person most to be blamed, though nothing can justify the conduct of either. The public will recollect, that it was Mr. Canning who moved for the *acquittal* of Lord Castlereagh, in the case referred to, and that, upon that occasion, he accused the *people of factiousness*. If, therefore, it be true, that he was then at work to get Lord Castlereagh out, while he was pretending, in the House of Commons, to look upon him as innocent, and was calling him his "*noble friend*," if this be true, he does, indeed, cut a very shabby figure, and furnishes us with a pretty good criterion whereby to judge of his sincerity and of the motives by which he was actuated.

CHANGE OF FACTIONS.—This event now seems to be inevitable. The No-Popery set appears to have worn itself out, before they have quite worn out the government. The *out* faction, by some called the *Whigs*, are all alive. They are as busy as wasps on a sunny morning, after long wet and cold. They have, for some time, been reviving from their dormant state. The failure in Spain, last year, was very cheering to them; they began to buzz and to prune their wings; but, the unfortunate affair of the Duke of York, and the other *scat-selling* affairs that followed, and in all which affairs they proved themselves to be just as sound as their opponents; these affairs came and drowned the affairs of Spain. Now, however, the "*victories*" of Walcheren and Talavera, together with the state of affairs upon the Danube, have again warmed the whole faction into activity, and the wars in the cabinet, of which they have long been informed, have strongly tended to cherish those hopes, which the *Duel* seems to be in a fair way of realizing.—The government is just in that state, which is best

calculated to make them, when they come into power, as bad a ministry as ever this country saw. They will take possession of it by way of grace on their part; for, really, *as the system* is to be *persevered in*, there appears to be nobody but themselves capable of carrying it on. There would be men enough found to conduct the affairs of the nation, if *a reform of the system* were to take place; but, as long as the power and sway of the borough-mongers continue, the faction now out seems to be the only set of men that can be called in; and the system is in that desperate state, that even those of their enemies, who are friends of the system, will wish for their return to power.—Coming in, thus, by the way of *no-thanks*, they will hardly forbear to shew the nation that they feel their own consequence; but, let them bear in mind, that, though called in by the *necessities of the system*, they are not called in by the *voice of the people*, who have no more confidence in them, than they have in the faction whom they oppose.—The Morning Chronicle, the trumpet of the Whig faction, the editor of which had a place under them, while they were in power, and who, as we shall soon see, will have another, and, perhaps, a better, place under them, if they come in again; this print, of the 26th instant, says:—"It is now universally known, that his Majesty has called for the services of lord Grenville and lord Grey; and that these distinguished Statesmen are forthwith expected in town. We trust that they will feel it to be their duty to take upon themselves the difficult and painful task of restoring to the Government the efficiency it has lost. It is a happy presage of their lasting power, that every eye is turned to them as to our *dernier resort*; and it is the ardent hope, that they may form an Administration that shall equally enjoy the confidence of the King and the Heir Apparent, as well as of the people at large, so as to set all questions of domestic policy at rest, and to unite all descriptions and persuasions in the common cause. The prospect of their return to power is hailed with so much cordiality as apparently to reconcile every jarring sentiment, and to make it unnecessary to recur to that appeal by which the sense of the nation is upon such an event generally collected. It will require some days to complete the arrangement."—This is, at once, as impudent and as foolish

a puff as ever appeared even in a London news-paper.—Oh! he trusts, this writer does, that these two great statesmen will consent to take the *task* upon them! Bless us! how long is it since they wanted *wooing* to come into place? How long is it since any man began to doubt of their eagerness to get back into power? It is only two years since they withdrew from before parliament a Bill, which they had brought in under the pretended persuasion of its absolute necessity to the safety of the nation; it is only two years since they did this with the hope of retaining their places. To be sure, they were in long enough to place and pension all their relations and dependents; but, still there is no man who knows any thing of them, who will believe, that they will not jump at the offer of place.—What is the most impudent in this Whig puff is, however, the assertion, that "*every eye is turned to*" wards them as our *dernier resort*." If this writer means, as the men who are to give the *finishing stroke to the system*, well and good; for I do think, that, if they come into power, they will see it out. But, if he means, that the eyes of the people of England are turned towards these two noblemen and their former colleagues, as to persons, who are likely to save the country from the great and manifold dangers that threaten it, from within as well as from without; if he means this, then I say, that he means to promulgate, and knowingly to promulgate, as gross a falsehood as ever was put into print, even in the Morning Post or Courier.—No, Sir, the eyes of the people are not directed towards your party, towards your selfish faction, with any such hopes. The people of England, though they have had their spirit pressed and squeezed out of them, have not lost the faculty of remembering; though they retain not the spirit to resent injuries and insults, they cannot deprive themselves of the power of bearing them in mind. The people of England remember, because they cannot have forgotten, that the Whig faction, when it came into power, made a compromise, by which the Duke of York, contrary to their declared resolution, was suffered to retain all his offices and patronage, some few of the effects of which we have since seen;—that, after having, for more than twenty years, been opposed to the administration of Pitt, which they had, upon numerous occasions, proved to be oppressive and foolish, and which had brought the nation

into the danger which then existed, they voted away 40 thousand pounds of the people's money to pay his debts, upon the ground of his *public services*, and, what was still more galling, more insolent towards this burthened people, that they voted him a public funeral and a monument at that people's expence;—that they had always been opposed to the bringing of *foreign troops* into this kingdom, which, upon more than one occasion, they had represented as a violation of those laws which placed the king's family upon the throne, and that, amongst the first acts of their administration, they brought in a bill to indemnify those, who had advised the king to augment the number of foreign troops before in the kingdom;—that the making war for Hanover had, for many years, been a subject of complaint with them, and that, in a few months after they got into power, they declared, in a public State-paper, that they should advise the king never to make peace for England, unless the restoration of Hanover to him was one of the conditions of that peace;—that, at the time when the Income Tax was imposed, they solemnly protested against it, as an act of oppression unparalleled, as inquisitorial, as destructive of every remaining notion of freedom, and that, in less than three months after they got possession of power, this tax, which they found at 6½ per cent, they augmented to 10 per cent, and when reminded of their former professions, seemed to condemn the folly of those who had thought them sincere;—that, in this case of the Income Tax, they did what Pitt had never attempted to do, namely, exempted from the payment of that tax all the money that the king might have in the funds, under whatever name it might there be lodged;—that, during the whole of their administration, they set their face against all inquiries into abuses, and endeavoured to beat down all those who attempted to cause such inquiries. All this, and a great deal more, the people of England well remember; and, they remember, too, that amongst the opponents of the Investigation into the conduct of the Duke of York, many of the Whigs were the most mischievous and malignant; they remember, that General Fitzpatrick, the Whig Secretary at War, was one of the sponsors for the Royal Duke's character; they remember that only 125 members of the whole House voted with Mr. Wardle;

they remember, and, I hope, will never forget, that both factions were cordially united in resisting every attempt to pass a censure upon the act of having *sold a seat in the House of Commons*; and, in short, that, in every thing, respecting the interests of the people, the Whigs have shown themselves, to the full, as insensible as their rivals.—All this the people remember; all this, and much more, is fresh in the mind of every man, who thinks at all about politics; and, is it not, therefore, outrageously impudent to say, that all eyes are fixed upon Lords Grenville and Grey as the men to save the nation?—Of the *freedom of election* the Whigs were just as tender as their predecessors; they dissolved the parliament for the purpose of having another of their *own* choosing; and I, for my part, shall never forget the villainy, the unparalleled villainy, of their partizans in Westminster against Mr. Paull, whose cause, before they came into power, one part of them, at least, had pledged themselves to support.—In short, there is no doubt in my mind, that, of the two factions, this is hated the most by the people of England in general; and, I really think, that they are the most worthy of the hatred of the people of Ireland, who ought to be reminded, that it was the Whigs, who maintained, that there was a *French party in Ireland*, and who actually *drew up that BILL*, which was passed after they were turned out, and under which the people of Ireland now live.—No, no: the eyes of no man of sense either are, or can be, turned towards these men as persons calculated to save the country. They are called in, if called at all, not by the voice of the people, or by the good opinion of the king, but by the *necessities of the system*, which are such, that the present set appear to be unable to provide for them: and still more by *accident*; by an accidental quarrel, which has made such confusion in the ranks of No-popery, that it can no longer keep going. There is no doubt, that the Whigs, if we must still call them by that stinking old sham name, contain abler men than are to be found in the other faction, and men of much more dignity of character. There is no doubt, that they could, if they *would*, do great things for the country. But, there is also full as little doubt, that they will not attempt it. I am inclined to think, nay, I firmly believe, that Lord Grey would perform his promise, so solemnly made to the people, of obtaining for them a Reform of

the House of Commons; but, this he cannot attempt, while joined with Lord Grenville and others. It was, indeed, this junction that ruined the Fox party, and that precipitated their leader to the grave. The people expected, they confidently and they justly expected, that, when Mr. Fox came into power, they should hear the Pitt system reprobated from the Treasury Bench, and, not only that, but that they should see a new line of policy followed. But, instead of this, they heard, from that Bench, nothing but the *praises* of "the great man now-no-more;" and, as if this insult had not been sufficient, they heard Mr. Fox himself defend his measures upon the ground, that they were in pursuance of the principles of Pitt, to get rid of the operation of whose accursed principles it was desired that Mr. Fox should be in place. The system of Pitt, in all its parts, now became an object of praise on *both sides* of the House; and this appeared to be the only change of any consequence, which the change of men had produced.—The Wellesleys and their government in India, who and which had been a grand subject of attack with the Whigs before they came into power, became, at once, a grand object of their protection. Thus was it, too, with all peculators, all the old battening Pittites, who were kept in their offices and emoluments, in spite of every demand of reason, of honour, and of justice.—What do the friends and partizans of the Whigs promise us *now*? Even now, in this terrible situation, what do they propose that this set of *statesmen* shall do for us? They tell us, that the present set have uselessly poured out the treasure and the blood of the nation; that they have squandered away millions upon millions of money, and exposed many thousands of lives to almost certain destruction, and that, too, apparently with the intention of purchasing disgrace and infamy. Well; having told us this, would not one expect, that they would state to us, as one of the great benefits to be expected from a change, is, the *bringing of these men to justice*? Not at all! We hear not a word about any such thing. No such idea seems to have had a place in the mind of their chief partizan, who tells us, that what Lords Grey and Grenville will do, is, "to *restore to the government the efficiency it has lost*," a phrase, which has any meaning or no meaning at all, just as the writer pleases: a poor, vague, shuffling form of words, like a Methodist's

prayer or the creed of a Jesuit. What is meant by the *efficiency* of the government? God knows, that, in but too many ways, the government, in the hands of these men, has been *efficient* enough, as witness the sending out of troops and the amount of our taxes.—This is, however, all we shall get in the way of promise now. A promise to do that which suits their own interests and views. They will be very cautious how they make any new and *definite* promises, having smarted so severely for the breach of so many promises before.

—Indeed, as to their predecessors (if a change is to take place) the new men will serve as a *shield*. They will call upon us boldly for *additional taxes*, and will tell us, they are to pay debts which their predecessors contracted; that the *fault* is not theirs; but belongs to those predecessors; and, if we call upon them, in return, to inquire *legally* into this fault, and *punish* it, they will laugh in our faces. They will soon convince us, as they did before, that their only dislike to their opponents, is, that they occupy the places that they want to occupy themselves, and one of the great uses of which places is to provide for their families and personal friends at the people's expence. Nay, instead of bringing their predecessors to justice; instead of any thought of that sort, we shall see the dependents of those predecessors provided for by a new batch of pensions and allowances.—We shall, too, see the same disgusting meanness as to the Pittites now in inferior offices. The Fox party did, in this respect, behave in the basest manner, that ever marked the conduct of public men. I do not say, that their partizans did not deserve it; for no man should ever make himself dependent upon any minister; but, the fact is, that there were, in every part of the country, men, who, for many years, had been making sacrifices of all sorts to their adherence to the Fox party; and, when that party came into power, they received their reward in being neglected, shunned, and, in a short time, calumniated. They had, in every part of the kingdom, the mortification to see, that the pert Pittite still held his office, and that, too, *in spite of the Foxites*. The secret was this: the Foxites could do nothing without the consent of the Grenvilles, and they were resolved to keep in the adherents of Pitt as instruments wherewith to prevent the Foxites from gaining an ascendancy; and to this these latter had the meanness to submit. In short,

the people every where felt, that there was, in fact, *no change*; that the same influence prevailed, and that nearly all the same persons were in power. In this county of Hants, for instance, excepting a few places about the Dock-yards, that the faction itself laid its hands on, all was, as usual, still left to the Right Honourable Old George Rose, whose minions laughed at the long-expecting and now despairing Foxites. There was no change of influence, whether in the custom-house, the stamp office, the other tax-offices, the militia, the magistracy, or, in short, in any department in the county, through the whole of which the same system of exclusion prevailed against the Foxites with as much rigour as it had prevailed at any former period.—I know of nothing that gave rise to so much contempt of the Whigs as this. It marked their insignificance so strongly; or, it was a proof of such base ingratitude. My opinion is, too, that the same would take place again; in which case, however, they may rest assured of not remaining in place a twelvemonth. If I were to select the particular cause, which I looked upon as more efficient than any other in producing that sort of public feeling towards them, which was well known to exist, and the existence of which emboldened Nopopery to advise the king to turn them out, I should say, that that cause was, their unfeeling neglect, their base abandonment, of their friends, their long-trying and faithful adherents, whom they sacrificed without the least apparent remorse, for the sake of keeping well with the Grenvilles. It was this connection that was the cause of their fall before; and, unless they change their mode of acting, it will pull them down again.—It was quite diverting to see Pittite wretches, who, from this cause, had been kept in their several offices, making use of those offices to undermine the ministry, who had been base enough to leave the power in their hands; and, what was best of all, they, almost every where, and in this county in particular, were full as zealous against the Grenvilles as they were against the Foxites. The truth is, that the Whigs wished to remain in power, and they thought that purpose would be accomplished by buying off their enemies, rather than by rewarding their friends; than which a more weak or more base notion never entered into the mind of man, as was proved in the sequel; for, never was the fall of any ministry at-

tended with so little sorrow, on the part of the nation. They really had no friends. Even their offices at Whitehall were crammed with the creatures of Pitt; so that, they became very soon objects of hatred with their former friends, and objects of contempt with those whose enmity they thought they had purchased.—After all, however, LET US GIVE THEM ANOTHER FAIR TRIAL. If the king should put them in office, let us wait and see what they will do, before we condemn them. If it shall appear, that, in spite of all they have now witnessed, they mean to go on in the old way, and give us no change except that of men, we cannot too soon begin to assail their proceedings; but, let us see this first; and let us, in the mean while, *endeavour to forget the past*. What I think they ought not to do may easily be guessed at from what I have complained of their having done; and what I think they ought to do, may be as easily guessed at from what I have complained of their not having done. They had the power to do all that was necessary for the safety and happiness of the nation, and they lost their places because they did not attempt to make use of that power. They were turned out, as they themselves said, by a low and despicable intrigue; but, if they had done any thing for the people; if they had been about doing any thing for the people, those, who were engaged in, those who were the principal actors in, that intrigue, would no more have thought of such a thing, than they would have thought of seizing a lion by the jaws. Their more cunning enemies had seen them rapidly sink in the public estimation, and therefore it was, that they availed themselves of the first pretence to work them out. I never remember joy more general than that which was expressed upon their expulsion from the cabinet. There was neither sorrow from a public motive, nor pity from a private one. Let them take warning, or such will again be their fate.—I have observed, that the Morning Chronicle, in speaking of the origin of the quarrel between the pistolling privy counselors, has this remark: that, "if Mr. CANNING did advise the king to put out Lord Castlereagh, and put *Marquis Wellesley* in his place, he acted like a *faithful servant* of his sovereign, and gave *very good advice*." I am not only of a different opinion; but, I am disposed to consider this remark of the Morning Chronicle, as

pecially when viewed with some others, made lately in the same print, as a very bad omen of what will be the system of the Whigs. The Wellesleys have, to be sure, treated them in a way, which would, if the Whigs had any spirit at all left in them, effectually remove from our minds all dread of the former having any share in ruling us; but, this language of the Morning Chronicle, and the notorious vassalage of the Foxites, really makes one dread that some coalition of this sort will take place; and, if it does, Mr. Perry's place will not be worth above two months purchase. He would, in that case, do better to join us Jacobins at once; for, unless he make up his mind to become a thorough-going Pittite, a Calcutta man, he may be assured that his services will soon be supplanted by those of the editor of the Morning Post, who, I perceive, is very fast tacking about, in order to be ready to sail in the new direction.—The Fox party has, from one cause and another, already suffered great diminution; and, if they now suffer the Wellesleys to be imposed upon them, they will all be shoved out in less than six months.—One would think, that they would not be so foolish; but, there is no saying what the eagerness for place may not do. If Mr. Fox had, in 1806, insisted upon his own terms of coming into place, he must, in a few months, have had those terms granted to him; that is to say, if his terms had been bottomed upon the principles for which he had contended. So must it be now, if Lord Grey and others were to insist upon such terms; but, if they enter the cabinet upon conditions such as they entered it upon before, and especially if they enter it with the Wellesleys, they cannot remain three months. They will be taken in merely to be demolished; to be finished; and, then, out they go, neck and heels, for the public to spit upon. Out of the ministry, and taking the side of the people, they may not only be something, but they may be formidable; but, if they enter the cabinet once more in the character of underlings; if they get one more dip of the negro, they may go and hang or shoot one another, for they will never again be admitted into the society of white men; they may associate with the rest of the tawnies, under the command of the Calcutta heroes, but associate with people with white skins they certainly will not.—I, for my part, shall not have far to go, for proof as to whether

they are underlings, or not. If they suffer this *monopoly* of power; this *exclusive system* of county government; if they suffer this to remain in Hampshire for only one month after they are in power, I shall be very certain as to what the nation has to expect from them.—Considering them altogether, they certainly have, beyond all comparison, more talent and more individual character, than their opponents, whom, indeed, it required a state of things like the present to put into the situation of ministers. Some years ago, a man, who, after describing Lord Castlereagh and his brother pistol, should have said, that two such men would become privy counsellors and ministers of state, would have been treated as a jester, or an idiot. But, neither talent nor character, nor both together, will now do, unless there be a resolution to produce a *change* in the *system* of conducting the affairs of the government. If the same system be to continue, it is full as well to have one set of ministers as the other; and, indeed, any mere change of *men* is a grievous misfortune to the country, because it is sure to cause a great addition to its burthens.—There is a talk about a *coalition* between the Whigs and part of No-popery. This I venture to pronounce *impossible*. It cannot be.

JUBILEE.—As the Seat-sellers and Contractors, and all that gang, who get rich by war and taxation, are bent upon a noise and guzzling match, it may not be amiss to tell, in the words of CHAMBERS, what is the proper way of keeping a Jubilee. "One of our Kings, viz. EDWARD III, "caused his birth-day to be observed in "manner of a Jubilee, when he became "fifty years of age, but not before or after. "This he did by releasing prisoners, pardon- "ing all offences, making good laws, and "granting many privileges to the people." —This is a sort of Jubilee, that the unfeeling boozers and guttlers of the City have not much notion of, as would appear from a Mr. Mawman (no bad name for the occasion and the cause), who insists upon it as necessary to have the expence of the dinner defrayed out of the City purse, lest, if the expence came out of the pockets of individuals, nobody should attend. This is a pretty good proof of Mr. Mawman's opinion, that the *loyalty* of the City is not worth the price of a dinner. —But, I beg the public to remark, that the leading men, in the promotion of this Jubilee, are *Bank Directors* and *India Directors*, the one while the guinea sells for

twenty five shillings in their notes, and the other asking for aid from the public, as a pauper asks for parish relief. — Will these Bank Directors do as Edward III. did? Will they petition the king for the release of the many poor wretches who are waiting the severe sentence of those laws, those acts, which are unknown to the ancient principles of English jurisprudence, and which have made it *death* to imitate *their* money, or to write their names at the bottom of a bit of paper? Will they do this? Will they ask for the *mitigation* of the sentence of only *one* of these unfortunate wretches? Or, will they, upon the very morning of the Jubilee, go and see them kick their last upon the gallows?—This is verily the most audacious insult that ever was attempted; and I cannot help, looking upon it as a trial of what the people will bear, preparatory to some new and yet unheard-of act of oppression.—I should not wonder if they had it in contemplation to apply for a law to make it transportation to say that *Bank Notes are at a discount*; or something of that sort. In short, after what we have seen, on the part of these Jews and Contractors, there is nothing that ought to astonish us.

W^m. COBBETT.

Botley, Thursday, 28th Sept. 1809.

STATE OF THE COUNTRY.

Sir; Among foreigners this nation has been esteemed a nation of humourists; and, doubtless, if differing in judgment and reasoning from the rest of the world be genuine humour, there is no people under the sun who have an equal claim to the same title. We are separated from the continent by a channel so narrow, that but too many of our Southern brethren are within hearing of the cannon, and within sight of the illuminations of rejoicing for victories over ourselves and our allies; and yet by a strange perversion of judgment, we hug ourselves, and act as if the victories were our own, and the French, from a mistaken notion of politesse, had been at the expence of celebrating their own reverses. We send out expedition upon expedition, with the advantage of sending them whithersoever we list, and of attacking points the most unguarded; and yet, with this advantage, the engine but recoils upon the feeble hands that directed it, and each successive expedition returns more beaten, more dis-

graced, and more confounded than that by which it was preceded.—With this accumulation of annual ignominy, instead of feeling humbled by our habitual blunders, and the awful judgments that await them, or, what is more to the point, instead of acknowledging that something must be wrong, and endeavouring to redress it, we grow more foul-mouthed toward friend and foe; we abuse the latter for beating us, and the former for suffering himself, like ourselves, to be beaten. With what efforts of panegyric, clumsy indeed, but well intended, was the patriotic Archduke celebrated but yesterday! With what virulence of invective is he persecuted to-day! It would appear that this prince anticipated with joy the defeat of his army, that he deliberately planned his own destruction at Wagram, and hastened to consummate it at the feet of Napoleon. The long, the laborious, the heart-rending services which he has performed for a corrupt system, to which, like all other champions in the same cause, he has fallen a victim, are forgotten. His former merits are as nothing; and he is now branded as a traitor by the humorous malignity of our hired and even unhired writers, and their too partial, credulous, or corrupt readers. Those on the field of action felt, and severely felt, that the hopes of Austria were lost at Aspern. The unbroken communication of Napoleon with the islands in the Danube, his tête-de-pont which stood in the face of the enemy unassaulted, and even without insult, and, above all, the fearful serenity of his mind, prove this defeat to have been achieved rather by the pens of English hirelings, than by the swords of our allies. Yet, placed as we are at a secure distance from the scene, we presume to call that Armistice infamous and unnecessary, to which a brave, a numerous, an almost numberless host, headed by a leader respectable for skill, and unimpeached for integrity, was *compelled* to submit. We, whose every scheme but heaps upon us treble confusion, are the first to join our voices with those of the enemy in stigmatising a nation for being vanquished after a struggle for independence. This it is, Sir, to be protected from invasion by local advantages, and the natural barrier of the sea—Glorious advantage! that we may look tamely on the wreck of empires, and join our reproaches to the vanquished, with the scoffings of the vanquishers!—Could a person be found,

whom the fame of occurrences for these last 15 years had not reached; he would doubtless expect, from the tenor of language held in this country, that while continental armies were repulsed at all points, the British held good more than their ancient fame, by an unbroken series of brilliant exploits. How eagerly would he listen, how hang upon the lips of the narrator! With what delight would the latter dwell upon one splendid, and *efficient* battle, in Egypt! I use the term *efficient*; for if the end be not answered, the exploit is to be numbered with failures. With what emphasis would he enforce, and vary this one, and almost only one tale, and with what despair would he cast his eye over the long catalogue of calamity and humiliation which truth would compel him to produce! I talk not of skirmishes, but of those encounters, which by their magnitude contribute to the mastery of empires—and of these, from the abandonment of the Toulonnese, whom we had sworn to protect, to the late childish business at the Scheldt, the general tenor has been failure, disgrace, defeat. Let us throw a hasty glance over these most distressing items of national disaster. Believe me, Sir, it may be of use—it may lead us to a detection of errors, and a developement of a wicked system—for, although a *casual* accident might befall; continued, and unvaried disaster in our military attempts, cannot, when we consider the transcendent bravery of our troops, be attributed to ought else but a depraved and wicked system. But if no other end be answered by the recital, owing to that blindness which refused the offered light, it may at least teach us humility, and a fellow-feeling for the partners in our misfortunes. Let us see.—Dunkirk! and our consequent retreat.—The Helder! and that immense host, which the French with a force totally disproportioned in numbers, compelled to escape by capitulation.—The above are princely trophies! Ferrol! or the manoeuvres of Sir James against open gates. Poor Sir James! he had the treasure in view, but from a sort of false modesty relinquished that and the peerage for a secure asylum in the ships. Buenos Ayres! It was an easy thing—any body, as in the latter case, was fit to command.—You had only to shew yourself; the Spaniards were poor creatures even at home, and in those parts were as easy to drive as their Merino sheep. Besides, the blessing of an English *governor*, (for *governant* is a term obsolete in the colonies)

would alone, *one would think*, bring them over. Those stupid ideots of Spaniards *thought otherwise*, and so, as they would not yield to general Whitelock, general Whitelock yielded to them, and thus narrowly escaped a peerage. I pass over the last deplorable business in Egypt under general Wauchope, and the gallant skirmish (for it was no more) at Maida; since neither the loss of the one nor the gain of the other were of a scale of magnitude sufficient to influence the destiny even of a province, and much less of a nation. The first was one unvaried tissue of disaster to ourselves, the latter was glorious to ourselves, and only disastrous to our wretched allies, whom we seduced, and, as usual, abandoned to destruction. Copenhagen! I do not imagine the greatest amateur will insist much on the ***** committed on Copenhagen, I am willing to pass it over, or even to number it, with splendid events, if it be insisted on, because it succeeded. We went to *****; neither did we come empty away. The part of ***** was not ill sustained, and the *prayers* of the fleet, no doubt, called down success upon our arms in this *pious* undertaking. I am aware that some difference of opinion prevails relative to this business; but, upon the whole, I am inclined to think it will not be an unentertaining supplement to some future edition of the history of the Buccaneers. To this brilliant list, add the consequences of the affair at Vimiera, by which we gained the distinguished honour of submitting our fleets to the use of the French, and of elevating our *naval men* to the rank of *carriers* to an enemy from a country where all was hostile, to a country where all was friendly; from difficulties, dangers, an exasperated mob, an enemy far superior in numbers, scanty supplies, and an untenable position, to the safety and plenty of a land that should recruit them for our destruction. Of the three remaining exploits, our flight from Salamanca to Corunna, our *victory* at and *flight* from Talavera, our late grand achievement at the Scheldt, which must have caused more Dutch women to miscarry than was ever known before, let the *amateurs* select which is their favourite.—All this is wondrous. But, Sir, next to the exploits themselves, the wonder is to observe with what address the memories of them are erased from the minds of men. A theatre, demolished, or rebuilt; a Mrs. Clarke; a Jubilee; a contest between Mrs. Dickens

and Madame Catalani ; or a Duel between two such men as Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning, a something, and an any thing, is sure to interpose between the just indignation of a brave and insulted people, and the wretches by whom they have been successively disgraced. With what horror must the cabinet have read the Convention of Cintra, had it not been smothered in the fumes of Covent Garden theatre ? With what dread would they have listened to the groans of a suffering people for their heroic countrymen who *fell uselessly*, or *returned fugitives* from the Spanish campaign, had not those groans been converted into laughter by the royal Love-letters ! How might they have felt, when a poor old man who had retired from all public employment, on the plea of years, and infirmities, was called upon to fill a place, of all others requiring the greatest activity and ability, that of Commander in Chief, had not their sense of feeling been deadened by another blow yet more violent, in a *grand* expedition, and the appointment of a *bran new* general (for warfare can alone make an *old* general, and not years, as is usually supposed in this country) to command it—and how might their attention be rivetted to this last, the consummation of indignities, which has been purchased by the blood or by the diseases of more than half that immense force, were not that newly goaded attention diverted from this dreadful blow, to the rise of price at a theatre, to Catalani, John Kemble, a Jubilee, or a Duel between the Noodle and Doodle of our Cabinet !—Oh, this is foul ! this is indeed very foul ! but worse may yet await us. But two days ago it was announced that *Lord Cochrane*, who has well merited the hatred of certain *cautious* and *prudent* men by the uniform *success* attending his enterprises, *transacted business in company with the hero of Ferrol* at Lord Mulgrave's office. I am not initiated in the mysteries of cabinets ; Would to God there were no mystery in them, but all was plain, open, honest, and intelligible ; but I do confess to you (impossible as it may appear) I read a fearful omen from this strange alliance of men so totally dissimilar, engaged in the same business. Is the Ferrolian chieftain really about to relinquish the peaceful occupations in which he is born to shine, for the dangers and mishaps of another essay in the art of war ? Is a peerage so necessary to human happiness as to induce him to change his very nature, and rush through

ways so dangerous to explore ? Of the fact I am ignorant ; I should have read of Sir James and Lord Mulgrave to all eternity, without even thinking of such a thing as war. But the name of Lord Cochrane puts it naturally into one's head, and as late events shew nothing to be impossible, I formed a most dreadful divination that another judgment impended over us.—At present I shall say no more ; but in taking my leave, I call on you, and every man, who is not absolutely hired and engaged to plot his country's downfall, to *arrest* the attention of Englishmen, and to *fix* it on one, or on all of the disasters to which a nation, the most gallant in the universe, has been bowed, by the folly or the voracity of their guardians ; to evince to them, in the clearest light, how much blood has been shed, what diseases contracted, what treasures exhausted, in foolish and vain expeditions, which could not have been more disastrous, if they had been planned for the sake of the contractors whom they enrich, the court generals whom they are intended to ennoble, and the scorn and laughter of an enemy who rises in vigour and in pride from the successive defeats and disgraces which we purchase to ourselves at this dear rate. Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

JUBILEE PROPOSED.

SIR ; As the present age will ever remain conspicuously memorable in the annals of the Christian æra, when posterity revert to this eventful page, will not the independence that this island has maintained, amidst the fatal wrecks of power that we have witnessed, be revered and glorified ? Does not this part of our retrospect afford matter of exultation—that, though we have been so long menaced with destruction by most inveterate enemies, yet we have, under the auspices of our God, preserved our valued country, secured her pre-eminence, and, amidst the blessings of liberty, enjoy the blissful reign of peace within her borders ? During the awful calamities that have afflicted such an extensive portion of the civilized world, has not our munificence and succour to the oppressed been manifestly exemplified ? Though this auxiliary sort of warfare has been very prejudicial to ourselves, yet we are not compelled to become fugitives ; we are not subject to the sanguinary laws of tyranny and despotism ; we are not the victims of that vengeance which has been

sworn against us; on the contrary, I boldly assert, that we are the greatest, the most illustrious people on the earth; happy in the supreme felicity of social intercourse, undisturbed by faction, and rich beyond competition in the prolific bounties of nature; therefore, sir, I would have this eminent period of our history commemorated in a most signal manner throughout Great Britain. I know myself incompetent to premise adequately a plan of such magnitude as the circumstance requires; but the impression I feel as to the happy consequences that would result, stimulate me to the attempt.—The divine historian, Moses; the inimitable Psalmist, and all the sacred writers of antiquity, exhorted the people to praise and thanksgiving, not in a spiritless manner, with distrustful visages, but with cheerful countenances, with songs and dances, with timbrels, harps, sackbuts, psalteries and dulcimers, which appears to me a more reasonable way of displaying gratitude for benefits, than the uttering any set form of words in a sullen and morose manner, as if, contrary to will, compulsively driven to it.—I would, therefore, recommend the institution of a National Jubilee, to consist of Grand Sacred Oratorios, Amphitheatrical Sports, Thespian Amusements, and various other public Diversions, somewhat after the following manner: Grand Oratorios should be appointed to take place in every Cathedral Church in Great Britain, and in other Churches or Chapels remotely situate from Cathedrals; these should consist in sacred recitatives, airs, and choruses, appropriate to the occasion, both original and select.—Extensive amphitheatres should be erected upon specified plains throughout the country, at proper distances from each other, in the centre of which gymnastic exercises should be exhibited, after the manner of the Olympian, Pythian, Isthmian and Nemean Games of Greece, instituted in commemoration of remarkable occurrences: These sports should consist in trials of skill in the arts of fencing, cudgelplying or single-stick, sparring, wrestling, horsemanship, and the like; together with morrice-dancing, running, leaping, throwing, &c. The champions who excelled in these exploits should be dignified with honorary meeds, such as weapons of war; the air at every interval to be agitated with the most powerful bands of martial music, playing the national airs of “Rule Britannia,” “Britons strike

home,” “See the conquering Hero comes,” “God save the King,” &c. Perhaps, in this instance, I may, by some, be accused of an offence against the refined sense of the times, by wishing to introduce the customs of those remote ages; but those who are acquainted with the estimation in which Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, and many other eminent poets, historians, and philosophers, held these public games, will bear witness for me that no inconsistency whatever attaches to it. The Greeks in their wars with the Persians were indebted to these institutions for their most memorable victories. Those who signalized themselves at the battles of Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea, had before obtained rewards at the public games. “Die,” said his congratulating companions to Anaxagoras, who had been a very successful competitor, “die, for thou canst not be a God.” Herodotus relates a story of some Arcadians who were introduced to Xerxes, and being asked what was doing in Greece, they answered, “that it was the season of the Olympic games.” Being asked, “how the conquerors in those contentions were rewarded,” they answered, “by an olive garland,” upon which Tritanæchmes, a prince of the blood-royal of Persia, exclaimed, “O, Mardonius, what a people have you brought us to fight against, who contend among themselves, not for riches, but for virtue.” Some of the most eminent English divines have also written with much eulogy their sentiments upon these institutions, and perhaps the following elegant illustration of them, by Archbishop Potter, may serve to heighten their propriety; “These games,” says he, “had excellent political effect in promoting national union, in diffusing the love of glory, and training the youth to martial exercises; they cherished, at once, an heroic spirit, which led to the formation of extraordinary and hazardous enterprizes; they contributed essentially to the improvement of the Greek nation, for while they promoted hardness and agility of body, they likewise cultivated urbanity and politeness; they were the resort of the poets, historians, and philosophers.”—Conveniently detached from these amphitheatres, spacious buildings should be temporarily erected for Thespian performances, in situations where provincial theatres could not be resorted to. These amusements should consist in scenes be-

twixt characters personifying British sailors, soldiers, landlords, politicians, &c. illustrating in a chronological manner, the progress of our present greatness; histories of the achievements of our most illustrious heroes of every age, wherein cowardice and despondency should be rendered as contemptible as possible. These dialogues would be well calculated to give in a comprehensive manner, an account of our present eminence contrasted with the imbecility of contemporary nations: the whole of which should be diversified with old national songs, and appropriate new ones, set to most simple alluring tunes, so that young and old should, as it were, learn to sing them by instinct; no doubt but some admirable little pieces would be produced, though it would be a confoundedly busy time at Parnassus; this performance should also be animated by the most appropriate music playing such spirited airs and marches, as might be appointed.—Sailing and rowing matches should be promoted in every situation where they could be accomplished. Public breakfasts and dinners, balls, exhibitions of artificial fireworks, and illuminations, would be matters of course during the festival, which should be arranged as speedily as possible, that the advantages of the long days might be obtained; and, indeed, the purposes of it being of a nature that admits of no delay, the early accomplishment of it would be very material.—Oratorical, Amphitheatrical, Thespian, and other committees should be chosen in each department, consisting of the most eminent characters in the neighbourhood, for which they may be deputed; these committees should arrange and regulate the performances in such a manner as they thought most proper, and military appointments should be made for the preservation of order and tranquillity in every district during the festivities.—The expenses should be defrayed by subscription to each performance, assisted by voluntary contributions, and wherever the expenses unavoidably exceeded the amount raised, the committee in such case should be remunerated by an order upon the Exchequer; or if an overplus remained in the hands of any committee, it should be given towards such deficiencies as the Exchequer might be liable to be called upon to make up.

C. L.

STATE OF SPAIN.

Sir;—When the people of Great Britain feel their purses fast emptying, and blood flowing, in defence of Spain, it would not, perhaps, be amiss, to let them know, through the medium of your excellent work, something of the political œconomy of that country as affecting the happiness of it's inhabitants; that Englishmen may judge of the principles of our ministry in defending such a system, and of their sagacity in even hoping, far less expecting, that the great body of the people of Spain are actuated with enthusiasm, love, or respect for that system sufficiently strong to enable them effectually to resist the arms of Buonaparté in its defence, even with the most powerful assistance Great Britain can afford them.—In the first place then, the government of Spain is completely despotic, was so, and is to continue to be so, for aught we have heard to the contrary; even if Buonaparté were driven out to-morrow. The Spaniards cannot complain and say, as the people in some countries may, "*decipimur specie Libertatis*," for the poor souls, for centuries past, have neither tasted, smelled, nor even had a Pisgah view of liberty. Their religion as well as government is of that description that tends to keep the people ignorant, paralyzing and depressing every species of mental and corporeal energy. Their laws are enacted for the very purposes of monopoly and oppression. The higher ranks (and the church) in Spain, as in other countries, by means of the villainous laws of primogeniture and entails, have monopolized almost every acre in the kingdom. Their foreign commerce itself is a mere monopoly of the government, by which it is carried on; their domestic and internal traffic is hampered by a thousand vexatious, though legal enactments. While agriculture, the most important of concerns, in every country, may be there said to be always in *articulo mortis*, in the very act of expiring.

(To be continued.)

THE EDINBURGH REVIEWERS,
AND PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

Sir;—That men of genius and education should prostitute their talents to the pur-

suits of party, is at all times to be regretted; but when those who assume the office of public censors, and, by virtue of that office, guide the judgments of no inconsiderable a part of the community, descend to such a practice, it calls forth a feeling harsher than regret, and may be looked upon as an immediate act of wickedness. In no other point of view, can I consider the paper upon Parliamentary Reform, inserted in the last number of the *Edinburgh Review*; a paper upon which, it seems, the Editors have bestowed uncommon pains, but which, like most other elaborate productions, carries fallacy on the face of it, and shows the argument to be untenable of itself, by the sophistry employed in its defence.

To follow them through all the mazes of logical division, and to explore the endless subtleties and refinements with which they have endeavoured to hamper and mislead their readers, would be a task as difficult of execution as it would be unprofitable in the result: I shall, therefore, confine myself to the basis of their objections against Reform, presuming, that if they shall be found to be defective there, it will be unnecessary to pursue them farther.

It cannot have escaped you, Sir, that when men of ingenuity are employed in a bad cause, which affords, as it were, no resting place on which they may make a stand, the first measure they have recourse to is to build one out of such materials as though differing mainly from the subject in dispute, still carry with them an appearance of identity. The *Edinburgh Reviewers* have, accordingly, charged the advocates for Reform, with disseminating, as a principle, that it will immediately correct all abuses, and in an instant restore the state to its pristine purity and vigour; as though they had been foolish enough to say, Reform in the House of Commons is like a magic wand, or a metallic tractor, a single touch from which will eradicate all complaints, and transform a thing from one extreme to the other. Now, if I understand any thing of what has been said upon the subject, nothing can be farther from the truth than this language which they impute to the Advocates for Reform; so far, indeed, from it being the case, that I have understood it to have been uniformly declared by them, that the remedy of our present system must naturally be a work of time, and that the longer that system is persisted in, the longer time it

will require to effect a safe and solid reparation. To be sure, it has always been insisted on, that the first step towards obtaining it, is a Reform in the House of Commons; that this step is primary and indispensable; that it is the prop on which all other measures hang, the root from which they all of them must spring;—in short, (to be a little *learned* on the occasion,) that it is a *sine qua non*, without which a change in our present mode of Government is hardly to be desired. If this be compared with what has been observed by the Reviewers themselves, it will be seen, that their observations tend rather to confirm than weaken the position, notwithstanding they are advanced against it.

The three principal evils in our actual condition, they admit, are, 1st, the burden of our Taxes; 2nd, the preponderating influence of the Crown, arising out of that burden; and 3rd, the monopoly of political power by a few persons, which, they say, (I confess, to my astonishment) the nature of our constitution has a tendency to create. Now, to follow their own order, if the burden of our taxes be the first of the three principal evils, out of the many evils with which our Government abounds; if this, I say, be the chief and most material of all our grievances, it cannot be disputed, that the House of Commons, to whom the levying and appropriation of the taxes essentially and almost exclusively belong, is the first power to be looked to for redress, if the evil is such as will admit of it. For, here, it is material to note, that these Reviewers, to evade the question, have thrown out some desultory remarks on the nature of taxation, shewing, that the amount of taxes is a criterion by which the wealth and power of a nation may be proved; and insinuating, that our present burden is demonstrative of the strength and sanity of the state, rather than of the extravagance and corruption of its ministers: and that, arising from our own intemperate love of war, it is irremediable while war exists.—But, putting away the doctrine of taxation as referent to a nation's wealth, let us consider not so much the *burden* as the *disposition* of the taxes: it is this, and this only, I apprehend, that those who are advocates for Reform allude to, when they talk of reducing taxes and lightening the people of their burden. If the taxes, in their present state, were no more than adequate to the just expenses of an economical and

upright government, I will be bold to say, that the people, straitened as they are, would glory with these Reviewers, in being able to supply the means of fulfilling its every want; that they would forego their greatest comforts, and sacrifice their dearest pleasures; but, when they see their hard-earned contributions collected together in a heap, and squandered away by the gross, on empty pageantry, disgraceful armaments, and futile enterprises; and, above all, when they see them dissipated in pensions and annuities, among those very persons who are the immediate causes of this scandalous expenditure; how is it possible for them to be silent, and not, at least, enquire if the evil admits of remedy? And to whom can they turn so naturally in their distress, as to their representatives; those men whom they have selected as guardians of their rights, and who, if the spirit of the Constitution were in force, would require no one to point out to them their duty, much less to solicit them to act up to it? But, the Reviewers would persuade us, that a Reform in the House of Commons would not render the representatives of the people more susceptible of these abuses; and insidiously contend, that they would be repeated, although perhaps in a less criminal and offensive manner, by any set of ministers whatever.—The next point, as connected with a diminution of the taxes, to which they refer, is the statement of Mr. Wardle; and here, again, they have compleatly misrepresented him and those who support Reform. This statement, which they deem extraordinary (and extraordinary, indeed, it is), contains, according to their representation, nothing more than a plan for the reduction of our forces. Now, say they, if war is to be carried on, our forces should be increased and not diminished; as if Mr. Wardle had recommended such a measure, in effect. Why, sir, a man may, with equal justice, be accused of a desire to spoil a tree or meadow, by cutting off dead branches from the one, or rooting out thistles from the other. Mr. Wardle has recommended no reduction of our effective forces; he has only suggested the propriety of dismissing those who live upon the country, without affording it any benefit in return; of keeping up our Navy to its full amount, at two thirds of its present cost; and of abolishing certain useless and ridiculous fortifications. How this can be construed into a wish to

weaken our military establishments, must to every candid person be surprizing. To me, it seems, not only the most desirable method of effecting a reduction in our taxes, but of concentrating and invigorating our almost exhausted energies.

The second evil pointed out by the Reviewers, is the preponderating influence of the crown, and this they admit to its full extent, but deny, that a Reform in the House of Commons is at all calculated to remove it. It is a little unfortunate, that the metaphysical talents of these gentlemen, should set them so far above the rest of mankind, that what appears obvious to persons of common understanding, should be seen by them in a totally different point of view. For instance, I had always understood, according to the principles of our constitution, that the power of the people opposed itself to the influence of the crown; and that accordingly as one or other of them assumed preponderance, so was it to be corrected, by investing the weaker side with more authority; or, what is the same thing, retrenching the ascendancy of the stronger. Now, that a free representation of the people will give to the people a greater degree of power, is too palpable to be denied; and if a Reform in the House of Commons amounts to a free representation, what more is necessary to correct this preponderating influence, of which the Reviewers, in common with the country at large, so heavily complain?—But, it is observed by them, that the evil is radically implanted in the system; that the people are themselves corrupted, and that, too, to such a degree, that it is their interest to support corruption. That this is true, to a certain extent, may possibly be the case; in as far as a very large proportion of the people receive a part of the taxes which give rise to the undue weight and bias of the government; but, putting the principle on an average, it is not so bad as they have represented it. Men receive taxes to enable them to pay taxes: and taxes are levied, in part, to pay men for collecting taxes; which two measures counteracting each other, leave men in very nearly the same state as they would be, if there were no taxes, or, perhaps, fewer taxes, to pay; with this important distinction though, that, situated as they now are, they are bound to government for an appointment, which takes away from them every privilege of free agency and self-direction.

The last evil in our condition, discussed in the Review, is the monopoly of political power by a few persons; by which is meant, it is supposed, that the government of the country is always to be found in the hands of one of two or more classes of persons, who alternately or successively compose the ministry. The party-spirit of the Reviewers here displays itself so as not to be mistaken: they may call the attention of the public to this, as an evil but little understood, and as an evil of alarming magnitude; but it is pretty evident, that their chief concern consists in the circumstance of their own party having been kept out so long, with the exception of its last short span, and that if they could once see it firmly seated in the cabinet, they would have no objection to a deviation from their general rule of short-lived administrations. The existence of the evil has been apparent for many years; but as, by the admission of the Editors, the nomination to all high offices is substantially in the majority of the House of Commons, it follows, of consequence, that a Reform in that House would tend to correct it, as far as necessary. If the members of it would exercise their rightful power, and shew themselves as masters to the ministers, there would be no fear of any evil consequence from a monopoly, which is only to be dreaded when in the possession of incapacity and corruption. I am, Sir, yours, &c.

September 22, 1809.

S.

THE EDINBURGH REVIEWERS, AND PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

Sir;—In an elaborate Essay on Parliamentary Reform, published in the last number of the Edinburgh Review, certain doctrines are advanced which are to be regarded as irreconcilable to the principles of the British Constitution, and contrary to truth; and therefore deserving public animadversion.—In that paper it is positively asserted “that a Reform in Parliament would not sensibly diminish the public Expenditure.” “With regard to the Taxes,” say they (p. 279) “it appears to us in the highest degree chimerical to imagine that any change in the plan of Representation should sensibly lessen their amount.” The reasoning by which this extraordinary conviction is supported the author does not pretend to rest upon facts. He proceeds with much formality to inform us of what he and

his colleagues think would *probably* occur in consequence of reformation, and the conclusion is, that they are “quite satisfied” of the inefficacy of Reform, as a remedy for an enormous expenditure. They are “quite satisfied” that Mr. Wardle’s retrenchments proposed last session are inexpedient, because they regard measures not of “economy” but “state policy.”—And affirm, that the same errors of policy that give rise to “unprofitable expence” at present, may be expected to produce the same effects hereafter; because “there is no good ground for thinking that a parliament chosen mainly on account of its good intentions will commit fewer blunders than one selected, in a great degree, from a regard to its *skill* and its *habits of business*.” It does not follow, say they, that a reformed parliament, because considerably “more honest,” than an unreformed one, must also be considerably “wiser,” and the conclusion seems to be this—that the infamous waste of public money admits of no remedy,—that the Whig party, were they in power, would be disposed to act just as the No Popery administration have acted; and that Sir Francis Burdett, Mr. Wardle, and their friends, are mere visionaries, when they talk of the introduction of honest principles into “state policy.”—Now, Sir, I have always been taught to believe, that honesty and fair and candid dealing, are estimable qualities, even in a Statesman, and that, as Mr. Locke informs us, “Politics are only common sense applied to national concerns.” Honesty and sound policy ever must be inseparable, and that being admitted, it necessarily follows, that the waste and misconduct of those, who openly condemn *honesty*, and who defend publicly and officially the basest corruption, may be remedied, and would be remedied, were men of good principles entrusted with the administration of public affairs.—Let us look back upon the useless expenditure of the present reign, or rather upon a few of the items of which the enormous amount is composed, and say whether a reformed and honest parliament could have possibly sanctioned the waste. Would the true representatives of the people have sanctioned the American war, and the millions expended in order to purchase the heavy loss, and the lasting disgrace which the attempt to enslave our fellow subjects must necessarily entail? Would the true representatives of the people of Great Britain have sanctioned the war against

P

France, while unoffending; the waste of millions upon millions thrown away as German subsidies? Or, in short, is it to be supposed that the *people* approve of the expence incurred by our late ruinous Expeditions? And are we to be gravely told that the Edinburgh Reviewers are "*quite satisfied* of the inefficacy of Parliamentary Reform to redress these evils?" If a steward cheat his master, if his peculation be discovered, and the injured master propose to turn off the criminal—these gentlemen might say, 'Human nature is always the same, you may get a new steward, but we are *quite satisfied* that he will also cheat you, to the same extent as his predecessor, if he has the same opportunities, and you are to expect nothing beneficial from the change.' Many plausible arguments too might be adduced in support of a doctrine such as this, (for arguments there are against the existence of matter and motion,) but fortunately on such occasions the *common sense* of mankind instantly decides, and when that which is asserted contradicts the uniform experience of mankind, a reply is justly deemed unnecessary: a simple expression of contempt is best suited to the occasion. According to these reviewers, the exertions of a vigilant and honest House of Commons, in the detection and consequent correction of abuses in the public Expenditure, would be attended with no sensible advantage to the public. It would be chimerical to expect it!

But the Reviewer farther asserts, that the prevalence of aristocratical influence is absolutely necessary in the House of Commons, in order to preserve our happy constitution.—"As for altering the position of the House of Commons by excluding from it all who are sent there by the interest of the ministry or of noble families, we shall only say, that if we believed it (*reform*) likely to produce such an effect, we should think it our duty to strive against it, as against a measure, which would deprive us of the practical blessings of our Constitution." (p. 300).—Again, "Dreadful convulsions would ensue if the three branches of the Legislature were *really* to be kept apart in their practical operations, and to check and controul each other, *not by an infusion of their elementary principles into all the measures of each* (what is this?) but by working separately to thwart or undo what had been undertaken by the other without any means of concert or

"co-operation.—It is perfectly obvious that if the House of Commons with its absolute power over the supplies, and its connection with the physical force of the nation, were to be composed entirely of the representatives of the yeomanry, of the tradesmen, of burghs, and were to be actuated solely by the feelings and interests which are peculiar to that class of men; it would infallibly convert the Government into a mere democracy; and speedily sweep away the incumbrance of Lords and Commons, who could not at all exist, therefore, if they had not an interest in this Assembly. But even supposing that this consequence should not immediately follow, is it not obvious in the second place, that if the House of Lords and the sovereign had no means of influencing the determination of the Commons within their own walls, they could only controul them in their legislative function by throwing out or negating the bills passed by the unanimous assent of that House?—If the House of Commons were to send up a series of popular Bills which were successively negated by the sovereign, the consequence would infallibly be an insurrection and a civil war:—And if on the other hand he were to pass as a matter of course every bill which had been voted by a great majority of that House, at the same time that he and his servants had no influence over their deliberations, the controul of the *Executive* would be utterly lost and abandoned, and the Government would be changed into a virtual Republic."

After complimenting Mr. Malcolm Laing as an accurate and *profound* historian, he proceeds to give that gentleman's *rationale* of how King Charles the First came by his misfortunes. "The King, he observes, ruined himself and the country by standing on his prerogative, and neglecting the means of *influencing* the Parliament. He made various efforts, indeed, to seduce and gain over the most formidable of the popular leaders in that Assembly, but he chose most absurdly to proclaim his triumph, by making them immediately desist from that occupation, and enlisting them as the open advocates of his prerogative.—Instead of submitting to receive the popular leaders as his ministers, and in this way bringing all the weight of the royal influence to bear through this commanding channel upon the Parliament, he never promoted them

"to office till they had lost all power and popularity by an avowed desertion to the separate party of the King; and thus, by allowing the Commons to carry every thing before them in their own House, and then opposing the *naked walls* of his prerogative, to the full shock of that unbridled current, he invited a contest that even in those days proved ruinous to himself, and to the Constitution. The same principle of mis-government, aided indeed by baser practices on a baser generation, lasted down till the Revolution, when, as is universally acknowledged, the true principles of the Constitution were first recognized, and the reign of *influence* and regular freedom began."

Such is the doctrine of our *soi disant* Whigs, regarding the very basis of the British Constitution, and nothing so impudently false has been published to the world since the Revolution; nothing more disingenuous in statement or more sophistical in argument.—We are here in the first place taught that the Commons of Great Britain are beings of an inferior order to the nobility, not merely in rank and title, but in intellectual endowments and a capacity for business. They are represented as actuated by vulgar feelings and partial interests; incapable of duly appreciating the genuine principles of the British Constitution, and disposed to destroy it, were it not for the salutary controul of the sovereign and peers, who, discerning better the true interests of the nation, keep them quiet by *influence*, that is, Bribery.

It is inculcated that were the King upon all occasions to act as becomes the first magistrate of a free people, and give up his own opinions in deference to the collected wisdom of a whole nation expressed by honest representatives; that then our constitution must be at an end; and a virtual republic established.—It is objected to Charles the First, that to the grossest tyranny he did not add the basest treachery and deceit, and carry his arbitrary measures under the forms of the Constitution; and finally it is asserted that at the Revolution, the true principles of the Constitution were recognized; because then the reign of *Influence* and regular Freedom began, and this is said to be universally acknowledged.—Had such doctrines been promulgated fifty years ago, an attempt to answer and refute them seriously, would have been deemed ridiculous. But we live in other times, and

while poisons are less guarded against than in former days, it becomes those who are aware of the danger to redouble their diligence in pointing out the proper antidotes to the unwary.—Now I would ask, whether it is really true that the Commons of Great Britain are inferior in any one of those qualities which constitute a competent Legislator? Even as now constituted, is there less information, less political wisdom, to be found in the lower than in the upper House? Is there one of your readers, Sir, who would hesitate to answer in the negative? And the individual who for the time may be King of Great Britain; are we reasonably to expect superior talents and public virtue in him, so that his will ought to influence the councils of the nation? The answer is prompt. The Constitution supposes no such thing. The Constitution declares the King to be the chief servant of the State, invested with the insignia of its power, for purposes of public benefit, and entitled to allegiance no longer than he shall act according to Law.—Where then does there appear any sufficient reason why these two Estates should interfere with the third in the exercise of its proper function, the appropriation of money drawn from the pockets of its constituents? Is it not enough that the Crown enjoys its executive power, and a patronage extensive beyond all example, with power also to render even the best measures of the Commons nugatory by a negative? And is it not enough for four or five hundred men distinguished by titles as peers, that they possess privileges and immunities far beyond those of their fellow subjects, and also possess the power of refusing the Bills of the Commons, and thwarting every one of their measures?—The Edinburgh Reviewer says, *No*; all this is not sufficient; there must be in addition to all this a steady and constant influence exerted over the Commons, who as foolish and turbulent schoolboys would certainly run into every dangerous excess, were it not for the ever-operating controul of superior minds! But let us enquire into the truth of this assertion, "that *Influence* was recognized at the Revolution, and consequently that the independence of the House of Commons was then understood to be incompatible with *real Freedom*." What say the honest and eminent men who lived during the Revolution? What say the statesmen of every succeeding year down to our times? It would be to abuse the patience of your readers to re-

cord the opinions of Locke and Addison upon this subject. They were really Whigs, that is friends, to truth and liberty. And although to record their opinions might and would refute the doctrines of the *Edinburgh Review*, and prove that *Influence* was *not universally recognized* as necessary to the existence of real Freedom; I mean to go farther, and appeal to the recorded opinions of the leading men of the Tory, or high court party, who, if they now lived, would regard with emotions of indignation and contempt the tenets of our modern Whigs.—SWIFT asserts the necessity of annual parliaments, because the frequency of Elections would tend to destroy the influence of the Court, and yet Swift was the very director of a Tory administration.—LORD BOLINGBROKE, not only a Tory but a Jacobite, mentions those who bring forward arguments against the *entire independence* of parliament in terms of the greatest indignation. "*Reason*" (says he,) "is against them, since it is a plain absurdity to suppose a *control* on the Crown, and to establish at the same time a *power*, and even a right, in the Crown to render that *control* useless. *Experience* is against them, since the examples of other countries, and at some times, of our own, have proved that a prince may govern according to his arbitrary will, or that of his more arbitrary minister, as absolutely and much more securely *with*, than *without*, the concurrence of a Parliament. —The authority even the uniform authority, of our whole Legislature, is against them—The voice of our *Law* gives them the *lie*. How then shall we account for this proceeding, this open and desperate attack upon our *Constitution*, and therefore upon our *Liberty*? Have these *great men* made any *nice* discovery that escaped the blunt sagacity of our ancestors, and is above the narrow conceptions of all other men except themselves at this time?"

In what noble strains of eloquence the illustrious Earl of Chatham inculcated the necessity of "erecting some strong barriers to defend the Constitution, and resist the enormous influence of the Crown," your readers well know. Upon a subject of far less importance than the malpractices of Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Perceval, he in his place declared the Constitution violated: "and until," said he, "that wound is healed, it is in vain to recommend union to parliament, or endea-

"vour to promote concord among the people. If we mean seriously to unite the nation, we must convince them that their complaints are regarded, that their injuries shall be redressed.—On that foundation I will take the lead in recommending peace and harmony to the people; on any other I would never wish to see them united again. If the breach in the Constitution be effectually repaired, the people will of themselves return to a state of tranquillity. If not, may discord prevail for ever?—I feel the principles of an Englishman, and I utter them without apprehension or reserve. —If the King's servants will not permit a constitutional question to be decided on according to the forms and on the principles of the Constitution, it must then be decided in some other manner; and rather than it should be given up, rather than the nation should surrender their birthright to a despotic minister, I hope, my Lords, old as I am, I shall see the question fairly brought to issue, and tried between the people and the Government.—We must reconcile the practice of parliament to its theory, and remove all just cause of complaint."

But even so late as the year 1797 it was not discovered by the Whig Party, that corruption and influence are necessary to the well being of our Constitution, and may be openly avowed and defended. On the discussion of Mr. Grey's Motion for Reform, Mr. Fox said, "When Government is daily presenting itself in the shape of weakness that borders on dissolution—unequal to all the functions of useful strength, and formidable only in pernicious corruption, weak in power and strong only in influence; am I to be told that such a state of things can go on with safety to any branch of the Constitution? If men think that under such a system, we can go on without a material recurrence to first principles, they argue in direct opposition to all theory and all practice. But it is said, What will this Reform do for us? Will it retrieve our misfortunes?—I admit that it would not be sufficient, unless it led to *reduction of substantial expence*, and to reform all the abuses that have crept into our government.—But I think it would do this.—It would give us in the first place a parliament vigilant and scrupulous, and that would secure us a government active and economical. It would prepare the way for every ra-

"tional improvement of which, without disturbing the parts, our Constitution is susceptible." And concluding—"Sir, I have done—I have given my advice. I propose the remedy, and fatal will it be for England if pride and prejudice much longer continue to oppose it. The remedy proposed is simple, easy, and practicable; it does not touch the vitals of the Constitution, and, I sincerely believe, will restore us to peace and harmony. Do not believe that the day is far distant when Parliamentary Reform *must* take place, and is it not better to come to it now while you have the power of deliberation, than when it may be extorted from you by convulsion? There is yet time—it may yet go to the people with the grace and favour of a spontaneous act.—What will it be if extorted from you with indignation and violence?"—How different the sentiments of these great men from those promulgated in this Review! And it deserves remark that although a profligate minister or his supporters may have sometimes used arguments somewhat similar in debates, yet no man since the Revolution has openly avowed such doctrines before the public, or told the people of Great Britain in plain language, and in a printed book, that it is necessary they should be bribed. A paper upon Parliamentary Reform, such as I have just animadverted upon, is not however calculated to do much mischief; provided it be attentively considered. A kind of lawyer-like plausibility appears on the surface, but upon closer inspection it wants consistency, it wants authority, and, worst of all, it is not supported by facts. It is, in short, such as we might expect from a young member of the Edinburgh Speculative Society, who is ready with much petulance to support either side of the plainest question, and much resembles the "lax pleadings," which Lord Grenville informs us are permitted at the Scotch Bar, and which are defined to be "the assumption of that for true, which is in reality false, as a basis, with a superstructure of sophistry and nonsense." I am, Sir, &c. A SCOTCHMAN.

Piccadilly, Sept. 28, 1809.

SPECIAL JURIES.

SIR,—I am desirous of drawing your attention aside for a few moments from that grand desideratum, Parliamentary Reform, to the consideration of a topic

very little inferior in point of interest, if not closely connected with it, and which I am confident you cherish as of vital importance to the existence of the liberty and independence of Englishmen; I mean Trial by Jury. Amidst all the encroachments which our constitutional establishments have suffered, Trial by Jury has perhaps best endured the shock; and as I should hope that that bloated monster Corruption, will be reduced to a stature of seasonable growth, by the wholesome regimen with which you weekly supply him, I entertain a confidence that Trial by Jury will preserve its wonted superiority, and that it will be found uniformly composed of impartial, independent, and uncontaminated members of society. I have reason to believe, Mr. Cobbett, that the ordinary or petit Jury, is composed of *boni homines*; "twelve good men and true," and that justice is very independently and fairly administered by this tribunal; but, Sir, as it is a wise and wholesome principle in our constitution, that every man shall be tried by his equals; or as Magna Charta emphatically has it, that no freeman shall be hurt either in his person or property, "*nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terræ*," it follows that in all cases an ordinary Jury is not the proper and best tribunal, and the earliest periods of our judicial establishments have therefore recognized the expediency of a superior, or what is termed a "Special Jury": Blackstone says, that Special Juries were introduced, "when the causes were of too great nicety for the discussion of ordinary freeholders, or where the Sheriff was suspected of partiality;" and he might have added, where the situation in life of the party, (upon the maxim of "*judicium parium*" or judgment of equals,) requires a more select tribunal. The utility of such select Jury is in many cases manifest. No man, for instance, who had a dispute with a builder, about an exorbitant charge for his house, would think himself very candidly dealt with, if his cause were to be decided by a Jury engaged in a similar branch of trade; still less would a gentleman of fortune, possessing liberal sentiments and entertaining a strong sense of honour, submit to the consideration of twelve mechanics, how far his character, peace and happiness, had been invaded by an unprincipled seducer, who under the mask of a friend had dishonoured his wife; I say, no man would feel content to be tried for an in-

fraction of the revenue laws, by a Jury of excisemen or custom-house officers. It was to prevent these inconsistencies, that a Special Jury, which it was formerly discretionary with the Judges to grant, (though I believe seldom, if ever, refused on application by either party,) was given to the subject as matter of right by the 3 Geo. 2, c. 25. Now, Mr. Cobbett, considering the object with which Special Juries are usually in request, it must be quite manifest, that those who are summoned for the purpose, should be of a superior class to shopkeepers; that they should not only be freeholders, but men of liberal education, unshackled with the trammels of trade: for instance, if I had particular grounds for not wishing my cause to come under the investigation of a farrier, or if you please a veterinary surgeon, would such a man be less objectionable, because he happened to possess a freehold estate? Can such an adventitious circumstance operate to qualify a man to sit upon a Special Jury, who on all other accounts should be completely disqualified and unfit for the office: but the very designation given to Special Jurymen, shews the true ground of distinction between them and a common Jury; for they are in all proceedings; in the pannel, and in the Sheriff's Freeholder's Book, denominated "esquires." What constitutes, let me ask, an esquire, if it be not a property independent of labour, and of exertion, and the possessing those liberal principles and that extensive mind, which are presumed to be acquired from the leisure which independence affords? Professions confer a like title on their members, from the presumption that the exercise of the profession requires a more cultivated understanding, than is the lot of ordinary life: but so jealous is the constitution of the qualification necessary to a Special Jurymen, that landed property is stated as an indispensable appurtenant. Now, Mr. Cobbett, these observations bring me to the conclusion, to which I have been anxious to draw your attention, viz. that nothing can be so preposterous, so complete a perversion of the spirit of the institution of a Special Jury, as that of denominating men esquires, and introducing them as qualified persons in the Sheriff's Book, merely because they possess a small landed property, though their daily vocations be within the walls of a manufactory, or the circuit of a mahogany counter; and yet, Mr. Cobbett, that this out-

rage to common sense does exist, is a fact beyond all dispute; for I assure you I am not speaking ironically when I state, that such persons are promiscuously mingled in the Sheriff's Book, with men of fortune and character, and are constantly summoned on Special Juries, to discharge a duty in which most frequently they are totally unfit, and are by no means the class of persons the law intended to cast into that situation. It was only the other day, Mr. Cobbett, that it fell within my observation, that in a cause of the first moment, as it regarded the character and feelings of a gentleman concerned, and in which, to do justice, it was indispensibly necessary that a Special Jury, as was the case, should be empannelled; I say, Mr. Cobbett, it fell within my observation, that the very Foreman of this Jury was—an Undertaker. Now, I am sure, Mr. Cobbett, you will not attribute my remarks to any thing intentionally contumelious or sarcastic, towards any class of men because they happen to be in trade: I know that the trading part of this country, is one of the sources of its opulence; I know that trade and agriculture constitute the sinews of the state; I admit all this; I do not object to the accustomed habits of mankind, requiring that we should be trimmed in a peculiar fashion, preparatory to our being handed over as a savoury dish to the worms; I do not complain that any usage should have made it necessary to hire distorted countenances, to "mimic sorrow when the heart's not sad;" I complain not of this, nor of those who follow the employment; but I do complain of that violation of public duty which induces a sheriff to introduce such men, as competent to serve on a Special Jury, and who, to sanction the impropriety, gives them the designation of esquires.—Mr. Cobbett, it may be said, that the law has pointed out no other criterion of a Special Jurymen, than that he should possess landed property to a certain amount; but does not the obvious reasoning upon the subject; does not the observations of all legal authorities; does not Blackstone, when he says that the utility of a Special Jury, is, when the causes are of too great nicety for the discussion of ordinary freeholders; does not the whole clearly shew what sort of men the sheriff ought to receive, and what to reject for this purpose? The result is quite evident, and admits of no ambiguity. It may be pleaded that the present practice of the

sheriff is agreeable to that of his predecessors, and that his predecessors were never the subject of complaint; to obviate then, Mr. Cobbett, some disadvantage arising from the defect of this system for the future, and without any incroachment on the usage of prior sheriffs, I would propose that until some more defined and permanent alteration shall take place, the sheriff do, in addition to the names, state the occupations of those persons, who are concerned in trade, and at the same time, specify the place where the business is conducted; this will be giving a publicity extremely requisite for those who are concerned in the appointment of Special Juries, and may obviate considerable injustice and inconvenience, until something more advantageous can be adopted. Mr. Cobbett, I regard this as a subject of weighty import; and, as I am acquainted with no publication where questions of magnitude receive more attention from the enlightened and independent part of mankind, than in your Register, I hope these crude comments will be permitted by you, to meet the public eye in that work, and that the insertion will be productive of public benefit. I am, Sir, yours, &c.

Lincoln's Inn.

W. F. S.

JUBILEE.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT OF COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF LONDON,
Tuesday, September 26, 1809.

Mr. Alderman Wood, as Chairman of the Committee appointed to consider of the most proper means of celebrating the ensuing Anniversary of his Majesty's Accession to the Throne, presented their Report. It stated in substance, as the opinion of the Committee, "That the Corporation should attend Divine Service at St. Paul's Cathedral; that they should afterwards proceed to St. James's with a Congratulatory Address to his Majesty, and that the front of Guildhall should be illuminated," but it was the unanimous opinion of the Committee, "That it was neither expedient nor necessary that the Corporation should dine together on that day." Mr. Alderman Wood then said that, although as Chairman of the Committee, he had felt it his duty to sign the Report, he by no means conceived himself pledged to the support of the propositions which it contained. So far was he from agreeing to the principle, that he held in his hand

copies of two motions, which, however, it was not his intention to press, which were in direct opposition to the recommendation of the Report. As to the Dinner, he had certainly attended the Committee with the express view of opposing that. He had not the slightest objection to attending at St. Paul's; nor to going up with an Address, provided that it was not made the vehicle of political opinions. The Illumination he had steadily opposed, as improper in every point of view: To preserve the peace of the City was highly important; and no man could be so blind as not to perceive that, although the resolution of the Committee confined it to the front of Guildhall, the illumination there would be the signal for a general and compulsory one throughout this immense metropolis.—The situation of the kingdom was, in every point of view, such as to render a General Illumination little better than a general insult. With what sincerity could those persons obey the mandate to illuminate, whose children, parents, relatives, and friends, had perished in Spain, or were dying in the hospitals at Walcheren? He hoped that the feelings and good sense of the Corporation would induce them totally to give up the idea of illuminating. In presenting the Report, he felt it incumbent on him to move that such Report should be received, and the recommendations contained in it adopted: but he should hold himself at liberty to state his objections to such parts of it as he deemed objectionable, before the question was finally put.

Mr. HERNES expressed much dissatisfaction at the Report, which, in his opinion, was directly contrary to the sentiments of that Court, when the Committee was appointed. But nothing better could be expected from a Committee, in which, with the grossest inconsistency, gentlemen had been appointed who were known to be against a Jubilee altogether. The propositions were absurd and monstrous; first, they were to go to Church, and then they were to go to Court, and then they were to go quietly about their business. Was this a testimony of respect from a Corporation so noted for their love of good eating and drinking? Instead of meeting together, and enjoying a good substantial dinner, and a glass of good old port, that it should be said of the Citizens of London, that they sneaked home, and finished the day on a mutton chop, was most monstrous, and would never be believed by

posterity. It was inconsistent with the dignity of the Corporation, and calculated to throw an odium on all their proceedings on this important occasion. It had been said that attempts were made to bring politics into the discussion. Gentlemen had indeed now made it a political question, and that of the highest importance.

Mr. Alderman SCHOLEY was of opinion that the Committee ought to have prepared an Address, and presented it to the Court for their consideration, together with the Report.

Mr. GRIFFITHS observed, that he was one of those who had signed the Report, and he could not help observing, that Mr. Herne had been prejudging others by the measure of his own conduct. The duty of that Gentleman had very often called for his attendance at Church, where he (Mr. G.) did not, however, remember to have seen him.—[Here the coarse exclamation of "*that's a falsity*," was heard, on which there was a general cry of Order, accompanied by very strong expressions of indignation.] He (Mr. G.) had as much loyalty as any man, although it had been insinuated that the Committee, if not disloyal, had recommended measures by which the City of London would be disgraced. But in his opinion, the Committee had recommended those measures, which, if adopted, would do honour to the City of London. Was a dinner the *sine qua non* of a Meeting of the Corporation of the City of London? Could not even the solemn act of returning thanks to God for the lengthened life of his Majesty be performed, without a succeeding feast? Was eating and drinking indispensably connected with every act of the Citizens of London in their corporate capacity? He was ashamed to hear sentiments so degrading, so humiliating to the City, which, he trusted, the good sense of that Court would rescue from the imputation of habitual characteristic gluttony.

Mr. S. DIXON was of opinion that the recommendations of the Committee in the Report should be discussed separately. With respect to a dinner, he was not one of those who could see any offence to the Almighty in eating a good dinner, or in drinking a few glasses of good red port (Applauses). The greatest proof of our love, regard, and adoration, was cheerfulness; and the most effectual way to promote that was, in his opinion, by a good substantial dinner, and a glass of good

wine, a motion for which he would second with all his heart and with all his soul (Applauses). Mr. Dixon concluded by moving that the Report be read clause by clause.

Mr. WAITHMAN said, that although he had attended the Committee, and put his name to the Report, he felt himself wholly at liberty to object to any of the recommendations contained in it. With respect to the first observation made by a Member of that Court (Mr. Hearn), that many gentlemen were appointed to the Committee who were not favourable to its objects, he should answer, that at least four-fifths of the Members of the Committee were composed of gentlemen of the other side, and that it had always been the custom of that Court not to choose their Committee entirely from one party. It was somewhat extraordinary that Mr. Hearn, who was himself a Member of that Committee, and attended its proceedings, should now find such serious objections to the Report, although he had never stated these objections in the Committee. By his attendance, however, in the Committee, he must have known that the Resolutions of the present Report had been prepared not by him, but by a worthy gentleman (Mr. Clarke), who very often differed from him in that Court. An honourable and most loyal baronet (Sir W. Curtis) did not attend at the Committee, and was also absent on the present occasion. This absence shewed pretty clearly that there was a point, beyond which the loyalty of the hon. baronet would not carry him. He, for his part, had gone so much at large into the subject on a former occasion, that he felt some reluctance now to trouble the Court at any length; but, although he hoped that he had briefly brought many most important subjects under their consideration, still there were many essential points which he had overlooked.—When he mentioned to some of his friends, before the last Court, that it was his intention to come forward and express his sincere opinion upon the subject, they most earnestly dissuaded him from doing it. It was not that they were not perfectly aware of the artful contrivance from which the business originated; they were not ignorant of the calamities which have befallen the country during the present reign; or of the foolery of calling for a day of rejoicing in a period of unexampled affliction. They knew that the object of the contrivance was to set up a

cry of loyalty, and throw the odium of disloyalty upon every one who ventured to express a difference of opinion. Notwithstanding this advice, he had determined to speak his opinion. Whatever odium there might be attached to opposing an artificial cry of loyalty, he had never been afraid of encountering it. As to popularity, if he should earn it, he would be content to wear it; but he never did; nor ever would decline speaking his real sentiments from any view connected with obtaining popularity. He did feel some self-applause in recollecting that he had resisted a cry which was set up from interested motives, and that he had preferred the risk of being unpopular, to the desertion of his duty in that Court as a Representative of the City of London. With respect to going to Church, he thought that was a very proper thing; but still he was a little surprised at the quarter from which it was proposed. As to the congratulatory Address, he declared that he was utterly at a loss to conceive what topics of congratulation could be selected, and he should think it a most puzzling thing to shape any Address of Congratulation without filling it with the most gross and infamous falsehoods. When his majesty first ascended the throne, we were a free, happy, and united people, and our public affairs were managed by the great Lord Chatham, the ablest Minister this country ever produced. The taxes then amounted to very little more than seven millions annually, whereas they have now increased to seventy millions. In the commencement of the reign, the union and happiness of the people were much disturbed by the squabbles of the government. During Mr. Wilkes's time, or until the commencement of the American war, he could see no subject of congratulation. Passing over then the earlier years of his majesty's reign, and coming directly to the American war, he must say that this was one of the most wicked and calamitous wars that ever the country had been engaged in; that all the objects of the war, and America itself, were lost; and that the debt of this country was increased to a prodigious extent. He could say more—that he believed that all the evils which have overrun the Continent of Europe, and reduced this country to great danger, might be directly traced to the wicked policy which dictated the American war. He therefore could not see room for congratulating his majesty on

that portion of his reign which went down to the dismemberment of the empire, and the loss of America. If we were to come to more modern times, and look at the history of the last 16 years, we should find that this country has been involved in a most bloody and calamitous war, for an object which the people never understood. The country knew when their fleets were in port, and when they were not; but they never knew what it was that they were fighting for. The calamitous events of these bloody, expensive, and disastrous wars, were certainly not subjects to congratulate his majesty upon. Were they to congratulate his majesty upon the frequent suspension of the Habeas Corpus act, and of the constitution, during his reign? Could we congratulate his majesty upon the Treason and Sedition bills, in consequence of which many unfortunate young men suffered the most severe punishment, for merely repeating what had been said with greater force at a former period, by the very ministers who recommended the prosecution? If we were to return thanks to Almighty God, merely for prolonging the life of his majesty, we could not congratulate our sovereign for having escaped bodily infirmity, nor yet could we congratulate him on his family, or on the success of the measures of his government. After such unexampled failures as the country has lately witnessed, it should rather be a time for the City to go up and point out to his majesty the cause of these failures, than to fix this as a time to have a day of rejoicing. At the conclusion of the last war against France, after having incurred a fresh debt of 200 millions, the nation was informed by the Secretary at War (Mr. Windham), that "although we had gained battles, the objects of the war were lost and that Europe was gone." Was it then for a war, attended with such expense, and so unfortunate in its results, that his majesty should be congratulated? Or was it for the events of the present war, the Convention of Cintra, the unfortunate occurrences in Spain, or the Expedition to Walcheren, the most disgraceful one that was to be found in the annals of the country; that a congratulation was to be voted? He might therefore ask, what portion was it of his majesty's long reign, which we could fix upon as the period for a complimentary address? If the address of the City had been attended to on a former occasion, and a proper inquiry instituted

respecting the shameful Convention of Cintra, the country would, probably, not have now to lament the loss which we have sustained in Spain, from the hasty advance and precipitate retreat of lord viscount Wellington. Now, although the Convention of Cintra had been felt as most disgraceful to this country, yet there was no man hardy enough to stand up and say, that in this, that, or any other failure, which is recorded in the annals of British history, was any thing near so disgraceful and calamitous, as the last and most infamous Expedition, which was entrusted to lord Chatham. There was nobody that would say, that the Income Tax, and the extension of the Excise laws, were subjects upon which his majesty should be congratulated. As to the conduct of our military affairs, it was so extremely bad, that although we have double the number of Generals on our staff that Buonaparté has, and maintained, probably, at four times the expence, yet when it comes to select Generals for the command of our Expeditions, we select a Whitelocke, a Dalrymple, or a Chatham. Could the court see with indifference the waste of British blood which was occasioned by the folly of those who planned, or who had the execution of the objects of our Expeditions? It had been said, and very truly, that the valour of our soldiers and sailors had been conspicuous in the late wars. If so, the greater blame rested upon the Government. If we had soldiers who would not fight, the wisest Government might fail in its objects; but when it is known that we have a brave army and navy, that will execute well whatever they are called upon to do, the blame will rest exclusively on the Government, which, by the absurdity of its plans, and its selection of officers, makes British valour useless, and causes torrents of British blood to flow for no purpose. Among the many faults of the Government, he would maintain, that although we had 38 Ambassadors, who received 54,000*l.* per ann. in pensions, in addition to their pay, yet in the very few courts in which they would be received, it was almost always found that they were completely ignorant of their duty. We had lately an example of this in America; and in Sweden, although every other man in the country knew a Revolution was probable, the British Ambassador alone appeared to know nothing of the matter. There never was a great country whose affairs had been so ill managed as the affairs of

this country: and yet ministers shewed great abilities in some things. They could easily discover all the means that would prevent surcharges from being evaded; and yet they never could discover the means by which the country's affairs in other respects could be managed with honour. At the very time that the taxes were to be levied with the utmost rigour, accounts to the amount of nine millions of money were yet unsettled at the Victualing-office; and above seven millions of West India accounts were yet unexamined, notwithstanding the expence of the Commissioners appointed for that purpose. In the very last year, above nine millions were added to the yearly expenditure; and when it was considered, that from the year 1797 to the present year, the taxes had increased from twenty-three millions annually to seventy millions, without gaining a single object for which we entered into the war, he could not see how his majesty could be congratulated on such calamitous events. It was evidently impossible for the country to go on much longer under such a progressive and enormous accumulation of public burdens. Those Gentlemen on the other side, who were always calling for unanimity in that Court, were acting inconsistently when they brought forward motions which must necessarily disturb that unanimity. He had himself for the whole of his political life, opposed, as far as he was able, the system which had brought so many calamities on the country. For the greater part of that time he had been buffeted and hunted down as a Jacobin, and for many years he could only prevail on five Members to divide with him. He nowever had never turned to the right hand or the left; but regardless of whatever odium the Gentlemen on the other side might excite against him, he had fearlessly pursued through life, and he should always continue to do it, that line of conduct which his sense of public duty pointed out [loud applauses below the Bar. The Lord Mayor called the Gentlemen to order]. These applauses were certainly irregular, and he was happy to say that it was an irregularity which did not often take place. There were, however, occasions when it was hard for men to conceal their feelings; and such demonstrations had been heard, sometimes, in the House of Commons itself. There were many Gentlemen in that Court who agreed with him in the most essential points; and yet, because there were some

shades of difference, they, upon many occasions, threw themselves into the arms of the enemy.—Nothing could be more mischievous or dangerous than such a course. Mr. Fox had elegantly observed, in his History, that “it was much better to concede something to a friend, than every “thing to an enemy.” He wished that those, who on important points thought as he did, were impressed with the truth of this sentiment. As to many of the Gentlemen on the other side, he might as well talk to stocks or stones, as to address them with any hopes of convincing them. They were evidently playing a game of their own; they were fishing for themselves, while he had nothing to hope for or to fear from any Government, and had never obtained or sought any favours. He was very much astonished that a Gentleman who had given notice of a motion for the present day (Mr. Deputy Kemble), should now feel differently from what he did upon the Convention of Cintra:—On that occasion he mentioned, “that his blood boiled “with indignation, and that he was ready “to go up to his majesty every week with “a remonstrance on the subject.” That burning zeal, however, must have now considerably cooled. The City of London could shew no better proof of its loyalty to its Sovereign upon the present occasion, than by pointing out to him those enemies who had brought such disgraces and dangers upon the country. An hon. and loyal baronet (sir W. Curtis) had, upon a former occasion, complained of his personality; but he did not at that time recollect for what number of years he (Mr. W.) had been exposed to the personalities of the hon. baronet and his friends. He had, perhaps, forgotten, that when he was in a minority on the question of the Treason and Sedition Bills, Gentlemen insisted upon a division in order that it might be seen “who were the enemies of the country.” As to what was called the monied interest, although he was himself a tradesman, he would never look much to the monied interest to support constitutional principles; nor to Bank Directors, who can get Acts of Parliament to prevent them paying their notes in cash, and who receive 5 per cent. for interest on a bit of paper intrinsically not worth a penny. On this subject he read the following passage from a Speech of Lord Chatham, on the question of the Falkland Islands:—

“There is a set of men, my Lords, in “the City of London, who are known to

“live in riot and luxury upon the plunder
“of the ignorant, the innocent, the help-
“less—upon that part of the community
“which stands most in need of, and best
“deserves, the care and protection of the
“Legislature. To me, my Lords, whether
“they be the miserable jobbers of Change-
“alley, or the lofty Asiatic plunderers of
“Leadenhall-street, they are all equally
“detestable. I care but little whether a
“man walks on foot, or is drawn by eight
“horses, or six horses; if his luxury be
“supported by the plunder of his country,
“I despise and detest him. My Lords,
“while I had the honour of serving his
“Majesty, I never ventured to look at the
“Treasury, but at a distance; it is a busi-
“ness I am unfit for, and to which I never
“could have submitted. The little I know
“of it has not served to raise my opinion
“of what is vulgarly called the monied in-
“terest. I mean, that blood-sucker, that
“muck-worm, which calls itself the friend
“of Government—that pretends to serve
“this or that Administration, and may be
“purchased, on the same terms, by any
“Administration—that advances money
“to Government, and takes special care of
“its own emoluments. Under this de-
“scription I include the whole race of
“Commissaries, Jobbers, Contractors,
“Clothiers, and Remitters!!!”

Had these most pertinent observations been made by himself (Mr. W.), he doubtless had been charged with Jacobinism of the deepest dye—but they were sentiments of the great Chatham, the determined foe of corruption in whatever shape it reared its head [Hear! hear!]. He well knew, as we also all well knew, or might well know, that these men were set up to sale to every Administration. No Administration, be it composed of who it might, could ever be at a loss to raise a loan, whilst such characters as lord Chatham had described were in existence. After Mr. Pitt retired, his successors were invited most cordially to partake of Civic Hospitality. Even Lord Grey, who had for years been opposing Mr. Pitt's system, no sooner came into power than he was invited into the City. Of this disposition to servile adulation he might adduce instances without end, which he should not detain the Court by recapitulating—but proceed to read his Amendment, which was as follows:—“That this “Court and the Country at large have “upon all occasions evinced their loyalty “and attachment to his Majesty's Person “and Family, and duly impressed with a

"sense of the eminent virtues which have so long endeared him to his people, they will at all times be ready to testify their loyalty and attachment.—That the People, distinguishing between the beneficent views and intentions of the Monarch, and the profligate acts of incapable and unprincipled advisers, who have abused the confidence of their Sovereign, have not suffered the destructive measures which have produced such an accumulation of calamitous events—the frauds, corruption, and peculation, which have so long existed—nor the wanton and wasteful sacrifice of blood and treasure—in any manner to diminish the love and affection which they have borne his Majesty, firmly persuaded that these events must have been equally afflicting to his Majesty and the People.—They are therefore of opinion, that during the present gloomy aspect of public affairs, amidst their recent afflicting losses and disappointments, and the present distracted state of his Majesty's Councils, to set any day apart as a day of public rejoicing, could neither be gratifying to his Majesty, or an appropriate way of testifying their loyalty, nor would it accord with the character of a free, grave, and considerate people, feeling deeply for the honour and character of the country."—Mr. Waithman concluded a most able speech (of which we have been unable to give more than a hasty and imperfect sketch,) by avowing, that although he should at all times be most ready to testify his love and attachment to his Sovereign personally, he trusted that he should never hesitate in discriminating between the acts of the King himself and those of his advisers.

The Common Serjeant then read the original Motion and the Amendment.

Mr. MAWMAN lamented that the Court was not unanimous on this important occasion; he was, however, somewhat relieved from the pressure of that feeling, by reflecting that the worthy member who now opposed the Resolution before the Court, had signed the Report which contained it. He himself did not, however, agree to the Report altogether, although he did to this Resolution, which was that of the Court going to St. Paul's, to hear divine service. But, as to another part of the Report, which stated that a Dinner was neither expedient nor necessary on that occasion, it was a proposition from which he dissented, and he had another

to make in lieu of it. As to the expence of a Dinner, he admitted that to be a considerable object, and that expence should be avoided as much as possible in the present state of the finances of the City; but they must retrench in something else to make up for expence on this occasion, which, he believed, would only amount to about 1,000*l*. He should propose, with his lordship's leave, that the Corporation should dine at the Egyptian Hall. Nor was the state of the finances of the Corporation so low as not to admit of this expenditure without much inconvenience, for its annual capital was larger than it had been formerly; besides, a Committee might be appointed to conduct the business of the Dinner, and do it for nothing, which would considerably diminish the expence; he should be glad to afford any assistance he could render in that way gratis. It was, with him, a first principle that the Corporation should pass that day as a feast, and also that the feast should be held at our Mansion-House. It had been asked, by a worthy member (Mr. Waithman), what there was to rejoice for? To which he answered, a great deal; for, during the present reign, much had been done to improve the condition of society at large; the public roads had been improved; we had had an immense quantity of inclosures. Let us look at the face of the country in general, and see whether it was approaching that ruin which the worthy member seemed to predict. Look at the state of your manufactures and your produce, your agriculture, your arts, fine and mechanic; look at your army and navy, and then see the progress which society had made in its condition within these ten years; the peace which we had enjoyed; and then he was inclined to think we should arrive to the conclusion, that, generally speaking, society was never in so flourishing a condition as at the present moment.—It might be said, that we could not attribute all these matters to his majesty; but without the benignity of his reign they might have been checked and prevented; besides, it was but fair to take this view of things, as others had taken such a view of the ills of the present reign. He therefore saw much matter of congratulation to his majesty on account of his reign. He considered our Constitution a matter of great congratulation; it was a happy and glorious Constitution, the principles of which his majesty had uniformly supported for fifty years to-

gether. Therefore, he flattered himself, that the sense of the Court was, instead of using the language of complaint, to indulge in that approbation.

Mr. S. Dixon lamented that gentlemen had wandered so much as they had done from the question before the Court, which was simply—Whether the Court should, or should not, go to St. Paul's to hear divine service on the 25th of October next, and return thanks to Almighty God? He had heard a speech of an hour long, from one member (Mr. Waithman), without containing a single word to the question. That worthy member had talked a great deal too much of himself. *Who* and *what* was *he*—that he should engross so much of the Court upon *his* affairs—*his* character—*his* circumstances—that he should thus talk so much of himself for himself. Here Mr. Dixon wittily introduced the old jingle of "As I walked to myself, I talked to myself," &c. which he repeated with great emphasis and violent gesticulation, to the no small diversion of the whole Court. As to the matter now more immediately before the Court, he had the pleasure to say, because he had the pleasure to feel, there was abundant matter for congratulation to our sovereign lord the King, for his happy reign of 50 years over a loyal and affectionate people.

Mr. Alderman GOODBEHERE saw the propriety of separating the personal from the magisterial character of the king. There was a wide difference between the moral character of the man, and the office which he holds; and to attribute to him things which were not produced by him, was to come to a conclusion without premises, and to a false conclusion. Such, he considered to be the attributing to the king the state of the public roads, the state of the manufactures, of commerce, of agriculture, of the arts, of the army, and the navy. These were not produced by the reign of the king, although they happened in the reign of the king; they were the effect of the industry and diligence of the people; and if the worthy member who had brought forward these subjects attended to that distinction, he would not have arrived at the conclusion of attributing them to his majesty. They were the result of the energy and the activity of the people. The way to judge this question rightly, was to look at the transactions of the present reign, and then we should find many things done by those whom his majesty had entrusted with his councils,

which not only were unfit subjects of congratulation, but such as must excite our abhorrence. Let us look at the extension of the hateful Excise laws; at the odious and inquisitorial Income Tax; at the huge, the monstrous size of the National Debt, the collection of the taxes to defray the interest of which had spread court influence and corruption into almost every branch of society, civil or military. Look at the waste of treasure and of blood, which had attended a reign of 49 years, thirty of which had been war; during which 26 Bishops, whose duty it was to preach the mildness of the Christian religion which was "good will to men," yet lent their aid, as Lords of Parliament, to a system of havoc and devastation all over Europe, and an immense portion of India; and also over a vast space of America. It was, therefore not enough to say that our roads, our trade, our commerce, our agriculture, our arts, were flourishing, we must look also at the calamities of the people: at the fatal policy which brought on those calamities. He should not now take up the time of the Court in enumerating them, but they were numerous; and some of them were at this moment, to him, awful and alarming; he knew the people at large felt them in that light; and the Court, in his opinion, ought to take care not to bring, as it were, a question between the king and his people, by thus injudiciously obtruding upon the public, a grave recollection of these calamitous events. Sound sense and wise policy would have shunned a discussion of these matters at this crisis. For God's sake, let the Court do nothing that had a tendency to commotion. Things are, at present, tolerably quiet over the country; discussion may disturb them. An illumination was the very worst project that could be devised. Lights might, indeed, be set in people's windows, but unless we could infuse cheerfulness into their hearts, the illumination would do them no good. This was not such a season as that of the news from Egypt or Trafalgar. They were, indeed, subjects fit for illumination. But this was to commemorate, by a Jubilee, the whole of a reign, which had been marked by most afflicting calamities; by the extension of the detestable Excise Laws; by suspensions of the act of Habeas Corpus, the bulwark of the liberty of the subject; by the prodigious waste of blood and treasure; by an increase of the National Debt from 100 to 800 millions. With these

views of things, it appeared to him, that we deceived ourselves, if we thought this a season for a Jubilee, for, to him, the situation of the country appeared to be truly calamitous.

Mr. KEMBLE did not agree with every part of the Resolutions before the Court, but with the first part he did agree. He could not help being surprised at the conduct of a worthy member (Mr. Waithman), for he had signed the very report which he was now attacking. He never would have put his name to what he disapproved; he thought this conduct disingenuous in that gentleman, and done to lull the Court into a delusive apprehension of security, the better to defeat its purpose, which was almost unanimously holding a Jubilee.

Mr. WAITHMAN said, his object in signing the Report was, to bring forward the discussion of the subject; the report was not his act, but the act of the Committee. He made no observations in the Committee; he did not exchange a word with any individual in it, until a question was put to him respecting the Dinner, and then he said distinctly, that he disapproved of that measure.

The question was then put on the Resolution for going to hear Divine Service, and to return thanks to the Almighty God, on the 25th of October next; and carried.

Mr. KEMBLE then observed, that the next question was upon the subject of Illumination. Such was the *loyalty* of the people, that he had no doubt, whether the Court ordered an illumination of the front of Guildhall, or not, the illumination would be general. The Court might expect that the Mansion-house, the India-house, and the Bank, should illuminate on that occasion; but there was no necessity for the Court to recommend it to individuals, for their *loyalty* was such, that they would do it without any suggestion from any quarter. He was aware of the pressure of taxes, but such was the *loyalty* of the people of this country, that he was confident they would bear still more without a murmur, in support of his Majesty and his Government; but as the people were so ready to pay their money, the Court should not shew a readiness to take it out of their pockets.

Mr. WHEBLE thought the Police of the City defective enough already, without any Illumination, which would create much confusion; but defective as the Police of the City was, there was this consolation,

that the Police of the West end of the Town was a great deal worse, witness the tumult and uproar of Covent Garden Theatre for a week together. Nor were peace, and quietness, and obedience to the laws, much recommended by the Duel which lately took place between two Secretaries of State, and Members of the King's Cabinet; for these reasons we understood the worthy Member's sentiments to be adverse to an Illumination.

Mr. Alderman WOOD advised the Court to look to the price of bread, rather than talk about Illumination. He disliked this proposition to illuminate Guildhall, because it would have the effect of compulsion on all the householders of the metropolis; for there were persons in abundance who were ready to break such windows as should not be illuminated.

Mr. MILLAR considered the whole of this measure of a Jubilee as a mere *trick* intended for the purpose of screening Ministers from an inquiry into their conduct, which was most culpable. He considered an Illumination as the most injudicious step that could be taken, even by those who most wished to render this reign illustrious; because it would afford opportunities to those who thought otherwise, to contrast the present condition of things with that of the end of the last reign. The illumination reminded him of what was said in the once popular entertainment of Harlequin Touchstone. The character in that piece is supposed to possess a talisman, by the application of which Truth is instantly elicited. Amongst other places which he visited was Paris, where the people were illuminating the city. Harlequin, on inquiring the cause of this illumination, is informed that it was for a great victory; but, on applying the touchstone, he discovers that this illumination was for the purpose of *keeping the People in the dark*. Thus, for instance, an invidious person might put up in one window, National Debt, 100 millions; in another, 800 millions. In one, the price of the quartern loaf at six-pence, in another, possibly two shillings. In one, the portion of Excise almost nothing; in another, most enormous. In the one, the possession of America; in another, the loss of it. In one, the state of Taxes, which were light, and collected constitutionally; in another, the Assessed Taxes, and the Income Tax, collected upon the principles of the Inquisition. In one, the annuitant and tradesman of 200*l.* enjoying, in the reign

of George II., every comfort which the country could afford, and living in comparative affluence; and in another, the same individual, in the reign of George III., reduced by the Income Tax to 180*l*. overwhelmed with taxes, and driven from his parlour to a garret. The Worthy Member having enumerated many other points of this nature, he said he saw no cause for illumination, but saw a great deal of folly in proposing it.

Mr. Box expressed a desire to support the honour and dignity of the City.

Mr. WARTMAN had insuperable objections to that part of the Report which went to recommend an Illumination of the front of Guildhall, because, as the worthy Alderman had said, it would become a matter of compulsion; for if nine or ten people were to light up, every body must do it for safety, or it might cost them their lives. He considered it as a scheme for the purpose of marking out, and exposing to obloquy, those who did not join it, by holding them out as persons deficient in attachment to their Sovereign. But let the matter be discussed as it might, the Day of the Jubilee would, in reality, be a day, not of joy, but of grief at heart for the people. *None but Contractors, Jobbers, Pensioners, Placemen, or Place-hunters would feel any Joy at heart on that occasion.* It would be impossible for any reflecting man to look at the transactions of that day, without a gloomy recollection of the enormous load of debt, which pressed upon us, without feeling that that debt had been incurred for the attainment of objects, none of which had been attained. That it was professedly incurred for the security of this Country, and of the Throne itself; that both are, at this moment, less secure than they were, when our debt was only 100 instead of 800 millions.—That it is absolutely impossible for this Country to go on, upon the same scale of expenditure for the next, as the last 7 years. That out of 49 years of this reign, we have had 30 years of war; that it was owing to accident alone we had been enabled to go on so long without national bankruptcy; and that was the invention of machinery by Sir Richard Arkwright for spinning cotton, by which that article might be said to have become the staple of the country, instead of wool. Having taken notice of the mistake into which Mr. Alderman Curtis fell, as an historian, the other day, in comparing the present reign to that of Henry III. a weak and wicked

Prince, whose measures were against the interest of his people, and who had even violated his Oath; when the Worthy Alderman must have meant, if he meant any thing, to have alluded to Edward III. who was, indeed, an illustrious Prince, he concluded with heartily dissenting from this Resolution.

Mr. HARPER said, that such was the general *loyalty* of the people, a general illumination would take place.

The question was put for illuminating the front of Guildhall, and carried.

The next important article to be considered was that of a DINNER.

Mr. MAWMAN then proposed his plan of dining the Corporation in the Egyptian Hall. The question was, how that was to be accomplished; and whether at the expence of the Corporation, or of the individuals who partook of it? For his part, he saw no medium between having no dinner, an idea not to be endured, and that of having it at the expence of the Corporation, because, if it was to be at the expence of the individuals who partook of it, it would be *but thinly* attended, which would be an effect much to be regretted on such an occasion!! He therefore proposed that the Corporation should dine at the Egyptian Hall in the Mansion House on that occasion, and that guests might be admitted, to a number to be limited.—[The latter part was exploded].

Mr. S. DIXON thought it had, of late, been too much the fashion to indulge gloomy apprehensions upon the state of public affairs. He saw no reason for it. He was of opinion that a day of *Jubilee* should be a day of *joy*. He had looked into dictionaries, this morning, and there he learned that a day of Jubilee was “a day of solemn feasting, rejoicing, and “praising God.” Nor did he see any inconsistency in devoting the morning to prayer, and the afternoon to a good Dinner, a glass of wine, and cheerfulness. He thought he might adore his Maker in cheerfulness as well as in gravity.

Mr. Box did not object to a Dinner, but did object to its being at the expence of the Corporation; besides, the members would better shew the sincerity of their attachment to their Sovereign, by putting their hands into their own pockets, than into those of others.

Mr. JACKS had no objection to the question of dining in the abstract, but he thought the expence would be too great for the Corporation.

Mr. KEMBLE would assent to dining, if those who dined paid for it out of their own pockets, but should object to it altogether, if at the expence of the Corporation.

Sir J. EAMER did not know of, and was unwilling to create, a precedent for the Court dining at any other than the expence of the Corporation.

Mr. VANDERCOMB saw many inconveniences which might result from the Members of that Court dining together in a body. He did not anticipate any riot or disorder on that occasion, but should there be any, the Members of the Court would be less efficient for the purpose of quelling them, by being all at the Mansion House together, than by being in their respective Wards; and, upon such occasions, the heads of families were never better situated, than when among them, and giving directions to their servants; he was therefore against the idea of a public Dinner, which did not appear to him to be consistent with the solemnity of returning thanks to Almighty God.

Mr. KEMBLE said, that although in former days there was a good deal of intoxication at some City Dinners, there was now a great reformation in that particular, for, of late, they were so well conducted, that Members might bring their wives and daughters with them, without hurting their delicacy; of late he had not heard, at a City Feast, any conversation which he should be sorry to hear at his own table. Formerly, indeed, some persons used to become so intoxicated as to tumble under the table, but that was a practice which had been long discontinued.

Mr. DIXON bore similar testimony to modern temperance at City Feasts.

Mr. STOKES had no hesitation in saying, that if this dinner was to be at the expence of the Corporation, it would be an *absolute robbery*. "I say, an absolute robbery," said he, "for you are already so poor, as a Corporation, that you cannot pay your own servants." He referred to a fact (the particulars of which the uproar which it produced prevented us from hearing), as an illustration of his assertion.

Mr. Alderman WOOD said, that in the Committee there appeared to be a general disposition for dining: but when it was said, that it should be at the expence of individuals who partook of it, there was a visible contraction in the lineaments of

the countenances of many of the Members. If there was to be a Dinner, he would recommend to the perusal of the Court, the Resolutions of the Corporation of the City of Dublin, which was—"That the expence was to be defrayed by those who dined—Aldermen 5, Commoners 3, and the Guild 2 guineas."

The question was now loudly called for; and a division being demanded, strangers were directed to withdraw. Of the proceedings which followed, we can only speak from information; but we learn that a scene of tumult and confusion succeeded, of a description wholly unprecedented in the annals of Civic Debate. The Court at length divided on the grand question of a *Dinner*, or *no Dinner*, which was carried by a majority of 25 in the affirmative. A division then took place on the question, whether the expence of the Dinner should be defrayed by the Corporation, or the Members individually; when there appeared,

For the payment of the expence by Individuals, Aldermen - - - - - 4

Commoners - - - - - 38—42

For dining at the expence of the Corporation, Aldermen - - - - - 1

Commoners - - - - - 46—47

Majority against paying the money out of their own pockets, - - - - - 5.

A division afterwards took place on the question, Whether the original Ward Committee, which had made the Report, or a new Committee of the Guttling Junta, should arrange and regulate the proceedings of the Corporation in the proposed celebration of the Jubilee; the question was carried in favour of a new Committee, by a majority of 15. The naming of this Committee became a matter of extreme difficulty, and engaged the whole Court in a scene of absolute riot and confusion, which lasted till seven o'clock. The "Guttling Junta," strenuously insisted on having a Committee of Members most celebrated for eating and drinking. The Lord Mayor in vain exerted himself to restore order. The whole Court was in a state of uproar. Mr. S. Dixon, and Mr. Mawman, made about a score of harangues each: At length the Lord-Mayor, finding it impossible to restore order, dissolved the Court, so that there must, after all, be another Court of Common-Council held for the purpose of appointing this new Committee!

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

Vol. XVI. No. 14.] LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1809. [Price 1s.

"The inhabitants of WARSAW (the capital of Poland) are making preparations for holding a grand JUBILEE on the birth day of the Emperor Napoleon, the restorer of their liberties and their constitution."—STATESMAN.

481] [482

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PISTOLLING PRIVY-COUNSELLORS.

Since the publication of my last Number, there has appeared in one of the hiring prints, the Morning Post, of the 3rd instant, a statement of the original cause of the Duel, upon Putney Heath, between Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning. This statement is curious; for, though one cannot place implicit reliance upon it, one may easily see, that it contains some truth. In time, the whole will come out. It is the interest of the people to get a knowledge of all the facts connected with this matter; because, hence they will be able, upon some future occasion, to turn such knowledge to good account.—I beg the reader to pay attention to this exposure; and to stop, now-and-then, during the perusal, and reflect, for a moment, that these men were the king's two Principal Secretaries of State, and, occasionally, sat with his Majesty in council.—"In addition to the particulars which we stated yesterday, in respect to the circumstances which led to the late extraordinary duel, we have to state, that towards the close of the session, when Lord Grenville Leveson Gower's writ was to be moved for, on account of his coming into office and the Cabinet, that Mr. Canning called upon the Duke of Portland, not upon the Cabinet, as a condition of his remaining in the government, to give him a decision upon the proposition (to which as early as March last he had induced the Duke of Portland to consent) for removing Lord Castlereagh, and appointing the Marquis Wellesley his successor; and the Duke of Portland having given Mr. Canning a specific and positive promise to this effect, Mr. Canning pressed that it should be immediately acted upon, and Lord Castlereagh acquainted with it. Lord Castlereagh, however, was not acquainted with it, and Mr. Canning acquiesced in its being concealed from him. Undoubtedly, Lord Camden was acquainted with the trans-

actions; but it is not true that his lordship ever undertook to make the disclosure to Lord Castlereagh, nor did he ever make it. It is also true, that Mr. Canning was thoroughly apprized that it was not made known to Lord Castlereagh. And it is farther true, that Lord Castlereagh, being kept in profound ignorance of the decision for his removal from office, was permitted, though, in fact, virtually no longer a Minister, and in this state of delusion, to continue to conduct the entire arrangement of the campaign, and to engage in a new expedition of the most extensive, complicated, and important nature, under the full persuasion, not that Mr. Canning had supplanted him in office, and possessed in his pocket a promise for his dismissal, but that he really enjoyed (as during the period he, in outward shew, and daily concurrence, experienced) Mr. Canning's sincere, liberal, and bona fide support, as a co-operating and approving colleague. It is further known, that Mr. Canning, having thus in his pocket Lord Castlereagh's dismissal, and having arranged with the Duke of Portland that it should be carried into execution at the termination of the expedition, he did, on the 3rd September, the day that the account arrived from Lord Chatham that he could not proceed to Antwerp, write to the Duke of Portland, demanding the execution of the promise made to him. What were all the difficulties which were started from time to time against the immediate execution of this promise it would be extremely difficult to detail; but there cannot be a doubt but the question of the Writership, which it has been attempted to connect with this transaction, could have nothing to do with it, as Mr. Canning never contended for Lord Castlereagh's removal from the government, but from the particular office he held, and into which he wished to introduce Lord Wellesley. It appears that the demand of the fulfilment of the promise led to the resignation of the Duke of Portland, and subsequently of Mr. Can-

"ning. And it further appears, that, as soon as the whole of this unparalleled conduct was, at this late period, disclosed to Lord Castlereagh, he immediately placed his resignation in his Majesty's hands.—On the truth of the above facts the public may rely; and they can no longer be at a loss for the real causes and grounds of the demand made by Lord Castlereagh for satisfaction from Mr. Canning."—Now, reader, you will please to observe, that this is the account, which the hirelings themselves give of the matter; and the interesting fact, if it be true, is, that, after the Prime Minister had agreed to put Lord Castlereagh out of his office, that same man, so marked down for being turned out, was permitted to plan, and to put in execution, the Walcheren Expedition, which, in point of magnitude of force and of risk, surpassed all the other undertakings of the administration; this expedition, employing a hundred thousand soldiers and sailors, and costing the nation so many millions of money, was left to the sole discretion of a man against whom one of his colleagues had obtained a promise of ouster. Yet, to the public, these men appeared to be not only upon a friendly, but upon a very cordial footing; they not only exchanged the term "friend," as often as they had to speak of one another in the House of Commons, but, to all appearance, were very warmly attached to each other.—If the story here told by the hireling be true, there can be little doubt as to which party the greatest share of dishonour belongs. Lord Castlereagh *might* be sincere in his professions of friendship for the other, and *might* suppose, that he was acting with a "co-operating and approving colleague." I say, this *might* be the case, though I am far from believing that it was; but, if the hireling's story be true, the other *could not be sincere* in his professions of friendship, and did certainly act a part such as it would be very difficult to censure in terms sufficiently strong.—Only think of acting with a man, of holding council with, of carrying a fair face, and using a smooth and flattering tongue towards, a man, for six months, during the whole of which time the party so acting, carried in his pocket a promise of that man's dismissal from office, and which promise had been procured by the said party! I do not believe, that any thing like this is to be found in the history of any set of men above the rank of tide-waiters.—Need

we wonder at the failure of expeditions? Need we wonder at any failure whatever? Need we wonder, that our enemy has become the master of the continent of Europe? Why, what is it that makes one nation rise and another nation fall? Simply this, that the former is under the guidance of *wisdom*, and the latter under the guidance of *folly*; and, after all the puns and antitheses of the Cannings and the Freres; after all their jests, cracked upon Buonaparté and his family, and upon the people of France; after all this, we have only to cast our eyes over the two nations; we have only to take a glance at their relative situation, to be able to judge as to which is under the guidance of wisdom, and which under the guidance of folly.—This nation has always borne the character of being *thoughtful* and *brave*, and especially in all matters, and upon all occasions, when its *rights* and *liberties* were at stake; and, would any man, only thirty years ago, have believed it possible, that this nation, at a time like this, would have looked on in silence, while its affairs were in the hands of men, who, after many months of ill-will, sally out upon a heath and pistol each other?—At the very time when this is going on in our cabinet, amongst our guardians of the state, Napoleon is concerting, in human probability, what he looks upon as the sure means of subduing us to his power; of making our country a department, or, perhaps, vice-royalty, of his vast empire.—Such, however, has been the uniform practice of nations. When pressed hard from without; when exposed to all sorts of suffering at home; instead of resorting to the means of removing the danger, they have, in almost every instance, increased it by their own conduct, and, particularly by quarrels amongst those, whose duty bade them make any sacrifice for the purpose of setting an example of unanimity.—The people will bear in mind, that they have been called upon daily, for the last fifteen or sixteen years; that they have, in fact, been worried half to death with exhortations, not to mention the *threats* that have been uttered; and, for what? Why, to be *unanimous*; and, now, at last, they have a very pretty example of that unanimity, which, as they have been told, is necessary to our existence as a nation.—Napoleon, though Messieurs Canning, Ellis, and Frere, laughed at his *bad spelling*; Napoleon, though never "Captain of Eton," and unable, perhaps, to make a pun, or

an antithesis; Napoleon knows very well what this duel indicates. He will pay much more attention to it than he will to the next Speech from the throne; it speaks in a language not to be misunderstood; and, what makes it peculiarly valuable to him, he is *sure* that it speaks the truth.—I before observed upon the *crime*, which, in the eye of the laws of England, these men committed, upon the supposition, that they did actually fight the duel which they are stated to have fought upon Putney Heath; and, I am much obliged to a writer in the *Morning Chronicle* of Friday last, for having placed this part of the subject in a very clear and forcible light. I shall here insert his observations, beseeching the readers' attention to them:—"By Stat. 43 G. III. c. 58. s. 1. the wilfully, maliciously, and unlawfully shooting-at, &c. any of his majesty's subjects, with an intent, in so doing, to murder, maim, disfigure, or disable, or to do some other grievous bodily hurt to such subject, is declared to be a felony without benefit of clergy, and the offender is adjudged to be punished by death.—There is a proviso in the statute, that if such act of shooting, &c. be committed under such circumstances as that, if death ensued, it would not in law have amounted to the crime of murder, any person committing such act, and indicted under the statute, shall be acquitted. From this proviso it seems that, in every case in which the acts mentioned in the statute would amount in law to murder, if death ensue, they amount to FELONY within the statute, *if death do not ensue*; and therefore, as the killing a man in a duel is held in law to be murder (of which we had last year a melancholy example), the shooting at a man in a duel, when death does not ensue, must be a felony within the above statute: and, by consequence, *Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning are felons within the meaning of the act, if they fought the duel at Putney it is said they did.* Yet although their offence was published in all the public newspapers, with the names of the witnesses, and every necessary particular to prove the offence against them, *they still remain at large*, and no warrant has been issued for their apprehension either by the magistrates of Surrey or others having the power to do so.—I should not have noticed this subject, as I neither admire the above statute, nor

"am disposed in the present state of things to punish duellists by death, but for the very recent case of Mr. Eliston, under the very same statute: This person was apprehended and subsequently committed to take his trial under this statute, although the only witness present and person injured, acquits him of any intention of doing her any bodily hurt. In this I do not blame the magistrate—he did his duty in apprehending Mr. Eliston, and also in subsequently committing him for trial, as he was not satisfied of his innocence; *but I say that the same sense of duty which led that magistrate to apprehend Mr. Eliston, obliges him to apprehend the other two offenders.* The case of Mr. Eliston is but a case of suspicion, whilst that of Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning, if true, is one of certainty of offence; and therefore, in my mind, it will be flagrant injustice if the former is further proceeded against while the latter are permitted to escape with impunity.—The administration of justice should, perhaps, be strict, unquestionably it should be equal; but where there are several offenders against the same law, to punish one and to take no notice of the others is not equal. Inequality in the administration of justice is not only censurable in a moral point of view, but it is dangerous to society; *for how can it be expected or required that any individual should suffer patiently if others are permitted to commit the same offence for which he suffers with impunity*; and the inequality is more offensive where there is a disparity in the rank of the parties, for the appearance in such case is, that the superior rank is the shelter from punishment.—In making the above observations I am only actuated with a desire to see the justice of the country impartially administered. I have no knowledge of Mr. E. neither have I a wish to see Lord C. and Mr. C. punished under the statute they have apparently offended against; neither should I have wished to have seen the survivor punished for murder, if either had been killed; although, at the same time, I cannot but observe, that in such case the survivor could not have complained of the severity, as it was during his administration that all mercy was refused in the unfortunate case of Major Campbell."—This gentleman, as well as myself, was, it now seems, both writing upon this same point, just about the same moment.

The case of Major Campbell struck me so forcibly at the time, that I could not help citing it. Nothing is clearer than that, if Lord Castlereagh and his brother Right Honourable Privy Counsellor did, as it has been so often and so publicly stated, actually shoot at one another in a duel, they are both guilty of FELONY; that they are both FELONS; and yet, so void of all decency are the hirelings of the press, that they do not scruple to hold out, that it would be proper for these men, these felons in the eye of the law, again to become ministers; again to associate with the king in person at his council-board! Nothing can more strongly characterize the state in which we are than the publishing of a thought of this sort. What opinion must these hirelings have of the public mind; what must they think of the people, amidst whom they promulgate a proposition like this?—Yes, as this writer observes, what is to be said of our justice; of our administration of justice, if this duel pass unnoticed thereby? The case of Mr. Eliston is very striking; that of Major Campbell more so; but, neither of them more in point than was, last Spring, that of the *poor Timman of Plymouth*.—There does not want the acting upon the suggestion of the hirelings and the taking into the ministry, one or the other, or both, of these pistolers. There does not want any thing of this kind. The whole thing was complete long enough ago. But, it would be something *new*. It would be a little additional garnish, though it would make no alteration in the dish itself.

THE CHANGE OF MINISTRY, as it is called, does not appear to be decided upon. It seems, that those, who choose to remain in, wish to coalesce with some of the *outs*. The scheme is not a bad one, but the *outs*, as it would seem, will not coalesce. I said, they would not. They think, that, if they hold out but a little longer, those who are now in place will find it absolutely necessary to give way, notwithstanding any patching that may, in the meanwhile, take place.—Why, let me see: I think it would be best for the country, for them to make a GRAND COALITION; a famous coalition. How delightful it would be to see *Popery* and *No-Popery* close in each others embraces!—The Morning Chronicle is quite melting upon the subject of his “*two distinguished statesmen*.” Won’t coalesce, won’t they? What, then, Lord Grey did not coalesce with Lord

Grenville, did he not? And both did not coalesce with the Addingtons? How shy they are become; how coy, all of a sudden. The Foxites, I warrant you, did not coalesce with Pitt, whom they had, for twenty years, been representing as the worst enemy of England? No, they did not coalesce with him; and why? *because he would not coalesce with them*. But, they coalesced with his memory, and voted the payment of his debts upon the ground of his “*public services*,” expressly acknowledged by them.—They do well, for themselves, however, not to coalesce *now*: for, so sure as they do, so sure they are tumbled out, neck and heels, in the space of a month or two, and the few friends they have left will shun them, as they would shun the Walcheren fever, or any thing the most pestiferous and loathsome.—There is one expression in the Morning Chronicle, which, if it be not considered as a slip of the pen, is well calculated to attract attention. After giving the names of the new-moulded ministry, it says: “This is the new plan. It certainly is not an extended and combined administration; but they (the ministers) hope, that, in the PRESENT STATE OF THE REPRESENTATION OF THE COUNTRY, even this may go down; and they do not hesitate to say, that, by striking out the *intellect* that was amongst them, they may proceed without contrariety of sentiment.”—Now, what are we to make of this? Its meaning cannot be misunderstood. Well, then, Sir, are you, and are your party, for any change, or reform, in the representation of the country? This is a question of vital importance; because, if you are for such change, you are the men we want. Only tell us, that, if put into power, you will bring forward the measure of a change in the representation of the country, and we are all for you, to a man. “Go down;” aye, to be sure it will, and why should it not? Did not Mr. Canning’s motion for the acquittal of his “noble friend,” Lord Castlereagh, go down; and, did it not go down very well too? And, when Mr. Madocks brought forward his motion about the seat-selling to Mr. Quintin Dick, and the bargain about Mr. Dick’s voting, did not a motion, made to set Mr. Madocks’s motion aside, and to prevent all inquiry, go down as smoothly as oil? And did not your party most cordially join in the said stifling motion, and also in the ever-famous cry of “make a stand”? Oh, yes; all this went

down; not with the majority only, but, with your party; with that very party, in whose behalf you are now complaining of the "state of the representation of the country," which state of the representation, by the bye, your great partizans, the Edinburgh Reviewers, declare to be essential to regular liberty. Aye, aye; you are now out of humour with the "present state of the representation of the country," though you called us Jacobins and Levellers for wishing that state altered. You dislike the state of the representation, because, just at this time, it operates to the keeping of you and your friends out of place; but, when you were in place, you shunned, as you would have shunned a pestilence, all those who endeavoured to make you recollect your pledges about Parliamentary Reform.—Surely, you cannot mean to complain of the present parliament merely as contrasted with yours? Is this it? Is the change, which you would make in the state of the representation, merely such a change as you wrought in 1806; that is to say, by the dissolution, which gave you a majority in the House of Commons? If this be the only change which your party has in contemplation, why, really, all those, who do not wish for a treat in muddy beer, would rather that things should remain as they are.—In the same article, speaking of the rivalry for place between Mr. Perceval and Mr. Canning, the writer states, that "it ought to be known that the real contest was between him and Mr. Perceval. On the Duke of Portland's resignation he stated to his colleagues that it was impossible to carry on the business of the House of Commons with a divided and unsettled leader. Either Mr. Perceval or himself must have the sole and decided lead of the Government business. Now, of the two, he thought that he had the better claim to the distinction from the superior attention which he had received for the last two years, and from his influence in the House."—Such is the language of this man, who, in another part of the very same article, complains of "the present state of the representation of the country." He talks (as of a thing of course) of a minister's carrying on "the business of the House of Commons;" he talks of a leader in carrying on that business, as he would of the foreman of a shop; and, in short, represents the House of Commons as a mere tool, as a mere manageable thing, in the

hands of a minister. Why, if this be the case, and if it be so to remain, what need we care a straw who is in power, and who out of power? What need we care which faction rules us, if we are to be thus treated? And, what need we care who are in the House of Commons? This is pretty language, and coming from those, too, who are complaining of "the present state of the representation," by which they clearly mean, a House of Commons in which they have not a decided, settled majority.—"The business of the House of Commons," indeed! So this man, who wants us to clamour for a change of ministry, coolly tells us, that Mr. Canning and Mr. Perceval quarrelled for the post of "carrying on the business of the House of Commons."—No, no: we shall not be hallooed on to call for any such change as this gentleman has in contemplation; we shall not be induced to follow his advice, "to hold meetings, humbly to represent to his Majesty" our apprehensions as to the dangers, "with which the present state of things is pregnant." No, no: we shall not hold meetings to obtain a choice of a man to "carry on the business of the House of Commons;" and, as to the "dreadful arrears of the Property Tax," of which the Chronicle tells us the present ministers are about to enforce the collection, we cannot help remembering, that the tax itself was almost doubled by those very men, whom we are requested to pray the king to recall to his councils.—No: we will not budge an inch for any such purpose. We feel no interest in any such change as that which has been talked of. It is not the difference of a straw's value to the people of England which faction has the predominance. "Meetings," indeed! Did the Whigs favour the last meetings that were held through the country? And, amongst all the enemies of Mr. Wardle, the very bitterest of all; he whose print has dealt forth the most venom, and what contained the most artful and the most base misrepresentations, is the conductor of the Morning Chronicle.—If, indeed, this party were to declare explicitly, that the state of the country demanded a thorough reform, in all the departments, and especially in the Commons' House of Parliament, then there would be some cause for our wishing to see them in power; but, for any thing that I have seen or heard, I should as soon expect a reform from the present men as from those who

wish to turn them out and get into their places.

TALAVERA'S BATTLE.—I have, upon a former occasion, given my opinion as to the utility of watching narrowly the occurrences in Spain, and of putting upon record, as they come out, all the material facts, relative to the campaign of the Baron of the Douro and the "Viscount" of Talavera and of Wellington in the said "county." This campaign will be a thing to be remembered, especially when considered in conjunction with the titles that have arisen out of it. This campaign involves the character of the army of Spain and that of England; it puts much to the test; it makes an English General and an English army witnesses, and makes them *give evidence*, as to the *humanity* of the French generals and the French army. It exhibits a great and mighty *Indian* conqueror pitted against European soldiers. —My last article, upon this subject, will be found at page 385 of the present Volume, and the others in the Numbers immediately preceding. —*Cuesta's* account of the Battle of Talavera has long been a thing much wished-for. At last it is come, and has been published in some of the London prints, but, which is well worthy of remark, not in the *hired* prints, a thing very scandalous indeed, especially when it is recollected, that this general Cuesta has had some very severe censure bestowed upon him in the dispatches from the Baron of the Douro, *published by our government*. —In this Number, if possible, and, if not in this, in my next, I will insert the whole of this dispatch of General Cuesta; but, I shall here introduce some part of it, that the reader may have the most material points at once under his eye. —There were with respect to the battle of Talavera, two points of great interest, which, after all, remained unsettled; namely, 1st, *Whether our army was attacked by superior numbers*, and, 2nd, *Whether the Spanish army took a part in the battle*. —Now, it has never been pretended, that the army of the Duke of Belluno was superior, or even equal in numbers to the Spanish and English army *united*. Indeed, the fact has clearly been proved to the contrary. The army of Cuesta alone was equal in numbers to that of the French, unless the accounts given us of that army, previous to the battle, were totally false. —Besides, the Duke of Belluno had been, and was to the very day before the battle, *pursued* by the combined armies;

and it does no where appear, that he was joined by any reinforcements of more than about 10,000 men. —No: our general has, all along, taken special care not to give us any account of his own numbers, or of those of the Spanish army. He drily tells us, that he was attacked by *double his numbers*; but supports this statement by no statement of actual numbers. —The French told us, that their army amounted to about 40,000, and that the combined armies amounted to more than 80,000. Here is, I dare say, some exaggeration; but, on the other hand, I think, that no man who is desirous of being regarded as having any love for truth; that no man, who does not belong to that set amongst us, who wish to be deceived, or to deceive others; with the exception of persons like these, I think, that there is no man, who will pretend to doubt of the *combined* army having been greatly superior in numbers to that of the French. —If the reader thinks with me upon this point, the next thing we have to inquire into, is, whether the Spaniards took any, and if any, what, part in the battle. —The Baron of the Douro gave us, in his account of the battle, a very laconic and remarkably dry description of the feats performed by the Spanish part of the army in that battle: I have since contrasted that account with the letter of Cuesta to the Junta and his Orders to his army, which documents will be found in pages 293 and 294 of the present volume. From these, it would seem, that the Spanish army had their full share of the battle. I do not mean, that they had, in proportion to their numbers, as much to do in the battle as our army had; but, it would appear, that they were *engaged*, a fact by no means to be inferred from the dispatch of the Baron of the Douro and the Viscount of Talavera and of Wellington in the said county, the said dispatch speaking of the Spaniards in these words —"Your lordship will observe, "that the attacks of the enemy were principally, if not **ENTIRELY**, directed "against the British troops. The Spanish "Commander in Chief, his officers, and "troops, manifested every *disposition* to "render us assistance, and those of them, "that were engaged, *did their duty*; but, "the ground which they occupied was "so important, and its front, at the same "time, so difficult, that I did not think "it proper to urge them to make any "movement to the left of the enemy, "while he was engaged with us." —In

one place he says, speaking of a particular attack: "this attack was most successfully repulsed by Brigadier General Campbell, supported by the *King's regiment of Spanish cavalry* and two battalions of Spanish infantry; and Brigadier General Campbell took the enemy's cannon. The brigadier mentions particularly the conduct of the 97th, 7th, and 53rd regiments." But, here is not a word said in praise of either the cavalry, or infantry, of the Spaniards. In another place, he just observes, that an attack of the enemy's cavalry upon the Spanish infantry failed.—Now, reader, these, as you must recollect, are all the passages, where in mention is made of the Spaniards having had *any hand at all* in the battle; and, so, keeping our own numbers studiously out of sight, we say, that, as the Spaniards merely *looked on*, we had all the fighting to do, and that we fought with *double our numbers*.—Let us now hear Cuesta, then.—No one will attempt to deny, that, when this dispatch arrived in England, every man looked upon it as conveying the meaning, that the Spaniards had no share in gaining the "victory."

—Let us, then, hear Cuesta!—Nay, the General Orders to our army, issued in the king's name, asserted, "that the enemy directed his *whole efforts*" [meaning, doubtless, *the whole of his efforts*] "against the troops of his Majesty; that the British army sustained *nearly the whole weight* of this great contest; and *has acquired* the glory of having vanquished a French army nearly double their numbers." This is, in more ways than one, making pretty free with the *king's English*; but, here is the old story again repeated.—Let us, then, hear Cuesta!—Why need I dwell upon it, however, when it is notorious, that there was not a public print in London, which did not crack its jokes upon the immobility of the Spanish part of the army, and which, in short, did not embody into *direct charges* all that could be inferred from the official dispatches.

—Let us now hear Cuesta, then!—I am sure, that the reader, be he who he may, must remember the self-complacent observations that passed, in all companies, upon the receipt of Douro's dispatch, and how many and many "good things" were said, over the tea as well as over the bottle, upon the conduct of the poor Spaniards.—Come, then, let us now hear Cuesta!—His dispatch is published by order of the Spanish Junta. It contains

an account of the operations of his army for some time previous to the battle. He then comes to the battle itself, and, after having spoken of the preparatory dispositions, he thus recounts the occurrences of the engagement. "As dusk approached, he commenced a furious attack by a cannonade, and a charge by the *whole of his cavalry, on the right, occupied by the Spanish infantry, with the apparent design, of breaking through our ranks*, posted as I have before described. This attack was received by an active fire perfectly well sustained, both of cannon and musketry, which *disconcerted the purpose of the enemy, and put him to flight at a quarter past eight*. During this time, a strong division of the French advanced by the valley to the left of the height, occupied by the English general Hill, of which, with very great loss, they obtained a momentary possession, but Hill returned to the charge presently with the bayonet, drove off the enemy, and recovered his ground. In the night the French repeated their attack, but without succeeding, and with great loss. At break of day on the 28th they returned with two divisions of infantry, but they were repulsed by the brave Hill, who could not be intimidated by their repeated attempts, or by the progressive accumulation of the forces of the assailants.—General Wellesley, in consequence of these renewed exertions of the enemy by the valley, on the left side of the height, ordered thither two brigades of his cavalry, supported by lieutenant general the duke of Alburquerque, with the whole of his division of cavalry. The French, seeing this movement, sent sharp-shooters into the chain of mountains to the left of the valley, who were attacked by the *5th division of my infantry under Marshal de Camp Don Luis Bassecourt, who dislodged them with much loss*.—The general attack commenced by the advance of different columns of the enemy's infantry, with the intention of attacking the height occupied by general Hill. These columns were charged by two parties of English dragoons, under the command of general Anson, led by lieutenant general Payne, and supported by the brigade of cavalry of the line of general Tanne. One of these regiments of English dragoons suffered very much; but this spirited charge had the effect of disconcerting the designs of the enemy, who sustained a very

"great loss. At the same time, the French attacked the centre of the army, where the English general Campbell was stationed, *having on his right lieutenant general Don Francisco de Eguia, the enemy was driven back by both these generals, who had their infantry supported by the King's regiment of cavalry, and by the division of lieutenant general Don Juan de Henestrosa. This corps covered itself with glory, in the charge that it made on the infantry of the enemy, during which it turned the column by which it was assailed; under which advantage, the English infantry, protected by the Spanish, possessed themselves of the artillery of the enemy. At the same time with these proceedings, the French attacked with fury the centre of the English army, commanded by general Sherbrooke. The foes were received with extraordinary courage, and were driven back by the whole English division, with charged bayonets. But the English brigade of guards, which was carried onward precipitately in the ardour of battle, advanced too far, and was in consequence obliged to withdraw under the fire of the second line, composed of the brigade of cavalry of general Cotton, and of a battalion of infantry detached from the height by gen. Wellesley, as soon as he observed the remote situation of the guards. General Howarth who commanded the English artillery, was distinguished for his extraordinary courage, and performed the most important services.*—Lieutenant general Don Francisco de Eguia, my second in command, was posted on my left, with the 3rd, 4th, and 5th divisions, under generals the marquis de Portago, Don Rafael Manglano, and Don Louis Alexandro Bassecourt, but the latter was ordered to support the division of cavalry of lieutenant-general the duke of Alburquerque, which was detached to reinforce the British army. The dispatches No. 4, 5, and 6, from these generals are inclosed for the information of his majesty.—I took under my particular orders the centre and the right, without neglecting, however, the superintendence of the rest, and with much satisfaction I noticed the conduct of the generals of the 1st and 2d division, of the marquis de Zayas, and Don Vicente Iglesias, as well as Don Juan Berhuy, and lieutenant-general Don Juan Henestrosa, &c.—The loss of the enemy was very great. They left on the field of battle from 4 to

5,000 men, and the number of their wounded is computed at 5,000 more. Two or three generals were killed and several wounded, and at least 400 other officers. We have taken 19 pieces of artillery, and many waggons of ammunition, and the rout was one of the most complete, considering that we were acting on the defensive. The English have lost general Mackenzie, brigadier-general Langworth, and other officers of distinguished rank and merit. The total of their officers, killed and wounded, is 260, and that of their rank and file 5,000, our diminution is much less. *Don Rafael Manglano was wounded, and 50 more of our officers were killed and wounded, and 1,150 rank and file. Our artillery was served with ability and fortitude, and the names of such officers, whose talents were most conspicuously displayed, are mentioned in the dispatches from the respective generals.*—I should be negligent of my own duty, if I did not communicate to your excellency, for the information of his majesty, that the conduct of the British general in chief, sir Arthur Wellesley, and that of the generals, subordinate officers, and soldiers under his command, is above all praise. I have seen the enthusiasm with which these faithful allies have in copious streams poured forth their blood in the defence of our liberty, and no language can adequately express the sentiments of gratitude with which our breasts are animated. With the highest satisfaction I have noticed my army hailing our companions for the victory obtained, and mingling with exclamations indicative of the warmest affection, the appellatives of our country, and Ferdinand, with those of our powerful and generous allies."—It is quite unnecessary to point out the wide difference between the language of this Spanish general towards our general and his army, and the language of our general towards the Spanish general and the Spanish army; for, it must strike every one, though, with all who reflect upon the character of the parties, this difference will be less a subject of surprise than of shame. Let the readers of the hireling prints, when they have read this dispatch of Cuesta, look back, if they can without shame, at the endless strings of paragraphs, published respecting that general after the receipt of Douro's dispatch.—But, it is the *facts* that we ought now to look after. The Spanish Com-

mander in Chief has now written, and the Spanish government have published to the world that the Spaniards *had* a share, and a very considerable share, in what was done at Talavera; that they fought, that they fought much and hard; that they had many officers, who greatly distinguished themselves; and, finally, that they had considerable numbers *killed and wounded*, though they do not speak of any "*missing*."—Let us look at this dispatch a little more in detail, bearing in mind, as we proceed, that Baron Douro and Lord Viscount of Talavera and of Wellington in the said country, explicitly states, that the attacks of the French were principally, "if not *ENTIRELY*," directed against the British troops, which statement was repeated in our king's General Order to the army, as above quoted.—Now, then, let us hear Cuesta!—He says, and his government has published to the world, *First*; that the French made a furious attack by a cannonade and a charge by the whole of their cavalry, on the right, occupied by the Spanish infantry, and that this attack was gallantly and successfully resisted by the Spaniards, who put the assailants to flight.

—*Secondly*; that the French sharpshooters were attacked by the 5th division of Spanish infantry, under Don Louis Bassecourt, who dislodged the sharpshooters with much loss.—*Third*; that the French, having attacked the English under General Campbell, who had the Spanish under Don Eguia on his right, were driven back by *both* these generals; that this body of infantry was supported by a regiment of Spanish cavalry, under Don Henestrosa, which Spanish regiment covered itself with glory; that it got in the rear of the French column by which it was attacked; and that it was owing to the advantage *thus* given to the English infantry under Campbell and the Spanish infantry under Eguia, that they were enabled to take the French cannon.—Now, upon this part of the statement, we must look back a little at Baron Douro's dispatch. He says: "This attack was most successfully repulsed by Brig. Gen. Campbell, *supported* by the King's regiment of Spanish cavalry, and by two battalions of Spanish infantry; and Brig. Gen. Campbell took the enemy's cannon." Mind how pointed the expression. This General Campbell was merely *supported*; and it is *he* who takes the cannon. Cuesta says, on the contrary, that the Spanish infantry were in line with the English; and, as to the cavalry, he

says that they doubled round the enemy, got in the rear of their flank, and enabled the English and Spanish infantry to take the cannon. Baron Douro of Wellesley-in-the-county-of-Somerset-and-Viscount-Talavera-and-of-Wellington-in-the-said-county, did not, as the reader will perceive, even mention the *names* of the Spanish officers, who were thus engaged, though, on the score of length of name, he certainly does not yield to any Spaniard living. Poor gentlemen; he might, one would think, have just done them the immortal honour to write their names. What must Don Eguia and Don Henestrosa think of this?—*Fourth*; the Spanish general asserts, and the Spanish government publishes to the world, that, in this battle, in which our public priests have stedfastly asserted, that the Spaniards had *no share whatever*; that, in this battle, the Spanish army had, in *KILLED AND WOUNDED, fifty-one officers and one thousand one hundred and fifty rank and file*.—Now, we must either give this assertion the *lie direct*, or, we must acknowledge, that the Spanish army *had* a share, in the battle, and that the "*whole effects of the enemy*" were not directed against the British troops.—Reader, if you are not one of the millions of wretches, who dare not say what they think; if you are not one of the last-ditch and life-and-fortune men; if you are not one of those, who have disgusted all Europe with English bragging; if you have a mind yet undebased by the corruptions of the day, tell me frankly, do you believe Cuesta? I will tell you my mind freely: I *do* believe him; because I think it next to impossible, that a lie so impudent should have been hatched by him, and, if hatched by him, published by the government.—But, if what he says be *true*, where are we to look for that *disparity of numbers*, of which the Baron of the Douro told us?—Reader, how came it that my Lord Douro said not a word, in his dispatches, in any of his dispatches, from the first to the last, about the *killed and wounded of the Spaniards*? You see, that General Cuesta informs his government of our killed and wounded, mentions the principal officers by name, and, which merited a better return, he says not a word about *our missing*; while my Lord Douro takes no more notice of the Spanish killed and wounded, than he does of the fact, stated by Cuesta, of the Spanish cavalry having been the cause of taking the French cannon that were taken. Are we

to believe, then, that there were no Spanish killed and wounded. Oh, no! We *cannot* believe it; and if the hirelings *pretend* to believe it, what will they say more to induce us to make war along with such an army and for such a government as those of Spain?—Let the hirelings choose; let the Ferdinand VII.-men; let the holy-altar-men and life-and-fortune-men choose; let them say, that the Spanish account of the battle is *true*, or let them say it is *false*. Just which they please; for, upon one horn or the other we have them. Will they say, that the Spanish Commander in Chief and the Spanish government are such impudent liars as to pretend that they had 51 officers and 1,150 rank and file, *killed and wounded* in the battle of Talavera, while the attacks of the enemy "were principally, if *not ENTIRELY*, directed against the "British troops?" Will they say this; or will they say, that Baron-Douro-of-Wellesley-in-the-county-of-Somerset-and-Viscount-of-Talavera-and-of-Wellington-in-the-said-county had *not* to fight the French army single handed; and that "the *whole efforts* of the enemy," in the language of the General Order, were *not* directed against the English.—In short, nothing can be more clear than this, that Cuesta's statement, and especially his return of killed and wounded, must be contradicted, and not only contradicted, but *disproved*, before any man of common sense will agree to consider the Spanish army *as not making part of the force, attacked by the Duke of Belluno*, under the eye of Joseph Napoleon. There is no man in his senses that can possibly so consider it, unless this statement of Cuesta be completely done away; unless Cuesta be convicted of being a liar and a braggart, and his government convicted of giving currency to his lies, under their authority and name. For, are there fifty officers killed and wounded, and upwards of a thousand rank and file killed and wounded, and is the army suffering that loss *not engaged*? Never was there any proposition so void of all reason and decency.—Our Lord of the Douro seems to have considered the whole of the French as engaged with *his* army; but, supposing, that not a man of the Spaniards had been either killed or wounded; supposing every word that Cuesta has uttered, upon the subject, to be false; what then? It proves that the Spaniards had no fighting to do; but, it by no means proves, that their *presence* was not

an injury to the French. In short, it is perfect madness to believe, that the French general would send his whole force against one part of the army, and leave himself exposed to be surrounded by the other part. Cuesta says, that the Frenchman did no such thing; but, on the contrary, that he commenced the action with a furious attack *upon the Spaniards*, with the whole of his cavalry, as well as with a part of his cannon. This was rational. This was what is likely to have been; and yet we, here, in England, have the impudence to crow over the poor Spaniards, and to represent them as mere stones or posts, stuck up on the field of battle.—This way of estimating the relative force of an army is perfectly original, unless, indeed, it be borrowed from the wars in *Hindustan*. Why, then, suppose we should, hereafter, meet a French army with an army altogether English. Suppose each side to have forty thousand men; but, that, owing to some circumstance or other, only *one half* of our army were engaged. Should we have the impudence to say, that we had to fight against *double our numbers*? We might. I'll not answer for it that we should not. But, would not the world laugh at us? Would they not call us empty braggarts?—This letter of Cuesta appears to me to settle the point respecting the relative numbers engaged in the battle, unless what he asserts be *disproved*. If his dispatch contains falsehoods, those falsehoods should be contradicted, and *officially* too, without loss of time. I must repeat, that I believe him, because he speaks so much in detail, gives us names and other particulars, and grudges not his good word either to our general or our army; and, in short, until I see it clearly disproved, I shall continue to believe; and so will the public, every word of it, let the conclusion, to which it leads, be what it will.

AUSTRIA.—The hirelings are actually pricking up their ears again upon the sight of a Proclamation of the Emperor Francis, purporting that he is prepared for war again. I should suppose this document to be a fabrication from the mill of some of the French emigrants now in London. But, for once, my wishes accord with those of the hirelings. I wish, with all my heart, that Mr. Gentz, or some of that set, may prevail upon the Emperor Francis to go to war again. I want to see him at war once more, and, I was very sorry indeed to hear of the

suspension of arms. It is for the good of mankind, and especially for us, in England, that the Emperor Francis should have one more bout with Buonaparté and his Dukes. It is high time for the Emperor Francis to "*make a stand*."—But really, there are parts of the Emperor Francis's proclamation, at which one cannot help staring. For instance, where he talks about the enemy's having "learned to appreciate the *public spirit*" of his *people*, and the *valour of his arms*," and says, the *enemy* has "*dearly bought* the knowledge, that he (the Emperor Francis) is constantly solicitous "to promote the prosperity of his dominions." Really one can hardly believe one's eyes. This must be a fabrication; and yet, why should it? Have not all the now-fallen governments gone on in the same way? Have they not all proceeded, to the very last moment, in the very course which was the cause of their overthrow, though the final consequences were so frequently placed before their eyes?—A few weeks, however, will now decide the fate of Austria, and, in all probability, of the other countries and states in the Eastern part of the continent of Europe.

WM. COBBETT.

Bolton, 5 Oct. 1809.

STATE OF SPAIN.—(continued from p. 444.)

The whole herbage of Spain, corn-lands as well as grass-grounds, are subjected, twice a year, to the legal depredations of several millions of travelling sheep, in which the miserable agriculturists have no interest whatever. Nay, more, every species of provender which the poor farmers save for their own live stock, in the interim of the fatal spring and autumn visits of these all-devouring flocks, can be, and is demanded, (legally, you observe, all according to law,) at a fixed price, and that price fixed by the owners of these flocks. But, I ask, what price can indemnify a farmer for the privation of the means of supporting his labouring and other live-stock, on his farm? on the condition of which depends his ability to perform every operation for its improvement. No durable inclosure can be made in Spain, except around gardens and vineyards. Even these were laid open to the flocks, previous to 1788. Add to these intolerable oppressions the arbitrary and exorbitant taxes on every description of the

produce of the soil, (grain now excepted) imposed, not by a legislative body chosen by the community, for, in this country of Spain there is nobody of this nature, not imposed by the government, despotic as it is; but by the mean, self-interested municipalities of the different towns to which the several articles of butchers-meat, poultry, wine, oil, fruits, garden-stuffs, &c. are brought for sale. The consequence of all this is, that there is not a province in Spain where there are not many estates in a manner deserted, without inhabitants; devoid of trees, irrigation or improvement of any sort. Over the whole country, agriculture is abandoned to the poorest and most ignorant husbandmen. The capitalist every where leaving the country in search of more lucrative employment. So many arbitrary taxes do the necessities of life pay from the moment of their existence to that of their consumption; so tormented are the lieges with the innumerable corps of guards, visitors, officers, &c. for the collection of the provincial imposts; so torn to pieces are they with denunciations, procedures, arrests, detentions, &c. to which the smallest and most innocent mistake gives occasion, that the citizen can neither move nor stand still without being surrounded with commissaries, guards, &c. who keeps him in vexation and poverty during the whole of his life.—Is it in defence of such a system as this, (in the overthrow of which every heart not imbued to the core with the deepest dies of despotism and misanthropy must rejoice) is it in defence of a policy like this, I say, calculated to debase, and even gradually extirpate the human race, that Englishmen are to expend their blood and treasure? Shall the sons of Liberty prop the rotten pillars of oppression? support the selfish, narrowminded Junta, who give no hopes of better days to the people of Spain, even when the French are expelled? The Junta, in which we perceive several of the very men whose partial oppressive policy, heretofore destroying the energies of her people, encouraged Buonaparté to attempt the subjugation of the peninsula.—Your constant reader,

PHILALETHES.

FOREIGN MINISTERS.

Sir; In running over the huge Report of the Finance Committee published in July 1808, my attention was attracted by the

numerous List of unemployed Foreign Ministers, who are now a burthen on the public purse. I am not one of those who disapprove of a due and reasonable provision being made for those who have devoted their lives to the public service, especially in a branch of it where the salaries, not being more than adequate to the necessary expences of the station, afford no means of laying up any provision for old age or infirmity; neither should I object generally to the amount of the provision which has been made in these instances, if my information be correct as to the difference between the apparent amount, as stated in the report, and the real amount received, the latter being, as I am told, about two thirds only of the former (what becomes of this difference?); but I may possibly, in a future letter, observe upon some particular cases, which bear very strong marks of jobs, or in which the remuneration far exceeds the length and importance of the service performed. For the present, I shall content myself with adverting to the extraordinary circumstance of new persons having been selected of late for foreign stations, whilst the old ones continue thus burthensome on the revenue. The selections I refer to, are too recent to need being pointed at, and they could not have been motived by any previous trial of the respective capacities of the persons selected, in as much as these persons, as far as I can learn, were never before employed.—Now, Sir, if the old ministers, who figure on this pension list, are all of them unfit for the discharge of the duties of the stations to which the new men have been appointed; if none could be found in this list who are capable of managing the national concerns at Cagliari, Lisbon, Sicily, &c. then there must have been a most lamentable want of discernment, or something worse, in the predecessors of the present secretary of state, by whom these incapable men were so improperly thrust into public employments; and the pensions which have been granted to them are a most reprehensible waste of the public money. But if, on the other hand, these pensioned ministers are still able to execute the duties of their profession, either better or even as well as the "young friends" (for the right honourable secretary treads in the early steps of his prototype Pitt in drawing satellites around him); if, I say, the old ministers are more capable or as capable as the young friends whom the rays of the right

honourable secretary's favour have illumined and vivified, then the preference of these latter is at once an act of gross injustice to the former, whose claims had a stronger foundation in past services, and to the public, who thus become most unnecessarily burthened with a large additional expence, without the prospect of being more profitably served. Leaving the right honourable secretary on the horns of this dilemma, I remain, Sir, his and your obedient Servant, B.

MR. WARDLE.

Sir; The following Letter was sent for insertion in the Morning Chronicle, a few days after the communication appeared which gave rise to it. By that impartial Journal it was deemed inadmissible: but as it attempts a defence of some opinions contained in your Political Register, from the misrepresentations of its calumniators, a space perhaps may be there afforded in its defect of better materials.

To the Editor of the Morning Chronicle.

Sir; In your paper of the 8th of September, I find a long and elaborate communication, on the subject of "Colonel Wardle's Trial," from a correspondent, who subscribes himself "a Lover of Truth." The lucubrations of this writer must be deemed the more valuable, as they are, confessedly, the production of a mind habitually conversant in the arts of logomachy, and practised in the wiles of disputation; of one, who, though living in a remote part of the country, is yet accustomed "weekly to read the papers and "to discuss the politics of the day, at a "club which assembles every Saturday "night." Whether the present be the first effort, on the part of these illustrious statesmen, to give publicity to their patriotic vigils, we are not told: In mercy to mankind, we hope it will not be the last; but that, emulating a like institution, whose proceedings they will find detailed with impressive solemnity in "Memoirs of P. P." a distinguished rural politician, their consultations may gain the ear of ministry, and direct the operations of legislature.—Not content, however, with simply disclosing his alliance with this respectable assembly, your correspondent condescendingly admits us to participate their counsils, and gives us to understand, that he, "and some others, who constituted a very small minority at the weekly meetings,"

have maintained a long, laborious, but at length successful struggle against their numerous and prejudiced associates. Indeed, he seems wonderfully to congratulate himself on the peculiar felicity of his discernment. He appears to have been favoured, for some mysterious purpose, no doubt, with a spirit of political second sight; to have harboured suspicions "for which he could assign no cause; and to have detected the fermentations of revenge and conspiracy, when they escaped the notice of every body else." These discoveries, too, were made at a time when the promulgation of them "produced no small degree of heat and controversy at the weekly meetings"! It is enlivening, however, to learn, that an assembly, possessing so powerful an influence on the public welfare, is at length restored to comparative harmony: "There is not now," thank heaven! "above two or three who adhere to their old opinions"; and we must hold ourselves deeply indebted to your correspondent, for the interesting intelligence, whatever be the precise object of his communications: whether it be to eulogize his own preternatural sagacity, or utterly to confound and demolish those two or three refractory spirits, who remain impervious to remonstrance,

"And who, though vanquished, yet will argue still."

At one time, indeed, it should seem, these disconsolate disputants were almost reduced to silence and despair. How unlucky then must we regard the arrival of those inflammatory "papers"! and how ought we to pursue with execration those artful writers who have given ardour to stupidity, and language to dumb-foundedness!—I fear, Mr. Editor, you will be more disposed to admire my temerity than my prudence, in presuming to take the field against a foe so formidable; in daring to frown defiance on one who enjoys the stated advantages of hebdomadal discussion, and who domineers over the politics of a neighbourhood. But, Sir, I must declare that, notwithstanding the laboured ingenuity of your correspondent, I do still think the "mode of reasoning," upon which he has lavished his animadversions, neither manifestly unfair, nor particularly complicated: and why he should choose to represent his refractory brethren, as incapable of arriving at it by their unaided efforts of excogitation, unless by way of contrasting his own perspicuity by their dulness, I really have not the

pleasure to comprehend. How far the reasoning of the club may partake of the above mentioned qualities, remains to be examined.—The general propositions, laid down with such imposing formality, by your correspondent, I am fully disposed to admit. It is very certain that the evidence of testimony unsupported by correlative circumstances, is mainly regulated by the value of personal character; that the "bias of interest" will render it suspicious; and that the violation of truth will justify us in "setting it aside, as totally unworthy of belief." Let us look a little at the application of these data.—Mrs. Clarke, for the benevolent purpose of paying her upholsterer's bill, thinks proper to prefer a charge against Colonel Wardle, the very existence of which, according to "a Lover of Truth," she had most unequivocally denied in the house of commons. Here we have both interest and contradiction. Now for the inference—That her accusation is false, her testimony worthless?—I thank you, says our acute logician; but that is not exactly the purpose for which my propositions were schemed. I brought them forward not to uphold the "sinking cause" of Col. Wardle, believe me, but to assist the Duke of York.—In the name of common sense, Mr. Editor, why should his royal highness be hooked up so triumphantly? In what respects can Mrs. Clarke's saying or unsaying her story of negotiation prove or disprove a charge perfectly distinct? How can her "variance of testimony," in this instance, bear upon a case in which there is no variance. Her general credibility as a witness, indeed, it may and does affect: her unsubstantiated evidence it may and does impair; and if this be all your correspondent has fatigued his faculties to evince, I would beg leave to tell him, he has only undertaken to prove what every man in his wits was fully convinced of. But he must excuse me for adding, that, so long as he has stamped no contradiction on the proof of connivance; so long as he leaves it *in medio* whether that proof do rest on "unsupported testimony," he has gained nothing to his purpose. The former indeed, he has attempted, by convicting Mrs. Clarke of a practical falsehood in the very fact of accusing COL. WARDLE! but the latter he has wittily tossed over to a "friend."—As for Mrs. Clarke, it is by no means my intention to perplex myself with her defence. I consign her to the malediction of "the club" without remorse. This

infuriated leader of a triumphant majority may pour upon her devoted head the whole storm of his accumulated vengeance. He is perfectly welcome. But can he be ignorant that, in so doing he is essentially befriending the "*sinking* cause," of Col. Wardle? Can it possibly escape his self-praised discernment, that upon this very hinge—the incredibility of her interested and contradictory testimony—Colonel Wardle's justification entirely turns?—Your correspondent, Sir, professes to be disconcerted with the "*unfairness*" of the "mode of reasoning," assumed by Mr. Cobbett and other writers, in favour of Colonel Wardle: apparently unsuspecting that the whole course of his own argumentation is diametrically opposite to that first taken, by their disinterested adversaries, on the occasion of the trial. Far from attempting to convict Mrs. Clarke of contradiction, *they* hailed her return to their broken and dispirited ranks with the most extravagant exultation. Far from calling into question, in this instance, the credibility of her depositions, they generously entertained every word of them; and were even willing to pardon her former deviations into propriety, in their first flush of gratitude for this new and almost unlooked-for display of perfidy. Now, in opposition to this ridiculous inconsistency, I do contend, it was perfectly *fair* to argue, that *if* Mrs. Clarke's testimony was so very immaculate when offered against Mr. Wardle, it was not absolutely incredible when produced against the Duke of York; that *if*, as a credible witness, she stigmatized Mr. Wardle with negotiation, his royal highness, by parity of reasoning, could not possibly be exonerated from connivance. But now steps forward a controversialist of a new description: who thinks proper to shift the ground of the argument; who skulks behind the artillery, and then, with a bravery truly admirable, decides its ineffectual fire. As a defender of corruption, we may pardon this ingenious writer for his adroitness: his conduct is equally fair with that of the generality of his friends:

Male verum examinat omnis
Corruptus iudex :

but as a "*Lover of Truth*" we must pronounce him guilty of most flagrant infidelity to his mistress.—But this new position; is it more tenable? This new course, is it more direct? In my humble opinion, not an inch:

Ille sinistrorsum, hic dextrorsum abijt; unus
atrique

Error, sed variis illudit partibus—

For who, I ask, but one habituated to the everlasting wranglings of a weekly vigil, would ever think of maintaining, that the point blank contradictions of this misguided woman, should confirm her credibility in one instance, and destroy it in another; and that too, when the proof of dishonourable collusion in Col. Wardle, rests infinitely more on contradictory and unsubstantiated evidence, than the proof of connivance in the Duke of York. Your correspondent, Sir, calls her evidence in the former case "*consistent*;" and yet (mark the absurdity of error) is actually at the pains of shewing that in daring even to assert the charge, she stands clearly convicted of deliberate falsehood. —What! was the testimony delivered in court, *indeed* more "free from the strong bias of personal interest," was it *really* more clear and better supported than that produced in parliament? The witnesses to collateral facts were perhaps more *numerous*? This, I should think, would hardly be imposed on "the club." The parties then were less interested in the result? Possibly, though I confess I do not recollect that even *one* witness was interrogated, who had 1,900*l.* depending on the inquiry, or whose profits were augmented in proportion to the extravagance of a confederate. Or, lastly, were "*truth*," and "*justice*" out-faced by the specious purity of reputation? This, indeed, seems a point, not undesirable to your correspondent's argument. But, yet, Sir, as far as I can find, the leading witness was in both cases the same; and it is certain, her character sustained a much severer scrutiny in the house of commons, than in the court of King's Bench. If there were some of our representatives, who indulged their eloquence, in "*expatiating* on her fine feelings, and her beautiful evidence," there were others, who did not scruple to handle those *fine* feelings very roughly, and to twist that *beautiful* evidence, into every possibility of distortion. Indeed, Sir, I am greatly mistaken, if it will not puzzle more than the *combined* efforts of your two ingenious correspondents to prove, that Mrs. Clarke's depositions were received in evidence upon trust; or that, supposing her then to have divulged her pretensions to infamy and dishonour, much more *could* have been done in attempting to divest the current of public

attention from incontestible facts, to flimsy declamation.—With regard to col. Wardle's character, though a "sinking" one, I am happy to observe, that the remarks of your correspondent upon it, are much less defamatory, than upon that of the amiable perfidious. He has not launched against it the same bold and animated ratiocination: nor has he inhumanly attempted to impale it on the horns of a "*dilemma*." Satisfied with announcing in the outset, the profound discoveries of himself and a few "others, who constituted a very small minority at the weekly meetings," he has prudently left the demonstration of them, to the sagacity of his readers: for, I do not find, in the sequel of his communication, even the abortion of an attempt, to bring to light those "lurking motives that would not bear exposure," to chastise Mr. Wardle for the "indecent eagerness of his 'accusations,' or to enlarge upon the meanness and vulgarity of his patriotism."—In fine, Mr. Editor, not to extend this discussion beyond all bounds, I would only beg leave to observe, that the intemperate hilarity assumed by the hirelings of ministry, and the advocates of corruption, on the occasion of this trial, is not more ridiculous, than it is impolitic. By their eagerness in catching hold of this twig of hope, they have only discovered the extent of their former despondence. They might have spared this manifestation of their weakness. The reputation of Col. Wardle is not a bubble that hangs on the breath of popular applause. His fame, however they may wish it, is not yet defunct; and I will venture to predict, that his "noble and disinterested defiance of 'power,' will be viewed with admiration, long after the premature dirges of these ditty-mongers have been despised and are forgotten.

Absint, inani funere, nœniæ,
Luctusque turpes, et querimoniz;
Compescere clamorem; ac sepulcri
Mitte superæquus honores.

T. W. Sept. 11th.

VARIUS.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND. — (*continued from p. 416.*)

I add a list of the enemy's ships now in sight. I received the same at Ter Goes, at eleven o'clock, where I spent the night. It is possible, before night, there may be some further movement. Yesterday some French pinnaces arrived at Fort

Bathz, but afterwards proceeded again to Lillo. I know not whether the French army has made a movement. The communication with the Prince de Ponte Corvo is become more difficult, and this is certainly the reason why I have received no answer to my letter of the 4th.

The Marshal of Holland, DUMONCEAU.

At the Chapel at Ter Goes, 6th of Sept. 2 in the afternoon.

(Here follows a list of the vessels observed, amounting in all to 218.)

Report from Marshal Dumonceau, &c.

Sire; Fort Bathz was taken on the 4th, your Majesty's anniversary. This enterprise appears to have caused the greatest astonishment to the enemy. The same evening, I proceeded to Bergen-op-Zoom, where I arrived with all my troops at night. Adm. Ruijsch and gen. de Mellet, governor of the place, gave me all the assistance in their power, in order to collect the vessels necessary for the transport of the troops with which I was to repair to S. Beveland. We embarked on the 5th, about noon. On quitting the harbour, several of the vessels stranded; I followed with the remainder, and arrived at five in the evening before Wemeldingen. The enemy, who was at anchor at the distance of one and an half cannon shot, saw our movements, without making any attempt to interrupt them, and all my troops were disembarked without any accident. Our horses could not be disembarked till the morning of the 6th; and during the night, the enemy amused himself with sending some soldiers in sloops, who fired with musketry upon our vessels, which were protected by a battalion of the 3d regiment of the line. After the disembarkation, I sent three companies of chasseurs to take possession of the town of Ter Goes, and I went thither likewise with major-general Stedman, Chief of the general Staff. At seven o'clock we entered amid the ringing of bells, while the master of the horse, and lieutenant-gen. Bruno, one of your Majesty's best generals, collected his troops around Wemeldingen. On the 6th, at day-break, the general proceeded with three battalions, to Ter Goes, while two battalions were placed behind the Sloe.—During the night, and at day-break, I was informed that the hostile force which environed me was still considerable. We saw 218 vessels as well frigates as brigs and cutters without counting boats, which from the mist, could not be count-

ed. The enemy's fleet in the East Scheldt was drawn up at Zierikzee before the Keeten, and above by Stavennisse, while 120 ships were moored in the West Scheldt, from Bonselen to Baarland. This being our situation, we were somewhat exposed; but when the enemy perceived that we were up the Sloe, and that our riflemen were arrived at Elleweutsdyk where he stood in great force, he thought himself more exposed than we were; for during the evening and night, he withdrew on the one side to Flushing, and on the other behind Zierikzee, and in the Roompot.—When our riflemen came to Elleweutsdyk, the enemy who occupied that village retreated, and our voltigeurs made a few prisoners. Serjeant Smit alone took four Englishmen prisoners, so much were they confounded.—Since yesterday morning the enemy had not approached South Beveland; he occupies Walcheren, and is raising six or seven batteries, each of four pieces, on the Sloe-bank, in order to defend the passage.—Leaving general Bruno the care of watching the enemy, I yesterday proceeded to Bats, taking with me captain of engineers Van Ingen, a distinguished young officer, whom I cannot too strongly recommend to your Majesty.—Intelligence which arrived yesterday evening, announces that the enemy is evacuating Ter-Vere. Your Majesty may be assured, that I shall take all possible care to obey faithfully the instructions your Majesty has been pleased to give me. I have, during the few hours since I have been here, prepared every thing for carrying on my operations. I am about instantly to depart from hence.

“ Marshal DUMONCEAU.”

Amsterdam, Sept. 7.—The following are the particulars contained in the Official Report concerning the passage of our army from Brabant to South Beveland:—On the 4th inst. general Heiligers, in consequence of intelligence gained by reconnoitring a few days before, placed himself at the head of a company of voltigeurs of the 1st regiment of chasseurs, and a company of carbiniers, and, during the ebb, availing himself of the distance at which the English ships were, waded with his party up to their shoulders in the water, over a passage of more than a league, and of

which the path was very narrow, and full of holes, and in spite of the stream, and the holes in the bottom, these chasseurs succeeded in crossing, without losing a single man. What increases the merit of this enterprise is, the necessity under which they were of undertaking it precisely at 3 o'clock of the afternoon, when the ebb was at the lowest: at which time a gloomy tempest deprived the soldiers of the sight of the island and fort. The short duration of the ebb did not allow a greater number of men to wade over; and the army remained on the shore for a long time, uneasy concerning the detachment, as the continuance of the storm did not permit them to perceive whether the fort defended itself.—At length, at seven in the evening, the Dutch flag was seen waving on the fort. An express was then sent to Antwerp. The prince, general in chief of the French army, was informed of it at nine in the evening, and announced it at the Theatre of the city.—The chasseurs and carbiniers were received by the inhabitants of Bathz, with the most lively demonstrations of joy, amid the continued shouts of Long live the King! Gen. Heiligers praises the intrepidity and valour of captains Schuurmen and Tabor, as well as of the lieutenants of engineers Cornabe and Wolf de Westerholt. It was impossible for the little corps to make great haste, surrounded by dangers; and yet obliged to end their march in consequence of the flow of the tide; a moment's delay, or indecision, would have been fatal to them.—His Majesty, desirous to recognise the service rendered by these brave men, and the dangers to which they exposed themselves, without any hope of retreating, and without being terrified by the numbers of the foe; who, they knew, were on the opposite side of the river, has rewarded them, through general Heiligers, by expressing to him his satisfaction at their conduct. He has granted promotion to the before mentioned officers; and ordered, that, without distinction of rank, all those who were in the detachment of general Heiligers, should wear on the left side of the coat an embroidered sabre. The soldiers, and non-commissioned officers, shall, during the campaign, enjoy double pay.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 15.] LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1809. [Price 1s.

"The people of Vienna seem to vie with each other in demonstrations of love and veneration of the Emperor Napoleon, whom they justly regard as their deliverer. They have entered into a voluntary subscription, for the purpose of erecting a statue of him in bronze; and, they propose holding a Jubilee on the anniversary of the battle of Wagram." — MONTTEUR.

513]

[514

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

THE JUBILEE.—This would seem to be the year of Jubilees; for, the people of Warsaw, of Madrid, of Vienna, of Naples, and of many other places, are, by the public prints, said to be making bonfires and illuminations, and singing *Te Deums*; that is to say, singing psalms of praise to God. It is true, indeed, that, in these instances, God is to be thanked for the birth, life, and deeds of the Emperor Napoleon, and "for the manifold blessings enjoyed under his benignant sway;" whereas our people propose to thank God in form, to sing psalms of praise to their Creator, for the birth, life, and deeds of our King, and "for the blessings enjoyed under his benignant sway;" and, moreover, to bestow, at the same time, a few execrations upon that same Napoleon, on whom the other nations of Europe are bestowing so many blessings, and whom our people assert to be a despot, a merciless squeezer and grinder of his abject subjects, and, indeed, whom some of them accuse of being a most profound hypocrite himself, while every, aye every, member of his family, female as well as male, is so corrupt in heart and so loathsome in carcass, as to be fit for little else than to be thrown to the dung-hill.—Buonaparté's people never describe, in this way, our sovereign and his family; or, I have missed the descriptions; but, ought not our jubilee people to be cautious how they thus describe a sovereign, whom so many cities and nations seem resolved to honour with public rejoicings? Surely those who live under a man's sway must know him best? The people at Paris must know the Emperor Napoleon better than we can know him. They may have a taste different from ours; but, then, observe, our taste is as different from theirs. Our people think it strange, that the French can like such a sovereign as Napoleon; but, our people should not forget, that it is possible, that the French may think it as strange, that

we should like such a sovereign as George the Third. In short, seeing that the French are our enemies, and are likely to continue such, I think we act very imprudently in goading them in this way about their "state of slavery." It appears to me, that our wise way would be to let them remain in ignorance of the great blessings, which we exclusively enjoy, and which, hitherto, they have not seemed disposed to envy us. Why should we fret ourselves about their slavery? Let them be slaves, if they choose it, so long as we remain so free and so happy.—It is peculiarly unfortunate, too, that these "wretched slaves" should be, as it were out of mere spite, making jubilees all over the Empire, and praising God for preserving the life, and prolonging the reign, of the man, who, as our people assert, rules them with a rod of iron, and robs them almost of the necessities of life. In answer to this, our jubilee people tell us, that these indications of love and gratitude are *not sincere*; that the people, the *real people*, of France, Austria, Spain, Italy, Poland, &c. &c. hate him and his authority, and every limb and branch and shoot and bud of his debauched and corrupted family, than which, as is asserted, there is not, in all history, ancient or modern, an instance of any one family, in any nation, or in any rank of life, more completely void of every thing like principle, whether of morality or of honour; and, that, of course, so far from rejoicing, and praising God, for his existence, they would, if left to their own will, if unrestrained by the innumerable troops that every where have a bayonet pointed at their breasts, put up public prayers for his extermination, lest, by any accident, his race should be multiplied.—Now, though this answer may do very well with men, assembled over the bottle, and particularly with such as are able to bear the verses of the pensioned poet, *Fitzgerald*, yet, I am afraid, that persons, who take time to reflect, will not be so easily satisfied with this answer; or, if they

R

should, I am afraid they will be led to draw therefrom conclusions unfavourable to the motives of *our* jubilee people; because, if it be a fact well established, and unequivocally acknowledged, that, in several other countries of Europe, the people do make bonfires, dance, illuminate their houses, drink, gorge, and sing anthems, in honour of a man, whom they wish at the devil, we come to this dilemma, either to allow, that there may be a doubt of the sincerity of our jubilee, or that, the people of *all* those countries (*all the Continent*, indeed) are a set of despicable wretches, and, of course, not at all likely "to assist," as Pitt used to call it, "in their own deliverance."—The Jubilee discussions, in the London Common Council, have been very interesting, and cannot fail, in due time, to produce a good effect. The proposition to hold a jubilee has given rise to remarks upon the occurrences of the last 50 years; it has caused some to be informed of what they never heard of before, and some to be reminded of what they had forgotten. After having, as they thought, carried a measure, intended to set the example of boozing and gormandizing and carousing all over the country, drowning the senses and recollection of the nation in toasting and cheering and hallooing, the movers of this measure, though not much subject to blushing, have been driven to abandon it, and, instead of going to a *taVERN*, they have agreed to go to *church*, instead of a *drunk*, they have agreed to have a *thanksgiving*.—But, this is a trifle compared to what has been gained in another way. These discussions have, it is to be hoped, most clearly pointed out to the *Livery of London* the importance of their right to elect the members of their Common-Council; but, of this I shall say more in my next; and, in the meanwhile, I beg leave to recommend to the reader a careful perusal of what passed at the last City meeting, and which, if I have room for it, shall be inserted in another part of this Number.

PISTOLLING PRIVY COUNSELLORS.—In my last, I stated the substance of the complaint of Lord Castlereagh against Mr. Canning; but, now we have, through the news-papers, this complaint stated in the Lord's own words. This, and the like of it, are most valuable documents; they are precious memorials of the conduct and character of our "statesmen;" of these servants of the king; these men, who had on their side a majority of the

House of Commons; these far-famed Anti-Jacobins; these tangible-shapemen; these life-and-fortune and holy-altar men; these men, who made war for the support of the dignity of government, for social order, and "our holy religion;" these valorous stand-makers against popular encroachment; these defenders of the House of Brunswick against a Jacobinical Conspiracy.—Come, then, let us have their mutual accusations: let us hear what they say one of the other; let us put their characters upon record in their own words.

"St. James's-square, 19th Sept. 1809.

"SIR,—It is unnecessary for me to enter "into any detailed statement of the circumstances which preceded the recent "resignations.—It is enough for me, with "a view to the immediate object of this "letter, to state, that it appears a proposition had been agitated, without any "communication with me, for my removal "from the War Department; and that "you, towards the close of the last Session, "having urged a decision upon this question, with the alternative of your "ceding from the government, procured "a positive promise from the Duke of "Portland (the execution of which you "afterwards considered yourself entitled "to enforce), that such removal should be "carried into effect. Notwithstanding this "promise, by which I consider you pronounced it unfit that I should remain "charged with the conduct of the War, "and by which my situation as a Minister of the crown was made dependent "upon your will and pleasure, you continued to sit in the same Cabinet with "me; and to leave me not only in the "persuasion that I possessed your confidence and support as a colleague, but "you allowed me, in breach of every "principle of good faith, both public and "private, though thus virtually superseded, to originate and proceed in the execution of a new enterprise of the most "arduous and important nature, with your "apparent concurrence, and ostensible approbation.—You were fully aware that "if my situation in the Government had "been disclosed to me, I could not have "submitted to remain one moment in office, without the entire abandonment of "my private honour, and public duty. "You knew I was deceived, and you continued to deceive me.—I am aware, it "may be said, which I am ready to ac-

"knowledge, that when you pressed for a decision for my removal, you also pressed for its disclosure, and that it was resisted by the Duke of Portland, and some members of the Government supposed to be my friends. But I never can admit, that you have a right to make use of such a plea, in justification of an act affecting my honour, nor that the sentiments of others could justify an acquiescence in such a delusion on your part, who had yourself felt and stated its unfairness. Nor can I admit that the head of any administration, or any supposed friend (whatever may be their motives), can authorize or sanction any man in such a course of long and persevering deception. For were I to admit such a principle, my honour and character would be from that moment in the discredit of persons wholly unauthorised, and known to you to be unauthorised, to act for me in such a case. It was therefore your act and your conduct which deceived me; and it is impossible for me to acquiesce in being placed in a situation by you, which no man of honour could knowingly submit to, nor patiently suffer himself to be betrayed into, without forfeiting that character.—I have no right, as a public man, to resent your demanding upon public grounds, my removal from the particular office I have held, or even from the Administration, as a condition of your continuing a Member of the Government. But I have a distinct right to expect that a proposition, justifiable in itself, shall not be executed in an unjustifiable manner, and at the expence of my honour and reputation. And I consider that you were bound, at least, to avail yourself of the same alternative, namely, your own resignation, to take yourself out of the predicament of practising such a deceit towards me, which you did exercise in demanding a decision for my removal.—Under these circumstances, I must require that *satisfaction* from you to which I feel myself entitled to lay claim. I am, &c.

CASTLEREAGH."

The Right Hon. George Canning.

Gloucester-Lodge, Sept. 20, 1809.

"MY LORD,—The tone and purport of your Lordship's letter, which I have this moment received, of course preclude any other answer on my part to the misapprehensions and misrepresentations with

"which it abounds, than that I will cheerfully give to your Lordship the satisfaction which you require. I am, &c.

GEORGE CANNING."

Lord Viscount Castlereagh, &c. &c.

Before I proceed to remark upon the nature of the facts, as thus authentically stated, I cannot help asking the reader, whether he believes, that a person, who would write such a letter as that of Lord Castlereagh, would, by any merchant in London, be taken into his counting-house, at 150 pounds a year.—I take these letters from the newspapers, and, as articles there found, I publish them; but, really, it can scarcely be believed, that a man, through whose hands so much of letter-writing must have passed, should have penned any thing so completely confused. At last, indeed, one gets at the meaning; but, in what way *must* affairs be understood, if left to such hands?—The meaning, however, appears to be this, that Mr. Canning was guilty of "a breach of every principle of good faith, both public and private;" that he knew Lord Castlereagh to be deceived, and that he "continued to deceive him;" that he pursued a long course of "persevering deception;" and that, therefore, Lord Castlereagh demands satisfaction of him.—Now, it is not we, Jacobins, who say these things of Mr. Canning, who reviled us as conspirators. If the letters be authentic, it is Lord Castlereagh; it is his colleague; it is his brother Pittite; it is his yoke mate; it is the man, at the very close of the last session of parliament, he called his "noble friend." This is the man, under whose hand and seal his character is now given to the world.—I, for my part, care not one straw, whether the facts, stated in this letter, be true or false. Not a single straw do I care; but, this nobody can deny, that, unless the facts be true, the accuser is a very impudent liar.—To be sure, if the facts be true, a point which, I repeat, I care nothing about; but, if they be true, what a pretty figure does Mr. Canning make? He demands that Lord Castlereagh shall be removed from his office, and makes this a condition of his remaining in the ministry himself; and yet, he sits in the same cabinet with him long afterwards, and suffers him to plan and execute measures of a magnitude unparalleled in the history of this long and perilous war. All this time, even after he has obtained a positive promise that Lord

Castlereagh shall be put out of office, he says not a word to Lord Castlereagh upon the subject; never expresses, to his face, any objection to him; works against him, behind his back, in the manner the most effectual; and, what is worse than all the rest, suffers the management of the war to remain in his hands, sees him fit out an expedition of enormous expence, while it was next to impossible that he (Mr. Canning) could wish that expedition success.

—The remark always to be made, upon these occasions, is, that we, Jacobins, have had no hand in the matter. It is not we who say these things of Mr. Canning; it was not we who obtained a promise for the turning out of Lord Castlereagh, nor did we ever call him our "noble friend;" we had nothing to do with the Walcheren expedition, or with the Talavera campaign; we have laid on none of the taxes, nor made any of the treaties. The whole of the nation's concerns have, from the beginning of debt and war to the present day, been in the hands of the "loyal," in the hands of those who call us mob and traitors. Well, then, if these concerns be in a bad way, find not fault with us; if the country be in a state of peril, and if it be, at last, become a question, whether England be able to preserve herself against the attacks of France, let the nation blame others than the Jacobins for what has happened; for, it is notorious, that she has fallen into this state, while her pecuniary and personal resources have all been at the absolute disposal of those, who have constantly derided the principles and views of the Jacobins. —For about sixteen years, there has been going on a regular attack, on the part of the people in place, upon a certain description of persons, to whom, because it was become very hateful, they gave the name of Jacobins, and this name they have invariably given to every man, who has dared to complain of their doings. Owing to various causes, the trick has succeeded; and, though it now deceives but few people, the *Anti-jacobins*, or, the *loyal*, have constantly beaten the Jacobins, have kept all the power amongst themselves, and have, in all cases, acted in *direct and studied opposition* to the well-known and clearly-expressed wishes of the Jacobins. They have beaten us; they have had their will; their principles have triumphed over ours. Nothing, therefore, can be more just, or more reasonable, than for us to disown the concern; and, if the nation begins to feel, at last, to request it to look for an account

to the Anti-Jacobins. We have had nothing at all to do with the matter. It is to our revilers that the nation, whom, for my part, I do not pity, has to look. We care not any thing about the old disputes: we will not begin the discussion anew: this is the point; that you have had *your will*: you have done just what you pleased: are the people satisfied with the result? If they be, much good may it do them; and, if they be not, on you let them throw the blame; to the Anti-jacobins let them look for a reason why they now suffer, and why they expect further sufferings.

TALAVERA'S CAMPAIGN. — After the publication of the substance of the General Order, said to have been issued at Lisbon *against the circulating of bad news*, it would be foolish in any one to expect any but *good news* from that quarter. Now, we get no news; and, as the saying is, *no news is good news*. I have, indeed, before me, a letter from an officer in my Lord Douro's army which contains some particulars worth knowing, and which particulars I shall here state, only observing, that I know the writer very well, and that I have not the smallest doubt of the truth of the statement. —The letter is dated on the 18th of August, in the *Camp near Truxillo*. — "You must," says the writer, "long ere this, have had a more correct account of the circumstances attending the battle of Talavera, than it is in my power to give. On the 1st of August, our wounded were not all taken off the field, and, when we left Talavera, they were putting the dead bodies in heaps, and BURNING them. * * * * * The sick of the army amounts to nearly eight thousand men. Our effective strength to between six and seven thousand. The light brigade, which left England last, has suffered more than any of the army. Four of the officers of the 43rd died within the last two days, and they have now twenty-six sick in that regiment. The men of the different regiments, composing that brigade, are in a dreadful state. The greater part of our wounded and sick were taken by the French, at Placencia, Aropeza, and Talavera; but, the French are reported to be taking the greatest care of them. —Our march from Aropeza to this place was severe, the troops having only half a pound of bread and the same quantity of flour a day, to subsist on during seven days, the weather dreadfully hot, and very little water.

" * * * * * Provisions are very expensive. The quantity of sour wine and bread, sufficient to keep a man alive, for twenty-four hours, cannot be procured under two or three dollars. General * * * * * I am happy to inform you, is quite well. For my own part, I am neither well nor ill; but, I am certain, I should be much better, had I a little more to eat.—P. S. The whole of the ammunition is ordered to be destroyed this evening. I have just received orders to get ready to march to-morrow."—The gentleman, who writes this, is not a man to exaggerate either distresses or dangers. What a pretty situation, then, must this army of *deliverers* have been in? A pound of bread, or flour, is not enough to keep a man alive upon a march; and, besides, how was the flour to be cooked? Only think of the number of poor creatures, who must have dropped by the way, during those seven dreadful days of march; and, think of the *expence*, when, to keep a man alive for twenty-four hours, the food cost *two dollars*, at least!—Such, Englishmen, is the war, which the Anti-Jacobins are carrying on for Ferdinand VII. and the ancient order of things, or, as the pastry-cook orator had it, for the "*holy altars*" of Spain. Such is the war, the object of which was first proclaimed by Mr. Canning, at the London Tavern, amidst the loud plaudits of the Jews, Contractors, Jobbers, and Makers of Paper-Money. Such is the war, the object of which I always reprobated, and which reprobation, the hireling prints asserted, arose from "*the direct instigation of the devil.*"—Here is another of the feats of the Anti-Jacobins; here is another of their exploits; here is another of those *blessings*, for which they bid us be thankful. Verily, it is the nation's fault; for, had the nation possessed either sense or spirit, things never could have come to this pass. Will it be believed, hereafter, that, after the fate of Sir John Moore and his army; after the woful experience, which they had of the disposition of the people of Spain; of their total indifference as to which party triumphed; and of the inevitable consequence of penetrating into the heart of Spain; will it be believed, that, with all this before their eyes, the same ministers should send more troops on the same errand, and that a general should be found to expose his army in the same manner?—Being upon this topic, I cannot help noticing a curious passage in the

Morning Chronicle of the 10th instant, relative to the conduct of my Lord of Talavera, whom, as the reader will recollect, this same Morning Chronicle did, not many weeks ago, and since the battle of Talavera, place "*in the very FIRST RANK of British heroes.*"—His tone is now changed, and he says: "Our expedition to Spain, in a moment apparently the most auspicious, when the necessities of the French Emperor had forced him almost to abandon the Peninsula, has ended only in the dear-bought glory of a single battle. Our gallant General took it into his head to imitate, as he conceived, the example of the great Captain of the Age; and because, in several instances, Napoleon had conquered by the rapidity of his movements, thought that nothing was wanting to success but rapidity. Lord Wellington either had not the judgment, or he did not give himself the time to discriminate between the situations in which Buonaparté had been quick, and those in which he had been slow in his operations. If he had allowed himself time, even for recollection, he would have seen that that consummate warrior decided on his line of conduct in every instance on its own peculiar circumstances. When he had to attack an enemy like the Austrians, where preparation had been made to receive him, he viewed their enemies magazines as collected for his use; and regardless of all the maxims of ancient warfare, by an extraordinary effort of seemingly desperate rashness, he threw himself into the country of his opponent, and seized on the stores of the enemy for his own subsistence.—But not so when he entered the peninsula of Spain.—He was well aware that he could find no magazines, no stores, no provision in a country which had been so long subjected to a government of superstition and ignorance, and accordingly before he entered Spain with his army, he had occupied nine months in preparing his provision, and providing the means of its conveyance. The contrast is lamentable. The testimony of every officer in Lord Wellington's army, who has communicated with his friends, is against the line of conduct which he pursued. He thought only of rapidity, and not of subsistence. He hurried on, stripped his Commissariat, forced himself into a predicament from which he could not escape without fighting, and in which he could reap nothing but honour

"by the sacrifice of one fourth of his followers."—And this man, *after* his advance to Talavera, was, by this same print, this same Morning Chronicle, placed "in the very first rank of British heroes!"

—What is the cause of this change?

Why, an opinion newly entertained by the editor of the Morning Chronicle, that the Wellesley family will join with Mr. PERCEVAL, and so keep his friends and himself out of place and out of the receipt of the public money. This is the reason, and the only reason, of this change of language. Now, therefore, the Wellesleys are to be pulled down as much as possible. Oh! these are miserable politics, Mr. Perry. Really it were far better for you to hire out the *whole* of your columns in a sort of backbiting advertisements and paragraphs against individuals, whom you envy, than to endeavour with practices like these to keep up the show, the mockery, of public writing.—In quitting, for the present, this subject of the Talavera Campaign, it may not be amiss to notice, that, some days ago, there appeared in the London news-papers, a paragraph, announcing, in very *concise* terms, the arrival of GEORGE FITZ-CLARENCE, Esq. from Spain. Now, I do remember me of a youth of this name, who *went out*, it was said, in the army of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and about whose lion-hearted disposition, whose terrible eagerness to be at the French, a vast deal was said in the news-papers. Does not the reader recollect that he was said to have driven a great many post-horses nearly to death, in order to get to Portsmouth in time? Doubtless, if he be *come home*, business of great importance must have brought him; and therefore, I did expect, that, before now, we should have had some important news communicated to us.—It is very curious to observe what has taken place as to the *Embassy* to Spain. First Mr. Frere, one of the partners in the firm of Anti-Jacobin prose and poetry, was appointed by Mr. Canning, another of the firm, to represent *his majesty*, NEAR the king of Spain, Ferdinand VII, who was safe in France, in one of Napoleon's palaces, where he was at best a state prisoner. This gentleman has been immortalized by a brother of Sir John Moore, who has published a book, in justification of the conduct of the unfortunate general, and in which book Mr. Frere makes a conspicuous figure. Next, Marquis Wellesley is to go, in order to take the place of Mr.

Frere, but with a higher rank; and now, if report be true, he is to come home, and Mr. Frere's brother is to supply his place.

—I should like to see the items of charge against this nation for the Spanish Embassy. Good God, what expence!

Oh! but I cannot away with this notion of recalling Marquis Wellesley. This is, I will frankly confess it, a mortification that I shall scarcely survive. What! bring away our Eastern conqueror, before he can well have begun to arrange his plans? He was sent, we were told, to infuse spirit into the Junta, and hardly can he have begun to blow, when he is to be called home again. No, no: he must not come yet. I'll petition the King to be graciously pleased to keep him there, 'till he has measured his strength with Buonaparté. Have not the wise men, who write in the Morning Post and the Courier, always told us, that the Marquis was the only man to match Buonaparté? Why not let him remain, then, in a place where he will have a fair chance of giving effect to our long-entertained wishes?—

This recal of the Marquis, if true, is a very grievous thing. *The Marquis went out when Buonaparté was said to have been defeated at Aspern*; and, shall it be said, that he comes home now, when Buonaparté may be expected to return *speedily to Spain*? Oh, no! For the world I would not have the noble Marquis come back, till the contest in Spain is completely decided. I think, too, that, under the present circumstances, he will not come back. Let us, however, keep our eye upon the Peninsula, and see what *moves* are made. There is little fear but things will go well at last, if we do but observe narrowly, and bear in mind what we observe, not suffering our attention to be drawn off by Theatre-rows, or by the toasting, and boozing and canting of the Jews and Contractors.

JACOBIN GUINEAS.—That his Majesty's own portrait, stamped on gold too, and in a year of *jubilee*, should be concerned in a conspiracy against him and his government, would be a thing not to be believed, if it was not so positively asserted by so many credible witnesses.—The hired news-papers do, indeed, throw the blame, not upon the guineas, but upon those who buy them up, whether to *hoard* or to *export*. This will not do. It is the guineas themselves that are to blame, if any one is, for their retreat from circulation. They will not stay to circulate amongst so much dirty, ill-looking, worthless paper. None

of your imputations against us Jacobins of flesh and blood, therefore. If there be jacobinism at the bottom of the evil, it is in the guineas themselves and not in us. To be sure, I must, for myself, confess, that I wish success to the guineas; that I wish them to beat the nasty mashed rags; that I wish to see some of the thousands upon thousands of those who are gulling the public, and, in fact, cheating them, reduced to follow some honest occupation; but I never will allow, that we Jacobins have had any hand in this any more than in the war-matters. The "*great-man-now-no-more*;" that object of the joint praises of Lord Grenville and Lord Grey; he, whose debts we were taxed to pay; he, whom to bury and to raise a monument to whose memory we were taxed; aye, that was the man, the *grand financier*, who managed all the banking affairs, who caused the bank notes to be made virtually a legal tender; aye, that was he; it was that "*great man*," who, at once, put down jacobins and made "*a war of finance*" upon the French. Do not blame us, then, for these jacobin tricks of the guineas. It was he, to whose memory the worthies of the short parliament compelled us to pay for the building of a monument: it was he who inundated the country with paper.——Aye, it was that idol of the Jews, jobbers, and loan-mongers; it was he, who, a hundred times, declared, in the House of Commons, that the war with the French was a *mere war of finance*! Aye, it was he (oh, that he was still on earth!) who, year after year, promised this deluded nation, that the French were just upon the point of being *ruined*; nay, who told us, that they were *ruined, beggared, and starving*——Good heavens! Look back, reader, to the date of those empty, those shallow-pated predictions, and look at what now is. The Anti-jacobin Pitt and his Anti-jacobin followers had their will; they persecuted, they put down, they silenced their opponents at home; they have, even until now, done what they pleased with all the resources of the nation: And, lo! that France, that very France, which, in the year 1795, they said was *ruined*, is now the mistress of Europe; that France, which, even at a later period, they had prepared plans for parcelling out, now has assumed such an attitude, has, during their unceasing hostility, arrived at such a pitch of greatness and of physical strength, as to make it matter of *boast* with these her former *menacers*, that she has not yet subdued

England!——It was a war of *finance* that Pitt waged, and a war of *starvation*. Europe cannot have forgotten his measures for preventing provisions from going to France, in a time of dreadful scarcity; nor can they have forgotten the *forging of assignats* in London, under the authority of the government, and sending them to France, in order to ruin the finances of that country. Well, what is the result of this "*great man's*" war against the *purse* and the *belly* of the French? What is the result? Why, we are now *endeavouring to obtain corn from France*; and, while our current coin flees the society of our countless millions of paper-money, France abounds in gold and silver, and knows none of the evils of a paper-currency; and, which is a very curious fact, I am credibly informed, that a great quantity of Louis d'ors, or Napoleon d'ors, were purchased by us in the islands of Guernsey and Jersey, in order to be sent out on the Walcheren Expedition!——Such, thus far, has been the result of the Pitt "*war of finance*." And, yet, do we find people so foolish, or so impudent, as to assert, that this was a great statesman. They will, in all human probability, suffer for his having had authority; and, I say, *let them suffer*; for, it is next to impossible, that people so wilfully blind, or so basely bent, should suffer more than they deserve.——The subject of astonishment is, how any man can be found with impudence sufficient to pretend to believe, that that was "*a great man*," who so managed the affairs of this nation; who so used its resources, of all sorts, as to render it, at least, a mere petty state in comparison with its ancient *rival*. But, again, I say, *suffer for it they will*; and, again, I say, *let them suffer*.——To return more immediately to the subject of *Jacobin Guineas*, I have no scruple in saying, that I think it a subject of *more importance* than any other; and, for this reason, that, as long as the present system of paper-money-making lasts, so long will last the abuses and corruptions which are eating out the vitals of the country. Viewing the subject in this light, I cannot help endeavouring to correct the errors of others, who write upon the subject; or, at any rate, what I deem errors. With this object in view, I here insert a letter, published, the other day, in the Morning Chronicle news-paper, signed L, which letter, as far as it goes to prove the *depreciation of bank notes*, is not only unexceptionable, but is excellent; but, when it

comes to speak of a *remedy*; of the bank's keeping its issues of notes *within due bounds*, he does not, I am sure, foresee the consequences of what he recommends. —The letter is rather long, but every word of it is well worthy of the attention of every father, mother, guardian, and of every one, who thinks of acquiring funded property. —“A writer in your Paper, under the signature of A. Z. acknowledges, that to purchase a pound weight of gold you must pay in Bank notes 55*l.* 16*s.*, while the mint or standard price of the same commodity is no more than 46*l.* 14*s.* 6*d.*, and yet he says that Bank notes are not at a discount. I am of a contrary opinion, and the fact as stated above, and which is admitted by A. Z. is of itself sufficient to prove it.—A pound of gold is equal in weight with 44 guineas and a half, and when taken to the mint, will coin into that number, this pound of gold will cost in Bank notes 55*l.* 16*s.*, and when coined into guineas it passes for only 46*l.* 14*s.* 6*d.*; does not this furnish a proof that our currency is depreciated? It certainly does; and, at the same time, it presents to our view the quantum of its depreciation, which, upon 55*l.* 16*s.*, is 9*l.* 1*s.* 6*d.*—The truth of this position may be proved by any one who will purchase a pound of gold bullion, for which he must pay in Bank notes 55*l.* 16*s.*; let him take that pound of bullion to the Mint to be coined into guineas, he will have returned to him 44 guineas and a half; they will weigh exactly a pound. Now let us see what these 44 guineas and a half are worth as currency in the purchase of goods; they will pass for no more than 46*l.* 14*s.* 6*d.*, though the gold from which they were coined cost in Bank notes 55*l.* 16*s.*; is not this a proof that Bank notes are depreciated? That they are at a discount? Again, let the same 44 guineas and a half be melted, and turned once more into bullion, they will instantly recover their former value with respect to currency, and will sell or exchange for 55*l.* 16*s.* in that depreciated medium. The same experiment may be tried upon a smaller scale; buy one ounce of gold bullion, for which you must pay in Bank notes 4*l.* 13*s.*; take the said ounce to the Mint and it will coin into 3*l.* 17*s.* 10½*d.*; by this operation you will sustain a loss of 15*s.* 1½*d.*, which sum is the depreciation of currency, both in coin and Bank notes, or, to use other terms,

“it is the discount on 4*l.* 13*s.* in currency, compared with bullion.—“Gold in bullion is the currency of the whole mercantile world, therefore it is not in the power of any particular Government to fix the limits of its price, which, for that reason, will always preserve its true and just value—whereas gold in coin is the creature and child of every particular Government, over which it has absolute power and controul, and the current value of which, by various expedients, it can raise or sink at pleasure, as is proved by the financial history of every country in Europe; therefore, gold in coin, viz. in guineas, is no standard at all whereby to measure the true value of Bank notes, and it was a want of attention to this very important point, which betrayed your correspondent A. Z. into an error, when he concluded, that, because guineas and Bank notes are of equal value in currency, therefore Bank notes are not at a discount.—It is true that a pound note and a shilling will buy as much of any commodity as a guinea, hence many have inferred with A. Z. that Bank notes are not at a discount, this inference is at first sight plausible, therefore calculated to delude the unthinking; but if it be tried by the touch-stone of truth, it vanishes in a moment, and we discover the plain and naked fact to be this—that the Bank-note is positively depreciated; that this depreciation has communicated itself to the guinea, consequently they are both in a state of depreciation. The great quantity of Bank notes in circulation has degraded them in value, and they, in their turn, have brought down to their own level the small quantity of coin: the market is glutted with Bank notes, whereby they are depreciated, and, in their fall, they have carried down the guineas along with them; but this lamentable effect could not have been produced without the co-operation of two powerful causes.—First, the law has made it felony, to melt the coin of the realm; therefore, though it may be done to a very great profit, and, for that reason, a tradesman may sell his goods cheaper for guineas, than for Bank notes, and reimburse himself by melting the guineas, and selling them as bullion, yet he is deterred by the severity of the law, he dares not make two distinct prices, because it would demonstrate, that he intended to melt the guineas, and thereby commit felony,

"in which he would instantly lose his character,
 "and would probably be ruined.—Secondly,
 "the law, though not in express terms,
 "yet virtually, has made Bank notes a
 "legal tender. If a man owe you 20 guineas,
 "he may tender you 21*l.* in Bank notes,
 "and should you refuse to accept them in
 "discharge of the debt, you are not allow-
 "ed to arrest him. Thus Bank notes are
 "become a legal tender, which is equiva-
 "lent to enacting a law that no difference
 "shall be made in current value between
 "guineas and Bank notes. The intention
 "of that law was to prevent the deprecia-
 "tion of Bank notes, by keeping up their
 "value to a level with that of guineas, and
 "so long as the quantity of Bank notes in
 "circulation was kept within proper bounds,
 "there was no depreciation; but as soon
 "as Bank notes were sent into circulation,
 "in greater quantities than the trade of
 "the country required, the market became
 "overstocked with them, and they sunk in
 "value, and in this state of things it was
 "impossible to prevent their depreciation:
 "but the power of the law had put them
 "upon a level with guineas, and ordered
 "that they should remain so: it therefore
 "followed of course, that the depreciation
 "of the one was the depreciation of the
 "other, for the law having bound them
 "together, Bank notes sinking in value,
 "carried down the guineas with them; by
 "these means the whole currency of the
 "kingdom, consisting of a great quantity
 "of Bank notes and a small quantity of
 "guineas, became equally depreciated.—
 "To prove the truth of this statement, let
 "these two laws be repealed, and leave
 "guineas, like other things, to find their
 "value unconnected and unfettered with
 "Bank notes, and what would be the con-
 "sequence? They would instantly sepa-
 "rate from coin, and have a distinct value.
 "Guineas would then be estimated as bul-
 "lion, two prices would be made in every
 "commodity; one for bullion, the other
 "for Bank notes; and should the dif-
 "ference be from 16 to 17 per cent., which
 "is about the present proportion, it would
 "follow, that Bank notes would pass in the
 "market at 16 to 17 per cent. discount,
 "and that in purchasing goods, a Bank
 "note of a pound would pass for no more
 "than about 16*s.* 8*d.* sterling. This is in
 "reality about the price for which they
 "now pass, though the fact is concealed
 "and hidden from the unscrutinizing eye,
 "because by the violence of law, guineas
 "have been degraded along with Bank notes,

"and the degradation being common to
 "both, it is not to be discovered by com-
 "parison. The only way to prove the
 "fact, is, by referring to the true stand-
 "ard, gold in bullion.—The general de-
 "preciation of currency, is to be dis-
 "tinctly seen in the rapid increase of
 "prices, that within a short time has
 "taken place in all these commodities
 "which are purchased with our circulat-
 "ing medium. The same crisis which
 "seems to be now coming on in this coun-
 "try, took place in France; when assig-
 "nats, being issued in too great abundance,
 "depreciated, so as almost to lose their
 "value, and the horrible result must be
 "fresh in the recollection of every one.
 "Should the depreciation or discount on
 "Bank Notes continue to increase, there
 "is no knowing to what height the prices
 "of all the necessaries and conveniences
 "of life may attain, and with what weight
 "the pressure may fall upon the public;
 "they may rise so high as to become al-
 "most unattainable, except by the rich, and the
 "consequences may be dreadful.—If then
 "we are threatened with such horrible
 "calamities, why is not a remedy instantly
 "applied? Why do not the Bank Direc-
 "tors keep the issue of their notes within
 "due bounds? And, if they are not so
 "disposed, why do not Government com-
 "pel them? Or, why does not our Go-
 "vernment order them, as formerly, to
 "pay their notes in cash? For then they
 "could not keep in circulation more than
 "the commerce of the country required,
 "their notes would always be at par with
 "bullion, and the high prices of commo-
 "dities would return to their former level;
 "but the Bank Directors may have mo-
 "tives which induce them to overstock
 "the market with their paper; the more
 "notes they can keep out, the greater
 "their profits; the greater their profits,
 "the more they can divide in the shape
 "of interest and bonus; and the more
 "they divide, the higher will be the price
 "of their stock. This accounts for the
 "late enormous rise in the price of Bank
 "stock, while the Government funds have
 "continued nearly stationary. By per-
 "sisting in such a system, the Directors
 "of the Bank may, in a short time, raise
 "the price of their stock to 300 per cent,
 "or upwards, and when the temptation to
 "enrich themselves, by raising the price
 "of their own stock, is so very great, and
 "is at the same time completely in their
 "power, may not human frailty, stimu-

"lated by avarice, yield to the temptation."—Upon this letter I have first to remark, that the *proof of depreciation* is very good; that the point is clearly and undeniably established. Yet, I must observe, at the same time, that this point was as clearly made out before, in the Political Register, Volumes IV and V, and VI, and in a very excellent pamphlet, published by Lord King about the same time. Indeed, if the reader will just turn to these Volumes, under the heads of *Finance, Restriction on the Bank, Funds*, and some others, he will find, that the writer of this letter has, without perceiving it, repeated the arguments and many of the illustrations there used in support of the asserted depreciation of bank paper, and especially those in refutation of the plausible argument, that a pound in paper will buy as much goods as a pound in specie.—This point of an actually existing depreciation, is, then, a point settled. No one but a fool, or a knave, will any longer deny the fact. And this being the case, I am rather surprised, that so clear-headed a person, as he who writes this letter, should think it amiss, that the bank-stock holders divide more per cent. than formerly. He should recollect, that what they divide is, like the rest, *depreciated*. I do not know any thing of the names of their trash, which they call property; but, I will suppose, that a man was fool enough to lay out a hundred good pounds in gold upon a thing (call it *Stock*, or what you will) for which the Bank, in the year 1792, used to pay him 5 pounds a year. I shall suppose him to have been fool enough to leave his principal money in the same hands, after Pitt openly declared, that he was making a war of finance; and, for argument's sake, I will beg my countrymen's leave to suppose, that some one amongst them was such a double-skulled wretch as to leave his money still there after the law was passed to exempt the bank from paying their promissory notes; and, supposing all this, it is certain, that, unless the *nominal* amount of this man's dividends were raised, he would in *reality* not receive much more than *half* as much as he received when he first put his money in the bank. To call it the *same sum*, therefore, is stupid; it argues a want of capacity to combine ideas. Yes, sure, five pounds is still five pounds in *name*, but it is not the *same thing*, it has not the same powers of purchase. For ten years previous to the year 1792, the average price of the quartern loaf was

under seven pence; for the ten years ending with this year, the average price of that loaf will have been nearly about *thirteen* pence. "Oh!" exclaims some rickety, bandy-legged Jew, or Jew-like Christian, "but that is owing to the *dearness* of bread." Why, yes, Moses, it is so; but, the *dearness* of bread, Moses, is, in fact, owing to the *cheapness* of money, and that cheapness has been produced by the eternal workings of your mill in Threadneedle Street.—At any rate, reader, you will take hold of this plain fact, that, before 1792, a pound in money would purchase nearly twice as much bread as a pound in money now will, and, of course, our bank stock holder, if his dividend were not nearly doubled, would, in fact, lose nearly one half of his income.—But, now we come to the point that is of great interest to the people at large; and that is this; that, while the *bank-stock*-holder, who is, in fact, a partner in the banking house in Threadneedle Street, has his dividends augmented in *nominal* amount, in order to keep pace with the depreciation of money, the man who has his money in what is, drolly enough, called "*The Funds*," obtains *no augmentation* of the nominal amount of his dividends. If, for instance, your father, by will, left you, in the year 1792, a thousand pounds, in "*The Funds*," compelling you to keep it there, you then received as much interest annually as would purchase nearly *twice as much bread* as you can purchase with that same interest now, because the nominal amount of your dividends cannot be augmented, as in the case of bank-stock, where the partners in the concern have the money-mill in their own hands. The fathers or mothers, therefore, who would thus *provide* for their children now, must be either very ignorant, or most obstinate brutes. Seeing, however, that it is entirely owing to the base credulity of those who adore banks and funds; seeing that all the disgraces and miseries of the nation are, at bottom, owing to this description of baseness; the more these people suffer the better, and there is a consolation in reflecting, that they will be great sufferers.—The author of the Letter before us, in speaking of the *destruction of the paper-money in France*, which arose from its excessive quantity, reminds us of that "*horrible result*." What does he mean by "*horrible*?" I see nothing horrible in the annihilation of a nasty, dirty, debased, currency, printed, like shop-bills, at every corner of

every town. I see nothing horrible in this, and in the return of gold and silver coin. But, on the contrary, I see something very horrible indeed in the system, which imperceptibly steals away the loaf, bit by bit, from the mouth of the widow and the orphan, and gives it to those, whom Lord Chatham denominated *muck-worms and blood-suckers*. I see something very horrible in that system, and especially when I reflect, that scarcely an assize passes over without sending to the gallows tree some one or more of our fellow creatures, the forfeiture of whose lives are necessary to the support of that system. This system may, indeed, be called "*horrible*;" it was the fatal present that the Whigs and their king gave to England.—Perhaps the writer means to say, that the *bloodshed* in France proceeded from the annihilation of the paper-money. Of this I do not believe one word. There is no reason why it should have produced bloodshed. Robespierre, indeed, and some others, *in order to SUPPORT the paper-money*, put people to death; but, by the *annihilation* of the paper neither bloodshed nor confusion was produced; and, my real opinion is, that, if our paper-money was completely annihilated in the space of six days, it would not create either mischief or trouble; but, on the contrary, would be like the removal of a long-endured, painful, alarming, and disgraceful disease. The destruction of the paper-money in America produced no bloodshed, and yet, *all* the currency was paper; and so much was it depreciated, that the *dollar notes*, sixty four of which were printed upon a sheet of paper, were paid away in the *quire*, uncut; and, at last, they *would not fetch their worth in blank paper*. Well, then, it all vanished, and no confusion at all ensued. The desirable thing is, that the depreciation should be *gradual*; because, then, the most perverse, the most greedy, and the most base, suffer most.—As to the "*remedy*" proposed by this writer, I have before shewn, that the application of it is *impracticable*, and, if practicable, it would be, in the very highest degree, unjust and wicked. This gentleman, with all the evils of a paper-currency before him; full in his sight, would fain find out the means of *renovating* and *perpetuating* that evil. I, now, for my part, like to see the paper money increase in quantity. I like to see new shops set up, new mills erected,

and I thought that I should have split my sides with laughter, when, the other day, I saw, in one of the news-papers, a very pompous description of a *new-invented machine*, by the means of which the Bank in Threadneedle street would be enabled to strike off its notes *with much greater rapidity than heretofore*. Bravo! said I. Tell me his name, and I'll toast the inventor. What a comforting thing this machine must be to those who have their whole income chained in the Funds! What a comforting subject of reflection with thousands of widows and orphans!—Here are the exhibitions for a *Jubilee*. Let the Jews and the Jobbers and the Contractors call forth all these miserable creatures, and march them in procession, together with our million and a quarter of paupers, and let them all be brought and made to kneel down before *Pitt's statue* and this *newly-invented machine*.

I should have added something respecting the Jubilee; but, the following letter has more than anticipated me.

WM. COBBETT.

Bolton, 12th Oct. 1809.

THE JUBILEE.

Alton, Oct. 11, 1809.

SIR;—Having often heard my father expatiate on the happy times at the beginning of the reign of the present king, I have been led to look a little into the price of the Necessaries of Life at that period, and to judge for myself; and though, often as it has been dinnaed into my ears by the lives-and-fortunes, last-drop-of-blood, and last-shilling men, that nothing was ever half so delightful as living under our glorious and happy constitution, and our beloved king, and existing circumstances, I cannot help thinking that my father was right, and that my neighbours, nay, the great and valuable majority of the nation, who know nothing of the riot and luxury in which their turtle-fed superiors, (as they are called), live, will, after they have perused the subjoined comparative table, agree with me in opinion, that the sons have not half the real comforts, (I am not here speaking of the loss of political rights and comforts), their fathers possessed; but have begun to suffer; are in an actual state of suffering, and will continue to suffer even unto the third and fourth generation, unless there be a speedy, and general, radical Reform of all Abuses in Church and State.—That no reasons may be wanting why the ap-

proaching Accession should not be considered as a memorable æra, I wish to call your, and your readers attention, and to impress on your minds, the state of things when George the second died, when George the third came to the throne, and when he enters into the 50th year of his reign.—I am for marking the day as it ought to be marked.—I would have my table read in every parish church in the kingdom, and by the king's permission printed at the back of the Form of Prayer.—George the second left us, it is true, a debt of about 90 millions. It is now upwards of 600. Since that time we have had 20 years of peace, and 30 years of war. And we have *spent in the last year only*, (of which 70 millions were raised by taxes), more than the national debt was in the year 1760.—Then, see how the poor-rate and paupers, state and parish paupers, have increased. The number of parish poor was then about 280 thousand, and the poor rate about one million 200 thousand pounds.—The number, in the 49th year of the reign of George the third, in that part of the United kingdom called Great Britain, is *upwards of a million*, and the poor rate upwards of *five millions*—both increased, and are still increasing in an equal ratio with the national debt.—But here comes the pinch.—It now costs a labourer in husbandry *ten days labour* to buy a bushel of flour, costing 16s. 8d. taking the average of wages at 10s. per week.—In 1760 it cost him only *five days labour*, the bushel of flour then being only 5s. 10d., and wages 7s. per week. Oh! but say the Jews, and Jubilee-men, and fat-headed contractors, he lives as well as he did heretofore,—the parish makes it up to him; and so it does, as the nation makes it up to you, but he loses his independence, his comfort, and his happiness: his very nose is brought to the grindstone,—while you, Sir Balaam, fare sumptuously every day, gain what he loses, and turn the handle of the grindstone. Luxury and dependence are more cruel scourges than the wars which beget them, whatever the whole crew of bloodsuckers, bloated, three-guinea-gormandizing gluttons, who with *Mawworm* and the rest assembled at Merchant Taylor's Hall on the 25th of October, may think, if they ever think at all, to the contrary.

Comparison of the Price of the common Necessaries of Life in the Years					1760	1809
Wheat per quarter ...	£.	2	0	0	5 0 0
Malt, do.		1	8	0	4 0 0
Flour per bushel		0	5	10	0 16 8
Bread per gallon		0	0	8	0 2 4

Bacon per pound	0	0	6	0	1	2
Pork	0	0	4	0	0	9
Butchers Meat	0	0	4	0	0	8
Cheese per pound	0	0	4	0	0	10
Malt per bushel *	0	3	6	0	12	0
Butter per pound	0	0	6	0	1	6
Soft Sugar, doz	0	0	3	0	0	10
Soap and Candles, do.	0	0	6	0	1	3
Pair of Men's stout Shoes	0	5	0	0	12	0
Do. Women's	0	3	0	0	7	6

* The Duty is now 4s. 4d. per bushel.

Rejoice, O ye people! Let us throw up our hats, and bawl out toasts and songs.
Yours, &c. Z.

JACOBIN GUINEAS.

Sir;—I beg leave to submit to your consideration some observations on the subject of your essay on Jacobin Guineas, contained in your Political Register of Sept. 23. The importance of the subject of money and exchange merits serious consideration, and requires to be thoroughly discussed, that clear and accurate ideas may be formed of their operation. Perhaps I may have placed the subject in a different point of view from what is generally conceived; at least I wish to contribute my mite towards its elucidation.—There can be no doubt that gold and silver are the best representatives of property, because they are the universal standards of exchange between all countries. But what occasions any medium of exchange or barter, whether of gold, silver, paper, or other commodity, to be possessed of real value? Why, its being the representative of the accumulation of so much capital, concentrated in a small compass, and which can be readily exchanged for any other commodity reckoned of an equivalent value. For instance, a farmer has a load of wheat of five quarters; there is in this article contained so much capital; such as rent, tythes, rates, taxes, seed, manure, ploughing, reaping, threshing, &c. as it has cost the grower to produce this quantity: besides, when it is sold, there must be a profit left to indemnify him for his capital, time, and attention in producing the commodity. Now, suppose he barter his wheat for seed, with his neighbour, for a like quantity. The last farmer's wheat being likewise a representative of the capital, labour, &c. he has expended in growing it, is an equivalent for the other's. So that there is, in this case, no occasion for a medium of exchange to adjust their respective values; but, if the load of wheat be sold for twenty guineas, or twenty-one

pounds, in bank notes, the guineas, or notes, then become the sign, or representative, of the capital and labour expended in producing the wheat. The same may be observed of any other article of manufacture or trade. Likewise a bill of exchange is a sign of the accumulation of so much capital as is specified by the amount; and is of no value, except there are effects, or the sum mentioned can be converted into real property. The guinea, the bank note, or bill of exchange, are considered, in themselves, of little intrinsic value. It is their being the sign and representation of the amount of the accumulation of so much real capital; or, in other words, industry, labour, and profit, as they respectively stand for, that stamps a value on each. As this is the case, it can make no difference as to the security of the property to the buyer or seller, what is the medium the exchange is made by, whether gold, silver, copper, bank notes, bills of exchange, &c. so long as they are respectively convertible to their full value. But, as gold is an universal medium of exchange, and bank notes only local, it is absolutely necessary that the latter should be always convertible into the former for the amount specified to be equally valuable; else a depreciation must take place, the moment they cannot be exchanged for cash, which will shew itself in the advance of the prices of wheat and other commodities. To make this clear, the price of wheat, at the commencement of the late war, in Mr. Pitt's administration, averaged about 14*l.* per load. When new loans and fresh taxes were required to carry on the war, it became necessary, on every additional loan and tax, to coin and issue annually a certain number of new bank notes to the amount of the interest on the loan or money borrowed; and so on, each succeeding year, as more money was wanting, the bank notes progressively increased and accumulated. Whether the notes were made by the bank of England or private banks makes no difference. Let us now see the operation of the funding system and taxation in increasing the quantity of bank paper, diminishing its value, annihilating the circulation of guineas, and increasing the price of every necessary of life, and article of consumption.—I will take as a standard the above average of wheat, viz. 14*l.* per load at the beginning of the late war, and that taxes directly or indirectly have been laid on the farmer to the amount of 4*l.* per load

on the wheat he grows. What is the consequence? If he grew 14 loads of wheat annually, before the additional taxes took place, he must either grow four loads more, or rise the price 4*l.* a load to gain as much as before. For the sake of a statement, say this kingdom grows one million of loads of wheat in a year; instead of 14 millions of pounds in gold or bank notes to effect the exchange, it will require 18 millions to be circulated to answer the same purpose. If we apply this reasoning to every kind of duty, excise, custom, and tax, what an immense value in bank paper is required to circulate all the exchangeable property and revenue of the kingdom. For the more any article is burdened the more nominal money at least it requires to purchase it, and that, added to the original price, make things dear. Now, as each succeeding year of the war has augmented the taxes, continual fresh issues of bank notes became necessary to keep up the exchange of the increased prices of every necessary and luxury of life, and to pay the accumulating interest on the loans. The consequence of which has been, that, as guineas do not increase so fast as bank notes, the latter have driven the former out of circulation.—There is a certain quantity of money necessary for the exchange and circulation of the trade of the whole empire, and there should subsist a mutual balance in value between bills and cash, for them to obtain a like currency together. In what way has the issuing of such immense numbers of bank notes, and the restriction on the bank of England, operated to the depreciation of their notes, and the withdrawing, or rather annihilating the appearance of guineas in circulation? I believe it will be allowed, that, if there was an equal quantity in value of cash and bills in circulation, every note would then have its correspondent value, and might be readily exchanged for cash; but as there is only a certain amount of money necessary to carry on the trade of the kingdom, and supposing there is a sufficiency and an equal value in bills and cash to answer this purpose, what must the natural consequence be of doubling, or quadrupling, the number of notes, and not the cash? Why, to be sure, the guineas become unnecessary, being superseded by the excessive number of notes. The guineas will be hoarded, and not the notes, and soon find their way into bankers, or merchants hands. But as guineas are precious things, and the banker or merchant,

who has ten or twenty thousand of them by him, will not chuse, I should imagine, to let them lay long dormant in his iron chest, but set his wits to work how to turn them to profit, which, if he cannot do at home, he well knows that foreigners are as much enamoured of his majesty's likeness in the shape of a guinea, as natives. There is such a warmth in the colouring, such weight and strength in the composition, that it is next to an impossibility they should resist the temptation of admiring, beholding, and handling the elegant portrait of king George the third, and this propensity we find is indulged in spite of prohibitory laws and penalties on the exportation of guineas.—With respect to the bank of England not continuing to pay their notes in cash, it arose, as I apprehend, from the country being deluged with promissory notes of one kind and another, more than sufficient for the circulation of the kingdom (as specie is of more intrinsic value than paper, arising from its nature, as well as being a universal medium) the consequence was, so long as the immense number of bank notes afloat could be exchanged for cash, a continual run upon the bank for payment, so that if it had continued the payment of cash for its notes, in all probability, before a very long period, the bank would have been drained of every guinea in it; and this demand upon the bank, in my opinion, shews that bank paper was then beginning to be depreciated and the present cause of its value and slow depreciation, arise from the payments of the revenue of the country being made by it. Thus, it become, the representative of real property, taken from the public, to pay the interest of the national debt, and carry on the war.—The effect of the national debt, or immense revenue levied on the nation, has been, and still continues to be, an increase in the price of every commodity; but, when every necessary of life advances, labour advances likewise, and this again advances the article produced, or manufactured; and thus every tax ultimately falls on the consumer; but, as taxes increase, the means of the public must keep pace with them, else they remain unproductive; and, as they are productive, a further advance of every thing takes place; the consequence is, more bank notes are required to keep up the exchange, and a further reduction of their value, in comparison with specie is the consequence.—Although the above observations contain

many well known truisms, yet I thought they might be useful, in order to lay a foundation on which some abler pen might build a further superstructure.—I remain, Sir, your most obedient servant, THO. BERNARD, *Mitchelmarsh, Sept. 28, 1809.*

PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

To the Author of "An Impartial Examination of Sir F. Burdett's Plan of Parliamentary Reform," published by Bone and Hone.

Enfield, 31st August, 1809.

Sir;—The tenour of your "Examination" evincing your respect for the liberties of your country, that respect on your part will, I trust, insure me your thanks, if I shall convince you that, in one very important particular, you have not only misconceived the meaning of the baronet, but have likewise misunderstood a fundamental principle of the English government.—It appears, Sir, from pp. 9, 14, 22, &c. you take for granted that a parliament of "constitutional duration" must be a triennial parliament; which I am inclined to believe is not the opinion of sir F. Burdett; as I trust I shall convince you, that it is not consistent with the constitution.—Had we, Sir, in politics, as we have in religion, a written covenant or testament, a simple reference might in a moment decide this question: But, denied such aid, we must, in the first place, endeavour to ascertain, by definition and facts, what the constitution is; and then refer to it for a decision. The constitution then may be defined to be, 'Certain points of national agreement touching civil government, and those principles on which the security of our national rights depends.' Respecting points of national agreement, I shall go no further than merely to notice, that, for the originating of laws, the nation has agreed on a legislature of king, lords, and commons; and, for the application of laws, on trial by jury; in one of which the law is made, and in the other administered, by representatives; whence it appears that representation is the great leading principle of our polity.

Parliamentary Representation and Political Liberty are convertible terms: But Representation is far less a personal than a social right: And it has relation, not only to a constituent body of electors, but likewise to time. No individual freeholder can properly declare: 'I elected

'A. B. member for the county; and therefore he is my representative.' But the collective body may correctly say, 'We chose him; and therefore he is our representative.'

Then again, when we speak of the freeholders of Middlesex, or other county, as a constituent body, there are two distinct senses in which we may use the phrase; for we may either mean the freeholders who at the time or period of speaking compose the body, or we may mean the body politic of the county as a permanent community, without reference to the individuals who at the time or period of speaking happen to compose that body. But it must be apparent that the freeholders who, at the period of an election, shall have a right to choose a person to represent their county, cannot, by virtue of that election, confer on the chosen person a right of representing a succeeding generation of the freeholders. In the nature of things, there must therefore be some limit in point of time, or duration, to the authority of parliamentary representatives.—How, Sir, shall we arrive at a correct idea of this limit? Shall we, like too many, put entirely out of our consideration the constitution, and prescribe a limit according to our own fancy or judgment? Surely not! Such limit cannot be thought to depend on any imagined expediency in the opinion of this, or of that man; but must be founded on some principle of free government. Not, Sir, that expediency is to be wholly disregarded: no; it is to be duly, but not exclusively considered; so that it may go hand in hand with justice and liberty.

With reference then to expediency, we ought to remember, that we are subject to seasons which yearly run their course, and dependent on the earth for yearly bread. Hence it is found expedient, yearly to till that earth; yearly to regulate human concerns, public as well as private; yearly to legislate, yearly to tax, yearly to settle accounts. We in this country also know, that such is become the magnitude of the national business, a considerable portion of every year is required for the labours of legislation. Hence we are taught that, for being provided against all contingents, the duration of parliamentary power ought not to be much, if any thing, short of a year; while we must know there could be no use, but might be great danger, if it were to be longer continued, as the faithful representative might, and

naturally would be, repeatedly re-elected, it could not be even expedient, that he should hold his office beyond the term of one year: and if he became unfaithful, it were a monstrous doctrine, that he should nevertheless continue to represent a community he betrayed. So far therefore as expediency is concerned, it is clearly in favour of annual parliaments.

Let us now examine the claims of Principle, that is, of justice and political liberty. Man's age being universally reckoned by the revolution of the seasons, or years; and every one entering upon his inheritance, equally in property and in political liberty, or his elective franchise, as soon as the period of his infancy or minority has expired; it is evident that any practice which militates against this right, and prevents this enjoyment, must be contrary to the constitution; or to 'those principles on which the security of our natural rights depends.' If the principle of duration be violated, then, whether a parliament have continuance for 3 years or for 7, for 17 or for 70, the violation is alike unjust; and all the difference will only be, in the degree of injustice. For when a parliament hath continuance beyond one year, then all those thousands of thousands, hundreds of thousands, or tens of thousands, (as the case may be) who, since the last preceding election, have attained the legal age for inheriting their elective franchise, and entering into the full enjoyment of political liberty, are unjustly denied a most sacred right, and kept out of an inheritance which is the very basis of all liberty and property.

If it be unjust to suspend the nation's enjoyment of this right and this liberty for six parts in seven of human life, it must be alike unjust to suspend it for two parts in three. When, Sir, you shall have considered this reasoning, I trust you will revolt at the notion of triennial parliaments. And if, Sir, we wish to know what our ancestors considered as a parliament's "constitutional duration," we have only to open the Statute Book in the 4th and 36th years of Edw. III, in both of which years a confirmation of Magna Charta having been part of the work in parliament, here is proof that the doctrine there laid down, touching parliaments themselves, was intended to shew forth the constitution in respect of them. In the first of these years it was accorded, "that a parliament shall be holden every year once, or

"more often if need be:" And in the second it was enacted, "that a parliament shall be holden every year, as another time was accorded by statute."—The words are "a parliament," that is, not a part, a fraction, a session, but a whole parliament; and in this sense the phrase of "a parliament," in contradistinction to a session, is in the Statute Book used to this day.—Hence it is most surprizing, that a person possessing the ability of a Blackstone should fall into so gross an error, as to remark, that by the aforesaid statutes of Edw. III, the king is bound to convoke a parliament "every year, or oftener, if need be. Not that he is, or ever was, obliged by these statutes to call a new parliament every year; but only to permit": [a pretty expression in a free country] "a parliament to sit annually for the redress of grievances, and dispatch of business." Comm. b. 1. c. 2.—It is surprizing, I say, how a Blackstone could do such violence to just criticism in so plain a case; because he must have known that when in those days parliaments were "convened" twice, or thrice, or four times in a year, it invariably was, in every instance, by a new writ; and that consequently the king was obliged, by those statutes, to call a new parliament every year.

This is apparent, not merely from the fact of the regular issuing of new writs, but also from their contents. A parliament was convened to consult on the "great and weighty affairs" which occasioned the summons. Having dispatched the same, which rarely required many days, there was no longer a cause of continuance, and the parliament was then of course dissolved; for prorogations were not then invented, nor for several ages afterwards. Hence it is clear, that in the ideas of our forefathers of that age, parliaments of a "constitutional duration," were sessional parliaments, for none other could have entered into the imaginations of the authors of those statutes.

The "great and weighty affairs" of the nation, in our days, necessarily occupy a parliament for a large portion of every year; and as more than one parliament in one year would be evidently unnecessary, burthensome, and extremely inconvenient, so we are now warranted in remarking that parliaments ought to be annual, and to have continuance for the whole year, or very nearly so, as a provision against sudden and unexpected contin-

gencies, which might arise out of the ordinary session: But that a longer duration, being utterly contrary to the constitution, and inconsistent with national liberty, ought never to be endured.

Swift, who in the case before us was as well qualified as Blackstone, to understand the recited statutes of Edw. III, not only construed them, in respect of the duration of parliaments, as I do, but held them in religious veneration. "I adore," says he, "the wisdom of that Gothic institution, which made them annual; and I was confident our liberty could never be placed upon a firm foundation, until that antient law was restored among us." After language so decisive of his opinion, how unaccountable was his carelessness when in the same breath he says, "the commerce of corruption between the ministry and the deputies, would neither answer the design nor the expence, if parliament met once a year." But still this word, "met," no more than the word, "holden," in the statutes of Edw. III, can cause any real obscurity in the passage here quoted.—The opinion, Sir, of Swift, is the more worthy of your regard, as he was cotemporary with triennial parliaments from first to last, and knew them well; and when, only four years after their departure, he thus gives his opinion, it is evidently with no small disgust at the recollection of their turpitude, that he contemplated annual parliaments with so much enthusiasm. He well knew both the origin and the exit of triennial parliaments to have been foul and tyrannical. The Convention Parliament, which accomplished the Revolution, first assembled in February, 1689, (according to our present stile) and continued for the remainder of that year. The succeeding parliament commenced in March 1690; when it soon appeared that William and this parliament shewed as little respect for the constitution, or for the fundamental laws of the land, as Charles and his Pensioner Parliament had done; for William disloyally continued this parliament, without the smallest regard to a "constitutional duration," and the commons had the treachery to sit for four years and a half. One year before their dissolution they passed the Triennial Act, purporting to enable the crown to keep the same parliament together for any term not exceeding three years. Thus these men, who, for the most part, had been active in expelling from the throne and kingdom the Stuart

race of kings, for tyranny and misgovernment, by a tyranny as flagrant as the worst act of those despots, passed an act of parliament to deprive the nation of its political liberty, for two years in every three. Such was a triennial parliament's origin!

After an existence of three and twenty years, a triennial parliament discovered, that the lengthening of parliaments beyond their constitutional duration, had "proved very grievous and burthensome, "by occasioning much greater and more "continued expences, in order to elections "of members to serve in parliament, and "more violent and lasting heats and animosities among the subjects of this "realm, than ever were known before:" but, instead of recurring to the constitution and its short parliaments, as the proper and obvious cure of the evils complained of, they, with singular effrontery, and in direct contradiction to their own reasoning in the preamble, pass an Act, for giving all subsequent Parliaments "continuance for seven years." Such was a triennial parliament's foul and treacherous exit!

As to the character of triennial parliaments, their historian hath told us, that "when the ministry was in alliance with "the Whigs, the majority of both houses "was Whig; when with the Tories, they "became Tory."—In short, all was craft, faction, and perfidy. About the time of passing the Triennial Bill, some such member as Colonel Wardle "set on foot "an enquiry into their own venalities, "which opened such a scene of iniquity, "as, in the comparison, made the Pen-sioner Parliament of king Charles II, "seem innocent *."

I have thus, Sir, laid before you what I know, and what I think, of triennial parliaments; and sorry have I been to find any friend of liberty, at this crisis, either the advocate or the apologist for such parliaments. Some there are who rejecting them in principle, as unconstitutional, do yet recommend a return to them in the way of Reform, as a step towards a recovery of our liberties; on an assumed notion that the nation will be more desirous of triennial than of annual parliaments; and as if all experience did not prove the folly of attempting, against a gigantic state corruption, which confers

on an oligarchy of usurpers sovereign power, a step-by-step Reformation! To this assumption, and to this conduct, I have amongst many others, nine substantial objections, which I will now state: 1. I am myself no prophet, and therefore cannot foreknow that the Nation would act contrary to common sense, and the principle of self-preservation. 2. I do not believe that these prophesying persons are themselves prophets. 3. I cannot reconcile it to myself to recommend a positive evil, and a gross violation of the constitution, on a mere baseless surmise (contrary to experience) of its leading to a possible good. 4. I am not for attempting to cheat, delude, and mislead the nation, by preaching corrupt doctrine, and setting an unconstitutional example, while at the same time I am ignorantly imputing to that nation folly and baseness, and a preference in its own case, of injustice to justice, slavery to freedom. 5. Had I evidence of the nation's folly, apathy, and inclination to servitude, it should seem more worthy of English gentlemen to enlighten, to animate, and to rouse their countrymen, by the honest words of truth, and the spirit-stirring influence of manly exertion in the cause of obvious liberty; than to become the benumbing teachers of ignorance, and the puerile authors of sneaking measures, which are just as likely to wrest from the corrupt grasp of the accursed borough faction, our mangled constitution, as our pretty little armies are likely to wrest from the gigantic grasp of Buonaparté, the Iberian peninsula, without first insisting on it, as a *sine qua non* condition, that not a single English soldier shall be remaining on Iberian ground, unless the governments of Spain and Portugal shall be radically reformed, and the people completely emancipated. 6. As it is most certain there will be no Parliamentary Reform at all, until loudly called for by the public voice, it will be as easy for that voice, when it do speak, to thunder the word "annual," as to mumble the word "triennial." 7. As truth and liberty address themselves to the human understanding and heart, with infinitely more force than error and abasement, so the nation may far more easily be roused to exertion for a real, visible, tangible, birthright freedom, made the immediate prize of manly exertion; than persuaded to contend in shackles for a something of which they can have no distinct conception, and consequently no strong feeling;

S

* Detection of the Parliament of England, I. 121, 160, 163.

a something which at best can only be explained to be an approximation to an amelioration of their condition; at which approximation to an amelioration of their condition, they may hope their grandchildren, or later descendants, will arrive; that is, when the borough faction can be reasoned into honesty and justice. 8. Thirty years ago, when the cry for a triennial parliament did (in my recorded judgment at the time) paralyze the patriotism of the nation, that cry might have its apology in our being then only on the threshold of discussion: But after that discussion has teemed with unanswerable arguments against any thing so unconstitutional, the revival of such cry at this time, would, in my opinion, be little short of insanity, and a presumptive proof that our liberties were gone beyond redemption. 9thly and lastly: The subduer of kingdoms and empires is abroad. No state has yet proved itself able to resist him; because in none which he has attacked, had the people the blessing of liberty, to make their state worth fighting for. England's turn is not distant. England therefore, must immediately determine to be free, or prepare her neck for the French yoke.

Such, Sir, is my reasoning; And I mean it to apply, not only to the mischievous error of aiming at a triennial parliament, but against all half-measures—the offspring of indistinct conceptions and timidity—and all proposals of circuitous courses for recovering our liberties. For such courses we have no time. Such counsels are therefore out of season. The crisis of our fate demands an instant decision: we must be now free, or never.

I subscribe myself, Sir,
your obedient servant,
JOHN CARTWRIGHT.

THE EDINBURGH REVIEWERS.

Sir;—Although the sentiments of the *Edinburgh Reviewers* were formerly known to be against the principle of Parliamentary Reform, yet, it was hoped, by some of the friends of that measure, who considered that the talents of these journalists might have been a tower of strength to the cause, that the growing pressure of our pecuniary burdens; the daily, hourly, increasing embarrassments, and danger of our political situation; and more than all, the base and shameless devotion of the house of commons to the views of the

ministry, so strongly exemplified during the last session of parliament; might have weakened their faith in the present “practice and true principles of the constitution,” which they have so elaborately extolled in an article on Cobbett’s Register in 1807, and that they might have been led to doubt the efficacy of that system of kingly and aristocratical influence in the house of commons, which they have represented as essential to the very existence of the constitution itself. But no, the *Edinburgh Reviewers*, whether from a desire to maintain their consistency,—a seeming want of which in others had so strongly excited their indignation, or whether, (and it is with some degree of pain that we admit the supposition,)—lured to their former opinions, by the hope, at no very distant time, of *again* basking in the sunshine of ministerial power, and which, under another system, might be less genial to plants of Scottish growth; whether, I say, it were these or what other motive that secured their attachment to the present order of things, we presume not to decide: the fact is apparent that they have defended their doctrine, in their last number, with all the force of their eloquence, and with every exertion of their talent and ingenuity.—It were hopeless to attempt to follow them through the windings, and shiftings of the lengthened and studied defence of their creed. To separate truth from fallacy, and sound argument from sophistry, when blended with such skilful hands, is an operation too difficult to be undertaken but by men of strong heads, and laborious habits. The few cursory observations we shall make on the general nature and effect of their doctrine, we hope, may induce the admirers of these celebrated critics, to peruse with great caution their political tenets, and to doubt at least the purity of their constitutional principles, whatever may be their opinions of their skill in criticism, or the extent of their literary acquirements.—The *Edinburgh Reviewers* have taken care in the pursuit of their argument, to soften down the asperity of their opposition to the reformers, by occasional concessions, and friendly professions towards a partial alteration in the house of commons: but their professions and their assumed tone of sincerity in wishing to see all the abuses of the government purged away, may be looked upon as mere rhetorical artifice, intended to entrap the unwary into an acknowledgment of

their principles; and they are in fact as decidedly adverse to an effectual Parliamentary Reform, as Mr. Perceval, or any of the present, or would-be ministers themselves. They are mere temporizers, soothing the country under its present afflictions, but without a wish to remove the cause of them.—The impression that their late article on this subject is calculated to make, is; That *any* reform must be inadequate to remove, or materially to lighten the weight of taxes under which the country is sinking; That these taxes, and all their consequent evils; have arisen from the prosecution of wars undoubtedly popular, and that the people have, therefore, only themselves to blame for their accumulated grievances; That the present mode of electing representatives to parliament, and the present manner of influencing them when so elected, is not only legal, and right, but is, in fact, the judicious practice, and true principles of the constitution: And that to attempt any reform is dangerous, and unnecessary, as the present system, under wise and provident leaders, is fully equal to the removal of those abuses, which are the most unpopular and irritating; (what abuses are not unpopular we are yet to learn;) and that we may hope at some future period, with such leaders, for a reduction of our public debt, a curtailment of our establishments, and a more economical expenditure of the national resources.—This then is all the consolation that these acute reasoners and able logicians, in the abundance of their legislative wisdom, are able to administer to the drooping spirits of the nation! They moreover inform us, that “in the present state of things it is the obvious policy of a minister to be economical in his measures,” and which policy, “is full as good a security for their adoption, as the warmer zeal and higher sense of duty of a reformed legislature.” So then we are to rest our security from further oppression in the shape of taxes, not upon the sense of duty of our rulers, or their desire to be economical, but upon the necessity of their being careful of the existing revenue of the public; the people having nothing more to give, or they to expect. Rest satisfied, therefore, ye people of England, with your governors present and to come, for the Edinburgh Reviewers assure us, that having screwed from you almost your last penny, their “obvious policy” is to make the most of what they now get!—In what relates to

the popularity of the wars which have unquestionably brought upon the country its present embarrassments, the Edinburgh Reviewers must pardon us if we require other proof than their bare assertion of their having been so. They would however gain nothing by a full admission of the fact; for it is the extravagant, unnecessary, and corrupt expenditure of their money, of which the people complain, and not of any spirited and liberal application of their resources. The popular voice, supposing it to exist, may be a good reason for entering upon a war, but can never be a justification of the improvidence and corruption of public men in the conduct of it. But we deny altogether that any of the wars alluded to were called for by the people; and we consider the delusion of a popular cry to be one of the degrading means by which the country has been betrayed into its misfortunes, and the propagation of which, may always be looked upon as a most artful and powerful auxiliary of a polluted administration. It has hitherto been an easy matter; but we hope that day is now past, for the government to give an appearance of popularity to all its political schemes. The moment a measure was resolved upon, the ministerial emissaries were let loose to counteract and overwhelm opposition before it could well appear. The innumerable public prints, and hireling scribblers; connected with the leaders of national affairs, immediately extolled the wisdom and necessity of the thing. Not only in the metropolis, but in the provincial towns, and villages, the whole host of greedy expectants, whether in black, red, or grey coats, gave vent to these intolerable rabble in vindication of their political patrons, the distributors of the loaves and fishes. These swarms of pestilential insects, that fatten upon the offal, as it were, of the public plunder which drops from their superiors, infest every society, and buzz around and poison every social company into which they can by any means thrust their heads. Such have been the tricks of every ruling junto, since that blessed time which introduced ministerial influence into the house of commons; that precious period which the Edinburgh Reviewers hail as the birth-day of “regular freedom.” But this is not the voice of the people: that voice is never appealed to, but is lost in the hubbub, and senseless clamour of contractors, speculators, place-hunters, and their sneaking tribe of fol-

lowers. The good sense and honesty of the country retire abashed, and ashamed of such company, and suffer quietly the growing injuries brought upon them by this cormorant crew, rather than encounter open insult, and brutal violence: But this disgraceful apathy cannot, nor ought not, to continue much longer. Truth and honesty must triumph at last. Had Mr. Pitt listened in 1793 to the real voice of the nation, and distrusted a little the suggestions of his own political wisdom, or vanity, he would scarcely have plunged the country into a war, merely on account of the paltry provocations of the then unstable and mad government of France. But Mr. Pitt falsely calculated upon humbling this haughty enemy, and upon himself cutting a brilliant figure in the negotiations of Europe. If instead of upholding this measure by extravagant exaggerations of the danger of French principles, and French revolutions, he had kept a tight hand upon the few factions at home, and had conceded to the just demands of the major and reasonable part of the country; redressed their grievances, and regulated the representation, even according to his own expressed judgment, he would have established his fame on a much more solid foundation than it rests upon at the present day. It is from this time that we are to date the rapid accumulation of our most pressing calamities. The rupture of Addington's treaty was evidently popular, because to abide by it was evidently more dangerous than war. It is the same conviction that upholds the popularity of the war at this moment; it is popular by necessity; if that can be said to be popular which admits not of a choice. But we are not hence to conclude, that the people are accessory to their own degradation, because they acquiesce in an unavoidable evil. So far from the people being at any time anxious or clamorous for war, it may be securely laid down as a principle that the real popular sentiment of all countries is ever in opposition to begin war under any circumstances. When a war is once begun, it is true, that the people may be artfully led by a thousand ways to give it in appearance their sanction. Even the best feelings of their nature; honour, national-pride, patriotism, may be entrapped into this service. But it would be highly unjust, therefore, to reproach them with being the cause of the distresses which the result might bring upon them. As well might the people of

England be said to have dictated the miserable policy which has marked our conduct towards Spain, because it was the universal and animated wish of the nation to afford effectual assistance and relief to that unhappy country.—The present system of administering the English constitution is said by the reviewers to be "expedient." It is pretended that the three great balancing powers of king, lords, and commons, cannot perform their operations with smoothness and effect without narrowing the sphere of their action, and concentrating their force in the house of commons; and this is to prevent those rude collisions which have heretofore subverted the monarchy. This union of the three great controuling powers, which is in fact a collusion against the people, they have the barefacedness to denominate the "true principles of the English constitution." They might as well have said at once, what would scarcely have deserved more contempt; that in order to secure the people from the effects of corruption, is to make it more certain, and practicable, by making it easier to be accomplished. It is no information or satisfaction to us to be told that this has been the practice since the era of the Revolution. We know it has, and we also know full well the consequences. It is because it has so long been practised, and that it does at this moment exist, that we complain: nor shall we cease to complain till it is remedied, that is, till a free and full representation of the people is established. The *Edinburgh Reviewers* may flourish their eloquence as much as they please on the weakness and corruption of human nature, and on the impossibility of making any alteration for the better, in the house of commons, so long as it is so. We think that there is, at least, as much reason, and philosophy too, in the plan that goes to remove temptation out of its way, as in that which professes to establish a basis of corruption upon principle, and then justifies its pernicious effects on the plea of expediency.—To support this argument, they, as well as all others who have advanced it, have recourse to the examples which occurred in the reign of the Stuarts. It is triumphantly asserted that their misfortunes are to be attributed to an attempt to abide by the theory of the constitution, and neglecting to establish an influence in the house of commons: while the abominable attempts of the whole of this family to overturn the constitution altogether, are

carefully kept out of sight. Hume, who is the acknowledged apologist of the Stuarts, does not however venture to legitimate this practice in their behalf. And in his *Essays on Government*, where it is to be remembered that he speaks speculatively, though he thinks that the king must have an influence there, to counteract the omnipotence of the commons, it never entered his head that the aristocracy must have one also; and he is particularly cautious to state the difficulty of pointing out the due proportion to be allowed, and even laments the impossibility of doing so with any degree of certainty or efficacy: "There is," says he, "in this case a peculiar difficulty, which would embarrass the most knowing, and most impartial examiner."—Mr. Laing too, in his history, though he points out the neglect of this measure as the cause of the unhappy convulsions which agitated the country in the reign of the Stuarts, he is far from recommending it, like the Edinburgh Reviewers, either as a necessary or a constitutional proceeding. Both these historians have on the other hand bestowed upon the Stuarts the general character, they so justly deserved, of being arbitrary and bigoted to the last degree. In fact the whole period of their reign was an attempt to establish absolute power, and to destroy those rights and privileges of the people, which they had sworn to maintain inviolate. Are we then to illustrate new maxims of government, and to justify encroachments upon the English Constitution, from examples of this nature? Could the Stuarts have been satisfied to have reigned according to the laws of England, their posterity might at this moment have been on its throne, and, by so reigning, the Edinburgh Reviewers would have been deprived of the opportunity of exercising their ingenuity at the expense of their judgment and candour, in defending a system which in their consciences they cannot approve.—There is one artifice in great vogue with the opposers of Parliamentary Reform, and which the Edinburgh Reviewers practise in common with the rest, which ought not to escape notice. It is by constantly praising, and keeping the public attention fixed upon the degree of liberty we enjoy, and the impartial distribution of justice in this our happy country. They do not perhaps recollect that we owe that impartial distribution chiefly, if not solely, to the ministers of justice being unconnected with that precious "influence," which is the idol of

their wishes. And they choose to forget, that while we have freedom of speech, and liberty of person, we are daily deprived of those comforts which make the latter an enjoyment; and that the former, when not prostituted to the basest purposes, is unhappily more in use to complain of our grievances than to extol the blessings derived from our "invaluable" constitution. The secret of this mode of conduct may be traced in the following words of the Edinburgh Reviewers, which may be referred to in the 10th Vol. p. 277, of their political lucubrations.—"Those who expect to see a nation rise as one man, in consequence of the gradual and regular increase of their pecuniary burthens, must found their hopes upon histories of human affairs, and views of human nature, which the rest of the world are not in possession of."—Being safe, therefore, on this head, they consider that the only thing necessary to secure a smooth and easy current to the present or any system of government, is to avoid shocking too rudely the public mind by any alarming encroachments on its liberty; and to leave it unmolested in the possession of its popular opinions, and prejudices. It is possible, however, that even these Machiavelian expounders may be out in their calculations.

R.

Staffordshire, 1st Oct. 1809.

STATE OF SPAIN.

Sir;—How little it can be expected that the people of Spain will rise in mass to resist the French, we may draw a pretty accurate conclusion from the following passages in FISCHER'S *PICTURE OF VALENCIA* (translated from the German, written in 1802, lately published).—Page 172. "IMPOSTS. These are divided into royal and manorial. The former are very inconsiderable, and are confined to what is here called the equivalent, which is a very moderate tax on income. [Valencia is not subject to the *sisas* or the *milliones*, or in general to the oppressive *rentas provinciales*, which are exacted in the provinces belonging to the crown of Castile.] The latter are more oppressive than in any other province of Spain. They consist in the appropriation in kind, sometimes of a fifth or sixth, at others even of one fourth, or one third of the *whole produce* of the toil of the industrious husbandman. To this must be added, a great number of privileges or rather usurpations, such as

privileged presses, ovens, shops and posadas, which are likewise extremely oppressive.—The origin of those barbarous rights must be sought in the ancient feudal system. After the conquest of Valencia in 1238, the kings of Arragon divided the lands among their nobles, who assumed the right of taxing their vassals at their own discretion.—The total expulsion of the Moors in 1609, produced no alteration in this system.—The farmer of this country, notwithstanding the fertility of the soil, and his own indefatigable exertions, is never able to acquire a decent competence.—Can it be surprising, that, weary of such oppression, he should more than once have risen against the nobility and the landed proprietors in general, and should have demanded the abolition of those rights, which might with more propriety be denominated unjust usurpations?—Should, however, a revolution break out at some future period in Spain, these oppressions will, doubtless, furnish the first occasion for it. The events of 1802, are still fresh in the recollection of every reader. The government took the greatest pains to conceal them: for they were of a much more serious nature than is generally supposed.”

B. C.

MERCHANTS IN THE ISLAND OF ST. THOMAS.

Sir;—It is a fact of public notoriety that British subjects, are by their government, permitted and encouraged to reside in neutral countries, into which they annually import British manufactured goods to a considerable amount, and which (by residing under a neutral flag) they are enabled to introduce into the colonies of our enemies.—The amount of British manufactured goods, that, in time of war, are, by these means, forced into the colonies of our enemies, is truly astonishing; and is consequently highly advantageous to the English nation.—The hides, coffee, cotton, and indigo, which were received from the Spaniards and others in payment of the British goods which were disposed of to them, (under the protection of the neutral flag) were shipped to England, the duties on which paid a very large revenue (and independent of the shipping employed) was of course highly beneficial to the nation.—The profits, which in the course of time, were realized by the merchant, in prosecuting this trade, were finally

vested, either in the funds, or in the lands, purchased in Great Britain, for the Englishman, (whose habits and modes of life seldom coincide with those of foreigners) invariably keeps his eye fixed on his native soil, and anxiously counts the days that he is compelled to absent himself from that country and those friends, to whom he is so strongly attached. This trade, it appears then, was equally beneficial to the English government; and to the individual who carried it on; but while the merchant is engaged in his accustomed pursuits, he is surprized by a sudden declaration of war; his ships and property are overtaken at sea, (for at the time of their sailing even the possibility of a war could not have been foreseen); he is carried into an Admiralty Court, where that property, which would ultimately have been sent to England, and would have paid for those very British manufactured goods, (which under the neutral flag, he had been introducing among our enemies) is condemned as being the property of an enemy!!! These, Sir, are no imaginary evils, but a true and faithful statement of the consequences which befel many English subjects, who resided in the Danish West India islands, previous to the late declaration of war against Denmark, and a reference to the records of the West India Admiralty Courts, will but too strongly corroborate the fact.—The foregoing statement, although but an outline of the subject, will, Sir, I trust, be sufficient to engage the attention of government to the excessive hardship of the case; but here, Sir, unfortunately, the evil does not rest: the advantages which belonged to this port formerly, of course ceased with its neutrality; but the extravagant fees, and charges of office, which have been imposed since its capture, do in fact amount to nearly a prohibition to any vessels entering this once flourishing, but now ruined port.—I am, Sir,

St. Thomas, July 1, 1809.

A. B.

Correspondence between MR. PERCEVAL, AND LORDS GREY AND GRENVILLE.

No. I.—*Letter sent in duplicate to Earl Grey and Lord Grenville.*

Windsor, Saturday, Sept. 23, 1809.

My Lord—The Duke of Portland having signified to his Majesty his intention of retiring from his Majesty's service, in consequence of the state of his Grace's

health, his Majesty has authorized Lord Liverpool, in conjunction with myself, to communicate with your Lordship and Lord Grey, for the purpose of forming an extended and combined Administration.—I hope, therefore, that your Lordship, in consequence of this communication, will come to town, in order that as little time as possible may be lost in forwarding this important object, and that you will have the goodness to inform me of your arrival.—I am also to acquaint your Lordship, that I have received his Majesty's commands to make a similar communication to Lord Grey of his Majesty's pleasure.—I think it proper to add, for your Lordship's information, that Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Secretary Canning have intimated their intentions to resign their offices.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

SPENCER PERCEVAL.

No. II.—*Answer from Earl Grey.*

Howick, Sept. 26.

Sir,—I have this evening had the honour of receiving your letter of the 23rd, informing me, that, in consequence of the Duke of Portland's intention of retiring from his Majesty's service, his Majesty had authorised you, in conjunction with the Earl of Liverpool, to communicate with Lord Grenville and myself, for the purpose of forming an extended and combined Administration, and expressing a hope, that, in consequence of this communication, I would go to town, in order that as little time as possible may be lost in forwarding this important object.—Had his Majesty been pleased to signify that he had any commands for me personally, I should not have lost a moment in shewing my duty and obedience, by a prompt attendance on his royal pleasure.—But when it is proposed to me to communicate with his Majesty's present Ministers, for the purpose of forming a combined Administration with them, I feel that I should be wanting in duty to his Majesty, and in fairness to them, if I did not frankly and at once declare, that such an union is, with respect to me, under the present circumstances, impossible. This being the answer that I find myself under the necessity of giving, my appearance in London could be of no advantage, and might possibly, at a moment like the present, be attended with some inconvenience.—I have thought it better to request, that you will have the goodness to lay my duty at the feet of his

Majesty, humbly entreating him not to attribute to any want of attachment to his Royal Person, or to diminished zeal for his service, my declining a communication, which, on the terms proposed, could lead to no useful result, and which might be of serious detriment to the country, if, in consequence of a less decisive answer from me, any further delay should take place in the formation of a settled government.

I am, &c.

GREY.

No. III.—*First Answer from Lord Grenville.*

Bocconoc, Sept. 25, 1809.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 23rd instant, and understanding it as an official signification of his Majesty's pleasure for my attendance in town, I shall lose no time in repairing thither, in humble obedience to his Majesty's commands.—I must beg leave to defer, until my arrival, all observations on the other matters to which your letter relates.

I have, &c.

GRENVILLE.

No. IV.—*Second Answer from Lord Grenville.*

Sept. 29, 1809.

Sir,—Having last night arrived here, in humble obedience to his Majesty's commands, I think it now my duty to lose no time in expressing to you the necessity under which I feel myself of declining the communication proposed in your letter; being satisfied that it could not, under the circumstances there mentioned, be productive of any public advantage.—I trust I need not say, that this opinion is neither founded in any sentiment of personal hostility, nor in a desire of unnecessarily prolonging political differences.—To compose, not to inflame the divisions of the Empire, has always been my anxious wish, and is now more than ever the duty of every loyal subject; but my accession to the existing Administration could, I am confident, in no respect contribute to this object; nor could it, I think, be considered in any other light than as a dereliction of public principle.—This answer, which I must have given to any such proposal if made while the Government was yet entire, cannot be varied by the retreat of some of its Members.—My objections are not personal—they apply to the principle of the Government itself, and to the cir-

cumstances which attended its appointment.—I have now, therefore, only to request, that you will do me the honour of submitting, in the most respectful terms, these my humble opinions to his Majesty, accompanied by the dutiful and sincere assurance of my earnest desire at all times to testify, by all such means as are in my power, my unvaried zeal for his Majesty's service.

I have, &c.

GRENVILLE.

No. V.—*Letter from Mr. Perceval to Lord Grenville.*

Sept. 29, 1809.

My Lord;—I lost no time in communicating to Lord Liverpool your Lordship's letter of this day.—It is with great concern that we have learnt from it, that your Lordship feels yourself under the necessity of declining the communication which I have had the honour to propose.—In proposing to your Lordship and Lord Grey, under his Majesty's authority, to communicate with Lord Liverpool and myself, not for the accession of your Lordship to the present Administration, but for the purpose of forming a combined and extended Administration, no idea existed in our minds of the necessity of any dereliction of public principle on either side.—Your Lordship may rest assured, that in communicating to his Majesty the necessity under which you feel yourself of declining the communication which I had the honour to propose to your Lordship, I will do every justice to the respectful terms, and the dutiful and sincere assurance of your Lordship's unvaried zeal for his Majesty's service, with which the expression of that necessity was accompanied.—I cannot conclude without expressing the satisfaction of Lord Liverpool and myself at your Lordship's assurance, that the failure of this proposal is not to be ascribed to any sentiment of personal hostility.

I have, &c. &c.

SP. PERCEVAL.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPANISH PAPERS.—*Official Account, by General Cuesta, of the Battle of Talavera, to the Secretary at War, dated Seville, Sept. 7.*

Most Excellent Sir;—I removed my head-quarters on the 21st current, to Velada, according to what I mentioned in my former dispatch of the same night.

This communication was made after I had seen at Oropesa, in the evening of that day, the gallant and illustrious army of the English.—These forces having all reunited in that town, I ordered my vanguard to be placed before Velada, concluding that the firing I then discovered, was a skirmishing of our parties with an advanced body of the enemy, stationed at that time in the district of Gamonal, two leagues distant from Talavera, and which in the sequel was routed and pursued to Casar. At break of day on the 22nd, my army being assembled in the extensive plain between Velada and Talavera, I directed that the vanguard, under the intrepid Chief Brigadier-General Don Josef de Zayas, should charge the enemy, who had been reinforced with the division of cavalry of General Latour Maubourg, and I directed that the divisions of infantry and cavalry should march in close order, that thus advancing towards Talavera, they might resist the attack, if the French should endeavour to force the entrance to this place, as they seemed to have determined. The dispatch of Zayas, No. 1. sent by this opportunity, will give you a perfect knowledge of what occurred on that morning. [This communication is promised in a new Supplement to the Seville Gazette, but was not published at the time of the departure of the vessel.]—The whole army followed the vanguard, passing by Talavera, and took up a position in the olive grounds, between that town, and the river Alberche.—The British army on the night of the 21st, marched from Oropesa, and on the following morning, united with us, and while the vanguard attacked and repulsed the enemy, the English also filed off by Talavera, to take up a position on our left, according to the plan agreed. It was, Most Excellent Sir, a magnificent exhibition, when we saw the combined armies in a plain of two leagues extent, advancing upon the enemy, and most brilliant and gratifying was the admirable order, firmness and gallantry, with which this movement was performed by our allies. The whole evening of the 22nd we were reconnoitering the camp of the enemy, when we took some prisoners between the wood and the olive grounds, who could not reach their vanguard, which had been obliged to retreat in consequence of an intrepid charge by our cavalry.—During the whole of the 23d nothing deserving notice happened. It was employed in examining the position of the ene-

my, who had again concentrated his forces in the district of Casalegas, and on the adjacent heights, preserving his vanguard, supported by some pieces of artillery on the bridge and shores of the river Alberche, and which fired the greater part of the day on our skirmishing parties.—I had agreed with the General in Chief of his Britannic Majesty's army, Sir Arthur Wellesley, as to the attack on the bridge and shores of the river before day break on the 24th, and to this purpose, I sent onward the 5th division of infantry under Marshal de Camp D. Luis de Bassecourt, in the evening of the 23d, in order, that after having crossed at the ford of Cardiel, three leagues from Talavera, they might march by the contiguous heights, so as by break of day on the 24th to fall on the rear-guard and right flank of the army of the enemy at Casalegas. At the same hour, I proposed to attack in person on the left flank, and a part of his front, while the English army assailed the whole of his right. The flight of the enemy during the night of the 23d disconcerted this plan, and when at dawn of the 24th, we saw the French camp abandoned, I thought it proper to follow them with my army alone (as the British army remained in Casalegas and the shores of the Alberche), with the hope of reaching his rear-guard, or some portion of it. The news which I acquired of his route, apprized me that he had proceeded in two columns by Santa Olalla and Cebolla, and in consequence, I divided my army so as to follow him in both directions. Notwithstanding the forced march of my army, who made their day's progress without fatigue, we could not accomplish our object, as the enemy had early commenced his retreat, and had proceeded with great rapidity. On the 24th, having posted myself in Santa Olalla, I ordered the troops which had taken the road of Cebolla to join me, with the exception of the 5th corps, which I left there to watch the district, placing the vanguard in the neighbourhood of Alcabon, from whence the piquets of the enemy were dislodged, and pursued to Torrijos, where a considerable part of the army of the enemy was stationed.

The whole of the 25th was engaged in giving repose to the troops, and in apportioning the rations, which were extremely deficient. Parties of the French during the day were employed either in endeavouring to dislodge us from our post, or to

reconnoitre our situation, but in both attempts they were disappointed by the valour of the officers commanding the skirmishing parties, who attacked them on all sides, and prevented their approach. At nine o'clock at night, of the same day, I had information that the enemy was advancing upon Torrijos, and that his whole army was in movement, but my advice did not instruct me to which point the greater part was proceeding. On hearing this, I apprised the Generals, and dispatched an officer to General Wellesley. In consequence of his determination and direction, and on finding my vanguard powerfully attacked on the morning of the 26th, by a very superior force, and the enemy indicating a design of making a general attack, I resolved to make a retrograde movement upon the Alberche, to reunite with the English, which I effected on the evening of the same day. The dispatches of Brigadier-General Don Josef de Zayas, and of Lieutenant-General the duke of Albuquerque, Nos. 2 and 3 (not yet published) explain the particulars of the action on the morning of that day, and in which the corps there mentioned acquired great credit for their firmness and valour, &c.—Thus the evening of the 26th concluded; and after having conferred with General Wellesley that night on our situation, I resolved to repass the Alberche on the morning of the following day, when we agreed that the right line should be taken by the Spanish, and the left by the English army. The English vanguard remained during that night in Casalegas, and on the heights near it, under Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke, with orders to retire to the opposite side of the river, which were obeyed on the morning of the 27th.—I must now observe, that at dawn on the 24th Marshal Victor had withdrawn from the post he occupied on the shores of the Alberche, in order to avoid the attack meditated on that day by the allied armies; and he afterwards united himself, in the neighbourhood of Toledo, with the forces under General Sebastiani, and with 8,000 men composing the guard of the Royal Impostor, who took the command of the whole, thus congregated assisted by Marshals Jourdan and Victor, and by General Sebastiani.—It now appeared that the enemy wished to bring on a general action, by the frequent approach of his advanced guard, and by the occupation of Santa Olalla by the whole of his army on the evening of the 26th. His outposts

then approached the allied army. Thus circumstanced, at break of day on the 27th, the position agreed upon was taken; and Sir Arthur Wellesley ordered General Mackenzie, with a division of English infantry and a brigade of cavalry, to continue in the olive plantation on the right side of the Alberche, where this party, composing the vanguard, might cover the right flank of the British army.—The whole combined army occupied an extent of ground of above three miles; the right towards the Tagus, was covered by our native troops reaching to the front of Talavera. The ground on the left was occupied by the English army, open to and commanded, by an elevation, where was assembled in a second line a division of English infantry, under the orders of Gen. Hill. Between this height and a chain of mountains at some distance, there is an inclosure, which, in the first instance, Gen. Wellesley did not order to be defended, because it was commanded by the height, and because it was considered too distant to be useful in the approaching battle. The whole of the ground on which the Spanish army was drawn up, was covered with olive plantations intersected by sinuosities, inequalities, and cottages. The great road towards the bridge of Alberche was defended by a strong battery, served by our infantry, in front of the Hermitage of Our Lady of the Prado. The other avenues of the district were defended in a similar manner. Talavera was protected by an appointed garrison, and the rest of the Spanish infantry, forming two lines, was placed behind a village which is at the extremity of the district, and formed a line in continuation of the position taken by the English army. In the centre, and between the two armies, there was a rising ground, where the English had begun to construct a strong redoubt, having in their rear a small plain. At this point was stationed the English General Campbell, who commanded a division of infantry, supported by the brigade of dragoons of General Cotton, and by some squadrons of our cavalry.—Our combined army being thus arranged, the enemy presented himself in considerable force to our view, manifesting, at first, an intention to attack the division of the vanguard under General Mackenzie. In point of fact, he fulfilled this design before that Officer was enabled to retire to his proper position, but these gallant and disciplined troops which composed the brigade of General Mackenzie, of

Col. Donkins, the brigade of cavalry of General Anson, and their corps, supported by General Payne, with four regiments of cavalry, posted in the plain and olive grounds of Talavera, retired in most admirable order, but not without some loss in the olive grounds, particularly two of the corps of this division. The regularity, steadiness, and fortitude of all these troops, as well as the military talents of General Mackenzie, were conspicuous in every movement, and this officer is deserving of the highest praise and admiration for the coolness and serenity with which he withdrew this division to the left of the British army. The number of the enemy increased on the right bank of the Alberche as the day advanced, and every thing indicated his determination to give battle to the combined forces.—As dusk approached, he commenced a furious attack by a cannonade, and a charge by the whole of his cavalry, on the right, occupied by the Spanish infantry, with the apparent design of breaking through our ranks, posted as I have before described. This attack was received by an active fire perfectly well sustained, both of cannon and musketry, which disconcerted the purpose of the enemy and put him to flight at a quarter past eight. During this time, a strong division of the French advanced by the valley to the left of the height occupied by the English General Hill, of which, with very great loss, they obtained a momentary possession, but Hill returned to the charge presently with the bayonet, drove off the enemy, and recovered his ground. In the night the French repeated their attack, but without succeeding, and with great loss. At break of day on the 28th they returned with two divisions of infantry, but they were repulsed by the brave Hill, who could not be intimidated by their repeated attempts, or by the progressive accumulation of the forces of the assailants.—General Wellesley, in consequence of these renewed exertions of the enemy by the valley, on the left side of the height, ordered thither two brigades of his cavalry, supported by Lieutenant General the Duke of Albuquerque, with the whole of his division of cavalry. The French, seeing this movement, sent sharpshooters into the chain of mountains to the left of the valley, who were attacked by the 5th division of my infantry under Marshal de Camp Don Luis Bassecourt, who dislodged them with much loss.—The general attack commenced by the advance of different co-

lums of the enemy's infantry with the intention of attacking the height occupied by General Hill. These columns were charged by two parties of English dragoons, under the command of General Anson, led by Lieutenant-General Payne, and supported by the brigade of cavalry of the line of General Tanne. One of these regiments of English dragoons suffered very much; but this spirited charge had the effect of disconcerting the designs of the enemy, who sustained a very great loss. At the same time, the French attacked the centre of the army, where the English General Campbell was stationed, having on his right Lieut. General Don Francisco de Eguia, the enemy was driven back by both these Generals, who had their infantry supported by the King's regiment of cavalry, and by the division of Lieutenant-General Don Juan de Henestrosa. This corps covered itself with glory in the charge that it made on the infantry of the enemy, during which it turned the column by which it was assailed; under which advantage, the English infantry, protected by the Spanish, possessed themselves of the artillery of the enemy. At the same time with these proceedings, the French attacked with fury the centre of the English army, commanded by General Sherbrooke. The foes were received with extraordinary courage, and were driven back by the whole English division, with charged bayonets. But the English brigade of guards, which was carried onward precipitately in the ardour of battle, advanced too far, and was in consequence obliged to withdraw under the fire of the second line, composed of the brigade of cavalry of General Cotton, and of a battalion of infantry detached from the height by Gen. Wellesley, as soon as he observed the remote situation of the guards. General Howorth, who commanded the English artillery, was distinguished for his extraordinary courage, and performed the most important services.—Lieutenant-General Don Francisco de Eguia, my second in command, was posted on my left, with the 3rd, 4th, and 5th divisions, under Generals the Marquis de Portago, Don Rafael Manglano, and Don Louis Alexandro Bassecourt, but the latter was ordered to support the division of cavalry of Lieutenant-General the Duke of Albuquerque, which was detached to reinforce the British army. The dispatches No. 4, 5, and 6, from these Generals, are inclosed for the information

of his Majesty.—I took under my particular orders the centre and the right, without neglecting, however, the superintendence of the rest, and with much satisfaction I noticed the conduct of the Generals of the 1st and 2nd division of the Marquis de Zayas, and Don Vicente Iglesias, as well as Don Juan Berhuy, and Lieutenant-General Don Juan Henestrosa, &c.—The loss of the enemy was very great. They left on the field of battle from four to five thousand men, and the number of their wounded is computed at 5,000 more. Two or three Generals were killed, several wounded, and at least 400 other officers. We have taken 19 pieces of artillery, and many waggons of ammunition, and the rout was one of the most complete, considering that we were acting on the defensive. The English have lost General Mackenzie, Brigadier-General Langworth, and other officers of distinguished rank and merit. The total of their officers, killed and wounded, is 260, and that of their rank and file 5,000. Our diminution is much less. Don Rafael Manglano was wounded, and 50 more of our officers were killed and wounded, and 1,150 rank and file. Our artillery was served with ability and fortitude, and the names of such officers, whose talents were most conspicuously displayed, are mentioned in the dispatches from the respective Generals.—I should be negligent of my own duty, if I did not communicate to your Excellency, for the information of his Majesty, that the conduct of the British General in Chief, Sir Arthur Wellesley, and that of the Generals, subordinate Officers, and Soldiers under his command, is above all praise. I have seen the enthusiasm with which these faithful allies have in copious streams poured forth their blood in the defence of our liberty, and no language can adequately express the sentiments of gratitude with which our breasts are animated. With the highest satisfaction I have noticed my army hailing our companions for the victory obtained, and mingling with exclamations indicative of the warmest affection, the appellatives of our country, and Ferdinand, with those of our powerful and generous allies.

[This liberal and spirited eulogy is succeeded by a list of the Officers and others of the Spanish army, who deserved the high reward of the approbation of their Commander, among whom is distinguished a lad of 16 years of age who killed four Frenchmen with his own hand. We are sorry our limits do not allow our inserting

the catalogue of the names of these brave champions of Spanish independence.]

Signed, GREGORIO DE LA CUESTA.
To his Excellency Don Antonio Cornel.

BATTLE OF TALAVERA.—*From the French Official Paper, the Moniteur.*

The *Moniteur* of September 28, contains the following observations, in the form of Notes on the London Gazette of Saturday, Sept. 2, containing the dispatches from Lord Wellington, dated Deleytosa, 8th Aug. 1809:—

‘When I entered Spain, I had a communication with General Cuesta, through Sir Robert Wilson and Colonel Roche, respecting the occupation of the Puerto de Banos, and the Puerto de Perales.’—(*London Gazette.*)

Note of the Moniteur.—We wish Lord Wellesley to command the English armies. With his character, he will risk great catastrophes. It appears that he has neither spies nor any accurate information; which is astonishing, in a country where England has so many partizans.

‘I preferred to go, from thinking that the British troops were most likely to do the business effectually.’

We are willing to believe that these dispositions were made; for we see in one of his dispatches that he thought he had only to do with 10 or 12,000 French; and it was possible that he might march, with 20,000 men, against a corps, which in his opinion, consisted only of 10 or 12,000; but he should have gained better information on his march, and he would have learned that this corps of 12,000 men amounted to 70,000. He had his retreat cut off, and was too fortunate to be able to throw himself, in order to escape, into impracticable roads. General Wellesley is inexcusable for not having known that the corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia, Elchingen, and Treviso, amounted to 70,000 men; and for having thought that he could cover his left flank against this formidable army, by leaving two battalions at Puerto Banos.—What ignorance!

‘I acknowledge that these reasons did not appear to me sufficient for giving up so important a post as Talavera.’

General Cuesta did right to leave Talavera; if he had delayed, he would have been lost. He did wrong to leave two divisions and 40 pieces of artillery on the

Tagus; he lost them; and this post, which was the rear-guard, was a post of honour. General Wellesley ought to have occupied it. It is acknowledged in war, that an advanced guard, or a rear-guard, according to the operations, is the post most important to defend. But General Wellesley had taken the lead; and, according to the laudable practice of his nation, had left to his allies the post of danger.

‘The enemy stated to be 30,000 strong, but at all events consisting of the corps of Soult and Ney.’

We see, that even at the time when he wrote, the English General did not know the force of the French. He speaks only of the corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia and Elchingen, and appears to have no knowledge of the corps of the Duke of Treviso, twenty-five battalions strong, and which, since their entrance into Spain, have not been inferior to the best troops in Europe. If Lord Wellesley frequently commits similar errors in war, he may one day pay dearly for them.

‘We had reason to expect the advance of Victor’s corps to Talavera, as soon as General Cuesta’s march should be known; and after leaving 12,000 men to watch Venegas, and allowing from 10 to 11,000 killed and wounded in the late action, this corps would have amounted to 25,000.’

This is a singular calculation which Lord Wellesley makes of the first and fourth corps and the reserve. The first corps is composed of 36 battalions, the fourth of 30; the reserve of 20 battalions, and the cavalry of 40 squadrons. Lord Wellesley had therefore around him 170 battalions, and 80 or 90 squadrons, and he expected to conquer Madrid with 20,000 men! We do not speak of the Spaniards; they may be reckoned as of consequence for plundering isolated persons, or for defending themselves behind a wall, but very little account can be made of them in a regular battle, as the English may have been convinced. If Lord Wellesley had had, besides his 20,000 men, the whole army of Lord Chatham, which went to bury itself in the marshes of the Isle of Walcheren, he could have derived nothing from his expedition but disgrace, confusion, and defeat. If the English mean to dispute Spain with France, they must land an army, if not equal to the French army, at least two-thirds as strong, that is to say, of at least 150,000 men, for the Spaniards cannot be reckoned

for more than one-third in a regular battle.—Nothing can be more advantageous to France than to have the English engage in land-wars; for then, instead of conquering England by sea, we shall conquer her on the continent. Such a contest shews to admiration what those are who direct the Cabinet of London.—Themistocles advised the Athenians to abandon their citadels, and take refuge on board their ships. It is to be wished that the British Cabinet may persist, as it has begun, in the plan of deserting its ships and throwing itself on the continent. We have predicted the humiliation of England, and peace, before a year elapses.—Before a year shall have expired, the English, whatever efforts they may make, will be driven out of the peninsula, and the imperial eagle will fly on the fortresses of Lisbon.

‘We had reason to expect, that, as the Marquis de la Reyna would not remove the boats from the river Almaraz, Soult would have destroyed them. Our only retreat was, therefore, by the bridge of Arzo Bispo; and if we had moved on, the enemy, by breaking that bridge, while the army should be engaged with Soult and Ney, would have deprived us of that only resource. We could not take a position at Oropesa, as we thereby left open the road to the bridge of Arzo Bispo, from Talavera, by Calera; and after considering the whole subject maturely, I was of opinion that it was advisable to retire to the bridge of Arzo Bispo, and to take up a defensive position upon the Tagus.’

We shall not continue these Notes; it would be an insult to our readers. The falsehood of the report of Lord Wellesley must be evident to every one.

Conclusion. Lord Wellesley, without knowing the force of the enemy with whom he had to contend, without being furnished with that which constitutes an army, advanced to Talavera. The idea of entering Madrid turned his brain. He took the French army for an army of Sepoys. He arrived at Talavera with 25 or 26,000 men. He was there joined by 30,000 Spaniards, and, with these two armies united, he intended to penetrate to Madrid. The Duke of Belluno manœuvred skilfully to draw him on, and formed a junction with the fourth corps and the reserve, and, with the King at their head, marched against the enemy. The Duke

of Dalmatia, with still more considerable forces than those of the King, marched upon their rear. Lord Wellesley could not extricate himself but by beating, separately, the two armies. The first and fourth corps presented him with an opportunity, since they attacked, without waiting for the three corps commanded by the Duke of Dalmatia. The English fought well; the battle of Talavera was doubtful; though the lost of the English was much more considerable than ours, for the French artillery was more numerous. It appears that, by a series of multiplied faults, the French could not take the position on the left; but the English were beaten back every time they attempted to advance upon the French. When the 70,000 men commanded by the Duke of Dalmatia were at Plasencia, Lord Wellesley believed there were not more than 10,000 men there, and formed the most ridiculous combinations. He perceived, however, the folly of his calculations, his extreme imprudence, and was sufficiently fortunate to escape into Portugal with his infantry. What would have been the case, if manœuvring according to the principles of war, the French army had not given battle until all united? Lord Wellesley says, that the want of the means of conveyance prevented him from marching to Madrid. What would have been the consequence, if he had marched to Madrid, and the Duke of Dalmatia had placed himself between him and the Tagus? He would have come with his army to France. He has sacrificed brave men through presumption, and ignorance of that of which a General ought not to be ignorant.—This expedition greatly resembles that of General Moore in the month of November last. But General Moore was more prudent, and saved himself sooner; and, though he suffered enormous losses, the half of his army returned to England, without their baggage, &c. Like General Moore, General Wellesley abandoned his hospitals, his baggage, his artillery, and arrived in Portugal with the half of his army. At this moment he has not 18,000 men under arms, out of the 40,000 which left the ports of England.

The Moniteur of 30th Sept. after giving the following intelligence from an English Paper—

‘The whole British army has quitted Spain. Sir Arthur Wellesley has his head-quarters at Elvas (1).—It is said

‘this retreat has been occasioned by the want of provisions (2).—The French have returned to Madrid.’

has these Notes:—

(1). This is certainly a great success, and the English people owe much gratitude to Lord Wellesley for having destroyed a part of their troops, for having compromised the glory of their arms, for having fled sixty leagues pursued sword in hand, in fine—for having abandoned their allies. The King of England has rewarded these great services by conferring on General Wellesley the title of Lord Wellington, Viscount Talavera. Why does he not give, likewise, to Lord Chatham, the title of Duke of Walcheren? This reward would be as well merited as that which has been granted to Sir Arthur. We hope that the English General, who, in the course of this winter, will be driven into the Tagus and forced to evacuate Portugal, will receive the title of Duke of Lisbon. Thus the French will find in the genealogy of the English Generals the list of their successes.—(2). It is impossible to find a worse excuse: What, was it in the middle of Spain, and when the English army had behind it Seville, Lisbon, and the Sea, that its retreat was occasioned by the want of provisions? It is impossible to sport more with the public credulity.—The English fled from the French bayonets, and the French troops, far from returning immediately to Madrid, pursued these fugitives as far as the heights would permit.

WAR BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND FRANCE, AND THE EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND.—*Notes from the French Official Paper, the Moniteur, on the Articles published in the London Papers upon the above subjects.*

‘We cannot consider the Austrian Monarchy, its Sovereign, and its armies, so entirely humiliated as they were after the battle of Austerlitz: there is no talk of an interview in a windmill.’—(*London Papers*).

Note by the Moniteur.—If there has been no interview, it is because the Emperor Napoleon would have none. The first interview, in which the Emperor Napoleon gave peace to his enemy, having left no remembrance of gratitude in the breast of the latter, it became evident that a fresh interview would be to no purpose.—With regard to the difference between the situations of Austria, after the battles of Aus-

terlitz and Wagram, it is this:—After the battle of Austerlitz, Russia was still allied with Austria; she had upon the Vistula a second army, which she might march; Prussia, who had signed the Convention of the 2nd of November, might take part in the war; in short, the army of Prince Charles was still untouched, and the whole of it might march. On the other hand, the important fortress of Raab and the Circles of Hungary had not been occupied; Saxony did not yet form part of the Confederation; and, however, the position of Dresden must be considered as of some importance; in fine, the Duchy of Warsaw belonged to Prussia, and the army of Galicia, which now menaces Moravia, did not exist. At present, on the contrary, all the Austrian armies and fortresses have been attacked and vanquished. There are hardly any vestiges remaining of the army which the Archduke John brought from Italy; and if it can still muster ten thousand men under arms, most of these men are only recruits. The grand army of Prince Charles being beaten at Eggmühl, at Ratisbon, at Essling, and at Wagram, has lost his best soldiers, and he himself, frightened at the spirit of intrigue and division which reigns in the Cabinet, has thrown up the command and retired. The difference is not less great in the internal situation of the Monarchy: after the Peace of Presburg, the French had only passed through the Hereditary States; upon the present occasion, they have already made a stay in them of upwards of four months. At that time Austria had not made the last efforts; her population was still entire; at present many provinces have been so much depopulated by the levies in mass, that no other inhabitants are to be found in the villages than women and children: At that time all the revolutionary means which had been taken existed, and might be employed: at present they have been taken, and have been taken in vain: the country is exhausted of men as well as of things.

‘An army, formidable from the number of the soldiers (we wish we could say formidable from the talents of its Chiefs) has been sent by England and landed in Zealand.’—

The expedition against Zealand could not have any result for England. It might occasion some embarrassments, some fresh burdens to the people of France; but these they do not calculate, when any proofs of zeal or devotedness are to be

given to the country; it could give the English nothing but shame; it could be attended with no other result than to make them lose an army, whilst it would procure a new army to the Emperor. These prognostics have been perfectly verified.—We say that the expedition could not be attended with any result, because it was necessary to begin by making the siege of Flushing. Flushing, provided the island of Walcheren be inundated, must be considered by every sensible officer as a place impregnable, by a regular siege, or at least as presenting difficulties which the labour of four months would be unable to vanquish. In this instance, the wisest calculations were baffled. Flushing, when the besiegers trenches were still three hundred paces from the body of the fortress, when there was no breach, when the body of the fortress was untouched, surrendered by the sole effect of the terror of a bombardment. Is this cowardice? Is it treason? The sequel of the inquiry will prove which. Thus, then, the sole opposition of Flushing, which detained the English expedition only twenty days, ought to have detained it three months.—Of all the chances of succeeding, certainly the one least expected by the English, must have been such a success obtained by a bombardment; they required 20 days for that. Now, 20 days spent in the island of Walcheren, in the month of August, must have occasioned a number of sick, which cannot be computed at less than one in four soldiers; and to calculate otherwise would betray a total ignorance of the effects of that climate. When we say that 20 days spent in the island of Walcheren must cost the quarter of the troops which land in it, we may add, that the health of the other three quarters must be essentially impaired, and that all the weakened men are on the point of falling sick. It is therefore a most senseless attempt to land brave soldiers in that fatal country, and we must consider the English army as destroyed, or at least what remains of it, as unable to do much duty for several months to come.—But in fine, after the siege of Flushing, we had to expect the siege of fort Banz, which communicating by water with Bergen-op-Zoom and with fort St. Martin, which the French have built opposite to it, could in like manner not be taken, but after works and trenches carried on in a country the climate of which is as fatal as Walcheren. It is true, that

the English were fortunate! A Dutch General, called Bruce, the shame of the military name, and whose head the nation must have to fall upon the scaffold, evacuated this fort through an unexampled panic six hours before the English arrived. Here, then, we again behold the English enjoying a good fortune upon which they could not rely; but these fortunate events, purchased with the ever-increasing diminution of their armies, whither could they carry them; to burn the French squadron? to effect this, it was necessary to take Antwerp. But in fine, the French squadron being taken and burned, it remains to be known whether such an operation was worth what it has cost, and whether it be very prudent to go to an expence of many men, and of 40 or 50 millions, in order to occasion one's enemy a loss of between 15 and 20 millions.

But the ships at Antwerp could not be taken. They did not depend upon the occupation of Flushing, upon that of Walcheren, nor of any island: they depended upon the Continent. It was necessary to take Antwerp! The English, who for this long time past have not travelled upon the Continent, consulted information collected six years ago, and imagined that Antwerp was still an open town, as it was when it was only a trading port; they did not take into their calculation the works of these latter years, especially those which the Emperor has caused to be raised since his journey to Antwerp. Upon establishing a dockyard in that town, he ordered its fortifications to be again raised; it is now surrounded with a bastioned rampart. The ditch filled with water which covers this rampart has been repaired; the left of the town is covered by an immense inundation which removes the approaches upwards of fifteen hundred fathoms; the right is supported by the citadel, which is a fine piece of fortification; upon this front, several works have been established; among others, a fine half-moon with its counterscarp. Upon the left bank of the Scheldt there are no houses, but the head of Flanders has been re-established, and its works are protected by an inundation of 2,000 fathoms in extent. The English could not, therefore, take Antwerp without besieging it, without methodically opening the trenches, without working on through the inundations and marshes, in short, without having invested the town: and if they must invest it on

both sides, they would require to have two armies: 1st, One between the head of Flanders and the town of St. Nicholas, opposite to Brussels and to the road of France; indeed, we know no General bold enough to take this position with less than 80,000 infantry, and between 8 and 10,000 cavalry, since he must have to withstand the army which should arrive from France, and the troops should stretch out from the head of Flanders, that is to say, the whole garrison of Antwerp, which is a combined attack, would sally out on that side. On the side of the town, the investment could not reasonably take place with an army of less than 40,000 men, having in front a corps of observation, to keep in check the army of the Duke of Valmy, assembled at Maestricht, which would draw near Antwerp, and having another corps towards Bergen-op-Zoom against the Dutch. It would, therefore, have been easier for Lord Chatham to take Brussels, to march against Ghent, and to advance as far as Flanders, leaving Antwerp and the French army behind him, than to undertake to invest Antwerp and besiege it. This much with regard to the same side;—

On the side of the river, the following are the obstacles which must have stopped the English:—1st. Fort Frederic and Fort Doel, each mounting fifteen 36-pounders; after these, Fort Lillo and the Fort of Liefkenshoek; each mounting sixty 36-pounders, and ten mortars; and behind, a line of eighty gun-boats and pinnaces, mounting two hundred 24-pounders. Now, every sensible man who knows that there is only a distance of 600 fathoms between Fort Lillo and the Fort of Liefkenshoek, which is opposite to it, perceives that this passage cannot be forced. With regard to fireships, it is well known that fireships and infernal machines are ineffectual. The infernal machine which was let off at St. Malo had no effect; these sorts of explosions were never able to shake a rampart. An estacado had been established, which secured our gun-boats from fire-ships. In fine, we had also fire-ships; sixteen were already in readiness, and we were going to avail ourselves of the first favourable occasion to send them against the English. Besides, to make use of fire-ships, it would have been necessary to approach within 500 fathoms of the town, since from Lillo to Antwerp the

Scheldt makes four elbows, which would have prevented fire-ships from being directed from any greater distance.—On the sea side in like manner no success could be hoped for; but admitting that by the combination of the effects of the land and sea, Lillo and Liefkenshoek had been carried, which supposes two regular sieges, the enemy would directly after have met with three other barriers to be forced; the Pearl fort, fort St. Philip, and fort St. Mary. All these forts are covered by inundations, and each of them would have required a separate siege. These different operations could not have taken place without losing 40 days more, and supposing that by the 20th of October the land and sea forces had been able to approach within 2,000 fathoms of Antwerp, they still required three months more to take the town. With regard to the squadron, it was entirely shut up within the town, up and down the river, protecting Antwerp, and protected by it. The taking of Antwerp was, therefore, a thing impossible for Lord Chatham, an operation much more difficult to be effected than the occupation of a quarter of France.—However, the following was the system of the French army; from the 15th of August three corps were formed. The Prince of Ponte Corvo was at Antwerp with 30,000 men, national guards, regulars and Dutch troops. The Duke of Cornegliano was at Ghent with the corps of the head of Flanders, consisting of 25,000 men; the Duke of Istria was at Lisle with 20,000 men.—We should have let the English, had they seriously presented themselves, cross the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom, stretch out beyond the inundation of Lillo, and march against Antwerp; the Duke of Cornegliano would have proceeded towards the Head of Flanders, and whilst the English would have been making their dispositions to invest Antwerp from fort Lillo, to the citadel, the Prince of Ponte Corvo and the Duke of Cornegliano, protected by the inundations and by the immense works of the town, would have waited for them, and on the day agreed upon, would have stretched out upon the right; and then the English armies would have terminated its destinies: the Duke of Istria would during that time have proceeded to the island of Cadsand.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 16.] LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1809. [Price 1s.

577]

[578

THE JUBILER.

TO RICHARD GOODLAD, ESQ.

OF THE

Parish of Droxford, in the County of Hants.

SIR, *Botley, 19 Oct. 1809.*

When I had, on the 17th instant, the pleasure of seeing you at the Justice-meeting at Droxford, you mentioned to me something about a subscription in behalf of the poor inhabitants of that parish, which has so long experienced the good effects of your activity and benevolence. You informed me, at the same time, that Mr. CHIDELL, the Overseer of the poor, in our Tything, would call upon me with a paper, containing a list of the subscriptions already taken. This paper, with my name on it, has just been presented to me; and, against my name, I have written these words: "*Mr. Cobbett thinks it improper to give any thing at all;*" my reasons for which opinion I shall now state to you, and (under an address to you) to the public at large; because I am satisfied, that, in more than one point of view, the statement may, sooner or later, be conducive to the public good; and, as to the mode of address, it will, I think, require no apology, when it is considered, that the aforementioned Subscription-paper came accompanied with a circular-letter under your hand.

Of this letter, Sir, which I kept in my possession until I had read it twice through, the following is the substance: *That, on the 25th instant, being the day when the king will enter upon the 50th year of his reign, there will be a GENERAL rejoicing through the kingdom; — that it would be a PITY, that, amidst this general joy, the parish of Droxford should APPEAR LESS LOYAL than its neighbours; — that Mr. GARNIER the Rector, and Mr. NOTT, the Curate, together with other gentlemen of the parish, assembled after divine service, on Sunday last, proposed the opening of a Subscription for the purpose of raising a sum of money, wherewith to purchase bread, meat, and beer, to be delivered, on the*

25th instant, to the poor parishioners of Droxford, it being the opinion of the parties so proposing, that the king would be peculiarly delighted with our loyalty's shewing itself in the form of largesses to his poorer subjects.

These, Sir, are the principal propositions contained in your letter; and, before I come to consider them in their relation to what is called the Jubilee; before I come to consider them as relating solely to the present occasion, give me leave to trouble you with some observations upon all Subscriptions, having such an object in view, and being set on foot in such a manner.

First, then, I decidedly disapprove of this manner of *feeding and treating* the poor, which, so far from being conformable to the principles of *hospitality*, it does, in fact, argue, in the donors, a contempt for the persons fed and treated, who are thus as clearly marked out for a degraded cast, as if they had badges put upon their clothes, or, as some of the American negroes have, a burnt mark in their cheek. When, therefore, I treat a poor man, I treat him under my own roof, or, in case of sickness, send what I have to give him, to his own house, and never expose him to the humiliation of this kind of public and pauper-like relief. Besides, Sir, I hold it to be very injurious to the country, that any attempt like this should be made to keep pauperism in countenance; for such will be the tendency, though certainly not the *intention*, of the proposed largess. It must, in my opinion, as far as it operates, have the effect of reconciling the minds of the labouring people to a state of dependence and beggary, and to efface the small remains of that spirit, which formerly withheld their names from the list of paupers. I hold, Sir, that it is a terrible evil, that a labourer not afflicted with *illness* of any sort, either in himself or his family, should be under the necessity of applying for parish relief, should be under the necessity of begging any part of his bread, or of receiving any assistance in the character of either beggar or pauper; and, of course, I must disapprove of any project the object of which is to feed and treat any portion of our neighbours in that

T

character. But, advertent here, for a moment, to the particular case before us, there is this additional objection to the proposed largess, that I cannot help considering it as a sort of premium for hypocrisy, fitted to this especial occasion, though certainly not so considered by you or the Rector or Curate. For, either it must be meant, that the people thus fed and treated, do entertain *some sentiments* respecting the 50th anniversary of his majesty's accession, or that they care nothing at all about it: if the latter be the case, then are they induced, by the proposed treating, to express joy which they do not feel; and, in the former case, their sentiments must perfectly correspond with yours, or they are guilty of a still more detestable species of hypocrisy. The poor should, like the rich, be left to rejoice where they see *occasion* for joy. Men may meet together for such a purpose; but, then, to avoid the charge of hypocrisy, they must meet and feast at their own expence. Who, for instance, does not despise the plaudits of a drenched rabble at an election, except the wretch who is mean enough, for his own selfish purposes, to purchase muddy beer, wherewith to drench the said rabble? Do the purchased shouts of a drunken crowd, do honour to the candidate in whose behalf they are uttered? Your answer must be in the negative; and, yet, Sir, I think you will find it difficult to make out a clear distinction between the character of those shouts, and the shouts, which the beer you propose to give, will purchase in behalf of our sovereign. After all, however, the great objection that I have to this species of treating in general, is, that *it encourages pauperism*; it keeps pauperism in countenance: it nourishes that, which I wish to see checked, and which, as far as I am able, I keep down. The *labourer* is worthy of his hire; and, if he and his family be in health, shame on the employer if the labourer can call himself a pauper, or can think it becoming his character to be fed and treated through the means of a parochial subscription, and, whatever may be his feelings, put on the face of joy for the sake of a meal of bread, meat, and beer. Good God, Sir! am I told by you, that a meal of good victuals and drink, is a *rarity* amongst the labourers in the parish of Droxford? No: in so many words I am not thus told; but, what am I to think of their situation, when I am called upon, as a proof of my *loyalty*, to

contribute towards the purchasing of one meal in fifty years for the labourers of that parish? *My labourers, Sir, stand in no need of any such largess; they have, from me, the means of purchasing bread, meat, and beer, every day of their lives; no parish officer ever sees their face; they are not slaves, but as free as I am myself; if they see cause for rejoicing on the 25th instant, they will do it, if not they will let it alone, and the probability is, that they will, on that day, earn bread, meat, and beer for the next. If all labourers were in this situation, we should have no occasion for subscriptions for the purpose of feeding the poor; and, indeed, that degrading appellation, under which all the labourers are now-a-days included, would soon bear a different meaning.*

Now, Sir, as to the *manner of setting on foot this Subscription*, unconnected with the particular occasion, I have a very great objection. The *name*, I perceive, of every person whom you expect to subscribe, in each Tything of the parish, is *put down upon the Subscription paper*, and in this state the paper is handed to him. So that, if he does not think proper to give his money away upon your recommendation, his *name* is to stand upon the list, with a *blank* against it, which blank does, in that case, amount to a positive *refusal*, to assist in feeding and making glad the heart of the poor. A very good judge of human nature and of the moral duties of man has observed, that "*the recommendations of superiors savour strongly of commands*," and, Sir, when I consider the weight, which your fortune, and especially your office of acting Justice of the Peace (the only one in the parish) necessarily give you, I must beg you to excuse me if I apply this observation to your present recommendation; which, I think, I am completely justified in doing, seeing that you have sent round our names, ready written upon the subscription list; an act so offensively presumptuous (though, I am sure, it was not so intended) that, had I been ever so much disposed to subscribe, I should not have done it, without protesting against the exercise of such manifest dictation. The truth, is, that habit, powerful in every walk of life, is peculiarly so with persons entrusted with public authority of any sort or degree; and, upon this occasion, you really do appear to me to have forgotten, that, when writing your circular letter, you were not upon the Bench, where your office frequently makes it your duty to dic-

tate, but which office gives you no right whatever to issue dictatorial recommendations to any persons whatever, for subscriptions of money, and especially to order the collection to be made by the overseers of the poor, or other parish-officers, or persons usually employed by the parish to collect its rates. Under such circumstances, Sir, it is in vain, it is quite idle, to call the subscription *voluntary*. With yourself, and with the other gentlemen, with whom the thing originated, the contribution is, of course, a voluntary act, and you have all, doubtless, your reasons for what you have done; but, with the *farmers* of the parish, with those who *cannot* be insensible to the weight of your recommendation, and whom you must be pretty sure would not send back your paper with a blank against their names; with these persons, is there any candid man will say, that the act of subscribing could possibly be voluntary?

These objections are *general*: they apply to all Subscriptions called for with a view of feeding, or treating, the poor; and also, to all subscriptions, for whatever purpose, set on foot in such a manner. But, Sir, upon the supposition, that subscriptions for feeding and treating the poor, may, in certain cases, be proper; and, upon the further supposition, that there are cases to justify the manner, in which this subscription has been set on foot, I have, in this case, an objection to the thing *on account of the occasion*; I object to the *principle* of your proposition; and, because I think it may be useful to the public, because I think it may tend to produce, or increase, a right way of thinking upon this and other political subjects, I shall here state the reasons, upon which my objection is principally founded.

The 25th of this month is, it seems, considered, by some persons, at least, as a day for the expressing of national joy; that it is, in short, to be a day of *Jubilee*, that is to say, of *rejoicing* and all sorts of *merriment* and signs of *gladness*; and it is to be so, for what? Why, it seems, *because*, upon that day, *the king enters upon the fiftieth year of his reign*. Now, Sir, if I had no other objection to your proposition than that which is founded upon the *nature of the occasion*, if its general principle, and *if its manner*, were such as I *approved* of; and, if the Jubilee were *expressly* stated to be merely a mark of *personal respect towards his Majesty*, under whose reign I was born, I should very willingly have joined your

subscription; but, Sir, so far from this being the case, so far from its being expressly declared, that the Jubilee is to be regarded as a mark of personal respect towards the king, it is perfectly notorious, that, with those individuals who have taken the lead in the thing, and who, indeed, first set it on foot, the object is any thing but that which I have described, and, that one of the main purposes is, in this indirect manner to obtain what will be construed into a *general approbation of all the ministerial measures of this long and unfortunate reign*; rather than aid in effecting which purpose, I shall certainly run the risk of exposing myself to your implied charge of *disloyalty*, of the justice and decency of which charge I will speak more particularly by-and-by.

But, let us inquire a little closer into this subject of rejoicing. You call upon me to rejoice on the 50th anniversary of the King's accession to the throne. Now, even viewing the matter in the best possible light; even supposing, that you wish the Jubilee to be held with reference to the king solely, to the king personally; *why* would you have me rejoice at *this time* in particular? You certainly would not call upon us, your neighbours, to express our joy that *49 years of the king's reign are already past*; to clap our hands and to shout because he has passed nine years beyond the age of man; to sing and dance and drink for joy, because the king is *very old*; to be full of joy, to overflow with gladness, in short, because the king has attained to an age, which, according to the course of nature, *must render the remainder of his reign of but short duration*. No: it certainly is not at *this* that you call upon us to rejoice. But, at what, then, would you have us rejoice? If not at the *old age* of the king, which is just the same thing as the mere *length of reign*; if not at this, you must then wish us to rejoice at and to celebrate the *changes and events of his reign*, and, in this way, to express our gratitude for the good which the nation has derived from those changes and events. Let us, therefore, see whether those changes and events are such as call upon us for expressions of joy and gratitude.

When the King mounted the throne, the DEBT, of which the nation pays the interest in taxes, amounted to about 90 millions; it now amounts to nearly 700 millions; and, one year's taxes now is nearly equal to what the whole Debt then was. The Poor Rates of England and

Wales then amounted to about *a million and a quarter* annually; they now amount to *more than six millions* annually. The number of parish paupers was then about *two hundred thousand*; that number is now above *twelve hundred thousand*. These are pretty good proofs, Sir, that we have no cause to rejoice at the changes of this reign. But, Sir, there is one, which will be very pat to your purpose, when you have the poor labourers of Droxford Parish assembled on the Jubilee-day; and that is, that, when this reign began, it cost the labouring man *five day's* work to earn a bushel of flour, and that now it costs him *ten day's* work to earn a bushel of flour; and that, if he happens to have three children, it is, upon the common run of wages, utterly impossible for him to earn bread enough for his family to eat, to say nothing of meat, drink, clothing, fire and house-rent. Pray, Sir, state this fact to the young ones: the old ones will not need be told of it. State this fact to them, and if they do not rejoice it is very strange indeed.—Then, Sir, if you should have some politicians in the higher seats of the festival, you may entertain them with the history of the last fifty year's glories, in diplomacy and in war. You may relate to them how we lost the continent of America for the *sake of a tax*; and how, for the *sake of other taxes* and of *corruption*, we got possession of vast countries in the East, through the means of which countries enterprising young men, with scarcely a second shirt to their backs, and with a not much greater stock of ideas, contrive so to draw upon the taxes raised in England as to oust from their estates those, by whom the said taxes have been paid.—From these topics you may diverge into matters of a warlike nature: you may remind the “loyal” audience of the capture of a whole British army at *Saratoga*, and of another at *York town*. *Dunkirk* and the *Helder* will, of course, become the theme of your praise, after which, in due place, will follow *Ferrol*, *Buenos Ayres*, *Cairo*, *Cintra*, *Corunna*, *Tulavera* and *Walcheren*. You will, then, doubtless, attempt an enumeration of those who have been slain during the *thirty years of war*, with which this nation has been blessed out of the happy *fifty*; nor would it be amiss if you were to lay before the convivial guests a detailed account of those who have lately died at *Walcheren*, and of the thousands of sick and wounded left behind, by our general in Spain, to the

mercy of the French; aye, to the mercy of those very French, whom the “loyal” writers in England denominate “*blood-thirsty villains*.” Returning again to the blessings of our present state, and the cause we have for joy, you may remind your hearers, that the king's servants, in their extreme care of us, have introduced a very considerable body of foreign troops into the country; a whole Legion of Germans, horse, foot, and artillery. You may remind them of the present state of Ireland, and bid them not to forget the number of years, during the present reign, that saw the *personal security act suspended*, and during which years many of their countrymen were kept, for years, in jail; without being brought to trial from first to last.—If this be not enough; if you find them still backward in rejoicing, remind them of the taxes they have to pay, and of the purposes to which they are applied; and, pray do, Sir, show them that there are many individual sinecure placemen, and many pensioners, any one of whom swallows up more of the taxes, in *one month*, than goes to the keeping of all the poor in Droxford for a *whole year*.—Should they still be insensible to your eloquence, remind them of the history of the Darling, not forgetting your old neighbour; late a tenant of Newgate. Your Reverend coadjutors may expound to them the cases of the holy Doctors O'Meara and Locke, and of the reverend Mr. Beazely, and bid any one produce, if he can, any thing the like thereof in any other reign. Any loyal lady, who chances to be present, may enter upon the rise, progress, and suspension of the “*Delicate Investigation*;” and, if they still remain unmoved, why tell them, tell them yourself, Sir, the history of the *Garniers* and their sinecure.

I should not have revived this topic, Sir, had not your letter, circulated through the whole of the parish, and, of course, amongst many of my neighbours, left it to be clearly inferred, that all those who did not *give money*, to be expended in a way that you and Mr. Garnier and Mr. Nott chose to point out, were *disloyal* men. I have every reason to suppose, that you knew, that my sentiments were opposed to any celebration of the day in question; to any act or deed which might give countenance to the thing to be called a Jubilee. But, whether you knew this, or not, a circular letter from

you, making the act of subscribing a *test of loyalty*, and accompanied with a subscription paper having my name ready written upon it, contingently inferred the accusation of disloyalty. You send me one paper with a list of names as Subscribers to the Jubilee, and amongst those names you place mine; and you, at the same time, send me another paper which tells me, in words the meaning of which is not to be misunderstood, that, unless I give my money, I shall be considered as *disloyal*. I do not choose to give my money, and your imputation of disloyalty follows of course. This imputation is a thing for me to laugh at; but, as my intention is to cause this letter to be read by all those who have read your letter, I shall here add a sentence or two for the purpose of shewing them what is the real meaning of the word *loyalty*, according to its modern acceptation, and by way of illustration, to give them a striking example of loyalty in the head of the family of that Garnier, who, as your letter states, thought it was "a *pity* that the parish of Drox-ford should appear *less loyal* than its "neighbours."

Be it known, then, to those of our neighbours, amongst whom you have circulated your letter, that *loyalty*, now-a-days, means the getting of a good round sum annually out of the taxes, or, at least, it means *living upon the public*. For this we have a fine practical instance in Mr. Garnier of Wickham, who, though he has never, during his whole lifetime, done for the public one single hour's service; though it has been given in evidence before the House of Commons, that he never has meddled at all with any business for the public; though these facts are indisputable, this Mr. Garnier does get of the public money upwards of *twelve thousand pounds a year*, arising from an office, which he has enjoyed *ever since he was a boy at school*, and which though not formerly so profitable, or nearly so profitable, as at present, was always a place of great profit. The total sum that he must have, during the whole time, cleared by this place, cannot be less than *three or four hundred thousand pounds*. If that is not a proof of *loyalty*, I do not know what is a proof of loyalty. But, Mr. Garnier has given a still stronger proof of his loyalty; for, not content with pocketing, out of the public money, *twelve thousand pounds a year*, under the denomination of profits of his office of Apo-

thecary General; not thinking this a sufficient proof of his attachment to the king and his government, what does he do, but gets a post in *the army* at the pay of *ten shillings a day*! Not content with twelve thousand pounds a year out of the public money, out of the taxes that we pay; not content with this immense sum for *doing nothing*; for, observe, it is proved, upon oath, that he has never meddled with any part of the business; not content with twelve thousand a year for *doing nothing*, he asks for, and gets, from the government, from that government whose conduct we are to have a Jubilee to applaud; he gets from that government an allowance of *ten shillings a day as a medical officer in the army*; and, while he lives constantly at Wickham, he is now actually in the receipt of this ten shillings a day (unless it be very lately taken off) out of the taxes that we pay. Aye, well, indeed, may men like this hold a Jubilee in praise of this long reign of war and taxation; this reign, the wars of which have, perhaps, put into the pockets of the Garniers not less than *two hundred thousand pounds*.

By this time, Sir, I hope, that you begin to be convinced, that there are some of us, at least, who understand too well the worth of modern loyalty to fear the effects of any such imputations as that, which, contingently at least, is conveyed in your letter; and that, by means of that sort, we shall not have the money extracted from our pockets. If Mr. Garnier, indeed, has a mind to give back to the people any portion, however small, or if another of your neighbours, Mr. Sturges Bourne, has a mind to give back a part of what he is annually receiving out of the taxes, let them do it; but, let them not accuse me or Mr. Chidell or Mr. Edney or Mr. Cowdry or Mr. Parrott, or any of the rest of us, of disloyalty, that is to say, of a very serious crime; let them not so accuse us, because we do not choose to give our money to make people rejoice at events which have produced great mischief to the nation in general, and good to none but those, who live upon the public, who get rich in proportion as the nation gets poor, whose riches do, in fact, spring from the same sources as the people's poverty. To all such accusations; all attempts made at getting popularity amongst the parishioners at our expence; all attempts at forcing us to give away our money, or to submit to be represented as hard-hearted towards the poor; all these at-

tempts we shall repel merely by stating, that Mr. Garnier of Wickham receives out of the public money more, *every month*, than is expended in keeping the poor of Droxford parish for a whole year; that, if only one *tenth* part of his income were distributed amongst the poor of Droxford, there would not need any parish rates at all, for there would be no poor; and that, of course, if he would give up the whole of what he receives from the public for *doing nothing*, it would, for ever, take away all poor, leave not one poor person, in *ten parishes* like that of Droxford. By statements like this we shall always answer any attempts to make us, who *earn* what we spend, appear hard-hearted to the poor. We shall not, upon such occasions, forget, that farmers Parrott and Edney and Chiddell, and the like; that every man who possesses any property; aye, and that even the day-labourer, whose very quid of tobacco is taxed, assists in maintaining the splendid equipage of Mr. Sturges Bourne, and the rattling coach-and-four of Mr. Garnier. Yes, Sir, I trust, that the day is not far distant, when not a man, either in Droxford parish or in any other, will want assistance to make him clearly understand these things; and, as for the present essay, if it should prove, in any degree, conducive to this great purpose, our neighbours will have to thank you much more than

Your most humble
and most obedient servant,
W^M. COBBETT.

The other topics, intended for this sheet, must be postponed.—I had prepared an article, or two, when Mr. Goodlad's letter was received, this morning, about nine o'clock. I thought it a duty I owed to the public (for it applies to every part of the kingdom) to answer this letter without delay; and, neither of the other articles could be inserted, without dividing them.

PISTOLLING PRIVY COUNSELLORS.

"Ill-weav'd ambition, how much art thou shrunk!"

My Dear Sir;—We think so much alike on all great points, and your very conjectures have been of late so prophetic, that I am inclined most seriously to doubt my own judgment, when it differs from yours even in matters of the most trifling importance.

Such is my present predicament, which I therefore esteem unfortunate, in contem-

plating the rencontre between the "pistolling privy counsellors." An incident, which, though exceedingly degrading to the character of the government, is by no means, as I think, to be regretted by the country. On the contrary, I consider it a topic of congratulation; and as it is unique, and peculiar to the auspicious reign of his present majesty, (which may God indefinitely prolong!) and adds one to the many considerations, which constitute the propriety of, as also may become an harmonious ingredient in compounding the loyal and dutiful Address, which the judicious Livery of London is so shortly to carry up to the throne, I would by no means have it omitted in it. The only objection, indeed, which I see to the including the incident in the Address, consists in the catastrophe not having been so complete, as one could have wished.—For my own part, I am anxious to see the idea pushed a little further, and when the Lord Mayor furnishes his hot cold beef, I think that a *petit plat* representing the duel itself, the combatants and their accessories in a pale tremulous *blanc manger*, with a *fac simile* of the blood and wound in currant jelly, (which Colonel Birch's loyal ingenuity might accomplish to the taste of the Jubilee "Mawmen," as well as be a device in itself most appropriate and pleasing to the curious. But as *blanc manger* in such a situation is a perishable commodity, I would, in order the better to perpetuate and transmit the achievement, have a medal or coin of the value of a half crown, struck, emblematic of the occasion; wherein the united effigies of Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning (instead of looking one way as in the coins of William and Mary) might, like Galba's most apposite medal of the Honos and Virtus, be placed vis-a-vis, with a hostile frown at each other. This coin, I will predict, would have a great run in the remote counties, ignorance and curiosity being inseparable; and as a circulating medium is much wanted, the adoption of my proposition in this respect would be a converting, possibly for the first time these 50 years, of the actions of politicians to the benefit of their country. In pursuit of the same thought, I would, as a distinct and separate honour to Mr. Canning, suggest to his majesty's ministers, to the President of the Royal Society, and indeed, to his own classical taste, the idea of another gem, containing an effigy only of himself in the attitude of the famous

Gladiator Moriens; and that Lord C. may not be jealous of this exclusive attention, I would suggest to him the hint of a coin representing himself in brass, as a Gladiator also, holding a little Victoria in one hand, with a convulsive grasp at a seal, which has just fallen from the other.—An imperial coin also, emblematical of the harmony of the cabinet, might be struck, having, as was customary with the emperors, a Concordia on its reverse.—But, to give you my serious reasons why I cordially approve of the duelling or pistolling ministers, distinct from this commemorative view of the matter:—1st, then, I think, it holds out to the people a very pleasing prospect of relief from their misfortunes, without any risk to themselves. 2ndly, to look at it in another light or two: I highly approve of the example of making ministers responsible in their persons for their political misconduct. This is good, extremely good; the transition not being at all abrupt from this to the making them in their persons responsible also to the people, to whom some persons may think a greater responsibility was due, than to each other. And although one might desire to make some little change in the article of execution, (as a death more appropriate than shooting would naturally suggest itself) yet, for the sake of unanimity, I would not cavil about trifles, such as mode or manner; and, therefore, provided substantial justice could at all seasons be obtained for the country, upon the persons of its ministers, I would not be a pedant to investigate whether there might be any solid reason for preferring hemp before lead for the occasion.—3rdly, as a gratifying spectacle to the nation, I must approve of the pistolling in the following point of view, wherein I consider it as a sort of *amende honorable* to the nation. I reason thus:—An immense sum had been expended by the discharged Right Honourable Pistoller in his warlike expedition against Walcheren; Now we approve of taxes and expenditure, the more lavish the better; it is the more creditable to the spirit and resources of the country; besides it goes more directly to the goal at which every thing conspires to drive. But when the people of England have turned their very purses inside out, in order to equip a gallant expedition, they do not think, that they have any right to expect it to be conducted with either vigour or success, but they do conceive themselves by a sort of *jus gentium* entitled to an equi-

valent; or, to speak more diplomatically, to a *quid pro quo*; that is, they have an equitable right to a battle: Now as Lord C. sent out a Cabinet General, who either would not, or could not, or at least did not fight, (all three being the same to us) the battle necessarily was returned to him, and lay upon his shoulders. And it is, in this regard, that I think Lord Castlereagh acted so very honourably towards us, in his transferring the war campaign from the continent to the cabinet, and in his taking back the battle from the General (who was well pleased to return it) to be fought by the Secretaries. Yet if the sword did little for the noble Lord's reputation amongst the people, disease has been extremely propitious to him; the climate has achieved what was omitted by the enemy: and death has been a most efficient *ex post facto* colleague to the noble Secretary, making him in this respect ample amends for all Mr. Canning's insincerity! In fine, one may apply to Lord Castlereagh what was poetically said of another noble sufferer:—"Nothing " in his (political) life became him like " the leaving it."—4thly, there is a view which you have taken of this cannonade on Putney Heath, where, in the animated expression of your abhorrence at the indecency of the transaction, you appear to me to have for a moment lost sight of that impartiality, which is the honour of history, and the peculiar glory of your publication. I refer to your allusion to the case of Major Campbell; which you appear in the sometimes indispensable hurry of perusal to have mistaken. Major C. was found guilty of murder by a jury in the ordinary course of law. So found, because there appeared evidence, that he had killed a brother officer, whom he had compelled to fight him under unusual circumstances; leading to violent suspicion of unfairness; corroborated by the dying exclamation of the man who fell. Execution would in due course have followed the sentence upon the verdict. The government so far had nothing to do with it; the ministry, indeed, might have advised the king to remit the punishment, but they did not: and in my opinion this was the best, and, for any thing I know to the contrary, the only good advice they ever gave his majesty. Now surely, my dear Sir, to draw the analogy a little closer, you do not believe, that if providentially Canning had shot Castlereagh, (for we are taught "that not a sparrow falls!" &c.) or *vice versa*, that Castlereagh had providentially

shot Canning, a jury of 12 Englishmen would have found either guilty of felony! What! hang Canning for shooting Castlereagh, or hang Castlereagh for shooting Canning!!! Good God, Mr. Cobbett, have you ever read the Marquis Beccario, or what an opinion have you formed of the freeholders of Middlesex? Let me entreat you to look at this matter then rather in its patriotic consequences, than in its exceptions, as an innovation; and, indeed, I am not afraid that, when you shall have reconsidered its valuable tendency, you will unite to mine your important approbation of it.—I am now naturally led from my panegyric upon the catastrophe, to a consideration of the plot, with a rapid appreciation of the respective merits of the performers. "O! that my enemy would write a book!" may, on this occasion, be narrowed to "O! that my enemy would write a letter!" Let us examine Lord Castlereagh's, which has matter in it deserving a few moments attention. We there, notwithstanding all that constitutional dreamers have dreamt upon the subject, find it publicly avowed, by a Secretary of State, that the King of England does not chuse his own ministers; but that, by an accommodating species of *co-optatio* (a thing prohibited by the Romans,) they virtually chuse each other. So that we have not even the small chance of that very small quantity of integrity, which collision and opposition might by bare possibility strike out of the independent action of 12 or 13 politicians in their several departments; but persons are put into one office, because they will be, or what is in effect the same thing, are turned out because they will not be, subservient to the views of the person, who fills another; and that person the leader of a faction in the House of Commons! This is the real and true state of the case, for to talk of any difference in principle, would be ridiculous in reference to two men, who were the underlings of Pitt, and the humble, or as the Edinburgh Reviewers would have it, the "sympathetic," or perhaps the "lofty," instruments of the worst measures of his detestable administration.—I now proceed to the mere personal matter in the letter; Lord Castlereagh, in a missive, which should have contained but the four words, begins it by telling Mr. C. that "he has deceived him." Now there, if this had been true, he stood on good ground, as a man, although, *perhaps*, not as a politician. The quarrel in short

(as Sir Lucius O'Trigger would have said) was a very pretty quarrel, as it stood; especially between two persons, having each something of the potatoe in him. I have however put a *perhaps*, for I really do not see how one factious placeholding politician can deceive another. An Italian meets his friend, and with open arms embraces him, but he has a stiletto in his hand, which his friend expects, and is disengaging his own; Now this first Italian does not deceive the other: he does indeed stab him, but that is clear another matter; for it is obvious by the precautions he was using, that his adversary did not deceive him. No, no! call it by its right name, and then we must say that he was only the most dexterous. In a word, there is no deception amongst the punters in politics; loaded dice are fair at that game, and every body uses them. But was I even to admit that a politician's honour could suffer by his being duped, I have no data to ascertain in that respect, what Lord C. could have lost. For in order to find that unknown quantity, we require two other quantities to be assigned, which after the strictest search appear to me undiscoverable; I mean the quantity of that quality, political honour, that really and *bonâ fide* belonged to Lord C. or was imputed to him by his countrymen, either in England or Ireland, before Mr. Canning discharged him, and the quantity, (which must have grievously suffered indeed by any deduction from it) that remained in his lawful possession at the very instant he discovered that Mr. Canning had robbed him of the rest! If one could get from any confidential friend, from any of all the Seymours for example, and I adjure them by all their places and pensions! (for the public is in total ignorance respecting his honour) these quantities truly assigned, one might, as I said before, not only find out what Lord Castlereagh had lost at the period alluded to, and which he so affectingly regrets, but one might even discover, which is indeed a much more curious point, what positive quantity he actually possesses now; and which, so far as I know, we have no other data whatsoever for ascertaining! But allowing Lord Castlereagh to be his own voucher for more or less of that quality, which "hath no skill in surgery," and "cannot take away the grief of a wound," let us inquire if he even himself thought that Mr. Canning had impeached it by concealing his discharge from him; Why, the very reverse

is distinctly stated in so many words in the actual letter, in the actual same letter; wherein he admits that Mr. Canning did press its being communicated to him; a matter, resisted, by whom? why, by his very own friends; who doubtless knew very well that he would be much better pleased by continuing to receive his emoluments than by being prematurely informed of an arrangement, the knowledge of which would have been incompatible with his retaining them. His friends, I think, judged very prudently, from their intimate knowledge of the man, and not at all the less so, for not having said one syllable about his honour; which, from some strange misconception or other, appears, in the whole of this business, to have occurred to nobody but himself! I omit the prosing metaphysical matter, and a great deal of very bad reasoning relative to his having been dishonoured by his continuing to exercise his functions, after he had been virtually superseded, contained in the middle of the letter, because it is obvious, that he conceives (whatever the nation may) that disgrace was to attach to him, not in respect of any past misconduct in his office, but in respect of his being virtually superseded therein without his knowing it; whilst it is nevertheless quite palpable to the capacity of a child, that no person can be disgraced by conscientiously continuing to discharge the functions of a public office, so long as he is not aware or apprized of any thing having occurred, which would make it proper for him to retire from it. I will only just farther observe, that having at the close of his letter, abandoned the only good pretext for calling Canning out, contained in it, namely, that he had deceived him, he again changes his ground, and rests his quarrel on a point nearly or altogether indifferent, viz. on the mode or manner of doing a thing, which he admits in the same sentence that the other had a right to do: and which indeed, the very letter written by himself to attack the act proves, by its absurdities, ought to have been done effectually as well as virtually many many months before. The truth here, as in almost every case, lies in a nut shell; from which, the following is not probably very remote. Canning wanted Castlereagh's place for a friend, Castlereagh was of no importance to any living soul but himself: his colleagues therefore gave him up at once, rather than suffer the diminution of Canning's abilities in

the House of Commons. The time was not ripe for putting in Canning's friend; and Castlereagh's friends, who must have known him better than any body else, (though he now disowns them!) thought, that they could not oblige him more, than by continuing to him *pro tempore* the emoluments of his office; they therefore did not wish to tell him, what would have compelled him to relinquish these profits (for to suppose that the abilities of the person who wrote that letter could be of any use even to the present administration would be ridiculous); they therefore concealed it from him, and, in doing so, acted the part of friends to him; (to which, as is customary, he makes the return of resentment). He necessarily protracted their friendly motives in acting so towards him; and therefore, as it would have been preposterous, if not ludicrous, in him, to have called out his friends, he challenges, on the refuted ground of his having deceived him, the only member of the cabinet, who, as far as we know from the letter, demonstrated a desire not to have deceived him! The fact I should take to be, that Castlereagh, if he saw at all, must have seen, that he had no one solid reason for challenging Canning, that did not apply much more strongly to perhaps every other member of the cabinet: he consequently vacillates from one pretext to another, until, as is common with men in that situation, he at length fixes on the worst. He could not challenge his own friends, who were the people that really deceived him; and his quarrel, not being about his honour, as he says, but about his office, he naturally, because revenge is natural, (only he will not allow it) challenged the man, by whose proposition he was to be turned out of it.—By the bye, people never know themselves; if they did, Castlereagh would never have shot Canning for not carrying a proposition into effect, for an "inchoate act;" since he could not so soon have forgotten, that, in the last Session of Parliament, Canning had got him acquitted of a most damnable charge, on the sheer and sole ground of the act imputed not having been carried into complete effect by him! Some of your readers perhaps begin by this time to consider me as the apologist of Canning; whereas nothing is more remote from my intention. Castlereagh has selected him out of many others, his associates, as the fittest on whom to fix a charge of deception. He must know

him better than we do ; and I have no doubt whatever that though erroneous in his instance, and wrong in his reasoning, he is right in his imputation. I acknowledge, however, that I do feel a desire on this occasion to remove from Mr. Canning's shoulders a burthen, which he ought not exclusively to carry. The ass's fault ought not to be laid upon the pack saddle. Amongst them, they have insulted lord Castlereagh's honour, as he says ; I have endeavoured in a friendly way to convince him, that he fixed wrong in fixing upon Canning, and that, consequently, the discharge of a lump of lead into Canning's posteriors leaves his honour just where it was before.—Let him now then fix right ; and there is one comprehensive way, the "*servetur adimum*," in which he will be sure, first or last, to get the right sow by the ear ; and should his majesty be then pleased to adopt for his cabinet the regulations of his army, whereby, in vacancies so occasioned, the promotion is prohibited from going in the regiment, should this, I say, take place, and the Whigs accordingly succeed to the command, who knows, but that, in their complete "coalition with the memories" of Pitt, and No Popery, they may adopt also for their example, the dissensions in the cabinet, and, inspired by Providence, may also imitate Lord Castlereagh's mode of deciding them. As my feather writes this, a beam of hope seems to shine upon the country, with a faint promise to us, that though England, corrupted as her establishments now are, can never dream of being defended by the union of her inhabitants, she may yet be saved by the dissensions of her ministers. With a fervent prayer, then, that the safety of the country may come this way, if it can come no other (a prayer the more sincere, as its accomplishment will suit my hypothesis,) I hasten to my conclusion of this tedious letter, whose substance I fully intended to have comprised in twenty lines. Permit me to add, that I am as sensible as you can be of the dull matter-of-fact tenor of its arguments ; I am aware that you will perceive, as I indeed did with frequent struggles of self denial, the many occasions of vivacity and pleasantry which were spontaneously presented to me by the subject, but which I avoided, "under Providence," by an incessant consideration of the welfare of my country being at stake ; which I thought an unseasonable levity might

wound ;—for as the interests were weighty, so the style I deemed should be serious. Above all, I hope you will see that I have endeavoured carefully to avoid any remark, which can be esteemed disrespectful, either towards our aged and beloved sovereign, his government, or the country. Moreover, I have, with a world of pains, expunged whatever in my rough copy appeared to me either sarcastic, or satirical upon the combatants. Considering them indeed, (which one must do, now that they are "*functi officio*,") as men politically dead, I have passed with a classical charity, mingled with melancholy over their ashes the "*favillus adhuc calentes*" both of the poet and the politician ; whilst "*de mortuis nil nisi bonum*" will at once be recognised to have been my rule. On this score, I feel that I have a conscience void of offence, and therefore have nothing to dread. But if it be objected to me, as I most fear, that I have erred on the other side, the side of good nature, by sometimes swerving from rigid impartiality, in putting a more favourable construction upon certain parts of their conduct, than they will bear, I must, like Mrs. Mal-a-prop, "own the soft impeachment ;" I here confess my weakness ; I know it to be my vulnerable side ; but I appeal to the benevolence of our nature, and as the error is amiable, I hope the censure will be charitable !

I remain, my Dear Sir,

Sincerely yours,

J. C. WORTHINGTON.

Cottage, Southampton, Oct. 10, 1809.

ANSWER TO THE EDINBURGH REVIEW

ON THE SUBJECT OF

REFORM IN PARLIAMENT.

From the Glasgow Sentinel.

Sir,—The Edinburgh Review is a work which I have long considered as a light shining in darkness, and the darkness comprehending it not ; and when in its attack upon Mr. Cobbett, I found it advocating the cause of parliamentary dependence, it appeared to me as something struck out rather by the collision of contest, than the genuine sentiments of the writer. In the last Number of that work, however, no room is left to doubt, that it looks upon the independence of parliament as an impossible, or a dangerous thing. That such an opi-

nion is false in theory, is subversive of all free government in practice, and is at utter enmity with the constitution of our country, I do not despair to shew; but in order to do so, I must begin with Mr. Hume, the real author of the opinion in question; "We may," says he (*Essay on the Independency of Parliament*) "give to this influence, what name we please; we may call it by the invidious appellations of corruption and dependence, but some degree and some kind of it are inseparable from the very nature of the constitution, and necessary to the preservation of our mixt government." In a note, he affects to limit this crown influence to offices and honours, and deprecates what he calls private bribery; by which, I suppose, he means pecuniary influence; as a shameless prostitution, and as always infamous under all ministers: but notwithstanding this distinction, I believe if he had compared his ideas, he would have come to the same conclusion with regard to both species. For the influence by offices and honours, either must weigh in a member's mind, so far as to direct his judgment, and determine his vote, or it must not; if it does, what can money do more? if it does not, it is useless. But to leave this distinction, a distinction without a difference; let us proceed to the principle itself; speaking of the House of Commons, he says, "how easy would it be for that house to wrest from the Crown all its powers, one after another, by making every grant conditional, and choosing their time so well, that their refusal of supply should only distress the government, without giving foreign powers any advantage over us." In this sagacious query, the learned gentleman seems inclined to carry his theory of the want of connection between cause and effect as far as it will go; but I am so far a disciple of the old school, as to conceive that there can be no effect without a cause, that in the event of the House of Commons wishing to deprive the Crown of its powers, it must either have the support of the people, or it must not; if it have not, it can do no harm; the king, by dissolving the house, can give an opportunity to the people to send other representatives, juster bearers of the public sentiment; if it have that support, then the discontent of the people is an effect which must have an adequate cause; either those powers vested in the Crown are grievous to the people, and hard to be borne, or they are

not; if they are, they deserve to be abolished; if they are not, it is not conceivable that the people should give that support to the House of Commons, which is necessary to the subversion of monarchy. So much for the effect likely to be produced on the monarchical part of our constitution, by the subject in question. Let us now see its effects on the democratical part of it; this we will find in the very next passage after the one last quoted from Hume. "Did the House of Commons," says he, "depend in the same manner on the king, and had none of the members any property but from his gift, would not he command all their resolutions, and be from that moment absolute?" Now, in an assembly where the resolutions are carried by the majority, either the majority are influenced, or they are not; if they are not, this influence, "invidiously called corruption and dependence" is of no use, and our mixed government still remaining, shews that for its preservation, it stands in no need of such an assistant; if the majority be influenced, what is this, to use the words of Mr. Locke, (*on Government*, 2. § 222.) "but to cut up the government by the roots, and poison the very fountain of public security? for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of their representatives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for no other end, but that they might always be freely chosen, and, so chosen, freely act and advise, as the necessity of the commonwealth and the public good should, upon examination and mature debate, be judged to require. This, those who give their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed the reasons on all sides, are not capable of doing. To prepare such an assembly as this, and endeavour to set up the declared abettors of his own will, for the true representatives of the people, and the law-makers of the society, is certainly as great a breach of trust, and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert the government, as is possible to be met with."—I now come to shew that parliamentary dependence, is, in proportion to its extent, subversive of all free government, in practice: and in order to be convinced of this, we have only to consult history, and observe the gradations by which, when the Legislative and Executive powers have been vested in distinct bodies, the former have gradually become

subservient to the latter ; and the conclusion will hold equally good, whether the Legislative be an hereditary or elected body. In Roman history, for example, the Senate, by the disturbances and bloodshed that took place, during, and immediately after the first of the Cæsars, had lost much of its power and dignity. Its purgation was reserved for Augustus, who, by expelling some members, and persuading others to take themselves off, attempted its reformation ; but this being his own act, and by his own individual power, necessarily brought that body under his controul. "Whilst," says Gibbon (Roman Emp.) "he thus restored the dignity, he destroyed the independence of the Senate. The principles of a free constitution are irrecoverably lost, when the Legislative power is nominated by the Executive." We accordingly find that that body from whom the kings of the earth were wont to solicit an audience, as its slaves and freedmen, fell more and more into contempt, till its power and authority were annihilated by Dioclesian, and the universal maxim came to be, "The will of the Prince is the supreme law." If we look to the history of Spain, we will find that both in Arragon and Castile, the Cortes, though independent, and invested with much greater powers than are vested in the House of Commons, did not subvert monarchy. In the principality of Catalonia, indeed, the impatience of the people to obtain redress of their grievances, did induce them to take up arms against their Sovereign John II. A. D. 1462, and to endeavour to establish a republican form of government ; but this was the work of a whole people, goaded to desperation by misgovernment, and not the endeavour of one part of their constitution, in consequence of its independence, to subvert the other. Seventy-seven years after this period, we find the ancient constitution of the Castilian Cortes subverted by Charles, and an assembly, to use the words of Dr. Robertson (Hist. Chas. V.) "bearing no resemblance, either in power, or dignity, or independence, to the ancient Cortes, and absolutely at the devotion of the court in all their determinations," substituted in its room ; and so of the others, till at last the whole Peninsula was grasped by despotism.—It would be tedious to trace the fate of government in the different countries of Europe, where in consequence of the early inhabitants being allodial proprietors, the legislative

powers were vested in Parliaments, Assemblies of the Estates, Cortes, and Diets ; different from and controuling the executive, and where, in course of time, by force or fraud, the executive came to controul the legislative. It may be remarked, however, that the mode of controul does not alter the question, the ascendancy which an executive obtains over a legislative, by (to use the polite name of) influence, being just as certain as that which it obtains by the dread of banishment, or a Bastile ; and is more pernicious, in fact, inasmuch as slavery, under the semblance of liberty, is more hopeless than open and undisguised slavery, against which there is greater probability of mankind asserting the rights of their nature. Having thus shewn that the necessity of Parliamentary dependence to the continuance of our mixed government, is false in theory, and in practice subversive of every thing like freedom, no Briton, I think, will deny, that the third position flows as a corollary from the two first, and that parliamentary dependence is at utter enmity with the constitution of our country. The authority of Blackstone, on this last point, is decisive. "The constitutional government of this island," says he, (Com. Introd. § 2d.) "is so admirably tempered and compounded, that nothing can endanger or hurt it, but destroying the equilibrium of power between one branch of the legislature and the rest. For, if ever it should happen, that the independence of any one should be lost, or that it should become subservient to the views of either of the other two, there would soon be an end of our constitution." If the above reasoning be correct, the independence of parliament is a thing which ought to be granted to the people of Britain, as their just right, whether it would or would not reduce "the burden of our taxes," "the preponderating influence of the Crown," "and the monopoly of political power."—Leaving, therefore, those topics into which the Reviewer has entered at so great length, as scarcely bearing upon the main point ; we find him, (in page 800 of the Review), apprehending, as Mr. Hume has done before him, that an alteration in the House of Commons would be attended with the abolition both of the Crown and Aristocracy ; but in his enunciation of this position, he seems to be guilty of an unfairness, similar to that, to which some aristocrats have recourse, who

in beating down every thing that savours of democracy, choose to draw their picture of the people of Britain in the 19th century, from Shakespeare's description of the Roman populace in *Coriolanus*, or of Jack Cade and his associates in *Henry 6th*. For, that the house of Commons would not be composed entirely of the representatives of the yeomanry and tradesmen, is sufficiently manifest to any one, that will for a moment consider of what sort of men the Commons of Britain are composed; that they consist of the younger branches of noble families; of knights; of country gentlemen of great landed property; of wealthy merchants and manufacturers; and of the individuals in the three learned professions; as well as of the yeomanry of the counties, and the tradesmen of the burghs; now although the representation were to go by numbers only, yet, from the very nature of things, and the situation of society, the sentiments of the two latter classes, would be much modelled by those of the former; indeed, the apprehensions which some affect to entertain of the versatility and turbulence of the people, limiting the phrase even to the two last classes of commoners, appear to me rather symptomatic of hypochondria, as in all countries, attachment to old customs, and aversion from novelty, are generally found to be the characteristics of the great body of the people; who, says Locke, (on Government, 2. § 223), "are not so easily got out of their old forms, as some are apt to suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to. And if there be any original defects, or adventitious ones introduced by time, or corruption; it is not an easy thing to be changed, even when all the world sees there is an opportunity for it.— This slowness and aversion in the people to quit their old constitutions, has, in the many revolutions that have been seen in this kingdom, in this and former ages, still kept us to, or after some interval of fruitless attempt, still brought us back again to our old legislature of King, Lords, and Commons: and whatever provocations have made the Crown be taken from some of our Princes' heads, they never carried the people so far as to place it in another line." But a most beneficial Reform could be introduced into Parliament, and at the same time leave to

wealth and stake in the country, that influence which it always will and ought to have. Let the elective franchise be extended to every man, who, to use Blackstone's phrase, may have a will of his own; suppose that the number of electors so qualified, amounts to two millions, and that the number of members to be returned to Parliament is 400; if the qualified population be divided into 200 equal parts, it will give 10,000 electors to every member, and thus half the representatives will be returned, who will, of course, be the representatives of the population. The wealth of the country may be equally easily represented by the Income Tax being made permanent, and divided into 200 equal parts, and every district where one of these parts is levied, returning a member, the person paying 5*l.* of tax, having one vote, and, if 50*l.* ten votes, and so in proportion; the American mode of collecting the taxes being adopted, and the longest term of one parliament being three years. What is next said about the House of Commons, sending up a number of popular bills, is just what Hume says about their divesting the Crown of its powers, and it is therefore to be answered in the same manner. Next, of the Nobility of England being no longer distinguishable as to their interests from her opulent Commoners, and of there being no intelligible grounds for excluding the influence of the one, more than that of the other; I perfectly agree to, supposing, that their judicial business were performed openly, as it is said to be virtually, by the Lord Chancellor; and that they were to cease to exist as a separate body. They would then certainly have a right to vote for the representatives both of the wealth and population; but so long as they choose to have a house of their own, possessed of a *veto* upon the proceedings of the House of Commons, it is manifestly unfair that they should have any thing to say in this House. The support which is next endeavoured to be drawn from history in favour of the principle, appears to me equally misplaced; for, in the first place, a despotical government never can be a secure one, and the abolition of monarchy in England, had nearly the same origin, as the revolt of Holland and Zealand, under the infamous government of the Duke of Alva. In the second place, Charles, by consenting to the Parliament having the power of continuing itself, vested in it an unconstitutional and improper power, and

such as now-a-days would never be granted. Perfectly agreeing with the writer in his last paragraph, I am, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,—A. Z.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

WAR BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND FRANCE, AND THE EXPEDITION TO HOLLAND.—*Notes from the French Official Paper, the Moniteur, on the Articles published in the London Papers upon the above subjects. (Continued from page 576.)*

On the 1st of September there were between Flanders and the Scheldt and Maestricht, 20,000 men under arms. They were not all regulars, but they were all commanded by men who had served; they were all volunteers, and consisted, for the most part, of former under officers, and former soldiers who had obtained their discharges, and who had run to arms on the first signal.—Lord Chatham, therefore, charged himself with a senseless operation, and those, therefore, who projected it, shewed themselves to be as ignorant of the climate as of the localities. Lord Chatham saved the English army by determining to re-embark it; but every day that he delays to execute this determination, heightens the misfortunes of his expedition, and if he is culpable, it is not in having ordered the retreat, it is in having so long delayed to re-embark; for during this delay, the English troops contract fresh diseases, and become infected with fresh seeds of destruction.—Let it suffice to say that the Emperor, when he learned that an English army had been landed upon that point, recommended that it should not be attacked, and that we should leave the destruction of it to the diseases, which, in that dangerous climate, must do the enemy more injury than the cannon, without its costing any thing to France.

The English, in landing in Flanders, did, therefore, a thing contrary to all the rules of war: 1st. Because they took for the theatre of their operations a country so unwholesome, that they had to presume that a month's stay in it would destroy this army; that the country is covered with strong places, such as Flushing, Bergen-op-Zoom, Bathz, and Lillo; and on the side of the Island of Cadzand, the new Fort Napoleon, &c. &c. 2d. Because their principal object appeared to be to capture the squadron; they ought to have imagined that the squadron depended

upon Antwerp, and that Antwerp was impregnable, for its communications with France could not be cut off, except by immense armies, against which the whole population of France would have time to march.—The result of all which is, that the English have been for so many years shut out of the Continent, that they are no longer acquainted with it. Every thing has changed, except their hatred against France.

With regard to the Island of Walcheren, it is said that they mean to keep it. We should have only cause to applaud this resolution for many reasons; 1st. The English, although they had 20,000 men in the Island of Walcheren, could not prevent it from being attacked and retaken; 2d. 20,000 English, exposed to the influence of the climate, would experience so much loss, that it would be necessary to be continually reinforcing them: that, in the course of the year, 80,000 men would as necessarily become victims to the climate, and it would cost them more to guard this marsh than to preserve the East Indies; but it is probable that time would not be left for them to suffer such losses. The channel between the two Islands is so narrow, that bombs can reach from the one to the other. The twenty ships of the line, and the flotilla which we have in the Scheldt, would soon make us masters of that river. It would not be forgotten, that four years ago, and with our flotilla alone, we were masters of all the coast; can it be doubted that we should be soon masters of a closed sea? and can it, at the same time, be supposed that the English would attempt to keep Flushing without being masters of the Scheldt? Besides, a flotilla is too dangerous a war for them. Such a war is not carried on with boats alone; it is conducted with excellent troops, that is to say, with means which do not allow the English any advantage over us.

We well know that men exist who, although completely ignorant of the art of war, have, notwithstanding, the silly habit of taking and endeavouring to give counsel to those who are masters in it; those people, yet more skilful than that public speaker who introduced the subject of war before Hannibal, tell you, that the English, by preserving the Island of Walcheren, will make it a second Gibraltar, or another Malta; in fine, a commanding point which will render them masters of Flanders, of Holland, &c. Poor madmen! they cannot perceive that if the English persist in keep-

ing the Island of Walcheren, that circumstance would be as advantageous for us as if they were embarrassed in the heart of Spain.—In general, whenever an English army lands on the Continent, every real Frenchman ought to rejoice.—Such a contest is completely in our favour: a nation of three millions of men cannot meet man for man a nation of forty millions. A new army, all the elements of which are in the navy, cannot keep the field against the veteran forces which have conquered two-thirds of Europe; in fine, an army which can only arrive by sea, has neither artillery, cavalry, nor equipages, at least it has a very great inferiority in all these means, and Lord Chatham really could not mount more than 2,000 cavalry? well! before 15 days were elapsed, the French effective cavalry, which were assembled on the Banks of the Scheldt, amounted to 4,000!

‘Reflecting also that our troops are not led on by a Marlborough, a Wolfe, or even a Wellesley.’

We here see what the spirit of party is capable of. It is a pity that Sir Arthur Wellesley had not the command instead of Lord Chatham. The latter saved the English army; the other would probably have lost it, as he has lost that which he commanded in Spain—where he had the imprudence to entangle himself with 30,000 men, without reflecting that he thus exposed his left wing to the different corps of the Dukes of Dalmatia, of Elchingen, and of Treviso, who had 70,000 men under arms. He has, it is true, drawn himself out of this critical situation, by a precipitate flight, and by abandoning his hospitals, his wounded, his horses, and a part of his equipages. It was thus that Gen. Moore, in his ridiculous expedition in the month of Nov. last, fled from Benevento to Corunna, abandoning his allies, his horses, his ammunition, and his equipages. Neither the one nor the other of these Generals has displayed that foresight, which is a characteristic so essential in war, and which prompts to do only what can be supported, and to undertake only what presents the greatest number of chances of success. Sir Arthur Wellesley has not evinced more talent than the men who direct the cabinet of St. James's. To wish to support Spain against France, and to contend upon the Continent with France, is forming an enterprize which will cost dear to those who have undertaken it, and who will meet in it only disasters. Conflagrations, it is true, may be

kept up; misfortunes may be brought on peaceable inhabitants; rivers of blood may flow; the people, the protectors of whom they call themselves, may be ruined; but any other results are impossible.

The *Moniteur* of the 30th of September, contains an article extracted from an evening paper on the failure of our Expedition against Antwerp, in which it is said, that the Armistice concluded on the Danube, could not but have a powerful influence on the issue of that expedition, makes the following remarks on this assertion: “What a miserable excuse; what have the affairs of the Danube to do with the expedition of the Scheldt. Can it for a moment be supposed that France stood in need of the army which is in Vienna to defend herself against the English. The English expedition failed because it was extravagant; it would also have failed had the French been defeated at Wagram; nay, it would in that case have more certainly failed of success, because an unfortunate event would have doubled the energy of the French in the interior; it would have, because, in fact, fools only could attempt a similar expedition in a month, and a climate where epidemic fevers carry off one moiety of the army. Had it been undertaken in the month of May, the chances against its success would have been far less considerable; because at that time of the year no dread of maladies was to be entertained. The Cabinet of St. James's, acting in a different manner, displayed the utmost ignorance of circumstances, in a case to which it attached so much importance. The expedition was absurd; because Flushing could not be supposed to be taken but after a long siege, carried on in the midst of inundations; because after the reduction of Flushing it was necessary to direct further operations against Batz, Bergen-op-Zoom and Lillo; and because no attack on the strong place of Antwerp could be made but after previous sieges, to the number of three, which must take at least three months; and because it was not recollected that the fourth battalions of the regiments of all the army, which remain in France, form an army of more than a hundred thousand men, exclusively of the national guards and gens d'armes of the neighbouring departments. In less than eight days a corps of 4,000 horse was assembled at Antwerp, while all the cavalry of Lord Chatham's army did not exceed 1,000.—Let not the English boast of their

holding the key of the Scheldt, they cannot hold it; any force which may be destined to defend that place must in the end be lost to England, either by capitulation or sickness, and in the former case we shall be more than indemnified for the loss of 4,000 men, who capitulated in Flushing, not 1,000 of whom were French.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—*Royal Order, directed to his Excellency the Marquis de Romana, and transmitted to him by Don Martin Garay, dated Badajoz, Aug. 31.*

In the midst of the great cares and attentions which the Supreme Governing Junta of the kingdom has taken, to follow with activity and firmness the defence of the country, it has never lost sight of the salutary reforms which the nation earnestly expects, which its actual situation requires, and which must be the foundation of its future prosperity. One of the greatest objects which now claim its attention, and which ought to occupy it with the greatest activity, is the convocation of the Cortes, the most important object which can, or ought, to employ the Supreme Junta. The more important this object is, the more necessary are the knowledge, the observations, and the experience of those who compose that assembly; and as, in a discussion of such magnitude, it will be expected by the nation, that all should concur, his majesty has been pleased to grant, that all the deputies shall give their assistance. It will therefore be necessary, in consequence of this sovereign and general determination, that the Marquis de Romana separate himself from his troops, and come to this city to exercise the functions of representative of the national body, though it is certainly most difficult to place at their head a Chief of equal experience and achievements; considering, however, the state of the kingdom of Galicia, and the principality of Asturias, the Junta, after mature deliberation, has determined that the Marquis shall transfer his command to that General of his army whom he shall judge most capable.—I communicate to your excellency the order of his majesty, for its fulfilment, advising at the same time that the command of the army cannot with propriety be transferred to the major general the Cónde de Noronha, because he being second Commandant-General in

Gallicia, ought always to remain in that kingdom.

In consequence of this Royal Order, the Marquis de Romana has signified, that he has confided the command of the army to the major-gen. Don Gabriel de Mendezabal, and that of the kingdom, to the Conde de Noronha, second Commandant-General, and President of its Royal Audience.

Proclamation to the Army by the Marquis de Romana.

Soldiers!—The august voice of our sovereign, Ferdinand, reached our ears in Denmark, and we obeyed the call. Our country invoked our aid, and a generous nation, traversing stormy seas, conducted us to join our valiant countrymen, from whom we had been separated by the atrocious perfidy and vile prostitution of an individual. You have resisted the mortal blows aimed at you by the tyrant Napoleon, to destroy you. You have suffered with me the disasters which his unequalled force has spread through the whole nation, and though all Europe; but you, without other assistance than your own valour—without other arms than those furnished by nature—without other ammunition than your own inimitable constancy—without other stimuli than your own heroic patriotism—without other ambition than that inspired by your honour and fidelity; have disputed the first fruits of his triumph; and have raised your names to a level with those of the men who have been born to inspire admiration.—Gallicia is covered with French carcasses: neither ancient Carthage, nor modern France, can compare their marches with those incessant ones, which, during six months of want and privation, you have made among the impenetrable Alps of Castile, Gallicia, and the Asturias, in the most exposed and rigorous situations. Immortal warriors! without great and signal battles, you have annihilated the proud army of the tyrant, by aiding the national patriotism, supporting the noble fermentation, harassing the troops of the enemy, defeating them in small skirmishes, and reducing their possession to the ground on which they stand; you have fulfilled the most elevated obligations of the soldier, and the fatigues and cares which I, as your general, have undergone for your sakes, are the reward I owe you. *(To be continued.)*

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 17.] LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1809. [Price 1s.

"The snake, tradition's tale avers,
"Shifts, once a year, his speckled skin;
"But no *improvement* change infers:
"He's still the self same snake within."

609]

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PISTOLLING PRIVY-COUNSELLORS.—In my last Number, at page 516, I inserted the Letter of Lord Castlereagh, containing his Charges against Mr. Canning; and, therefore, justice demands, that I here insert, in like manner, Mr. Canning's Defence; when I have done which, I shall offer such further observations as occur to me upon this at once ludicrous and scandalous transaction.

"It is perfectly true, that so long ago "as Easter, Mr. Canning had represented "to the Duke of Portland the insufficiency "(in his opinion) of the Government, "as then constituted, to carry on the "affairs of the country, under all the difficulties of the times, and had requested "that, unless some change should be "effected in it, he might be permitted to "resign his office. It is equally true that "in the course of the discussion which "arose out of this representation, it was "proposed to Mr. Canning, and accepted "by him, as the condition of his consenting to retain the seals of the Foreign "office, that a change should be made in "the War Department.—But it is *not true* "that the time at which that change was "ultimately proposed to be made, was of "Mr. Canning's choice; and it is not "true that he was party or *consenting to* "the concealment of that intended change "from Lord Castlereagh.—With respect "to the concealment, Mr. Canning, some "short time previous to the date of Lord "Castlereagh's letter, without the smallest "suspicion of the existence of any intention on the part of Lord Castlereagh to make such an appeal to Mr. Canning as that letter contains, but upon information that some misapprehension did exist as to Mr. Canning's supposed concurrence in the reserve which had been practised towards Lord Castlereagh, transmitted to one of Lord Castlereagh's most intimate friends, to be communicated whenever he might think proper, the copy of a letter addressed by Mr.

[610

"Canning to the Duke of Portland, in the "month of July, in which Mr. Canning "requests, 'in justice to himself, that it "may be remembered, whenever hereafter this concealment shall be alleged "*(as he doubts not that it will)* against "him, as an act of injustice towards Lord "Castlereagh, that it *did not originate in* "his suggestion; that so far from desiring "it, he conceived, however erroneously, "Lord Camden to be the *sure channel of* "communication to Lord Castlereagh; and "that up to a very late period he believed such communication to have been "actually made.—The copy of this letter, "and of the Duke of Portland's answer "to it, 'acknowledging Mr. Canning's "repeated remonstrances against the concealment,' are still in the possession of "Lord Castlereagh's friend.—The communication to Lord Camden, to which "this letter refers, was made, on the 28th "of April, with Mr. Canning's knowledge, and at his particular desire. Lord Camden being the near connection and "most confidential friend of Lord Castlereagh, it never occurred to Mr. Canning, nor was it credible to him, till he received the most positive asseverations of "the fact, that *Lord Camden had kept* "back such a communication from Lord "Castlereagh.—With respect to the period "at which the change in the War Department was to take place, Mr. Canning was induced, in the first instance, to consent to its postponement till the rising of parliament, partly by the representations made to himself of the inconveniencies of any change in the middle of a Session, but principally "from a consideration of the particular circumstances under which Lord Castlereagh stood in the House of Commons "after Easter; circumstances which would have given to his removal at that period of the Session, a character which it was "certainly no part of Mr. Canning's wish "that it should bear.—Mr. Canning, however, received the most positive promise, "that a change in the War Department

U

"should take place immediately upon the close of the Session. When that time arrived, the earnest and repeated entreaties of most of Lord Castlereagh's friends in the Cabinet, were employed to prevail upon Mr. Canning to consent to the postponement of the arrangement.—At length, and most reluctantly, he did give his consent to its being postponed to the period proposed by Lord Castlereagh's friends, viz. the termination of the Expedition then in preparation; but he did so upon the most distinct and solemn assurances, that whatever might be the issue of the Expedition, the change should take place at that period; that the Seals of the War Department should then be offered to Lord Wellesley (the person for whose accession to the Cabinet, Mr. Canning was known to be most anxious), and that the interval should be diligently employed by Lord Castlereagh's friends, *in preparing Lord Castlereagh's mind to acquiesce in such an arrangement.*—It was therefore matter of astonishment to Mr. Canning, when, at the issue of the Expedition, he reminded the Duke of Portland, that the time was now come for his Grace's *writing to Lord Wellesley*, to find, that so far from the interval having been employed by Lord Castlereagh's friends, in preparing Lord Castlereagh for the change, the same reserve had been continued towards him, against which Mr. Canning had before so earnestly remonstrated. Being informed of this circumstance, by the Duke of Portland, and learning at the same time from his Grace, that there were other difficulties attending the promised arrangement of which Mr. Canning had not before been apprised; and that the Duke of Portland had himself come to a determination to retire from office, Mr. Canning instantly, and before any step whatever had been taken towards carrying the promised arrangement into effect, withdrew his claim, and requested the Duke of Portland to tender his (Mr. Canning's) resignation, at the same time with his Grace's, to the King. This was on Wednesday the 6th of September, previously to the levee of that day.—All question of the performance of the promise made to Mr. Canning being thus at an end, the reserve which Lord Castlereagh's friends had hitherto so perseveringly practised towards Lord Castlereagh appears to have

been laid aside. Lord Castlereagh was now made acquainted with the nature of the arrangement which had been intended to have been proposed to him. What may have been the reasons which prevented Lord Castlereagh's friends from fulfilling the assurances given to Mr. Canning that Lord Castlereagh's mind should be prepared by their communications for the arrangement intended to be carried into effect; and what the motives for the disclosure to Lord Castlereagh after that arrangement had ceased to be in contemplation, it is not for Mr. Canning to explain."

This defence appeared first in the *Morning Chronicle*, a circumstance which (joined with others to be noticed by-and-by) is, as to the views of Mr. Canning, very well worthy of notice.—As an answer to *Lord Castlereagh's charge* this paper amounts to just nothing at all. A man who is a tolerable master of words, may so confuse any statement of facts as to raise out of it a question for dispute amongst persons, not accustomed to reason, or, not naturally of very clear heads; and, such is the device to which the "Captain of Eton" has now had recourse. He has laboured hard to "be-bother" the matter, and, has, in some measure, succeeded; but, I think, I may venture to say, that he has not produced the slightest alteration in the before-formed opinion of any man of even common discernment. We have nothing here but quibbling and shuffling; and not a single fact of any importance, nor a single argument to remove the charge, which it was the object of the statement to remove.—In the bother-brain letter of my Lord Castlereagh we find, after a great deal of labour to get at the true meaning; after sifting and boulding this confused heap of verbosity, we find Mr. Canning charged with *underhand dealing*; we find him charged with *having*, UNKNOWN TO LORD CASTLEREAGH, obtained from the Duke of Portland, a *positive promise* that Lord Castlereagh should be put out of his place; and, *having*, while he carried this promise in his pocket, continued, for many months, not only to be one of the same ministry with Lord Castlereagh, but to act towards that Lord with all the appearances of cordiality.—Such is the charge which Lord Castlereagh prefers against Mr. Canning; and to me it does not appear, that the charge is removed, or, in the smallest degree, weakened, by what the latter has, in the paper above inserted, urged by way of defence.—MR. CANNING acknowledges,

that, at Easter, he did obtain from the Duke of Portland, a positive promise that Lord Castlereagh should be put out of his office; and, he also acknowledges, *that he himself did not*, either before or after this application was made and *this promise obtained, communicate either his intentions or his acts* (relating to this matter) *to Lord Castlereagh.*

—This was an underhand proceeding; it was a foul and unmanly intrigue; it was like what one reads of in the anecdotes of the court of Russia; it was, as Lord Castlereagh characterized it, deceitful, and marked with the very worst features of bad faith. —As to the *time* when the promise was to be put into execution; and, as to his remonstrance to the Duke of Portland respecting the communication of the matter to Lord Castlereagh; as to all these excuses, what do they make in his favour? It was for him to communicate, *not his application* to the Duke of Portland, but his *intention* to make that application; and this he should have communicated to Lord Castlereagh before he took even the most trifling step towards his removal.

—Mr. Canning says, that he neither *suggested* the concealment, nor *approved* of it; no, but the sin is a sin of *consent*, and consent he most assuredly did, according to a fair and honest interpretation of the meaning of that word. No, says he, for I “*reputedly remonstrated*” against the concealment. —Now, observe: he states, that, in the month of *July*, more, perhaps, than *three months* after he obtained a positive promise that Lord Castlereagh should be put out of his office, he wrote a letter to the Duke, of Portland, requesting, “that, when, hereafter, the concealment should be alledged against him, it might be remembered, that the concealment did not originate in his suggestion; that he conceived Lord Camden to be the sure channel of communication to Lord Castlereagh, and that, up to a late period, he believed such communication to have been actually made.” —Here is a distinct avowal, that, in *July*, three months after he had obtained the promise for putting Lord Castlereagh out of his place, *he knew* that the fact had been, and still was, *concealed from Lord Castlereagh.* —What nonsense is it, then, to talk of his not having *suggested* the concealment; of his not having *desired* it; and of his having *remonstrated* against it; when he knew that the concealment did exist, and when he had it completely

in his *own power* to do it away, at any moment? Remonstrances, indeed! Why, he may as well tell us of his remonstrances against people for bidding him not eat his dinner. He would eat it, in spite of their commands; and he would have made the communication to Lord Castlereagh, if he had wished the communication to be made to him. We *remonstrated* with people for doing that which we have not the power at hand to prevent them from doing; or, for leaving undone that which we cannot easily compel them to do; but, who ever heard of a remonstrance like that of Mr. Canning? Really, for me to remonstrate against my neighbour at table for not moving my jaws for me would not be much less absurd. He would fain have the world believe, that he was no party to the concealment. He perceives the shabby figure he makes under that imputation, of which, therefore, he is anxious to get rid: but, before he can make any man of common sense believe, that he is innocent of the charge, he must prove himself utterly unable to *speak* or to *write*; for, until then, his mouth will always be closed with this question: “Why, when you knew that concealment had taken place during three months, did not you, with your own tongue, remove that concealment, as any fair-dealing man would have done?” —The letter written to the Duke of Portland in *July*, instead of being a proof of innocence, contains proof of conscious guilt, on the part of Mr. Canning, who was evidently alarmed at the probable consequences of the concealment, and who in this letter, endeavoured to provide himself beforehand, with an excuse for his conduct, a scheme quite worthy of its author. —To pretend, that he ever *believed* Lord Castlereagh to have been informed of the promise made to him (Canning) is, really, what one would not have expected even from him. He had, from Easter to Michaelmas, been in possession of a positive promise, that one of his colleagues should be put out of his place; he continues, during the whole of that time, to act with that colleague, to sit in council with him, and says not a word to him upon the subject of his complaint against him; and, at the end of the time he pretends to be *astonished*, that no one had informed his said colleague of what he himself had done against him. To make this asser-

tion demanded as much confidence in the maker, or as much contempt, in him, for the public, as any assertion that I have met with. It is quite useless to dwell upon this part of the statement; for it is what no man in his senses will believe.—When you see men “go about the bush,” as the saying is; when they deal in circumlocutions instead of names; when you see them resort to all manner of means of avoiding direct assertion, and of reserving a hole to creep out at; when you see them at this work, you may be quite certain, that their cause is a bad one. Of this description is the statement of Mr. Canning, which, while it seems to point at Lord Camden, cannot be said to *assert*, that Lord Camden undertook to make the communication to Lord Castlereagh. It says, that Mr. Canning “conceived Lord Camden to be the sure channel of communication to Lord Castlereagh.” Then again it states, that a knowledge of the *promise*, made by the Duke of Portland to Mr. Canning, was communicated to Lord Camden by Mr. Canning’s desire, on the 28th of April; and that “Lord Camden “being the near connection and most confidential friend of Lord Castlereagh, it “never occurred to Mr. Canning, nor was it “credible to him, till he received the most “positive asseverations of the fact, that “Lord Camden had *kept back* such communication from Lord Castlereagh.”—But, if you requested the thing to be communicated to Lord Camden, with what view was it? Was it with a view, that it might thus reach Lord Castlereagh? Oh! miserable shift! If this had been your wish, how came you not to make the communication yourself? How came you, when, in July, you found the communication had not been made, not to make it yourself then?—But, what says Lord Camden to this? What says he, in answer to the charge of having been the cause of that concealment, of which Lord Castlereagh complains, and for which he demanded satisfaction? Why, he *denies the fact*. This is his statement.—“As it may “be inferred, from a statement which has “appeared in the public papers, that Lord “Camden *withheld* from Lord Castlereagh “a communication *which he had been desired “to make to him*, it is necessary that it “should be understood, that, however “Mr. Canning might have *conceived* the “communication alluded to, to have been “made to Lord Camden, it was never “stated to Lord Camden, that the com-

munication was made *at the desire of Mr. Canning*; and, that so far from Lord Camden having been *authorised to make “the communication to Lord Castlereagh*, he “was *absolutely restricted from so doing*.—“As it may also be inferred, that “Lord Camden was expected to prepare “Lord Castlereagh’s mind for any proposed change, it is necessary that it “should be understood, that Lord Camden *never engaged to communicate to Lord Castlereagh any circumstances respecting it, “before the termination of the Expedition*.”—If what Lord Camden says be true, what Mr. Canning has said, upon this part of the subject, *must be false*, unless the Duke of Portland deceived Mr. Canning upon the point, that is to say, gave him untrue information, or, in other words, *stated falsehoods* to him.—Which of the three are we to believe? For my part, I believe Lord Camden, because it appears quite out of nature, that he should have concealed the fact from Lord Castlereagh, if he had not been restricted from communicating it to him; and, besides, whatever we may think of the conduct of Lord Camden, it is evident that Lord Castlereagh regards him not as a party offending in a very high degree.—In fact, if there could be hatched, by any means whatever, a plausible reason for Mr. Canning’s leaving the task of communication to a third person, his friends might have some hope of seeing him ride off over the Duke of Portland, by whom, of course, Lord Camden means that he was “*absolutely restricted*” from *making the communication to Lord Castlereagh*; and thus the whole of the blame would fall, at last, upon a poor old man, who, as the public papers inform us, *is upon his death-bed*! Castlereagh charges Canning with concealing from him the fact of his having obtained a promise from the Duke of Portland to put him (Castlereagh) out of his place: Canning throws the blame upon Lord Camden, who, as he leaves us to infer, was put in possession of the fact, by the Duke of Portland, for the purpose of communicating it to Lord Castlereagh: Lord Camden then comes forward, and avers, that, so far from his being *authorized* to communicate the fact to Lord Castlereagh, he was *absolutely restricted from doing it*. Lord Camden and Mr. Canning may, as to this point, both speak truth; but, in that case, the Duke of Portland must have given Mr. Canning *false information*; for Mr. Canning asserts, that he firmly

believed, that, in consequence of the communication of the fact to Lord Camden, by the Duke of Portland, that fact was communicated to Lord Castlereagh, and that he could not possibly believe, that Lord Camden had *kept back* the communication from Lord Castlereagh, till he received the most positive asseverations of the fact. If, therefore, we believe Lord Camden, the question of *veracity* lies between the Duke of Portland and Mr. Canning, the former of whom, in closing his political career, will, at any rate, leave to the noblemen of England a pretty good lesson upon the subject of choosing their companions in power.—But, in whatever way this question of veracity may be settled, Mr. Canning stands, *upon his own confession*, charged with having obtained from the Duke of Portland a positive promise to turn out Lord Castlereagh, without having communicated his intention to Lord Castlereagh; of having suffered the fact of the promise to lie *concealed from all the world*, from Easter to the 28th of April; of *never having, from first to last, spoken to Lord Castlereagh upon the subject*; and, moreover, it does not appear, that, at any stage of the business, *he ever did request any person whatever* to make the communication to Lord Castlereagh.—Here, as far as relates to his conduct towards Lord Castlereagh, is the whole case. It cannot be mended, and, I am sure, it cannot be made worse. It exhibits an intrigue of the worst and lowest sort; and, besides its own intrinsic demerits, it tends to fix upon the author of it, the imputation of *other intrigues*, his share in which has, by many persons, at least, been hitherto considered as doubtful.—As to the manner, in which the *country* has been treated by Mr. Canning, in this instance, I think the less of it, because, were the treatment ten thousand times worse, the country would richly deserve it, seeing that it is entirely owing to its want of spirit, to its base abandonment of its ancient character, that such a man, and that this particular man, has had it in his power to injure and insult it.—Can any one believe, that, had the English nation been what it was only thirty years ago, this man would ever have conceived the audacious idea of becoming its prime minister; that is to say, in fact, its chief ruler? No: if England had been what it was but twenty years ago, it is not to be believed, that any man, capable of such an intrigue, would have found his way into the king's

council; and much less is it to be believed, that any cabinet minister, that a Secretary of State for foreign affairs, would, after having obtained a positive promise for the dismissal of the Secretary of the War department (a promise which must have been demanded upon the ground of the *unfitness* of the latter for that important office), remain in the same ministry, for six months afterwards, with the person against whom the promise was to operate. It is not to be believed, that any man would have dared to do such a thing in England, only twenty years ago. The treatment of his colleague, whom he had doomed to expulsion, was bad enough; but what can atone for his treatment of the country; that country from which he has, for so many years, been receiving such immense sums of money, and on which, not content with his own salaries and sinecures, he has not scrupled to quarter his relations.—The only ground, upon which he, or his friends, will dare to set up a defence of his conduct in *asking* for the putting out of Castlereagh, must be that he thought Castlereagh unfit for the post that he filled. Indeed, this is his own defence. His proposition was grounded upon the "*insufficiency of the government, as then constituted, to carry on the affairs of the country, under all the difficulties of the times.*" It was then, he says, proposed to him that the change should be made in the War-department; and, with this he was satisfied; whence it naturally follows, that, in his opinion, the *insufficiency* lay in the War-department; that is to say, *in Lord Castlereagh*. This is conclusive: it is here upon his own confession, that, so conspicuous was the insufficiency of this Secretary for the War-department, that the *whole government* became thereby inadequate to the carrying on of the affairs of the country, under all the difficulties of the times. Well; with this fearful conviction in his mind, what does this servant and sworn adviser of the king do? Why, he, without any representation to the king or his council, suffers this insufficient minister to remain in his post; he himself continues, not only by his still being one of the ministry, but by his declarations in parliament, to support a ministry, which, as then constituted, he regarded as insufficient for carrying on the affairs of the country; and, which adds greatly to his demerit as towards the public, he stands silently by, and sees this insufficient war-minister, whose insufficiency

was such as to be contagious; he stands by, laughing in his sleeve, and sees this man plan, and put into execution, a measure of warfare of greater magnitude and of greater risk than any that had been undertaken during the whole of the war, and, indeed, greater than any which this country had ever known; a measure which gave employment to a hundred thousand men, and which would naturally cost several millions of money. This he stands by and suffers to pass unopposed, though he had declared the war-minister to be insufficient for his post; and, yet he has, even after this, the assurance to put forward claims to public confidence!—Mr. Worthington has very forcibly observed upon the utter disrespect, not to say downright contempt, of the king, and the *kingly office*, exhibited in the conduct of Mr. Canning, through the whole of this proceeding. We have been taught to believe, that *the king chose his own servants and dismissed again when he pleased*; and, it will be recollected, that the ministry, to which Mr. Canning belonged, did, at their coming into office, most distinctly maintain this doctrine. But, here we see, that the dismissal of Lord Castlereagh is agreed upon; Mr. Canning obtains a *positive promise*, that he shall be dismissed; and all this without the king having any thing more to do with the matter than one of his cream-coloured horses has. The king confides in Lord Castlereagh for the planning and the executing of measures of the greatest importance; and, all the while, Mr. Canning has doomed that he shall have his place taken from him. The king looks upon Lord Castlereagh as one of his confidential servants; he entrusts him with most important secrets of state; he sits at the same council-board with him, and is, in part at least, directed by his advice; and, all this while, Mr. Canning, *unknown to the king*, carries in his pocket the positive promise, that Lord Castlereagh shall be turned out of the service of the king, a promise, which, as Mr. Canning now says, was demanded from the conviction of the said Lord's being *unfit for his place*. There appears to have been no appeal made to the king, at any stage of the business. The proposition is made and acceded to; the promise takes place and is broken; there are six months of undermining and chaffering; first Lord Castlereagh is to be put out at one time, then at another time; and, during the whole of it, the king is never once consulted, nor is the thing ever

mentioned to him; and, in fact, it was, as to this great prerogative of dismissing and choosing ministers, Mr. Canning who was acting in the capacity of king!—While this intrigue was going on, the Marquis Wellesley was, as the reader will call to mind, kept dancing backwards and forwards between London and Portsmouth; and, from the dates, it necessarily follows, that, when Lord Wellesley was sent out to Spain, it was agreed upon between Mr. Canning and the Duke of Portland, that he should, in a very short time, *perhaps in ten days*, be sent for back again to fill the place of Lord Castlereagh. I am not of opinion, as some persons appear to be, that the cause in Spain suffered from this delay; because, I am thoroughly persuaded, that, as far as the aiding of that cause went, Mr. Frere, the Anti-Jacobin poet, was just as likely to succeed as the Marquis Wellesley. Therefore, my ground of complaint, as to the sending of the Marquis out, is different from that taken by some others. I blame Mr. Canning, who was Secretary for foreign affairs, and who, of course, selected the Marquis for the embassy to Spain, for sending him out at the very time when he was in almost daily expectation of seeing Lord Castlereagh put out of that place at home, which he had destined the Marquis to fill. He must, supposing his brain not to have been quite turned by ambition, have known that Lord Wellesley could do no good in Spain; and, it really appears now, that he sent him off thither for the sole purpose of better disguising his views at home; and for this the country will have to pay, first or last, not less, perhaps, than two hundred thousand pounds; but that, and much more, it richly deserves. I do not pity the country. It deserves all the injuries and all the insults that have been heaped upon it; but, that is no justification of Mr. Canning, who, at every new view of him, assumes a deeper die. He seems to have formed a very correct idea of the spirit, or, rather, the baseness, of the country, when he says, that he should have insisted upon Lord Castlereagh's dismissal *during the last session of parliament* had he not been apprehensive that the dismissal would have been attributed by the public to the share which Lord Castlereagh had had in bargaining for seats and votes in parliament. This is excessively impudent. He has no scruple to revive the memory of those scandalous transactions, and to tell the public, that he, for his part, did not wish them to be

lieve, that Lord Castlereagh was dismissed on account of his having grossly violated *their* rights; for having committed an outrageous offence against *them*. The words are these: "Mr. Canning was induced to consent to the postponement of Lord Castlereagh's dismissal, till the rising of parliament, *principally* from a consideration of the particular circumstances under which Lord Castlereagh stood in the House of Commons after Easter; circumstances which would have given to his removal, at that period of the session, a character, which it was certainly no part of Mr. Canning's wish that it should bear." Upon this impudent passage the Times news-paper has the following remarks; "Here then is the ingenuous and manly simplicity of a magnanimous statesman; to rescue, by your public voice, an obnoxious Minister from the just indignation of his country, at the moment that you have secretly doomed him to be the victim of a dark and insidious intrigue; to vindicate the very act by which he had merited degradation, at the time that you are determined upon his disgrace; to avow his innocence while you are plotting his destruction! Display your stores, ye accumulated treasures of ancient guile, and shew us whether they contain a fraud like this!" But, what I wish to imprint upon the mind of the indignant reader is this; that Mr. Canning, who and whose relations were receiving such sums annually from the public purse, from the taxes raised upon the people; that this Mr. Canning, being, as he now declares, fully convinced, that the insufficiency of Lord Castlereagh rendered the whole government, as it then stood, inadequate to the carrying on the affairs of the country, did nevertheless agree to let him remain in place, lest that people, that injured people, should conceive, that he was removed from that place on account of his offences against *them*. There has seldom, and, perhaps, never, been an insult like this offered to any nation upon earth; yet, should I not be at all surprised to see this same man again in power, in the space of a few months, in company with some of them. It cannot have escaped those who are in the habit of observing the conduct of the parties in the House of Commons, that the Opposition have always appeared to have, in their censure of the ministry, a good deal of reserve, with re-

gard to Mr. Canning. They have always spoken of him with some degree of mildness, and, often, with respect, making Mr. Perceval and Lord Castlereagh the objects of their unqualified censure. I believe, that, from the time that the last change of ministry took place, there has been a growing intrigue between *some* of them and Mr. Canning; and, I further believe, that the plan was, first to introduce Lord Wellesley, and then, at a convenient time, for him and Mr. Canning to join in insisting upon *further* changes, by the means of which a ministry would have been formed to the exclusion of all those, in both parties, who were likely to stand in the way of Mr. Canning's ambitious views. It is true, that, by such means, he would not have mounted to the top of the tree at once; but, having got rid of all those rivals, who are of nearly his own age, he would have trusted to time for the rest; or, at any rate, he would have made his ground sure against the arrival of any of those events, which would naturally put the existence of the present ministry to hazard.—For the same reasons, I now expect to see him join in the Opposition to the present ministry. Not all at once, perhaps; but by degrees, as his great master Pitt joined in the Opposition against Mr. Addington. Mr. Canning saw, that, while the ministry continued constituted as it was during last winter and last summer, he could never get to the head of it, there being no less than three in his way, namely Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Perceval, and Lord Castlereagh. The two former were too firmly rooted to afford him any hope of their removal, for the present, and until he acquired additional strength; but, the latter, never a favourite of any body, except for special and temporary purposes, had been shaken almost to the ground by the recent detections and exposures, and had, in fact, been propped up by Mr. Canning himself, only, as it now appears, for the purpose of making his fall the work of the latter's own hand. It was at this moment, having just propped him for a little, that he demanded his ejection from office, being ready, no doubt, in case things had taken a more popular turn in the House of Commons, to have made a great merit of this demand.—That the demand arose wholly from an intriguing motive, there can, I think, be no doubt at all: for, as to ability in conducting the War department, when had Mr. Canning

discovered any want of that in his colleague? There had been no warlike measure, under the administration of Lord Castlereagh, which Mr. Canning had not publicly defended in the most strenuous manner. No one can have forgotten the part he took in defending the expedition under Sir John Moore; and, indeed, it is perfectly well known, that of that most unfortunate measure, he and his friend Mr. Hookham Frere were the principal cause. He had seen the expedition to Portugal and that to Spain; he had seen another expedition sent out under Sir Arthur Wellesley; of all these he had, over and over again, expressed his decided approbation; and, he never did, it seems, discover any want of *sufficiency* in the ministry, of which he formed a part, until Lord Castlereagh was detected in having bargained for votes and seats in the house of Commons. Then it was, and not till then, that he discovered an insufficiency in the ministry as then constituted, and that that insufficiency lay in the war department. He had, upon numerous occasions, when the charge of insufficiency was preferred against the ministry, resented that charge in the most bitter terms; nay, by a reference to the Debates, it will be seen, that he was loudly defying those, who preferred the charge, at the very time, or, at least, within two days of the time, and frequently *after* the time, when, as he now unblushingly states, he was making a representation, to the Duke of Portland, of the existence of this insufficiency; that is to say, was complaining in private of the lamentable existence of that the existence of which he was stoutly denying in public, and that, too, in his double capacity of member of parliament and adviser of the king.—It is quite useless to pursue these observations any further; it being, I think, quite manifest, that the reason alleged by Mr. Canning for the removal of Lord Castlereagh was a mere pretence, and that the real motive was, the getting rid of a rival, who had just then luckily became an object of pretty general censure. If the reader be, as, I think, he must be, satisfied that this was the fact, where will he find words adequate to a description of the conduct and character of the man, who, after having so acted, and from such a motive, now, in the stils of candour and magnanimity, pretends that he *did not wish to take advantage* of the circumstances under which Lord Castlereagh then stood

in the House of Commons; and who has now the audacity thus to insult the public, in order the more effectually to disguise the motive of his intrigue?—With respect to the *change in the ministry*, which has grown out of this intrigue, I am of opinion, that, as far as it has hitherto gone, it is, by no means, a change for the worse, notwithstanding all that the Morning Chronicle is pleased to say about the *loss* sustained in the withdrawing of Mr. Canning's *intellect*; for, I cannot but remember, that it was Mr. Canning who selected Mr. Hookham Frere for the embassy "*near* his Catholic Majesty Ferdinand VII," which Mr. Frere was assisted by that *Monsieur Charmilly*, of whom such memorable mention is made in the complaining dispatches of the unfortunate Sir J. Moore; nor can I so soon forget Mr. Canning's harangues, amongst the Jews and Contractors, respecting the wars in Spain and in Austria, and his famous manifesto about the *Universal Spanish nation*. Indeed (and I hope the public will bear it in mind) it is, as a matter of course, this very Mr. Canning, who has had the management of the whole of our connection with Spain, since the commencement of her revolution. It is he, in fact, who *fashioned the cause*, for which we are contending in Spain, and in which contest so much English blood, and English resources, of all sorts, have been wasted. It is he, to whom, principally at least, is to be attributed the stupid and fatal notion, that, without a total change in the country, a disposition would be found, in the people of Spain, to resist Buonaparté. It was he, who, as minister for foreign affairs, must, in a more especial manner, have held England back, kept her aloof from the cause of the Spanish nation, until those spirited bodies, the provincial Juntas, had been put down, and one General Body, that wanted all the good, and that was wanting in none of the evils, of those separate bodies, had been established. From that moment; from the moment that the influence of English councils superceded that of the spontaneous and vigorous, though irregular and, perhaps, democratical, influence of the provincial Juntas; from that moment began the extinguishment of the spirit of resistance in Spain. The operation of this influence, on the part of our government, it was that enabled Joseph Buonaparté to reach Madrid; and, for the use of this influence we and the Spaniards have to thank Mr. Canning. His colleagues are

to blame too; but, they are, in this respect, to blame only, perhaps, because they suffered him to follow his own inclination. When, therefore, one looks back at what Spain was, at the time when all those spirited Addresses were issuing from the several Juntas; when one reflects, not only on what might have been done by us, but on what was actually pointed out by many persons (and by myself amongst the rest) as proper to be done; when one compares the probable result, in such case, to the result that will now inevitably take place; and, especially when one takes into account the monstrous waste of means, the dreadful loss of lives, the most indescribable human misery that has been endured, that is still to be endured, and the vast mass of disgrace, of all sorts, which this country has to sustain: when one takes a view of all this, and considers, that of producing all this Mr. Canning has been the principal cause, one must be of an uncommonly patient disposition not to resent the affront that is offered to one's understanding by those, who affect to see, in the resignation, or turning-out, of that minister, a loss of capacity to the cabinet. *Intellect* Mr. Canning has; but, it is, in my opinion, not only not of the best sort for a statesman, but precisely of the very worst sort: of that sort which unfits him, absolutely unfits him for the management of great and weighty affairs; and, when you add to this his restless, his audacious, his insolent ambition, which he sucked in with his political milk, and which has its rise in the notion, that the talent of talking is the first of human talents; when you add this to the other disqualifications, it must, I think, be evident, that the loss of such a man is a gain to any ministry. Of one thing I am quite sure, and that is, that though the new-modelled ministry may go on as badly as Mr. Canning did, with respect to the foreign affairs, it is impossible that they should go on worse; for, whether we look to Spain or Austria, the only two countries where he had it in his power to do much mischief, we shall be convinced, that, if the choice had been left to the emperor Napoleon, he would have chosen for us a minister that should have adopted just such measures as those, which have proceeded from the "intellect" of Mr. Canning, who (and that is saying all of him in one word) was one of the *legacies* which Pitt bequeathed to England. — There are two or three ques-

tions now in agitation amongst politicians, upon which I shall venture to offer my opinion. The first of which is, whether the Marquis Wellesley will yield to the invitation, said to be sent out to him, and join the new-modelled ministry. If he does, it will be owing to the situation, in which events have placed his brother, the Baron Dourou; for, otherwise, there are abundant reasons why he should not; and, if the Baron can show, as Sir John Moore could, that his march into the heart of Spain was not voluntary, but was forced upon him, I am decidedly of opinion, that he will not join the ministry. Upon the whole, I think he will not, and, in that case, they will certainly find it more difficult to stand, because such a refusal on his part will be, with the wavering (of which there must be many) a signal for defection.

— Another question is, whether the Opposition will take Mr. Canning into their ranks. Some of them would gladly do it, for they would associate themselves with any one capable of giving them the smallest share of even temporary aid. But, some others will be very slow to admit him, seeing how troublesome an inmate he has constantly been. He has always had several persons, when in power with him, whom he has been known to dislike, and against whom he has evidently had a grudge. Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Perceval, Mr. Addington; in short, every one that stood between him and the light. It must ever be thus with a man of greedy ambition, who must always be a teasing companion, especially when of a turn so satirical as Mr. Canning is. Such a man's "hand is against every man, and every man's hand is against him." So that, in spite of the *flirtation*, as it is called (borrowing a term from another species of prostitution and applying it to politics); in spite of the flirtation of the *Morning Chronicle*, I should not be very much surprised to see Mr. Canning, during the next session of parliament, occupying a corner of an empty bench, or, at least, making one of a party uncommonly select; and, if this should be the case, he must muster up his philosophy, and wait for "better times," when his "*NEW MORALITY*" shall have gained a greater number of disciples. — I do not know whether the same idea may have struck any of the members of the Opposition; but, I cannot help thinking, that, if there be one thing, which, above all others, the ministers ought to wish for,

it is, that the Opposition should receive Mr. Canning, and march him on, at once, in a furious charge against his late colleagues; for, in that case, even the people, who have, in fact, no interest at all in the warfare of the factions, would, to a man, be on the side of the ministers.—The last question, which, at present, I shall notice is, whether the ministry, as it is now constituted, will be able to keep their ground; and, here, it is clear, that much must depend upon the conduct of the adversary; but, I cannot see why they should *not* keep their ground; for, they have, it is evident, the perfect good will of the king, and as to *the people*, they desire no change at all, unless there be a *change of system*, being thoroughly convinced, from the experience of the last fifty years, that a change of ministry is a mere shifting of the power and emoluments of the several offices in the state, from one set of men to another, *with the certain evil of adding to the burthen of the taxes by the grant of a long list of new pensions.* In short, a change of ministry is now-a-days regarded, and justly regarded, as the forerunner of a *new tax*; and the people think that they have already quite taxes enough. That the thing should be viewed in this light; that this opinion should generally prevail, may be mortifying to the traders in party politics, but such is the opinion, and such it will be, until there be a radical change in the system, and that change can be wrought only by a house of parliament, really the representatives of the people; and, I do think, that even the most inveterate non-reformist will not deny, that, if there had been such a house of parliament, we never should have heard of the dirty intrigue, which has led to the making of these observations.

TALAVERA'S CAMPAIGN.—The news from our army in Spain, appears fully to confirm that statement which was published in the Register of the 14th instant, at page 520; and the chief fact in which was, that more than one half of the remains of the army were upon the *sick list*.—The French now tell us, why their generals did not continue the pursuit of our army into Portugal. Their reason was, that it was better to leave our people to the exterminating influence of those *diseases*, which were sure to fasten upon them in the provinces, whither they were marching. There *might* be some other reason besides this; but this was a very good

one; and especially as they had the game so completely in their hands, that to destroy Douro's army, totally to annihilate it, was an object not worth even a triding risk of lives.—Upon Baron Douro's conduct, during the campaign, the *Moniteur* has made some very just, though very severe remarks, in the way of Notes upon his dispatch from Truxillo, which Notes were inserted in the Register, at page 567. It is there observed, that Douro's complaint against Cuesta, was ill-founded; and that, if the latter had *not* quitted Talavera, he *would have been lost*.—In these Notes, which contain what *Europe* will believe relating to this campaign, our Baron and Viscount is spoken of in a way very different indeed from that, in which he is spoken of in the famous *GENERAL ORDER*. The French say, "*We wish Lord Wellesley*" (meaning Baron Douro) "*to command the English armies.*" They laugh at his tactics, and at that "*military resource*," which the *GENERAL ORDER* gave him.—Upon the subject of his post in the retreat, the French have some remarks, which I cannot refrain from inserting here, because they exactly correspond with what I said upon the same subject.—"Lord Wellington had abandoned the army of Cuesta, who had been beaten on the Tagus, and lost 35 pieces of cannon, and all his ammunition.—"The writer asks, why the French did not pursue the English army? They did pursue it, for they came up with the rear-guard. "This rear-guard, it is true, was composed only of the troops of Cuesta; but they were there as allied troops, and *made a part of the pursued army.* The French, too, destroyed that division, which they overtook. Two things certainly result from this: 1st, That the rear-guard of Lord Wellington was destroyed; 2dly, That Lord Wellington, having to give the *post of honour* either to the English troops, or those Spaniards of whom he speaks so ill, *determined in favour of the Spanish troops.* The post of honour in an army is that which is *nearest* the enemy. When Francis the First sent to redemand the sword of Constable from the Constable of Bourbon, the latter replied, "the King took it from me, on the day when he gave the command of the advanced guard to the Duke of Alençon." Lord Wellington had not the same sentiments with the brave Chevaliers of those times. He does not

"pique himself on keeping for himself the
"post of honour, he *gives it up to his allies.*"

—It is impossible to get out of this. There is no rebutting the charge. It is so manifestly just, that it will not admit of a moment's dispute. Yes, the noble Baron, who, as the French say, speaks so ill of the Spaniards, did most generously cede to them the post of honour at the Bridge of Arzobispo. He *gave up* the post of honour to them, having, apparently, been glutted with honour of that sort at the battle of Talavera. To be serious, it is very ill-treatment of the Spaniards to represent them as of no use at all in the campaign, at the same time that we are making them *cover our retreat*; for that was, as is now evident, the real state of the case.—Upon the subject, too, of Douro's want of provisions, the *Moniteur* has some cutting remarks:—"The pretext of wanting provisions is
"always the excuse of *Generals who are*
"*beaten*, or who are rendered unable to at-
"tempt any thing. Would not one sup-
"pose Lord Wellington commanded an
"army of 300,000 infantry, and 40,000
"cavalry? When a General has an
"army so considerable, the procuring
"of provisions may give him some
"trouble, but cannot absolutely stop his
"progress. Can it be believed, that an
"army of 26,000 men could not find sub-
"sistence in a country where towns are so
"numerous? Such an army is only a
"strong division, which a single town of
"Spain could maintain for two months.
"Besides, if Lord Wellington was uneasy
"with respect to the subsistence of his
"army, *why did he abandon his magazines?*
"His line of operation and his magazines
"were upon and at Placentia. Why did
"he suffer Placentia to be taken? Why?
"*Because this GENERAL OF SEPOYS*
"*had the imprudence to advance to the very*
"*middle of Spain, without knowing either*
"*what force was before him, or what upon his*
"*flanks.*—We see by his dispatches that
"he sometimes believed that the Duke of
"Dalmatia had but 8,000 men, and some-
"times that he had 16,000. Under these
"false suppositions he had proposed to
"divide his forces to go and attack the
"Duke of Dalmatia, when all on a sudden,
"and too late, he learned that this same
"Duke was advancing upon him with a
"corps of 60,000 men. He then fled in
"the utmost haste, and he was in the
"right. Had he been *amused at Tala-*
"*vera, instead of being attacked, and had*

"not particular and local circumstances
"permitted him to pass the Tagus, and
"escape by sacrificing the corps which he
"left behind him, not a soldier of his army
"would have again seen England. *If ever*
"*there was a General wanting foresight, it*
"*is certainly Lord Wellington. If he*
"*should long command the English armies,*
"*we may flatter ourselves with obtaining great*
"*advantages from the brilliant combinations*
"*of a General so inexperienced in the trade of*
"*war.*—Yet, this is the man, upon
whom we bestow a brace of titles at a time,
and whom we cry up as worthy of a place
"in the *very first rank of British heroes.*"—
It is, I think, pretty evident, that a very
small portion of our army will, in the end,
escape. We get *no official accounts* of this
army, though packets are continually arriv-
ing from Portugal; and, by-and by, after
due time has been allowed for *leaking out*
the facts, the official statement will come,
bolstered up at head and foot with falsehoods
in a demi-official form. Thus will the
nation be again deluded.—It should al-
ways be borne in mind, that the titles were
bestowed upon Douro after the ministers had
in their possession the facts relating to the
retreat from Talavera, or, at least, after
they were possessed of what must have
convinced them, that the retreat must im-
mediately take place, and, of course, that
the General, upon whom the titles were
conferred, had, to give it the mildest term,
been guilty of great indiscretion. They
must, at the very moment when they were
advising the king to bestow the honours
upon him, have known, that he would be
compelled either to yield himself and his
army prisoners of war, or to flee with a de-
gree of haste that would not permit him to
carry off his sick and wounded. And, yet
they advised the king to make him, at once,
a Baron and a Viscount; to bestow upon
him greater honours than were bestowed
upon him who gained the Battle of the
Nile.—It appears from these observations
in the *Moniteur*, that the Duke of Dalma-
tia (Soult) had, in the rear of Baron Douro
an army of *sixty thousand men*. Now, it
will be remembered, that the Baron tells us,
that he quitted Talavera, with the English
part of the army, in order to go and meet
Soult, and to "do his business effectually."
We know, indeed, that, instead of doing
this, he fled across the Tagus, long before
he came within reach of Soult; but, what
I wish to point out to the reader is, the ex-
treme improbability of his ever having

intended to march against Soult, seeing that Soult had 60,000 men, and that Douro must, being then so near to him, have known the amount of Soult's army. There always appeared to me something very strange and inconsistent in this movement from Talavera for the express purpose of *attacking* Soult and "*doing his business effectually*;" and then, instead of this, getting across the Tagus, with all possible dispatch, lest Soult should come up with him; but, if we suppose, that the Baron was duly informed of the amount of the force which the *Moniteur* says Soult had, this part of the Baron's conduct was perfectly wise, and leaves us nothing to lament, except, indeed, that he should have told Cuesta that he was going to meet Soult and to do his business effectually, and thereupon have left the poor Spaniard, together with his own sick and wounded, to the mercy of the French.—This is a part of the transaction, which, I should think, must become a subject of inquiry in another way. The Baron, in his official dispatches, *blames the Spanish general for quitting Talavera*, which he himself has left in order to seek out and to attack Soult; and, instead of attacking Soult, he gets out of Soult's way; he avoids him as one would avoid a lion; he crosses the Tagus, in order to get out of the reach of the army that he went to attack; and, to crown the whole, he continues his retreat, covered by the army of Cuesta, *covered* by that very army, of whom and of whose general he speaks with so little respect.—Take it all together I cannot help thinking, that this is the most disgraceful campaign that was made by an English army, and this the most disgraceful year, known to England from the beginning of her history.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—If it be true, that peace is actually concluded between France and Austria, the affairs of Spain and Portugal are not far distant from the epoch of their final settlement; and, indeed, from all appearances, the army which the French already have in the Peninsula, would be quite sufficient for the purpose.

—The scheme of *concentrating* the authority and energy of the government in Spain does not seem to be taken in very good part, especially by the JUNTA, whom, it seems, the concentrating scheme would completely cashier; and people like to be in office, in Spain as well as in England.

—There is in Spain a body, called the

SUPREME COUNCIL OF SPAIN AND THE INDIES, which has presented an Address to the Supreme Junta, beseeching the said Junta to put an end to their own power, and to erect a *Regency* in the person of the Archbishop of Toledo. One passage of this Address will suffice to give us a pretty correct notion of the ultimate object of its authors.—It is drawn up under the whimsical notion, that, in addressing the Supreme Junta, the parties are addressing Ferdinand VII. It is, to be sure, quite farcical to hear the minister of war telling the generals, that "His Majesty" has ordered them to be assured of this or of that, when it is notorious, that he (poor fellow!) is in the safe custody of Napoleon's dragoons. However, this is the way in which they choose to talk; and, in this sort of style the Supreme Council addresses the Junta:—"The people are indulging in unrestrained complaints, and make them known by libellous and inflammatory placards. Their daily conversations, in places of the greatest resort, suppose different parties, views, and interests among their governors, and threaten some, whilst they insult others, forgetful of the respect due to the supreme authority, and regardless of the consequences to the public peace and union.—The Council shudders upon contemplating the danger in which it sees the country, because it cannot foresee the possible results of this ferment, which, while it meets with its utmost disapprobation, as contrary to law, at the same time excites its apprehensions on account of the opposite interests of the Juntas, and of the variety it observes in their opinions; and also because it is generally known, that the law, in cases like this, directs that the government be entrusted to one, three or five individuals. The Supreme Junta is, therefore, bound by the most sacred duty to lay these truths before your Majesty, in order to ward off the dangers by which we are threatened, and to prevent the excesses of a people who think their defence and protection unattended to.—In your Majesty resides the Sovereign power; the remedy is in your own hands. A generous self-denial will perpetuate the memory of the services of the Supreme Junta, and immortalize its Members. May it please your Majesty to restore to the law its authority; and there will be an end of the uneasiness to which we are a prey, and which will be succeeded by tranquillity and

"applause.—The immediate appointment of a provisional Government will pacify the people; the nation will indulge in the most flattering hopes:—and the supreme will of Ferdinand VII, who requires it, and who suffers most, will be fully complied with.—The whole nation will applaud the measure; and it is the opinion of the Council, that, in order to rouse the spirit depressed by the present load of evils, it would be proper to establish a legal government, with a Bourbon at its head. And the perfidy of our infamous enemy having left in Spain none but the Most Reverend Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo and Seville, it seems as if Heaven had preserved him to support the nation under her calamities, and continually to call to our minds the beloved Sovereign for whom we are fighting.—Policy points out the urgency of immediately filling up that seat, until the wished-for return of our Monarch. —His Eminence's elevated character leaves no room for competition, and silences all possible pretensions of either natives or foreigners. Spain and the Indies will obey him with enthusiastic devotion; all rivalry will be at an end; and the Spaniards will see in his Excellency a branch of the family of the King whom they so passionately love. —The better to ensure the success of his administration, and also to ease him of part of the burden, four Adjuncts ought to be given him, of different ranks and professions, provisionally to compose the Government until the next meeting of the Cortes. Whatever matter comes under discussion, every question should be decided by a majority of votes; and they should swear to observe our laws, which are not to be altered without the concurrence of the Cortes, which the Government should convene as circumstances permit.— Upon this subject, the Supreme Council of Spain and the Indies will prepare its observations, and lay them before the Government as usual. It is just and requisite that our American settlements should have a principal share in this national body, as they derive such strong titles to our regard from their fidelity, loyal services, donations, attachment to the King, patriotic zeal, and great importance. This Supreme Tribunal reserves to itself to give its opinion upon the justice of their intervention, which it will do after the most mature delibera-

tion.—It is supposed that the four individuals to be appointed by the Supreme Junta until the Meeting of the National Congress, will bear a high character for probity, religion, loyalty, skill in their respective professions, impartiality, and disinterestedness. The Supreme Junta itself, which they are to succeed in the exercise of the sovereignty, will secure the opinion of the public, and provide for its own safety, by appointing individuals endued with these qualities; for, if the persons elected should not rank high in the public opinion, Government would scarcely succeed in suppressing the present popular complaints and suspicions. By so doing, no doubt will remain in the minds of the people about the upright intentions of the Supreme Junta; the superior ones will cease to exercise their powers; they will obtain the applause of the whole Monarchy; and posterity will ever be grateful for their services. —May it please your Majesty to lend a gracious hearing to this Representation, which has no other object than your Majesty's glory, and the extermination of the Tyrant by whom we are oppressed!" —The short and long of this rigmarole Address is, that there is, or at least, was, an intrigue going on for the purpose of ousting the Junta, and erecting, by degrees, a new monarch, under the shew of a regency. Of the character of this intended monarch we shall speak a little presently; but, in the meanwhile, it is to be observed, that no one, whether Junta or Council or Regent, says a word about the *liberties* of the people. Not a word. Upon that topic they are all as silent as the grave.—As to the result of all these intrigues there can be no doubt in the mind of any rational man; but, it is of some interest for us to mark their progress, and especially to note what part our government appears to have in them.—There is a letter, published in the Morning Chronicle of the 21st instant, purporting to be written by a Spaniard at RONDA, in which Lord Wellesley is said to be reported to be decidedly in favour of a Regency, in the person of the Archbishop of Toledo. The Editor of the Morning Chronicle does not answer for the correctness of this letter; but, it is worthy of remark, that the Address of the SUPREME COUNCIL, from which I have given an extract above, is dated on the 26th of August last, about a fortnight,

or three weeks, *after the arrival of Lord Wellesley at Seville.*—Of the Archbishop of Toledo the abovementioned letter speaks in the following terms:—"No good Spaniard will lament the downfall of the narrow and impolitic system, which the Junta has so fatally pursued; and, if Lord Wellesley lends the powerful influence of his name and nation for the restoration of our long lost liberties, and the admittance of our people to their just and natural weight in their own concerns, he will confer greater obligations on Spain, than she owes even to the munificence of your Treasury, or the valour of your arms.—But alas! such is not the report which has reached me—I cannot, and I will not, however, believe what I am told, but it has been confidently asserted, that upon the pretext of concentrating authority, it is Lord Wellesley's intention to force the Archbishop of Toledo upon us as a Regent. This would be concentrating authority with a vengeance, it would be concentrating not only the authority, but the *folly*, the *bigotry*, and the *inefficiency* of the Junta into a focus. The Conde de Chinchon, son of the Infant Don Louis, brother of the Princess of the Peace, and Archbishop of Toledo and Seville, is *destitute of every talent, surrounded by the basest of mankind*, and in every way *calculated to entail ridicule and failure* upon any Government committed to his charge."

—Well, and what of that? What of all that, I should be glad to know? What if he be a notorious *fool*, a notorious *bigot*, notoriously *inefficient*; what if he be *destitute of every talent*; what if he be *surrounded by the basest of mankind*; what if he would seem to have been created for the express purpose of *entailing ridicule upon any government committed to his care*: what reason is there in all that against his being Regent, aye, or King, if need be? I leave this question to be answered by the Pastry-cook Alderman, by the place-hunting Dixons, or by any of the crew of holy-altar and life-and-fortune and last-shilling and last-drop-of-blood men, who are now infesting the country with their harangues; and I shall take my leave of the Spaniards, for this time, with observing, that, as it was foreseen from the beginning by me and by many others, there will be a *revolution*; that if there is to be a king, it will be a king of a *new dynasty*; that the nobility and the opulent in Spain have this choice, and this choice

only, a new government of the people's own making, or a sovereign set over them by the Emperor of France; that, in either case, the change will be not only highly beneficial to Spain, but to all the nations, with which Spain has any connection; and, finally, that if any thing had been wanting to convince all rational men, that the cause of the Supreme Junta was not the cause of the *people* of Spain, that conviction would have been produced by the *recent decrees against the press*, appointing a *Censor* on the news-papers, and a *Public Prosecutor* to bring writers, printers, and book-sellers to what is called *justice*, and, in short, putting the Spanish press upon the *same footing as the press in Calcutta*. While decrees of this stamp are issuing from Seville; King Joseph is issuing from Madrid, decrees of a very different description; decrees for putting down the monkish establishments, and, in a word, for improving the condition of the people.

JUBILEE.—There is every reason to suppose, that a peace is now concluded between France and Austria; that is to say, that the latter has, in due form, submitted to the domination of the former, which former, be it observed, the King has, upon a very recent occasion, declared to be our *inveterate enemy*. Well, then, here is our most powerful *friend* and *ally*, bent down, at last, beneath this our enemy. But, it is towards the events, now naturally to be expected, that we are to look; for, the subduing of Austria is, in fact, the mere signal for the great and steady proceedings against England. Napoleon may now be regarded as having the whole of the continent of Europe at his absolute command, Spain and Portugal only excepted; and, were not those countries assisted with the statesman-like advice and the military skill and prowess of the Wellesleys, to complete their subjugation would certainly not cost him many months; nay, there are those who appear to believe, that both the noble Marquis and his brother the Baron will find it their duty to come home, in order to give their personal aid to their sovereign and his government, and that this move will take place before Napoleon will be able to get back to Spain. If this should be the case; if Spain and Portugal should be thus deprived of the talents of the heroes of Calcutta and Talavera, their doom is sealed at once. In short, when we see the Wellesleys come away, we may be sure, that, in *their opinion*

at least, the *house is about to fall*. But, whether they come away or remain, the short of the matter is, that, with the exception, perhaps, of the pensioned poet, Fitzgerald, the editor of the fast-sinking Morning Post, and a few such ones, there is nobody who does not expect to see Joseph Buonaparté as much master of Spain and Portugal, by the end of this year, as his brother Louis is master of Holland, or, as George the Third is master of England. This being the general opinion, a question, which every man ought to put to himself is, *shall we then be able to defend ourselves against this conqueror?* He will have, under his absolute command, every sea-port in the world capable of being greatly mischievous to this country; and, at the same time, he will have all the means for building a hundred ships of the line in a year. At the end of one year from next Christmas, he will, in all probability, have *two hundred ships of the line fit to put to sea*. It is not more difficult for him to have a force like this, than for him to march an army to Vienna; and, that man must be a fool indeed, who supposes, that the Conqueror of Europe will want *inclination* to create such a force. Indeed, there is, I should suppose, even in these times of madness, no one so mad, so very mad, as to suppose, that the Emperor Napoleon, when having finished the conquest of the continent, will say to himself, "come, that is enough; and, "I will not only leave England unat-tempted, but will amicably shake hands with her, and leave her in quiet possession of those means, which she has so frequently employed for the stirring up of other nations against me, and for the putting down me and all my family." No: even the Dixons and their pastry-cook co-operator; nay, I hardly believe, that poet Fitzgerald is so execrably stupid as to suppose this. No: that man must be staring mad, who does not see, that the serious warfare between England and France is only now beginning; that it is now the beginning of dangers; that all former and present dangers are trifling compared to those which are now about to menace us: of this truth every man of sense must be convinced, and yet this is the time when we are told to hold a national *Jubilee*; when, even on this very day, on which I am writing this article, all the means of intoxication have been applied to the thoughtless part of the people; and, as if we were in love with

warlike failure and disgrace, we answer with cannonades of joy, those which the enemy, from the opposite coast, is firing in token of the completion of a peace won by his skill and valour; while we have before our eyes the miserable adventures upon the Scheldt and the Tagus. We appear to have lost all shame; to be so far from that *sheepish* people, that we were formerly thought, that we may now with much more propriety become famous for our senseless impudence. The poet, when he drew the character of Bobadil, made him hang down his head after having taken a drubbing; for, he did not suppose that it was in human nature for a boaster to continue on in his boastings; and that, too, with an increase of brass, after having become notoriously a beaten thing. Look at the Scheldt; look at the banks of the Tagus; look at the droves of English prisoners of war, who are, at this very moment, traversing France on their way to a prison; I do not say, look back, but look at what is, on this very day, and then tell me, if you believe, that any nation upon the face of the earth ever thought of a Jubilee under such circumstances. —It is, however, fitting that it should be known, that the nation, properly so called; that is, that the *sense* of the nation disapproves of this measure. It appears, from a letter, published by the Mayor of Glasgow, that underhand means to *feel the pulses of corporate bodies*, as to the keeping of a Jubilee, were resorted to so early as about the middle of August. The Jews and Contractors in the City were the first *openly* to propose the thing, and, as the public will bear in mind, the proposition was as openly opposed by every sound and sensible man in the Common Council. Grand dinners and feastings amongst the rich contractors and jobbers were, at first, the intention; but, fear soon suggested, amongst these gentry, the hypocritical pretence of a desire to *relieve the poor*; just as if they could not, if they had been so disposed, have relieved the poor on any other day, as well as on the 25th of October, 1809. —Thus the thing originated, and that the main object of the Jews and Contractors was to amuse the people, to keep them, as long as possible, from seeing their real situation, there can be no doubt. —There is a man of the name of *Drummond*, who is, it appears, the commandant of a corps of Volunteers in Westminster, called the Prince of Wales's Loyal Volunteers, who has published a Let-

ter, or Order, to his corps, in which he clearly imputes *disloyalty* to every one of the corps, who intentionally is absent from parade on that day. This man, who is, it is said, *the king's banker*, has said no more than others: and, the fact is, that, either in direct or indirect terms, the Jews, Jobbers, Contractors, Nabobs, Pensioners, and Sinecure-placemen, who have put themselves forward upon this occasion, have charged with *disloyalty* all those who disapproved of the measure, which charge, if it were not false, would be dreadfully ominous to the royal family; for, I will venture to say, that the measure is decidedly disapproved of by those who possess nine hundred and ninety nine parts out of every thousand of the sense, the talents, the virtue, and the property of the country.—There is to be a grand *naval and military promotion*, it seems, when we have already ten times as many admirals, perhaps, as are employed, and when we have *more generals than Buonaparté has*. These newly promoted people will, of course, *rejoice*; and so will the sailors who are to have a *double allowance of drink*; and so will the soldiers who are to be *released from dungeons and jails*; and so will all those, who, at the expence of others, are to be *crammed and made drunk*, and who will sing and bawl out the praises of those who stuff and who drench them.—To read the accounts in the news-papers, to read the exultations at the prospect of the feeding and drinking of this day, foreigners must look upon us as having lived upon hips and haws for the last forty-nine years. We appear to be a people, a very great part of whom are actually *starving*. We seem to be preparing *one single meal* of victuals and drink for the king's subjects, as it were by way of making up for a life of starvation; and, when these fed people set up a *shouting for joy at feeling the effects of a belly-full*, we are, to proclaim it to the world as a proof of national *loyalty*; and, what is more, as a proof of the people's having been happy, having enjoyed *prosperity*, for the last forty nine years!—To be added to this, and to the grand naval and military promotion, there is but one thing wanting, and that is a new swarm of knights to match those made upon the occasion of Peg Nicholson. This would render the thing quite complete, and, therefore, it is pity it should be left out. A set of *Jubilee knights*, scattered over the country, would

be the thing, of all others, wherewith to crown the whole transaction.—In the mean while, Buonaparté keeps steadily on. We cannot shout *him* down. We cannot, with all our boasting and toasting, turn him aside from any one of his objects. While those who fatten upon the taxes here, are giving the ignorant and the hungry victuals and drink, in order to make them shout for joy, whole nations, unbought with either bread or beer, are proclaiming their admiration of our enemy. He, I'll warrant him, will make no Jubilee Knights; nor will he, unless he should want them for real services, add to the number of those persons, who are already a heavy expence to his people.—I remember very well, that, when Buonaparté's coronation took place, our newspapers ascribed all the rejoicings at Paris to the *means used by the government*. Oh! how they abused the new Emperor for purchasing the shouts of the ignorant and venal with the money wrung from the sensible and honest and industrious part of the French nation: How repeatedly and how sincerely did they pity the good people of that country, who were, as they said, compelled to put on a face of joy, while their hearts were full of grief! And, who can have forgotten, that within these six weeks, they attributed the general illumination at Madrid, and even the *Te Deum* sung in the churches, to the *fears*, the *selfishness*, or the *hypocrisy* of the people, who partook in it.—Well, then, will they *now* repeat, that the rejoicings at Madrid were the effects of the basest of all human feelings? Will they *now* assert, as boldly as before, that it was blasphemy to sing the *Te Deum* upon such an occasion? I think they will now be a little more cautious how they speak upon the subject of those rejoicings, which take place in honour of other sovereigns.—I shall now have done with this Jubilee, which has been attended with this good, at any rate, it has led to discussions, by the means of which the people of this country, who are always too ready to *forget*, have been reminded of many things, many acts and events of the king's reign, which had sunk into oblivion amidst the uproar of the last seventeen years, and which, added to the acts and events of those seventeen years, cannot fail, in due time, to produce excellent effects.

W^m. COBBETT.

Coleshill, Wednesday, 25 Oct. 1809.

LONDON:—Printed by T. C. HANSARD, Peterborough - Court, Fleet - Street; Published by R. BAGSHAW, Brydges-Street, Covent - Garden:—Sold also by J. BUDD, Pall-Mall.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 18.] LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1809. [Price 1s.

"For, all that passes *inter nos*
"Might be proclaimed at Charing-Cross."

POPE.

641]

[642

TO WILLIAM BOSVILLE, ESQ.

DEAR SIR;

FEW things have given me greater pleasure than to hear, that you resisted the mandates of the venal crew, on the night of what they called a day of *Jubilee*, and, in spite of the yells of their drenched mob, consisting chiefly of Jews and foreigners, refused to be guilty of that basest of all acts, namely, the exhibiting of signs of joy while (being a true friend to your country) sorrow and shame were at the bottom of your heart. Yes, it would, indeed, have been a cruel mortification to hear, that, from any motive whatever, and especially from the beggarly motive of saving a few pounds in glass, you, who, perhaps, of all men living prove by your practice, that you best know the real use of money, and whose abhorrence of hypocrisy is proverbial amongst all those who have the honour to know you; it would, indeed, have been a cruel mortification to hear, that you should, on any account that can be named or thought of, have been induced to give the proceedings of that day the semblance of your approbation; and, I must confess, that, of all the numerous proofs of good sense, independence of mind, public spirit, and a contempt of hypocrisy, which have appeared upon this occasion, none has given me so much satisfaction as to hear that your hospitable dwelling became an object of the violence of a herd, whose attachment and whose services had been purchased with offal from the shambles, and with dregs from the cellar, to fill whose bellies and to turn whose brains a robbery had been committed upon the dogs and the hogs.

Of my sentiments, relative to the keeping of a Jubilee upon account of the king's having entered on the fiftieth year of his reign, you are, through the pages of the Register, already put in possession. Here, therefore, I shall content myself with a few observations upon the manner of the celebration, and on certain remarkable incidents, which ought, while they are fresh in our memory, to be put upon record.

And, first, pray notice the trick, resorted to, in order to excite a *shouting*, and other signs of joy amongst *the people*. You will remember, that, when any one, no matter whom, or upon what ground, has stood forward in defence of popular rights and privileges, though those rights and privileges are clearly established by the constitution, such person has, by those who have now called for a Jubilee, always been represented as a courter of the mob; as appealing to the passions of the people, and not to their reason; as a demagogue, whose object it was to seduce the ignorant crowd by flattering their vanity, and filling their heads with false notions of their own importance. Well, now, then, let these high-minded gentlemen, who have talked so prettily against flattering the mob into an adoption of one's views; let them tell us, what, if it be base to flatter the mob into an approbation of one's doctrines; if that be an act of baseness; if it be an act of baseness to obtain the plaudits of the common people by the means of words; if that be an act of baseness, let them tell us how we shall characterize the conduct of those, who have purchased, actually bargained for and bought, the shouts of the half-starved people, not with flattery, not with empty words, but with food and drink; who have clubbed their pounds for the purpose of bribing those, *who wanted a meal*, to put up shouts of *joy* for the *prosperity*, in which they *have lived*, and are *still living*. Really the story you told me, during our journey from Honiton, about the fellows whom you saw in Morocco, hardly comes up to this. The Jews, Contractors, Pensioners without services, Sinecure Placemen, Nabobs, and the rest of the tribe, who set the Jubilee on foot, and whom, to prevent repetition, we may as well call the Jubilee crew: These people have the impudence to pretend, that it was proper for *the people* to rejoice on the 25th of October, because they were in the *enjoyment of prosperity*; but, you perceive that they were not content to leave this *prosperity* to produce the wished-for shouts. If the people felt themselves so happy; if

X

they had enjoyed, and were enjoying, *such prosperity as to call for a Jubilee*, they would, of course, rejoice, they would sing and dance and shout, without being fed and drenched by way of hire to sing, dance, and shout. Of the particular time the mass of the people might, indeed, be ignorant; but, then, it was easy to inform them of that; and, if they felt an inclination to rejoice, they would, of course, have rejoiced. But, the hypocrites knew the situation of the people too well to expect them to put up *voluntary* shouts of joy; and, therefore, they, as the least of two evils, resolved upon purchasing those shouts; so that, as the thing now stands, those, to whom the gift of a single meal of food and drink was an object worth solicitation; aye, these very wretches are said to have shouted for joy on account of *the prosperity they have enjoyed and are still enjoying*. As to the people of England, properly so called, the Jubilee crew knew very well that it was useless to appeal to them. They, therefore, addressed themselves to the *twelve hundred thousand* miserable creatures, called paupers; to these they tendered their offal and their dirty drink; to these they tendered that rarity, that luxury, a belly-full; and, it is to the shouts of these poor creatures, thus purchased, that they bid us refer for a knowledge of the public sentiment. *Sentiment*, indeed! Aye, if, like Congreve's soldier, their brains lie in their belly, these wretched beings may, upon this occasion, be said to have given utterance to their sentiments. Talk of Paine's *seducing* the ignorant! What did he *give* them in exchange for their plaudits? Men of honest minds count it very base to purchase, at an election or elsewhere, the shouts of those who are willing to sell them for food and drink; but, the case of the Jubilee has this aggravated circumstance belonging to it, that the poor wretches *necessarily* expose themselves to the charge of falsehood and hypocrisy. The man, who shouts at an election, *may*, by bare possibility, be sincere, and may utter well-merited praise. But, the creature, *who is in want of a meal*; for, observe, the Jubilee subscriptions were for the purpose of *feeding the poor*; the receiver, the feaster, the *convive*, must, to entitle him to a seat at the festive board, be in want of a meal; and, this wretch, whose very presence upon the occasion implies that he lives a life of almost starvation, shouts for joy for the *prosperity* he has enjoyed and is still enjoying. There have,

of late years, so many things taken place, degrading to the character of this country, that one cannot say, without much time for reflection, which of them is the *most* so; but, the *least* so, certainly is not this subscription, (from the purses of those, who, in one way or another, live upon the taxes,) for the purpose; for the openly avowed purpose, of giving the people a meal of victuals and drink; and, as if it were a subject of great national pride, our hiring prints announce to the world, that Englishmen have, for once, for once in this long reign, had a belly full. What a subject for national exultation! And, as if this did not render the mixture of folly and baseness complete, these same prints, and also the crew by whom they are paid, are continually reminding us of our happy state, *compared to that of the people of other countries*. Nay, one of the specific topics of rejoicing is, that we are much more happy than other nations are; and yet, in the very same breath, we proclaim, that there are thousands and hundreds of thousands of our countrymen, who are in want of a meal; to whom the gift of a single meal of victuals is an object of importance; with whom to have had a belly-full will become a *memorable* epoch.

Upon an occasion like the Jubilee, it would have been strange indeed, if any one of the pensioned rhyme-makers, and still more strange if that indefatigable grinder of doggerel, Mr. FITZGERALD, had been silent. The stuff, which has, within these three weeks, been poured, I had almost said puked, out upon the public, in the form of verse, upon the subject of the Jubilee, would add to the disgrace of any nation upon earth, England only excepted. The song of "*God save the King*," that piece of clumsy and stupid flattery, without one poetical thought or elegant expression, has, I perceive, been *sung* in *many of the churches*, whose congregations have, in this respect, become the rivals of the Covent Garden row. But, the pieces, written for the occasion of the Jubilee, are infinitely more fulsome, more gross, and, if possible, more stupid, than that song; and, in no other country upon earth would there have been found men so shameless as to give them circulation in print. I have, however, noticed these effusions of stupidity and baseness only for the purpose of shewing the falsehood of a part of one of them, and I am desirous of exposing that falsehood,

because it relates to a fact of some political importance, and with respect to which great pains have been taken to mislead, deceive, and abuse that part of the people, who are not, and cannot be expected to be, well-informed upon such matters.—To those, who were the proposers of the Jubilee, the question was put: "What has been done, during this long reign, in favour of the freedom of the people?" It was easy to point out how much had been done *against* that freedom; and, after long consultation, the advocates for the Jubilee discovered, that, during the present reign, that Act was passed, which rendered the JUDGES independent of "the crown." It would be easy to shew, that the crown can, at all times, bestow, by promotion at least, great favours upon any of the Judges, nor, if every thing else be right, especially if the people be fairly and fully represented in parliament, do I think that, if it could be done, such power ought to be taken from the king. But, the thing, alluded to, is of a very different nature indeed. The Judges formerly held their places *during the pleasure of the king*; that is to say, he could, at any time, without cause assigned, put any one of them out of his place, in the same manner as an officer of the army. Now the king cannot do that; for, by an express statute, the Judges hold their places *during good behaviour*, and of that good behaviour the king is not the sole judge. In short, a Judge cannot now be displaced, unless upon proof, and very satisfactory proof, too, of his having been guilty of that which renders him unworthy of his high and important station, and upon the address of both Houses of parliament.—This was a great thing done in favour of the real liberty of the people; a very great thing indeed; and accordingly, the pensioned poet, FITZGERALD, thus revives the memory of it in his "ODE for the Royal Jubilee," published in the Morning Chronicle of the 26th of October, and hawked about the streets of London on the day before.

"The upright Judges of the Land,
 "From Worldly Influence free,
 "Were made by his benign Command;
 "The surest Pledge of Liberty!
 "This Act alone endears his Name,
 "Beyond the Pride of Cressy's fame!
 "By this our Rights are made secure,
 "And the deep Spring of Justice pure!"

Lest this should not be clearly comprehended by every reader, the poet has put into a note, the following explanation:

"The first act of his present Majesty's reign was, to render the Judges independent of the crown."—Now, the whole of this, poetry as well as prose, is an *unmixed falsehood*; and, seeing that it must have been written for the purpose of *deceiving* the people, and, of course, of answering a bad end, it is what PALEY denominates "A LIE." There is not a word of truth in it from the beginning to the end; it is as false as it would be to say, that the king came down from Heaven in a coach, drawn by eight cream-coloured horses. It is, in short, a downright lie, and nothing can make it either more or less.—The Act in question was that famous act of parliament, commonly called the ACT OF SETTLEMENT, and this act was passed in the 12th and 13th year of the reign of KING WILLIAM III., and in the year 1700, a hundred and nine years ago, before any of the family of Brunswick came to the throne of this kingdom.—The *twenty third* act, passed in the reign of the present king, made a provision about the Judges' commissions in case of the *death of a king*; because, upon such occasions, all commissions granted by the king dies with him, and must be renewed by his successor, or else they cease. The commissions of the Judges had, without any exception, been renewed by all the succeeding sovereigns from William III. to George III.; but, in order to put the matter at rest for ever, it was enacted, at the time referred to, that, at the death of a king, the *commissions of the Judges should not need renewing*. That was all. This king gave up not one fraction of his power; an act was passed that took away the bare possibility of an exercise of a little kingly power; but, it took that, *not from this king, but from his successor*. Indeed, it is notorious, that this act of parliament had nothing at all to do in rendering the Judges independent of the crown; and, of course, that the whole of poet Fitzgerald's assertion, prose and verse, is a gross falsehood, intended to impose upon that part of the people, who cannot be expected to have an intimate acquaintance with such matters.—Has it never struck you, as a matter of wonder, how these deceivers, these political impostors, can *look one another in the face*? It is Voltaire, I believe, who observes, that he wonders how two monks can pass one another in the street without bursting out into laughter. But, many of

the monks are themselves the dupes of the imposture which they assist in supporting; whereas our political impostors cannot possibly be ignorant upon the subject of the deceptions they practise. That they should write and print and circulate barefaced falsehoods is not wonderful; that, when these falsehoods are detected and exposed, they should again publish them as admitted truths; that they should be base enough to rely for success upon the ignorance of those amongst whom their falsehoods are intended to circulate; that every one of these impostors should do all this is by no means wonderful; but, really, how any two or more of them can meet, look one another in the face, and even hold council as to the best means of effecting their purposes, is wonderful even to me, who have so long been in the habit of examining their conduct, and exposing their detestable manoeuvres. Only think of the state of mind, into which they must have fallen before they could meet and deliberate upon the lie most likely to succeed, and upon the means of circulation most cheap and extensive. Only think of that. When you have thought of it, am sure you will be satisfied, that the human mind can conceive nothing too base for such men to attempt.—The wretched poetaster, who has led me into these remarks, would have performed but half his task, if he had not preferred the charge of *disloyalty* against all those who refused to join in the act of hypocrisy which he was celebrating. Accordingly he says :

“ If there’s a *Traitor* in the land :
 “ Who will not *raise for George his hand* ;
 “ Whose heart malignant grieves to see
 “ All England rise in Jubilee !
 “ Let the *detested Monster* find,
 “ Some cavern blacker than his mind !
 “ There let him waste his life away,
 “ Nor with his presence blast this day.”

So, you see, that you, who refused to put a single candle in your windows, and, of course, who did not “ *raise your hand for George*,” on that day, are, according to this pensioned poetaster, a “ *traitor*” and a “ *detested monster* ;” and this wretch, whose very bread comes, in part, out of your estates, has the impudence to send you to waste your life away in some black and dismal cavern. Verily, if your heart were no truer to your country than the heart of this impudent pensioner, you would, when you saw yourself thus insulted by those

whom the government compels you to feed, care very little indeed what happened, or whose authority prevailed, so that you could but obtain vengeance upon those, from whom such insolence proceeded.—The “ *Ode*,” as it is called, upon which I have been offering you some remarks, was, it seems, recited at a dinner of the *Merchants and Bankers* of London, at whose dinner, many of the ministers, and of the leading men of both factions, attended. It is said, too, that the *Ode* was received with *universal approbation*. Let the world judge, then, of the character of those, who could bestow their approbation. **FIRST**, upon so vile and gross a falsehood as that which I have noticed above; and, **SECONDLY**, upon an assertion, according to which every man, who disapproved of the Jubilee, was a “ *traitor*” and a “ *detested monster*.” The persons, present upon this occasion, knew well not only that the measure of holding a Jubilee had been distinctly disapproved of by many persons at public meetings, held even in the city of London; not only did they know this full well, but they knew also, that, in the whole kingdom, there were not, in all likelihood, one hundred men of sense, who did not, in their hearts, decidedly disapprove of the thing; that there was scarcely one, who took any active part in promoting it, who was not actuated by some selfish motive; that the shouts put up by the rabble, were actually bought with bread, meat, beer, and gin; and, in short, that the whole thing was invented purely with a view of reviving, or exciting, if possible, a set of feelings in the popular breast, which *feelings might serve as a counterpoise to other feelings, excited by recent events and disclosures*, and which latter feelings were, it was perceived, making their way deep into the minds of even the least informed part of the people. The Jubilee men at Merchant Taylor’s Hall knew all this very well, at the moment that they were cheering the pensioned poetaster’s charge of *treason* against such men as Mr. Waithman and you.—At first sight, it appears strange, that, when it is their business to make the world, and especially the Emperor Napoleon, believe that the nation is *unanimous* on their side, they should let any thing drop, which amounts to a confession, that there are people, who think differently from themselves, and, in fact, who, as you and I do, very anxiously desire to see them put down. One would suppose, that they would take all possible pains to disguise

this fact; and so they would, if they did not love themselves much better than their cause. Regular mole-catchers will never catch in *breeding-time*; and rat-catchers of eminence hold it to be a pity to kill *females with young*. For reasons similar to those by which these regular tradesmen are actuated, and which are too obvious to be pointed out, the Jubilee crew, the regular-traders in Anti-Jacobinism and loyalty, take special care to lose no opportunity that offers itself of inculcating a belief, that there are jacobins and traitors in the country. It is true, that in whatever degree they are believed, they give encouragement to the foreign enemy; but, though they do not wish to assist that enemy, *because it is not to be believed that he, if he became master of the country, would give them so much for doing nothing as they now get*; though they do not wish to assist that enemy, they wish to live upon the public; and it is upon the ground that the king has *enemies* at home, and upon that ground alone, that they can pretend to any merit in being his "*friends*," or, indeed, that they can justify the use of that appellation. How often has it been thus, and how many thrones have been overturned, in great part, at least, from this cause! It is in courts and governments as in private life: is there a base insinuating knave, who, for his own selfish purposes, wishes to be thought the *friend* of a man capable of doing him service; the first thing he does is to make that man believe that he has *enemies*. The persons, thus misrepresented, in consequence of being considered and treated as enemies, do, in time, become enemies in reality; and, as they have justice on their side, it is ten to one, that, in the end, they triumph, and that he who has been flattered into an abuse of his power experiences the mortification, or the actual punishment, due to his folly and his injustice. How often, in all ranks of life, public and private, have we seen this verified!

Without supposing the Jubilee crew to have been actuated by motives of this selfish description, it is quite impossible to account for their placard respecting *me*, exhibited at *Charing Cross*, on the day of the Jubilee, and of which the STATESMAN news-paper gives the following account:—
 "An ineffectual attempt to produce
 "a riot was made at Charing Cross, where
 "about four o'clock in the afternoon, a
 "person in a sailor's jacket, mounting on
 "horseback before *King Charles*, affixed

"to the neck of the horse a placard, with
 "the following words:—

"MAY GOD

"disperse

"The Votaries of

"COBBETT

"As the Clouds

"Of this day."

"But, although the miscreant strained his
 "throat till he was hoarse with huzzaing,
 "he could not get a *solitary individual* to join
 "him in this incitement to riot and blood-
 "shed, and the spectators treated the at-
 "tempt with the scorn which it deserved."

—Now, to be sure, if those who, *without doubt*, caused this placard to be put up, and nobody will be at a loss to know who they are; if these people had not been full as much fools as knaves, or rather more; if knavery, when it overshoots itself, did not always become folly, and if this had not been the case in the present instance, these people never would have done a thing like this, which was, in fact, in terms the most distinct, in a manner the most impressive, in a place proverbially the most public, and on an occasion the most memorable, to proclaim . . . what? Why, in the first place, that there were, at least, some persons, who disapproved of the Jubilee; but, in the next place, it was to proclaim, that I, the man whom they are known to hate, and whom they affect to condemn, has, in the country . . . what? Not *readers*; no, nor merely *partizans*, as some others have; not merely these, but that I have VOTARIES; that is to say, that I am a man, who is almost, if not quite, *worshipped*, by a part, at least, of the people of England, and that, too, just after not less than *fifty thousand pounds* is well known to have been expended for the purpose of circulating, gratis, publication upon the back of publication, and each teeming with the most atrocious falsehoods, the sole object of which publications was to put me down. Oh! these men, though precious knaves, are certainly less of knaves than of fools, or they never would have given me and the public this irrefragable proof of my having triumphed over them, aided by all the numerous herds of venal scribes.

"Hated by fools, and fools to hate:

"Be that my motto, that my fate."

The Editors of the hireling prints, albeit not amongst the Solomons of the age, have, as far as I have been able to ascertain the fact, taken not the smallest notice of this famous placard, though it was hung

upon the horse's mouth or neck, though every letter was, at least, three inches high, and though thousands and tens of thousands flocked to see it, and were continually flocking thither, till those who ordered it to be put up, thought proper to order it to be taken down, *in the night*. These hireling Editors, though no conjurers, could perceive, that this placard gave the lie direct to all their assertions about my being *a person of no consequence*; a person whose opinions and exhortations had *no weight* in the country; it would, with them, have been an act of political suicide to state, that, upon the day of the Jubilee, one of the acts of piety, performed by those who call themselves the friends of the king, was to pray to God to disperse my *Votaries*, clearly implying, that the number of them was so great as to be not a little formidable. No: the hireling Editors could not bring themselves to give the history of the Charing-Cross placard: they were not such shocking fools as he who sent a man, in a *sailor's* jacket, to put it up; and to fasten it, too, to the horse bearing the statue of a king, whom Englishmen beheaded as a traitor, upon a charge of having been guilty of a violation of their rights.—The effect of this placard is worthy of being recorded. Some persons, amongst the many thousands, who composed the continually shifting crowd of gazers at the placard, asked a very worthy friend of ours, who lives near the spot, what the thing meant, and who "COBBETT" was; to which he answered, that Mr. Cobbett was a gentleman, who wished to see sinecure places and unmerited pensions abolished, who wanted all speculators and public-robbers to be punished, and by such means to lessen the taxes and give the people encouragement to fight for their country. This ran, of course, from one to another; and, it is no wonder, that, on the fourth night after it was put up, the stupid wretch (he is the most vain and stupid in Christendom) who had ordered it to be hoisted, found somebody to beat into his addled brains the prudent measure of taking it down.—The best of it is, that, while these senseless creatures are plotting and conspiring against me, and are scratching their empty skulls for inventions whereby to injure, or, at least, annoy me, I am leading a life the most pleasant and undisturbed that can be conceived; and, it really is not unworthy of remark, that while the corrupt and venal herd, who

waste so much time and money in the hope of tormenting me; while these people were engaged in the contriving and preparing and playing off their placard trick amidst the bustle and uproar of the "*jubility*," as NOODLE or DOODLE calls it, in Tom Thumb; while they were so engaged, I was walking over a very beautiful farm and pleasure grounds, the hospitable occupiers of which are just as great despisers of hypocrisy as you yourself are; and, it is quite curious, that, at the very moment when, as it appears from the news-papers, the placard was hoisted, and the disguised and hired ruffian, with hoarse throat and straining eye-balls, was endeavouring to raise a mob against me, in London, I was in a farm yard in Berkshire, taking and noting down the dimensions of a sheep-crib.

Suffer me, now, by way of conclusion, to notice, in as brief a manner as possible, a few more facts, relating to this subject of the Jubilee, which I look upon as being of very great political importance, it having, unquestionably, been intended (by those who set it on foot) to answer the double purpose of diverting the minds of the public from the terrible calamities and disgrace in Holland and Spain, and, as I before observed, to revive, or excite, a set of popular feelings, calculated to *counteract the popular feelings, which have been excited by recent exposures, and by the busy and increasing WHISPERS, to which those exposures have led*. The thing was not badly imagined. The inventor is entitled to some praise for his cunning; for that *low cunning*, which it was quite happy to select for the occasion. But, for all this, the thing has failed as to *both* its objects; nor, is it necessary for me to say, that it is now *too late* for any such scheme.—Of the facts, which it is right, that the world should know, and that we should remember, the following are a few only; namely;—That, in several of the churches, the old battered song of "*God save the king*" was sung, and, particular public mention is made of this having been done in the church at Brighthelmston; which puts one in mind of a saying of John Wesley, who, when he set one of his hymns to the tune of a jovial song, observed, that he did not see why the Devil should have all the pretty tunes to himself;—That the illumination in London, though a drenched rabble paraded most of the large streets, was not a quarter part so general, or so bright, as upon any com-

mon occasion of a naval victory, a fact very much to the honour of the people of the metropolis;—That very few people illuminated at all, any farther than to guard against stones and brick bats from the belly-filled rabble; and, that, in fact, the illumination, as far as *good-will* went, appears to have been confined to the *East-India House*, the *Bank of Threadneedle Street*, the *Post-Office*, and the several great *Houses of Taxation*, the *Public Offices in White Hall and Downing Street*, the several *Offices of the Salaried Magistrates and Thief-takers*, the *Gambling Houses*, the *Quack Medicine Shops*, and certain other *Houses of resort*, which I do not think it necessary more particularly to point out;—That, in the country; not a soul, except those, who, in one way or another, live upon the public, made the smallest stir; but that the belly-filled rabble were every where in high spirits, and, at Winchester in particular, seemed extremely grateful to his Majesty for having lived long enough to occasion them one hearty meal in their lives.—The transparencies at a place called “*The Yellow Fever Remedy Warehouse*” exhibited the following:—“*Besides the Star and Anchor*,” (which are “usually illuminated on days of rejoicing), “the letters *G. R.* displayed by an immense number of variegated lamps, and “a very beautiful Transparency, in the centre of which was a Portrait of his Majesty, surrounded by *Hearts*, in each of which was written *Joy*; and in other parts of the Transparency was written “(in letters of gold) *The Fiftieth Year of the Reign of George the Third—a real Patriot—the best of Kings—and the only virtuous Sovereign in Europe.*—Every Heart is filled with joy, for thy long Reign, O King!”—That was pretty well, I think, for a vender of *quack-medicines*; but he was surpassed by one of the venal poetasters, who expressed himself thus:

“The Sun rules the day—the Moon rules the night,
“The King rules the Land—*by the very same right*;
“His lawful succession—just Heaven will secure,
“As long as the Sun and the Moon shall endure.”
The *Morning Chronicle* gives this, as a specimen of the *adulation* and of the *blasphemy* of the day; and, as such, I preserve it.—All the swarm of dependents in and about Kew and Windsor seem to have put themselves in motion. It is said, that “their hearts overflowed with *loyalty* and *love.*” I wish you or I could have overheard their conversation upon the subject,

when they got into their bed-chambers at night; we should then have been able to ascertain to a nicety what is the real meaning of the words “*loyalty* and *love.*”—The conduct of the news-papers upon this occasion ought to be noticed. Most of them made awkward attempts to disguise the real feelings of the Editors; but, the *STATESMAN* (an evening paper which every friend of the country ought to encourage) spoke out; its columns were full of excellent matter, such as, if hypocrisy were not always backed by impenetrable impudence, must have put it to the blush.—The good which will grow out of this thing is not easily to be calculated. It has provoked many persons to do what they never would have thought of, namely, revert to the several acts of this long reign; it has revived Saratoga, York Town, the Helder, and all the other brilliant exploits; it has called upon us to discuss, and has, in some sort, compelled us to discuss, what we never should have thought of discussing, though, I must confess, we ought not to have wanted any such spur; it will operate as most other feasts do, that is to say, it will leave a *head-ache* for those who were concerned in it. They have made the king’s reign a subject for rejoicing; we say that it has been a most unfortunate reign; thereupon they accuse us of being *traitors*; thereupon we must *show*, that *what we say is true*; their drunken-bout is over; it is now our turn to be heard, when they have no longer purchased shouts wherewith to drown our voices; and, before we have done, it shall go hard but we will make their Jubilee turn to good account. For my own part, I have already turned it to one most valuable purpose, which is to avail myself of this occasion publicly to declare, that I am, with great respect, and sincere regard,

Your faithful,

And most obedient servant,
W^M. COBBETT.

Botley, Thursday, 2 Nov. 1809.

P. S. Pray read the letter, below, respecting the *Blue Ribbon* scheme at Epping.

§ The Letter of “*Decius*” shall be noticed in my next.

JUBILEE.

Sir;—Any man who, in the pursuit of the sciences, can contribute a new fact, is considered meritorious. It lays either a

new, or an enlarged ground, upon which the philosopher may reason; it affords him more extensive inferences to combine and compare; it encreases his analogies, and is one step gained, in the progress after truth. I am to submit, Mr. Cobbett, that political science does not differ, in this respect, from the other sciences; and that he who can aid the prevention, or promote the dissipation, of popular delusion, by the communication of a simple fact, is equally meritorious. Were this principle universally acted upon, I do not know that you would stand so pre-eminent as you do; not that your merit would be less; but the utility of your labours would probably not be so great.—At the moment I am writing, it is afflicting to consider the system of influence which is operating around us on every side, to produce the meanest political deception. It would be scarcely credible to many well disposed persons in this kingdom, who judge of the freedom of twelve millions of people, by a row at a theatre, or a brawl at an election, to form a just estimate of the silent system of coercion, that exists in this country, and which on occasions like the present is enforced and executed, through all classes of the people. These secret workings of political power are dangerous in proportion as they are secret. The misfortune is, that the mischief can only be known, when it is too late to repair the ruin which it has produced. It is idle to boast of the liberty of that people, who are constrained by oppressive influence to express sentiments they do not possess, or if they do possess them, to compel them to wear insignia of such sentiments, against the dictates of their own judgment, in violation of the liberty of opinion, and in degradation of their mental independence. If I understand what liberty is, I should think with Montesquieu, that it consisted in the free exercise of individual opinion, so far as it was not constrained by the laws; laws I mean framed upon the sacrifice of that portion only of the freedom of each, which is absolutely necessary for the good of the whole. But where is the liberty of that class of the subjects of this realm, who are obliged under the heaviest penalties, the penalty of the imputation of disaffection, the penalty of the loss of domestic peace, and of being deprived of the common enjoyments of good neighbourhood, to wear a Royal Blue Ribbon in their hats, at the dictation of a man,

who is perhaps cringing for a title, and who is kindling animosity among his majesty's subjects, that he may probably enjoy a portion of their taxes.—Impressed with these ideas, I beg to submit to your notice, a fact, which I select, because I am prepared to authenticate it. The late Chelmsford meeting regarding Colonel Wardle, must be fresh in your recollection; and you cannot fail to bear in mind, that John Conyers of Copthall near Epping in the county of Essex, esq. (for I think with you all these gentlemen should have their full addition) was extremely active in favour of his majesty's government, on that occasion. In fact, Sir, he displayed so much loyalty, at Chelmsford, that it was the opinion of most men, that his majesty's ministers had not as usual done their duty, in not recommending his majesty, to include the name of Mr. Conyers in the last most respectable batch of baronets. Not, Sir, that I imagine such a reward would at all operate on Mr. Conyers's mind; the motives which actuate him are no doubt founded in, and originate out of, pure unalloyed and unadulterated loyalty.—In the exuberance of this loyalty, Mr. Cobbett, Mr. Conyers, (and every good Englishman must thank him), addressed a Letter some days ago, to the leading solicitors, in the town of Epping, on the subject of the ensuing Jubilee, in which is the following passage. I inspected the Letter in question, and after reading the following sentence several times, I immediately reduced it into writing, therefore though I may not be literally correct I can vouch for its being substantially so:

“ I much wish that on the 25th instant
“ all the inhabitants of Epping, both men
“ and women, who are friends to the
“ king and government, should appear
“ in Royal Blue Cockades. This measure,
“ if I am not mistaken, will tend to pro-
“ duce some curious discoveries.

“ Yours, &c. JOHN CONYERS.”

“ N. B. Let the Milliner be prepared
“ with plenty of Blue Ribbons.”

I shall make no further observations on this proceeding; I have given you the text, the commentary (if any is required) is best in your hands. I remain,

Yours, &c.

D—R—WL—D.

Gray's Inn Place, Oct. 24th, 1809.

"OH! 'TIS A DAY OF JUBILEE."

TOM THUMB.

SIR; Accident placed in my hands your observations upon the Jubilee, and though in an humble situation myself, I greatly admire the principles upon which you withheld your subscription. The Parish in which I live made a noble collection to feed and to feast the poor on that memorable day the 25th instant. The parish officers, whose province it was to make the distribution, being men of affluence and discretion, and well knowing the imperfections of human nature, and the great danger that is to be apprehended from hungry half-starved families eating to excess, took the wise preventive measure of restraint in the midst of plenty, and, to prevent discord, gave to each poor family (who chose to accept it) small and great, two shillings and a quarter loaf; leaving the surplus of the collection to be accounted for at a future day. I must here remark that, setting aside the feasting on that joyful occasion, you do not appear to me to be aware of the great utility which the Jubilee afforded to me, and to thousands more who had no heart to feast, but much more disposed to fast. I am one of those oppressed beings called a householder, though, by-the-bye, my necessity hath constrained me to act with that prudence and civility to seclude both myself and family from every part of the house except the ground floor. Some weeks back I received from the collector a printed notice, that unless my half year's assessed tax, 5*l.*, due the 20th of September, was paid by the 10th of October, my goods would on that day be sold to make good the sum. As I knew I might as well attempt to raise the D—— as the money against the time, I looked on my small portion of this world's good in a state of requisition, or rather similar to a man under sentence of death, and who only awaits the signing the warrant to receive execution. My household property hath withstood the gripe of the king's and parish officers near forty years, but being, like myself, worse for wear, and carrying with them also strong marks of antiquity, I am led to imagine that my whole property will but barely pay the tax and the expence of seizure. But however, Sir, a respite is granted for a few days; a few nights more to indulge myself with a bed; thanks to the Jubilee, a seizure is not yet made. The commissioners and other great men, whose goodness and humanity

is not to be equalled, conscious that the immediate distress of so many thousands would ill accord with so rare a festival, have delayed putting the stern decree into execution until after the Jubilee. Permit me now to observe, from what I have advanced, that if the total loss of my little property was for the real good of my country, that consoling reflection would soften every plank of my floor (upon which I shortly must extend my weary limbs) into a downy pillow, from the pleasing hope that my children, grand-children, or rising generation, would ultimately enjoy the benefit. But, is it so? No, Sir, you know it is not. It is to answer the craving demands of the sons and daughters of luxury, avarice, and dissipation; the thoughts of which will turn every board of my deal couch into a holly-bush! TRUTH IN OBSCURITY.

Black Friars, Oct. 28, 1809.

JACOBIN GUINEAS.

SIR;—Whatever symptoms of intemperance may have introduced themselves into the discussion of the several articles that have appeared in your Register under the title of "*Jacobin Guineas*," I cannot suppose that on the present, any more than on any other occasion, you can have any wish that your arguments should pass for more, than when tried by the test of reason, they were found to be worth. Entertaining this persuasion I am encouraged to offer, for insertion in your Register, the following observations on the articles in question, thinking with you, that it is in itself a subject of very considerable importance, and moreover that its importance has been materially increased by the misdirection, as it appears to me, the great mass of public mind that is influenced by your work, has been receiving.—The subject is in itself of a perfectly grave description; it involves neither party nor personal considerations, the fair discussion of it can therefore in no degree be aided by appeals to the passions and prejudices of the public. It is always suspicious when a man lugs in, by way of helping out his arguments, abusive unmeaning epithets: it is peculiarly suspicious when this is found to be the case on a subject not of a nature to stir up the angry passions. It convinces the reader that the writer is angry, not that his arguments are well founded. What can be meant by saying "I see
"nothing horrible in the annihilation of a
"nasty, dirty, debased, currency, printed like

"shop-bills, at every corner of every town."

[Register xvi. 532.] The mere quoting a passage of this description, is of itself sufficient to shew how totally incapable such a mode of reasoning, if so it may be called, is of affording any real instruction: at least if there be those that are convinced by it, they can scarcely be worth undeceiving. If the object be to lead into the same way of thinking as yourself any other than the mere rabble; by any such helps as these, I cannot but think your views, in this respect, will be defeated, not promoted.

—What is complained of is simply this—The Bank of England, having been exempted by the legislature from the obligation of exchanging their notes for specie, have possessed, and exercised, the power of issuing these notes in an excessive quantity. Two evil consequences have, as is alledged, thus been produced. 1. A rise in the prices of commodities in general: 2. The expulsion of gold as a part of the circulating medium. The remedy proposed is the repeal of the Bank-Restriction act, by which it is *avowedly* hoped that a great mass of gold will immediately flow into the country, and displace the paper that is now in circulation, and *disguisedly* hoped that the government will thus be effectually and permanently disabled from paying the dividends due to its creditors, and that thus the national debt will at once become extinguished.—Admitting that guineas now bear a premium, that is, that twenty guineas cannot now be procured but for a greater sum than one and twenty pounds in Bank of England notes, this is not of itself sufficient to prove that guineas, compared with Bank notes, are now in a state of depreciation. There are other and temporary causes, perfectly adequate to account for the effect that has thus been produced. Among these causes the principal one is, the expedition that has lately been sent to the neighbouring coast. Guineas being the only medium that could there be employed in the way of exchange for other commodities, it became an object with every individual engaged in that expedition, to take with him, in this shape, whatever money he might conceive himself likely to have occasion for. Considering the great number of persons employed on this expedition, thence the large sums for which, in this shape, a demand would thus come to be created, combined with the comparatively small quantity of coin of this species that was at the time in question in circulation,

this alone, without searching for other and remoter causes, appears very satisfactorily to account for a greater sum than their nominal value in Bank notes being paid, in many instances, for the procurement of guineas. Upon no occasion has it been so much as attempted to be shewn, that for any other purpose than that of exportation, a premium has been paid for guineas. Did you yourself, Sir, for your own use, and to be employed in this country, ever actually buy, or ever think of buying, at a premium, guineas with Bank notes? Or did you ever hear of any body else that has so done? The truth is, that this doctrine, as to a permanent and steady depreciation having been suffered in the case of Bank notes, greater than has been suffered in the case of guineas, having been found untenable, seems now to be abandoned.—What, however, is certain is, by whatever causes it may have been produced, that within these last hundred years, a considerable and gradual, though lately accelerating, advance in the price of commodities in general has taken place. That this is ascribable, in a great measure, to the circumstance of paper having become a part of the circulating medium of this country, is equally incontestable. This, however, is far from being the only cause. From the searching nature of money, so long as any intercourse is carried on between the several European nations, an increase in the quantity of currency, in whatever shape it may exhibit itself, whether it be composed of the precious metals or of paper, in one country, will produce a corresponding increase in the circulating medium, thence an increase of prices, in every other nation with which it may directly, or through the medium of any other country, have communication. Thus Spain, by the quantity of bullion that it has imported from South America, has been the means of increasing the prices of commodities in all other European countries, to say nothing of non-European countries.—An increase made to the quantity of hard money in one country, from its intrinsic value serving as a medium of exchange equally in all European states, would produce more uniformly in all other countries the effect of equalizing prices, than would an increase, to the same amount, made in the shape of paper money. No European country, possessing any circulating medium in the shape of paper currency, however great might be the increment made to the hard cash circu-

lating in any one country, by the tendency that money has to find its own level, all other countries, with a celerity proportioned to the intercourse carried on with the country that first received this increment, would feel the effects of it. The effect being thus generally diffused, commodities in all countries would experience an increase of price; the rise, after a while, not being greater in the country first receiving the money than in any other. A similar effect is produced when the circulating medium of all European countries consisting partly of paper, partly of the precious metals, an increase in any one is made to the quantity of paper currency. Our own country affords an illustration of this process. By the increased quantity of our paper circulation, the guineas have been expelled from this, and have found their way into foreign countries; where they have contributed to cause a rise of prices in those countries, as the paper money has caused a rise of prices here. An analogous effect is produced in this country by an addition made to the quantity of paper money in any other country: we receive their hard money, which contributes to produce a rise of prices in this country, they retain their paper, which contributes to produce a corresponding rise of prices in the country in which it was issued. By fresh issues of paper money, however, any one European country, having an uninterrupted intercourse with neighbouring states, and while retaining as a part of its circulating medium a quantity of the precious metals, may accumulate within itself, a circulating medium far greater in proportion than what is possessed by the neighbouring states. If it were not so, the prices of commodities, except in so far as influenced by taxes, would be the same, or very nearly the same, in every country in Europe; the contrary of which is universally known to be the fact. To explain the causes of this aberration from the so universally acknowledged propensity in money to find its own level, would require far more space than could possibly be afforded for it in your Register.—If what is said above be true, I see not how those who regard the rise of prices as an evil, can, with any consistency, complain of the expulsion of gold from the country as increasing that evil. The retaining it here under the present circumstances, were that possible, not having the smallest tendency to prevent fresh issues of paper-money, would, by so much as it added to

the amount of the money in circulation, help to increase, not to diminish the evil. If displaced from the circulation, by lessening the quantity of the circulating medium, it palliates the evil producible by fresh issues of paper-money. You, Sir, too, appear to be peculiarly estopped from complaining of this expulsion of gold as a grievance: in the present state of our relations with the rest of Europe, it helps materially to obstruct the carrying on that foreign commerce that is so pernicious to this country, so profitable to others.—That of late years a considerable increase has taken place in the price of commodities, attributable, in a far greater degree than to any other cause, to an increase in the quantity of circulating paper, and that this increase is productive of very disastrous results, is perfectly obvious. What, however, is equally obvious is, that as a producer of this evil, the Bank of England, though standing most conspicuous, does not stand alone.—Whatever addition may come to be made to the mass of paper-money in any given country, of whatever materials that addition may be composed, whether of metal or of paper, and whatever may be the nature of the paper, so long as it passes from hand to hand for its nominal value, while the original mass, and the increment thus made, remain in the country, the effect produced upon the prices of commodities will be precisely the same. Thus, whether the addition be made in the shape of Bank of England or of country bank paper, a corresponding rise of prices, proportioned to the amount of the issue, and without any regard to the source whence it proceeds, will immediately take place. As to the exact amount of the country bank notes in circulation, I have no materials for forming any conception: it certainly falls materially short of the amount of Bank of England notes. What however is certain is, that if it is not greater, we owe it to nothing less than to any forbearance, or regard to the public welfare, on the part of the description of persons in question. A circumstance that shows that, on the part of the Bank, there can have been no such exorbitant and excessive issue of their notes, as appears to have been imagined, is the very existence of these country bank notes. The principal means by which the Bank of England, as well as the country banks, introduce their notes into circulation, is by granting loans, and discounting bills, which is nearly the same thing under

another name. Besides the advantage that it derives from the being a Bank of deposit, an advantage peculiar to itself in contradistinction to the country banks, working on a more extensive scale, the Bank of England could afford to work for smaller profits than the country banks, and might thus probably, were it not for the advantage possessed by the country banks in respect of their locality, engross the whole business of this description that is transacted in the country. How it has happened that with these obvious advantages, this result has not been more nearly or altogether produced, it is foreign to the present purpose to enquire. What, however, these considerations shew is this, that if the conductors of the Bank of England are just objects of our abhorrence, the conductors of the country banks are not less so.—A notion that appears very generally to have seized men's minds is, that there is a sort of identity between the government and the Bank of England, and that they are together carrying on a joint concern, by which they are the profitters, the public the losers. Nothing can be more shallow or mistaken than this idea. Need it really be said, then, that the Bank Directors and the king's ministers are a perfectly distinct set of persons? That no man ever united these two functions in himself? It seems to be supposed that the Bank is receiving every year out of the public taxes outrageously large sums of the public money: but for what purpose paid, or out of what fund it comes, the retention of the persuasion seems much too delightful to allow the brokers of such notions to stop for a moment to consider. The public accounts shew precisely what is the amount of the sums that the Bank receives yearly from government. But perhaps it may be supposed that over and above the sum to which the interest, thus avowedly paid, corresponds, the Bank Directors put into the hands of ministers, when called for, any quantity of this their paper-money, and that, when thus possessed of it, ministers employ it in paying the public creditors. Yes: this notion really is entertained, and here we have a gentleman stating himself as entertaining it. Hear your correspondent, Mr. Bernard (*Register*, vol. xvi. 537.) "When new loans and fresh taxes were required to carry on the war, it became necessary on every additional loan and tax to coin and issue annually, a certain number of new Bank notes, to the amount of the in-

terest on the loan or money borrowed; and so, each succeeding year, as more money was wanting, the Bank-notes progressively increased and accumulated." Really, if what this gentleman says be correct, the amount of paper in circulation would be considerable indeed! Why, it would be at least equal to the amount of all the debt created, and all the taxes imposed since the Bank were restrained from exchanging their notes for specie. It is inconceivable that any man that can count his fingers should fall into such gross errors.—The truth is, the Bank of England derives no advantage from forcing their notes into circulation, unless in so far as they are paid in the shape of interest for making a fresh issue, with the prospect of receiving, at some future period, an equivalent in money. The Bank Directors might unquestionably, so long as the Restriction act remains unrepealed, without suffering any considerable present loss, manufacture, and hand over to the government, a quantity of their notes: but ministers have no motive for the asking such an advance, nor, if they had, have the Bank Directors for complying with it. On the contrary, a certain loss would thus be incurred. Each Bank Director being as much one of the public as any other individual, he would suffer in common with the rest of the community by the rise of prices that would thus be produced, and moreover, the concern in general upon the repeal of the Bank Restriction act, whenever that event may take place, would be subjected to the obligation of exchanging these notes, as others, for specie.—When painful emotions have been excited in the human bosom, as in the present instance by the distress occasioned by the pressure of the public taxes, it is a sort of relief to give vent to the unpleasant sensations that are thus experienced. On this occasion, the Bank Directors have been pitched upon, as the most appropriate objects for bearing the public odium, and, with the view of giving colour to this imputation, it is attempted to be shewn that they alone are the public creditors, and that all the cost that they have incurred to entitle them to receive, and put into their own pockets, all the money that is now paid for the interest of the debt, has been simply the expence of manufacturing their notes. Or at least if this is not supposed, what is supposed is, that upon the payment of every quarter's dividend by the Bank, a fresh mass of notes, equal to the amount of the dividend,

is issued, and that by so much the Bank Directors profit. This appears extremely absurd when stated; but such, or something analogous, must be the notions of those who thus lustily deal out their invectives against the Bank Directors.—The operation, that is thus attempted to be confounded, is in itself extremely simple and intelligible. Whatever is paid to the public creditors as interest upon the loan, has first been raised upon the people in the shape of taxes. Upon this occasion the Bank is the mere agent of government. It first receives the money from government, then pays it away for government: just as a private London banker, having received from a private individual, a mass of money in deposit, pays it away in detail to his order; in the one case the receipt for the dividend being the voucher, in the other case the draft.—It is said, that the public creditors would be no sufferers, by government ceasing at once to pay their dividends. This appears to be an assertion so extravagant, and so exclusively dictated by blind passion, that I cannot think it will be persisted in, after any the smallest consideration. Besides, Sir, you yourself, in almost the same breath in which the assertion is made, depict in the strongest terms, the suffering that would thus be produced. [Register, v. xvi. p. 531.] A man losing half his income, no words can paint the indignation felt, at the folly of his exposing himself to this suffering: losing the whole of it, he is not to be pitied, nor is he any sufferer. The Bank Directors are in your view of the matter a very wicked set of people, and have done, and are now doing, very serious mischief to the country. But, how would you have them treated for this their evil-doing? Let the result you are invoking take effect, you reward, not punish them. Perhaps, as was done in Ireland, by way of taking revenge upon these blood-suckers for their misdeeds, you would joyfully join in collecting together a mass of these nasty dirty ill-looking bits of paper, and set fire to them, provided you yourself were not called upon, to contribute any thing towards the formation of the pile. This really is a most notable and effectual contrivance for relieving the poor distressed and oppressed people of this afflicted country. Would you, Sir, pray let me ask you, find yourself very greatly punished or impoverished, if, after having issued a number of bills, the amount of which, at some subsequent period,

you thus imposed on yourself the obligation of paying in money, or money's worth, the holders of those bills should unaccountably take it into their heads to destroy them? Or would the holders of those bills, having paid, and expecting again to receive, valuable consideration for them, be greatly enriched by any such operation? Do pray, Sir, take a one hundred pound Bank of England note in your hand, that you may have received in exchange for a hundred pounds worth of wheat, and ask yourself whether, if that note were at once to lose its exchangeable value, you would not be in precisely the same condition as if your wheat had been burnt, or by any other means destroyed. Did it never happen to you to hear, Sir, that great distress was occasionally produced by the failure of country bankers? But perhaps you may be prepared to shew that all this suffering is not real, but purely imaginary, and that what people thus mistake for loss is a real gain to them. If this be so, Sir, and I really see not how with any consistency you can think otherwise, the stating on this subject your ideas to the public appears to press upon you with peculiar emphasis, since it would teach those that were persuaded by your arguments, to see advantages, when before nothing was visible but distress. What is expected from you, then, is this: to shew that a given individual, you yourself for example, being possessed of 1,000*l.* worth of the notes of a country bank, for which you had paid a valuable consideration, and that bank happening to fail, without leaving any assets, you would not be any the poorer by that 1,000*l.* worth of notes ceasing at once to be of any value. What, it is hoped, will not escape your penetration is, that by mere transference of property, the nation at large is no gainer. It is quite clear that there are many persons that would be gainers by the destruction of the paper currency of the country; but the gainers bear no proportion to the losers: they are not perhaps as one in a hundred thousand.—As to the remedy proposed, or rather the leaving the evil to cure itself, it seems not in the smallest degree calculated to produce any such effect, as that which appears to be expected from it. It is asserted that the gold coin, if it has not already all of it quitted the country, yet, from the rapidity with which it disappears, there will very shortly be none of it remaining. The return of this gold coin is the thing desired. No such effect as this seems,

however, likely to be produced, though double or treble the quantity of Bank notes, that are now in circulation, were issued, and consequently prices double or treble beyond what they are at present. Besides, Sir, though the disorder were thus capable of being cured, the process would be an extremely gradual one, and the mass of suffering produced proportionably great. Neither the Bank of England, nor country banks, have the power of introducing their notes into circulation, but in proportion as a demand is made for them by individuals. Nobody, you least of all, Sir, will accuse the Bank of England, or the country bankers, of not seizing every such opportunity of giving currency to their notes: this is among the complaints against them: we now see the amount of the effect that has thus been produced, and the time that has been taken to produce it. The restriction on the Bank took place in the latter end of the year 1796, or beginning of 1797. The issues cannot be expected to be more rapid hereafter, than they were in the interval between that period, and the present. They will be less rapid; and that from two causes; 1. The stagnation of commerce, and transactions in general, thence a diminution of the number of occasions, on which the discounting of bills has heretofore been required; 2. The discounting of bills by individuals, this they will be enabled to do, by the quantity of capital that will have been thrown out of employment. We see then, Sir, how long we should have to wait for the relief in question, did it really contribute to produce the desired effect.—So incorrigibly dull has the public hitherto been, that though the process is obvious enough, and easily traceable, they have never yet been able to comprehend, how it has happened that guineas have disappeared as paper money has increased. A fresh mode of reasoning is necessary to make it intelligible to them. Here we have it (Register, xvi, 524). "They" [Guineas] "will not stay to circulate amongst so much dirty, ill-looking, worthless paper." Now, this is probably designed as a fair, legitimate, persuasive, convincing mode of argument. It speaks to the senses, and is intelligible to the meanest capacity. Guineas are endowed with feeling: they feel the passions of aversion and love, they love England, but their hatred to paper is greater than their affection to their country: they therefore quit their country, when ex-

posed to the contamination of paper; return to it when the paper has vanished. I am afraid, however, Sir, that to ensure the return of these sensitive guineas, we must have something more substantial to offer in exchange for them, than the mere absence of the objects of their aversion. To those, who possess them, we must pay an equivalent for their return. And how is this to be effected in the present little less than annihilated state of our commerce with the Continent? If we get them back, it must be by commerce that it will, if at all, be accomplished. As to this purpose therefore, you, Sir, will scarcely declare that Britain is independent of commerce.—This letter has already extended to such a length, that I shall only add, that the conclusion from what has been said above, is, that the only true remedy for our present calamitous condition, is by an act of the legislature to prohibit, both on the part of the Bank of England, and of country bankers, the issuing of any fresh notes, or the reissue of those, that in the course of business, may be returned upon them, till the number in circulation has been reduced to a given amount. This is the only sure and safe course of gradually preparing the way for the return of guineas into the circulation; of enabling Parliament after a time, without endangering the production of some violent concussion, to repeal the Bank restriction act; of reducing the prices of commodities to the level they were at on some given anterior period, and thus affording relief to fixt incomists; and of preventing thenceforward any such calamitous consequences from advance of prices, as those that we now labour under.

I am, Sir, yours, &c. DECIUS.

WEST INDIA CUSTOM-HOUSE FEES.

St. Pierre, Martinique, 20th Aug. 1809.

Sir;—Among the numerous subjects which require reform, there is none which more imperiously requires the attention of government than the exorbitant amount of the Fees, extorted by the Custom-Houses throughout the West Indies. In the old established English islands, the Fees, which are demanded, are considerably more, than they are authorized by the act of parliament to receive; but it is in the colonies and islands recently captured, that this evil has reached its full extent, as the following Table of Fees received in the Custom-House at St. Pierre, (and authorized by Sir George Beckwith, K. B.) will plainly shew:

DOCKET OF FEES.		Collector.	Comptroller	Searchers & Waiters.	Clerks.
		Dls. Cents.	Dls. Cents.	Dls. Cents.	Dls. Cents.
On Vessels entering with Cargo, and clearing in Ballast; viz. (on Island Vessels)					
From 15 to 30 Tons		7 50	2 50	3	2 50
30 - 55		10	3 33	4	3
55 - 80		12	4	4	4
80 - 100		15	5	6	4
100 - 150		18	6	6	6
150 - 200		19 50	6 50	6	6
200 and upwards		24	8	8	8
On entering Vessels with Cargo, and clearing with Cargo.					
From 15 to 20 Tons		10	3 33	3 50	3
20 - 30		15	5	5	4
30 - 55		20	6 66	6	5
55 - 80		24	8	8	6
80 - 100		30	10	8	6
100 - 150		38	12 66	12	8
150 - 200		42	14	12	8
200 and upwards		54	18	16	8
On drawing Passes for 3 Months					
Do. for 6 Do.		10	3 33	3	3
		20	6 66	6	6
On Non-objection Notes.					
Under 100 Tons		2	1	1	1
Above 100 Do.		3	1	1	1
On European and American Vessels, entering in Ballast, and clearing with Cargo.					
From 15 to 50 Tons		36	12	8	6
50 - 130		48	16	12	8
130 - 200		54	18	16	12
200 Tons and upwards		72	24	16	16
Ditto entering and clearing with Cargo.					
From 15 to 50 Tons		48	16	8	6
50 - 130		66	22	12	8
130 - 200		72	24	16	12
200 Tons and upwards		96	32	16	16
On Permits and Cockets for above Vessels, three Dollars are charged for each; on all Produce shipped, the Waiters and Searchers receive five Stivers for each Package or Box; and also, sixteen Dollars for two general Manifests for an European Vessel.					
Fees on Registers.					
From 20 Tons and under		9	3	3	
20 - 30 Tons		12	4	3	
30 - 40		15	5	5	
40 - 60		18	6	6	
60 - 100		21	7	6	
100 - 150		24	8	7	
150 - 200		30	10	8	
On licensed Boats.					
First Class, or under 15 Tons		18	6	6	4
Second Do. - 10		12	4	4	4
Third Do. - 5		6	2	2	2

(Signed)

GEO. BECKWITH.

N. B. The Governor's Fees are not included in the above Table.

The Revenue which arises to the Collector alone of this Port, from the above exorbitant Docket of Fees, is, at a very low estimate, worth at least twelve thousand guineas per annum. It is, Sir, a melancholy reflection, that this severe tax on commerce and industry, does not, in the most remote degree, go towards increasing our resources or lightening our heavy burthens, but is appropriated to the sole benefit and use of one individual, who fattens on the exertions of the industrious, and by the insupportable extent of his Fees, does incalculable injury to the nation, by paralyzing those efforts, which, if unshackled by the enormous weight of Custom-House Fees and Charges, would be the means of benefiting thousands of individuals, and of giving circulation to English manufactures to a surprising extent. Should a merchant make any representation as to the extravagance of the charges made by the Custom-House, he is immediately referred to a Docket sanctioned by the signature and approval of Sir Geo. Beckwith, K. B.; and here, Sir, I cannot but observe, that I believe this to be a solitary instance, where a British commander in chief has, of his own authority, thought fit to supersede an act of the legislation! For, although the Fees received at other Custom-Houses be higher than those specified in the act, yet, until the present instance, no governor has been bold enough to put his hand to an illegal and oppressive Docket. There is, Sir, however, another, and a great evil, attendant on the rapacious system of the English Custom-Houses, established in foreign colonies or islands; it impresses the natives and others, with the belief, that extortion is sanctioned by our government. A foreign island is justly esteemed more lucrative to the governor, than an English one; and if it were not so, how could St. Croix, St. Thomas, and Martinique, be as valuable governments (or perhaps more so) than Jamaica? But I hope, Sir, through the medium of your Register, that this representation will meet the eyes of ministers, and that, by their measures, foreigners may be convinced, that nothing but a want of proper information, has hitherto permitted the existence of abuses, so degrading to the nation, and so oppressive to individuals. I remain, &c.

MERCATOR.

HIGH PRICE OF PROVISIONS.

SIR;—Having observed by the news-

papers, that the Lords of Trade had granted, or, were about to grant, licences to import corn, and stones to grind it with, from France, in exchange for colonial productions; for trash where bread is wanted; and feeling myself, as it were, involved in the disgrace of a measure which, in my estimation, at once betrays our want of resources to carry on the war till an honourable peace is obtained, and places us in the ridiculous situation of claiming the dominion of the sea, and begging bread to enable us to hold it from the very enemy, who is determined to give up his share of that dominion only with the existence of the nations which he rules; I addressed the underneath to their lordships, and sent it to a Sunday newspaper for insertion; but it was returned without assigning any reason whatever. I allow every man, Sir, to be the best judge of his own reasons for whatever he does; and I can conceive many reasons why the conductors of periodical publications, should return or suppress many of the articles that may be sent them; but as I do not see the reason why public spirited men should not assign their reasons for doing so, I think I see very clearly that such of them as do not do so, take the most effectual means in their power to crush public spirit and deprive themselves of its aid, by shewing such unqualified marks of contempt, as their refusal does shew of the feelings of those, who may, from a sense of public duty, wish to add their mite to the aggregate stock of general knowledge through the medium of the press. It cannot be flattery to say, Sir, that I hold a very different opinion of your liberality as a public spirited man; (a public character Lawyers will not allow you to be) and to confess that such opinion has received a considerable degree of strength, from your recent publication of an article in defence of Col. Wardle, which the Editor of the Morning Chronicle refused to insert, perhaps with no greater degree of regard to the feelings of the author and the duties of candour, than the Sunday paper has shewn in my case. Holding this opinion of your liberality, I beg leave to trouble you with the letter in question, leaving you, as I did the said paper, to apply such corrections, as in your better judgment it may stand in need of, to merit its room in the Political Register, if it deserves your attention.

My Lords;—It is unnecessary to remind your lordships of the fatal consequence to

millions, I may say, of your fellow subjects which resulted, immediately as well as remotely, from the duke of Portland's Proclamation of Scarcity in 1799. Your lordships' recollection of the calamities of that and the succeeding year, can only terminate with your lives; and the public can only forget them, when history ceases to record the soup shops, accumulation of poor's-rates, and multiplication of paupers which disgraced those years, and will disgrace others for ages to come. Your lordships are also aware of the rapid strides which these calamities are again making this year, under the similar plea of a deficient crop; and to arrest their progress, your lordships, if report be true, have either granted or intend to grant, licences to import grain from France, provided Napoleon will take colonial productions in exchange. It is impossible to conceal from him that we have sugar, coffee, and cotton to dispose of; but in the present state of his temper, power, and determination, is it not the last thing that he ought to know, nay, is there any thing which ought not to be done, to conceal from him that we are in want of bread? Conceiving that there is not, I beg leave to submit to your lordships whether the means of defeating the internal enemies of their country, who, by advancing the price of provisions under the plea stated, have placed your lordships in the humiliating, if not traitorous, situation, of cringing for bread to the very enemy whom we attempted to conquer by the means of famine, be not more immediately within the reach of your lordships' power. The recent and rapid advanced price of corn must either be or be not the measure of the scantiness of crop, to which it is ascribable. If it be the measure of it, then the scarcity amounts to one third of last year's crop, for the price has advanced, or will soon advance, in that proportion to last year's price. And if it be not the measure of it, then it is not the corn that has advanced a third in price, but the money that has retreated back to two thirds of its last year's exchangeable value. It is my positive belief that the latter is the case, and in holding that belief I am not a free agent, for it is forced upon me, not only by my total disbelief in a deficiency of one third, or even of one thirtieth in this year's crop; not only by my experimental knowledge of the conscientiousness with which the freedom of trade allows the monied farmer and corn-dealer to take every possi-

ble advantage of the consumer, but by my positive recollection, that the price of bread in the winter of 1799 and 1800, rose nearly in the proportion of 125 per cent. to the price of the preceding year, while the deficiency of crop, as stated by the late duke of Bedford in the house of peers, amounted only to 25 per cent. of the preceding year's crop. This, my lords, is the strongest proof which the case will admit of, that the 100 per cent. difference between the whole of the advance, and the 25 per cent. corresponding advance to the deficiency of crop, cannot be traced to any other cause but a corresponding increase of Bank notes, country bank notes, Bank post bills, navy bills, exchequer bills, bills of exchanges, promissory notes, bonds, or any other instrument in writing, or otherwise, by whatever name it may be called, which absolutely or conditionally purchases or circulates the produce of our industry. The bank notes, both town and country, bills of exchange and promissory notes, part of which were issued for the express purpose of withholding from market and forestalling in the market, corn, as well as every other article of necessity or conveniency. And if this proof be positive as to the real cause of the calamities of 1799 and 1800, can it be less so as to that of the famine which again threatens us with soup shops, and their concomitant increase of paupers, in 1809? Conceiving that it is not, I must assume your lordships to be unacquainted with the manner in which the dealers in corn, and in every thing else, drag Bank notes and country bank notes into circulation, to satiate their own insatiable avarice at the expence of the consumer, with the view of shewing, more distinctly, my notions of the practicability of obtaining that supply at home, which must be looked for in vain from France, while the people of that country have a recollection of our assignats, and other visionary efforts to starve them out of their independence as a nation. When the farmers, (I do not mean the board of Agriculture), wish to raise the price, their policy is to keep back their produce, and create an artificial scarcity in the market. But to create this scarcity is impracticable, without ready money to pay their rents, taxes, and servants' wages, &c. &c. and, therefore, to make it practicable, they lodge their own securities with the bankers, who greedily issue their paper for the sake of the interest it carries. Thus at their ease, they come to market

Y

with long faces and scanty samples; and the dealer, alive to the prospects of advanced price and profit, which the scarcity holds forth, eagerly buys up what is offered to sale, and pays for it, either in his own bills of exchange, or, in the bank notes which he obtained by discounting such bills. And having got possession of the commodity, to raise its price to any extent he pleases, beyond the interest he paid for the notes, he has only to follow the farmer's example, and obtain the notes required to pay his rent, &c. Briefly, my Lords, these are the means, and the only means, by which the farmers, dealers, and bankers unite, their power to fitch the consumer of his last shilling; and to subject their country to all the calamities of a real scarcity. The remedy, however, is simple, and, as a choice of evils, if such it could be, it seems to be far preferable to the slow, if sure, degrading attempt to import corn from an enemy, whom we hold at so much defiance. It is only to restrain our numerous banks from issuing their notes, until their value raises, or, the price falls to that level at which it may be thought the mutual interest of the farmers, dealers, bankers, (if they are to exist) and consumer, it should stand. It is true the farmers and dealers claim the right of raising the price of their commodities, as their taxes and rates advance: who then is to pay them, the consumer only? That cannot be, surely; it is impossible to allow them to exempt themselves from taxes, and, therefore, a level of prices should be established, which would, as nearly as possible, leave no party to enjoy the benefits of society, without contributing towards its expences; and far less to accumulate fortunes by its miseries; as farmers, dealers, and bankers must continue to do while they are allowed the use of such facilities as paper money gives them to fix the rate of price at any level they please. Should the interest of the farmers, &c. be pleaded as a bar to the application of this means of lowering prices, it will immediately occur, that importation would deprive them of the profits on which they calculate from public misery, and that this remedy can do no more. But this is not the point on which national honour and national interest will suffer the question to turn. The pivot on which the question turns is this; shall we, at the hazard of every thing, that is dear to us as a nation, and as individuals, submit to the degradation of begging our bread

from an Emperor, who must "laugh when our fear cometh," or be the most magnanimous of men? or, shall we, by the simple means of discharging first, and then finding useful employment for, the able bodied men, who work and manage our town and country rag-money manufactories, manifest to the world, that for Britain to be happy, free, and great, it is only necessary that she should will it? But the statesman and the landholder will perhaps exclaim with horror, what shall we do without the thousands and millions of pounds which we now collect in taxes and rent? Should our rags be converted into dung instead of money? Just what you did before you had them; and that was better than you do with them; for then, in addition to the rags, as manure, you had the labour that converts them into money, and that which money in various ways employs unproductively, to cultivate the land, and bid defiance to such scarcity as that, which at present threatens you with the most serious consequence. But independent of this advantage, and the most solid advantage too, it does not necessarily follow, that the exit of paper money can injure the interest of any class of the community, (that of its proprietors and those whose baseless bills they discount excepted), and to that evil the acquisition of their labour to productive industry is more than an equivalent. But unnecessarily its fall may be attended with fatal consequences. Suppose, for instance, that the exit of paper money would reduce the circulating medium to one tenth of its present amount. In that case, one tenth of the taxes and rents now collected in money, would necessarily yield as much real revenue to the state and the landholders, as the whole ten tenths now produce, while nine tenths of the collectors would be at liberty to join the bankers, &c. in cultivating the land, and multiplying the real revenue of their country, at least to the amount of their own consumption of it. But should avarice or ignorance lead government and the landholders to extort the whole ten tenths of their present nominal revenue, or even more than a tenth of it, while the farmer and the tradesman can sell their produce at but one tenth of its present price, then indeed the consequences of parting with paper money will be unnecessarily calamitous; and the only change produced is, that government and the landholders have snatched the hatchet from the hands of the

bankers, and became themselves the executioners of their country. Hence and hence only the danger of pointing out the means of raising the value of money, without shewing the necessity of lowering rents and taxes in the same proportion.

Oct. 16th, 1809.

C. S.

EDINBURGH REVIEWERS.

SIR;—As your correspondents complain of the manner in which the *Edinburgh Reviewers* have treated of Parliamentary Reform; of the length of their details; of the collateral subjects which they have introduced; of the refinement of their arguments, and the other means by which they have endeavoured to bewilder and mislead their readers, I think an analysis of their system may be of use. By reducing it to a narrow compass, we shall see it in a naked state, stripped of its meretricious trappings, and be enabled to determine that degree of weight which it ought to have in fixing our opinion.—They begin by enumerating, in a very systematic manner, the evils under which we at present labour: 1st, The burden of taxes; 2ndly, The influence of the crown; and 3rdly, The monopoly of the power of the state by a few.—The first of these evils is necessarily included in the last; for whatever abuses exist with regard to taxation originate in the corruption of the government, and whatever part of them can be removed, must be by Parliamentary Reform. The second, they themselves dismiss, by saying that the king has no power. There remains, then, only one question for us to discuss, namely, the last, or that of Parliamentary Reform. On this, the main subject of their consideration, they have, in 30 pages of close print, only two arguments: 1st, That the people are corrupt, and that no reform could render them otherwise; 2nd, That, “as the whole substantial power of government is now manifestly vested in the House of Commons, the balance of the constitution is preserved, and can only be preserved, by being transferred into that house; where a certain proportion of the influence of the crown and of the great families of the land is advantageously, though somewhat irregularly, mingled with the representation of the people.”—In answer to the first of these, it is sufficient to say, that a Parliamentary Reform would undoubtedly remedy the corruption of the people as far as it can be remedied; and that it is

no argument for rejecting any good to assert, that it is not complete.—As to the second, their extraordinary desire to preserve the constitution, it is a complete piece of sophistry; and consists, as all sophistry does, in an endeavour to impose words for things. They wish to preserve the constitution, without saying that any good would result from its preservation. They abhor a change, and yet would introduce a change to prevent a change. The truth is, they hate only a change for the better, and would not object to any alteration on the present system which would add to its rottenness. Any thing, Mr. Cobbett, will they call the British constitution which favours their own views, and nothing will they call by that name which does not.—The foundation of their second argument is indeed the assumption that all the power of the state resides at present in the House of Commons. But I believe the House of Commons possess no other power than they ever did; the power of granting or withholding the supplies. If recent circumstances have allowed this to be the real power of the state, they prove nothing more than what has been and should be the case. In this consists all the liberty of which we boast; and whenever the Commons are deprived of this power, the constitution is indeed lost and gone. That the other branches of the legislature see their own comparative insignificance, and wish to share the power of the Commons, is no reason for quietly permitting the encroachments, or for confounding all the separate divisions of the state in one illegal intermixture. Yet this adulterous intercourse is the only expedient which the *Edinburgh Reviewers* recommend for preserving the mutual controul of the different branches of the legislature, and for enabling the king to withstand the encroachments of a democratical House of Commons. According to their doctrines no encroachment indeed remains to be made, and the king, and lords, (who have always been considered as an appendage of the king), would still preserve all the power in the state, which, by the British constitution, they ought to have, that of swaying the balance between the people and their representatives; for great part of the argument of these Reviewers is made out by dropping, with admirable dexterity no doubt, the distinction between the people who chuse, and those who deliberate and judge for them, and calling both by the general

appellation of a Democratical House of Commons. As to insurrection and civil war arising from the king's negating the bills of the House of Commons, it may be remarked, that this prerogative of the king's is the most rarely used of any. It is for the advantage of the different branches of the legislature, as for people in common life, to practise a mutual forbearance, and to prevent, by timely concessions, all rude collisions in the political machine; and there is no reason to suppose that a reformed House of Commons would urge the king to an exercise of this prerogative more than a corrupt. The king, I believe, has more to fear from Borough-mongers than from his people. The prerogative, which, in case of a difference with his parliament, he would use, is rather that which the Reviewers wish to keep out of view, viz. an appeal to the people by a dissolution. On a new parliament being returned which persisted in passing the same bills, the king, it is to be understood, would concede, if he had not an interest different from the nation; and here it is to be remarked, that this is not the age in which the people are supposed to be made for princes, but princes for the people. The executive is only the hand which ministers to the head or deliberative body of the state; and a good government will always be ordered so as that a king will find his interest to be the same with that of his people. But to conclude this letter, which has been already drawn out to too great length, the doctrines of the Edinburgh Reviewers may be summed up in this, that the House of Commons have assumed a power in the state consistent neither with the constitution nor with expediency, and that the evil can be corrected by nothing but an infusion of royal and aristocratical influence into that assembly to an indefinite extent; while I contend, and every person may perceive, that the House of Commons has assumed no new power, but that the other branches of the legislature have made encroachments on that house consistent neither with the constitution nor expediency, and that nothing can purge it of aristocratical influence and restore it to purity but a Parliamentary Reform.

W. Y.

PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

SIR;—I have been so long in the habit of applauding the principles which apparently direct your political conduct, and

so long accustomed to admire your sense of public duty, your discernment of the true interests of nations, and your quick perception of the immediate and remote effects of the various measures of Statesmen, that I really feel an almost insupportable degree of reluctance in questioning the expediency of that project which you have distinctly pronounced to be indispensably requisite to the welfare and stability of the British Empire: I mean a Reformation of Parliament.—But, Sir, were I to decline provoking a more minute discussion of that momentous project than it has, as yet, to my knowledge, undergone, those considerations which actually dispose me to deprecate a general pursuit thereof, must inevitably continue to operate with unabated and effective force; and thus fix me, with reference to one subject at least, in a distressing state of opposition to a person with whom I am solicitous to concur: the contrary of which, in the event of such discussion, though extremely improbable, I shall certainly not presume to say is utterly impossible.

That the influence of the Ministers of the Crown is enormous; that this influence has already proved detrimental, in several respects; and may ultimately become ruinous, are truths, which no ingenuous person, capable of due reflection, can find himself satisfactorily prepared to refute. It falls under the observation of every man conversant in public affairs, that taxes the most burdensome and vexatious are, without difficulty, imposed and continued; that scrupulously comprehensive enquiries into the expenditure of public money are either thwarted or rendered abortive; that jobbing, peculation, and corruption, in various shapes, prevail; that the tutelary laws of British liberty are occasionally suspended without urgent necessity; that every measure, however prudent and popular, which happens to originate among the opponents of administration, is enviously and contumeliously resisted with effect; that decisive majorities in Parliament may be obtained by any Minister, on any question; and that the affairs of the Empire are most ineptly conducted, and its resources most egregiously and dangerously mismanaged. It is a truth too obvious to require illustration, that all these and other evils are imputable solely to that influence which the Ministers of the Crown are enabled to exercise. And to affirm that this pernicious influence, operating thus, has already, to a

certain extent, undermined, and, if not seasonably counteracted, must, at no very distant period, subvert, or radically change our unrivalled system of civil polity, will hardly be considered, by unperverted persons, as the idle, unsubstantial declamation of a querulous dissatisfied man.

Under such circumstances, Sir, it is extremely natural that a vast portion of the people of England should be favourably disposed towards any constitutional project calculated to retrench, or confine within safe limits, the influence in question. And certainly that which has of late been again presented to the public mind, namely, a Reformation of Parliament, produced by a disfranchisement of decayed and corrupt boroughs, an extension of the right of suffrage, an abridgement of the duration of Parliaments, and an exclusion of placemen and pensioners from the House of Commons, seems, at first view, so likely to prove efficacious, in the way desired, that there can be little ground for surprise at the growing prevalence of a solicitude for its adoption.

But, Sir, as every change in a system of civil polity may rationally be expected to produce, under the varying aspect of the times, many important effects, which, while the change is in contemplation, cannot possibly be foreseen; inasmuch as the production of these effects is ordinarily governed by combinations of moral or political circumstances, of a casual or emergent nature, which are confessedly beyond the sphere of human foreknowledge; and as the means proposed for accomplishing a Reformation of Parliament are undeniably essential changes, the distant effects whereof no man, however penetrating his foresight, can pretend to anticipate, without a greater degree of presumption than accords with a profound understanding, so it behoves us to examine this pregnant project with peculiar patience, care, and circumspection; to consider seriously whether it be really adequate to the end proposed; whether, if carried into effect, it may not ultimately be productive of greater evils than we actually experience; and whether we may not, with an equal prospect of success, resort, for the attainment of the final object in view, to some other of a more familiar and less hazardous kind.

It seems to be generally received as an indisputable truth, that a reformation of Parliament would completely prevent a corrupt exercise of the patronage of the

Crown. But, Sir, I will frankly declare, that, until farther informed, I cannot, for my part, avoid considering this fundamental position as a mere plausible assumption, more likely to be disproved than confirmed. And I will add, that instead of regarding the meditated reformation, as a safe and salutary renovation of our system of civil polity, I am greatly apprehensive that, if carried into effect, it may prove a proximate cause of the dissolution thereof. How far I am yet to be undeceived you will easily discover by the following observations.

The preservation of the hereditary rights and liberties of Englishmen, which should always be the paramount object of their public concern, is manifestly connected, in the strictest manner, with the maintenance of the national independence of England. The maintenance of that independence will be found, on reflection, to be utterly incompatible with an uniform adherence to pacific measures, on the part of those who administer the affairs of the nation. To perpetuate that independence, it is certain that recourse must occasionally be had to war. And to prosecute war, with vigour and success, national opulence, resulting from domestic and foreign commerce, must unquestionably be seasonably and sedulously augmented; for to that opulence, at the disposal of able and upright Statesmen, the success of every war, and the eventual stability of the British Empire must always, principally, be proportioned.—If England cease to be belligerent, she must soon cease to be independent; and if she cease to accumulate wealth, she will cease to be in a condition to carry on war with the prospect of a safe and honourable peace. Had it not been for her great and increasing opulence, she certainly could not have resisted her potent and numerous enemies so long as she has done, under an evident mismanagement of her resources. But the necessary wars of England, the progressive increase of taxes requisite to defray the inseparable expences of these wars, and commensurate with the growing wealth of the Empire; and moreover the incidental annexation of foreign colonies to the British Crown, must obviously be accompanied by the distribution of a vast number of honourable and lucrative employments, in the army and navy, in the civil and mercantile lines of business auxiliary to these, in the colonial and diplomatic departments, and in those of

the excise and customs: in other words, an immense and increasing patronage must always exist. The exercise of this patronage, together with the power of bestowing those civil, ecclesiastical, and forensic dignities which emanate from the Crown, must, so long as the preservation of the existing system of civil polity shall be held in view, be consigned to the individuals on whose counsel the King may think proper to rely; for, were it transferred to any other description of persons in the community, it is clear that an extra-constitutional power of superior magnitude would immediately be created; and that an eventual destruction of the system of civil polity would ensue. The public duty of these Counsellors consists in devising, prosecuting, and accomplishing measures for the support of the government, and the general welfare of the Empire: and on the performance of this duty the preservation of their places confessedly depends. But without the concurrence or acquiescence of Parliament in these measures, they cannot possibly be carried into execution. To secure that indispensable concurrence or acquiescence, therefore, the Ministers of the Crown, under the joint impulse of a sense of duty and personal interest, will always naturally resort to those means the efficacy whereof has been experimentally proved. Sound reasoning, persuasive eloquence, and an elaborate display of the expediency of the measures proposed to Parliament, may, possibly, on several occasions, incline that assembly to second the views of Administration. But precedents and reflection have taught the Statesmen of England to beware of relying wholly on such uncertain means for securing an undeviating and satisfactory support of their measures. Armed with the immense patronage of the Crown, and amply convinced, by a long and uninterrupted series of trial, of the invariable efficiency thereof, when exercised with the view of securing Parliamentary support, they will always prudently place their chief, if not exclusive reliance, on its instrumentality; and I am firmly persuaded that so long as ambition and avarice shall hold their places among human passions, this reliance will not be vain. The projected reformation, accompanied by the imposition of new oaths, may undoubtedly prevent a direct, undisguised, and manifestly corrupt exercise of the patronage of the Crown, on the constituent and representative bodies; but a

collateral, clandestine, or remotely retentive, and equally effectual exercise thereof cannot thus be impeded. The corrupter and the corruptible, he whose interest prompts him to sway, and he whose passions prepare him to be swayed, he who is ready to give and he who seeks to get, will assuredly, sooner or later, find means to approach, understand and covenant efficiently with each other. We perceive that, in almost every instance, self-interest operates with much greater and more durable energy and activity than zeal for the public good; and have therefore little reason to expect that those who are actuated by the former will, in this instance, fail to outstrip, weary, and finally defeat the few who are animated by the latter. Human ingenuity besides, is always confessedly more likely to succeed in the task of evasion, than in that of prevention.

Suppose, Sir, that with a view to the obstruction of ministerial influence, the elective franchise were extended to all men possessed of clear, independent, yearly incomes of 100*l.* at least, derived either from land, or from any other source? and that all other persons were disqualified to vote for Members of Parliament;—an expedient which would not, upon the whole, narrow the constituent body, and besides precluding the tumults ordinarily attendant on elections, would certainly have a greater tendency than any other to prevent what may be called elemental corruption, inasmuch as an independent competency, on the part of the elector, is far more likely than any law to frustrate pecuniary or other influence on the part of the candidate; and suppose that these electors were obliged to swear under the heaviest penalties in case of perjury, that they neither did receive, nor were promised, nor had asked any remuneration for their votes; that the candidates under the same penalties, were obliged to swear that they neither gave, nor promised any species of reward to any elector; and that the representatives were obliged to swear at the opening of every session, that they neither had asked for, nor were promised any civil employment, honour, or emolument, in consideration of the support which they might give the executive government, still the patronage of the Crown, would, in my opinion, be, in no degree, rendered ultimately imperative, in its present sphere. If the individuals who gave support were prevented from

asking, and those who obtained it prevented from promising remuneration, a practice which indeed already exists, of bestowing unstipulated, unsolicited rewards, would soon be generally established. Those who had been supported, would, with an eye to futurity, be still more diligent than at present, in searching for opportunities to evince their gratitude. General expectation would be kept alive, and work as forcibly as the most solemn and repeated promises. And, furthermore, an exemption from importunities would enable the distributors of the honours and offices of the state to bestow them in the most suitable, judicious, and effectual manner, with reference to their own personal interests. As for the expedient of obliging the representatives of the people to swear that they would never accept any employment or honour in the gift of the Crown, the reflections of almost every man will sufficiently enable him to discover its ruinous tendency, in the extremely unlikely event of its being ever adopted and established. If, in consequence of having acted, for a few years, as a representative of the people, a man were to be for ever debarred by his oath, from accepting the honour of nobility, and transmitting the rights thereof to his descendants; and if he were likewise to be thus for ever incapacitated to hold any place of trust, or in the state, of what description of men, Sir, would the House of Commons, that most authoritative part of the Legislature, be composed? Certainly not, for the most part, of incorruptible, unassuming, public-spirited and intelligent men, as some people vainly anticipate; but of a description of persons, from whom to say no worse, much less good, upon the whole, could rationally be expected, than from those of whom it is at present composed.

It may be said, Sir, that admitting the likelihood or certainty of the establishment of the practice just noticed, in the midst of such obstacles, and likewise admitting its efficacy to the extent presumed, there is still at hand an expedient calculated to supersede completely the exercise of the patronage of the Crown, among the representatives of the people: namely, the simple and sanctioned one of granting them liberal salaries.—But, Sir, with regard to this expedient, it is to be observed, that on those who are governed by ambition, on those who aim at distinction in the community, it could produce no effect whatsoever; that if these salaries were

not so ample as to be considered in the light of desirable additions to the incomes of individuals, they could not produce the intended effect on the avaricious; and that if they were so, the representatives of the people, at least those among them who might be influenced by the passion of avarice, would ultimately become as complete tools in the hands of their constituents as any of them ever were in those of a minister of the Crown. They would acquiesce as servilely in all the crude, capricious, and dangerous projects of electors, probably under the controul of aspiring demagogues, as any of them have ever done in the impolitic or unconstitutional measures of successive administrations; and the example of France, Sir, ought, I think, to make us beware of the remote effects of subjecting the representatives of the people too much to their dictation. Besides, in these days of luxury, profligacy and venality, it seems not altogether unbecoming to consider, whether if our own Government were restrained from gratifying the avarice of individuals, another government might not address that passion, with dangerous effect.

Let us, however, Sir, for the moment, suppose that Ministerial influence were entirely excluded from the Legislature, and that the persons elected by the people to serve in Parliament, were, for the most part, removed by the magnitude of their private incomes, beyond a likelihood of being swayed in their decisions, by a solicitude to preserve the salary annexed to the office of representative; might it not still be reasonably apprehended, that the various passions, and propensities which belong to human nature, and the different views, interests, and pursuits of individuals would too often conspire to form an irresistible opposition to many of the measures of every Administration? Might it not reasonably be apprehended, if the Ministers of the Crown had no other means of obtaining the concurrence of Parliament in their measures, except such reasoning as they might employ in behalf of them, that superior sophistry, or eloquence, or address, or talents for intrigue, on the part of their opponents, or perhaps even the plausible language of a popular Pamphleteer, would too often govern the determination of Parliament, to the discomfiture and dissolution of the existing Administration! Might it not be apprehended that almost every Administration would

be thus extinguished before the Members thereof had acquired sufficient experience to conduct the affairs of the Empire with facility and advantage? And should we not then be exposed to the manifold inconvenience of a weak, fluctuating, transitory Government, unsatisfactory to its subjects, unfavourable to loyalty, and extremely disadvantageous to the Empire in respect of its foreign relations? If, indeed, there existed any reason to expect that the Representative body, in the event of the reform in question, would contain a majority of wise, steady, disinterested, unambitious, public-spirited, patriotic men, there would remain little ground for these apprehensions; but to entertain and act upon an expectation of this nature, in times like the present, or in truth, in any other times, is, surely, a puerility too manifest to require exposure.

But independently of these considerations it is not likely, Sir, that a disfranchisement of decayed boroughs, an extension of the right of suffrage, an abridgement of the duration of Parliaments, and an exclusion of placemen from the House of Commons, would be productive of certain disadvantages for which perhaps an adequate compensation might not be obtained? It certainly needs no extraordinary exertion of the human imagination to trace out, on rational grounds, many effects of rather an unpropitious nature, which might ensue from the disfranchisement of those boroughs which have hitherto so often supplied the legislature with statesmen and orators of an inferior note—with men, whose laboriously acquired information, cultivated eloquence, and diligently improved powers of reasoning qualified them eminently for the management of state affairs, for guiding, correcting, or confirming the public opinion, and for giving salutary efficiency to the voice of the nation. It certainly is far from difficult to exhibit a series of evils which might possibly arise from involving a greater number of persons than at present in the ferment of elections, and from rendering that ferment almost continuous by frequency of repetition. Nor would it evince superior penetration to detect the varied inconvenience which might be experienced in consequence of excluding, from the great deliberative assembly of the nation, those who might be appointed to administer its affairs. In truth, Sir, if the right of propounding laws were thus, in reality, exclusively

exercised by the Lords and Representatives of the people, to whom alone it formally and theoretically belongs, it is not improbable, that, in the event of a removal of the actual influence of the crown, measures inconsistent with the requisite dignity and even safety thereof, tending to the dangerous elevation of parliamentary leaders, would be obtruded upon the executive power; and that the existing system of civil polity would soon, in consequence, assume a new form. The Royal Veto, alone, Sir, is confessedly inadequate to check for any length of time, the possible encroachments or usurpations of a House of Commons influenced by democratic principles.

Such, Sir, are the considerations which incline me to doubt the efficacy of parliamentary reformation: and to deprecate the pursuit of that project. Do you then, I may be asked, deem it prudent, on the part of the people of England, to rest contented upon that corrupt and pernicious exercise of that enormous patronage of the crown which every honest and reflecting man must deeply deplore? Most certainly I do not: for I feel thoroughly persuaded of its direct tendency to endanger the rights and liberties of Englishmen, and the stability of the Empire. But, I am prone to think, that there is not sufficient ground for despairing of the possibility of protecting the people of England against all the dangerous excesses, of the influence resulting from that patronage, by a much safer, more simple, and more constitutional expedient than parliamentary reformation. I mean an unfettered, distinct and formal annunciation of the genuine sentiments of the people, on all prevailing practices of an important nature, and on all momentous questions which may at any time agitate the public mind.

Even under the most arbitrary governments, public opinion, if peradventure, it ever reach the ears of the Prince or those of his council, will frequently sway his decisions. In England, whenever fully and loudly expressed, it has almost always had the effect of governing the conduct of administration. To comply with it indeed, to a certain degree, is in most cases a proof of political wisdom: to resist it and scorn it, a proof of rashness, amounting to political insanity. If a great majority of the people of the United Kingdom should be found really adverse to the pursuit, or really solicitous for the

adoption of any measure, or system of measures, it surely cannot be presumed, that any minister would inconsiderately disregard their wishes; and pertinaciously decline to act in conformity therewith. But, Sir, in consequence of the comparative infrequency of public meetings, and also in consequence of the stratagems employed to procure resolutions and addresses favourable or hostile to the views of the existing Administration, it is certain that the real sentiments, especially of the more reflecting and moderate of the people, are far from being always known; and never sufficiently pressed upon the consideration of those in authority. Now, Sir, I am disposed to believe that this disadvantage, affecting both the government and the people, might be effectually removed by the enactment of a specific law, authorising and requiring local meetings of the more respectable inhabitants of the several counties and principal towns to be held every year, on the first Monday after Christmas day, for the purpose of discussing all important questions agitated in the preceding Session of parliament, and reviewing the actual state and exigencies of the nation; limiting the duration of these meetings to a single day; prohibiting all others of a similar nature; and directing that the sentiments of the majority, present at each, be reduced into a few brief resolutions; transmitted, in this shape, to the Clerk of the House of Commons, arranged, printed and distributed, in small volumes, among the Members of Parliament. By this mode of proceeding, as instructive a document, on the subject of public opinion, would be obtained as any legislator or statesman could wish to possess; and there can scarcely be a doubt that the prevailing sentiments of the nation, thus announced, would, on all important questions, govern the conduct of the ministers of the crown, and that of the representatives of the people. These several meetings being composed of persons possessed of clear, independent, yearly incomes of 100*l.* all others being by heavy penalties excluded, the sphere of individual influence would be narrowed; and there would probably be neither riot, uproar, nor confusion, as is too often the case at present. The meetings being held on the same day, throughout the United Kingdom, the resolutions passed at one would have no effect in governing the resolutions of another. The infrequency of these meetings, and their short duration, would completely prevent the assumption

of any power which local demagogues might otherwise gradually become enabled to exercise. And the length of time which would elapse between the close of the session of parliament and the day appointed for the meetings, would greatly conduce to an ample, able and temperate discussion of the more important questions which had antecedently engaged the attention of the legislature.

Should this regulated recurrence to a constitutional practice, the safety and efficacy whereof have heretofore so often been experimentally evinced, fail to induce a compliance, on the part of Government, with the reasonable wishes of the people, and a removal of all those scandalous abuses of which they now so justly complain; should the minister, backed by a corrupt majority, contumeliously disregard the reiterated remonstrances of the people, and should the king inflexibly decline to dismiss his minister, after an accumulation of urgent addresses from his subjects to that effect; events which, by the way, are singularly unlikely; then let recourse be had to the dangerous project of parliamentary reformation: for then there will be sufficient ground for considering the reputed representatives of the people as usurpers of their rights, exercising an unconstitutional aristocratic power, pregnant with as much political mischief as could be apprehended to ensue from the project in question. But, Sir, if a spirit of patriotism, a spirit of independence, a spirit of rational liberty, a just sense of public duty and political integrity, prevail in the nation, the avowed and ultimate objects of parliamentary reformation must infallibly be attained by the expedient here proposed. If, indeed, these principles of action be wanting, it may undoubtedly for some time, and in some degree, prove nugatory. But then, Sir, if they be so, a reformation of Parliament, which cannot, without the utmost difficulty and danger, be accomplished, must, upon the whole, be demonstrably of no avail. It may indeed, rescue us, for a short time, from some evils; but it must, in the end, inevitably involve us in others of at least equal magnitude. To attempt a reformation of Parliament, previously to a revival of these principles, is unseasonable, preposterous and dangerous. A recurrence to the expedient here proposed is undeniably safe; and affords the fairest opportunity for diffusing and invigorating those prin-

principles, which alone can insure an improvement of our political condition,

I am, Sir, with due respect,
Your obedient humble Servant,
THOMAS NEWENHAM.

Coolmore, Cork, Oct. 10, 1809.

CITY JUBILEE ADDRESS TO THE KING.
Nov. 1, 1809.

To the King's Most Excellent Majesty :
The humble and dutiful Address of the
Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons
of the City of London in Common
Council assembled ;

" Most Gracious Sovereign ; We the
Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons, of
the City of London in Common Council
assembled, approach your Majesty's sacred
person with our most lively and unfeigned
congratulations on the recent Anniversary
of your Majesty's Accession to the Throne
of these realms ; with joy and gladness we
hailed the day on which your Majesty en-
tered into the fiftieth year of your Ma-
jesty's reign, not only over the persons,
but in the hearts of your Majesty's sub-
jects.—When it pleased the Almighty
Ruler of Princes to place the sceptre in
your Majesty's hands, the brave, free, and
loyal people, whom your Majesty was or-
dained to govern, received with pleasure
your Majesty's first declaration to the
great Council of the nation, that " born
and educated a Briton, the peculiar happi-
ness of your Majesty's life would ever con-
sist in promoting the welfare of your peo-
ple, and your Majesty's resolution to main-
tain our most excellent Constitution, both
in Church and State, with an assurance
that the civil and religious rights of the
subject were equally dear to your majesty
with the most valuable prerogatives of the
Crown."—We experience and acknowledge
the blessings of this security to our religion
and laws, and that great charter of lib-
erties which, in virtue of the glorious Revolu-
tion, your majesty's illustrious house was
chosen to defend. Through the lapse of
nearly half a century your Majesty has
proved yourself, on every occasion, un-
wearied in the maintenance and practice
of all the principles so graciously pledged.
—It is a proud subject for your Majesty's
faithful Citizens of London to record, that
in the midst of all our unexampled strug-
gles, your Majesty is enabled to say,
now, as at the commencement of your
Majesty's reign, that your Majesty can see
with joy of heart the commerce of these

Kingdoms, that great source of our riches,
and fixed object of your Majesty's never
failing care and protection, flourishing to
an extent unknown in any former war.—
Deeply impressed with gratitude to Al-
mighty God for the innumerable blessings
he has been pleased to pour down upon
this highly favoured nation, and more par-
ticularly for his wonderful and great good-
ness, in having continued his divine pro-
tection to your Majesty until this joyful
period, we, your Majesty's faithful Citizens
of London, have implored heaven to ac-
cept our fervent prayers of praise and
thanksgiving, and to continue that same
providential care and protection to your
Majesty for many years yet to come.—
Believe, Sir, that it is the warmest wish
and most fervent prayer of your Majesty's
Citizens of London, that Providence may
long continue to this nation so distinguish-
ing a mark of divine favour, and that in
the fullness of time, when your Majesty
shall be called from your earthly to a ce-
lestial crown, the memory and example
of so beloved a Sovereign may secure to a
grateful people the imitation of your Ma-
jesty's virtues, in the successors of your
Royal House, till time shall be no more.

Signed by order of Court,

HENRY WOODTHORPE."

To which Address his Majesty was
pleased to return the following most graci-
ous Answer:—" I thank you for this testi-
mony of your zeal and affection for me
and my government. It has ever been
my anxious care to maintain the rights
and privileges of every class of my sub-
jects ; and it is a great satisfaction to me
to reflect, that, in the midst of all our un-
exampled struggles, and notwithstanding
the duration of the wars in which, for the
safety of my people, I have been engaged,
the Commerce and Manufactures of my
City of London have been carried to an
extent unknown at any former period."

They were all received very graciously,
and had the honour to kiss his Majesty's
hand. After which his Majesty was pleas-
ed to create the Lord Mayor a Baronet,
and conferred the honour of Knighthood
on William Plomer, esq. Alderman.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—*Proclamation to the
Army by the Marquis de Romana.*—(Con-
tinued from page 608.)

The country has not
for some time known your best services ;

but the actions of Villa Franca, Vigo, Lugo, Saint Jago and San Payo; where your valour shone, must free you from any stain which you may seem to have incurred by your having refused battles, which must have been destructive; and you have rendered yourselves formidable to your enemies, who have been repulsed and conquered, when the superiority of their numbers did not prevent an obstacle absolutely insuperable to your valour.—Yes, brave Spaniards, in viewing you this day, I have no longer that serenity of mind with which I before ever met you. I am no longer your general. His Majesty has called me to occupy a place in the Supreme Central Junta. Had not this been his irresistible will, nothing should have separated me from you, nor made me renounce the right I have to participate in your future victories, under the command of your new chief, and the generals who command you. Receive, Soldiers, the last word of your general, and accept the love and paternal gratitude of your countryman and companion in arms, *THE MARQUIS DE ROMANA.*

Royal Decree, dated Seville, Sept. 1.

His Majesty would neither fulfil his own wishes, nor the hopes of his people, if, at the same time, when he labours to free the country from the oppression of its tyrant, he did not make every exertion to correct the vices which exist in the interior administration, and to raise this magnanimous and generous nation to the high degree of splendour and power to which it is entitled by the fruitfulness of its soil, the benignity of its climate, the extension of its coasts, and the possession of its rich colonies. Among the obstacles which have constantly opposed the progress of our agricultural industry and commerce, the first place is held by the contributions, called *Alcabalas*, *Cientas* and *Millones*, *Composts*, which obstructing the interior circulation, and pressing unequally on the productions of the land, on manufactures, and, in general, on all objects of commerce, not only have banished from our unfortunate country that liberty, without which there can be neither arts, cultivation, nor commerce; not only have rendered odious the fiscal administration, and even industry itself; but, which is more, inflicting on it incurable wounds, have ever been only a feeble resource for supplying the necessities of the state. Observation and experience have shewn their prejudicial ef-

fects; the people have cried out for a remedy; the decline of our manufactures, and the mercantile system unanimously embraced by all the nations of Europe. But though the government knew these defects and reformed them partially, these reforms were a new vice, which only still more embroiled the system. At length the time is arrived when good principles shall triumph over ignorance, and the nation which has appeared great and majestic in the eyes of all Europe by its valour and its virtue, shall be so also by the liberality of its principles and the goodness of its interior administration. The Supreme Junta of government of the kingdom is well convinced, that the riches of individuals are the riches of the state, and that no nation can be rich without encouraging its agriculture, commerce and industry, and that industry in general does not increase but remove the obstacles which may obstruct both the fiscal and civil laws. From these considerations the Supreme Junta cannot omit occupying itself with this work, beginning with the most urgent reform, which is, that of the contribution, and providing in the place of those abolished, others upon such things as can more properly be required to contribute, distributing them equally among the contributors, exacting them in the time and manner least offensive, and collecting them with the least expence possible. Thus the contributions, which are always an evil, shall fall only on those who can contribute, shall be applied to their true objects, and not to the maintenance of an innumerable multitude of tax-gatherers, who are unproductive consumers, and so many hands lost to industry. In consequence therefore of these principles, the King our Lord Don Ferdinand VII. and in his royal name the Supreme Junta of the government of the kingdom decrees as follows:—Art. 1. The contributions known by the name of *Alcabalas*, *Censo*, and *Millones*,* shall be abolished, as soon

* [The *Alcabala* is a tribute or royal duty which is paid upon every article sold, in the form of a per centage, according to the value of the commodity. This per centage is varied, but all the laws and ordinances respecting it, to remove ambiguity and to prevent exactions, are collected in a book called the *Alcabalatorio*. There is a Spanish proverb which sufficiently shews the unpopularity of this form of taxation—*¿Quién descubre la Alcabala*.

as those which are appointed to supply their place shall be appropriated and established.—2. The Department of Finance is charged to propose to his Majesty the contributions which shall supply the place of those abolished.—Art. 3. The present Decree shall be printed, published and circulated, in the usual form, from the royal palace of Seville, August 7, 1809.

MARQUIS of ASTORGA, President.
DON MARTIN DE GARAY.

FRANCE.—*Address of his most Serene Highness the Prince Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, to the Conservative Senate, Sitting of the 3rd of October, 1809.*

GENTLEMEN; His Imperial and Royal Majesty, taking in with a single glance the present situation of affairs, finds it necessary to order a levy of 36,000 men.—This is the purport of the Decree which is to be submitted to your deliberation, and by which the new levy is imposed upon the new classes of the conscription of the years of 1806, 1807, 1808, 1809, and 1810.—Your wisdom will already have discovered the benefit of this arrangement. You will soon be assured that it is the result of a prudent foresight, and of the unceasing anxiety of his Majesty for the public interest.—Whatever, Gentlemen, may be the issue of the negotiations at Altenburgh, there are strong indications

ese lo paga. "Whoever informs of the Alcabala should pay it." In the Recopilacion de los Lues the superior clergy and judges are exempted from it.—The Censo, which has been improperly called Censos and Ciensas, in the newspapers, is a rate collected on the rents of houses and estates.—The Millones is an aid that the kingdom granted to the Sovereign on the consumption of six articles of domestic use, wine, vinegar, oil, butcher's meat, soap, and tallow candles. Among the accommodations at court, in the Council of Finances, there is an apartment called the Sala de Millones. In this room or hall the affairs relating to this due to the king, are transacted, as well as some others regarding the tax on tobacco, cocoa, and a few other commodities. The persons appointed to superintend this business consist of some members of the Council of Finances, and several deputies nominated by such of the cities of Spain as have authority to vote for representatives (Procuradores) in the Cortes.]

that the English, after having been driven back from our territories, will endeavour to prolong the war in Spain. The numerous battalions which his Majesty opposes to them in that kingdom, need only be kept up to their full complement, in order to baffle all the attempts of the enemy.—If the peace be renewed between France and Austria, it will be impossible, without great inconvenience, to suddenly transport the brave troops who will have conquered it, from the Banks of the Danube to those of the Guadalquivir. This remark has not escaped the paternal attention of his Majesty; and let us be persuaded, that, after such glorious exertions, he is desirous, and with justice, that the conquerors should receive the testimonies of public gratitude and general admiration.—These points, Gentlemen, will be explained to you by the Orators of the Council of State, and more particularly in the Report of the Minister of War; which the Emperor has ordered him to communicate to you.—The levy required is, moreover, much less than his Majesty could draw from the classes by which it is to be supplied; besides, it will be rendered as little burdensome as possible.—In this crisis the Senate will be anxious, as on former occasions, to forward the intentions of our august Sovereign, for the honour and glory of the French people.

Report made to His Majesty the Emperor and King, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, by His Excellency Count de Huneburgh, Minister of War, Sept. 15, 1809.

SIRE; If the numerous victories of your Majesty, and the extraordinary successes of your armies, be at the same time the work of your genius, the result of the most scientific military combinations, of your inherent intrepidity, and of the courage of so many brave men, these victories and successes are no less owing to your admirable foresight. It is this which has inspired your Majesty with the idea of assembling at first, in the interior of the empire, whatever might be the complexion of affairs, the youth of France who are successively called to serve their country, and of making them constantly pay their contribution to the safety of the State, at the same time that they accustom themselves to arms.—The temporary dereliction of this system would be productive of some danger to the empire, and it would be placing rather too great a reliance upon

the future, however flattering appearances might be at present, to suffer the *depôts* in the interior of France to want the regular supply of recruits, whenever a part of the young soldiers who fill them should be called into actual service.—A short glance at the state of your Majesty's armies will be sufficient to shew, that the levy, which I feel it my duty to propose, is sufficient at present.—Master of Vienna, and of more than half the Austrian Monarchy, your Majesty is at the head of the most formidable army that France ever had beyond the Rhine; and to judge of what it is capable of effecting, it is only necessary to mention, that it was hardly formed when it conquered Austria, in the fields of Thaur, of Abersberg, and of Eckmühl. Whether the negotiations of Altenburgh terminate in peace, or whether the war continue, your Majesty has in your *depôts* troops enough, fit to take the field, to recruit your army in Germany.—In the month of January your Majesty pursued the English army in Galicia. While you were engaged in it, your Majesty was informed that the Court of Vienna intended to break its engagements. Though such an event seemed to call the principal part of your forces into Germany, your Majesty nevertheless thought proper to leave your veteran army in Spain; not that the whole of that army was actually necessary to complete the subjugation of the Spanish rebels, but to deprive England of the possibility of prolonging that rebellion, of which she is the cause. That power, seeing in the new system established in Spain, the presage of her own ruin, did not, however, despair of overturning it; and her efforts upon this occasion have greatly surpassed all that we have seen her make upon similar occasions.—General Moore had not been able to bring off from Galicia the half of his troops. The immense losses which his army sustained, did not dissuade the English Government from sending a fresh army, consisting of 40,000 men, to Lisbon. It penetrated to the centre of Spain, and rallied round it the various corps of insurgents. The banks of the Alberche and the Tagus witnessed their flight and their confusion. Compelled to retreat to the further side of that river, and pursued at the point of the bayonet, they totally evacuated Spain, and the Portuguese saw them return in disorder to their territory.—At the same period, an army of equal force suddenly made its appearance at the

entrance of the Scheldt, with the intention of burning the dock-yards at Antwerp; there our enemies were covered with confusion. At their approach, Flushing was provided with a numerous garrison; 12,000 picked troops marched from St. Omer, under the orders of the Senator General Rampon; and eight demi-brigades of reserve, which were at Boulogne, Louvaine, and Paris, proceeded post, to the points that were menaced.—These troops were of themselves sufficient for the defence of Antwerp. That place, which is covered by a strong rampart, and the advanced works which your Majesty caused to be constructed four years ago, is still further protected by extensive inundations; and on the left bank of the Scheldt, the fort of La Tete de Flandre, which is itself surrounded by an inundation of 2,000 toises, secures the communication of Antwerp with our fortresses in the north.—The English Expedition was formed upon the supposition, that Antwerp was only an open city, whereas that fortress could not be taken but after a long siege. Independent of troops of the line, your Majesty saw, at the first signal, 150,000 national guards ready to march, and at their head the majors of your infantry, officers of the fifth battalions, and veteran officers; you found in their ranks a number of old soldiers.—Numerous detachments of cavalry of the line were preceded by the *gens-d'armes* of France. The English were not aware that this branch of force alone could, at a moment's notice, assemble at any given point 60 squadrons, composed of men that had seen sixteen years of service, all equally experienced, equally well disciplined and armed as those brave cuirassiers, who, under your Majesty's orders, have brought to so high a pitch the glory of the French cavalry.—As if by enchantment, the dispositions prescribed by your Majesty caused to appear, at the same instant, on the banks of the Scheldt, and at the rendezvous of the reserve at Lisle and Maestricht, four different armies, under the command of Marshal the Prince of Ponte Corvo, and Marshals the Dukes of Corneigliano, Valmy, and Istria.—The sudden development of such a force, and the national impulse which continued to multiply its numbers, struck the enemy with consternation. Their enterprise, calculated upon false data, completely failed.—Europe has witnessed the realization of that which your Majesty's penetration anticipated, when you pro-

nounced that this expedition originated in ignorance and inexperience; and when, sparing of French blood, and directing that a plan merely defensive should be followed, you wrote to me;—‘We are happy to find the English crowding into the marshes of Zealand; let them be merely kept in check, and their army will be speedily destroyed by the bad air, and the epidemic fevers of that country.’ Whilst our troops were distributed in comfortable cantonments in the environs of Antwerp, or stationed in that fortress, the English army, encamped in the midst of marshes, and destitute of water fit for drinking, lost upwards of one-third of its soldiers. But the facility which the English have of going by sea from one quarter to another, may lead us to expect that all that will have escaped the disasters of this expedition, will be sent to reinforce their army in Portugal.—Sire, the various fields of battle in which your armies have distinguished themselves, are too remote from each other to admit of your marching, without inconvenience to the soldier, one of your armies, from one scene of action to the other; and your Majesty, so highly satisfied with the zeal of the troops you command beyond the Danube, is anxious to spare them from the fatigues of the war in Spain. Besides, the French armies beyond the Pyrenees, now consist of 300 battalions and 150 squadrons. It is therefore sufficient, without sending any additional corps thither, to keep up at their full establishment those already there. Thirty thousand men, collected at Bayonne, afford the means of accomplishing this object, and of repulsing any force which the English may cause to advance.—In this state of things, I conceived that it corresponded with your Majesty’s views to limit the levy, necessary at this moment, to the contingent indispensably requisite for replacing, in the battalions of the interior, the drafts which are daily made from them. The returns which will be laid before your Majesty will inform you, that, of the conscription for the years 1806-7-8-9 and 10, there still remain more than 80,000, who, though ballotted, have not yet been called into actual service. This immense reinforcement might march against your enemies, should that measure be rendered necessary by any imminent danger to the State. I propose to your Majesty to call out only 36,000, and to declare all those classes entirely free from any future call.—By this means, your armies, Sire, will

be maintained at their present respectable establishment, and a considerable number of your subjects will be definitively released from the conscription. Your Majesty will also have at your disposal, the 25,000 men afforded by the class of 1811, upon whom I shall not propose to your Majesty to make any call, unless events should disappoint your hopes and pacific intentions. Your Majesty’s armies are equally formidable from their numbers as from their courage. But who could advise France not to proportion her efforts to those of her enemies? In giving such advice, the result of the most imprudent security, it would be necessary to forget that Austria, very lately, had on foot 700,000 men; and that to create this gigantic force, that Power did not hesitate to expose her population to almost total destruction, and to attack the very basis of her prosperity. We must equally forget, that England has taken part in the Continental War, by landing, at the same moment, three different armies, on the coasts of Naples, Holland, and Portugal.—The agitation of those who are jealous of France has been redoubled, because they are conscious that the present crisis has for ever fixed her greatness. Their efforts will be impotent, because France has been enabled to reach the highest pinnacle of success and of glory, without making any of those ruinous sacrifices which destroy her enemies. In fact, notwithstanding the successive calls, up to the present moment, made upon the different classes of conscripts, scarcely have one-fourth of those who composed them taken the field.—In considering the situation of your Majesty’s armies and the results of the English expeditions, can we, without a degree of satisfaction, behold England, in imitation of Austria, making efforts disproportionate to her means, and the wants of her navy? What can she expect from this contest upon land, and man to man, with France, that shall not redound to her own injury and disgrace?—Sire, the French people will have to thank your Majesty for the inexpressible advantage and glory of a peace, conquered without maritime expeditions, from an enemy who, by his situation, thought himself free from all attack. Every serious attempt upon the Continent, on the part of the English, is a step towards a general peace.—The English Ministers, who preceded the Members of the present Government, a more able set of men than the latter, were well convinced of this

truth, and took good care not to commit themselves in an unequal contest. It did not escape their observation, that, to carry on a long war, it was necessary that it should press lightly upon the people who had to support it.—Within the last twelve months, the war has cost England more blood than she had previously shed from the period when she broke the peace of Amiens: committed in the battles of Spain and Portugal, whence her duty and her interest forbid her to recede, she will see those countries become the tomb of her bravest warriors. Sorrow for their loss will at length produce in the minds of the English people a well-founded abhorrence of those cruel men, whose ambition and frantic hatred dared to pronounce the expression of *eternal war*. It will excite in that people the wish for a general peace, which every man of good sense may predict to be near at hand, if the English persist in a continental contest.—I am with respect, &c.

The Minister at War,

COUNT DE HUNNEBURGH.

Report of the Motives of the Projet of the Senatus Consultum, relative to a Levy of 36,000 Conscripts, on the classes of 1806, 1807, 1808, 1809, and 1810, by the Count de Cessac, Orator of the Council of State.

This Report, after many adulations on the genius of the Emperor and King, and a high-coloured panegyric on the loyalty and exertions of the French nation, proceeds to explain the causes of the levy:—"The enemies of France," says the Orator, "observing that we levied the classes of 1809, and 1810, before the period in which they were to be called into action, thought, without doubt, that we had recourse to that mode, because none of the resources of former years were left to us. How great was their mistake! If the French Government had adopted that line of conduct, it was because it could never be brought to think that the English Government had determined to wage perpetual war with France; it was, because it could never be brought to think that the Austrian Government, to which peace was so important, so necessary—that that Government, to which a liberal and unexpected peace had been granted, had a right to cope again with the French armies, directed by Napoleon the Great, and electrified by his presence. Our Emperor, therefore, calculating upon a

speedy and long peace, was willing to divide the weight of the war among several classes, in order that it might press the lighter upon each of them. He was also desirous that the French, who constituted these two classes, and who, according to the proper estimate of public duties, might have been deprived of their share of military glory, should be furnished with an opportunity of acquiring it. Disappointed in his first expectations, the Emperor had recourse to those supplies of men which he had, from principles of prudence, left in reserve. Twice did he apply for succours, and twice were the contingents which he deemed necessary furnished with rapidity. Our moderation had thrown a veil over our strength, but our moderation is desirous now of manifesting our strength. Let us put an end to an error so fatal to our enemies, and which may become still more disastrous to them! When they shall be well acquainted with our resources, they will, no doubt, be convinced that a frank and solid peace is the only part, the only post in which they can find safety. It belongs to weak governments to seek for security in the concealment of their weakness, and the exaggerations of their strength. It is the duty of France to make known to her friends and enemies her true situation; that situation is such as to inspire the former with more energy, and to warn the latter, that, in taking up arms, they must expose themselves to certain loss. The following, Senators, is the precise state of the conscriptional force of France, and I can pledge myself for its accuracy: The class of 1806 consisted of 423,000, according to the lists of conscription.

That class comprising 15 months	423,000
That of 1807	352,000
1808	361,000
1809	362,000
1810	362,000
Total	1,867,000

Of these classes, until the present moment, there have been raised but 520,000 men.

1806	102,500
1807	102,500
1808	102,500
1809	102,500
1810	110,000
	520,000

There consequently remains still at home, of the five classes, 1,317,000 men."

The Orator next proceeds to shew the great facility with which the new levy must be raised, leaving an immense number still behind, and argues that such resources will be the most efficacious means of reducing the English to the necessity of demanding a peace, which, however necessary to France, is indispensable to them, because their very existence may perhaps depend upon it.

AMERICA.—*British Deserters. Case of the Men arrested as Deserters from the Frigate L' Africaine, by John Hunter, esq. Sheriff of Baltimore, at the request of William Wood, esq. British Consul for the Port of Baltimore.*

An Habeas Corpus was applied for to Judge Scott, late on Thursday evening, on behalf of seven men, arrested and held in custody by the Sheriff, at the request, and on the statement of the British Consul that they were deserters, by their counsel. The Habeas Corpus was issued as prayed for, returnable the next morning at nine o'clock. Accordingly, this morning, the men were brought up amidst an immense concourse of citizens, who filled the court-house and the neighbouring street, and the Sheriff made return that he had arrested and detained the men in custody, in virtue of the following, from the British Consul :

" *British Consul's Office, Baltimore, Sept. 6, 1809.*

" Sir ; Having received information that 13 seamen have deserted from L'Africaine frigate, and are now in this city, I have to request that you will be pleased to secure them till they can be sent on board.—I am, &c. Wm. Wood."

" John Hunter, Esq.

By virtue of this authority, I have arrested and put in prison the following persons, to wit: John Nowland, William Whokes, Denis Murphy, Richard Hewes, John Earp, John Burwell, and Jacob Lamb.—The Judge said, that he had conceived it his duty to give notice to Mr. Wood (the British Consul), of the application, so that he might appear and shew cause, if any he had, why the men should be detained.

In the course of a few minutes Mr. Wood came into Court, and the Counsel for the Prisoners, Messrs. Glenn and J. L.

Donaldson, moved the Court that the men be discharged, sufficient cause for their detention not appearing on the return. Mr. Wood's Counsel, Mr. Walter Dorsey, requested to be allowed time to inquire into the law ; and said, that they would be ready to prove that these men were deserters from his Britannic Majesty's Ship. The Counsel for the Prisoners objected to the delay. The Chief Justice stated, that the opinion of the Secretary of State had satisfied him, that deserters from British vessels ought not to be arrested or detained under the authority of the Government of the United States, for the purpose of delivering them up to the officers of the British Government, he therefore ordered the prisoners to be immediately discharged. The audience expressed their approbation of his decision by three loud and tumultuous huzzas and execrations of the Tories, and carried off the deserters in triumph !

COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF State Trials :

To be completed in Thirty-Six Monthly Parts, forming Twelve large Volumes in Royal Octavo.

The ELEVENTH PART of the above Work was published on Wednesday the 1st of November. One Part will appear, with the greatest regularity, on the first of each succeeding Month. Those Subscribers who have expressed their intention of taking the Work in Quarterly Volumes, are respectfully informed that the Third Volume is now ready for delivery.—In order to remove all professional doubts, as to how far this new and enlarged Edition of the State Trials may, with safety, be cited as authority in the Courts, and relied on as of equal authenticity with the former, I think it right to state, that it is intended to be a literal transcript of the last edition, as far as that edition extends ; that where I have inserted fuller and better reports of any Cases, or of any parts of Cases, the text of the old Edition will nevertheless be retained ; and that the new matter will be distinguished in a manner not to be mistaken, and be distinctly pointed out in the Table of Contents to each volume.

LONDON :—Printed by T. C. HANSARD, Peterborough - Court, Fleet - Street ;
Published by R. BAGSHAW, Brydges-Street, Covent - Garden :—Sold also by J. BUDD, Pall-Mall.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 19.] LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1809. [Price 1s.

" Men, at some time, are masters of their fates :
" The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
" But in ourselves, that we are Underlings."

705]

[706

TO THE CITIZENS OF LONDON.

GENTLEMEN,

Oppression, or insult, when the object is *helpless*, never fails to excite against the oppressor, the indignation of the generous and the just ; but, when the object is *not* helpless, when he who suffers oppression, or insult, has within himself, the power of obtaining complete redress, and makes no use of that power, then, that same justice, which in the former case, calls forth our indignation against the oppressor, calls for our contempt of the oppressed. In truth, it would be absurd for a third party to compassionate the wretch who should seem fond of being kicked ; and not less absurd to be angry with the man who should kick him. The parties would, in such case, seem to be made for one another ; and the world ought to let them alone. When, therefore, we talk of oppressions of a political nature, when we talk of an oppressed and insulted people, we should be careful to ascertain beforehand, that the said people do not deserve to be oppressed and insulted ; that they have not the power of redress in their own hands : that they have not themselves put the power of oppression into the hands of their oppressors ; and, in short, that they do not by their actions, shew, that justice makes no demand of compassion in their favour, but condemns them to the contempt of mankind.

If, gentlemen, you assent to the truth of these general propositions, you will, I hope, suffer me to ask you, Whether you yourselves are quite free from the danger of their application ? I beg you to put the question to yourselves ; each of you to ask himself, whether it be in him, or in his stars, that he is an Underling, the degraded instrument in the hands of greedy and impudent speculators upon the public spoil ; and whether it be not now in his own power to obtain complete redress, for past, and as complete security against future, oppression and insult ?

It is denied by no one, that the situation of this kingdom is awfully dangerous. Even the vile wretches (certainly the very vilest of mankind), who are hired to put forth falsehoods for the purpose of deluding the people ; even these wretches, who have, for months passed, amused the ignorant with hopes of a new war between France and Austria, and who have talked of the firmness and dignified tone of the latter power ; even these awkward as well as venal wretches, who asserted that the Emperor Napoleon was *insane*, and who, as if to prove their own mental derangement, told us, that he must *cease to reign* if he was mad ; even these wretches, profligately impudent as they are, have not the impudence to deny, that this kingdom is now in danger *greater than it ever before had to contend with*. They talk of its *prosperity*, and they triumphantly compare its situation with that of *other countries* ; but still they are compelled to acknowledge the existence of the danger ; and, it would be quite impossible for them to point out any nation upon the earth, exposed to such danger. The more we possess the more we have to lose ; in number equal to that of our enjoyments are our wants ; nor does it require much reflection to convince any reasonable man, that, if this country were to be subdued, those amongst us who live in luxury would suffer the most. It is not possible for any man but a mad man, or a natural fool, or some one who is partly one and partly the other, not to see the danger now hanging over us ; and, it is not possible for any one, who is not a sensual brute that cares not what becomes of the country so that he can gratify his never-satiated appetites ; it is impossible for any one, except a brute like this, not to feel great anxiety on account of this danger. We see kingdom after kingdom falling at the feet of the Conqueror ; we see him returning from the subjugation of one empire, to begin, or, rather, to finish the subjugation of another, where even a detachment of his mighty army has discomfited and pursued all that we have been able to raise up against him ; we see him in pos-

Z

session of all the naval ports and means of continental Europe; we see him with all the facilities of doubling in a year the amount of his navy, already large; we see him, in this last act of pacification, not forgetting his war with us, and his means of assailing us; and, what is of more consequence than all the rest put together, we see, in our government, those qualities which he has met with in the governments, which he has overturned and annihilated, and moreover, while we see, in our rulers, the same pertinacious adherence to that of which the great mass of people so justly complain, we see, amongst too many of ourselves, that coldness, that listlessness, that indifference, that want of public spirit, which of all symptoms is the most alarming, because it denotes, that there is wanting the *only* thing by which a nation can finally be saved. Much of big talk have you, Gentlemen, lately heard from the Curises and the Dixons and the Jackses; much about a *contrast* between this nation and the fallen nations of the continent of Europe; but, I do beseech you to bear in mind, that there is not one; no, *not one*; not any single nation or state amongst them, which has not, in its turn, been the object of the praises, of the *applause and admiration of these your city courtiers*; these your smooth-tongued place-hunters. Every one of these fallen nations has, first or last, been the *ally* of England; all their rulers have, in their turn, been praised for their *wisdom* and their *piety*; their kings have all been ardently *beloved by their people*, and their queens have all been *amiable and virtuous*; their people have all been devoted to their "*holy altars*," have been full of "*loyalty*," and have *mortally hated the French*. Is not this so? Have you not been told this? Has not this been dinned in your ears even to the danger of stunning? Yet, all these nations have fallen before the conqueror; all these nations with their pious kings, amiable and virtuous queens, wise governments, and people happy, contented, religious, loyal and hating the French, have all, one after another, yielded to those same French, who have not only beaten them in the field, but have revolutionized their governments, and, in most cases, have furnished them with new sovereigns. Well, then, what becomes of this *contrast*, so fashionable with your city orators? They tell you, for instance, of what Holland is *now*; but, they do not remind you of what they told you about Holland *before* it was subdued

by France. In short, this is the truth of the matter: such as they describe England to you now, they have, each in its turn, described those nations to be, which they *now* bid you look at as objects of triumphant comparison; whereas, if they wished you to derive any benefit from their observations, they would bid you *beware*, for that all those nations, who, but a little while ago, were, according to their account, *what England now is*, have now been *subdued by the enemy of England*.

Folly and wickedness, which are, generally in the end, their own chastisers, do, nevertheless, sometimes derive benefit, or, at least, temporary impunity, from their long continuance. So has it happened with respect to the folly and the wickedness of those, who at the end of a seventeen year's contest for "*security*," have brought us into a situation, in which we not only are not secure, but in which we have not left the smallest chance of seeing security provided for the times of our children. This contest has continued so long, and so numerous have been the follies and the acts of wickedness, on the part of those who have had a principal share in it, that the public, weary with attempting to preserve a recollection of them, content themselves with a retrospect of a few months, the catalogue for which time is, indeed, quite sufficient to occupy any ordinary mind.

Were it not for this circumstance, it surely would be unnecessary for me to remind the Citizens of London of the share which they have had in causing all those measures to be adopted, which have most powerfully contributed towards the bringing of us into our present disgraceful state, and the still-operating effect of which measures will, like that of a fever in its last stages, press daily upon the vitals of the nation with accelerated force. There was no folly, no egregious folly, nor any vice, in the undertaking or the conducting of this contest, in which you did not eminently share. To you, from long habit, the other parts of the kingdom looked for example; and, instead of giving them an example of wariness in listening to the insinuations of an artful minister, or his minions, you gave them an example of seemingly wilful cullibility. In short, you became, and continued, the mere puppets in the hands of the minister of the day. You sanctioned all he did; you joined him in all his undertakings; you hissed or you clapped as he commanded.

You shouted for joy when he bade you shout; and you wept, or affected to weep, when he bade your tears flow. No pump, no anvil, no bit of dough or of dirt, was ever more completely at the command of the possessor, than you were at the command of the minister and his underlings; and, it was reserved for this reign, in honour of which we have just witnessed a Jubilee, and for the "*blessings*" of which there are men to be found to "thank God," and apparently, without dreading any chastisement; this reign, which will be distinguished, in the history of England (if England shall hereafter have a history), by its calamities and its disgraces, civil as well as military; it was reserved for this reign to see the Citizens of London, distinguished in all former times for their good sense, and particularly for their firmness in resisting acts of oppression; yes, it was reserved for this reign to see the Citizens of London not only become the dull and stupid tools of a minister in giving currency to all his doctrines relative to war and peace, but to suffer him to assault the liberties of the country, to see, in silence, the suspension of laws made for the protection of the people, and other laws passed creating new political offences, and, to your everlasting shame be it recorded, you openly applauded the persecution of those few Englishmen, who had the courage to make a stand in the cause of that freedom, to preserve which for you your fathers had fought and bled. To you this nation has a right to look for no small part of all its losses of every sort. Against your voice the fatal measures never could have been adopted; nor, indeed, could they have been adopted without your *approbation* actively given. You might have prevented all those measures; and, therefore, I repeat, that to you the nation has a right to look as to the authors, or, at least, the joint authors, of all that it now suffers, and all that reason bids it anticipate. If the Citizens of London had acted with only common spirit, is it to be believed, that things would have come to their pass? But, such has been their tameness, nay, their cowardice, that, at last (until very lately) they have become an object of so much contempt, that the minister of the day appears to have doubted, whether they were worth using any longer; and, upon two or three occasions, the offer of their services seemed to be scarcely accepted of. I am aware, that it has, in

your defence, been urged, that the City of London is not what it formerly was;—that the *merchants* and *tradesmen*, properly so called, have, in consequence of the increase of the government debt and the Pitt-system of banking, and especially by the erection of a new power in the East India Company, been, in a great measure, put aside, and that the persons now calling themselves "*The City of London*," are a set of contractors, brokers, jews, jobbers, nabobs, and seat-dealers, the interest of every wretch of whom it is to create and support pretences for expending the public money, and to prevent, by all means, and at any risk to the national welfare, every one guilty of any act of public-robbery, great or small;—that, such is the influence, and, indeed, the direct power, of this numerous swarm of keen and indefatigable enemies of the country, that all attempt at resistance is vain;—and that, seeing that it was from these wretches that proceeded all the support that was given to the measures that have produced our present danger, the *Citizens of London* are not without discrimination to be blamed.

To this I answer, that, if the persons to be influenced, or domineered over, were *few in number*, it would not be, with me, a matter of much surprise, that the real voice of the City should be stifled. But, when it is well known, that the Livery of London consist of, at least, from ten to *twelve thousand*, is not the City of London, without any discrimination, to be charged with the principles of Curtis, Shaw, Birch, and the like? It is in vain to talk; for, if *ten thousand* of the principal people in the City can be *influenced*, the blame lies upon the people of the City much more than upon those by whom they are influenced. As if, however, this were not enough, whereon to convict the Citizens of London of having been the cause of their country's ruin, there is, annually, an opportunity for them to express their sentiments, in a manner, which, if they do not express them with effect, leaves them no excuse whatever. I allude to the election of persons to represent them in *Common Council*, and, in which election every Citizen *householder* has a voice. Here, then, we have every man to vote, who, upon any occasion, ought ever to be permitted to vote. These Citizen Householders amount, perhaps, to a *hundred thousand* in number; and, therefore, if *influence* can prevail here, the mass is too corrupt ever to be cured.

The fact is, that corrupt influence does not prevail here; but, there is something, which, in its effects, is full as fatal, that does prevail, and that is, *indifference*, which, in this case, is quite inexcusable, because a proper choice is, in a few weeks, perhaps, visible in its good consequences. Much has been taken away from you; the City of London, as well as the rest of the kingdom, has felt the effects of the Pitt system; but, this right of choosing your representatives in the Common Council still remains to you; that is not taken away; you possessed that before the Jubilee-reign commenced, and, by great good luck, you still possess it; and, if you fail to exercise it, and that, too, with a view to the advantage of the nation at large, you act neither a wise nor an honourable part; and, you should always bear in mind, that, as you have it in your power to put down, by your voice, legally expressed, the combination of contractors, jobbers, jews, nabobs, and seat-dealers, every evil resulting from the existence of that nefarious combination is fairly ascribable to you, and that, against this charge, all your professions of patriotism will not weigh as a feather.

The most contemptible of all the characters drawn by the pen, is the waggoner, praying to Hercules to get his waggon out of the mire. "Get up, lay your whip to the horses, clapping your own shoulder to the wheel, at the same time, and then Hercules will help you." To be sure; and, is it not proper to give an answer similar to this to all those Citizen Householders of London, who either do not vote at all for members of the Common Council, or who, voting, are indifferent, or nearly indifferent, as to the objects of their choice; is it not just to give them an answer similar to this, when they are complaining of the prodigality in the public expenditure, the shameless waste in all the departments, and of the death and destruction of so many of our countrymen, without any good purpose whatever being thereby answered? When such people complain of the *weight of taxes*; of the almost incessant harrassing, teasing, and tormenting, that they undergo, from the visits, and, still more, from the constantly apprehended visits, of the taxgatherers of various descriptions; of the examinations and cross-examinations, of the accusations, the reproaches, the brow-beatings, and all the endless variety of affronts and insults, which they are compelled to

put up with in silence, upon pain of being half-ruined; when such people thus complain, is it not just to laugh in their face, to flout and jeer them, and treat them, in short, with every species of contempt? "What can one man do?" Oh! silly question. Yet, not so silly as it is insincere; for, who puts such a question to himself, when some object of private gain, pleasure, or convenience; when an object of self-gratification of any sort is pointed out to him, if, indeed, such objects did not crowd upon him fast enough of themselves? "What can one man do?" never seems to occur to those who are going to a fair, a market, a ball, a play, or on any other pursuit of gain or of pleasure. This question, so often put, arises, be assured, not from a want of understanding; but from a want of zeal, or, rather, from a want of public spirit and public principle. Were the thing practicable, I should like to put, verbally, to each individual of you, this question:—*Do you believe, that, if the whole of the Common Council consisted of men of Mr. WAITHMAN's spirit and principles, the abuses of which you complain would soon be removed?* My opinion is, that, if this question were put to every man of you, you would, without a moment's hesitation, answer in the affirmative. My opinion is, that this would be your answer with as thorough a conviction as you entertain of your existence; and what excuse, therefore, is there for your apathy; for your wilful neglect of so important a duty?

The history of our country shews, that it is the capital that must lead the rest of the kingdom. It is in reason and in nature that it should be; but, the fact is, that London has always taken the lead. Thus it will still be; and, therefore, it is not at all matter of surprize, that every minister of the king should endeavour to gain over the City of London to his side, and especially that a corrupt minister should do this; that he should bestow places upon some, pensions upon others, gew-gaw titles upon others, and that he should give his supporters in the City contracts, jobs, and patronage. These are formidable means; but even means like these cannot corrupt a hundred thousand men, and, of course, they can have no very great effect in an election of the Common Council, which, if well constituted, consisting as it does of more than *one hundred persons*, would, in a short time produce an effect, of the extent of which few persons are aware. In short it is

pears very clearly to me, that, without any assistance, from any quarter whatever, you have it in your power to lay the certain foundation of that *reform*, without which it is my thorough conviction, that this nation will soon have nothing to boast of more than its late allies upon the continent.

I have not the vanity to suppose, that, with those who could chuse men like the Dixons, who, by their city oratory, have notoriously gained places for sons; or with those who could vote for a man, who makes an open defence of corruption, having, at the same time, a contract for making great coats, for the army water-proof; nor, indeed, have I the vanity to suppose, that any thing to be said by me is capable of inducing one of you to do that which you otherwise would not be disposed to do; but, of this I am certain, that, unless the Common Council of London be composed of men of sound political principles, there is no ground whatever for your complaining of any hardship proceeding from the government, and that, if every farthing of your earnings were taken from you in taxes, to be given to nabobs, contractors, or to be thrown into the wells and down the mountains of Spain, you would not be an object of the compassion of any rational man. You sin, in such case, not only against the light and *without temptation*; but, against the memorable example, the noble example, of your ancestors, who, in the cause of freedom, always stood foremost, taught the nation how to think and how to act; and who, whether the dispute was decided by the pen or the sword, always prevailed.

I am, Gentlemen, Your friend,

W^m. COBBETT.

Botley, Thursday, 9 Nov. 1809.

THE JUBILEE.

Sir;—When it was first hinted that the day his majesty entered into the 50th year of his reign, was to be publicly observed by the country, it naturally struck me, that it was to be set apart, as a day of Fasting and Humiliation, on account of the depressed state of the country, both internally and externally in relation to foreign connections, when compared with what it was when George the Second died. With this idea I was much pleased; but, when I understood it was to be a Jubilee we were to celebrate, my mind filled with the grandeur of such a glorious prospect,

became quite entranced, and, supposing it to be such a Jubilee as that kept by divine authority among God's ancient people the Jews, I imagined I saw on this happy day consigned to oblivion all those laws, which within the last fifty years have been enacted, to restrain the Liberty of the Subject, entammel the Press, and hold in fetters the opinions of men:—I saw repealed the various Taxes which have in that period been imposed upon the people, and which bow down to the ground the industrious mechanic; I fancied I saw the labourer and the people in the middle walks of life, restored to the same happy state they were in fifty years ago, when the labour of two days procured them as much of the necessities of life as three days labour yields at present; I imagined I saw children whom the pressure of the times compelled prematurely to labour for a scanty sustenance in cotton mills and other public works to the injury of their health, and destruction of their morals, indulging themselves in innocent amusements and healthful recreations, their pale and emaciated visages assuming a blythe and vigorous aspect, the time they formerly stole from sleep to learn some smattering of reading, devoted to its natural purpose, and their minds aroused from a state of ignorance and apathy, stored with sound instruction and virtuous morality, and fitting them to become useful members of society.—I saw the Poor, which this war for the deliverance of Europe has increased beyond all calculation, diminished to a scanty few, as was the case in the reign of George the Second, and these decently supported by what was wantonly thrown away on pampering courtly lords, whose service to the public consists in signing a receipt for their Pensions.—I saw bursting open to view a glorious reformation in Ireland, an obliteration of religious animosities, an establishment of national schools like Scotland, and an universal diffusion of knowledge and learning. I saw upon this auspicious day the Constitution restored to its primitive excellence, the People reinstated in their just rights, every householder who paid direct Taxes for the support of the state exercising the elective franchise, and an end put to that shameful and scandalous trafficking of Seats in Parliament, which bears so striking a resemblance to the buying and selling of cattle in a market.—I fancied that his majesty, to stamp with greater celebrity this glorious Jubilee, and to shew the impartiality of his proceedings,

ordered the Privy Council Books to be brought him, and with his own hand erased from that honourable and reverend body the names of those artful and ambitious men, who playing upon the credulity of the people, raised the cry of No Popery to cover their designs upon the Liberty of the Subject and the Treasure of the Country, but who have since proclaimed to the world their own hypocrisy, by trampling upon all laws both human and divine.—I saw driven from the royal presence Jews, Contractors, and the whole herd of servile fawning beings, who neither love his majesty nor his people; hypocrites who would join the cry of No Popery in Britain, and in Spain drink a speedy deliverance to the Roman pontiff, at whose degraded state every friend of true religion and humanity rejoices, and for which the prayers of the godly have for centuries been put up.—In fine, I saw a medal struck by the unanimous desire of the people in commemoration of this new era of happiness, having on one side the image of his majesty, and on the other “George the Third, the Restorer of the Purity of Parliament and Deliverer of the People.”

—But this pleasing dream, this enchanting delusion was soon exchanged for melancholy reflection, at finding those happy prospects were but phantoms of the imagination, which possessed neither shape nor form; at learning that the word Jubilee had lost its original meaning, and that by it was not meant a restoration to the state the country was in fifty years ago, a deliverance from a heavy load of taxation, from gagging statutes, from test acts; and an abolition of religious distinctions, and reformation in parliament. But that, under cover of that cheering sound, that host of moths and muckworms, the Jews, the Contractors, &c. (leeches who suck the blood and fatten upon the vitals of the country, who would, like their brethren in Vienna, and Warsaw, be ready to make a statue to Napoleon if in London, and hold a Jubilee in honour of the battle which hurled from the throne the reigning family,) had prostituted it for other purposes, to divert the public from enquiring into the corruption and speculation which enriched them, from investigating into the causes of the misfortunes attending our Expeditions, to draw away their attention from the enormous expenditure, the effects of which we shall shortly feel, to drown the cries and tears of parents for their children, widows for their husbands, and children for their fa-

thers, to give a colour of approbation and sanction to those men and measures which have reduced the country to its present perilous condition.—Such, then, being the intention of those turtle patriots and Jubilee makers, whether in Warsaw, Naples, Vienna, or London, it becomes the duty of every true friend to his majesty and the country respectfully to petition his majesty to dismiss from his presence and councils for ever, all such vermin, their aiders and abettors, to restore parliaments to their constitutional duration, and to extend the elective franchise to respectable householders; to punish all those vile speculators who rob the public; and to abolish religious distinctions.—Measures which would prove a tower of strength to the throne, and be its best security against those hurricanes and earthquakes which have overturned so many whose foundation rested not in the hearts of the people.
Yours, D. I.

JACOBIN GUINEAS.

SIR;—From the general opinion entertained of the mischief, arising from the circulation of Bank notes in lieu of guineas, I presume, there must be something of a truism in the position; and yet the evil is either so latent, or mysterious, that it seems to puzzle our most able calculators, to establish the fact. To smoothe the way, your correspondent, Mr. Thomas Bernard, has entered into some of the elementary principles of exchange and barter, in the statement of which he seems tolerably clear; but he, as well as many other gentlemen, who have handled the subject, stops at the very point in question; viz., that the circulation of paper or bank notes is injurious to commerce. Mr. Bernard observes that, if the quantity of cash and bank notes are together more than sufficient for the purposes of our commerce, the one or the other will disappear here as a superfluous commodity; and, that as the intrinsic value of the guinea, is greater than that of the note, the former will be hoarded in preference to the latter: but, yet as the accumulation of any commodity, whether gold or any thing else, must be unproductive, unless put in circulation, he concludes that the hoarder of guineas will part with them to foreigners, whenever the price they offer, proves sufficiently tempting. Now, Sir, I have one question to put to Mr. Bernard, which he will probably, for the benefit of

such a tyro as myself, have the kindness to solve; viz. from what cause it arises, that there should be so great a request on the continent for these same guineas? There was a time when guineas were sufficiently numerous to answer all the purposes of circulation here, and when that circulation was not interrupted by the seducing offers of foreigners to win the commodity from us; but now every guinea we possess is so hunted after, and such baits are held out for it by our neighbours on the continent, that even those, who are the loudest in their complaints at the scarcity of gold, are unable to resist the lure, and part with the last guinea, though the disappearance of the coin makes them so inconsolable. If it be said, that an increased population upon the continent, occasions an enlarged consumption of the conveniences of life, and that the want of a circulating medium is proportionably increased; would not the diminution of the species within the last 50 years, from the ravages of war, be an answer to the assertion? But, Sir, before this question, one of more curiosity than importance perhaps, is explained, let me observe, that it seems a little difficult, to make out, how the country is injured by the use of bank notes in lieu of gold coin. It has been at all times found necessary to have a law prohibiting the exportation of the current coin of the realm. Such a prohibition existed in the reign of Edward III. The consequence resulting from it therefore is, that the coin of this realm can only be legally circulated in the kingdom. By proclamation the value of a guinea is declared to be 21 shillings, for which it must always pass current, and a greater value cannot be lawfully demanded for it. Assuming then with Mr. Bernard, that wheat sells for 14*l.* per load, what greater advantage would the holder of guineas have by paying the 14*l.* in that coin, with the assistance of a seven-shilling-piece, than by paying for it in 14 one-pound bank notes? It is said that bank notes are depreciated, because upon the continent a guinea will exchange for 25 shillings, which 25 shillings will here purchase a one pound bank note, and a fourth part of another. Allow the guinea to have this superior value on the continent, is it equally valuable here? Will the farmer give you 25 shillings worth of wheat for a guinea? No.—What then is the injury to the proprietor of notes? The paradox, I take it, is this; all the arguments to

shew the depreciation, as it is called, of bank notes, proceed upon the ground, that the prices of the various articles of commerce are all regulated by the value of gold; whereas I imagine in this country, they are regulated by the value of bank notes. A farmer knows that there is a restriction on the exchange, by the bank, of coin for their notes; can a farmer then, when he values his wheat at 14*l.* a load, be said to estimate the value in gold, when he knows he cannot be paid in gold? Clearly not; he estimates it in bank notes; the shoemaker does the same by his shoes; all the commercial men in the country calculate by the same scale; what injury then, let me ask, does either receive from the payment being made in bank notes? I will ask Mr. Bernard, whether there is not some little quibble, in saying that notes are depreciated because guineas will pass for a greater value on the Continent than they do here. Suppose a pair of shoes to be worth in England a seven shilling piece; the seven shilling piece will pass upon the Continent, but the shoes will not; are the shoes therefore depreciated? No, they are well made shoes, and will here produce the manufacturer seven shillings: why, then, they are worth to him seven shillings.—Where is the depreciation here? A commodity is not depreciated because one man will purchase it and another will not; upon that principle there is nothing in existence but what would fall under the paradox of being both of its full value and depreciated at one and the same period. But, Sir, let us for a moment, with one charm of the pen, dissipate all the bank notes in the country. Will the guinea in consequence purchase more corn of the farmer? He will still sell his wheat at 14*l.* per load, estimating a guinea as being of the value of one shilling only beyond one of those pounds. But how, let me ask, when I have annihilated all this machinery of paper, will Mr. Barnard, or any other strong-bodied man, be able to retain what guineas there are left in the country? All the theatrical-manager-coadjutors; all the pugilistic Mendoza tribe will never have skill enough to box the guinea from the continent; for so long as it produces 25 shillings there, and only 21 here, or the worth of 21 shillings, it will take the grand-tour in spite of all opposition.—It will visit all the courts in Europe whether allies or enemies. Well then, Sir, having got rid of the paper per force; and the guineas getting rid of

themselves spontaneously, what substitute will Mr. Barnard have the goodness to invent for paper, which shall produce the holder more advantages than he before derived from that bank note, which nobody but John Bull would treat with the smallest respect. As it is quite clear, that the cause which operates in giving gold that migrating quality which it possesses at present, would incline it to take its leave of John Bull, though bank notes should be discarded, some substitute as a commercial medium must be adopted; and I can only say, that if Mr. Barnard could devise any pleasant manufacture to be obtained with the same facility as bank notes, that would prove more productive and valuable to the holder, he would entitle himself to my most unfeigned approbation, in which I am sure I should not be singular. That these observations are crude I must admit; but that the paper system is so pernicious as is in general apprehended, I confess I cannot discover. In the next letter Mr. Barnard may favour us with, the mystery will be probably unfolded. In the mean time, I am obliged to that gentleman for the letter he has already written; I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

W. F. S.

Lincoln's Inn, October 20.

MR. WARDLE.

PROCEEDINGS of the COMMON COUNCIL of the CITY of LONDON, at Guildhall: Friday, Nov. 3, 1809.

Mr. KEMBLE rose to make his promised motion, and began by assuring the Court, that in rising to make the motion which he was about to make, he was not influenced by any party motive whatever. He had not even consulted with any one person as to the expediency of the motion, or as to the mode in which it might best be submitted to the Court. He could, therefore, truly say, that he was the dupe of no man or set of men; he thought and acted for himself. The Court would recollect, that on the day of meeting to which his motion referred, the 1st day of August last, notice had been regularly given of a motion for that day, to rescind the Vote of Thanks to col. Wardle. The gentleman with whom that motion was to originate thought proper to abandon it, and did upon that day absent himself. With the absence or presence of any member the Court had nothing to do. Their duty was to have proceeded to the special mat-

ter before them, for which they had been particularly summoned, and in their decision upon that they should have rested; and not to have gone into the consideration of other matter, unconnected with the special business, and concerning which the majority of the Court could not have expected any discussion whatever. It was this informality of which he had to complain, in the proceedings of the Court on the 1st of August.—The Resolution for rescinding the Vote of Thanks to Mr. Wardle, was brought forward for the purpose of introducing an Amendment for confirming those Thanks, and containing a long series of Resolutions foreign to the special object of the meeting, and totally unexpected. He did not want to question the propriety or impropriety of the original Vote of Thanks to Mr. Wardle, but he thought that the gentleman who moved that string of Resolutions, would have acted more candidly, if he had openly come forward and gave due notice for a future day of his intention of moving such Resolutions; in that case the Court would not, as it actually had, been taken by surprise. His object was to vindicate the honour and character of the Court, which were impeached by proceedings, in their nature so irregular; the Resolutions ought not to be permitted to remain on their Journals, for they had been moved and carried without the due notice. He concluded with moving that the Resolutions of the 1st of August be expunged. (Which Resolutions having been read),

Mr. BOX rose to second the motion, which, he said, he felt great satisfaction in doing. On the day on which the Resolutions had been moved, he had objected to them, because he thought it wrong to proceed so hurriedly and unexpectedly, in matters affecting the ministers and the first characters in the country.

Alderman GOODBERE said, that it would not be denied, that the motion just made had a tendency to censure the proceedings of the Court upon a former day. The Gentleman who had made it had declared that his motion was to support the character and honour of the Court. There was no questioning that assertion, nor was he disposed to discredit it, but the Gentleman had not shewed how far the honour and character of the Court had been injured by the Resolutions it was now proposed to rescind. Indeed, this part of the argument had been given up, for the Gentleman had confined himself solely to

the alleged informality, of which he had complained. The first objection seemed to be founded on the absence of the original Mover. This seemed an odd ground of objection. He could not understand why one man's neglect of duty was the reason why another should delay discharging his—or if the objection was meant to apply generally, why that the Court was not to come to a decision upon any important question while certain Gentlemen were out of town. A great deal had been said about the necessity of a notice—did the Gentleman mean to say, that the notice of an original motion did not warrant the introduction of an amendment upon that motion when made. There had been formal notice of the original motion, and an amendment had been made upon that motion, and was carried—were the proceedings of that Court to be tied down and confined to the letter of a notice? [Hear! hear!] Were they to be kept from adverting or taking advantage of any incidental circumstances that might usually arise, because such circumstances were not formally alluded to in the notice?—Were they to be prohibited from applying the remedy to the evil, if that remedy was not formally set forth in the words of a notice? This would be to give a notice the force of restricting their powers, not of regulating their proceedings—in short, would be to deprive them of all discretion. Would the Gentleman in the transacting of his mercantile business deprive his agent of all his discretion, and confine him to the mere letter of his instructions? Would he act so towards even his servant in an ordinary message? The Gentleman had acknowledged that he did not wish to disturb the decision upon the justice of *Mr. Wardle's* claims on the gratitude of the Court and the country, for his eminent services in the detection of public abuses—if this was the Gentleman's wish, what was the object of his present motion? Did it not, in effect, tend to disturb that decision? The Gentleman wished to remedy an informality, the informality he had not succeeded in establishing; but it was clear, that if he succeeded in his motion, the spirit of that motion would be done away, to which he had acknowledged he was not hostile. The Gentleman had declared himself not hostile to the motion of thanks, but he obviously did what he could do to rescind that vote. The Gentleman had been in the country for some time, and he (*Mr. G.*) was apprehensive that he had suffered some-

what by the communication. His opinions of *Mr. Wardle's* services had changed; this change had nothing to do with any alleged opinion as to the individual by whom they were conferred; the services were the same; but it was evident that his (*Mr. K.'s*) opinion was not as unchangeable; for it would be remembered that that Gentleman (*Mr. K.*) had been looked up to, and with great justice he believed at that time, as one of the broad banners of freedom and reform (a laugh), but now that Gentleman saw no necessity for change; he wanted nothing, and nothing he could want for any thing; the lines that had been once otherwise applied might be justly applied to him—

“No Lord or Squire,
Or Knight of the Shire
Liv'd half so well,”

as the Gentleman who wants for nothing. Why the Gentleman was in such haste to evince the mistake he had fallen into about Colonel *Wardle*, he could not well account for, unless it was upon the principle of making his *amende honorable* to his friends on the other side, for having been guilty of thinking for himself at their expence. But it could not be doubted, that the tendency of the present motion was, to do away their tribute to the merits of *Mr. Wardle*. He called on the Court to consider seriously the nature of those services to which it was now proposed to make so bad a return—was it right at such a time as this to damp the ardour of those honest men who were bold enough to resist corruption? *Mr. Wardle's* services to the public had been of the first kind; he did not hesitate to say, that more benefit had resulted from the services of *Mr. Wardle*, in the last parliamentary campaign, than from all the victories by land or sea that had occurred during the late and present wars! *Mr. Wardle* had been assailed by the most foul and wanton calumnies. Two of them he would advert to. One was, that *Mr. Wardle* had not fulfilled the engagement in which he had pledged himself to the public, that of prosecuting *Mrs. Clarke* for perjury. To this it was a sufficient answer, that the Grand Jury had found a true Bill against *Mrs. Clarke* and others, for a Conspiracy; and that they found so in consequence of the unquestionable proofs of perjury committed by the parties having been laid before them. He asked then, if *Mr. Wardle* could be said to have failed in his pledge? The perjury could not be said to be proved

until a Jury had pronounced the final verdict; but still Mr. Wardle had lost no time, and hitherto he had acted up to the spirit, and even the letter of his pledge. The other objection was, his travelling to the coast in the company of Mrs. Clarke. The construction put on this appeared to him not warrantable. Mr. Wardle had in view a great national object: his principal instrument in effecting that was this woman. He could not have been a stranger to her character; and he wished to keep her out of the enemy's camp. The object of this journey was to keep her from *evil communication*, and the event proved that he succeeded. Mr. Wardle's private character secured him from those constructions which certain persons were anxious to put upon his conduct in this instance. It was well known that Mr. Wardle was a man of mildest manners; that in private life he was distinguished for that purity so essential to domestic happiness, and that domestic happiness he enjoyed in a degree eminently and enviably high.—Those who knew Mr. Wardle best valued him most, and those who knew his private life best valued his domestic happiness most, perhaps, most envied it. The consistency of that life was the best answer to those who would object to Mr. Wardle any unbecoming motives in his tour with Mrs. Clarke. Mr. W. could find no public honour but in promoting the true interests of his country. He never could find private happiness in any way inconsistent with his honour as a domestic man. Mr. Wardle had a family and a country, and he never had been false to either. He next alluded to the harsh manner in which, he said, Mr. Wardle had been treated in the different stages of the process. Mr. Wardle, he affirmed, had been waiting for ten days for the due notices; that he did not get them till the last of the ten, and that the Judge had in consequence signified his doubt of the legality of the instrument. The Worthy Alderman concluded, by moving the previous question.

Mr. JACKS said he must either have misunderstood the notice given by the Worthy Member, or his motion did not relate to the merits or demerits of Mr. Wardle; it related merely to the questions then for the first time introduced in the Resolutions now sought to be rescinded.

Mr. KEMBLE said, all he wished was, let the Worthy Alderman give notice of the propositions contained in his Resolutions,

and then he should argue them, but not till then.

Mr. JACKS continued—It was not till the first notice of the present motion had been sent to the different Members of the Court, that he had read the Resolutions now under consideration. He should now take the liberty of discussing those Resolutions, paragraph by paragraph, and should consider, first, if they were founded in fact; secondly, if it was expedient for the Court to have adopted them. As to the merits of Mr. Wardle, he had nothing to say in opposition to them; the Court had come to an unanimous vote on the subject, and he saw nothing in the trial which ought to induce them to alter that decision. Some of the paragraphs of the Resolutions which the Court had lately passed seemed to him to require serious consideration. In the second paragraph it was alleged, that the abuses complained of had extended to the disposal of Church preferments. Now, he submitted, that no detection of the kind could be fairly attributed to Col. Wardle. Mention had, indeed, been made of a Dr. O'Meara, and of a wretched parson of the name of Beazley, who wrote in favour of "No Popery;" but their cases were far from warranting the charge of the corrupt disposal of Church preferments. The Court, therefore, was without proof on this point. The Resolution then went on to implicate Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Perceval, and Mr. H. Wellesley, in the corrupt and illegal traffic charged in the Resolution, and quoted the words of the Speaker of the House of Commons on that subject. Now, he took it to be an established principle of British justice, that criminality must be proved before it could be taken as granted. Here charges had been brought forward; but, certainly, no proof had been adduced in support of them. He then turned to the Morning Chronicle of the 7th June, and from thence quoted the words used by the Speaker, which, he contended, applied not to the then actual state of the House of Commons, but simply to declare, that, if the practice which he there referred to should at any time become prevalent, "it would bring a greater scandal upon the Parliament and the Nation than this Country had ever known since Parliament had an existence." In the following part of the paragraph in which reference is made to Lords Castlereagh and Clancarty, he cordially agreed, and declared, that in Parliamentary His-

tory he had not read a more direct interference in the disposal of Seats in Parliament. When the Worthy Alderman however, went on to state that the House of Commons, by its conduct, "had recognized and acknowledged the corrupt influence under which it had been called together, and exercised its functions," he could not help thinking, that he had greatly gone beyond that line of respect to Parliament which it was his duty to have observed. Did the worthy Alderman mean to say, that the Members for the City of London; that those for the City and Liberties of Westminster, that those for the County of Middlesex—or that those for the Borough of Southwark, were returned through corrupt influence? He admitted, that there were Boroughs which were corrupt, but the Resolution, as it stood, conveyed a charge of a similar nature against the whole House of Commons. No man, he declared, detested corruption more than he did. He hoped, too, there was no man had a greater detestation of vice, taken in an abstract sense. He believed corruption to be as inherent in Public Bodies, as vice was in the mind of man. Each of these, therefore, required every effort that could be used to restrain, if not to eradicate them. Corruption, like the vicious habits of the mind, when they got beyond certain bounds, led on to evils which again naturally produced disease. This, we would find, had been the case in every age. Lord Bacon, the Father of Modern Philosophy, was guilty of receiving bribes, as Lord Chancellor. It had been found as early after the Revolution as the year 1694, by a Committee of the House of Commons, that 90,000*l.* had been spent in bribes, for the purpose of insuring the passing of a Bill. To Sir J. Trevor, the then Speaker, 1,000*l.* had been given, who was so much ashamed, that he afterwards absented himself from the House. At the same time the House of Commons impeached the Duke of Leeds for receiving a bribe of 5,000*l.* on the same account. Sir W. Pulteney declared, in his time, that corruption had come to so high a pitch in the State, that our Constitution could not long stand. Thirty years, however, had since elapsed, and we still remained as entire and unbroken as at the moment the words were spoken. Sir W. Windham had declared in 1740, that he had alluded to the corrupt state of our Boroughs, and yet the present Resolution held out only 200 Seats in Parliament as being depend-

ent on the Government. It appeared, therefore, that we were not now so corrupt as we were then. It was not his wish to screen corruption. The public mind, however, was too much worked on. Who had discovered Lord Melville, Davison, Jones, &c.?—Committees of the House of Commons—of that very Body here declared to be so corrupt in its formation, and in the discharge of its functions. The worthy gentleman proceeded to the other parts of the Resolution, and by again referring to the Morning Chronicle, argued that the idea of a Public Office for the Sale of Offices was absurd, and its detection not attributable to Mr. Wardle. He also referred to Mr. Wardle's projected diminution of the army, and contended that this was a proposition highly inexpedient and injurious to the country at such a period. On these grounds, he thought the majority of the paragraphs of the Resolution not exactly correct. He presumed the worthy alderman had meant the whole rather as notes for a speech, than as the digested words of a Resolution. The question then was, if these were only crude and unsupported averments, ought they, without proof, to receive the sanction of that corporation? He called on every man who detested anarchy and confusion—on all those who were the friends of rational liberty, to reflect how this country could exist, if, as the Resolution seemed to imply, no confidence was to be placed in any of their public men. If so, what remained for them but to resolve into their crude state, and take the government into their own hands; or, like other States, to come under the dominion of a Foreign Power. Gentlemen talked of the changes in the opinions of men; but was this peculiar to the present day? Had not Pitt been the greatest Reformer, and did he not afterwards change his opinion? Mr. Fox coalesced with Lord North, and called him his Noble Friend. Mr. Burke, too, had changed his opinions; and why should this be conceived such a crime at present. He was decidedly of opinion, that there was now more danger from the inroads of the People, than from the prerogative of the Crown. *(To be continued.)*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AUSTRIA.—*Treaty of Peace between France and Austria, Oct. 15, 1809.*

Napoleon, by the Grace of God, and the Constitution of the Empire, Emperor

of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the League of the Rhine, &c. Having seen and considered the Treaty concluded, determined, and signed at Vienna, on the 14th of this month, by the Sieur Nompere de Champagny, our Minister for Foreign Affairs, in virtue of the full powers to that end given him by us, and the Prince John of Lichtenstein, Marshal of the Armies of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, equally provided with full powers—which Treaty is of the following tenor;—

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the League of the Rhine, Mediator of the League of Switzerland; and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, being equally animated with the desire of putting an end to the war which has arisen between them, have resolved to negotiate forthwith a Definitive Treaty of Peace, and for that purpose have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries namely:—His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the League of the Rhine, the Sieur Jean Baptiste Nompere Count de Champagny, Duke of Cadore, Grand Eagle Bearer of the Legion of Honour, Commander of the Order of the Iron Crown, Knight of the Order of St. Andrew of Russia, Grand Dignitary of that of the Two Sicilies, Grand Cross of the Orders of the Black and Red Eagles of Prussia, of the Order of St. Joseph of Wurtzburg, of the Order of Fidelity of Baden, of the Order of Hesse Darmstadt, his said Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs; and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the Sieur Prince John of Lichtenstein, Knight of the Order of the Golden Fleece, Grand Cross of the Order of Maria Theresa, Chamberlain, Marshal of the Armies of his said Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and Proprietary Commander of a Regiment of Horse in his service.—Who having previously exchanged their full powers, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

Art. I. There shall, from the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty, be peace and friendship between his Majesty the Emperor of the French King of Italy, Protector of the League of the Rhine, and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, their Heirs and Successors, their States and Subjects respectively, for ever.

II. The present peace is also declared to be common to his Majesty the King of

Spain, his Majesty the King of Holland, his Majesty the King of Naples, his Majesty the King of Bavaria, his Majesty the King of Wirtemberg, his Majesty the King of Saxony, and his Majesty the King of Westphalia, his Most Eminent Highness the Prince Primate, their Royal Highnesses the Grand Duke of Baden, the Grand Duke of Berg, the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, the Grand Duke of Wurtzburg, and all the Princes and Members of the League of the Rhine, the Allies, in the present war, of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the League of the Rhine.

III. His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, cedes, as well for himself, his heirs and successors, as for the Princes of his House, their heirs and respective Successors, the principalities, lordships, domains, and territories, herein-after mentioned, and also all titles which may accrue from the possession of the same; and all properties, whether manorial or held by them under an especial title, lying within the said territories.

1. He cedes and transfers to his Majesty the Emperor of the French, to form a part of the League of the Rhine, and to be placed at his disposition for the interest of the Sovereigns of the League:—The territories of Saltzburgh and Berchtolsgraden; that part of Upper Austria, situate on the further side of a line running from the Danube, at the village of Straas, therein comprehending Weissenkirch, Wedersdorff, Michelbach, Greist, Muckenhoffen, Helst and Jedina; thence in the direction of Schwandstadt, the town of Schwandstadt on the Aller, and thence ascending along the bank of that river, and the lake of the same name, to the point where the lake touches upon the territory of Saltzburg.—His Majesty the Emperor of Austria shall only retain in property the Woods belonging to the Salz-Cammer-Gut, and forming part of the manor of Mondsee, with liberty to cut and carry thence the brushwood, but without enjoying any right of Sovereignty upon that territory.—2. He also cedes to his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, the County of Gorizia, the Manor of Montefalcone, the Government and City of Trieste, Carniolá, with its dependencies on the Gulf of Trieste, the Circle of Willach, in Carinthia, and all the territories lying on the right bank of the Save, from the point where that river

leaves Carniola, along its course to where it touches the frontiers of Bosnia; namely a part of Provincial Croatia, six districts of Military Croatia, Fiume, and the Hungarian Littorale, Austrian Istria, or the district of Castua, the islands depending on the ceded territories, and all other territories, howsoever named, upon the right bank of the Save; the middle stream of the said river serving as the boundary between the two States.—Lastly, the Lordship of Radzuns lying in the Graubunderland.—3. He cedes and makes over to his Majesty the King of Saxony, the territory of Bohemia depending upon, and included in the territory of the Kingdom of Saxony, namely, the parishes and villages of Guntersdorff, Taubanranke, Gerlochsheim, Lenkersdorf, Schirgiswald, Winkel, &c.—4. He cedes and makes over to the King of Saxony, to be united to the Duchy of Warsaw, the whole of Western or New Galicia, a district round Cracow, on the right bank of the Vistula, to be hereafter ascertained, and the Circle of Zamosc in Eastern Galicia.—The district round Cracow, upon the right bank of the Vistula, shall in the direction of Podgorze, have for its circumference the distance from Podgorze to Wieliczka. The line of demarkation shall pass through Wieliczka, and to the westward touch upon Scawina, and to the eastward upon the Beek, which falls into the Vistula at Brzdegy.—Wieliczka and the whole of the territory of the Salt-pits shall belong in common to the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Saxony. Justice shall be administered therein in the name of the Municipal Power; there shall be quartered there only the troops necessary for the support of the Police, and they shall consist of equal numbers of those of both nations. The Austrian Salt from Wieliczka, in its conveyance over the Vistula, and through the Duchy of Warsaw, shall not be subject to any toll-duties. Corn of all kinds, raised in Austrian Galicia, may also be freely exported across the Vistula.—His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and his Majesty the King of Saxony, may form such an arrangement with regard to these boundaries, as that the Save, from the point where it touches upon the Circle of Zamosc, to its confluence with the Vistula, shall serve as the line of demarkation between both states.—5. He cedes and makes over to his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, in the easternmost part of Galicia, a tract of territory containing a

population of 400,000 souls, the city of Brodi being, nevertheless, not therein included. This territory shall be amicably ascertained by Commissioners on the part of both Empires.

IV. The Teutonic Order having been abolished in the States of the League of the Rhine, his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, in the name of his Imperial Highness the Archduke Anthony, abdicates the Grand Mastership of that Order in his States, and recognizes the dispositions taken with regard to the property of the Order, locally situated out of the Austrian territory. Pensions shall be assigned to those who have been on the civil establishment of the Order.

V. The debts funded upon the territory of the ceded provinces and allowed by the States of the said provinces, or accruing from expences incurred for their Administration, shall alone follow the fate of those provinces.

VI. The provinces which are to be restored to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, shall be administered for his behoof by the Austrian Constituted Authorities, from the day of exchanging the Ratification of the present Treaty; and the Imperial Domains, wheresoever situated, from the 1st of November next. It is nevertheless understood, that the French army in this country shall take for their use whatever articles cannot be supplied by their magazines for the subsistence of the troops and the wants of the hospitals; and also whatever shall be necessary for the conveyance of their sick, and the evacuation of the magazines.—An arrangement shall be made between the High Contracting Parties respecting all war contributions, of whatever denomination, previously imposed on the Austrian provinces occupied by the French and allied troops; in consequence of which arrangement the levying of the said contributions shall cease from the day of the exchange of the Ratifications.

VII. His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, engages to give no obstruction to the importation or exportation of merchandize into and from Austria, by way of the port of Fiume; this, nevertheless, not being construed to include English goods or manufactures. The transit duties on the goods thus imported or exported, shall be lower than upon those of all other nations, the kingdom of Italy excepted. An inquiry shall be instituted, to ascertain whether any ad-

vantages can be allowed to the Austrian trade, in the other ports ceded by this Treaty.

VIII. The titles of domains, archives, plans and maps of the countries, towns, and fortresses ceded, shall be given up within two months after the period of the Ratification.

IX. His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, engages to discharge the yearly interest, arrears, and capitals, invested in securities of the Government, States, Bank, Lottery, or other public establishments, by subjects, companies, or corporate bodies in France, the Kingdom of Italy, and the Grand Duchy of Berg.—Measures shall also be taken, to completely liquidate the sum due to Mont St. Theresa, now Mont Napoleon, at Milan.

X. His Majesty the Emperor of the French engages to procure a full and complete pardon for the inhabitants of the Tyrol and Vorarlberg, who have taken a part in the insurrection; so that they shall not be prosecuted either in person or property.—His Majesty the Emperor of Austria equally engages to grant a full and complete pardon to those inhabitants of the territories of Galicia, of which he returns into possession, whether civil or military, public officers, or private individuals, who have taken part in the levying of troops, or the formation of judicial or municipal administrations; or in any other proceeding whatsoever during the war, which inhabitants shall not be prosecuted in their persons or property.—They shall have permission, during a period of six years, to dispose of their properties, of whatever description they may be; to sell their estates, even those that have been considered inalienable, such as *fidei commissa* and *majoratus*; to leave the country, and to carry with them the produce of these sales, in specie, or effects of any other description, without paying any duty for the same, or experiencing any difficulty or obstruction.—The same permission, and for the same period, shall be reciprocally allowed to the inhabitants and landholders in the territories ceded by the present treaty.—The inhabitants of the Dutchy of Warsaw, possessing landed estates in Austrian Galicia, whether public officers or private individuals, shall enjoy the revenues thereof, without paying any duty thereon, or experiencing any obstruction.

XI. Within six weeks, from the ex-

change of the present Treaty, posts shall be erected, to mark the boundaries of Cracow, upon the right bank of the Vistula. For this purpose there shall be nominated Austrian, French, and Saxon Commissioners.—The same measures shall be adopted within the same period upon the frontiers of Upper Austria, Saltzburgh, Willach, and Carniola, as far as the Saave. The Thalweg (stream) of the Saave shall determine what islands of that river shall belong to each power. For this purpose French and Austrian Commissaries shall be nominated.

XII. A military Convention shall be forthwith entered into, to regulate the respective periods within which the various provinces restored to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria shall be evacuated. The said Convention shall be adjusted on the basis, that Moravia shall be evacuated in fourteen days; that part of Galicia which remains in possession of Austria, the city and district of Vienna, in one month; Lower Austria in two months; and the remaining districts and territories not ceded by this Treaty shall be evacuated by the French troops, and those of their allies, in two months and a half, or earlier if possible, from the exchange of the ratifications.—This Convention shall regulate all that relates to the evacuation of the hospitals and magazines of the French army, and the entrance of the Austrian troops into the territories evacuated by the French or their allies; and also the evacuation of that part of Croatia ceded by the present Treaty to his Majesty the Emperor of the French.

XIII. The prisoners of war taken by France and her Allies from Austria, and by Austria from France and her Allies, that have not yet been released, shall be given up within fourteen days after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty.

XIV. His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the League of the Rhine, guarantees the inviolability of the possessions of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, in the state in which they shall be, in consequence of the present Treaty.

XV. His Majesty the Emperor of Austria recognizes all the alterations which have taken place, or may subsequently take place in Spain, Portugal, and Italy.

XVI. His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, desirous to co-operate in the restora-

tion of a maritime peace, accedes to the prohibitory system with respect to England, adopted by France and Russia, during the present Maritime War. His Imperial Majesty shall break off all intercourse with Great Britain, and, with respect to the English government, place himself in the situation he stood in previous to the present war.

XVII. His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, shall observe, with respect to each other, the same ceremonial in regard to rank and other points of etiquette, as before the present war.

XVIII. The Ratifications of the present Treaty shall be exchanged within six days, or sooner, if possible.

Done and signed at Vienna, Oct. 14, 1809.

(Signed) J. B. NOMPÈRE DE CHAMPAGNY.

JOHN PRINCE OF LICHTENSTEIN.

We have ratified, and hereby ratify the above Treaty, in all and every of the articles therein contained; declare the same to be adopted, confirmed, and established; and engage that the same shall be maintained inviolable.—In confirmation whereof we have hereto affixed our signature, with our own hand, being countersigned and sealed with our Imperial Seal.—Given at our Imperial Camp at Schoenbrunn, Oct. 15, 1809. (Signed)—NAPOLEON.

By the Emperor.—CHAMPAGNY, Minister for Foreign Affairs.—H. B. MARET, Minister Secretary of State.

Certified by us, The Arch-Chancellor of State, EUGÈNE NAPOLEON.

COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF State Trials :

To be completed in Thirty-Six Monthly Parts, forming Twelve large Volumes in Royal Octavo.

The TWELFTH PART of the above Work will be published on Friday the 1st of December. One Part will appear, with the greatest regularity, on the first of each succeeding Month. Those Subscribers who have expressed their intention of taking the Work in Quarterly Volumes, are respectfully informed that the Fourth Volume will be ready for delivery at the same time.—In order to remove all professional doubts, as to how far this new and

enlarged Edition of the State Trials may, with safety, be cited as authority in the Courts, and relied on as of equal authenticity with the former, I think it right to state, that it is intended to be a literal transcript of the last edition, as far as that edition extends; that where I have inserted fuller and better reports of any Cases, or of any parts of Cases, the text of the old Edition will nevertheless be retained; and that the new matter will be distinguished in a manner not to be mistaken, and be distinctly pointed out in the Table of Contents to each Volume.—In the last Volume will also be given what I call a PARALLEL INDEX, consisting of two Columns; in the first of which will be inserted, in their order, the numbers of all the Pages in the last Edition; and in the other, correspondent figures shewing in what Volume and Page of the present Work the contents of each Page of the last Edition will be found; by means of which Parallel Index, the place in this Work of any passage occurring in the last Edition, may be ascertained with nearly as much ease and expedition as if the paging of that Edition were preserved; which, it is obvious, would be perfectly impracticable, considering the valuable mass of new matter to be introduced.

To such Gentlemen as may happen to be in possession of curious Trials, or of documents relating to Trials of the description of those to be contained in this Work, I shall be much obliged for a communication of them. If the document, or paper, whether in print or manuscript, be requested to be preserved, great care shall be taken of it.

Of the 185 Trials or Proceedings of which the first Four Volumes consist, *eighty-nine* never before came into any Collection. The following is a list of the articles contained in the FOURTH Volume :

* * *The New Matter is marked [N].*

151. Proceedings in Parliament against John Lord Finch, Baron of Fordwich, Lord Keeper, for High Treason, A. D. 1640.
152. Proceedings in Parliament against Dr. John Cosin, a Delinquent, 1640. [N.]
153. Proceedings against Dr. Matthew Wren, Bishop of Ely, on an Impeachment for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, 1640. [N.]
154. Proceedings in Parliament against Sir Francis Windebank, Knt. Secretary of State, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, 1640. [N.]
155. Proceedings against Sir George Ratcliff, Knt. on an Impeachment for High Treason, 1640. [N.]
156. Impeachment of Sir Richard Bolton, Knt. Lord Chancellor of Ireland; Dr. John Bramhall,

- Lord Bishop of Derry; Sir Gerard Lowther, Knt. Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas; and Sir George Ratcliffe, Knt. before the House of Lords in Ireland, 1641.
157. Proceedings against John Goodman, a Seminary Priest, condemned for High Treason, 1641. [N.]
158. Proceedings against Twelve Bishops; namely, Dr. John Williams Archbishop of York, Dr. Thomas Moreton Bishop of Durham, Dr. Robert Wright Bishop of Coventry and Litchfield, Dr. Joseph Hall Bishop of Norwich, Dr. John Owen Bishop of St. Asaph, Dr. Robert Skinner Bishop of Oxford, Dr. William Piers Bishop of Bath and Wells, Dr. George Coke Bishop of Hereford, Dr. Matthew Wren Bishop of Ely, Dr. Godfrey Goodman Bishop of Gloucester, Dr. John Warner Bishop of Peterborough, and Dr. Morgan Owen Bishop of Llandaff, upon an Accusation of High Treason, 1641. [N.]
159. Proceedings, by the King's Command, upon Charges of High Treason and other High Misdemeanors, against Lord Kimbolton and Five Members of the House of Commons; namely, Mr. Denzil Hollis, Sir Arthur Haslerig, Bart. Mr. John Pym, Mr. John Hampden, and Mr. William Strode, 1641. [N.]
160. Proceedings in Parliament against James Duke of Richmond, as a Malignant and an Evil Counsellor to the King, 1641-2. [N.]
161. Proceedings against Sir Edward Herbert, Knt. the King's Attorney General upon an Impeachment for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, 1642. [N.]
162. Impeachment of George Lord Digby, eldest Son of the Earl of Bristol, for High Treason, 1642. [N.]
163. Impeachment of Mr. George Benyon, Citizen of London, for contriving a Petition against the Ordinance for the Militia, 1642. [N.]
164. Impeachment of Sir Edward Dering, Knt. for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, 1642. [N.]
165. Proceedings against Sir Richard Gurney, Knt. and Bart. Lord Mayor of London, on an Impeachment of High Crimes and Misdemeanors, 1642. [N.]
166. Articles of Impeachment against Sir Thomas Gardiner, Recorder of the City of London, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, A. D. 1642. [N.]
167. Impeachment of Henry Hastings, Esq. (second Son to the Earl of Huntingdon), Sir Richard Halford, Sir John Bale, and John Pate, Esq. for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, 1642. [N.]
168. Impeachment of James Lord Strange, for High Treason, A. D. 1642. [N.]
169. Proceedings against the Nine Lords at York; namely, Spencer Earl of Northampton, William Earl of Devonshire, Henry Earl of Dover, Henry Earl of Monmouth, Charles Lord Howard of Charlton, Robert Lord Rich, Charles Lord Grey of Ruthven, Thomas Lord Coventry, and Arthur Lord Capel, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, 1642. [N.]
170. The Trial of Colonel Nathaniel Fiennes, before a Council of War at St. Alban's, for cowardly surrendering the City and Castle of Bristol, 1643.
171. The Trial of Dr. William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, for High Treason, 1640, 1644.
172. Proceedings against Mr. Tomkins, Mr. Waller, Mr. Challoner, and others, before a Council of War, for a Plot against the Parliament, 1643. [N.]
173. The Trial of Connor Lord Macguire, at the King's Bench, for High Treason, in being concerned in the Irish Massacre, 1645.
174. Proceedings upon a Charge of Breach of the Trust reposed in them by the Parliament, preferred against Mr. Hollis and Mr. Whitelocke by the Lord Savile, 1645. [N.]
175. The Trial of Sir Robert Spotswood, President of the College of Justice in Scotland, and Secretary there to King Charles I. for High Treason, in the Parliament held at St. Andrews, November, December, and January, 1645.
176. The several Informations, Examinations, and Confessions of the Witches, arraigned and condemned at the Sessions holden at Chelmsford, in the County of Essex, before the Right Hon. Robert Earl of Warwick, and several of his Majesty's Justices of the Peace, 1645. [N.]
177. Proceedings against Eleven Members of the House of Commons, viz. Denzil Hollis, Esq. Sir Philip Stapleton, Sir Wm. Lewis, Sir John Clotworthy, Sir Wm. Waller, Sir Jn. Maynard, Knts. Major-General Massey; Mr. Glynn, Recorder of London; Walter Long, Esq. Colonel Edward Harley, and Anthony Nicholls, Esq. charged by Sir Thomas Fairfax and his Army, to be Delinquents, 1647. [N.]
178. The Case of David Jenkins, Esq. a Welch Judge, for publishing Seditious Books, and for passing Sentence of Death on Persons for not assisting against the Parliament, 1647. [N.]
179. Two Judgments of the Lords assembled in Parliament against John Morris, alias Poyntz, Mary his Wife, Isabel Smith, Leonard Darby, and John Harris, for forging, framing, and publishing a Copy of a pretended Act of Parliament, 1647.
180. Proceedings upon a Charge of High Treason against Sir John Gayre, Knight, Mayor of the City of London; Thomas Cullam, Alderman, and one of the Sheriffs of London; and James Bunce, John Langham, Thomas Adams, Aldermen of London, for countenancing and abetting Force and Tumults against the House of Commons, 1647. [N.]
181. Proceedings against the Seven Lords, namely, John Earl of Suffolk, Francis Lord Willoughby of Parham, John Lord Hunsden, William Lord Maynard, Theobald Earl of Lincoln, George Lord Berkeley, and James Earl of Middlesex, upon an Impeachment of High Treason, for levying War against the King, Parliament, and Kingdom, 1647. [N.]
182. The Trial of Charles Stuart, King of England, before the High Court of Justice, for High Treason, 1649.
183. The Trial of James Duke of Hamilton and Earl of Cambridge, before the High Court of Justice, for High Treason, 1649.
184. Proceedings against the Earl of Holland, the Earl of Norwich, Lord Capel, and Sir John Owen, for High Treason, 1651. [N.]
185. The Trial of Lieutenant-Colonel John Lilburne, for High Treason, 1649.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 20.] LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1809. [Price 1s.

"The Jubilee was celebrated at the Isle of Walcheren with as much festivity as in any part of his Majesty's dominions. At 11 o'clock in the forenoon General Don, with all the General Officers, and many of the principal inhabitants, paid their respects to Sir Eyre Coote at the palace. In every quarter of the Island the troops fired three volleys at noon; and at one all the ships fired a royal salute. After all the general officers, the public functionaries, and principal inhabitants had paid their respects to Sir Eyre Coote, they attended him in procession to the great Church, where detachments of the 8 Regiments in Middleburgh, with their colours, went also. At five Sir Eyre entertained a most numerous party to dinner at Middleburgh. Admiral Otway also gave a sumptuous entertainment on board the *Cæsar*. In the evening there was a grand display of fireworks at Middleburgh."

MORNING POST, Nov. 6, 1809.

737]

[738

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AUSTRIA.—The Treaty of Peace between this power and France, which will be found at page 726 of the preceding sheet, may be said to *put an end* to Austria as a military power; because, though she will have some military means left, those means, from her situation, can never be employed, with any effect, *against France*. In fact, the thing, to which I have just referred, called a *Treaty of Peace*, is nothing more than a list of the several things which Napoleon takes from Francis, who, as it were in mere mockery, is permitted to retain his *titles*.—This fall of Austria will have no good effect upon the old governments, which are, as yet, unsubdued. Like the silly birds, known to those who have been in the Northern Seas, they will pursue their old courses. Nothing will be a sufficient warning to them. They will still go on in those very practices which have brought their allies on their knees. Shoot half a flock of the birds on the rocks off Newfoundland, and the other half will, after a short flight, come back and alight upon the same spot. Nay, kill them all but one bird, that one will come and present itself as it were for the express purpose of being destroyed too.—I know of nothing in nature, these birds excepted, to be compared to the old governments of Europe.—But, the truth is, that, in general, those, in whose hands those governments are, know very well, that to *alter their courses* would be to insure their *individual ruin*; would reduce them to their proper level; would, in short, prevent them from living by the means of public robbery; would compel them to work for their bread. Governments, when they fall into a state of decay, become, like decayed buildings, tenanted by odious and noxious animals; and, it is not from

such that you have to expect any of those measures, which would have for their objects renovation and security; for, every measure of that sort must tend directly to the expulsion of those, who can exist only amidst rust, rubbish, and corruption.—General, therefore, as is the wonder, the impatient astonishment, that the old governments do not profit from the awful fate of their former associates, such astonishment is not very natural, and, indeed, is very unnatural, when we take time to reflect on the consequences of the state of things just described. We cry out against those, whom we wish to take measures for restoring the sense and vigour of government, but we should have the justice to reflect, that, if such sense and vigour were restored, those persons might happen to starve; I mean actually starve, for want of victuals and drink; and, we should not forget, that an animal's being odious and noxious does not prevent it from having a strong desire to live.—If men in general had seen the matter in this light, much less would have been said and written in the way of lamentation that the old governments of Europe continued so blind. They have *not been blind*: not at all blind; nor have they acted like blind people; for, if the persons constituting them adopted what was necessary to preserve the governments, they adopted what was certain ruin to themselves; whereas they had a *chance* of retaining their power, their riches, and their luxuries, if they did not adopt such measures. People have, in short, been complaining of the old governments for not doing for themselves full as bad, if not worse, than the French could possibly do for them.—"But," I shall be asked, "are the *people*, the *nations*, over whom those governments have ruled; are their interests, their honour, their safety to be left out of the question, and that, too, as

2 A

"completely, as if they were not in existence?"—Why, upon my word, this is a question, which I shall leave the querist himself to answer; I shall merely repeat, that I think it quite unnatural, perfectly absurd, to suppose, that any set of persons, getting a good livelihood by conducting an old rotten government, should, of themselves, ever attempt to mend that government, seeing that the amendment must begin by their good livelihood being taken from them; and, having said this, I shall, I hope, hear no more of those melancholy reflections respecting the *obstinacy* and *blindness* of the old governments in not having, in time, adopted measures of renovation. The *Prince of Peace*, for instance; was he *blind*? Suppose he had adopted "*timely*" measures of renovation. What would have been the consequence? Why, his fall would have come *sooner* than it did; and, his fate would have been worse; for, in that case, he would, in all human probability, have had to work for his bread; I mean to *dig*, or, if not skilful enough for that, to fill a dung-cart, or rake the kennel. Who, therefore, can blame the Prince of Peace for not adopting "*timely*" measures of renovation?—It is thus with all, who have the conducting of such a government, who must laugh immoderately at those who complain of them for not turning themselves into the street. —If the reader be satisfied of the truth of these observations, he will get rid of, at least, one *source of deception*; and will, of course, be the better for them. He will not any longer waste his time in lamentations about the "*obstinacy*" and "*blindness*" and "*infatuation*" of the old governments, and will, with more tranquillity, wait the course and the effects of those events, which, it is very evident, are not to be resisted by the miserable means hitherto opposed to them.—It is impossible to view this peace between France and Austria without recollecting, that the war, which produced it, was hailed, by the hireling prints in England, as one of the most fortunate events that had ever occurred in the world. In fact, it is my real belief, that our government and our partizans were the cause, and the *sole* cause of that war; for, if this had not been the case, is it possible that Austria, then at war with us, would have drawn bills of exchange upon us the moment she drew her sword? The French bulletins made some mention of the papers of Ma. GENTZ, which they had taken. Would to God, that the

people of England could see those papers! We should, I suspect, there see the history of the origin of the war, of that war which has led to this peace in spite of "*the battle of Aspern*," the account of which I believe to have been a gross fabrication.

—Not able to make us believe any longer, that Napoleon was defeated, the base hirelings of the London press, told us he was *mad*; and, just at the moment, when the fools, who believe those hirelings, were expecting to hear of his being clapped up in a straight waistcoat, as is the custom in such cases, out comes this treaty of peace, with his name to a ratification of it; out comes an indubitable proof of his sanity, of his wisdom as well as of his valour. The Athenians, when in the last stages of their independence, used, we are told, to circulate lies respecting the ill *bodily* health of the conqueror whom they feared, and, having so done, hug themselves in believing in the *belief* of what they *knew* to be false. After having done this for several years, we have, at last, fallen to inventing lies respecting the *mental* health of Napoleon. We have, at different times, given him all the *mortal* diseases, to which the body is subject; we have wasted him with consumption and blown him up with the dropsy; we have brought him to death's door in all manner of ways; but, not being able to kill him, we now seem resolved, that he shall live without brains. It was told to some king, who happened to have cowardly commanders, that a certain famous captain of the age was "a madman;" "Is he so," answered the king, "I wish he would bite some of my generals."—To be sure, nothing can more strongly paint the state of vassalage in which our press is, than this simple fact, that it was believed here, that the Emperor Napoleon was actually *insane*, at the very moment when he was engaged in the most important negotiation that Europe has witnessed for many years. When the historian shall come to this part of our history, he will need only this one fact to prove what a besotted people great part of us, at least, were become. Nay, there is something in this fact beyond a proof of mere stupidity; for, the cause of our *believing* in the insanity of Napoleon was that we *wished* it. This belief still exists; it has not yet travelled over more than two thirds of these islands, and has yet to go to the East and West Indies. To wish one's enemy *insane*, coolly and deliberately to wish this is a

mark of excessive baseness; and, in *all* the hireling prints, in the country as well as in London, this wish, respecting the Emperor Napoleon, was expressed in a way not to be misunderstood. All that seemed to be wanted was to mould this wish into a *prayer* for the Jubilee.—What! you wretched vermin, do you pretend; that, because an Emperor happens to be a little maddish, or so, he is *the worse for that*? Why! did you not tell us, that the Queen of Portugal was a most excellent Queen of Portugal, and that she was almost *adored by her subjects*? Do you not remember this? And how you told us of the *wonderful marks of the hand of Providence*, who, upon the said Queen being driven into exile by Buonaparté, experienced a mental restoration before she had been many hours upon the salt-water? Have you so soon forgotten this? Well, then, what foundation for joy is there in the circumstance of our enemy being mad? You will not now believe, that he is not mad, though you hear of his *hunting* at Fontainebleau. What, then, you think, perhaps, that *madmen sometimes go a hunting*; and that their companions of the chase are, *in fact, so many guards and watches*? In short, there is nothing too absurd for you to think, or to say that you think, when the object is to create a belief disadvantageous to poor Buonaparté, whose madness will be believed in, by some people. in this country, if he should live and reign to the end of their lives.—It is curious to observe the contrast in the language of the English hired prints and that of the prints (not less hired, perhaps) in France and other parts of the continent, with regard to the situation and the feelings of the people, who, in consequence of this treaty of peace, have changed their masters. Our hirelings assert, that the said people are sunk in despondency; that they look, with longing eyes, after their late “dearly beloved sovereign,” the “*chaste and pious*” Francis, and his “*illustrious*” family; that they detest the French, and especially Buonaparté; and, in short, that they do not seem to care whether they die or live. The French prints, on the contrary, assert, with equal confidence, that the change has infused fresh life into the people; that hope once more dawns upon them after a long, long night of tyranny-created despair; that the gloom of long-settled despotism is breaking away before the sun of freedom; that their revenge is sunk in

their joy, or else swift destruction would await the numerous blood-suckers, the agents of their late governments; that they love the French armies, receive them as brothers, and adore Napoleon as their deliverer; and, in short, that it was not till now that they began to think life worth preserving.—Now, though I believe, that *all* which is asserted, as to this point, by our hireling prints; *that every word of it is false*, I do not believe *all* that the French prints assert. As to *freedom*, the people in question will not, I fear, taste much of that; but, I think, there can be no doubt, that the lot of the people will, upon the whole, be much bettered. They will get rid, not of taxes and duties, but of some of them, and they will certainly get rid of many of their present cursed oppressors. They will see (and that will be a scene of great satisfaction) thousands and tens of thousands of those, who have so long been sucking their blood, driven away from the country, or sunk into poverty and disgrace. They will have the happiness of daring to *kick* those, who, for so long a time, have, under the protection of the bayonet, robbed and insulted them; and this is, at any time, worth *any risk*. Besides, a people, daily robbed and insulted, have nothing to risk; for, what, except death, can man endure more than robbery and insult? A people, so situated, have a chance of gain in any change, and never a chance of loss. The French *may* possibly be *as bad* as their former masters; but they *cannot* be *worse*: so that the people have the clear advantage of seeing the fall of their former oppressors. To hear our hirelings, one would suppose, that the French, upon taking possession of a conquered country, *swallowed up* all the food and drink and live stock and unthrashed corn and even the land, literally swallowed them all up; for they tell us of the people being *ruined*; of all their *property* being *taken from them*; of their being *stripped* of every thing; and the like. But, certainly these, as to conquered countries in general, not only are, but necessarily *must be*, mere raw-head-and-bloody-bone-tales. Whence are the mouths to come to swallow up all the eatables and drinkables of a country of any extent? But, suppose these hirelings to mean merely the taking possession of people's property, of their land, houses, goods and cattle. Whence are to come the persons so to *take possession*? Are they to be brought from France? The notion is wholly false and absurd. The

interest of the conqueror imperiously calls upon him to respect property; to make as few changes of property, amongst the mass of the people, as possible; and, with regard to the conquests of Napoleon, this call has invariably been obeyed. Indeed, none but a miserable fool would attempt to act otherwise; and Buonaparté is not a miserable fool.—All, therefore, that we are told about the *destruction of property*, in the conquered countries, is false; unless the word property be confined to the incomes of those, who live upon the taxes, and the far greater part of whom plunder the people. The *property* of these gentry, indeed, must, in cases of conquest, be in a perilous way. Some of them, and as many of them as are able, turn traitors, and thus bespeak the good will of the conqueror; but, the greater part sink into insignificance, become poor, miserable things; and, if this be not a *good*, the word good has not the meaning that I have always understood it to have.—There was a sentiment, expressed, I remember, by Colonel Craufurd, in a speech upon one of Addington's army-making bills, that struck me as very unnatural. It was this, that a people, *rather than pass under the sway of a foreign conqueror*, however mild that sway might be, *would quietly submit to be whipped with a rod of scorpions by a native tyrant*. Where the Colonel got this philosophy I know not; but, I am quite certain that he did not find it in the experience of any country in the world; and, really, it is astonishing that such a sentiment should have been expressed in any *English* assembly. Experience will, I believe, teach us precisely the contrary; and, I think, it will be found, that, amongst nations, as amongst individual families, men will take that from the hands of strangers that they will not take from those who make part of themselves. The yoke of the foreign conqueror may be full as heavy, but it is not half so *galling*, as that of the domestic despot; who, to the real sufferings that he inflicts, adds the crimes of treachery, usurpation, and ingratitude, from all which the foreign conqueror is free. Nor is the yoke of a foreign conqueror so *disgraceful* to a people, as is the yoke of a domestic despot; because the former *may*, at least, have been imposed by irresistible force, whereas the latter could never have been imposed but through the stupidity, the baseness, or the sheer cowardice of the people. A people, subjugated by a foreign conqueror, may deserve to be free; but a

people, subjugated by a native despot, must deserve to be slaves.—If I am right in these observations, how vain are all the hopes of our hirelings, who seem to rely upon risings and insurrections in the countries conquered by Buonaparté! How vain are all those hopes, which, with a view of cajoling us on from one year of war to another, and to the bearing of tax upon tax, have been inculcated through about two hundred mercenary periodical publications, and the editors of which publications live, in great part, upon the fruit of such cajolery! How vain are all the expectations of all the hundreds of thousands of those, who live upon the taxes, that pestilence and famine and death in all its most horrid shapes will stalk at large, will sweep over, every country that has been subdued by, and that has submitted to, the Emperor Napoleon! It cannot have escaped any man of common observation, that these detestable hirelings have invariably extolled to the skies every nation at war with Buonaparté; but that, the moment such nation was subdued by him, these same hirelings have described them as the basest of mankind. Nay, it has sometimes happened, as in the case of the Austrians, that, after being subdued, they have been surrendered to their old master, and have, under him, renewed the war against Buonaparté; and, in this case, they have, with our hirelings, instantly regained their former exalted character, and have again become the subjects of their unbounded applause.—One would think it impossible for publications like these to be tolerated in any country; and certainly their being tolerated here is amongst the worst signs of the times.—There is one more topic, connected with the peace between France and Austria, that I shall shortly touch upon here; namely, the probability, that Napoleon will now lose no time in making *serious attempts upon Ireland*, of the *situation and disposition* of the people of which country I need say nothing, especially to those who reflect upon the inevitable consequences of the measures, adopted with respect to that people, during the last three years. I cannot help observing, however, that only about two years have passed over our heads, since Mr. Grattan declared, in the House of Commons, that *there was a French Party in Ireland*. Now, if this was true, at that time, and if it was, in consequence of this fact, necessary to pass that *act* which

I will not attempt to describe, I will just ask the reader, what he thinks is the state of the Irish mind, with respect to France, *at this time*?—It is said, that Napoleon is actually making preparations for an invasion of Ireland. This is stated upon the authority of persons said to have escaped from France; and it is added, that the corps of *Irish Emigrants* have received orders to hold themselves in readiness for the expedition.—This is a little too hasty to come from a head like that of the Emperor. He does not, like some folks, act first and think afterwards; or, think first, and never act at all, till every chance of success has vanished. But, there can be very little doubt, that, as soon as he has settled the affairs of Spain and Portugal, and got some ships into their ports, an invasion of Ireland will be attempted, and that, too, from various points at once. Then we shall feel the effects of our present and obstinately-persevered-in mode of naval warfare; or, rather, then we shall feel the effects of the *borough system*, for to that nefarious system all our misfortunes and disgraces, abroad as well as at home; all our bad measures in war as well as in peace; all our national calamities, of every sort, are to be ascribed.

JUBILEE.—Well, and what if the continent be subdued; and what if our turn of, at least, constant alarm be now come; what of these? We still can hold a *jubilee*, and go to church, and *thank God* for a reign, which, at the close of its forty-ninth year, sees us in a state of continual 'opardy; in a state, which places an army of foreign mercenaries, in the heart of the country; in a state in which we see officers of those foreign mercenaries, taking the command, even at reviews, in our own counties, of English officers and regiments, not excepting regiments of militia: yes, in such a state of things, we can hold a *jubilee*; we can go and turn up the whites of our eyes and clench our hands together and make responses and sing anthems with a voice as loud as that of Martin Morales: yes, there are to be found amongst us, people thus to go and to *thank God*, to look upwards, as if *in the face of their Maker*, and *thank him* for a reign that found all our enemies at our feet; and which has brought us to a point, which it is unnecessary to attempt to describe. Numerous are the denunciations against *hypocrisy*, but our Jubilee crew seem to have forgotten them

all.—The conduct of *many of the clergy*, upon this occasion, is worthy of notice; but, we must not be too general here, because many honourable exceptions will have occurred to every man, who has had the means of extensive observation.—We hear talk of *enemies of the Church*: but, the real enemies of the Church are those, who make use of it for political purposes, for those purposes, which, first or last, must be universally reprobated. A few years ago, as a correspondent observes, the Clergy lent their churches, and were most active in preaching for, and even, in some instances, threatening their flocks into subscriptions to the LLOYD'S FUND, called by its managers, *Patriotic*. The recent attempt to revive that fund has shared the fate of the attempt of John Bowles and his brother Commissioners to revive Jacobinism. The late trick of a Jubilee has, in fact, also *failed*, and utterly disappointed its planners and proposers. To require men to rejoice and be glad at the end of the 49th year of the present reign for what has happened in it, would be like requiring a man to laugh and be happy with his hand held in a hot fire; or like asking a man sick in bed to get up and dance and sing. The thing is impossible, and the project, the trick, has failed entirely from the natural and innate feelings of all men at the present crisis. But, those hypocrites, who put forward the project with their usual cant and cunning, are now grievously vexed at its failure, and, taking advantage of a proposition, made in the City by those hostile to the Jubilee, of converting it to the purposes of charity, they have again set the clergy to work to collect money, under the specious pretence of *relieving the poor*, but, in fact, to endeavour, by this contrivance, to let down easy their plan of *rejoicing*, at a time when men feel only fear and distress; shame for things that have passed, and apprehension for the future; and, in the midst of a war that promises no termination, but in a peace without security. Amongst many, who have written to me upon this subject, one gentleman tells me, that the parson of his parish came to his door, with his *Beadle* and *six other persons*, to ask for money on this occasion; that he gave them none, but told them frankly that they seemed to be making an attempt to *frighten* or *cajole* people out of their property; else why not appoint a place and leave people to carry in their subscriptions. He tells me, that he knows of several persons, particularly old women

and others who are timid, that have drawn their purses through fear, and fear only. —This is the case all over the country. Not a penny is given from the pretended motive.—I cannot help noticing, in a particular manner, the Jubilee subscriptions at *Hampstead*, swarming, I dare say, with government dependents, with creatures who live upon the public. From a printed paper, now lying before me, purporting to be an account of the proceedings of the Jubilee Crew at *Hampstead*, and signed by a person named CHARLES CARTWRIGHT, as Chairman, it appears, that there was found to be, in that village, *two thousand one hundred* poor persons, fit objects to be relieved; and, it was, accordingly resolved, to give to each of the families, to which the said persons belonged, a *piece of beef*, and a proportionate quantity of *bread, potatoes, and porter*, and also a quantity of *coals* sufficient for *dressing the same*! Why not lend them platters too, and knives, that, for once, they might not tear their food with their claws? Well; but what were these people to *rejoice* for? Why, that they got a maw full, to be sure; for, as to rejoicing for *any good that their country had enjoyed*, the very thought would have been an absurdity. But, mark, here were 2,100 objects of compassion; 2,100, who were in want even of a couple of hat-fulls of coals; and, according to the official returns laid before parliament, the whole of the population of *Hampstead* amounts to no more than 4,343; so that these canting gentry, these people who are calling upon the nation to thank God for the *blessings* of this reign, have themselves, in print, and under their signatures, furnished us with the proof, that within a very trifle of one half of the people in this "*loyal*" parish, are objects of compassion on account of their poverty; are so poor as to render a single meal of animal food a thing worth applying for and going after; are so wretched as to render two hat-fulls of coals an object worth their acceptance. This is, indeed, a striking fact. It is, at once, proof of the misery of the people and of the craft of those who have been treating them.—The intention (and I beg the reader to bear it in mind), the declared intention, of the first *open* movers of the Jubilee, was, to have a *feasting*, and nothing but a *feasting*, all over the country. They said nothing about *charity*, and, indeed, to keep a jubilee in honour of a reign which exhibited such swarms of paupers; to thank God for all this pauperism and mise-

ry, must have seemed a little inconsistent. But, the harvest happening to run rather short, and bread rising just about the time that the jubilee project was first broached, the projectors began to fear that their festivity would not be very well *stomached* by the half-starved people, who have had the happiness to live under the jubilee reign. It was not till now, and till the crew received some gentle hints of what they might expect; it was not till now that they thought of the *charity* part of the scheme. In fact, they found, that, if they did not give the hungry poor a *share* with them, the Jubilee feast was very likely to lead to the very thing which the feast was intended to prevent; and that, instead of continuing the blindness of the common people, it would, at once, open their eyes. The *charity*, therefore, was a sort of *sop* to keep the poor and hungry from making clamorous complaints. But, this *sop* was not to be given without acknowledging that, which, upon such an occasion, the crew must have been desirous to keep out of sight; because, what could be more mortifying, than, on a day of Jubilee, to make such a grand exhibition of poverty and misery; to exhibit such undeniable proofs of the evils of the reign, which the people were called on to celebrate, and for the *blessings* of which they were to *thank God*. —Much *compassion*, or affected compassion, has been, by our hirelings, bestowed upon the people of the continent, conquered or over-run by Buonaparté. But, strange as it may appear to us, those people, those very people, have been holding a sort of *Jubilee*, and, to all appearance, have greatly surpassed us in their manner of doing it. The *Moniteur* says: "The peace recently concluded has been announced in all the principal cities on the Continent, amidst the sound of cannon, and every demonstration of general rejoicing. At Vienna, Munich, Stutgard, Frankfort, Naples, Rome, Florence, Milan, Madrid; &c. as well as in Paris, illuminations have taken place. A hundred millions of men have taken part in this general festivity, and celebrated it with marks of public approbation." —Well, now, you hypocrites, what do you say to this? Was all this feasting and rejoicing a sham? Was it all a vile mockery? Were these signs of joy exhibited by slaves, with a view of gaining favour with their masters, or of saving themselves from the effects of the anger of those masters? Were these signs of joy merely made use of by some

for the rascally purpose of earning thereby a chance of picking the public pocket, or for the stupid one of obtaining some paltry title to gratify the vexatious vanity of a tawdry and freakish wife? Did these rejoicers, supposing, nay, *knowing*, Napoleon to be the *most consummate hypocrite of his age*, think to flatter him by this imitation of his conduct; and did he himself, at the same time and in the same act, seem as if he were resolved to out-hypocrite them? Now, I believe none of these. I believe, that *these* rejoicings were not *totally* insincere; but, *you* must allow them to have been all sincerity, or else what becomes of your own illuminations, and other signs of joy? At any rate, we do not find, that Napoleon's rejoicers had recourse to the trick of *stopping the mouths of the poor*. They seem to have been in no dread of a people wanting a single meal of victuals and drink.—Of all the good things, however, connected with this famous jubilee, that was the best, of which record is made in *my motto*. So, the people of *Middleburgh* kept the day *with as much festivity as any people in his Majesty's dominions*! I believe it, with all my soul. Full as much *festivity*, including, of course, heartiness, or, sincerity: and I verily believe, that the *joy* was full as *sincere* at Middleburgh as it was at London, or any where else. Yes, this is an excellent specimen. Were it not for this, we might be at a loss for a standard of interpretation. Now we know what the word *joy* meant, when used upon this occasion. But the joy, the heart-felt joy, and "pious gratitude to heaven," visible in the island of Walcheren, were not confined to the inhabitants; they were also visible in every part of the *army* and the *navy*, who even fired *feus-de-joy* and royal salutes. Aye, this is it: *Make ready!—Present!—Fire!*—This is the true sort of *joy*; it is joy at word of command. This is *unanimity*; this is a specimen of that "electric unison of feeling," of which the wise-man of the Morning Post talked so nicely.—It would be curious to know, if one could ascertain it, how many thousands of *Englishmen, sick and dying*, there were in the island of Walcheren on the day of the jubilee; how many actually expired that day; how many were struggling in the last pangs of death, while the toasts and songs were going round at the festive table; and how many whose lives were shortened by the tremendous noise which must have prevailed. It would be cu-

rious to ascertain these facts. A *calculation* might come near to the point, which is a very interesting one.—Reader, let me take the liberty to press upon your attention this account of the Jubilee in Walcheren, given by the most famous of the literary hirelings in London. He tells us, that the people of Middleburgh *rejoiced*. Now, after this, will you say, that any account given by these mercenary wretches is to be relied upon? Will you believe, that people, in whose houses our troops were living at free-quarter, could join in any rejoicings of ours? No small part of the people of Middleburgh must have been much injured by the war; and, will you believe, that they *sincerely* rejoiced, that their expressions, of esteem; that, in short, their *prayers*, for the king of their invaders, were sincere? They, too, you will observe, *went to church*. Would it not have been a good thing to have *heard their prayers*?—Oh! it has been a sad scene of hypocrisy from the beginning to the end. There wanted nothing but this Jubilee to cap the character of those who set on foot and urged it forward. I repeat, however, that it has answered this good purpose; it has given rise to discussion, and will give rise to further discussion; for the promoters of it having thrown down the gauntlet, we shall not fail to take it up. They have, by their proposition to hold a jubilee, challenged us to a discussion upon all and singular the measures of the king's reign; they have invited us to examine into many things, which might have passed without examination; they have, in short, relieved us from all scruples as to many very delicate topics of discussion, and these we shall, of course, take up as occasion offers.

CHANGE OF MINISTRY.—The ministry, as at present composed, is, to be sure, such a thing as England never before saw; but, it does not follow, that it should not stand for all that the *Morning Chronicle*, with whatever reason and truth, can say against it. This print seems extremely angry, that *the nation* appears to be perfectly indifferent about the matter; but, *why* should the nation be otherwise?—This print, in notifying the intention of the government to evacuate (if they can) the island of Walcheren, has the following observations.—"At this determination no man in the country can fail to rejoice. But how acute must the feeling, of the nation be when they see that

“about two months have been consumed before our *Rulers* could make up their minds on the question, amidst their eternal intrigues and disputes! The country was all the while forgotten. Week after week our brave soldiers were kept in a climate which was hourly thinning their ranks—not to mention the money spent during this dreadful interval, above 2,500 of our troops were buried in the island; no less than *six thousand* were sent home sick to the hospitals, and nearly the same number still remain sick in the island itself. An army of 18,000 men, the finest in our service, was thus kept lingering in that horrid climate, until it was reduced to about 2,000 fit for duty. More men were lost for ever to their country than the battles of the Nile, Trafalgar, Camperdown, and St. Vincent cost altogether. More men are left sick, with their health irreparably injured,—their constitutions damaged for life, than the whole of the wounded amounted to in all those naval victories, and in all the battles by land which we have fought in Egypt, Portugal and Spain. We do not here reckon the loss incurred by taking possession of Walcheren; we are only estimating what the delay in evacuating it has cost us. We are endeavouring to give some idea of what the country has paid in blood, for the cold, selfish, unprincipled intrigues of the Percevals, the Mulgrave, and the Whartons. While those *Statesmen* have been squabbling among themselves about place and profit, the country has been losing the enormous number of her bravest soldiers which is stated above. This delay then forms a new and terrible item in the account which those *intriguers* must soon render to an injured and insulted people. We must know why the evacuation, which was always known to be inevitable, was delayed for one hour. *We must have satisfaction for the lives of those gallant men* who have thus been sacrificed to ministerial caballing and jobbing. Their blood lies upon the head of the Ministers. They have not come fairly by their end; and the GREAT INQUEST OF THE NATION is now to sit upon their bodies. We challenge any man who has the common feelings of our nature to say whether an ignominious dismissal from office will satisfy the claims of justice in this atrocious case? We ask, is it enough to take away from those men the power of de-

stroying more of our armies? We believe the feeling to be universal, that nothing short of a Parliamentary proceeding against those offenders, for the purpose of bringing them to an exemplary punishment, can either satisfy the nation for the past, or prevent a recurrence of the same calamities in future.”

—Here is, indeed, enough to stir the blood of any man. The subject, the bare facts; with this eloquent description, are enough to excite resentment in the breast of any man, not lost to all feeling. But, so ill-used has this nation been; so betrayed and insulted by both parties; so often have they seen that a change produces nothing but a new batch of peers and pensioners, that they cannot bring their minds to wish for any change. *We must have satisfaction for the lives of those gallant men, who have thus been sacrificed to ministerial caballing and “jobbing.”* What! and does the editor of the Morning Chronicle believe, that, after what we have seen, there is one man in this whole kingdom fool enough, beast enough, brute enough, to suppose, that a *change of ministry* would produce us any such satisfaction? Have we not constantly seen, that, as soon as such change has taken place, there is an end of even all talk of inquiry; and that such questions are agitated merely for the purpose of putting out of power those who are in power?—Those who are now in power never would have been there, if the people had not become indifferent, and justly indifferent, upon the subject. When have the people obtained satisfaction for any thing? When have they seen any instance of *real responsibility* in any minister, or any servant of the crown? Aye, it is very true, that this affair of Walcheren is most horrible, and that of Spain, nearly as bad; but, what hope have the people of redress; what hope can they found upon a change of ministry, when they recollect, that the leaders amongst those, who would supplant the present people, were also the leaders amongst those, who defended some of these very people, during the last session of parliament, in the commission of what was ten thousand times worse than the affairs of Walcheren and Spain united. Oh! it is, indeed, well for the Morning Chronicle to call upon the people, as it did about a week ago, to assemble in town and county-meetings, all over the kingdom, to petition the king to remove the ministers! The people, all over the kingdom, know

better; the people, all over the kingdom, remember, that when they met to vote thanks to Mr. Wardle, and to express their abhorrence of *the traffic in seats*, those, who *now want their support*, were amongst the first to abuse them for such meetings; amongst the first to call out against yielding to "*popular clamour*;" amongst the first, when the fact of seat-selling was ready to be proved, to cry out, "let us make a stand against *popular encroachment*;" the people, all over the kingdom, remember this, and, whatever other acts of baseness they may have been, and may yet be, guilty of, they will not, I think, be base enough to meet for any such purpose as that of putting one faction out of place and another faction, whose disposition towards them is exactly the same, in their stead. — Some people think, that the folks, now in place, will not be able to remain there after the meeting of parliament. For my own part, to say the truth, I have not bestowed many minutes of thought upon the subject, in which I cannot bring myself to feel any interest. I have seen the *outs* once in, and that is enough. It is, therefore, with me, and with most other people, I believe, a matter of very dry speculation, whether there will be a change, or not, when parliament meets. It will, in fact, be a question to be settled wholly by the borough-mongers. To them I, for my part, am very willing to leave it; and, whatever the editor of the Morning Chronicle may think, he will find, that the people, "all over the country," are of my mind. — I cannot get over this attempt to make us believe, that a change of ministry would bring us *satisfaction* for what has been done in Walcheren. This is so very impudent, especially after we have so recently seen the letter of Lord Grenville to Mr. Perceval, in which the former very plainly indicates, and, indeed, says, that he should have no *personal* objection to unite with the latter and his set. Oh, yes! we remember the *satisfaction* we obtained in the case of Pitt's forty-thousand-pound loan, out of the public money, to Boyd and Benfield. We, good silly souls, seeing the fact exposed, expected that the House of Commons would give us *satisfaction* for such an outrageous offence against us; but, the satisfaction, which we received, was to see the two factions most cordially unite in passing a *bill of indemnity* for the said offence; and, afterwards, in passing another bill to make us pay *his debts*, upon

the score of his public services. No: we do not expect any satisfaction, from any cause whatever, and least of all from a change of ministry. — "The account which those, intriguers must soon render to an injured and insulted people." What unmeaning verbiage? An account! What account has any change of ministry, at any time, during this Jubilee reign, caused to be rendered to the people? The people! I wonder a partizan of the out faction is not ashamed to name the people in such a way, seeing that, only in the very last session of parliament, the leaders of that faction most distinctly declared the voice of the people to be "*popular clamour*;" and, the addresses of the people to be "*popular encroachment*," against which it was necessary "*to make a stand*." — "The GREAT INQUEST of the nation," indeed! Oh, shameful abuse of words; and still more shameful attempt to impose upon the public! "The *great inquest*" is now to sit; is it? Well, let it sit; for we shall not disturb it by our curiosity. We have seen this *Great Inquest* sitting before now. We have seen it sit upon the affair of Pitt's forty-thousand-pound loan; we have seen it sit upon Lord Wellesley's India proceedings; we have seen it sit upon the case of the Duke of York; we have seen it sit upon Colonel Gordon's Chelsea Lease; we have seen it sit upon the case of Lords Castlereagh and Clancarty; we have seen it sit upon the case of Mr. Quintin Dick's Seat, when the *great inquest*, upon proof being offered it, almost unanimously *refused to enquire*. All this we have seen, and have it yet fresh in our memories. The *great inquest*, indeed! Shame on the man, who would thus delude his readers! — "But," some one will observe, "what are we to do, then? Would you let the affairs of the nation remain in the hands of the Walcheren ministry, who, but the other day, sent over *bricks, timber* and *workmen*, to build barracks, and who are now evacuating the island? Would you leave the affairs of the nation in the hands of men like these, two of whom, in consequence of a quarrel about a place, turned out, upon a heath, the other day, and shot at each other's heads?" No: if I could have my wish, certainly I would not leave the affairs of the nation in their hands for a single hour. But, it does not follow, that, because I disapprove of them, I must approve of their opponents; and, though many

men may differ from me in this respect, the Morning Chronicle may be assured, that the time is passed when the people were content to be mere tools to one or the other of the factions. If I am told, as the *outs* have plainly told us, that, let us have which faction we may, there shall be no reform of abuses, that the people shall not be represented, but that all the power shall still be monopolized by the borough-mongers: if I am told this, then I say, that I care not one straw which faction it is that rules, and that I would scorn to vote, or to open my lips, for any purpose connected with a preference of one faction before the other.—“The people must take the consequences of their apathy,” we were told, the other day. So, belike, the Whigs, the *haughty* Whigs, who licked the shoes of the Grenvilles, will leave us to perish in the hands of the Walchereners, as a just punishment for our blindness in not being able to discover their superior patriotism. Oh, no! They, surely, would not be so hard-hearted! The Spartan General would, surely, relax, and, rather than leave us thus abandoned, I’ll engage he would take another regiment, profits and all.—Empty threat! Why should we not perish in the hands of this ministry as well as in the hands of their opponents? We want the *constitution of England*, and unless we have that, we are in fact, *perishing*, in the only way, in which, as bearing upon the question before us, men can be said to perish; for, the Whigs will hardly pretend, that the continuance of their opponents in power will cause us to die. No, that is not what is meant. We want the *constitution of England*: both factions feel and declare themselves alike upon this subject: why, then, should we prefer one faction to the other?—In what way, for what cause, are wars and treaties, and, indeed public measures of any sort *interesting* to the people of a country? They are interesting to them, because they have an influence upon the condition of their lives, upon their happiness and fame, upon their *property* and their *persons*. So that after all, it comes to this: would our property and persons be *less exposed* under the *outs* than they now are? This is the only question that is worth the attention of any rational man. The *outs*, we are told, have greater abilities to conduct wars and negotiations, and would never have committed the blunders and caused such disgrace and misery as the *ins* have. This has by no

means been *proved*, either by reasoning or experience; but, admit it; take it for granted; I am still for no change; for, generally speaking, how is the nation affected by these blunders? How is its lot *made worse*? It is just where it was last year: a little heavier taxed indeed; but, that is natural and inevitable as long as the system lasts: Every man’s *property* and *person* are with the exception of this addition to his taxes, just as they were, and so they would continue, if a change of ministry were to take place to-morrow.—Let us put the matter to the test a little more closely. We are, by the editor of the Morning Chronicle and other partizans of the *outs*, always told in *general terms* what a monstrous deal of good they would do us. The prediction, or promise, is always dressed up in fine high-sounding words; but nothing particular is ever stated; there is no *precise mention* of what these generous persons would do for us, in case they were to get possession of the powers of the state. Let us enumerate a few of the things, which are of *real interest* to every man of us; let us ask what would be the conduct of the *outs* with respect to these; let us try them by this test, and, if they will not bear it, we may safely conclude, that they are as well (for us) out of power as they would be in power.

FIRST, then, Would they, who nearly doubled the *Income Tax*, take off any part of that tax, render the imposition of it more equitable, or make the collection of it less odious and vexatious?

2nd, Would they take off, or diminish *any tax whatever*; or would they, in any way, lighten the pecuniary burdens that we bear, and that have subjected us to the almost daily visits of the tax-gatherer?

3rd, Would they, frankly agreeing to a fair inquiry in the case, put to rights the important matter of the *Droits of Admiralty*?

4th, Would they, setting the influence of lawyers at defiance, reform the Prize Courts, and give to the Navy what is now, to the infinite injury of the country, swallowed up by Proctors and Advocates, and an endless list of law officers?

5th, Would they lop off all unmerited Pensions and Sinécures, beginning with those of themselves and their families?

6th, Would they reduce all the useless

parts of the Army; introduce an impartiality of Promotion, taking merit as the sole ground thereof; and would they, in all promotions, employments, and contracts, in the Army as well as in the Navy, set borough-mongering influence at nought, and consult the public good, and that only?

7th, Would they, in all questions relating to Hanover, think only of the interests of England,* and not think Hanover as dear to us as Hampshire?

8th, Would they dispense with the services of a great body of foreign Mercenaries, kept on foot in this kingdom, and paid out of the fruit of the people's labours?

9th, Would they, if Mr. Madocks's motion were renewed, for an inquiry into the circumstances of the Sale of a Seat in the House of Commons to Mr. Quintin Dick, support that motion?

10th, Would they bring forward, and maintain, with all their might, the desired measure of Parliamentary Reform, restoring to the great body of the people of property their due weight, and making the House of Commons in reality "*the representatives of the people*"?

Now, to point these questions as directly as possible, I put them, MR. PERRY, to you. You may know the intentions of your party. It is possible, that those intentions may be such as to enable you to answer all these questions in the affirmative, without the smallest hesitation; and, if this be the case, then I will say, that every man in the kingdom ought to bestir himself instantly for the purpose of bringing your party into power; but, if, on the contrary, you cannot answer even one of these important questions in the affirmative, then, of all the fools in this world, that man must be the greatest, who would stir hand or foot for the sake of a change of ministry. I beg you, Sir, not to condemn this invitation of mine; for, you grossly deceive yourself, if you suppose, that I am singular in these opinions. Indeed, you can hardly suppose so, seeing what you now see. The history of the last campaign is enough, one would think, to move stocks and stones to complain; but, you see, not a tongue moves: the people are as mute as so many fish: they would still be mute if ten thousand times worse were to happen: the last *parliamentary Campaign*, during which the two hos-

tile armies so cordially united "*to make a stand against popular encroachment*" (that is to say, against the people's complaints of *seats in parliament having been bought and sold*) that campaign rendered the people of this kingdom quite indifferent as to the events or the result or the consequences of any other campaigns; and, take my word for it, that, let the parliament meet when it will, your party will excite no *popular expression* against the ministers, who, if they do not want courage or perseverance, may keep their places, in spite of all the harangues that can be made against them.

—MR. PERRY complains bitterly, in his said paper of the 13th, of the power which certain great men have *over the ministry*, in consequence of their *influence elsewhere*; and he particularly mentions Lord Wellesley and Lord Lonsdale. The former of these, he says, "*is understood to have the giving away of one Secretaryship of the Treasury*"; and both are represented as having many places and appointments at their disposal. This is a subject of very loud complaint with Mr. Perry; but *why* is it so? Have not his whole party maintained, that this sort of influence *ought* to exist? Nay, have not his fellow-labourers, those who are, with him, regular *defenders of the faction*; I allude to the EDINBURGH REVIEWERS; have not they very recently published a set defence of that very system of an aristocratical influence, of which Mr. Perry now complains?—Shall we not, then, laugh at these complaints? What is it to us, who has the giving away of the places, Lord Lonsdale or Lord Carrington, or any other rich Lord. One is, for aught I know to the contrary, just as fit for it as the other; and I am sure the *right* of one is equal to that of the other.—No, Mr. Perry; never expect the *people* to stir again in behalf of any party, until that party shall have made an open and unequivocal declaration in behalf of the people, that is to say, for the measure of Parliamentary Reform, by which alone the people can be restored to their rights and their proper feeling. Nay! threaten us not with *approaching destruction*. We are deaf to that threat. We know that your party would do nothing to keep destruction away. Besides, *what* is it that we are to be afraid of? *What* is it that we have to apprehend? Will *additional* burdens be laid upon us? Is there a new insult in store? In short, what we want, the only thing worth caring about, your party will not let us have, if they can (by no matter

what means) prevent it, and, therefore, we wish your party to remain where they are, especially when we consider (and I do beg the reader to consider it well) that a change of ministry, though attended with no possible good to us, would be sure to produce an addition to the long list of pensioners, male and female, and, of course, *would cause an addition to the taxes.*—By way of conclusion, I earnestly beseech the reader to bear in mind this great, this all-important truth; namely, that all our evils, all the disgrace, all the miseries, all the dangers, of our country, arise from the exercise of that *very influence*, of which the *Morning Chronicle* complains; that, it is this influence, (an influence which totally stifles the voice of the people) which prevails in the filling of offices at home and commands abroad; that to it the *creation* of a great part of the national expences is owing; that it is a cormorant never to be satisfied: that nothing but a Reform of Parliament can do away this influence; and that, to such reform, the *outs* are as decidedly opposed as the *ins*.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, Thursday, 16 Nov. 1809.

COBBETT'S Parliamentary Debates:

The Subscribers to the above Work are respectfully informed, that the Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Volumes, comprising the Debates in both Houses of Parliament during the last Session, will be ready for delivery on Friday the first of December.

At the same time will be published, the
Fourth Volume of

COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF State Trials:

Comprising the Period from the Sixteenth Year of the Reign of King Charles the First, A. D. 1640, to the First Year of the Reign of King Charles the Second, A. D. 1649.

The Sixth Volume of the Parliamentary History OF ENGLAND,

Will be ready for delivery in the Month of January, 1810.

PROCEEDINGS of the COMMON COUNCIL of the CITY of LONDON, at Guildhall: Friday, Nov. 3, 1809. — (Continued from p. 726.)

Mr. WAITHMAN certainly expected that he should have had to trouble the Court with only a few sentences on the present occasion. He was, as he imagined, relieved even from this necessity, when he had heard the speech of the Gentleman who had opened the business, and who opposed the Resolution simply on the ground of irregularity. He presumed there never was a point clearer than the Resolution was in this respect. They had acted so on the very last Meeting. They were then called on to appoint a Committee to carry certain Resolutions into execution, and yet, on the motion of the hon. gent. who had just sat down, they had set aside the original Resolutions, and adopted others diametrically opposite in their stead. Here, too, the Court was called on to protect its own character, and the character of a Gentleman, of whose conduct they had formerly expressed their unanimous approbation, but who was now most grossly traduced. Notwithstanding all he had heard from the Gentleman opposite, and though he had often seen him unnecessarily load himself with dust and cobwebs, he confessed that he did not recollect an occasion on which the hon. gent. had done so to so little purpose as on the present occasion. To the first paragraph of the Resolution the Worthy Gentleman had no objection. His objection to the second paragraph consisted only in finding fault with the words of it, so far as the expression *disposal* of Church Patronage was used; like that arch-quibbler Mr. Canning, who wished to infer that Lord Castlereagh had not abused East India Patronage, because the transaction had not been carried into effect. When they saw a Dr. O'Meara brought into the presence of Royalty by the interference of a common prostitute, was it possible for that Court to doubt, that the most corrupt

interference had taken place in Church Patronage? As to the third paragraph, he (Mr. Waithman) maintained that the speech of the Speaker did apply, and that it did most completely reprobate the system from beginning to end. Lord Liverpool, too, had done the same in the House of Lords, and both had stated, that though the practice was known to exist, it had never till then been publicly acknowledged, and the Speaker, on that occasion, observed, that if the practice had not then been detected, in the end Seats would have been publicly sold, and that such traffic "would bring a greater scandal upon Parliament and the nation than this country has ever known since Parliament had an existence." The Worthy Gentleman agreed with the next paragraph, concerning lord Castlereagh, who was, as another Worthy Gentleman (Mr. Box) had described him, one of the greatest and most leading men in the country! Yes, this was one of our great leading men, but, he should say, whatever the Worthy Gentleman opposite might think of the declaration, that, under such men as Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning, this country could not last long. The hon. Gent. said he loved virtue and detested vice; but how did he love virtue? as he did a good dinner. He loved virtue and detested vice in the abstract. Such a thing might be possible to the hon. Gent.'s metaphysical mind, but, for his part, he (Mr. W.) could not comprehend it. Though such calamities as vice and corruption do exist in a State, did the hon. Gent. mean to say that they ought to be endured? Mr. Canning was told that the discovery had taken place; he said that a stand must be made; and so there had, for both parties united to preserve the system. The Hon. Gent. said, that in the time of sir W. Pulteney there was corruption in the State, and to a greater extent than at present. He asked the hon. Gent. if he could shew him a Government which had at any time been overturned, unless from the dreadful corruption which existed? and ought not that Court, and the country, at all times to exert themselves against corruption, and in favour of virtue. Every free country must be in a sort of constant state of resistance on the part of the people, to keep in check the encroachments of government. The hon. gent. seemed, however, to think that no interference should take place on the part of the people. In this he could not agree. We had frequently

had good ministers, if the house of commons would have kept a vigilant eye over them. So had that Court good officers; but if the Court were to suffer their officers to have it in their power to bribe the members of the Court, how long did they suppose the Court would continue to possess a controul over their own officers, worthy and upright men as they might otherwise be.

Mr. S. DIXON wished to protect the officers of the Court.

Mr. WAITHMAN recommended to the worthy gent. to reserve his defence for himself. He was satisfied there was not an officer belonging to that Court who believed that he meant any thing personal to them. Under any Administration, even though Chatham himself was at the helm of public affairs, we must have, and even such a minister would require, a vigilant house of commons to look after him. The hon. gent. said that Mr. Wardle caused derision in the house by the mention of a house in the City for the Sale of Offices. True, he did so; but those same persons who then laughed at his information, afterwards availed themselves of it by prosecuting the offenders, charging the offence as one calculated to vilify and degrade the government, and to bring it into contempt. The hon. gent. said, borrowing the expression of Mr. Perceval or Mr. Canning, that Mr. Wardle wished to reduce the expenditure by reducing the army. This was not the case; he wished to do so by reducing only what was useless and unprofitable. He recollected, that in the latter end of the administration of lord North, when he could no longer stand against the opposition by which he was assailed, that a Committee of Accounts was appointed. Afterwards, in 1797, a Finance Committee was appointed, and many reports were made; but to what good end? Commissioners were also appointed to examine the accounts in the West Indies. Several millions were then outstanding, and yet the salaries of the persons employed have hitherto exceeded the advantage derived by the public from their labours. He (Mr. Waithman) had looked into these accounts, which were as voluminous as Rapin's history of England, and it was true, as Mr. Windham had said, we were corruption from top to bottom, and could never expect to do good, till things were completely changed. In the War Office there was a yearly allowance for salaries to the amount of 28,000l.

yet this sum remained at the disposal of the Secretary to the Treasury, and was no doubt given away in pensions, &c.; for here the arrear of accounts was explained on the ground that there was not a sufficient number of clerks, or that they were unqualified for the duty. They were, no doubt, in many instances, young gentlemen, who, with notions too exalted for a mercantile life, were set down there to spend their forenoons in amusing themselves with Anti-Jacobin Newspapers and Magazines, as a fit preparation for the more public sphere in which they were afterwards destined to move. He proceeded, to mention a Mr. Hamilton, who, with a salary of 150*l.* in the War Office, was also secretary to Mr. W. Dundas, with a salary of 300*l.*; clerk of the Ordnance, with a salary, and with free house, coals and candles, who neglected all these duties that he might act as Surveyor of Taxes, and who on Mr. W. Dundas's retiring, had received a pension of 150*l.* per annum, for extraordinary services rendered to Mr. W. Dundas during the two years he held the office of Secretary at War. He also mentioned a servant of Mr. C. Jenkinson's, who held the office of a Messenger in the War Office for upwards of 30 years, during all of which time he never quitted his master (then lord Liverpool's) service: that general Fitzpatrick's Secretary had also, on his retiring, received a pension as Mr. W. Dundas's had done. These were all men, he contended, who ought not to be trusted. The hon. gent. said there were only 200 members of the House of Commons who were supposed to be influenced by the Minister. He (Mr. W.) maintained that there were not 20 in the whole house who were completely disinterested, he meant through themselves or relatives, or through peers with whom they might be connected, or in stations naval or military; men might be as much influenced by expecting as by having; and what immense influence must not a revenue of 78 millions per annum be supposed to create. When lord Amherst was Commander in Chief the whole expenditure of his office was 1,000*l.* a year; now it amounted to 8,000*l.* Col. Gordon, the Secretary to the Commander, had 2,000*l.* a year, being double the whole expence in lord Amherst's time, yet it surely would not be contended that the business was not as well done then as it was now. The hon. gent. called the Resolution of the Worthy Alderman crude. He must rather con-

ceive the speech of the worthy Gentleman to be so. He had never left the Court more in the dark, than on the present occasion, though he himself seemed to have been getting new lights lately, which taught him to advise the Court to support the prerogative against the people. He proceeded to read a quotation from a speech of Mr. Justice Bailey, in the case of sir Christopher Hawkins, in which the learned Judge states, that if the rights of election are so to be trampled on, the Constitution which is now our boast, will be something even less than a shadow. This was the opinion of one of the Judges of England, and where was this shadow even to be found, if the House of Commons, instead of discharging their duty, was to protect the prerogative against the people. The Hon. Gentleman's arguments went to prove quite the reverse of what he wished, and completely shewed that the country could not at present have any confidence in Ministers. They had now so much to do in the House of Commons, that they could not think of the great affairs of the nation. When the Hon. Gent. declared that he would be ready to go up to the Throne week after week till the corruptions in the State were done away, he (Mr. W.) did not expect that he would have shewn so little punctuality. - When the other worthy Member, however (Mr. Kemble), declared that his blood was boiling at the distresses of the people, he little expected that he could have been silent during the series of calamities which the country had lately sustained by the gross inefficiency of its Government; but still less could he have imagined that that worthy Gentleman would have come forward, and called on the Court to rescind the motion, which did them more honour than any other Resolutions which they had passed for several years. The worthy Gentleman talked of charity; let him think however of those brave men, and their relatives, who perished along with the gallant Moore, and in our other more recent expeditions. — And though we were told that due inquiry had been made, Mr. Canning since tells us no, and yet, while he admits the inefficiency of the minister, under whom the Expedition was prepared, he sits calmly by and allows him to take the superintendence of two other Expeditions, and to send two other armies to be wasted, one at Walcheren, and another in Spain. It was the duty of that Court to stand up and defend every public man

when they saw him attacked by both parties. When Col. Wardle first stood up in the House of Commons he had not one man to support him, and yet, at the end, he had 125 with him against both parties. It was his (Mr. W.'s) firm conviction that the country could not stand unless the House of Commons kept a vigilant eye over ministers. By passing a Bill to prevent the Sale of Seats in the House of Commons, they had themselves recognized the existence of such a practice. If the Court rescinded this Vote, they would thereby pass a censure on Col. Wardle, and degrade themselves and their Constituents. If so, he hoped meetings of the Citizens would be called to consider of their conduct. If they acted so unworthily, he should not desire again to have a seat in that Court.

Mr. S. DIXON supported the motion.

Mr. KEMBLE disclaimed any intention of reflecting upon the character of Mr. Wardle, declaring that if he conceived the Motion he thought it his duty to submit had such a tendency, he would immediately withdraw it. Mr. Wardle was so situated at present, that he would feel it unjust to make any attack upon him. Full opportunity for explanation ought in justice to be afforded him, before any decision was formed against him. That there was a great deal necessary to be explained was obvious, and he had no doubt that much would come out of which the public had not yet the least idea. As to the sentiments of the Gentleman on the floor, (Mr. Waithman), he must say, that although he approved of his conduct on certain occasions, he was not prepared to go the entire length to which these sentiments would lead. He felt himself quite an independent man, owing no favour to any Minister, and he was decidedly hostile to corruption, which he would have torn up by the roots; but the learned Gentleman on the floor had taught him a lesson, how cautious he should be as to the company with which he acted, in prosecution of his principles, lest he should be betrayed farther than it was his wish to go.

Mr. Alderman ATKINS deprecated the unqualified censure of the House of Commons, which the Court had heard in the course of the debate. How, he would ask, could it be consistently maintained, that there were not 20 independent Members in that Assembly, when it was recollected, as the Gentleman himself who

made the assertion quoted, that 125 Members voted with Mr. Wardle; and when its conduct in Lord Melville's case was taken into account, there he would ever contend that the independence and integrity of the House of Commons—that its proud support of the British character, was most eminently proved.

Mr. MILLER emphatically contrasted the conduct pursued by certain Gentlemen, with regard to the Family of the King and the interest of the Minister. When it was proposed to thank Mr. Wardle for his opposition to the Duke of York, these Gentlemen, notwithstanding all their vaunted loyalty, were silent or acquiescent; but the moment the interest of the Minister was attacked, up started this party to raise a hue and cry against Mr. Wardle. It would be well for real loyalists to consider this contrast. It was equally material to the King and to the people to consider it, and to examine the character and motives of those who abused Mr. Wardle. They must be stupid indeed who could suppose, that that abuse sprung from any objection to vice, or any regard to virtue. No, Mr. Wardle was not abused, because he was believed to be wrong, but because he was known to be right—and if he had not deserved the approbation and esteem of good men, the base men, by whom he was abused, would have been his panegyrists. But Mr. Wardle, supported by the people, must triumph over such foes.

Upon the question being put, a very decided majority appeared in favour of the Previous Question.—We could not indeed perceive more than five hands in favour of Mr. Kemble's motion.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SWEDEN AND RUSSIA.—*Treaty of Peace between Sweden and Russia. Dated 5-17th September 1809.*

In the name of the Holy and Undivided Trinity! His Majesty the King of Sweden, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, equally animated by the desire of causing the advantages of peace to succeed to the calamities of war, and of re-establishing harmony and good understanding between their states, have, to this effect, appointed their Plenipotentiaries; namely, his Majesty the King of Sweden, Baron Count Louis Bogislas; Christopher de Stedinck, one of the Nobles of the kingdom of Sweden, General of

Infantry of the Swedish armies, Knight and Commander of the Swedish Orders, Grand Cross of the Order of the Sword, Knight of the Order of St. Andrew, of St. Alexander Newsky, and of St. Anne of the first class; and M. Andrew Frederick Skojoledand, Colonel and Commander of the Order of the Sword: and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, Count Nicholas Romanzoff, actual Privy Counsellor, Member of the Council of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Commerce, Senator, actual Chamberlain, Knight of the Orders of St. Andrew, St. Alexander Newsky, Grand Cross of the Order of St. Wladimir, and of St. Anne of the First Classes, Grand Eagle of the Legion of Honour of France, Knight of the Royal Prussian Orders of the Black Eagle and Red Eagle, and of the Royal Dutch Order of the Union, and M. David Alopeus, actual Chamberlain, Knight of the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Wladimir of the second class, and of St. Anne, of the first;—who, after the exchange of their respective full powers, found to be good and in due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

Art. I. There shall henceforth be peace, friendship, and good understanding between his Majesty the King of Sweden, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias. The high contracting parties will make it their chief study to maintain a perfect harmony between themselves, their states, and subjects, and will carefully avoid whatever may hereafter disturb the union so happily re-established.

II. His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias having manifested the invariable resolution not to separate his interests from those of his allies, and his Swedish Majesty wishing to give, in favour of his subjects, all the extent possible to the advantages of the Peace, promises and engages, in the most solemn and binding manner, to neglect nothing which, on his part, may tend to the prompt conclusion of Peace between him and his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and his Majesty the King of Denmark and Norway, by the means of the direct negotiations already commenced with these Powers.

III. His Majesty the King of Sweden, in order to give an evident proof of his desire to renew the most intimate relations with the august allies of his Majesty the

Emperor of all the Russias, promises to adhere to the continental system, with such modifications as shall be more particularly stipulated in the negotiations which is about to be opened between Sweden, France, and Denmark.—Meanwhile, his Swedish Majesty engages, from the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty, to order that the ports of the kingdom of Sweden shall be closed, both to the ships of war and merchantmen of Great Britain, with the exception of the importation of salt and colonial productions, which habit has rendered necessary to the people of Sweden.—His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias promises before-hand, to consent to every modification which his allies may consider just and fit to be admitted in favour of Sweden, with respect to commerce and mercantile navigation.

IV. His Majesty, the King of Sweden, as well for himself as for his successors to the throne and kingdom of Sweden, renounces irrevocably and in perpetuity, in favour of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and his successors to the Throne and Empire of Russia, all his rights and titles to the Governments hereafter specified, which have been conquered from the Crown of Sweden by the arms of his Imperial Majesty in the present war, namely—The Governments of Kymenagard, Nyland, and Tavastchus, Abo and Bjorneborg, with the isles Aland, Savolax and Corelia, Wasa, Uleaborg, and part of West Bothnia, extending to the river of Tornea, as shall be fixed in the subsequent Article in the demarkation of the frontiers.—These governments, with all the inhabitants, towns, ports, fortresses, villages and islands, as well as all the dependencies, prerogatives, rights, and emoluments, shall henceforth belong, in full property and sovereignty, to the Empire of Russia, and shall remain incorporated with it.—To this effect his Majesty the King of Sweden promises, in the most solemn and obligatory manner, as well for himself as for his successors, and all the kingdom of Sweden, never to make any claim, direct or indirect, on the said governments, provinces, islands, and territories, all the inhabitants of which shall, in virtue of this renunciation, be relieved from the homage and oath of fidelity by which they were bound to the Crown of Sweden. (*To be continued.*)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 21.] LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1809. [Price 1s.

"The defect of Representation is the national disease; and, unless you apply a remedy directly to that disease, you must inevitably take the consequences with which it is pregnant.—*Without a Parliamentary Reform* the nation will be **PLUNGED INTO NEW WARS**; without a Parliamentary Reform you **CANNOT BE SAFE AGAINST BAD MINISTERS**, nor can good ministers be of use to you. No **HONEST** man can, according to the present system, continue minister."

MR. PITT'S Speech, 1782.

769]

[770

TO THE INDEPENDENT PEOPLE OF HAMPSHIRE.

LETTER IV.

Parliamentary Reform.

GENTLEMEN,

My addresses to you, upon this subject, have for some months been discontinued on account of other matter having forced itself upon the public attention. Now we may resume the discussion without much danger of its being interrupted by the interest excited by warlike events, seeing that, after what we have now seen in that way, there can happen nothing of the sort, capable of exciting our wonder, or rousing our indignation. Since the date of my THIRD Letter; that is to say, within the short space of six months, we have seen, 1. The war and the peace, begun and concluded in Austria. 2. We have seen the campaign in the southern peninsula, the destructive campaign in Spain and Portugal, and the list of titles bestowed upon our commander. 3. We have seen the splendid and enormously expensive embassy to Spain. 4. We have seen the Walcheren Expedition, for the achievements of which, as well as for those of Baron Douro, the Park and Tower guns were fired, and government illuminations were made, in token of joy. 5. We have seen, one week, materials (even to brick and mortar) and workmen shipped off for the purpose of building barracks wherein to lodge our troops in the island of Walcheren, and, the next week, we have seen it stated, that these troops are ordered to evacuate the island. In short, six such months for military events; six months of such importance to the world have, I am pretty confident, never been before, though my opinion is, that the next six, after this winter, will not be less important. Well, Gentlemen, now, look back over these six last months, not forgetting that one of the ministers remained

in office along with another of them, and suffered that other to plan and execute the terrible expedition to Walcheren, while the former carried in his pocket a promise of the dismissal of the latter, upon the ground of his unfitness for his office; not forgetting, I say, that millions of our taxes and the lives of thousands of our countrymen were committed to the united councils, to the co-operating wisdom, of men whose jealousy and hatred of each other urged them, at last, to shoot at each other's heads: look back over these six last months; then read my motto; and then ask yourselves, whether you have not there before you the *disease* and the *remedy*.

When Pitt uttered these words he did not foresee, that he himself should go so far in the way of fulfilling them. He could hardly have foreseen, that, "without a Reform," he should become minister, and "continue" such for nearly twenty years; had he foreseen this, he would not have declared, that, *without a reform, no honest man could continue minister*. We are now in a situation to render this subject particularly interesting, because we have the practical consequences before our eyes. A *change of ministry* is called for by some persons, as the means of saving the nation; or, at least, of affording it a chance of salvation; but, Pitt, in this memorable speech, told us, that, "without a Parliamentary Reform, even good ministers would be of no use," a truth which, I think, none but such persons as the Edinburgh Reviewers, that is to say, those who profit, or seek to profit, from corruption, will attempt to deny.

There cannot, I think, be the smallest doubt, that it is owing to the want of a representation of the people, that this nation has been plunged into new wars and expensive and useless and inglorious wars; for, indeed, it is manifest, that almost constant war is necessary to the present system, war being the source of such endless

2 B

means of influence. But, to take a recent instance or two, is it not notorious, that the war for *Ferdinand VII*, a war which has already cost us so many millions in taxes and so many thousands of valuable lives, a war the events of which make one shudder with horror; is it not notorious, that this war was never approved of by the people of this kingdom, who were willing to make any sacrifices for the purpose of restoring the *liberties* of Spain, and of defending them against Buonaparté, but who abhorred the idea of aiding in the perpetuating of Spanish *bondage*? The Edinburgh Reviewers have asserted, that the people have to *thank themselves* for the National Debt, for that they have *always urged the government to make war*: That every one of the wars of this reign has been a war of the people. "The people!" What a shame for men of talents thus to prostitute those talents! The people? In what way did the *people* express their approbation of this war for Ferdinand? I need not put the question to those of you, Gentlemen, who happen to live at Winchester, and who saw some two score of sycophantic clergymen and tax-gatherers and barrack-masters and dock-yard contractors trooping to St. John's House at the heels of George Rose, and there, calling themselves a *county meeting*, passing, in the form of an Address to the King, an approbation of the war just then resolved upon, and which Address was brought ready manufactured, in the pocket of the said George Rose, or some one acting under his direction. Now is it not baseness to the last degree for any well-informed man to call this the voice of the *people of Hampshire*? Our voice, as you well know, was directly against such a war; and, indeed, our interests must be eternally opposed to every project, calculated, as this was, to produce a waste of national resources, without the smallest chance of effecting any good purpose whatsoever. It is not so with the far greater part of those, who assemble upon such occasions. They have an interest not only separate from, but in direct opposition to, our interests. To them *every addition to the taxes* (no matter from what cause) *is a benefit*, because the gain of most of them is in proportion to the amount of the taxes. And, which applies to the whole of them, they, at any rate, have in view some place, pension, or emolument from the ministry of the day, and, therefore, they ought not to be, in such a case, considered as speaking the voice of the

people, nor, indeed, of any portion of the people.

It was my intention, at this time, merely to point out to you some of the consequences, which we have, at *this moment*, before us, of a want of a Parliamentary Reform; but, an advertisement, which I have just seen, for a county-meeting in BERKSHIRE "to consider of an Address, "congratulating his Majesty on his entering the 50th year of his reign," induces me to beg leave to trouble you with a few words upon that subject.—If there should be a meeting called in *this county* for a similar purpose, and if the Address, there proposed, should contain, whether expressly or by *implication*, any praise of the *ministers* and *measures* of this most unfortunate and calamitous reign, it will be our duty to demand an alteration in such Address. There is not a man of us who will be disposed to dissent from any expression of good wishes or of duty towards his Majesty; but, at the same time, that we "congratulate him upon his having entered on "the 50th year of his reign;" at the same time that we express our fidelity to him as our sovereign, it will be perfectly proper for us to express our unfeigned regret, that, during the whole of his reign, he has never had but very few servants, in whom the people confided, and that every set of his servants have been, by their successors, accused of want of honesty as well as want of wisdom; so that, each set of servants have made false assertions, or every set have been bad.—I trust, that we shall not keep away from this meeting (if one should take place) merely because it may be called by others. It is a time of the year when most men have some leisure. My decided opinion is, that it is impossible for George Rose and all his underlings to pack a meeting in such a way as to obtain any thing resembling a majority, unless they were to hire carts and waggons and actually bring up loads from the Dock-yards and the Barracks in the Isle of Wight. Indeed, they cannot do it: let the *yeomanry* act as they did upon the last occasion, and there is not the smallest doubt of their success.—This county has long been regarded as being full as much at the ministers' nod as if it were a rotten borough. It was only because it had lent itself to *faction*. Every man almost was persuaded to attach himself to one faction or the other, and thus became a political slave of his own accord. This is not now the case. We

now think, each man of us for himself, and we have proved to the nation, that Hampshire is yet a little more dear to us than Hanover.—I beg leave to add one caution. The factions may, perhaps, agree to call together only the *Noblemen, Gentlemen, Clergy, and Freeholders*. But, they have *no power of exclusion*. Every man, who can possibly attend, should attend, and no one dare attempt to set his voice aside. There are thousands of persons, who have copy-hold, or lease-hold, lands, or who have good personal property, though they have nothing of what is called *freehold*; but, will such persons be weak enough to keep away from a county-meeting upon that account, and thus tacitly sanction the abominable abuse, of which we complain, and which abuse sets a forty-shilling freeholder, who is not unfrequently a *pauper*, above the copy or lease holder, or the man in trade, or the farmer, who is, perhaps, worth thousands of pounds, and who pays in taxes every year, or, perhaps three or four times a year, more than the fee-simple of the forty-shilling freeholder's property is worth.—No: I trust, that there are, at this day, very few indeed of the yeomanry and tradesmen of this county, who are to be thus deceived, or thus intimidated from doing their duty. Every man in the county has a right to attend a county meeting, and, for this reason, that no one has a right to put any question to him as to what is the nature of his property. Those who pay no taxes, indeed, if any such could be found, might, with some shew of reason, be objected to. At a meeting, some time ago, at Reading, it was asked whether there were any but *freeholders* in the Hall; whereupon Mr. HALLETT said: "If there be any man here who does not pay taxes, in one shape or another, let him withdraw." A laugh ensued, and all stood fast.—This is the principle whereon to act in such a case. There is no one who has authority to examine into any person's qualification. No one has authority to bid another go away; and, therefore, I trust, that any trick intended to make the meeting thin, will be defeated.

I am, Gentlemen,

Your friend,

W^m. COBBETT.

Botley, 22 Nov. 1809.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

STATE OF FRANCE.—Many have been

the occasions, upon which I have endeavoured to guard my readers against a belief of the reports, published in this country, relative to the pretended *misery* and *disaffection* of the people in France; which reports have been repeated, perhaps, a thousand times.—The mischief of this delusion, is, that it leads people to rely upon what is not true, and disposes them to slacken in their exertions for their country's defence. To be deceived, in any thing, is mischievous; but every deception of this sort is peculiarly so.—Most of the attempts to deceive the public in this way have been gross enough; but, I do not, at present, recollect any one so very gross as that, which I am about to make a subject of comment; and, what makes it the more necessary to be commented on, is, that it found its way to the public through the pages of the *Morning Chronicle*, which introduced it in a manner calculated to give it as much credit as possible. The introductory words of the editor are as follows:—"The Packet of French Papers which should have been delivered to us on Monday evening, reached our hands yesterday morning. It has furnished us with a regular set of the *Courier de l'Europe* down to the 4th inst. and what is of more importance, with a particular detail of the present state of France, written by a Gentleman who has had the best means of observation, and upon whose authority we can IMPLICITLY RELY.—The following is the substance of his private letter to us:"—Now, who, from this introduction, would not suppose, that a detail was about to be given, worthy of public reliance? The editor says, that he himself *implicitly* relies upon it; he calls it *important*; and he says his correspondent has had the best means of observation.—The article is taken from the *Morning Chronicle* of the 15th instant. I think it necessary to be particular; for, really, it is hard to believe, and I could blame no one for doubting in the existence of such a publication. Besides, it contains a statement respecting the conduct of English prisoners of war in France, of which I should be very sorry to be suspected as the author, or even the promulgator; for, if the fact stated be true, it is indeed of importance, but of a most disgraceful nature.—Here, then, is that detail, on which the editor of the *Morning Chronicle* places *implicit reliance*.—The date, as to place, is blank: the time is the 4th of November.—"Buona-

"parté passed through Meaux, on the 26th October, at three o'clock; he appeared unusually pale and fatigued; a handkerchief was tied round his head; on a faint cry of Vive Napoleon! Vive l'Empereur! he scarcely nodded his head. His baggage was on its route for Bayonne—troops marching from all parts of the North for Spain. He goes after the meeting of the Senate. Joseph Buonaparté is to be King of Italy. Spain to be treated as a conquered country, and divided into twelve Governments. —Beauharnois is to be King of Poland; that part lately wrested from the Austrians to form a part of the kingdom. —Not a light more than the ordinary lamps were seen at Paris on the announcing of peace, although the Monitor boasted of a general joy and illumination; no such thing; the Parisians are as indifferent to any peace on the Continent as the Khann of Tartary. They complain loudly of the Corsican's ambition; pray for peace with England, with whom they are not enemies. It is the Corsican himself, and those who are enjoying military rank and place, that are for war; but they wish for repose. There is no Commerce; Paris presents perfectly splendid misery; a few carriages, and those by no means convey any great idea of riches. Every trader readily carries his merchandize 25 or 30 per cent. for ready money. Coffee, sugar, cloth, all cotton manufactures, augment amazingly in price. The theatres not half full, except in the pit. Bills are stuck up every night at St. Cloud, Malmaison, and in the streets, that the police are employed taking down. The farmers ruined, cannot pay their servants or their labourers, but in kind, wheat being so cheap and plentiful. Where they dare speak, I never was witness to so much discontent, in every department; and this new call of 36,000 men (which will be treble) has filled up their cup of sorrow. The flower of the army is cut off. The Imperial Guard, not one out of ten, that left Paris in April last, returned without loss of limb or severely wounded: the privates and subaltern officers speak freely. His army is composed of thousands of Prussians, whom he took prisoners, and never suffered to return, in violation of the treaty of peace. The conscripts wound and maim themselves to prevent serving.—The new public works are not paid for: the person who is repairing the Thuilleries, &c.

"has not been paid a sous since two years, and then on Government bonds at more than 12 per cent. discount.—Sir Thomas Lavie was thrown into prison and conveyed at four in the morning to St. Menould, a small fortification near Verdun; his papers seized, and no one knew for why—a most wicked breach of good faith, almost as wicked as our detention of the Corsican. They treat our prisoners with uncommon cruelty; thumb-screwed, a chain round their necks and bodies, conducted from brigade to brigade; nothing but bread, no wine, no beer, no meat, oftentimes without straw, and put into dungeons full of water! chained often with galley slaves or other criminals. This severity has forced many to enter into their service; 600 already clothed and armed, passed through Meaux for Bayonne. They swore to me they would desert; above 30 had. I am sure, poor fellows, they entered into the service with no other view than running away; but, alas! I fear they will never succeed."—Now, this detail does, I think, come completely up to the instructions given by Sir Toby to his brother knight, when the latter is about to write a challenge to his supposed rival: "Let it be curt and brief; have as many lies as will lie in thy sheet of paper; let there be gall enough in thy ink, though thou write with a goose pen." —Let us pass over the faint cry of Vive Napoleon, and also the dim illumination at Paris, admitting, for the sake of avoiding dispute, that the accounts, which the Monitor gives of the joy and enthusiastic loyalty of the people of France, are just about as true as those, given by the Morning Post and other hireling prints, in similar cases, on this side of the water. Let swallow, too, the assertion, that the people of Paris are quite indifferent about any peace upon the continent, and that they pray for peace with us, whom they love most cordially, and further that they complain loudly of the Corsican's ambition. . . . But, stay! We must be cautious how we believe this; because our authentic gentleman has, in other parts of his letter, told us that it is only certain persons who dare speak. Here seems to be a little contradiction; and, indeed, if it be true, that the Parisians do loudly complain of the Corsican's ambition, they take greater liberties with their sovereign than we ever do with ours, of whom none of us ever dream of complaining, though we have

seen some little slaughter of our countrymen, and though this war as well as the last was *begun* by our government. If, therefore, the people of France do loudly complain of the conduct of their sovereign, the people of France are not in a state of slavery so very complete.—So, amongst the proof of misery, the “*theatres are not half full.*” How are our theatres? “The police are employed *taking down.*” How are our police employed? Oh! what unfortunate strings to touch upon just at this time! But, what are we to think of what this authentic gentleman says about the *losses in the army*? “The flower of the army is *cut off.*” Good God! and is that a subject of *discontent* in France? Are we to believe, that that will cause the people to *hate* their sovereign; and are we to believe this too, just at this time, when we are still hearing the accounts of the Jubilee through the besotted columns of the hired prints? Do the people of France charge their sovereign with the blood of his armies?—“Not one in ten that left Paris, in April last, *without loss of limb, or severely wounded.*” Well, and what then? But, really, one can scarcely help thinking, that this correspondent of the Morning Chronicle was writing ironically. Alas! the French army, though very likely their loss and their sufferings have been great, have not fought and bled and suffered *in vain*: they have returned, though few in number, perhaps, covered with *glory* and not with *disgrace*. The Emperor of France may hold up his *conquests* as the price of his people’s sacrifices. He may say to them, that, if he has called upon them for great services, and great pecuniary sacrifices, he has given them in exchange *perfect security*. His people dread no enemy. They are haunted with no fears of invasion. They are not filled with alarms. They are not *in doubt* as to what may be their fate in six months from any given day. They are, in short, in a *settled* state of things, and they have as much of glory as is necessary even for them.—Paris, it seems, according to the notions of this writer, is in a state of *splendid misery*, and, as a proof of it, he tells us, that there are but very few carriages. This writer forgets the passage, wherein GOLDSMITH, who was, I take it, full as sound a political philosopher as this gentleman; he forgets the passage, wherein this poet so justly, so poetically, and so feelingly describes the misery, which never fails to accompany

the “rattling chariots’ clash, the torches’ glare.” Perhaps there is no remark that could have been made, better calculated than this, to give a reflecting man a favourable opinion of the change, which the last seventeen years has introduced into France. The fault here is, that it is all carriages, all rattle and glare, in the public parts of the metropolis, while, every where else, real misery prevails; while the poor-rates and the number of paupers are daily augmenting; and while the whole nation is so heavily burdened with taxes, that no man can scarcely call any thing his own.—As if, however, the absence of carriages from the streets of Paris; as if the disappearance, or, at least, the diminution of luxury; as if this were not sufficient to convince us of the *misery* existing in France; as if, to convince us that the people of France are in a miserable state, it were not sufficient to tell us that they are not in danger of being trampled under foot by the horses of loan-jobbers, jews and contractors; as if this were inadequate to the giving of us a just notion of the *misery* of the French people, this gentleman tells us . . . what, think you, reader? You have seen, or you never would have guessed at it, if you had kept on guessing to the end of your life. He gives us as a proof of the misery of the people of France, the fact of “*wheat BEING SO CHEAP AND SO PLENTIFUL.*” There is a proof of *misery*: There is a proof of national misery, and of the terrible effects of the change that has taken place in France! Have a care, Sir, how you promulgate such proofs of French misery; for they might produce, in England, effects that you do not appear to be aware of, especially if the quatern loaf should happen to rise to half a crown or two shillings.—This is, to be sure, a most curious symptom of national misery, and no less curious a source of national discontent. We now know, then, what it is these gentlemen mean when they talk of national misery, national ruin, national destruction, and the like. They mean that state of things, in which there are few coaches and chariots and landaus and curricles, but in which there is plenty of bread. They mean that state of things, in which there are, comparatively speaking, few persons who live upon the taxes; few persons who live upon the fruit of the labour, or of the estates, of others. This is what they mean by national misery and destruction; but, I would advise them, if they

really have discovered this to be the case in France, to "keep their own council;" for that, even with the aid of the *fee-losophes* of the Edinburgh Reviewers, they will never persuade the people of England, that the sight of the fine carriages of jews and contractors is preferable to plenty of bread.—But, it seems, this *abundance of wheat* has *ruined the farmers*.—Well, then, what pretty fellows we must be, who have, in our Common Prayer Book *Forms of Thanksgiving for Plenteousness*? All the maxims of the world are wrong, then? People should pray to be guarded against abundant crops? The arts of tilling and manuring, and the anxieties of the husbandman, are, then, all worse than useless?—"The farmers are *ruined*, wheat being so *cheap* and *plentiful*." If it be plentiful, it will, of course, be cheap. One is a consequence of the other; but, that the growers of corn should be ruined by the abundance of produce is an absurdity too gross to be tolerated for one moment.—They cannot, we are told, "*pay their servants or their labourers, but in kind*." It was well our gentleman, "who has the *best* means of information," put in this saving sentence at the end. Sad state, to be sure; the farmers have nothing but corn, that is to say, *nothing* but the means of making *food and drink*, to give to their servants and labourers; and those means they have in such abundance that they do not know what to do with them?—Oh! wretched farmers! miserable labourers! Unfortunate people of France, such are the effects of that change, which has driven from amongst you the loan-jobbers, farmers of taxes, contractors, Jew-brokers, and all those, whom in former times, you had the honour of seeing drive along the streets in gilt chariots, and to hear of their sumptuous meals upon turtle!—Reader, you must recollect, that that wise man William Pitt, commonly called "an *illustrious* friend now—no more;" you must recollect, that this "great statesman," at the commencement of his war against France, conceived the brilliant idea of starving that country into submission, and that, with this view, he expended several millions of English taxes. The scheme, brilliant as it was, failed. Pitt promised the parliament that his starving scheme, joined to the breaking up of "public credit" in France, would do the business of the revolutionizers in a very short time. We know this to have turned out a false promise; but our *best informed*

friend, if he had been of Pitt's council, would have told him, that he went just the wrong way to work; for that, the certain way to ruin a nation was to ensure it, if possible, most abundant crops of every thing, and especially of wheat; that is to say, an abundance of bread.—I do not know how the reader may view this matter, but, to me, it appears very disgraceful to this country, that such absurdities as this should be sent forth to the public, through the columns and under the express recommendation of a print of long standing, and of established character. It is not many weeks since a publication appeared in one of our daily prints, which of them I now forget, giving quite another account of the agricultural state of France. The writer in that case, as well as in this, wished to make us believe that the people of France were miserable, and, of course discontented; but, the former did not, apparently think it likely, that we should be able to discover a source of national misery in the great abundance of wheat and cheapness of bread. Be his thoughts what they might, however; his assertions were, that agriculture was in a neglected state.—The truth is, I believe, that agriculture never was, in France, in a state so flourishing as at this time. There are many reasons why it should be so. Rich lands, in vast quantities, never tilled formerly, began to be tilled the moment the revolutionary fury was over. Nay even during the reign of the DIRECTORY, all those who went to France were surprized to see the rapid improvements in agriculture.—It is of great consequence, that we should see this matter in its true light, because, as to the result of the contest, in which we are now engaged against Buonaparté, it is proper that we should know, that we have no ground for hoping for any assistance whatever from the internal situation of our enemy's country. We should scout all idea of hope built upon such a foundation. We should place "*implicit reliance*" upon our own exertions; and no reliance at all upon any aid to be derived from any other source.—There is something in the close of this article of "*undoubted authority*," that I do greatly doubt of, and that I most sincerely hope is false from the beginning to the end.—The reader will anticipate that I allude to the story about the *prisoners of war*, which is, I think, one of the most shameful that could have been invented.—We are told, that our countrymen who are prisoners in France, are

used in a *very cruel manner*; that they are *thumb-screwed*; that *chains* are put round their *necks and their bodies*; that they are often *chained with galley slaves*; that they have *nothing but bread to eat*; that they are often *without even straw to lie upon*; and are put into *dungeons full of water*.—Had these facts come unaccompanied with any sequel, I should not have believed them. These are so glaringly false, that they could have been believed by nobody; and, besides, they so directly contradict what we *know* to be true with regard to the treatment of our prisoners of war in Spain, that we would think they had been invented for the purpose of throwing discredit upon the channel through which they were conveyed to the public. The *sequel*, however, the sad, the disgraceful sequel, explains the whole at once. It not only shows the facts to be false, but also shows the cause of their invention.—This gentleman of “the best means of information,” and on whose statement we are to place “implicit reliance,” says, that many of our countrymen, who were prisoners of war in France, *have entered into the French service*; have actually become *soldiers in the army of “the Corsican!”* And, the writer tells us, that he himself saw *six hundred* of them *already clothed and armed*, passing through Meaux for Bayonne.—After we have read this our wonder ceases at the account of the chains round the neck and the dungeons full of water; for we see that some such account was absolutely necessary, for the purpose of palliating the disgraceful and ominous fact of the enlistment of Englishmen under the banners of Napoleon.—We are told however, that they *swore they would desert*; that thirty of them had *already deserted*; that the writer is sure they entered into the service with *no other view than that of running away*; but that alas! he is *afraid they will never succeed*.—Leaving the reader to settle the question of morality in this case, I will offer a remark or two upon the *probability* of what is here said as to the views of the persons thus said to have entered into the French service.—But, first, let me say, that I greatly doubt the fact. My doubts may arise from my wishes (for I must wish the fact to be false); but, as I do not believe one word about the alleged cruelty, so I do not believe that any part of our countrymen would be so base as thus to take up arms in the service of our enemy. Upon the supposition, however, that the fact be true, what are the grounds, whereon to

believe, that the men, thus enlisted, mean to desert? What chance will they have of deserting? And where, I should be glad to know, will the *thirty* hide themselves who have deserted in the heart of France? But, the worst circumstance, for the veracity of this writer, is, that the French are marching these men to *Bayonne*; that is to say, to Spain, or to Portugal, where they will find (if they find any body to fight with) an army of their own countrymen; and whither, in short, it would seem, they are sent for the express purpose of affording them the means of deserting, if the fact be, that they are so much disposed to desert. Whatever may be the opinion of the writer, as to the views of these men, there can, I think, be no doubt, that those who have enlisted them are not afraid of their deserting, or, most assuredly, they would have marched them in any direction, other than that of Spain or Portugal.—I repeat my hope, that the whole of this story is false, notwithstanding the Morning Chronicle points it as worthy of the “implicit reliance” of the public. I hope it is false from the beginning to the end; but, upon the supposition of its being true, as to the fact of enlistment, what a contrast does the conduct of our prisoners of war present when set beside that which is, by this same Morning Chronicle, of the very same date, attributed to the *Spanish prisoners of war*.—The facts are thus stated: “We have received letters from Vigo to the date of the 26th ult. By these it appears, that the peasantry of all the adjacent country is provided with pikes or fire arms, and that the inhabitants are in the best disposition to support the public cause. A Gentleman, who has had the good fortune to escape from the French, has just arrived from Spain, and has favoured us with some interesting particulars. What he says with regard to the number of French in the hospitals of Madrid precisely corresponds with what was stated in a letter from that city which we inserted in our Paper of Monday last. He informs us, that all the convents and public buildings at the Spanish capital are full of sick and wounded Frenchmen, who are crowded into them to the number of 18,000. An endeavour was made by Joseph to raise a native regiment under his own banners from the prisoners and others in the vicinity of Madrid; and to facilitate this purpose, two or three thousand of them were kept without

"food for upwards of two days, when they were invited to partake of the Royal bounty, and to enlist under the new King. In this feeble condition, from the want of natural sustenance during so long an interval, the Spaniards rejected the proposal, with the exception of two hundred, who entered the ranks. It is said, that the attempt to raise Spanish battalions in France has been yet more unproductive. From 20,000 prisoners, only about 50 Spaniards have been seduced by ultimate threats and promises, to enrol themselves in the French service."—Here, then, if this account be true, only two hundred out of twenty thousand Spanish prisoners in France, have, by all the threats and promises, that the French have been able to make use of, been induced to join the armies of the enemy; while we are told, that, in one place, six hundred English prisoners are actually seen, clothed and armed, in the service of that enemy. This is a pretty contrast; a contrast to boast of, and just at this time too!—I am of opinion, as I said before, that the whole of the story is false; and, I think, the public will agree with me in thinking, that, to say the least of it, the falsehood must have a very mischievous effect. It is right particularly to deprecate any overstrained statement respecting the ill-usage of our prisoners of war at a time when the French have so many of them at their mercy. We, who are at home, in safety, should be very careful how we say any thing, that may tend to render more severe the lot of those of our countrymen, who have hazarded their lives in war, and whose captivity is, in itself, no bad proof of their having been distinguished for their bravery.—I have heard from several persons, serving in our unfortunate army in Spain, a full confirmation of the facts stated by Baron Douro as to the good and kind treatment of our people left at Talavera. Of these facts, therefore, we cannot doubt. These facts we know to be true. Why, then, are we to listen to anonymous reports, respecting the treatment of English prisoners in France?—It has been said, that we are indebted to Marshals Mortier and Victor for the kind treatment of the prisoners at Talavera, and not to the Emperor Napoleon; but, does the reader believe, can any man of common sense believe, that those Marshals would have so acted towards our prisoners, if they had suspected, or had had the smallest reason to suspect, that their so acting

was contrary to the wishes of Napoleon? Nay, must not every one be well assured, that those Marshals knew, that their kind and generous conduct towards our countrymen would be agreeable to their master? And, is it not, then, very wrong to pretend to believe; to seem as if we believed, these stories, these utterly incredible stories, of the cruelties practised upon our countrymen, who are prisoners of war in France!—I trust that these remarks will have some effect towards inducing the editors of papers to be more cautious how they give circulation to statements, arising evidently from the resentment of individuals, but calculated to produce, in so many ways, effects injurious to the country.

CHANGE OF MINISTRY.—In my article, upon this subject, published last week, I commented upon a paragraph in the Morning Chronicle, and put some questions directly to Mr. PERRY, the proprietor of that paper. These questions he has, in his paper of the 21st instant, *noticed*, but not *answered*. As it were, however, by way of compensation for this omission, he has commented, with no little severity, upon my conduct in the present instance, and, indeed, upon my political motives and conduct in general.—Before I set about an answer to these comments, I shall introduce an article or two from the same print, upon the subject of the proposed change of ministry. I do it for this reason. Mr. PERRY will be found to accuse me of a desire to cure the evils of the country by *rebuilding*, by which he means, that I would first *pull down*. By these extracts I shall shew what sort of building he thinks we have to deal with, and whether his wishes are for pulling down or for repairing.—The first extract relates to the alledged conduct of Lord Wellesley, and, if true, most curious facts it contains.—"There is a most singular story in the political circles which merits publicity. It is perfectly well known, that both Mr. Canning and Mr. Perceval sent dispatches to Lord Wellesley, informing him of the convulsion that had broken up the late Administration; and of the ascendancy gained by Mr. Perceval—of the offer that had been made by him to Lord Grenville and Lord Grey—of their rejection—and also containing the offer, by Mr. Perceval, of the Foreign Office to the Noble Marquis. We understand, that by some accident, which remains yet to be explained, Mr.

"Canning's dispatch did not reach the Noble Lord; but Mr. Perceval's was faithfully delivered to him. He had, therefore, only Mr. Perceval's statement of the *cabal* before him, but which of course came corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Wellesley Pole, who had accepted the place of Irish Secretary under the new firm. Whether the Noble Marquis thought, however, that further information was necessary—that the aspect of things might change even before his letter could arrive in England—that Mr. Perceval's footing was not sure—or what other presentiment struck him we cannot say; but we understand he confined himself in his answer to all his friends; *except one*, to a simple declaration, that he had no engagement with Mr. Canning that could preclude him from accepting a responsible situation in the Cabinet with Mr. Perceval and Lord Liverpool; but said, that he had inclosed his determination at length, as to the specific offer made to him, in a letter addressed to his friend Mr. Sydenham, who would of course make it known. Accordingly, there is a large packet, *duly sealed* by the Noble Lord's splendid seal of arms, addressed to Mr. Sydenham, still lying in the Secretary of State's Office *unopened*, Mr. Sydenham having been dispatched on a special mission to Seville, before this important packet arrived in England! This has given rise to observations of the most *lively* kind; as it is facetiously conjectured that the packet may contain *more than one letter*."—This is pretty well, I think.—It having been found, that Lord Wellesley was willing to join the ministry, the Morning Chronicle appears to have thought less reserve necessary towards him; and, accordingly, on the 15th instant, it boldly speaks out thus:—"Never was failure more complete than Lord Wellesley's in Spain. He has not succeeded in a single object of his mission. He has neither expelled the French, nor reformed the Junta; neither united the people, nor conciliated the government. He loitered in England, till it was too late to check the rashness or assist the valour of his brother; and he has found at Seville, that Spaniards are neither dazzled by the splendor of an Asiatic retinue, nor overpowered with the exuberance of an Oriental style. His exhortations, his remonstrances, his menaces, have been

"thrown away upon the Junta, but assisted by other causes, they have kindled a flame among the people, of which, it is difficult to say who will be the victims, or what the duration or the extent. A storm is gathering in that quarter, which our Lord Wellesley has no disposition to encounter. *Political courage* is not, "on *this side of the Cape* at least," in the number of his virtues. We all remember the time when his fears, not his friendship, kept him from the highest situation but one of the government. With characters like his, the present danger is always the most alarming, and therefore we were not surprised to hear, that he had so readily acquiesced in the first proposals of Mr. Perceval. But he, who shrinks from popular commotions at Seville, will seek in vain for courage in England, to face, day after day, in a popular assembly, an eloquent, an indignant, an injured opponent. That the possession of the Treasury might inspire that confidence we will not deny; and we have no doubt in asserting, and Ministers know it to be the case, that he accepted their overtures in the belief, that *this splendid prize was included in their offer*. Impatient to get away from Seville, he instantly announced his intention of returning, but before he had begun his journey the news of Lord Grenville and Lord Grey being sent for arrived most inopportunistically, to suspend his purpose, and detain him there, like Prince Volscius, in the Rehearsal, with one boot on and another off, uncertain what course to resolve upon. What will be his decision when Mr. Sydenham assures him that negotiation is at an end, but that Mr. Perceval means to keep the Treasury to himself, the appearance of things at Seville will probably determine. If a Government is likely to be established there, which he can hope to direct, he will prefer a Pro-Consular sway in the Court of a dependant Ally, to an inferior, subordinate, or inactive situation at home. But, if the Junta are obstinate, and the populace riotous, he will obey Mr. Perceval's call, and if refused the first place in Administration on his return, he will probably retire to the obscurity from which he so lately emerged, and seek in the shade of private life consolation for the disappointments of ambition. To those who recollect Lord Mornington at the Treasury Board, reciting his annual oration by Mr. Pitt's

"permission, and condemned to silence for the remainder of the Session, it must appear a strange caprice of fortune, that could have elevated Lord Wellesley to be the hope and prop of an Administration. But such is the fallen state to which the crooked policy of half a century has degraded the once free and respectable Government of England. A troop of hungry Barristers, who have got possession of the lucrative Offices of State, have need of an Actor to personate the character of a Statesman; and as none can be found in the metropolis to accept their offers, they are forced to have recourse to provincial Theatres for some one to complete their Company. But they who look to Lord Wellesley for active support in danger, or for extraordinary resources in counsel, have widely mistaken his character and means. *A giant and hero among the Hindoos*, he quitted Lilliput for Brob-dignag when he returned to Europe."

—What! Mr. Perry, has there, then, been crooked policy in this government for half a century? Is the "once-free and respectable government of England degraded"? Are we now ruled by "a troop of hungry lawyers"? Is all this true? And, if it be all true, what sort of a thing have we got over us, called a Government? But, whether true or not true, I defy you to shew, that I have ever spoken of the government in this way. No: to take such liberties is a privilege peculiar to you men of party, who all understand one another, and who are known to mean no harm to the good old common cause of place and pension.—But, let us take one more article. Let us hear your description of those, who now govern us; of those who have the management of our internal concerns, and who are to defend us against all the mighty means and mightier genius of our enemy. "Next to the mismanagement of public affairs, the distribution of Places to incapable men, forms the most conspicuous part of the conduct of the present wretched Ministry. The appointment of Mr. Croker to the Admiralty has attracted universal notice, and Lord Palmerston, as Secretary at War, and some say, a Member of the Cabinet, (though *this* we cannot believe) almost surpasses Mr. Croker. But that both these eminent Statesmen might be kept in countenance we now have Mr. Huskisson's office, one of the most difficult, delicate, and important under Government, confided to Mister

Richard Wharton, or Warton, another broken down Barrister, only known by his attempts at raising the cry of Jacobinism last year, and only recommended by that illustrious nobleman Lord Lonsdale. We have long heard that his Lordship is supposed to have the patronage of one Cabinet Place, if not two—the giving away of it—the appointment of Lord Mulgrave—the nomination to the supreme direction of Naval Affairs, This has been long talked of; and it now appears, that beside various lesser things, Lord Lonsdale is also complimented with a Secretaryship of the Treasury. It is also suspected that he has insisted upon the appointment of his Attorney, Sir James Graham, of Lincoln's Inn, as Chairman of the Ways and Means.—Nor can there be a doubt, that if he asks it, Ministers must give it. It may indeed be expected, that when briefless Barristers fill the higher stations, from the absolute impossibility of inducing any other men to take them under such a Ministry, the next Places should fall to the lot of worn-out Attornies. Whether all this Lowther patronage may suit the House of Commons as well as it does Mr. Perceval, and the Noble Lord in question, we presume not to anticipate—but this we will assert—that no expedient ever was devised more surely calculated to bring Government into universal contempt—more admirably fitted to alienate the people from their Rulers, than this shameless distribution of the highest Offices in the State. In God's name, let Lord Palmerston go stand for one of the vacancies now contested at Cambridge—and let Lord Lonsdale and his Mulgraves, his Wards, his Whartons, his Grahams, his Sons, his Servants, &c. be provided for out of his 100,000*l.* a year in the North—but let not the Country be told, that it is a matter of perfect indifference who is Secretary at War, or Secretary of the Treasury, or First Lord of the Admiralty—for this is the practical lesson taught by those scandalous appointments. Among a thousand other evils, this obvious one arises from it—that it degrades the stations in question. What man fit to serve his Country, can step into the Offices just held by such persons as the Lord Palmerston and the Sieur Wharton, without reluctance, without feeling that the Place has been rendered unfit for him?"—Thus, then,

Mr. Perry asserts, or he obviously intends his readers should believe that we are now under the rule of *broken down Barristers* and *worn out Attornies*; that Lord Lonsdale in consequence of his borough-power, has the patronage, the actual *giving away*, of a place in the cabinet, that is to say, that he has, in fact, the appointment of one of those few servants (not above ten or eleven in number) to whom the king entrusts the conducting of the great affairs of the nation, and who, as it is well known, sit in council with the king himself.—This Mr. Perry tells his readers; and, after that, I should not have expected him to find fault of any one, as wishing to go *too far*; for, I am quite 'at a loss to know, how it is possible for any man to go farther in his ideas of the degradation of the government.—We now come to the article, wherein Mr. Perry comments upon my conduct and views, which article professes to be an *answer* to mine of last week, on the subject of a change of ministry. We shall presently see what sort of answer this is; and whether it be worthy of the name of answer; but, before I insert it I must observe, that if my article was worth so pointed and so long a commentary, on the part of Mr. Perry, it was worth inserting in the same paper along with the commentary, and if it had been so inserted, Mr. Perry's readers would have been able to judge between him and me. But, this practice of laying before your reader *all your adversary has to say*, is what I never saw followed by any one but myself. It is, however, what fairness demands; and, indeed, it is what bare truth demands, especially if, as was the case in this instance, the insertion be attended with no possible inconvenience. Mr. Perry had more columns, than were necessary for this purpose, filled with matter very uninteresting. He allows that this subject is of great importance. He seems to be fully persuaded of the necessity of combatting what I have written upon it. But, does he think, that the way to succeed in this, is to comment upon what he will not, if he can help it, suffer his readers to see?—The reader will bear in mind, that ever since the pistolling affair, and the consequent confusion and chopping and intriguing and plotting amongst the people in power, Mr. Perry has with all his powers of statement and of reasoning (and they are not small,) been recommending a change of mi-

nistry; that is to say, the turning of these people out and the putting of the late ministry in their place. This, as he says, would be for the good of the nation, and, indeed, according to him, such change is absolutely necessary for the preventing of this country from falling into a state of utter ruin.—I, in my last Number (page 750) combatted these opinions. I asserted, and, I think, pretty clearly proved, that, unless the *out-faction* would do certain things, their coming into place could produce no good to the nation. Referring the reader now to the article itself, I shall, without further preface, insert the comments of Mr. Perry, which, as the reader will perceive, may be, without any great hazard of mistake, regarded as containing the sentiments of the what is called the *Whig* part of the *outs*. "It is the invariable fortune of The Morning Chronicle to be persecuted, with equal bitterness of hostility," by Mr. Cobbett on the one hand, *for not going far enough*, and by The Courier, *for going too far*. Mr. Cobbett, in his paper of Saturday last, puts forth ten questions which we are called upon to answer *seriatim*; and The Courier charges us, *point blank*, with rank and confirmed *Jacobinism*, because we have ventured to oppose the unprecedented and (as we think) flagitious attack on the people by the monopolists of the Theatre.—We are prepared to answer both our adversaries.—We cannot conceive a more effectual mode of supporting any Administration, however feeble, corrupt, or hostile to the rights and interests of Englishmen, than the course which Mr. Cobbett pursues. He does not attempt, like the Courier, to palliate the misconduct of the men who are content to occupy the seats, without possessing the power of Government; but he sets up an irrational cry, that their opponents are equally bad, equally corrupt, and equally inimical to their country. There is nothing, to be sure, more easy, nor more summary, than this course of proceeding. It saves all reasoning, prevents all discussion, and if it does not satisfy the inquisitive, the discerning, and the impartial part of mankind, imposes on the ignorant and the idle, while it gratifies the unprincipled; for there is a malignant feeling which makes the guilty receive with complacency the foulest imputations upon those who disdain their fellowship.—We can-

“not, indeed, conceive any thing more
 “degrading to human nature, or more
 “flagitious, than an attempt to confound
 “all the degrees and distinctions that ex-
 “ist among us, and to reduce all intellect
 “to one level. It is a species of calumny
 “that is even blasphemous. It is a denial
 “of the dispensations of Providence, and
 “a wilful blindness to the physical and
 “moral order of the universe. Mr. Cob-
 “bett is too shrewd an observer of the
 “palpable varieties in the scale of human
 “understanding, to deceive himself into a
 “belief of the slander which yet he pro-
 “pagates. He makes use of it with his
 “eyes open to its fallacy. But it is con-
 “venient, and saves a world of labour. It
 “strikes directly at the great object,
 “which he seems systematically since his
 “last conversion, to pursue, viz. to aim
 “at the deliverance of the nation from all
 “its grievances, rather by convulsive than
 “by moderate means. We do not im-
 “pute to him the treasonable thought of
 “the overthrow of his country; but we
 “think he would rather save it by rebuild-
 “ing than repairing the fabric: and he
 “is well aware that the predecessors of
 “the present Ministers are not of his
 “order of reformers. He knows that they
 “are men gifted with minds and hearts
 “to preserve, and not to destroy, and that
 “they are infinitely more likely than the
 “present Ministers to prevent (if human
 “sagacity can now prevent) the ruin of
 “the Empire, without resorting to the
 “desperate remedies which he recom-
 “mends.—When, therefore, he asks us
 “whether they would take off or lower
 “the existing taxes—we say, distinctly,
 “that we verily believe they would main-
 “tain inviolate the faith of the nation,
 “well knowing that its honesty is its
 “strength, and that the slightest infringe-
 “ment of our obligations would be irre-
 “parable ruin. The diminution of taxes
 “must, therefore, be the slow consequence
 “of a change of system, not the forerunner
 “of it, and though their Administration
 “might end in the material ease of our
 “burthens, it could not begin with such a
 “measure.—But as to the institution
 “of the most rigorous inquiry into “the
 “important matter of the *Droits of the*
 “*Admiralty*—the reform of the *Prize*
 “*Courts*—the lopping off of unmerited
 “Pensions and Sinécures—the reduction
 “of all useless parts of the Army”—and
 “generally as to a systematic and vigilant
 “correction of abuse in every department

“of the State—we can only say, that we
 “should be ashamed of the preference we
 “give to these honourable men over their
 “opponents, if we did not religiously give
 “them credit for their avowed determina-
 “tion to introduce and to practise an uni-
 “versal economy in the conduct of our
 “affairs. We will say more—We believe
 “that it is the persuasion, that such is their
 “principle and rule of conduct, that con-
 “stitutes the sole obstacle to their employ-
 “ment.—We of course can judge only
 “of the intentions of public men by their
 “public acts. We have no pretensions
 “to secret or to confidential intercourse.
 “What may be their line of proceeding
 “with regard to Hanover we certainly do
 “not affect even to conjecture; because,
 “in the present state of European politics,
 “it is scarcely to be considered at all.
 “The employment of mercenaries in
 “England every constitutional man must
 “deplore; and as to a Reform of the Re-
 “presentation of the People in Parliament,
 “we can only say, that we have uniformly
 “and earnestly urged it as the wholesome,
 “sound, and practical means of restoring
 “to the Legislature the power of making
 “responsibility more than a name. We
 “pretend not to speak for others; but
 “we should imagine that to the simple and
 “effectual Reform, of which we have al-
 “ways been the friends, there is no great
 “objection to be found in any quarter.”
 “—Taking the several parts of this article,
 in the order in which they lie before us,
 the first thing to be noticed is, the asser-
 tion at the very outset, namely, that I
 persecute Mr. Perry for *not going far*
enough. Now, pray, Mr. Perry, *when did*
I accuse you of not going far enough? This
 assertion has no foundation whatever; and,
 it appears to have been made solely with a
 view of forming a set-off against the charge
 of Jacobinism, preferred by the Courier.
 As if you had said: “look, here is proof
 “that I am no Jacobin, for Mr. Cobbett
 “*persecutes me for not going far enough.*”—
 You, in these comments, next charge me
 with “setting up an irrational cry, that the
 “opponents of the present ministers are
 “equally bad, equally corrupt, and equal-
 “ly inimical to their country.” This
 you stigmatize as casting foul imputations,
 and as calculated to gratify malice. But,
 Sir, you seem to have forgotten, that I
 produced *reasons* for thinking the *outs* just
 as bad as the *ins*; that I produced *facts*,
 too, in support of my opinion; and I can
 hardly think, that you are vain enough to

suppose, that my opinion, so supported, is to be overset by your bare assertion, or, rather, without any distinct assertion, but a sort of sweeping condemnation of what I had asserted upon proof. This is not the way to *answer* any one, and particularly me, who deal so much in facts and so little in speculation.—You say, that I “attempt to confound all the degrees and “distinctions that exist amongst us, and to reduce all intellect to one level;” and this you describe as calumnious and blasphemous and every thing else that is bad. This charge also is wholly untrue. I have never made any such attempt. I have never pretended, that the *outs* had no more *talent* than the *ins*. I have never said, and I am sure I have never thought, that the two factions were upon a level in point of *intellect*. But, what I have said, and what I have thought; what I still say, and what I still think, is, that, *with respect to their views and intentions as to all those matters in which the people have an interest*, they are perfectly upon a level; and that, therefore, any change of ministry, which should produce merely the shifting of the salaries from the *ins* to the *outs*, would be useless to the nation. These, Sir, were my propositions. To these you should have given an answer. But, to these you could have given no answer, because they are notoriously true; and, therefore, you chose to pass them over, and, in their stead, to invent propositions for me, which you found it more easy to manage. No, Sir, I deny your charge. It is not a *level of intellect* that I have insisted on, but a level of views and intentions as to all those points in which the people are interested. And, if this be the case, why should we prefer one faction to the other? You should have shown, that this was not the case. You should have shown us in what respect the *outs* differ from the *ins* in their political views and principles; but especially in those views and intentions by which the people are likely to be affected. This is what you should have done, and this you have left even unattempted; though you set out with telling your readers, that you are prepared to answer me. The course of the matter was this: You called upon us to come forward and petition for a change of ministry; I say, “no,” because the *outs* have, towards us, just the same views and intentions as the *ins*; you publish what you call an *answer* to this, and in this answer you talk of my attempting to level all intellect, of my being

blasphemous, of my denying the dispensations of Providence, of my attempting to degrade human nature, of my imposing on the ignorant, of my gratifying the unprincipled, of my being guilty of calumny and slander; of all this and a great deal more do you talk, but not one word do you say to the main point, not one word do you say, in order to disprove what I asserted, namely, that, with regard to whatever was really interesting to the people, the views and intentions of both factions were the same. And this is your way of *answering*, is it, Sir?—What, you do, then, acquit me of “the treasonable thought of the *overthrow* of the “country”? Gramercy! I’ll bear your kindness in remembrance, believe me. You only impute to me the wish to *save* the country “by *rebuilding* rather than by “*repairing* the fabric,” which you afterwards explain to mean a wish to “*destroy*” by the use of the “*desperate* remedies,” which I recommend.—Here, Sir, as in the former case, you answer facts and reasoning by bare assertion; and by assertion, too, unconnected with the subject. It was not *my* political principles that were under examination, but those of the two contending factions. Since, however, you have chosen this course of proceeding, let me ask you what “*desperate* remedies,” what “*destroying*” measures, I have ever proposed? I have urged, and I still urge; I still insist that without what I urge, that it is no matter who is in power or what else takes place; I still urge, such a reform in parliament as will give the people a voice there; and what is this more than was contended for by Mr. GREY, who is now Lord Grey, and who is one of the persons, whom you hold up to us as capable of saving the nation? Give me what he proposed, and I will be contented. I think his plan was too complex and was not quite consistent as to principle; but, give me that, and you shall not hear me complain. What, then, is there “*desperate*” in this? How does this denote a wish to “*destroy*?” Sir, these imputations against me evidently arise from the vexation you feel at not being able to answer me. You are angry with me for reducing you to the necessity of acknowledging, either expressly or tacitly, that you have a bad cause. You know, that the faction, whom you endeavour to support, have deceived the people; you know that their intentions towards the people are no better than those of their rivals for place and profit;

you know, that if the great question of reform was brought forward, some of its most resolute enemies would be found in your faction; and, because I say all this; because I say, what you know to be the truth, you have the injustice to cast upon me imputations which you know to be unfounded.—When, Sir, you took up your pen, upon this occasion, you appear to have formed a scale of answer from which you afterwards departed. What we say of boys and their bread-and-cheese seems applicable to you and your commentary: your eye was bigger than your stomach. When your readers heard you say, that Mr. Cobbett had put TEN QUESTIONS to you, and heard you add, that you were prepared to answer him, they must naturally have expected to find an answer to each question; an answer immediately to the point; a plain intelligible answer; in short, an answer, for nothing which does not answer to this description is worthy of the name of answer. But, Sir, how have you answered these ten questions? Let us see, re-inserting the questions as we proceed, especially as you have not done it.

First then, Would they, who nearly doubled the *Income Tax*, take off any part of that tax, render the imposition of it more equitable, or make the collection of it less odious and vexatious?

2nd, Would they take off, or diminish any tax whatever; or would they, in any way, lighten the pecuniary burdens that we bear, and that have subjected us to the almost daily visits of the tax-gatherer?

Now, what answer have we to these? The questions are as plain as words can make them. The answer is this: "When, therefore, he asks us, whether they would take off, or lower the existing taxes, we say, *distinctly*" (mark this!) "we say, *distinctly*, that we verily believe, that they would maintain inviolate the *faith of the nation*, well knowing that its honesty is its strength, and that the slightest infringement of our obligations would be irreparable ruin. The diminution of taxes must, therefore, be the slow consequence of a change of system, not the fore-runner of it, and, though their administration might end in the material ease of our burdens, it could not begin with such a measure."—This might all have been saved by the use of the monosyllable NO; for, it is plain from

what is said, that even Mr. Perry does not expect, that the outs would attempt any thing in the way of reducing our enormous expenditure. But, you perceive, that he passes over the *first* question; takes no notice at all of it; but amuses his readers with a statement of his creed as to national morality; as if my questions called for any such statement! What has national *faith* and *honesty* to do with the mode of imposing and collecting the *Income Tax*? Does he mean, that, unless this tax remains, and is imposed and collected in the same manner that it now is, the *faith* of the nation will be forfeited? What does he mean then?—At any rate, he plainly enough tells us, that the *outs* would suffer this tax to remain just what it now is; and, if so, I am quite certain that I would as soon have the produce of it expended by Mr. Perceval as by Lord Grey or any body else. If I am to have my property taken from me, without the power of appealing to a jury as to whether it be taken away justly, or unjustly, I care not one straw whether it be expended by the *ins* or by the *outs*.

3rd, Would they, frankly agreeing to a fair inquiry in the case, put to rights the important matter of the *Droits of Admiralty*?

4th, Would they, setting the influence of lawyers at defiance, reform the Prize Courts, and give to the Navy what is now, to the infinite injury of the country, swallowed up by Proctors and Advocates, and an endless list of law officers?

5th, Would they lop off all unmerited Pensions and Sinécures, beginning with those of themselves and their families?

6th, Would they reduce all the useless parts of the Army; introduce an impartiality of Promotion, taking merit as the sole ground thereof; and would they, in all promotions, employments, and contracts, in the Army as well as in the Navy, set borough-mongering influence at nought, and consult the public good, and that only?

To these questions we have nothing but the following general and vague sort of answer: "We can only say, that we should be ashamed of the preference we give to these honourable men over their opponents, if we did not religiously" (in the jubilee way, I suppose,) "give them credit for their avowed determination to introduce and to practise an universal economy

"in the conduct of our affairs." Economy! Why, it is not merely economy that these questions point at. They point at, nay, they speak of, matters deeply interesting to the *efficiency* of our navy and our army. How are these huddled together and confounded by the word economy, and *universal* economy too! I ask, will your faction reform the prize-courts and give to the navy what is now uselessly swallowed up by proctors and advocates? To this what answer do I get? Why, "we verily believe they will practise an *universal* economy." This is no answer to the questions. It is no answer to any one of them; nor does the answerer express even an opinion as to what his faction would do, relative to these important matters. — But, let us stop here to notice an observation, of the tendency of which the writer does not appear to have been fully aware. After stating, that he is thoroughly persuaded, that the *outs* are determined to introduce and practise an universal economy in the conduct of our affairs, he says, "We will say more—we believe, that it is the *persuasion*, that such is their principle and *rule of conduct*, that constitutes the sole *obstacle* to their employment." — That is to say, in plain English, that they are kept out of power *solely because they are known to wish to save the public money*. Now, then, Mr. Perry, who is it that keeps them out of power? *Who* is it that dislikes them because they wish to spare our purses? *Who* is it that is such an enemy of the people? Answer me this, thou moderate gentleman, who do not wish to rebuild, but to repair. *Who* is it that you mean? And, are we not in a pretty situation, if there does exist any person or persons, having the will and possessing the power, to keep men out of office, solely because those men would, if in office, endeavour to *alleviate the burdens of the people* by preventing, as much as possible, a wasteful expenditure? I do not like insinuations. Why did not Mr. Perry tell us *who* it was he meant as keeping the *outs* from power, solely because they were desirous of saving the people's money? — The remaining questions I will now put, one by one, and the answer to each immediately after it.

Qu. 7. Would they, in all questions relating to Hanover, think only of the interests of England, and not think Hanover as dear to us as Hampshire?

Ans. "What may be their line of conduct with regard to Hanover, we certainly do not affect even to conjecture; because, in the present state of European politics, it is scarcely to be considered at all."

Qu. 8. Would they dispense with the services of a great body of foreign Mercenaries, kept on foot in this kingdom, and paid out of the fruit of the people's labours?

Ans. "The employment of mercenaries in England every constitutional man must deplore."

Qu. 9. Would they, if Mr. Madocks's motion were renewed, for an inquiry into the circumstances of the Sale of a Seat in the House of Commons to Mr. Quintin Dick, support that motion?

Alas! not one word of answer to this. Not a syllable, good, bad, or indifferent!

Qu. 10. Would they bring forward, and maintain, with all their might, the desired measure of Parliamentary Reform, restoring to the great body of the people of property their due weight, and making the House of Commons in reality "*the representatives of the people*?"

Ans. "As to a reform of the representation of the people in parliament, we can only say, that we have uniformly and earnestly urged it, as the *wholesome and sound and practical* means of restoring to the legislature the power of making responsibility more than a name. We pretend not to *speak for others*," (O, oh!), "but we should *imagine*, that, to the simple and *effectual* reform, of which we have always been the friends, there is *no great objection* to be found in any quarter."

I wish, while you had the pen in your hand, Sir, you had just taken the pains to tell us what *sort* of a reform that is, to which you have always been a friend. But, you only *imagine*; you expressly say, that you do not *speak for others*; and, I am fully persuaded, that those others are far indeed from being of your way of thinking upon this all-important point. The writers who speak for those others, as to this matter, are the Edinburgh Reviewers, well-known to be closely connected with many of them, and these Reviewers have lately told us, that any change, which should give the people a voice in the

House of Commons, would be injurious to the nation, and would, indeed, *infallibly destroy the kingly government*.—From your manner of expression, at the close of your comments, one would suppose, that, to a reform to a certain extent; such a reform as that proposed by Mr. GREY, your party would have *no objection*. Will *they* say so? Has any such expression escaped them? I believe not.—You (and they, too, I dare say,) complain, that Lord Lonsdale has the *giving away* of a seat in the king's cabinet council; and you represent this council as being, in fact, the mere nominees of those, *who have influence in the House of Commons*. Now, is this so? You talk of my uttering calumny; you talk of my slandering; but, if this be not true, what are you guilty of? And, if it be true, is it not idle to talk of a *change of ministry*, unless you can, at the same time, put down this influence in the House of Commons? Is it not a shame for a man of sense and of talents to feign a hope of any national good, unless such reform take place as shall do away this deadly influence?—If, indeed, your faction would state to the people what you have stated; if they would tell us that they have no objection to an effectual reform, such a reform as would *render responsibility something more than a name*; if they would tell us, that they would give us such a reform, then, indeed, we might begin to conceive hopes. But, no such thing do they tell us. There are some persons, who would be satisfied with the restoration of *triennial Parliaments*, without any thing more. Not even those persons have been able to extort even a nod of assent from any of your party. Why, then, should any of us, any single soul amongst us, wish for their exaltation to power? Will they promise us, that they will bring to *punishment* any predecessor who has abused his power? Not a man of them will promise any such thing; but, on the contrary, would call us fools, if we were weak enough to expect it. *Why*, then; I will repeat my question 'till I weary you; *why*, then, I say, should we wish for any change of men;—“I pause for a reply.”

W^m. COBBETT.

Botley, Thursday, 23 Nov. 1809.

A letter of Mr. WATTHMAN, inserted below, I beg leave to recommend to the particular attention of my readers.

ADDRESS

TO THE

CITIZENS OF LONDON.

MR. COBBETT,

SIR;—I feel highly obliged to you for your endeavours to bring back the Citizens of London to a proper sense of their duty. I am anxious, as far as in me lies, to retrieve my own character and theirs from the shame and obloquy which must attach to it by confiding such an important trust into the hands of men, who have given us such flagrant proofs of folly and want of principle. You will therefore oblige me by publishing the following Address to my fellow-citizens:— I am, yours, &c.

FELLOW-CITIZENS!

The conduct of our Common Council demands our serious attention: The state of the Country imperiously calls for it; and we have no other alternative than to restore to the Corporation the dignity and independence it has lost, or to surrender all pretensions ourselves, not only to character, but to those rights which our ancestors fought for and obtained, and which the most affluent, the most temperate and most virtuous amongst us acknowledge to be worth preserving, even at the hazard of our lives.

In calling your attention to the disgraceful proceedings of the Common Council for the last twenty five years, I entreat you to recur to its transactions, previous to that period; you will then be the better enabled to mark the shameless depravity of the present times by contrasting it with the manly and decisive firmness with which the open, or insidious attacks of the ministers of the crown were resisted, whenever they attempted, by trick or by violence, to render the Citizens of London subservient to their designs. No longer the intrepid Champions of our Constitutional rights:—no longer the vigilant guardians of our honour and interests; or the stern opposers of ministerial encroachments—the Common Council have shewn themselves the willing advocates of a system of corruption which is sapping the very foundations of the government it pretends to support.

Instead of approaching the throne with firmness, in the language of truth: instead of insisting, as they are bound to do, on an inquiry into the scandalous waste of

Public Money, and the wanton sacrifice of lives in hazardous enterprises and unwholesome climates: instead of opposing with courage equal to the magnitude of the occasion, the enormous abuses which dishonour and impoverish the nation:—we find the Common Council the mere agents of succeeding factions, partaking of that infamy it should expose and extinguish, giving to crime, and imbecility, the plaudits due only to virtue and to wisdom.

There is not in the United Kingdom, a city, borough, town, or village, where the Common Council has not become the subject of severe animadversion, of scoff and of ridicule. The public journals, the theatre, and the print shops, have equally contributed to the exposure of their folly, ignorance and selfishness; nor are we, my fellow Citizens, exempt from the censure it has incurred; seeing that it could only have proceeded from our criminal supineness and neglect, that men so unworthy and incapable, should have been chosen as our representatives in the Corporation. If their turpitude have brought our fortunes into hazard, their guilt is less blamable than our indolence and indiscretion, in making such improper selections. Their ignorance and incapacity prepared us, in some sort, for the baseness and venality we have experienced; the country has reason to expect from us a choice more worthy the character of the Citizens of the metropolis of the British Empire.

It may not yet be too late in some measure to repair the injury they have done us, and secure the level which we have lost. In short, our right annually to elect persons to represent us in Common Council has acquired a value beyond what it ever before possessed in any period of our history. Let us estimate it according to its full worth. Let us, by a manly discharge of our duty at this perilous moment, endeavour to retrieve our own character, and save the empire. The Aldermen were once elected annually; this privilege was lost by our neglecting to exercise it. The want of this prudent check may account for their neglect of our interest and contempt for our opinion. Their basking in the sunshine of court favour, with pensions, titles, contracts, loans, jobs and appointments, more than sufficiently atone to them for the loss of our confidence and respect. No longer in danger of being dismissed; they hold their situations for life, as some of the Common Council are well disposed to do, and who really, by their conduct,

seem to consider themselves fixtures beyond the reach of our authority, owing to their having been suffered to continue, year after year, in office, although, year after year, they have forfeited all claim to the distinction.

Are you aware that, by abstaining from the annual exercise of this invaluable right, we are virtually constituting it an office for life? As we have annual elections, let the use of them be marked with firmness and discrimination, by dismissing those who are undeserving of our favour, and electing men of ability and public principle. By such conduct we shall put a stop to the infamous traffic, the dishonourable but profitable intercourse carried on between the members of that Court and the Treasury.

I am very far from insinuating, that all the members of the Corporation merit this censure. On the contrary, there are several who well deserve our esteem; and the best proof we can give of our confidence in their integrity, will be to return them at the ensuing Elections to the post they have so honourably filled. To such men it will be the most gratifying recompence we can bestow upon their fidelity; and while our approbation serves as a stimulus, to future, and I trust more effectual exertions, it will confirm them the more strongly in an inflexible attachment to our rights and interests.—In the late disgraceful contentions at Guildhall, the conduct of these men, opposed to the venal and selfish hirelings of that Court, offers a contrast too striking to escape your notice: and it is owing to the firm stand they made, that the majority were driven back, and the corporation has been rescued from the odium of appropriating from our impoverished funds, those sums in feasting and rioting, which we have since had the felicity to behold applied to releasing the captive, and solacing the afflicted.

Having called these important facts to your recollection, and, in order to impress them more strongly on your mind, requested you to look to the actual state of the Country, I conjure you not to treat the office of Common Council-man, as unimportant, and below the acceptance of the most intelligent, and respectable amongst you. There must be a consequence attached to the proceedings of men, whose actions regulate the conduct of others. However absurd or contradictory, nay, however mischievous and

even wicked the resolves of the Common Council may be, those resolves serve as examples to all the corporate Towns in the Kingdom. They become in a great measure epidemic, and the City of London becomes in fact responsible for the guilt and folly of the nation.—Do not therefore suppose, that the odium belongs exclusively to the Common Council; a far greater portion of guilt and folly attaches to ourselves, for having furnished improper and incapable men with the means of dishonouring our character and injuring the Country. Their errors and their crimes are no less ours than theirs. We gave existence to both, by delegating a power to men, who had neither wisdom to exercise, nor virtue to resist the temptation to abuse it.

As a Body whose Councils have evidently an extended and decisive influence, the greatest circumspection should be observed in the choice of materials of which it is composed; and as not only our Rights and Interests are confided to their discretion and ability, but those of our posterity, let me again conjure you not to consider the office as trivial, or of little importance, requiring neither talents, experience, nor honesty. Before you vote ask yourselves this question, Would you if you had an affair of some difficulty to submit to arbitration, confide in the understanding or integrity of the men you are about to vote for? If not, how then, can you possibly reconcile it to your conscience, to deposit into the hands of these individuals a trust of such magnitude.

I beseech you to remember, that not only our civil and political rights are for twelve months surrendered into their hands, but that several local duties are confided to their care: that the licencing of Victuallers, on which the morals of the lower orders of society depend: the paving, lighting, watching and cleansing of the metropolis, so conducive to the preservation of health, to personal security, and comfort, belong to the Common Council. You will also recollect, that they have the management of a revenue amounting to nearly 100,000*l.* per annum, the application of which has been employed, not in improving and embellishing the City, not in removing public nuisances, or in works of public utility, but in public dinners, jobs, and improvident schemes.

If the decisions of the Common Council have for the last 25 years been gene-

rally opposed to our interests, look at the characters, the pursuits, the talents of the individuals who have exultingly promoted such injurious measures, in opposition to better and more temperate judgment; which, happily for the country, now appears likely to obtain that weight it ought at all times to have. The men to whom I allude have, in order to accomplish their own sordid and corrupt views, long arrogated to themselves a consequence to which they have not the least pretension. It is to these presumptuous, and at the same time servile agents, that the authors of our public grievances have enjoyed so long a furlough from national resentment. Let us, then, by a manly exercise of our elective franchise, give an effectual check to the iniquitous career of these presumptuous individuals in the Common Council; which will be a prelude to the disgrace and punishment of their abandoned and profligate employers.

Fellow Citizens: It is neither possible, nor I trust necessary in an Address like the present, to enumerate the long catalogue of evils which the folly and misconduct of our rulers have inflicted upon the country, even during the present year, much less for a long series of years passed. With an expenditure of 80 millions per annum, what have we achieved? Have we lessened the power of the enemy? or have we added to the security of the country? Our taxes, particularly the Income and Assessed Taxes, are demanded of us with increased rigour and severity; our grievances remain unredressed, corruption, abuse and speculation in the public expenditure unreformed; thousands and thousands of our brave soldiers have ingloriously perished in Spain and Walcheren. The land is filled with afflicted parents, widows, and orphans, to mourn their guilty loss, whilst the remains of our gallant army are now languishing with sickness and disease.

While the nation at large, feeling for the wounded honour of the country, have been anxiously looking up to the Corporation of London to take a lead in demanding inquiry, we have seen the sycophants of the Common Council, instead of sharing with the country in the generous indignation which it feels at beholding a vast empire crumbling to pieces, instead of joining with the virtuous part of the corporation to call for reform of abuses, these place-hunting canker-worms, destitute alike of talents, probity, or shame, have endeav-

voured to prevent inquiry into these failures and disgraces, by drowning the complaints of the people in the tumult of general feasting and illuminations. Imbecility and crime have found in them protection, and they have constantly opposed every measure calculated to remove the present corrupt system, without which removal this kingdom must ultimately fall, as other kingdoms have done, under the power of a foreign sword.

It is to prevent a calamity of this extent—it is that our rights may be preserved to the very end of time, that I call upon you to select men worthy of your confidence, and with talents suitable to the times in which we live. Remember that the trust we delegate is not exclusively our property: nor is it to be exercised exclusively for our own benefit; but a trust confided in us for the security and advantage of the whole community. This truth cannot be too strongly impressed upon our minds. Our existence as a state may depend upon our integrity and prudence in the exercise of this right. It is a mistaken generosity, and at this period a very hazardous experiment, to allow unworthy or incapable individuals to retain their situations merely because they have held them for years. Nor is it less criminal in those who have talents equal to the discharge of the duties, to withhold their services at a moment like the present, when the nation is tottering under the imbecility of a corrupt and despicable faction, avowedly unequal to what they have undertaken, and who have held out flags of distress for assistance to men as unworthy as themselves. Feel as men ought to feel when assailed with difficulties; Come forward like men; Vindicate your rights; Retrieve your character, by dismissing those who have betrayed their trust, and giving the Corporation the full benefit of your talents and your virtues; Shame the unprincipled hirelings of the day into that obscurity from which their conscience should inform them they ought never to have emerged: Form immediately Committees in your respective Wards for the purpose of bringing forward and supporting proper Candidates.

A CITIZEN OF LONDON
Nov. 18, 1809. OF THE OLD SCHOOL.

SPECIAL JURIES.

SIR; The appearance of a letter by your correspondent W. F. S., in your Register of the 11th of this month, recalls,

to mind a former one by that gentleman, on the abused organization of Special Juries, which I had intended to notice at the time, with a view to trace the evil to its source, and to shew the true character and extent of it; but which afterwards escaped my recollection, and has not since been thought of. This explanation will, I trust, apologize for advertg to a paper, inserted so far back, as the 30th of September last.—The question, I conceive, embraces a wider field of argument, and involves considerations of infinitely more importance, than what have been ascribed to it by your correspondent. He has stated a case for the contemplation of your readers; but, by confining himself simply to the recital of that case, without attempting to account for it, or speculating on its consequences, has left the argument incomplete. The facts adduced by him, and the quotations cited from Professor Blackstone, are only useful to establish the truth of his position, that Special Juries are not now organized as the law intended they should be; but, why this difference in their organization has taken place,—whether it tends to the advantage of the community; and, if not, how it may be remedied, he has hardly thought it necessary to explain.—Now, it appears to me, that, before condemning an abuse (by which, in a case of this sort, is to be understood, an aberration from any customary or prescriptive act), it is indispensable to know, if such abuse could have been avoided; and, at least, politic to inquire, if, upon the whole, it is injurious to the parties who may be affected by its operation. Your correspondent has complained, that Special Juries are now composed of tradesmen and manufacturers; that these members of society are dubbed “Esquires,” in the Sheriff’s book; and that though, by this insertion, and a competent qualification in respect to property, they may answer in denomination to the persons mentioned for the execution of the office,—yet, that, by want of education, and a consequent narrowness of mind and principle, they are virtually incapable of acquitting themselves properly; that the men alluded to are not of this description; that they are real esquires; and that a real esquire is a man possessed of understanding as well as property, whose rank, and opulence, and independence, are only subservient to the improvement of his intellect and the developement of his talent.—If I understand your correspondent rightly, this is what he means, Sir; and

certainly it is sound doctrine, unimpeachable philosophy. But, still, I am afraid, this notion of an Esquire, this character of a Special Jury-man, is founded in theory rather than in practice, and accords better with the Utopian system of sir Thomas More, than with instances to be selected from real life.—I will not take upon me to affirm what may have been the state of society at the time the law in question was enacted; nor, indeed, what it may have been in the day of sir William Blackstone, although, if we are to believe that which is recorded of him, he, too, made a difference between writing on the principles of the constitution and illustrating them by his practice; but, this I may state, without fear of contradiction, that those men who are considered now a-days in the light of native 'Squires,—I mean men of independent fortunes, acquired and transmitted to them through the industry of their progenitors; are infinitely less competent to discharge the duties of a Special Jury, than the objects of your correspondent's censure. They formerly may have been distinguished from their fellow countrymen, by qualities more substantial, and attributes more respectable, than empty titles and a relative state of riches; but now, alas! the man of fortune is identified with the man of fashion, and, of all characters upon earth, the man of fashion, considered exclusively as such, is the most despicable and disgusting.—A pedestrian or a pugilist, a jockey or a gamester, now marks him to public notice, and stamps distinction on the rising race of noblemen and young esquires; their leisure and independence are sacrificed to folly; their spirit is debauched by the meanness of their pursuits: the parade and pageantry of a *Whip-Club* exhibit sufficient scope for their emulation, and the attitudes of a bruiser, or, perhaps, the pedigree of a pointer, are among the most abstruse and severest of their studies. And yet, these men complain of a disposition, on the part of the people, to degrade nobility, and to bring the higher orders of society into contempt, as if any thing could more effectually tend to do so, than their own profligate demeanour and ignorance of understanding. Indeed, it is truly lamentable to reflect on the degenerate and disgraceful state of this part of the community, opposed to the situation of their inferiors: whilst the latter are contending against the pressure of the times, and substituting solid study and rational forms

of learning, in place of those amusements with which they were wont to soothe the cares of life and soften the fatigues of business, but which they are now unable to afford; the former is, at best, indulging in inanity, or running through the scenes of fashionable dissipation.—But, the order of employment is inverted: the amusements of the poor are converted into objects of study by the rich; while the studies of the rich are transmuted into means of relaxation by the poor!—What such a man as Locke, who in his work on Education treats the ignorance of men of fortune in matters of jurisprudence, as an actual absurdity, would say to this exchange, one may easily conceive; but, without probing the grievance deeper, it is cutting enough to think, that those designed by the law to discriminate between right and wrong, and to admeasure and assign its penalties, are, for the most part, ignorant of its first principles, and are certainly incompetent to serve on Special Juries, to whom the more refined and intricate parts of it are referred.—I cannot, therefore, agree with your learned correspondent, that the removal of the men objected to by him, from our Special Juries, and consequently the introduction of such as I have described, would be a public benefit, or better answer the purpose of the legislature: for, it is manifest, that our present Jurymen are superior in understanding; and as to sentiment and feeling, in regard to those cases where a sense of honour is required to appreciate a breach of duty, or estimate a loss of happiness; where pecuniary costs and damages are the only reparation that can be made for a violence committed on a man's internal quiet and reputation; it would in regard to these, be little better than a joke, a mere mockery and make-game, with so many great delinquents before our eyes, to select a tribunal from the higher paths of life, or pack a jury from the fashionable sphere. The idea is really laughable; one might as well think of drinking brandy to check a fever, or of using acids to correct a choleric. For my part, if I were in the situation described by your correspondent,—deprived of my wife's affections, and supplanted in her esteem; wounded in my honour, and injured in my fame, by the machinations of an artful scoundrel, calling himself my friend; I would rather submit my claim to a jury of enlightened Tradesmen, with a respectable Undertaker

at their head (since a person of that profession is stated by your correspondent to have acted in such capacity on a late occasion),—men, susceptible of the comforts of domestic life, and patterns in themselves of conjugal fidelity, than even to a set of Peers, with a prince or prelate for their foreman, if the latter were deficient in these respects, and not exempt, by law, from serving upon Juries.—In short, Sir, your correspondent must perceive, that the evil he complains of, arises rather from the general depravity of society, than from any wanton innovation on an established principle; and that it is unavoidable, and even desirable, considering the incapacity of those alluded to by the law.—He has, I am sure, from his style of writing, too much candour to impute to me any interested motive, in commenting on his paper; my only aim in doing so, having been to remove an impression that it may have excited in disparagement of public justice, as administered in our courts of law, which, notwithstanding the abuse in question, the prevalence of party spirit, and the preponderating influence of the executive government of the country, was never, I believe, dispensed with greater purity and freedom than at the present moment.—Before concluding the discussion of this topic, as reference has been made to the admirable treatise of sir William Blackstone, I am tempted to transcribe a passage from it in regard to Juries, which cannot be too seriously attended to by every Englishman who values the privileges of his constitution:—"All gentlemen of fortune are, in consequence of their property, liable to be called upon to establish the rights, to estimate the injuries, to weigh the accusations, and sometimes to dispose of the lives of their fellow-subjects, by serving upon Juries. In this situation, they have frequently a right to decide, and that upon their oaths, questions of nice importance, in the selection of which some legal skill is requisite; especially where the law and the fact, as it often happens, are intimately blended together. And the general incapacity, even of our best Juries, to do this with any tolerable propriety, has greatly debased their authority; and has unavoidably thrown more power into the hands of the Judges, to direct, controul, and even reverse their verdict, than perhaps the Constitution intended." I am, Sir, yours, &c. S.

Hendon, Nov. 12, 1809.

MR. WARDLE

AND THE

EDINBURGH REVIEWERS.

SIR; I cannot contemplate the fallacious misrepresentation of these writers, of Mr. Wardle's Speech on the Public Expenditure, at the same time with the extensive influence of their book on the public opinion, without seeking through your aid to do justice to his extraordinary merits. After a preamble full of praise of Mr. Wardle as one of "the most zealous, and able champions for economy and reform," and for having "come fairly forward with the items of his proposed deductions," language truly becoming their subject, and coming from such authority as ought to make the servile authors of the Morning Post blush for their base calumnies, they proceed to lay down this position; that "the main saving, and indeed all that in a national point of view, is worth attending to, is to be effected by a reduction in the number or allowances of our army and navy." Now, Mr. Cobbett, I do not hesitate to assert, that a statement more false, or more demonstrative of a vicious perversion of fact, never was made. The writer of it must have known how gross a falsehood he was attempting to give currency to, and it is but too manifest that his motive could be no other than that of a wish to please a party who have uniformly vilified and opposed Mr. Wardle; because he could not have been unacquainted with those points of Mr. Wardle's Speech which I am about to refer to, and which will shew, that, so far from any reduction being proposed in the effective force of the country, no one saving can be considered as having the smallest tendency to diminish it.—In order to make out his case the Edinburgh Reviewer says, "a certain proportion of infantry and cavalry are to be discharged," but of what kind, any of our regulars, militia or volunteers? not a single corps or regiment, except two regiments of household troops, that are never sent on service, and whose duties could be performed by the heavy dragoon regiments: and except a reduction of the cavalry regiments from 23,409 to 18,000, a reduction which has the sanction of some of the ablest officers, and which, if effected, would leave a force of cavalry, that with the volunteer cavalry would be equal to every duty the state could desire. It is positively false that Mr. Wardle proposed to discharge a single man of the infantry, and in saying that he did, the Reviewers

have in terms said what was not true. Nor did he, as they alledge, propose that the remains of the Volunteers should be discharged. On this head he adopted the opinion of sir R. Wilson that, "military cloathing is not necessary for such a force," and proposed a saving equal to the expence now incurred by cloathing the Volunteers. Of the whole therefore, of the assertion of the Reviewers, as far as relates to a reduction of our army, all of it that is good for any thing, is just so much of it as can be borne out by the disbanding of two regiments of household troops, and reducing our cavalry from 23,000 to 18,000 men. So much for their honesty and accuracy!—They have stated truly, that Mr. Wardle proposed to disband the foreign corps. But not correctly that such a measure would be a reduction of our army; looking to its efficiency, and not to its numbers, for its value, because no man capable of appreciating the character of our constitution, and of what really forms the safety of the empire, can say, that 24,000 foreign troops add any thing to our security; but, on the contrary, his mind must revolt from the idea of such a force having existence in our country, and be forcibly alive to apprehensions of danger rather than to confidence in security, whenever it contemplates so formidable a force wholly unconnected with the interests and liberties of the people.—The Reviewers go on to say, "no more fortifications are to be constructed; the allowances to the militia are to be reduced; a third part of the sum destined for the Navy is to be withdrawn. But, "these were not measures of economy, but measures of state policy."—Not measures of economy? So because by hook or by crook the idea of a measure of state policy can be attached to any proposition by which a saving of millions will be effected to the public, then it is not to be a measure of economy, therefore to have no merit or attention bestowed upon it, but to be wholly disregarded, and the people told to be satisfied, and not to expect its being adopted, because they are quite under a mistake, have nothing to say to it, but must leave it entirely to the ministers, who alone have concern with measures of state policy!—But in regard to these fortifications, how stands the fact; is it at this moment a measure of state policy to vote 700,000*l.* a year to extend them? After some hundred millions of money had been expended upon them in the course of the last twenty years, and after it is quite plain to every man who

ever read a newspaper, that this expenditure was wholly useless, any other person besides the writer of this Review might have been willing to allow that the question was no longer one of state policy; but one more belonging to the head of state corruption, and, therefore, most fit for the budget of Mr. Wardle.—As to the allowances to the militia, Mr. Wardle proposed that they should be allowed to work at harvest for three months in the year, and during these three months to stop their payment, a practice of the famous King of Prussia.—But the most scandalous opinion broached by the Reviewers is, that on the subject of the naval expenditure, they say, "that any retrenchment of the funds appropriated for the navy, must be attended with the utmost hazard."—It really, (Mr. Cobbett), is quite melancholy to think, that a work which has by its former opinions so deservedly gained great weight with the public, should contain so base a prostitution of talents as is here exemplified in this short sentence. What, after the facts which have been heaped upon facts of an unquestionable and unquestioned fixed nature, proving how much of the annual naval expenditure is actually robbed from the public by those who belong to the naval department, is it possible that any man could have been found that would venture to step forward in support of this system of state corruption and common robbery, and give a calm deliberate opinion, such as these Reviewers have here given? I am sure that the public have too much good sense to be led astray on this point, even by the influence of these Edinburgh Reviewers.—But now, Sir, having, I conceive, completely refuted the assertion of the Reviewers, that the main saving proposed by Mr. Wardle was to be effected by a reduction in the Army and Navy; I will shew by a reference to his published Speech what proportion of the saving can have no possible connection with the reduction of either.

Staff of 15 Militia Corps reduced - - - - -	£. 10,000
Cloathing Local Militia - - -	700,000
Cloathing and Staff of Volunteers - - - - -	1,000,000
Staff of the Army - - - - -	200,000
Recruiting Staff - - - - -	200,000
Army Agency - - - - -	51,075
War Office - - - - -	24,000
Pay Office - - - - -	24,000
Medical Department - - - -	200,000

Commissariat - - - - -	500,000
Barracks - - - - -	350,000
Army Cloathing - - - - -	270,000
Collection of Revenue in	
Great Britain - - - - -	1,051,930
Collection of Revenue in	
Ireland - - - - -	388,367
Commissioners and Auditors	
of Public Accounts - - - -	70,000
Bank; The sum charged for	
the management of the	
National Debt - - - - -	210,594
Pensions, and Offices executed	
by Deputy - - - - -	200,000
Bounties - - - - -	150,000
Colonies - - - - -	500,000
Catholic Emancipation - - -	2,000,000
	<hr/>
	£. 8,099,841

Here, Sir, is a saving proposed of eight millions, without including a single item exposed to either of the two objections of the Reviewers, either as being a reduction of military defence, or belonging to a question of state policy. Was it, then, fair for them, in giving so decided an opinion upon what they are pleased to call the extraordinary statement of Mr. Warde, to pass these items over in silence, and thus give their authority to the ingenious but false imputations of Mr. Huskisson, to take from the true value of this truly astonishing display that Mr. Warde made of the practicable measures which might be adopted to ease the burdens of the people? But the sober judgment of the people of England will not be led astray so easily. The facts which have been disclosed of waste and corruption in the control of the Public Expenditure cannot be so readily effaced. They know too much not to see that Mr. Warde must be right, and that there is room even for doing much more than he proposed to do. For my own part, I have no hesitation in saying that if a very few members of the House of Commons stand by him in his endeavours to obtain a financial reform, he will before the end of next session carry with him the public approbation and support fully as extensively as he did in the business of the Duke of York.—Your obedient servant, VERAX:

SPEECH

Of the REV. MR. SHEPHERD, delivered at the recent Celebration of the AN-

NIVERSARY of MR. ROSCOE'S Election, taken

From the Statesman.

Gentlemen; I have witnessed, with the greatest pleasure, the enthusiasm with which you have paid your tribute of respect to our late worthy representative; and that, not merely on account of the friendly sentiments which I have long entertained towards Mr. Roscoe, but because, in my humble judgment, this enthusiasm augurs well of the final success of the glorious cause in which we are jointly embarked. (Applauses.) To this cause, Gentlemen, the course of passing events, should induce us most steadily to adhere; for the occurrences of every day more manifestly demonstrate its truth and justice. Yes, Gentlemen, I am persuaded we cannot better prove our attachment to the country, than by treading in the steps of our much loved and valued friend, the anniversary of whose election we are now met together to celebrate; and in opposing the proceedings of those weak and wicked ministers, who have too long directed his majesty's councils, and who have obstinately and perversely persevered in a system which has reduced this nation to its present deplorable condition. (Applauses.) I trust, Gentlemen, that we shall never forget the means by which those ministers came into place; I trust also we shall ever remember, that the foundations of their power are bigotry and intolerance; that they were wafted into office by the drunken belchings of "No Popery" and "Church and King." (Loud applauses.)—What are these watch words of party, Gentlemen, but the signals of riot, and the instigators of persecution? What do ministers and their adherents mean, when they stimulate the intoxicated multitude to cry out "No Popery!"? Do they mean to say, that the Roman Catholic Religion shall not be exercised in this country? If so, they fly directly in the face of the law of the land. But do they mean to insinuate, that there is some noxious charm in that religion, which renders its professors hostile or indifferent to their native land? I maintain, that the history of the world, and the course of passing events, give the lie to this insinuation. Who are they, who have in spite of disaster and discomfiture, time after time, rallied round the standard of the Emperor of Austria, to defend his throne and their country? They are Roman Catholics. Who are they, who,

from the bleak summit of the Tyrolean mountains, at this moment breathe defiance against the Conqueror of the Continent? They are Roman Catholics. Of what faith were the heroes who chose to perish amidst the smoking ruins of Saragossa, rather than submit to the oppression of their country? Why, to a man, they were Roman Catholics. (Loud applause.) Referring to these instances, and a thousand others which might be mentioned, I will always maintain, that, as I expressed myself on a former occasion, the flame of Loyalty and Patriotism can glow in the breast of a Roman Catholic. (Applauses.) And from the nature of things, Gentlemen, it must be so; for, upon what is the principle of patriotism founded? It is founded upon the possession of property; upon the enjoyment of the protection of the law; but more than that, perhaps it is founded upon the charities of social and domestic life. (Loud applause.) Until then it can be proved to me that the Catholics of Great Britain and Ireland have no stake in the country; till it can be proved to me that they are destitute of natural affection, that they feel no love for their parents, no fondness for their wives, no tender solicitude for the welfare of their children, I will maintain that they are fit to be trusted with arms in defence of their country, and woe befall the man who basely insinuates the doctrine that they and their country have different interests. (Loud applause.)—Again, Gentlemen, what mean those words which, in the season of turbulence, we see chalked upon our walls, and hear resounding amidst the conviviality of our opponents? What means the noted symbol of party, Church and King? Gentlemen, I will tell you what it means, and for this purpose I will borrow the language of an eminent Dignitary of the Church of England, whom I have the honour to reckon among my friends; when immediately after that most disgraceful outrage, the Birmingham Riot, this Dignitary was called upon, in the midst of a large company, to drink the toast of Church and King, he addressed the Master of the feast in the following terms, "Sir, I venerate the Church, the holy offices of which I have long been accustomed to administer; I trust also that the whole tenor of my life proves that I honour my King; but I will not drink the toast of Church and King, for I well know what is the meaning of those words when they are put in conjunc-

tion. Their meaning is a Church above the State, and a King above the Law. Against these principles I will protest to the latest moments of my life." So said this Dignitary, Gentlemen, so say I, and so I am confident say we all. (Applauses.) Yes, Gentlemen, after the example of this Dignitary, we will honour the King. We will honour him constitutionally. We will also testify our regard to him, but in a mode different from that adopted by Mr. Spencer Perceval and his adherents, should it so happen that a pledge confessedly unconstitutional is required from his Ministers. Should it so happen that an unpopular and insulting answer is given to an address from the metropolis of the kingdom, we will not say, these are the personal acts of the King, and must not be called into question. No, Gentlemen, we will take our stand upon the platform of the Constitution, and our motto shall be, "A King that can do no wrong, but Ministers that are responsible for every act of state." (Loud applause.)—And, Gentlemen, what a weight of responsibility rests upon the shoulders of Mr. Spencer Perceval and his co-adjutors! For what is the substance of the history of Britain for the last eighteen months but a series of disgrace and disasters abroad, and the open and unblushing patronage of corruption at home? (Applauses.)—Amongst the foreign transactions of Ministers stands first in order of time the celebrated Convention of Cintra. Permit me, Gentlemen, to go back to that period, I will detain you for as short a time as possible. (Loud cries of hear, hear!)—Such of you, Gentlemen, as I had the honour to address on a similar occasion on this day twelve months, may perhaps recollect that I then expressed my opinion that no satisfactory result was to be expected from the Court of Enquiry, which was appointed to examine into that transaction. Gentlemen, the event justified my prognostic. That Court did not probe the transaction in question to the bottom.—By its very constitution, indeed, it was precluded from so doing; it was a Court of Military Inquiry; and of Military Inquiry only; and I have no doubt that its verdict was strictly correct, which declared that no blame was to be imputed to the Commanders of the Expedition. Still, however, it was the general feeling of the country, that blame was to be imputed somewhere; and I think that this feeling was right, and that I can demon-

strate to you, that blame of the most serious kind is to be imputed to his Majesty's Ministers, who planned and organized the expedition.—Gentlemen, I am not so absurd as to pretend to be a critic upon the minutæ of military operations. I do, however lay claim to credit for a little common sense, under the guidance of which, and under the correction of my worthy and gallant friend on my left (Colonel Williams), I lay down the following positions, That in order to insure success to an expedition against a foreign enemy, it is absolutely requisite that the planners of that expedition should be acquainted with the number and species of the enemy's forces, that they should provide their troops with the means of transporting artillery and ammunition; that they should secure an adequate supply of provisions; and, though it may not be absolutely necessary, yet I should think it highly expedient that the conduct of the expedition should be entrusted to a General, well apprised of its objects and plan, and who is intended to prosecute it to its termination. Now, Gentlemen, let us try the expedition to Portugal by these rules. On the 12th June, 1808, Sir Arthur Wellesley set sail from Cork, with between eight and nine thousand men, under assurances from Ministers, that the disposable force of the French in Lisbon amounted to no more than four thousand.—In point of fact, Gentlemen, the numbers of French troops in Portugal at that time, amounted to four and twenty thousand! Two days after Sir Arthur sailed, they received more correct information, in consequence of which, they sent after him reinforcements. These having, more by good luck than good management, arrived in time, Sir Arthur was enabled to meet the enemy; he did meet them at Roleia and Vimiera—his soldiers did, what I trust (allow me to correct my expression, what I am confident), British soldiers always will do, when they contend with a foe—they covered themselves with glory. (Loud applause.) They repulsed, and defeated the enemy. But their Commander was unable to follow up his victory. And why? On account of the superior number of the enemy's horse. For, be it known to you, Gentlemen, that to a British army of eighteen thousand men, there were attached no more than two hundred and ten cavalry.—At the outset of this expedition, great inconvenience was experienced, from the want

of horses to convey the artillery and ammunition. And for this, Sir Arthur accounted to the Board of Inquiry in a very singular manner. For he stated, that thinking that the horses of the artillery (which we must presume to be sound and good) would suffer from the hardships of the service, he substituted, in their place, a number of Irish cast cavalry horses, worth about twelve or thirteen pounds each. (A laugh). Why, Gentlemen, with the good leave of my worthy friend, Mr. Casey, I must say that this was a most Irish mode of fitting out an expedition, and that Sir Arthur's plan would have been consistent and complete, had he, instead of able bodied men, filled his battalions with tottering invalids and Chelsea pensioners.—(Loud laughing.)—When, Gentlemen, Sir Arthur took his departure from Cork, he was instructed principally to depend upon the country to which he was going for supplies of provisions. When he arrived in Portugal, which supplies itself with bread for only seven months in the year, provisions were so scarce, that he was earnestly solicited to victual the Portuguese troops who joined him, from the stores which he had brought with him in his ships. And as to the permanency of the Commander-in-Chief, it is, I believe, an unparalleled circumstance, that in the course of twenty-four hours the British army was under the orders of three different Generals.—Gentlemen, you well remember the outcry that was raised against Sir Hugh Dalrymple. You remember the Newspaper edged with black; and the protest of various towns against the odium of having given him birth. This outcry was eagerly encouraged by Ministers, as it tended to divert the attention of the country from their own insufficiency. It is highly probable that some of us here present joined in this outcry; if so, let us make Sir Hugh the *amende honorable*; let us acknowledge that no blame is attachable to the Military Commanders of the Portuguese Expedition; let us bestow our execrations where they are due; namely, upon those Ministers who planned that Expedition, and whose ignorance and incapacity rendered necessary a Convention which made Britain the laughing-stock of Europe.—(Applauses.) By this Convention, however, Portugal being cleared of the enemy, Ministers resolved to expel the French from Spain. With this view, they sent into that country an army under the com-

mand of Sir John Moore, who was most pointedly instructed to pay great attention and deference to the communications which he might, from time to time, receive from Mr. Hookham Frere, who was residing in Spain, in quality of Minister Plenipotentiary on the part of his Britannic Majesty. On this second occasion Ministers betrayed their ignorance of the numbers and resources of the enemy. Had they sent double the force which they did send, it would have been hardly sufficient to secure the object of the Expedition. And as to the vigilance and superior intelligence of the highly accredited Mr. Hookham Frere, one fact will settle your opinion upon that point. He was so singularly vigilant that he contrived to apprise Sir John Moore of the capture of Madrid by the French, three days after the news of that event had been published in the London Papers (A laugh). In fact, this vain and foolish man was led by the nose by a couple of traitors, at whose instigation, he in a most offensive and insolent manner pressed Sir John Moore to make a forward movement, which would have infallibly insured the capture of Sir John and his whole army. The sagacity of the British Commander, however, preserved him from the snare. He effected his retreat to Corunna. Under the walls of that town, he fought the enemy—he conquered—and he fell.—He fell bravely fighting at the head of his gallant troops. (Loud Applauses.)—Had I the honour of being of the kindred of Sir John Moore, I should have rejoiced at that event. For truly honourable was his death; and it saved him the extreme severity of mortification. For, to the eternal disgrace of Ministers be it said, that while the generosity of the enemy was gracing the fallen Hero with the honours of the tomb, the malignity of ministerial hirelings was whispering away his fair fame, and attempting to tarnish his reputation. A foresight of this seems to have embittered his last moments. For in his dying agonies he said, “I hope my country will do me justice.” Yes, Gentlemen, his country will do him justice; and whilst she consigns his calumniators to the contempt which they merit, she will inscribe his name in the list of her most illustrious heroes. (Loud Applauses.)—With the same pen too will she record the disgrace of those Ministers, whose incapacity occasioned the sacrifice of him, and of his gallant followers. (Applauses.)—The failure of the first Spanish Expedition was,

however, imputed to the want of zeal, or to the overcaution, of Sir John Moore. To remedy this deficiency, Ministers entrusted a second Expedition to a General, who was stated to be of a different description; who was trumpeted forth as being all spirit, activity, and vigour; and who had reaped a rich harvest of laurels on the plains of Hindostan. You are all aware, Gentlemen, that I allude to Sir Arthur Wellesley, now Lord Wellington. Well, what was the result of all this enterprise and activity? He rashly advanced, without intelligence, and unprovided with magazines of provisions, into the heart of the country. In consequence of the customary negligence of Ministers, when he met the enemy, he found their number double his own. By astonishing efforts of valour, his soldiers earned for him the title of Baron Talavera—in return for which his improvidence left them sick and wounded in the hospitals of that town. Gentlemen, if Lord Wellington be the high-spirited individual which he is represented to be, if he have that nice sense of honour which he is reported to have, this title of Talavera will be a perpetual torment to him. He will regard it as a blot upon his escutcheon—as the record of his disgrace. (Applauses.)—Before I close the melancholy list of our expeditions, permit me briefly to notice the Expedition to the Coast of Holland. While the Emperor of Austria was struggling with Buonaparté, Ministers determined to make what they call a grand diversion. For this purpose they equipped a force of an hundred thousand men.—But, according to inveterate custom, they were too late in their preparations; and when Lord Chatham arrived at the mouth of the Scheldt, he learnt, to his astonishment, that Antwerp was a fortified town: that the approaches to it could be laid under water; and that the Scheldt was bristled with batteries and forts. In short, the upshot of this Grand Expedition was the burning of Flushing, and the capture of the Island of Walcheren, which has proved to be the grave of our gallant countrymen.—But we are seriously told that though the ulterior objects of this expedition are not accomplished, much has been done, since Walcheren is a capital situation for the carrying on a contraband trade. A contraband trade, Gentlemen! An hundred thousand men employed in establishing a contraband trade! Oh, that we should have lived to hear the potent and

pious Sovereign of the British Isles represented by his own servants at the head of a gang of smugglers (loud applauses), or to see the Genius of British Commerce, who was wont proudly to spread her wings from one extremity of the ocean to the other, metamorphosed into an eel wriggling her dirty way through the mud banks of Holland. (Loud applauses.)—And yet I doubt not, Gentlemen, that when Parliament assembles, as it will soon do to our cost, this Expedition to Walcheren, and Lord Wellington's Expedition to Spain, will be vindicated by great majorities, as being planned and conducted with the most consummate wisdom. I argue this from a consideration of the last Session, which was occupied by the varnishing and defence of every species of abuse. Need I on this head remind you of the affair of the Duke of York, of which I will say no more, than that a ministerial majority was prepared, in spite of the disgraceful situation in which his Royal Highness appeared to the eyes of the nation at large, not only to encourage, but to solicit him to retain the office of Commander in Chief. Need I to remind you of the conviction of Lord Castlereagh, or his own confession of offering to barter East India Patronage for a seat in the House of Commons? Who can think, with patience, of the conduct of the House on that occasion, or read without indignation, its resolution not to proceed against his Lordship, because the bargain had not been actually concluded? Good God, Gentlemen, what doctrine is this? I once heard at the Lancaster Assizes the question gravely argued, whether a man who was caught *in transitu* in a chimney, had broke into a house, (a laugh) and where the life of a poor wretch was at stake, it was fit and proper to raise an argument upon such a cause. But Lord Castlereagh was a servant of the King and of the Public; and I appeal to you all, Gentlemen, whether, if you had caught one of your servants picking the lock of your iron chest, you would not have dismissed him from your service, though he had not actually carried off a single guinea, or a single note. On the same principle I maintain that such a mass of corruption as Lord Castlereagh, should no longer have been permitted to approach the person of his Majesty, and that it was fitting that he should have been expelled the House of Commons.—Gentlemen, such was the public feeling; but upon this, as on a thousand other occasions, the public feeling was, by the House of Commons,

held in contempt. And how happened this? Gentlemen, I will tell you. Because 151 individuals return a majority of that House. This certainly ought not to be. (Loud applauses.) Till this evil is remedied, we shall see no good times for Old England. (Applauses.) We have lately heard a great deal of the strenuous endeavours of the inhabitants of the Metropolis to put down the Private Boxes of Covent Garden Theatre—would to Heaven that I could see the same spirit rising in the country at large to put down the Private Boxes in St. Stephen's Chapel. (Loud plaudits.) Till placemen, pensioners, and jobbers, are swept from the Benches of the Senate, how can we expect prudence in the granting, or economy in the expenditure of the Public Money.—I have seen a good housewife raise water from a pump that is out of order, on pouring a quantity of water down the pump-stock; this refreshment causes the sucker to play, and produces a copious stream. I leave it to your consideration, Gentlemen, whether some such process does not occasionally produce a copious stream of public money.—It is doubtful, Gentlemen, whether we shall soon be able to do any thing on a large scale respecting Parliamentary Reform. We shall, however, in all probability, soon have an opportunity of doing something in the retail way. It is well known that dissension and mutual recrimination have shaken the foundation of ministerial power. When Parliament meets, things will be found, to adopt General Gascoyne's celebrated expression, "to be at sixes and sevens." (A laugh.) So much so, indeed, that in all probability the gallant General may once more vote according to his conscience. (A laugh.) This phenomenon must forebode some great event, which event I take to be a dissolution of Parliament. (Applauses.) In that case, I trust, Gentlemen, that the Town of Liverpool will second your endeavours, and that in lieu of our present Representatives, we shall return two men, who, without any selfish views of private emolument, will dedicate their talents to the promotion of their Country's good.

AFFIDAVITS,

Read in the Court of King's Bench, in the Case of WRIGHT against MR. WARDLE.

(From the Statesman.)

Affidavit of Simeon Bull.

SIMEON BULL, of Holles-street, Cavendish-square, in the County of Middlesex,

House-agent, maketh Oath, and saith, that in the month of June, 1808, the Plaintiff, above-named, with whom this Deponent was then unacquainted, applied to this Deponent, to take of him, this Deponent, a ready furnished house in Holles-street aforesaid, for a Mrs. Farquhar, whom he described as a lady coming from the country, by whom he was employed to look out for a house, which he was also employed to furnish for her. And this Deponent further saith, that he accordingly let his said house, and that Mrs. Clarke, assuming the name of Farquhar, came into and occupied it; but this Deponent finding out whom she was, went to the said Francis Wright, and insisted upon Mrs. Clarke leaving the said house at the end of the month, which she did do. And this Deponent further saith, that the said Francis Wright, the Plaintiff, and Captain Thompson, the brother of the said Mrs. Clarke, called upon this Deponent, and paid this Deponent the rent, and that there was a dispute between the said Plaintiff and Captain Thompson, as to the name in which the receipt should be given by this Deponent.

Affidavit of Sarah Mumford.

SARAH MUMFORD, of Holles-street, Cavendish-square, in the County of Middlesex, widow, maketh Oath, and saith, that she resides with Simeon Bull, of Holles-street, aforesaid, and his wife, and assists them in letting the houses belonging to the said Simeon Bull, and keeping of the accounts relative thereto. And this Deponent further saith, that in the month of June, 1808, she recollects the Plaintiff coming in the evening, with Mrs. Clarke, who passed by the name of Farquhar, to look at a house in Holles street, belonging to the said Simeon Bull. And this Deponent further saith, that she went over the said house with the said Plaintiff and Mrs. Clarke, and acquainted them with the terms thereof; and the said Plaintiff then told this Deponent that he had seen Mr. Bull that morning, and learnt the terms of him, and he informed this Deponent that Mrs. Clarke might stay in the house for a month or two, as he was looking out for a house which he was employed to furnish for her.

Affidavit of Joseph Curt.

JOSEPH CURT, of Coventry-street, Haymarket, in the County of Middlesex, Coffee-House keeper, maketh oath and

saith, that in the month of October, 1808, Mrs. Mary-Anne Clarke, now of Westbourne-place, Chelsea, in the said County of Middlesex, but then of Bedford-place, Russell-square, in the same County, called upon this Deponent with one Captain Thompson, whom this Deponent understood to be her brother, for the purpose of taking of this Deponent the house she now occupies in Westbourne-place aforesaid. And this Deponent further saith, that at the time Mrs. Clarke so came to this Deponent, she said her name was Farquhar, and referred this Deponent to the Plaintiff above named for a character. And this Deponent further saith, that he accordingly called upon the said Plaintiff for the character of Mrs. Clarke, whose name this Deponent then understood to be Mrs. Farquhar: that he saw the said Plaintiff, and requested of him, as between one tradesman and another, to be candid; whereupon the said Plaintiff assured this Deponent he would be so; and told this Deponent that Mrs. Farquhar was a most respectable Lady, that he had taken several thousands of pounds of her money, and that if he had fifty houses to let, she should have her choice of them all.—And this Deponent further saith, that he then enquired of the said Plaintiff whether Mrs. Clarke, speaking of her by the name of Farquhar, was married or not, to which the said Plaintiff replied, that he believed she had been married, but whether her husband was living or not he knew not. And this Deponent further saith, that being satisfied with the character he had so received from the said Plaintiff of the said Mrs. Clarke, he, this Deponent, expressed such his satisfaction to the said Plaintiff, and afterwards acquainted Mrs. Clarke, that she should have his said house. And this Deponent further saith, that he soon afterwards went to, and saw the said Mrs. Clarke, in Bedford-place aforesaid, for the purpose of completing the arrangement about the terms of the said house; when this Deponent, in a conversation which then took place, thinking that the furniture which he saw was her own, observed to her, the said Mrs. Clarke, that he thought the furniture in Bedford-place would suit the house she had taken of him, this Deponent; to which the said Mrs. Clarke replied, that the furniture he; this Deponent, spoke of, was too old-fashioned, and that she only intended to take with her a few articles of it, such as beds and drawers, and that the said Plaintiff was

to new furnish for her the house in Westbourne-place. And this Deponent further saith, that some short time before the lease, which was granted by this Deponent to Eliz. Farquhar, the mother of Mrs. Clarke, was executed, and which lease was executed and bears date on the 9th day of November last, he, this Deponent, was returning from the house in Westbourne-place aforesaid, and met the said Plaintiff in the King's Road, going there for the purpose, as the said Plaintiff then informed this Deponent, of taking measure for the carpets and fenders, to be put down in, and sent to the said house. And this Deponent further saith, that it was only just before the said 9th of November that this Deponent saw the mother of the said Mrs. Clarke, and was given to understand that the house was taken for her, and that the person he had before seen was her daughter. But this Deponent did not become acquainted with the real name of Mrs. Clarke, until after the execution of the said lease; and when he did so, and found out whom she was, he, this Deponent, remonstrated with the said Plaintiff for the deception he had practised upon him, which the said Plaintiff did not attempt to deny, but told this Deponent he thought he had known whom Mrs. Clarke was. And this Deponent further saith, that after the house had been so taken as aforesaid, the execution of the lease was delayed for a time, on account of the said Mrs. Clarke wishing not to pay this Deponent for the grates and other fixtures in the said house until the end of twelve months, when she acquainted this Deponent she should purchase of him the original lease of the said house, and for which purpose a clause is inserted in the lease granted by this Deponent. But this Deponent saith, that having himself taken and paid for the said fixtures at a valuation at the time that he bought the original lease of the said house, he, this Deponent, objected to Mrs. Clarke's proposal, and insisted upon having the money; whereupon the said Francis Wright, on the day and at the time of the execution of the said lease (which lease is witnessed by the said Plaintiff, and Wm. Stokes, the Attorney of the said Plaintiff and of Mrs. Clarke), gave this Deponent a draft upon his bankers for one hundred and six pounds fourteen shillings and sixpence, the amount of the valuation of the said grates and fixtures. And this Deponent further saith, that the first quarter's rent of the said house becoming

due and not being paid, this Deponent employed Messrs. Robins to distrain for the said rent, and such rent was then paid by a bill or draft of the said Plaintiff, and the second quarter's rent was also paid by a draft of the said Plaintiff on his bankers.

—
Affidavit of Sir Richard Phillips.

SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS, of Bridge-Street, Blackfriars, in the City of London, Knight, maketh Oath and saith, that on or about the 8th day of March last, this Deponent was applied to by Mrs. Mary Anne Clarke, of Westbourne-place, Chelsea, in the county of Middlesex, to publish her Memoirs, and certain Letters written to her by his Royal Highness the Duke of York, which publication this Deponent declined to engage in. And this Deponent further saith, that in the latter end of the same month of March, this Deponent, under the supposition that he was the proprietor of the said book, was applied to by the Earl of Moira, and at his request commenced a negotiation with Mrs. Clarke for the suppression of the said book about to be published by her as aforesaid. And this Deponent further saith, that in the course of the treaty for the publication of the said book, the said Mary Anne Clarke assigned, as a reason to this Deponent for making the most of the said publication, that she had 2,000*l.* to pay to Francis Wright, the Plaintiff above-named, for the furniture sent in by him to her house in Westbourne-place aforesaid. And when this Deponent afterwards negotiated with the said Mary Anne Clarke for the suppression of the said book, the said Mary Anne Clarke stated, that a sum of money must be given her for the payment of her debts; and amongst the debts enumerated by her, she, the said Mary Anne Clarke, mentioned the debt so due from her to the said Plaintiff as aforesaid.

—
Affidavit of James Glenie, Esq.

JAMES GLENIE, of Woolwich, in the County of Kent, Esq. maketh Oath and saith, that on or about the 16th day of December last, Mary Anne Clarke, of Westbourne-place, in the County of Middlesex, urged this Deponent, with tears in her eyes, to ask the Defendant, above named, to become answerable himself, or to procure some friend to be so to the Plaintiff above-named for the sum of 500*l.* to be paid in two or three months; and the said Mary Anne Clarke then repre-

sented to this Deponent, that she was distressed by the Plaintiff's pressing solicitations for money. And this Deponent further saith, that he, this Deponent, then informed the said Mary Anne Clarke, that he could not think of asking the said Defendant to comply with such her request, for that he, the Deponent, knew the Defendant's determination not to come under any engagement to pay her debts, either to the Plaintiff or to any other person; but this Deponent observed to the said Mary Anne Clarke, that if she could point out any method of repaying the sum she wanted in three months, in that case he, this Deponent, would speak to the Defendant on the subject, not doubting but that he, the Defendant, would, on such conditions, be disposed to assist her, the said Mary Anne Clarke, in getting some person or other to afford her such temporary accommodation. And this Deponent further saith, that the said Mary Anne Clarke assured this Deponent, she should be able to repay the money in less than three months, out of the sale of a book she was about to publish. And this Deponent further saith, that soon after this conversation had passed between the said Mary Anne Clarke and this Deponent, the said Defendant came, when this Deponent took him into the garden of the house in Westbourne-place, and there mentioned the request the said Mary Anne Clarke had made. But this Deponent saith, that the Defendant refused to comply therewith; and this Deponent further saith, that afterwards, and about the 20th of December, this Deponent, at the request of the Defendant, called upon the Plaintiff to beg that he would not continue just then to press the said Mary Anne Clarke for money, and this Deponent in such conversation then informed the Plaintiff, that it was impossible for the Defendant to pay or engage to pay the debts of the said Mary Anne Clarke, whether due to him, the said Plaintiff, or to any other person; and this Deponent further saith, that the said Plaintiff never pretended to this Deponent, that there was any debt due to him from the said Defendant, or that the said Defendant had, in any manner, become or agreed to become responsible for the furniture supplied by the Plaintiff and sent into the house at Westbourne-place aforesaid; on the contrary thereof, this Deponent says, the said Plaintiff represented to this Deponent, that he had given credit to the said Mary Anne Clarke, for the furni-

ture sent into Westbourne-place, in the hope that she would thereby be induced to repay him, the said Plaintiff, which his Royal Highness the Duke of York had promised, but afterwards refused to pay; and this Deponent further saith, he recollects a conversation afterwards taking place between this Deponent and the said Mary Anne Clarke, in which this Deponent observed, that, in the opinion of this Deponent, it would be more to the credit of the said Mary Anne Clarke if, considering her situation, she had a smaller house, and less expensive furniture. And this Deponent further saith, that the said Mary Anne Clarke appearing displeased at this Deponent's remark, he, this Deponent, informed her, that several of her friends concurred with him, this Deponent, in opinion; and that he, this Deponent, had heard the Defendant make the same remark; to which the said Mary Anne Clarke, as this Deponent well remembers, replied, "What is it to Colonel Wardle what house and furniture I have?—he is not to pay for it." And this Deponent further saith, that he was subpoenaed on the part of the Plaintiff, and attended upon the trial of the said cause, but was not called or examined; and this Deponent says, he well remembers that the said Defendant was anxious that this Deponent should be examined as a witness on his part, and actually sent this Deponent, with Major Dodd, into Court for that purpose.

Affidavit of Richard Stonehewer Illingworth.

RICHARD STONEHEWER ILLINGWORTH, of Pall-Mall, in the County of Middlesex, wine-merchant, maketh oath, and saith, That in or about the latter end of the month of Dec. last, this Deponent was applied to by Major Dodd, who dealt with this Deponent as a wine-merchant, to give his acceptance to the Plaintiff for 500*l.* on account of Mrs. Clarke, and to take her note for the same sum, which Major Dodd assured this Deponent Mrs. Clarke would be able to pay when it became due. And this Deponent further saith, that he was before this time unacquainted with the Defendant, never having seen him but once; and that Major Dodd proposed as a guarantee to this Deponent, to give his acceptance to this Deponent for 250*l.* and the Defendant's acceptance for 250*l.* both which last mentioned acceptances were to become due before the acceptance to be given by this Deponent to the Plaintiff, but after the note to be

given by Mrs. Clarke should fall due : and this Deponent further saith, that having agreed to comply with Major Dodd's request, he, this Deponent, went to Mrs. Clarke, and told her that he came there by the desire of the said Major Dodd, and that if she would give her note for 500*l.* he, this Deponent, would accept the Plaintiff's bill for that sum. And this Deponent further saith, that Mrs. Clarke did give this Deponent her note, dated the 27th of December last for 500*l.* payable three months after the date thereof, but which note was never honoured ; and that he, this Deponent, thereupon accepted the Plaintiff's bill for the said sum of 500*l.* And this Deponent further saith, that at the time of this Deponent's calling upon the Plaintiff to give his acceptance for the 500*l.* he knew nothing of any dealings between the Plaintiff and Defendant, nor had he ever heard of any investigation about to be instituted by the said Defendant in the House of Commons ; nor did the Defendant, or the said Major Dodd, express any wish that their names should be kept secret. And this Deponent further saith, that at the time he called upon the said Plaintiff, no conversation passed between the said Plaintiff and this Deponent, respecting the said Defendant or Major Dodd, nor was either of their names mentioned or referred to in conversation by this Deponent or the said Plaintiff, for this Deponent says he was but a few minutes with the said Plaintiff, and merely mentioned to him that he came to give his acceptance for 500*l.* on account of Mrs. Clarke. And this Deponent further saith, that when he called upon Mrs. Clarke, he acquainted her that he came there at the desire of Major Dodd, and that upon her giving this Deponent her note for 500*l.* he this Deponent would call, as he afterwards did do, and give the Plaintiff his acceptance for 500*l.* And this Deponent further saith, that nothing ever passed between this Deponent and Major Dodd, and Mrs. Clarke, and the Plaintiff, or any or either of them, from whence this Deponent was induced to believe, or given to understand, that the said Defendant had ordered, or was indebted, or in any manner responsible, to the said Plaintiff for the furniture sent in by him to the said house at Westbourne-place. And this Deponent further saith, that he was subpoenaed by the said Plaintiff on the trial of the said cause, but was not called or examined ; but this Deponent well recollects, that the said Defendant

was anxious that this Deponent should be examined on his behalf.

Errata in Mr. Newenham's Letter, in Register of 4th inst.

- P. 683, l. 46, *for trial, read trials*
 684, l. 58, *for imperative, read inoperative*
 685, l. 34, *after or insert emolument*
 687, l. 23, *for it is read is it*
 688, l. 24, *for upon read under*
 25, *for that read the*

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SWEDEN AND RUSSIA.—*Treaty of Peace between Sweden and Russia. Dated 5-17th Sept. 1809.—(Continued from p. 768.)*

V. The sea of Aland, (Alands Haf) the Gulph of Bothnia, and the rivers of Tornea and Muonio, shall hereafter form the frontier between Russia and the kingdom of Sweden.—The nearest islands, at an equal distance from the main land of Aland and Finland, shall belong to Russia, and those which are nearest to the Swedish coast shall belong to Sweden.—The most advanced points of the Russian territory, at the mouth of the river of Tornea, shall be the isle of Bjorken, the port of Rentehamn, and the peninsula on which the town of Tornea stands. The frontier shall then be extended along the river Tornea, to the confluence of the two branches of that river, near Kengis. It shall then follow the course of the river Muonio, passing in the front of Muonioniska, Muonio Ofreby, Palajoeus, Rultane, Enontekis, Kelöttijorfoi, Paitiko, Nuimaka, Raunula and Kilpisjaure, to Norway.—In the course of the rivers Tornea and Muonio, such as it has been described, the islands situated to the east of the Thalweg shall belong to Russia, and those to the west of the Thalweg to Sweden.—Immediately after the exchange of the ratifications, engineers shall be appointed on each side, who shall proceed to the before-mentioned places, to fix the limits along the rivers Tornea and Muonio, according to the above described line.

VI. His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias having already given the most manifest proofs of the clemency and justice with which he has resolved to govern the inhabitants of the countries which he has acquired, by generously, and of his own spontaneous act, assuring to them the free exercise of their religion, rights, property, and privileges, his Swedish Majesty

considers himself thereby dispensed from performing the otherwise sacred duty of making reservations in the above respects, in favour of his former subjects.

VII. On the signature of the present Treaty, information thereof shall be transmitted immediately, and with the greatest celerity, to the Generals of the respective armies, and hostilities shall entirely cease on both sides, both by sea and land. Those acts of hostility which may in the mean time be committed, shall be regarded as null, and shall not infringe this treaty. Whatever may be, during the intervening period, taken or conquered, on the one side or the other, shall be faithfully restored.

VIII. Within four weeks after the exchange of the Ratifications of the present Treaty, the troops of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia shall evacuate West Bothnia, and repass the river Tornea.—During the said four weeks, there shall be made no requisition of any kind whatever on the inhabitants; and the Russian army shall draw its supplies and subsistence from its own magazines, established in the towns of West Bothnia.—If during the negotiations, the Imperial troops have penetrated in any other direction into the Kingdom of Sweden, they shall evacuate the countries they have occupied, in virtue of the before stipulated conditions.

IX. All the prisoners of war, made on either side, by sea or land, and, all the hostages delivered during the war, shall be restored in mass, and without ransom, as speedily as possible; but at the latest within three months, reckoning from the exchange of the ratifications; but if any prisoners may be prevented by sickness, or other cause, from returning into their country within the period specified, they shall not thereby be considered as having forfeited the right stipulated above. They shall be obliged to discharge, or to give security for, the debts they may have contracted, during their captivity, with the inhabitants of the country in which they may have been detained.—The expences which may have been incurred by the High Contracting Parties, for all subsistence and maintenance of the prisoners, shall be reciprocally renounced, and provision shall respectively be made for their subsistence, and the expence of their journey to the frontiers of both places, where commissioners from their Sovereigns shall be directed to receive them.—

The Finland soldiers and seamen are, on the part of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, excepted from this restitution, with reference to the capitulations which have taken place, if they grant them a different right.—The Military and other Officers, natives of Finland, who may wish to remain, shall enjoy that privilege, and the full exercise of all their rights over their property, debts, and effects, which they have now, or may hereafter have, in the kingdom of Sweden, on the footing of the 10th Article of the present Treaty.

X. The Fins now in Sweden, as well as the Swedes now in Finland, shall be at full liberty to return into their respective countries, and to dispose of their property, moveable and immoveable, without paying any duty of removal, or any other impost due on the like occasions.—The subjects of the two High Powers, established in either country, Sweden or Finland, shall have full liberty to establish themselves in the other, during the space of three years, from the date of the exchange of the ratification of the present Treaty; but shall be held to sell or alienate, during the said period, to any subject of the Power whose dominion they desire to quit.—The property of those who, at the expiration of the above term, have not complied with this regulation, shall be sold at a public sale, by authority of the Magistrate, and the produce thereof delivered to the owners.—During the three years above fixed, it shall be allowable to all to make such use as they may please of their property, the peaceable enjoyment of which is formally secured and guaranteed to them.—They may, themselves, or their agents, pass freely from one state to the other, in order to manage their affairs, without experiencing any obstacle whatever, in consequence of their quality of subjects of the other power.

XI. There shall henceforth be a perpetual oblivion of the past, and a general amnesty for the respective subjects, whose opinions, in favour of one or the other of the High Contracting Parties during the present war, may have rendered them suspected or liable to punishment. No trial shall hereafter be instituted against them on such grounds. If any process have been commenced, it shall be annulled and superseded, and no new proceeding shall be commenced. *(To be continued.)*

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 22.] LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1809. [Price 1s.

"Whilst there are the same advisers, we must expect the same advice; whilst there are the same counsellors, we must expect the same results; and a change of men alone will not do; it is but the first step to our happiness; the *principles*, or maxims, of state must be removed. It is not taking away this or the other man, and putting in another to act by the same rules, that will cure our disease; but it is the *change of principles that must do it*. * * * * *

"I think it is very plain, that, till these principles are removed from Whitehall, all our labour and pains will end in nothing. The way, then, as I conceive, to do this, is, to lay before His Majesty the state of the case; let us show him how unable these men are to serve him, and how destructive to his interest it is to follow their advices."—Mr. Booth's Speech, in the House of Commons, against *Favourites*, in the reign of Charles II. See Parliamentary History, Vol. IV. page 1268.

533]

[534

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CHANGE OF MINISTRY.—The speech, from which I have taken my motto for the present Number, should, at this moment, be read by every man in the kingdom. In more than one respect the present situation of this kingdom, bears a strong resemblance to its situation at the time when this excellent speech was made; and, our members of parliament, those, I mean, who are independent, will find in this speech sentiments and language worthy their adoption and imitation.—Then, as now, it was not so much a change of *men*, as a change of *principles*, a change of maxims and rules of government, that was wanted; or, at least, it was not solely a change of men that would have done any good. The advice of Mr. Booth was not followed. There was, in spite of the complaints of the people, *no change of principles*; all change was resisted, and, as often as possible, the advocates of such change were persecuted and punished. Force, of one sort or another, was employed for the purpose of stifling the voice of truth and justice. But, what did it finally effect? Why, the renewal of those bitter and loud complainings which at last, it was attempted to put a stop to by the bayonet; and, then, in a twinkling, away went the whole thing.—There is no man who will attempt to deny, that our present situation is a most alarming one. Ask any man of sense, what he thinks will be the result of the present contest; and, no matter of what party he may be, he will, at best, tell you, that he cannot even guess at that result. He will tell you, that he *hopes*, that we shall still remain an *independent nation*; but, he will hardly state any grounds of such hope.—Now, if this be the case; if this be the prevalent state of mind through the kingdom, does it not

become us to consider well what is the *cause of it*? The answer of some will be; "Why, the cause of it is the *power of Buonaparté*." This is true, as far as it goes; but, what has been the *cause of Buonaparté's having so much power*?—The state of the case is this: England and France had, for centuries, been rival nations. Many, previous to the year 1793, had been their wars and their negotiations. Many their struggles for the upperhand in the affairs of Europe. But neither seemed to prevail much over the other. Sometimes France appeared to be rather uppermost and sometimes England; but, still the *rivalship* continued; and, as to England's *fearing* her rival, the idea never entered into any man's mind. The contest was always for some *colonial or commercial or continental* object. But now, our rulers themselves tell us, that the contest is, on our part, for *existence as a nation*. Not for honour, not for glory, not conquest; no, nor for self-defence, in the usual sense of that word; but, for *existence*. Yes, they are not ashamed to tell us plainly, that they have brought us into such a state, that it is become a question *whether we shall continue an independent nation or become the slaves of the sovereign of France*. This question is undisguisedly stated in parliament as well as out of parliament, and it was reserved for this time to state it; for never was it stated before, since England was England.—Well, then, ought we not to suppose, that there is something wanting in the principles, upon which our rulers, since 1793, have acted? There has no change taken place in the geographical situation of England and France: the countries lie where they did formerly; their physical means of defence and of offence are what they formerly were; and, of course, all that France has gained, she has gained by superiority of moral means. It

2 D

is in vain to tell us, that her means have been of an *extraordinary* kind; for, the answer to such an observation, is, that we should have employed extraordinary means also. France began a revolution, and our government set their faces against that revolution. The revolution took place, and, as our rulers chose to set their faces against it, it was for them to be prepared for all the effects of the resentment of the revolutionists.—No disturbance has, at home, been given to any of the schemes of our rulers. Opposition to those schemes have frequently been attempted, but it has never succeeded. They have, in short, done just what they pleased, as to the raising of money and the expending of money. Their partisans have always contended, that what they did was right. Their opponents have contended, that most of their measures were bad, and that they proceeded upon wrong principles. The result is, that these rulers themselves now tell us, that the contest is become, at last, a contest for our very existence as a nation, while no man pretends to believe, that *France is in any danger at all from us*.—This is a most humiliating confession. We are exposed to great danger from France, and France to none from us. We would fain have peace; but France will not give us a peace in which we shall have a moment's safety. Our war, as we have long been told, is a war *purely defensive*. Our government first undertook to correct French principles; next it undertook to repress French ambition; next it undertook to repel French aggression; but, it has long been content to confine its expressed hopes to the keeping of the French out of England; to preserve itself and the people from the yoke of the Emperor Napoleon, so long the object of the *ridicule* of all good Anti-Jacobins, who, to secure his degradation, thought it quite sufficient to publish his private letters and expose his *bad spelling*.—A contest for existence may sometimes be honourable for both parties, or, at least, not disgraceful to either. But, it is when the existence of *both* is at stake.—How cheerless, how heart-sinking, must that contest be, in which *my* existence is at stake, and in which I openly confess that my adversary, supposing him to be disappointed in all his views, is still in no danger? France could to-morrow give us a peace, which our government would be well satisfied with, not only without any humiliation on

her part; but without causing the world to believe, that she could not have subdued us if she had chosen to continue the contest.—Again, therefore, I ask, whether the principles, upon which our government has acted, for the last seventeen years, must not be wrong? And, whether it be not absurd to suppose, that out of our present state we can be brought by a mere change of ministers, without any change of the principles upon which ministers act?—A correspondent (who does not give me leave to publish his letter) asks me, if “it would be doing nothing to grant the reasonable prayer of the Irish Catholics.” As this is, at this time in particular, a subject of great national interest, I shall answer the question fully and explicitly.—I have always, since I obtained a true account of the state of Ireland, been of opinion, that to grant what the Catholics now ask for is necessary; but, that, to grant them that, without granting more, would produce little effect. Since, however, this question was before agitated; namely, in the spring of 1807, circumstances have materially altered. Spain and Portugal were then tributary to France and very much harassed by her; but, the sovereigns of those countries were upon the throne, and their ports were not at the command of France. Now, if I were to predict, that the whole of the Peninsula will be in the hands of Napoleon, in the space of eight or ten months from this day, I should, I dare say, be most violently abused by all those, whose business it is to delude the public. I will, therefore, argue hypothetically; I will merely, for argument's sake, suppose the thing possible: not *likely*, but merely possible. And, upon such a supposition, I hardly need point out to my readers (I am sure I need not point out to Buonaparté) the great increase of means, which he will possess of invading Ireland. It is a well-known fact, that, of all the ports of Europe, those of the Southern Peninsula are most favourable for such an undertaking; and, there is, I believe, no man, who is at all acquainted with naval affairs, who will not acknowledge, that, if we had ten times as many ships as we now have, it would be next to impossible so to guard the outlets and inlets, for any length of time, as to prevent a fleet of French ships from finding their way to Ireland, supposing the Peninsula to be wholly and safely in the possession of France. Supposing, then, that Napoleon should obtain this

possession, and supposing that he should have the means of making ships, in which I have before shown that he will not be wanting, we need not ask, *whether he will have troops for the service*, seeing, that, his work once accomplished in Spain and Portugal, the difficulty with him will be and must be, how to find *employment* for his troops. His is that sort of situation, that requires war. For years to come war will be necessary to him. The inordinate love of glory, inherent in Frenchmen, will be continually craving. It must be satisfied, or it will turn into contempt of him who fails to satisfy it. So that, even if we could suppose, that he, whom we are incessantly accusing of ruthless ambition, will, for our sakes, cease to be ambitious, the moment the pursuit of his ambition becomes greatly dangerous to us, whom he must hate more than all the world besides; even if we could suppose, that, when in possession of the best means, he will, all at once, want the will to endeavour to annoy and to conquer us; even if we could lay this flattering unction to our souls, we must perceive, that he would be pushed on against his will. In short, it is, I think, quite impossible to believe, that, when he has made himself master of the Southern Peninsula, he will not set systematically to work to invade and to conquer this kingdom. —The reader will, I hope, without hesitation, exclaim: “aye, but he will never succeed!” I hope such is the sentiment of every soul of us. But, if we think that he will make the attempt, it is surely wise in us to consider of our means of resistance. I like to hear men speak boldly upon the subject; but I like to hear them *reason* as they speak. I remember that in the year 1803, there was no small panic prevailed through the country: the flotilla at Boulogne caused the people in London to stop each other in the streets; it is notorious that many persons removed from the coast nearest France, taking their valuables with them: nay, why need I state circumstances to prove the then-prevailing dread of invasion, when we have upon record the official documents relative to the preparations for fortifying the cities of London and Westminster. —All this shows, that we are vapouring, when we treat the idea of invasion with contempt. And, if invasion was a thing not to be despised in 1803, when Buonaparté was merely *First Consul*; when Prussia was unbroken; when Austria was unbroken; when Italy was unsubdued; when Russia was actually

ready to join us in the war, and did join us in the war; when Spain and Portugal, though tributary, were still formidable to France; and, which is not the smallest circumstance, when the port of Antwerp contained neither ships nor arsenal: if invasion was not a thing to be despised, nay, if it was a thing to be dreaded, and greatly dreaded, *then*, what is it *now*; when, with the exception of the Southern Peninsula, the whole of the continent of Europe has been subjugated by our enemy, or is his ally? —If we look back as far as the year 1803, we shall find, that, since that time, every power on the Continent, not then dependent on France, has been, by us, raised up against our enemy. That enemy has beaten them all. Our ministers have all along told us, that, by our money, paid away in *subsidies*, we were, *in the most effectual manner*, carrying on war against our enemy. Of these means we have employed a great mass. Many and many a million of money have the people of these kingdoms toiled for, and have then seen it given to foreign nations by way of *subsidy*. Well, then, if this was “the most effectual manner of carrying on “war against our enemy;” if this was so, is it not now time to look about us? —Because the flotilla is no longer seen sailing along the coast of France, is it, therefore, supposed, that the flotilla is annihilated, and not to be revived? The contrary is well known. It is well known, that the boats and all belonging to them, are preserved with the greatest care, ready to be drawn forth upon any occasion; and who can doubt, that that occasion will soon be found, when the affairs of the Peninsula are settled, supposing them to be settled to the liking of Napoleon? From the *flotilla itself*, there could not be much danger; but, the flotilla must be attended to, and that alone will require a considerable naval force. Antwerp will have, indeed she has, her fleet of ships of the line and of frigates; the Texel, Rochfort, Brest, Ferrol, Lisbon, Cadiz; each will have its fleet in one year from this date; and, it is to be observed, that the forming of these fleets will, where it is required, greatly facilitate the work of subjugation, and will, indeed, tend to reconcile the people to the rule of the new dynasty. All this while *no new taxes* will be necessary in France; and, as to Spain and Portugal, the people there would experience *great relief*; because the heavy and odious imposts, founded on ex-

clusive privileges, would be abolished, and because a great part of the fruit of the people's labour, which is now swallowed up by those who do nothing, would remain for the use of those who perform that labour.—This is a very material consideration; for, if the war continue many years longer, it is manifest, that the mere effects of its duration upon the distribution of property, in *this country*, must produce something very serious. It has, in fact, done so already; it has made great progress in the shifting of property; and it is daily going on. Napoleon has nothing of this sort to apprehend. France knows nothing of paper-money. There is nothing fictitious in her currency or her wealth. Her land yields more than she wants both for eating and drinking. Scarcely any part of her population now look for employment or for gain beyond her own European dominions. The wants of luxury are daily diminishing, because luxury itself is almost banished from the land. And, as to *commerce*, we have, for now more than two years, exerted all our mighty means in an endeavour to ruin France by cutting off her commercial connections; and, what is the result, why, that she has become *more and more powerful*.

—If we, from these reflections, and many other that might be offered, believe that Napoleon has very dreadful means of invading this kingdom, and has the hearty good will to employ those means, it becomes us seriously to consider on the means that we have of resisting him. What are our means? Let me not be answered by *hopes*. Let me not be told, that it is to be *hoped* his fleets and flotillas will be met at sea, and there beaten. They *may* be; but they *may* not. Too many persons are apt to talk of blockading a port as they talk of stopping up a rat's hole, or a rabbit's bury. But, the sea is a wide place; and, perhaps, it is always an even chance, that, once in every month, at least, every blockaded fleet has a chance of getting out. Besides, is it *possible* for us to blockade all the ports from the Texel to Genoa, inclusive? The idea is absurd.—Well, then, supposing Napoleon to send out, at one and the same time, troops from the Texel, the Scheldt, Rochfort, Brest, Ferrol, Lisbon, Cadiz, Toulon, and Genoa, with orders to sail for *Ireland*. I see, for my part, nothing more easy than this. Nay, I think, that some such expedition will be necessary to him. Some of his ships, and even many of them might, and,

doubtless would, be met by our naval force, and, in all probability, would be taken, or destroyed. But, is it to be believed, that a *part* of them would not reach their destined port in safety? Nay, is it to be believed, that, seeing that he would menace England with his flotilla, while he was pushing out his fleets for Ireland, *great bodies* of his forces would not stand a fair chance of landing in the latter country? —If I am answered in the affirmative; if I am told, in the language of poet Fitzgerald's odes, that "the Corsican's legions would be *annihilated* the moment they set their foot upon this *blest* shore;" if this be the answer, I have, of course, nothing further to say. But, if the reader thinks, with me, that it is not only possible, but probable, that, in such a case, a French army to a very considerable amount would land in Ireland, he will not fail to be deeply interested in the question, *How, in such a crisis, the people of Ireland would be likely to act?* This, of all the questions that can now be agitated, is by very far the most interesting to all those, who are *anxious* for their country's independence. —I shall not give any opinion of *my own* upon the state of the public mind in Ireland. I shall merely state, what is, indeed, almost too notorious to need stating at all, namely, that the people of Ireland now *live* under a law, called the *Irish Insurrection Bill*; that this law was passed on the ground of its *absolute necessity*; that it was declared, in the House of Commons, at the time of passing this bill, that "there had been" held, in Ireland, treasonable meetings, "for the purpose of *organizing a force* to *assist the French*, and that it was *certain*, *that there was a French party in Ireland*." Upon this ground it was, that that law was passed, under which the people of Ireland *now live*. —Is not this a fearful state of things? Ought not every means, in the power of our rulers, to be used, and that speedily, for the purpose of rendering this law unnecessary? What those means are it would, perhaps, be not very difficult to point out; but, in my next, I shall endeavour to show how, in one respect, at least, the Irish might be conciliated. I allude to the measure against which the abominable cry of *No Popery* was raised; and which I think myself able to prove, beyond all contradiction, to have been one of the most unprincipled attempts that ever was made, to impose upon the ignorant and the thoughtless. It is now the time

to discuss this question fully. It is time to show to the people of England for *what* their very political existence is to be kept in jeopardy. Ireland safe, we might laugh at the conqueror; and let us, therefore, see, *why* it is that Ireland is not safe.

LORD WELLESLEY is, then, returned! Come back, and that, too, without beating Napoleon; aye, and without having had an opportunity of *facing* him! "Why," some one will say, "did he not remain, then, till the opportunity offered?" Yes, to be sure, there is something in that.—The most noble Marquis has always, by his partizans, been held up to us as the *only* man able to meet Buonaparté. Like Buonaparté, he was a great conqueror; had made kings and princes bend the knee before him; and, it was supposed, that the circumstance of climate made no difference. When, therefore, the news was first announced, that our Eastern Hero and Statesman was about to be sent to Spain, the paragraph grinders in the Nabob's Gazette were all on tip-toe, and the pensioned poet Fitzgerald wrote a poem, predicting the speedy destruction of Buonaparté and his being "*hurled headlong to the shades below.*" What a mortification, therefore, to find that the most noble hero is come back without having, as far as we know, done *any thing at all.*—The most noble hero set out, it will be remembered, just at the time when, building our hopes upon the base fabrications about the *battle of Aspern*, we, every day, expected to hear of Napoleon's *complete overthrow*, an expectation in which, doubtless, the most noble personage participated. Such was the time when our Hindostan Conqueror sallied forth for Spain. *What a time is it, under what circumstances* is it, that he comes back? Answer that question yourself, reader; but, it is a question very well worth answering, and I hope every man in England will answer it for himself.—Reader, we have been, by the hiring prints, over and over again told, that the main purpose of the Marquis Wellesley's going to Spain, was to *bring about a change in the government of Spain*; and these prints have not failed to accuse the Junta of obstinacy, folly, and, sometimes, of treasonable intentions, because they refused to adopt the change which the most noble Marquis proposed to them.—Very well; and now, *pray* look back to the Debates of the last Session, upon Spanish affairs; there you will find Mr. Whitbread blaming the ministers for having

hazarded so much English blood and so much English treasure without first seeing, that the government of Spain meant to give the people motives for fighting; and there you will find the ministers telling Mr. Whitbread, *that it did not become them to interfere in forming a government for Spain.* What think you, then, of their *sincerity*? They even affected to reproach Mr. Whitbread, for saying that they ought to have seen that the government was such as it would have been wisdom to support. No: they were for leaving the Spaniards wholly to themselves. Very nice in their notions upon such matters. So nice, that they would rather fail in their enterprizes, than suffer any under their authority to meddle with the work of government-making in Spain. But, now, if the hired prints tell us truth, the Marquis Wellesley was sent out by these very ministers *for the express purpose of effecting a change in the government.*—Of the nature of that change we were informed. We were told, that the Marquis proposed a *Regency*. The Junta, however, did not approve of this. They liked power as well as other people; and, besides, there was the dread of Napoleon to be set against the eloquence of the Marquis. Is it not likely that the Junta were pretty nearly as wise as the Marquis Wellesley? At any rate, he failed; no change in the government has taken place upon his recommendation; and, no change, in all probability, will take place.—I wonder whether the most noble Marquis walked over the *French flag* again, when he came on board ship? His brother of Douro had no French flag, I believe, to send him from *Talavera*? Oh! that flag scene! That flag scene! I shall never be happy till I see it represented upon the stage. Well, we may see it yet.—In the meanwhile, the Marquis is, it seems, to be Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Aye, he is to fill *Mr. Canning's place*; aye, the place of that very person, who endeavoured to put the Marquis in the place of Lord Castlereagh, but who, in the attempt, got ousted himself!

MR. CANNING.—This poor gentleman is almost an object of pity, even with me, who know him so well. He is the only man that I know of, in the world; not to be pitied in a similar case; under such very dismal circumstances.—His long exculpatory Epistle I have, by way of *rubbing off an old score with him*, inserted below, word for word and letter for letter. The STATESMAN news-paper has, I see, not

published it, thinking it too *contemptible*; but, it is for that very reason that it ought to send it over the world, that the world may see what a fall upstart arrogance has received. Never was there so dull, so stupid, so despicable a publication. One can make neither head nor tail of it. You may begin at the bottom as well as at the top. It is a mass of unmeaning verbosity that may have been equalled, but that never was surpassed, even by the *dispatches from Hindostan*.—Mr. Canning is not one of those who can be merry under all circumstances. Like the fellow in Congreve's *Old Bachelor*, he is nothing without his *back*. What is become of all his Anti-Jacobin wit and wagery? "Where are his gibes now? Not one left?" Would that *John Hookham, the Marquis of the Union*, were here to assist him!—Out of the heap of lumber, however, comes a confirmation of the fact, that my Lord Castlereagh was treated with *insincerity unparalleled*. Be he what he may; much as he has to answer to the nation, he ought to have been treated fairly, and especially by those who were his colleagues in office; who were sharers in all that he did.—But, all this is nothing, when one thinks of the manner, in which the *country* has been treated by this ministry, a great part of whom, at any rate, now stand accused, by one of their colleagues, of having left to fill, during six months, the most important post in the government, a minister whom they thought unfit for that post. Upon this part of the subject; upon the injury and insult our country has received upon this occasion, I here beg leave to introduce an extract from the *Times* of the 29th of November, the honour of writing which I envy the author:—"The facts, as stated in this defence, though more minutely specified, agree very well with those before advanced by Lord Castlereagh. His Lordship, however, supposes his dismissal to have been settled at the beginning of April. The defence avers, that the intrigue for procuring it only commenced then, and was terminated on the 28th, and then immediately communicated to Lord Camden, who acquiesced in the propriety of a change in Lord Castlereagh's situation," provided (and here first occurs a phrase that will long live in public derision) *provided "it could be reconciled to his LORDSHIP'S FEELINGS."* So that we have, in April, on the part

of Lord Castlereagh's friend, an acknowledgment that his Lordship is unfit for his situation: which situation he is nevertheless suffered to retain for five months afterwards: to plan and conduct an Expedition, unparalleled in the misery, and disgrace, and ruin resulting from it. And why is he suffered to do this? Because the sensitive youth, as the no-less-sensitive Lord Camden imagines, cannot "*reconcile it to his feelings to go out.*" Who can think, without shuddering, that the independence of this land, when assailed by so hardy a ruffian as BUONAPARTE, should have been intrusted to the guardianship of such a set of sentimental men-milliners as these? Reconcile it to his feelings, indeed! Has the nation no feelings? and, if it has, how have they been harrowed up by the indescribable miseries of the Walcheren Expedition? No timid girl, in the last stage of consumption—no condemned malefactor, when about to sustain the final sentence of the law, ever entertained so dire an apprehension of the terrors of their situation, as his MAJESTY'S Ministers conceived must agitate the heart of LORD CASTLEREAGH, when warned of the approaching end of his Ministry. "Time is to be taken," as it is said in another part of the defence, "by his friends to prepare him for the change." The *mollia tempora fundi* are to be selected, lest his delicate frame should sink under the awful disclosure! With what laughter and buffoonery did the town yesterday read this exquisite nonsense!—Such, then, being the difficulties in making the dreadful communication, it appears, that divers expedients were devised, in order to remove the necessity of it, and to preserve Lord Castlereagh's "feelings," unruffled; and here we believe one general sentiment of indignation must pervade the land, on the discovery made by a Member of the last Administration, of the universal impotence of the whole body to which he belonged; they could not even agree upon and execute a plan of this narrow and contemptible nature. On the 8th of June, (says Mr. Canning.)

I. "An arrangement was stated to me, which had for its object a new distribution of the business of the War Department; on the 13th, I signified my acquiescence in that arrangement, so far as I was concerned."

II. "But, on the 18th, another arrangement was stated to me, as intended to be substituted for that in which I had acquiesced; but again—

III. "On the 21st, it was announced to me, that the first arrangement was finally decided upon, and was to be immediately carried into effect."

IV. "And lastly, on the 5th of July, a new plan was stated to me to be in contemplation; and this plan was, on the 13th, announced to me as settled, and as intended to be substituted for that which had been first proposed."

"Four different arrangements, resolved and unresolved upon, in the space of as many weeks, which at last end in executing no arrangement whatever!! How one's blood boils to think that the affairs of our country have been consigned to the absolute impotence of such men as these! And much as we have suffered under their Councils, and cruelly as we have been aggrieved by their incompetence—incompetence did we say? No! no word that language ever contained can describe this, their unreckoned nothingness, as here detailed by one of themselves. Yet, much as we have suffered under them, how thankful ought we to be that we have really been found to exist at the close of such an Administration! We call upon Mr. Perceval to say, as he now aspires to the situation from whence that great decider of strifes has removed his predecessor, whether he was privy to these arrangements, four times disarranged, and terminating in no arrangement at all? How Mr. Canning could have the confidence thus to blazon the incapacity of his colleagues, thus to unfold the secrets of his prison-house, we know not; but we confess that the tale he has revealed, does indeed freeze our very blood. Was Antwerp captured, and the French Fleet destroyed, by resolutions four times taken, by plans four times formed, and at last ending in no plan? Oh yes, the same energy and decision marked the public and the private councils of these unhappy men. But the latter burthened us with no expence; in them no lives perished, by them no disgrace was incurred, except what has now fallen upon the authors of them, from this their exposure. Their public projects present a different result, and more calamitous consequences. Yes, it

"was indeed by firmness and resolution like these that Antwerp was taken, and the fleet destroyed, without the waste of a moment's time; it was by vigour and decision such as these, that to day it was determined to evacuate Walcheren, and to-morrow to retain it—this moment to build barracks, and the next to destroy the fortifications; while our poor troops—but tears enough have been shed on their account already! Yet how will Mr. Canning look his recent colleagues in the face, after this his promulgation of their resolutions, *four times formed and revoked within a month, and at last ending in nothing?* How will they feel towards the man who has thus exposed both himself and them to public scorn and derision? Four arrangements in four weeks have these sons of sapience formed; and yet have not they been able to rescue the Ministry which they composed from dissolution! Yet the powers of ridicule are lost upon a subject so base; and the source of grief has been already dried up by the more pregnant and ruinous evils which have drawn upon it during their Administration. We must, therefore, cease. But how an atom of them should dare linger in office after a statement so destructive of their credit as this, and from one of their own body, too, we cannot easily conceive."—This is all so just, and, at the same time, so excellently well expressed, that it leaves nothing to be added to it. It is hardly to exaggerate to say, that Buonaparté must be disposed to pity us, to see us in such hands. Good God! That a nation so full of well-informed men; so full of learning and of talents of all sorts; so full of bravery when opposed to a foreign foe; that this nation should be thus treated by such men as are here, in this writing of Canning, exhibited upon the stage! To see the King, too; time after time, teased, baited, insulted with the tender of this man's resignation! There is really something in it too monstrous to be endured.—The *exposure*, however, is valuable. It is another instance of the necessity of that change of system, that constitutional reform and renovation, without which, it must now be evident to every one, this kingdom cannot be saved.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, 30 Nov. 1809.

LETTERS
FROM THE
RIGHT HON. GEO. CANNING
TO
THE EARL CAMDEN,
Lord President of THE COUNCIL.

Gloucester Lodge, Nov. 14, 1809.

MY LORD—I had written to your Lordship immediately after the publication of your Lordship's Statement;* but I delayed sending my letter, in the hope of being able previously to submit it to the perusal of the Duke of Portland.

In this hope I have been disappointed by that fatal event, which has deprived this country of one of its most upright and disinterested Patriots; the King, of one of his most faithful, devoted, and affectionate subjects; and the world, of one of the most blameless and most noble-minded of men.

Thus situated, I have thought it right to revise what I had written, and scrupulously to expunge every reference to the authority of the Duke of Portland, which would now stand upon my sole testimony; retaining such only as are supported, either by written documents which I shall be happy to communicate to your Lordship; or by facts which are well known to your Lordship or to your Colleagues, and in which for the most part your Lordship is yourself concerned.

Neither, however, can I content myself with this precaution; but must protest, at the same time, in the most earnest manner, against any possible misconstruction, by which any thing in the following Letter can be strained to a meaning unfavourable to the motives which actuated the Duke of Portland's conduct.

It is impossible, indeed, not to regret the policy, however well intentioned, which dictated the reserve practised towards Lord Castlereagh in the beginning of this transaction; or that practised towards myself in its conclusion.

It is to be regretted, that the Duke of Portland should have imposed, and that your Lordship should have accepted, the condition of silence, in the first communications between you.

It is also to be regretted, that I should

not have learnt in July, that your Lordship was not party to the assurances then given to me on behalf of Lord Castlereagh's friends in general;—and that another Member of the Cabinet, comprehended in that description, had (as I have since heard), refused to concur in them.

Had I been made acquainted with these circumstances, I should then have resigned; and my Resignation would, at that time, have taken place without inconvenience or embarrassment; and without stirring those questions (no way connected with the causes of my retirement) or subjecting me to those misinterpretations of my conduct and motives, which have been produced by the coincidence of my resignation with that of the Duke of Portland.

But, however this reserve may be to be regretted, it is impossible to attribute the adoption of it, on the part of the Duke of Portland, to any other motives than to that gentleness of nature which eminently distinguished him; and which led him to endeavour (above all things) to prevent political differences from growing into personal dissensions; and to aim at executing whatever arrangement might be expedient for improving or strengthening the Administration, with the concurrence (if possible) of all its existing Members.

And no man who knows the affectionate respect and attachment, which the manly and generous qualities of the Duke of Portland's mind were calculated to command, and which I invariably bore to him, will suspect me of being willing to establish my own vindication, at the expence of the slightest disrespect to his memory, or prejudice to his fame.—I have the honour to be, My Lord; Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

TO THE EARL CAMDEN, &c. &c. &c.

MY LORD—The Statement, which has been published in the newspapers, in your Lordship's name, has decided a question on which I had before been hesitating, as to the necessity of an authentic detail of the transactions (so far as I am concerned in them or am acquainted with them) to which that Statement refers.

For that purpose, I think a direct address to your Lordship more decorous, both towards your Lordship and for myself, than an anonymous paragraph in a newspaper.

* For the Statement, see p. 861.

It is with the most painful reluctance that I recur to a subject, which, so far as it concerns Lord Castlereagh and myself, had been settled in a manner, which is usually, I believe, considered as final.

Discussions of the causes of dispute more commonly precede, than follow, the extreme appeal to which Lord Castlereagh resorted:—And when, after mature consideration, his Lordship had determined to resort to that appeal in the first instance, I should have thought that such a choice, deliberately made, would have been felt by his friends to be equally conclusive upon them, as upon himself.

But your Lordship needs not to be informed, how assiduously my character has been assailed by writers in the newspapers, espousing Lord Castlereagh's quarrel, and supposed (I trust, most injuriously) to be his Lordship's particular friends.

The perversions and misrepresentations of anonymous writers, however, would not have extorted from me any reply. But to them succeeded the publication of Lord Castlereagh's Letter to me of the 19th of September.*

I entirely disbelieve that Lord Castlereagh, and I distinctly deny that I myself, had any knowledge of this publication.

But, by what means it matters not, the Letter is before the world: and though the course originally chosen by Lord Castlereagh precluded me from offering any explanation to him, the course which has since been adopted on his behalf (though undoubtedly without his privity), might perhaps have been considered as rendering such an explanation due to myself. It is, however, only since your Lordship's publication that I have felt it to be indispensably necessary.

The Statement on my behalf, which has also found its way (without my consent and against my wish) into the public papers, was written under a sense of delicacy and restraint as to the particulars of the transaction, which, from the character of the transaction itself, must always continue to prevail in a great degree; but from which, until Wednesday, the 11th of October, the day on which I gave up the seals, I had not an opportunity of soliciting any dispensation.

Of the indulgence which I then most humbly solicited, I trust I shall be able to avail myself sufficiently for my own vindication, without losing sight of those considerations of duty and propriety, by which the use of such an indulgence must necessarily be regulated and confined.

It is stated in Lord Castlereagh's Letter, "That I had demanded and procured from the Duke of Portland, before the rising of Parliament, a promise for Lord Castlereagh's removal from the War Department; that, by this promise, Lord Castlereagh's situation, as a Minister of the Crown, was made dependent upon my pleasure; and that this promise I afterwards thought myself entitled to enforce;"

"That, after and notwithstanding this virtual supersession of Lord Castlereagh in his office, I allowed him to originate and conduct the Expedition to the Scheldt;"

"And that, during this whole period, I knew that the agitation, and the decision of the question for his removal, were concealed from him: and was party to this concealment."

Lord Castlereagh indeed admits,

That he "has no right as a public man, to resent my demanding, upon public grounds, his removal from his office, or even from the Administration, as a condition of my continuing a member of the Government."

But he contends, that a proposition, "justifiable in itself," ought not to have been "executed in an unjustifiable manner;" and he makes me responsible for the manner in which the "Head of the Administration," and some Members of the Government, "*supposed* to be his (Lord Castlereagh's) friends," executed the proposition which he attributes to me."

He is ready to acknowledge, indeed, "that I pressed for a disclosure, at the same time that I pressed for a decision; and that the disclosure was resisted by the Duke of Portland and his (Lord Castlereagh's) *supposed* friends."

But, in this circumstance, Lord Castlereagh professes not to see any justification of what he conceives to have been my conduct towards him; because, by acquiescing in the advice or intreaties of his "*supposed* friends," I admitted "an authority" on their part, "which I must have known them not to possess;" because, by "pressing for disclosure," I shewed my own sense of the "unfairness" of concealment; and because, with that sense, I "ought" (as he conceives me not to have done) "to have availed myself of the same alternative, namely, my own Resignation, to enforce disclosure, which I did to enforce decision."

* See Reg. Oct. 14, p. 516.

Without offering a single word in the way of argument, I shall, by a distinct detail of facts in the order of their date, substantiate my contradiction of these charges.

I shall only premise,

1st, That I had (as is admitted by Lord Castlereagh) an unquestionable right to require, on public grounds, a change in the War Department, tendering at the same time the alternative of my own Resignation.

2dly. (What no man at all acquainted with the course of public business will dispute), That the regular, effectual, and straight-forward course for bringing that alternative to issue, was to state it directly to the "Head of the Administration," the King's chief Minister, to be laid by that Minister before the King.

I proceed to the detail of facts.

In the beginning of April, (the 2d) I addressed a letter to the Duke of Portland, containing a representation on the state of his Administration, and expressing my wish and intention, unless some change were effected in it, to resign.

(April 4th to 8th).—Upon the Duke of Portland's requiring a more detailed explanation as to the motives of my proffered Resignation, I stated, among other things, that a change either in my own department, or in Lord Castlereagh's, appeared to me to be expedient for the public service—I stated my perfect willingness that the alternative should be decided for my retirement; and only requested that the decision might, (if possible) take place before the recommencement of business in Parliament after the Easter holidays.

The Duke of Portland requested me to suspend the execution of my intention to resign: wishing to have an opportunity of consulting with some of our colleagues, before he determined what advice to lay before the King.

The Easter holidays thus passed away. On the 16th of April, shortly after his Grace's return to town from Bulstrode, the Duke of Portland opened the subject to one of the Members of the Cabinet, whose name, (not having been hitherto brought forward,) I do not think it necessary to mention. Your Lordship is perfectly acquainted with it.

By the Duke of Portland's desire, I had a communication with that Member of the Cabinet, within a very few days after his interview with the Duke of Portland.

He strongly represented the difficulty of making any new Arrangement during the sitting of Parliament; and urged me to defer the pressing my own resignation till the end of the Session. To this recommendation I did not promise to accede: but we agreed (whether upon his suggestion or upon mine, I am not confident) that, at all events, no step whatever could properly be taken, until after the decision of the question upon the Writership; which was about this time brought forward in the House of Commons.

That question was decided on Tuesday the 25th of April.

On Friday, the 28th, the Duke of Portland communicated fully with your Lordship; and informed me as the result of that communication, that your Lordship thought a change in Lord Castlereagh's situation in the Government desirable,—provided it could be effected honourably for Lord Castlereagh, and that it "could be reconciled to Lord Castlereagh's feelings."

From this period, I understood that your Lordship was constantly consulted by the Duke of Portland in every step of the transaction. Other Members of the Cabinet were also consulted by the Duke of Portland; but how many of them, or at what precise periods, I neither knew at the time, nor can now undertake to say.

Shortly after your Lordship's first interview with the Duke of Portland, (I am sure before the 5th of May) that Member of the Cabinet with whom his Grace had first communicated, reported to me a suggestion of your Lordship's of a change of office for Lord Castlereagh, evidently calculated on the principles which your Lordship had stated as indispensable to such a change. Whether this communication to me was in the nature of a direct message from your Lordship, I do not exactly know. But I understood distinctly that you knew of its being made to me; and that whatever observations, I might make upon it, was to be reported to your Lordship. What I observed upon it, was in substance,—that it was not for me to presume to say what change would be proper; that I had done all that I had thought myself either called upon or at liberty to do, in stating to the Duke of Portland my opinions, and my intention to resign; that the Duke of Portland alone could either propose any change or obtain the necessary authority for carry-

ing it into effect; and that I therefore recommended that your Lordship should state your suggestion to the Duke of Portland.

On the 5th of May the Duke of Portland informed me, that he had determined to lay the whole subject, on the following Wednesday, before his Majesty.

On Wednesday the 10th of May, he informed me that he had done so; and that his Majesty had been graciously pleased to say, that he would take the subject into his serious consideration.

On Wednesday, the 31st of May, apprehending it to be possible, that my intention might not have been fully explained to his Majesty, and thinking it my duty to leave no doubt upon it, I humbly repeated to his Majesty the representations which I had before made to the Duke of Portland, and humbly tendered my Resignation. I received thereupon his Majesty's gracious commands, to retain my situation until his Majesty should have considered the whole subject.

Some time in the course of the next week, I think on the 8th of June, the Duke of Portland stated to me, that he had received his Majesty's commands, to propose, and to carry into effect at the end of the Session of Parliament, an Arrangement for a partial change in the War Department.

The particulars of this Arrangement I do not think it proper to detail; feeling it my duty to limit myself strictly to what is absolutely necessary for the explanation of my own conduct. It is sufficient to state, that the object of this Arrangement was not the removal of Lord Castlereagh, but a new distribution of the business of the War Department, whereby that part of it which was connected with political correspondence, would have been transferred to the Foreign Office; and the business of another office, then vacant, would have been transferred to Lord Castlereagh. It is only necessary to add, that the effect of this new distribution would not have been to take out of Lord Castlereagh's hands the superintendence of the Expedition to the Scheldt.

On the 13th of June, I wrote to the Duke of Portland, signifying to him that, although such an Arrangement had never entered into my contemplation, and although I did not think it calculated to remedy all the difficulties which had induced me to bring the state of the Admini-

nistration under his Grace's consideration, I was ready, so far as I was concerned, to undertake and discharge to the best of my ability, any duty which his Majesty might be graciously pleased to devolve upon me; but I expressed at the same time, great doubts, whether this Arrangement could be expected to be acceptable to Lord Castlereagh, or, in all its parts, satisfactory to the public feeling.

On Sunday the 18th of June, (Parliament being expected to rise on the 20th or 21st) I wrote to the Duke of Portland, to enquire whether this Arrangement, or any other, was to take place; stating to him that, "if things remained as they then were, I was determined not to remain in office."

(June 18th.)—In answer the Duke of Portland mentioned to me a new Plan of Arrangement, altogether different from that which he had been authorised to carry into effect; and stated that he had sent for your Lordship and the other Member of the Cabinet with whom your Lordship and the Duke of Portland had been in constant communication, to co-operate with him in forwarding this new Plan, and to urge Lord Castlereagh to consent to it.

The particulars of this new Plan, I do not think it necessary to state, as I learnt from the Duke of Portland, either the next day or the day following it, that to this Plan Lord Castlereagh certainly could not be brought to agree. Whether this was known to his Grace only from your Lordship, or through your Lordship from Lord Castlereagh himself, I was not apprized.

On Wednesday the 21st, the day of the rising of Parliament, I was assured by the Duke of Portland, that the specific Arrangement which he had in the first instance proposed, viz. the new distribution of the business of the War Department, should be carried into effect;—and that his Majesty had directed him to desire your Lordship to communicate his decision to Lord Castlereagh.

On Tuesday, June the 27th, finding that no communication had been yet made to Lord Castlereagh, I wrote to the Duke of Portland in terms of the strongest remonstrance, both against the concealment and the delay; and intimated my determination to recur to my original intention, and to press the acceptance of my Resignation.

Accordingly, on the following day,

Wednesday the 28th of June, I had an audience of the King, in which I humbly and earnestly repeated to his Majesty the tender of my Resignation.

That same evening, the Duke of Portland informed me that he had that day signified to your Lordship the King's desire, that your Lordship should communicate the intended Arrangement to Lord Castlereagh; and, that the communication was to be made by your Lordship as soon as the Expedition had sailed; which, it was expected, would be in less than a fortnight from that time.

But before this fortnight elapsed, viz. on Wednesday the 5th of July, the Duke of Portland informed me, that in consideration of the difficulties attending the proposed Arrangement, he and those with whom he had consulted, were of opinion, that another should be substituted for it, which he trusted, would also be more agreeable to me. He told me that hopes were entertained that your Lordship would determine to offer your Resignation, for the purpose of facilitating a general Arrangement, in which a complete change in the War Department might be effected consistently with Lord Castlereagh's feelings. He said, however, that your Lordship had not yet finally made up your mind upon the subject:—but, that you would probably come to a decision before the following Wednesday.

The Duke of Portland stated his intention, in the event of your Lordship's resignation, to submit to his Majesty the nomination of Lord Wellesley to the War Department.

It was well known by the Duke of Portland, that I had been always anxious for Lord Wellesley's accession to the Cabinet, but this was the first mention to me, in the course of this transaction, of his introduction into the War Department.—But for a severe indisposition, Lord Wellesley would, before this time, have been on his way to Spain.

On Thursday the 13th of July, the Duke of Portland informed me, that your Lordship had, the day before, actually tendered your Resignation; but that your Lordship had annexed to it the conditions, that no change should take place till after the termination of the Expedition to the Scheldt; and that it should be left to your Lordship to choose the time of making any communication to Lord Castlereagh.

(July 13th to the 20th.)—I made the strongest remonstrances against this new

delay, and this indefinite renewal of the concealment from Lord Castlereagh. I said that after the repeated postponements which had already taken place, and after the reserve which had already been practised towards Lord Castlereagh, I could not rely upon the execution of any Arrangement which should not be now completely settled in all its parts; and, if this were not to be done, I most earnestly intreated that his Majesty might be advised how to accept my Resignation.

The Duke of Portland most anxiously deprecated my Resignation, as leading, in his apprehension, to the dissolution of the Administration. He declared himself to be authorised to assure me, in the most solemn manner, that the Arrangement now in contemplation should positively take place at the termination of the Expedition; that the Seals of the War Department should then be offered to Lord Wellesley—an office (to be vacated by means of your Lordship's retirement), being at the same time to be offered to Lord Castlereagh;—and that in the interval, and without loss of time, Lord Castlereagh's friends should take opportunities of preparing him for the change, and reconciling him to it, by representing to him the great advantages to be derived from it, in the acquisition of additional strength to the Government.

Not only the Duke of Portland, but other Members of the Cabinet, Lord Castlereagh's friends, some directly and some through common friends, urged me, in the most earnest manner, to acquiesce in the postponement now proposed. It was represented to me, that if instead of pressing for the execution of the Arrangement now, time were allowed to Lord Castlereagh's friends to prepare him for the change, and to reconcile him to it, the Arrangement might ultimately take place in an amicable manner; that every public object might thus be answered, without any unnecessary harshness to the feelings of individuals; and that so far from finding fresh impediments raised to the execution of the Arrangement, when the time arrived, I should find all those, to whose representations I yielded, considering themselves pledged equally with the Duke of Portland, to see it carried into effect.

It is due to your Lordship to say, that your Lordship's name was not, so far as I recollect, specifically mentioned to me on this occasion; but it is equally due to myself to declare, that I never for a mo-

ment imagined, nor could have believed, that the general description of "Lord Castlereagh's friends," as stated to me without exception or qualification by the Duke of Portland, did not comprehend your Lordship, whose proffered Resignation was the basis of the whole Arrangement, and without whose express consent, therefore, no other person could announce the Arrangement to Lord Castlereagh.

By these representations and assurances, at length, (July 20,) most reluctantly, and I confess against my better judgment, I was induced to acquiesce in the proposed postponement of the change; and consented to remain in office till the termination of the Expedition.

On Saturday September the 2d, the result of the Expedition to the Scheldt being then known, I wrote to the Duke of Portland, at Bulstrode, reminding his Grace, that the period fixed for offering the Seals of the War Department to Lord Wellesley, was arrived.

On the following Wednesday the 6th of September, the Duke of Portland informed me, that no steps whatever had been taken by any of Lord Castlereagh's friends, to reconcile him to the change, or to prepare him for it; that the execution of the Arrangement would be attended with other Resignations, or at least with one other Resignation, (of which I had never before received the slightest intimation); and that he had himself determined to retire.

Upon receiving this intelligence, I immediately disclaimed any wish that the Arrangement, however positively I understood it to have been settled, should be carried into effect under circumstances to me so unexpected; and instantly reverted to that "alternative" which, upon each successive stage of difficulties and delays, I had uniformly pressed,—that of the tender of my own Resignation;—which I desired the Duke of Portland to lay that day before the King.

On the following day, Thursday the 7th of September, I declined attending the Cabinet; stating in a letter to the Duke of Portland, (which I left it to his Grace to communicate to the Cabinet if he should think proper), that I considered my Resignation as in his Majesty's hands; and myself as holding my office only until my Successor should be named.

On Friday the 8th, I heard from the Duke of Portland that Lord Castlereagh had sent in his Resignation. I have been

informed since, (but whether correctly or not I cannot affirm), that he did so, in consequence of a communication made to him, by your Lordship, after the Cabinet of the preceding day.

On Thursday the 14th of September, your Lordship called upon me at the Foreign Office, by your own appointment, for the purpose of explaining the causes which had prevented your making any communication to Lord Castlereagh in the earlier stages of the transaction.

On Tuesday, September 19th, your Lordship, in answer to a letter of mine of the preceding day, explained to me the grounds of your silence to Lord Castlereagh, during the latter period of the transaction.

On Wednesday morning, September the 20th, I received from Lord Castlereagh the letter, which produced our meeting.

From this series of facts it appears,

That, in April, I made a representation to the King's First Minister, on the general state of the Administration; and that, in the course of the discussions arising out of that representation, I proposed on public grounds, not, as Lord Castlereagh appears to have been informed, his removal from the Administration, but the alternative of a change, either in the War or Foreign Department;

That on the 10th of May, the Duke of Portland submitted to his Majesty the subject of my representation: and informed me that his Majesty would be pleased to take it into his consideration:

That, from the 10th of May until the 8th of June, I was wholly unapprized of the result of that consideration: but that, for fear of misapprehension, I had, in person, during that interval,—viz. on May 31,—humbly repeated my representation, and tendered my Resignation to his Majesty;

That, on or about the 8th of June, for the first time, an arrangement was stated to me, which had for its object a new distribution of the business of the War Department, and that, on the 13th, I signified my acquiescence in that arrangement, so far as I was concerned;

That, on the 18th, another arrangement was stated to me, as intended to be substituted for that in which I had acquiesced: but that, on the 21st, it was announced to me that the first arrangement was finally decided upon; was to be immediately carried into effect; and was to be communicated to Lord Castlereagh by your Lordship;

That, on the 27th of June, no step appearing to have been taken, either to execute the intended Arrangement, or to apprise Lord Castlereagh of it, I remonstrated against the delay, and against the concealment from Lord Castlereagh: and that, on the 28th, I again tendered my resignation; and that on the same day your Lordship received an injunction to communicate the intended arrangement to Lord Castlereagh;

That, on the 5th of July, a new plan was stated to me to be in contemplation; a plan originating with your Lordship, and depending for its execution upon a step to be taken by yourself: that this plan was, on the 13th, announced to me as settled, and as intended to be substituted for that which had been first proposed;

That I at that time renewed my remonstrances in the strongest manner, both against the delay and against the concealment; but that it was stated to me to be an indispensable condition of this plan on your Lordship's part,—that it should not be acted upon till the termination of the Expedition to the Scheldt; and that the time of making the communication to Lord Castlereagh should be left to your Lordship's discretion;

That, at length, in compliance with the representations and intreaties of the Duke of Portland, and of others, Lord Castlereagh's friends, and upon the most solemn assurances that Lord Castlereagh should in the mean time be prepared by his friends for the change, and that the change should positively take place at the period fixed by your Lordship, I consented to remain in office;

That on Wednesday the 6th of September, finding that nothing had been done towards preparing Lord Castlereagh for the arrangement; and that the execution of it would be attended with difficulties of which I had not before been apprised, I desired the Duke of Portland to lay my Resignation before the King.

Your Lordship will therefore perceive, That up to the 8th of June, so far from being in possession of any "promise for Lord Castlereagh's removal," and from his continuance in office being made thereby "dependent upon my pleasure;"—no decision whatever had, to my knowledge, been taken, up to that time; no proposal had been made to me by the Duke of Portland, in any way affecting Lord Castlereagh's political situation; and no intimation had been given to me, whether my own Resignation would be finally accepted or declined;

That the Arrangement which was in contemplation from the 8th of June to the 5th of July, in no degree affected, and was never intended to affect, "the conduct of the Expedition to the Scheldt;"

That Lord Castlereagh's "removal from the War Department" was first determined upon as part of the plan of which your Lordship's Resignation was the basis;

That his "removal from the Administration" was not at any time "demanded" by me;

And, lastly, that I *did* employ the tender of my own Resignation, not to "enforce decision" *only* (as Lord Castlereagh's Letter supposes), but equally to "enforce disclosure;" and that in fact I did ultimately resign, rather than "enforce" the intended change, under circumstances so different from those which I had been authorised to expect.

It cannot be expected that I should labour very anxiously to refute the charge of my having "*supposed*" your Lordship and others "*to be* Lord Castlereagh's friends;" and having, under that impression, deferred to your opinion and "authority," in a matter affecting Lord Castlereagh's interests and feelings.

That your Lordship, in particular, as well from near connection as from an active and anxious partiality, was entitled to consultation, and to deference on such an occasion;—is a persuasion which I felt in common, as I believe, with every Member of the Government; and which not even Lord Castlereagh's disclaimer has induced me to renounce.

I should not have been surprised, nor should I have thought myself entitled to take the smallest offence, if your Lordship had, instead of concurring in the expediency of a change in Lord Castlereagh's department, protested against it, and had recommended to the Duke of Portland, to advise the King to accept my resignation: and it was perfectly known by the Duke of Portland, and I am confident, not unknown by your Lordship, that, at any moment from the beginning of these discussions to the end, I was not only ready but desirous to terminate them by resigning.

But when the opinion of the expediency of a change in the War Department, had been adopted by so many of the immediate friends of Lord Castlereagh, upon the condition that it should be reconciled to Lord Castlereagh's feelings, and when they and your Lordship among the first,

had devised and concerted with the King's First Minister the mode of carrying that object into execution, I cannot help thinking that I should have been much, and justly, blamed, if I had insisted upon taking the communication to Lord Castlereagh out of your hands into my own.

I now come to your Lordship's Statement. That Statement is as follows—

"As it may be inferred, from a Statement which has appeared in the public papers, that Lord Camden withheld from Lord Castlereagh a communication which he had been desired to make to him, it is necessary that it should be understood, that however Mr. Canning might have conceived the communication alluded to, to have been made to Lord Camden, it was never stated to Lord Camden, that the communication was made at the desire of Mr. Canning; and, so far from Lord Camden having been authorized to make the communication to Lord Castlereagh, he was absolutely restricted from so doing.

"As it may also be inferred that Lord Camden was expected to prepare Lord Castlereagh's mind for any proposed change, it is necessary that it should be understood, that Lord Camden never engaged to communicate to Lord Castlereagh any circumstances respecting it, before the termination of the Expedition."

—MORNING CHRONICLE, Oct. 19th.

This Statement appears to me to have been much misunderstood. It has been construed, as if your Lordship had meant to aver that what you were *restricted from doing* and what you *had not engaged to do*, were one and the same thing:—whereas your Lordship's Statement, in point of fact, contains two distinct propositions, and refers to two separate periods of time.

The period during which your Lordship states yourself to have been "*absolutely restricted*" from making a communication to Lord Castlereagh, extends from the 28th of April, on which day the first communication was made by the Duke of Portland to your Lordship, to the time at which the proposed Arrangement, for the new distribution of the business of the War Department was superseded by your Lordship's tender of your Resignation.

The period during which your Lordship states yourself "*not to have engaged*" to make a communication to Lord Castlereagh, extends from the time of the tender of your Lordship's Resignation to the termination of the Expedition to the Scheldt.

It ought, however, to be observed, that during the first of these two periods,—from the 28th of April to the 12th of July,—the nature of the communication to be made to Lord Castlereagh, and the nature of the restriction imposed upon your Lordship, were entirely changed.

Previously to the 5th of June—the communication which your Lordship would have had to make to Lord Castlereagh, was simply that I had represented the expediency of a change either in his Department or in mine; and that *no decision* whatever had yet been taken upon this representation.

With respect to *this* communication, it does appear that the restriction upon your Lordship was absolute and indefinite. But I knew nothing of it's existence.

Subsequently to the 8th of June, the communication to be made to Lord Castlereagh was, that an Arrangement was in contemplation for a new distribution of the business of the War Department.

With respect to *this* communication, not only was the *restriction* upon your Lordship not indefinitely continued; but your Lordship actually received on the 29th of June an *injunction to make this communication* to Lord Castlereagh at a period distinctly specified, viz. the sailing of the Expedition. And this injunction was only superseded by a voluntary act of your Lordship's—your tender of your own Resignation on the 12th of July as the basis of another Arrangement.

During the whole of the period, from the 28th of April to the 12th of July, the concealment practised towards Lord Castlereagh was either without my knowledge and contrary to my belief, or it was against my earnest remonstrances.

It was without my knowledge and contrary to my belief, up to the week in which Parliament rose; and from that time forth it was against my earnest remonstrances.

Even when I learnt, in June, that the communication had not been made by your Lordship to Lord Castlereagh, I did not learn that you had been prevented from making it by any absolute restriction.

It was not till the month of July, in the course of the discussions which took place from the 13th to the 20th of that month, respecting the proposal for postponing the new arrangement to be founded on your Lordship's resignation, and for leaving to your Lordship's discretion the time of

disclosure to Lord Castlereagh, that I learnt that the silence which you had hitherto observed towards him, had been imposed upon your Lordship by the injunction of the Duke of Portland. I did not till then know with whom the concealment hitherto practised had originated; I frankly own that I thought it had originated with your Lordship; I was anxious above all things that it should not be ever suspected that it had originated with me; or that I had been a consenting party to it, or even (till a late period) conscious of its existence.

In my correspondence with the Duke of Portland at this period, therefore, at the same time that I resisted the new delay then proposed, I disclaimed any concurrence in the concealment which had been hitherto practised—and requested “that it might be remembered hereafter, whenever that concealment should be alledged against me, as an act of injustice to Lord Castlereagh, that it did not originate in my suggestion, that so far from desiring it, I had conceived (however erroneously) your Lordship to be the sure channel of communication to Lord Castlereagh; and that up to a very late period I had believed such communication to have been actually made.”

The Duke of Portland, in answer, acknowledged my repeated remonstrances against the concealment; stating himself at the same time not to have been aware that I had at any time believed the communication to have been actually made; but assuring me “that he should be at all times ready to avow that the concealment had originated with himself, (the Duke of Portland); that he had *injoined it* to all those with whom he had communicated,—from motives which he was at all times ready to justify; and that he was desirous of taking whatever blame might have been, or might at any time be, incurred by it, upon himself.”

This, as I have said, was my first knowledge of any restriction whatever upon your Lordship's communication to Lord Castlereagh.

If I am asked *why* I believed your Lordship to have *actually made* the communication, I answer, because it was natural that you should make it; because the expectation of your making it was the motive which induced me to desire (and I *did* desire) that the communication should be

made to your Lordship;—because the manner in which you first received that communication (as reported to me by the Duke of Portland) tended to confirm the belief that your Lordship was the fit channel of communication to Lord Castlereagh;—and because I knew not of the existence of any impediment to your pursuing what appeared to me (and does still appear to me) the natural and obvious course to be pursued upon such an occasion.

If it be objected, that I ought not to have been contented with *presuming* the disclosure to have been made, but ought to have diligently ascertained that it was so;—first, I answer—that no person naturally sets about ascertaining that of which he entertains no doubt:—and, secondly, I answer—that the moment that my suspicion of the fact was excited, I did set about ascertaining the truth; and that upon ascertaining it, I did remonstrate in the strongest manner against the concealment;—and enforced that remonstrance by the tender of my own resignation.

It was on the 26th or 27th of June (five or six days after Parliament rose) that I discovered my suspicion to be founded.—On the 27th I remonstrated.—On the 28th I tendered my resignation.—And in the course of the same day, your Lordship (as I have already stated) received an injunction to make the communication as soon as the Expedition should have sailed.

The second of the two periods to which your Lordship's Statement refers, begins from the 12th of July, the day of the tender of your Lordship's Resignation.

It does not appear, nor does your Lordship's Statement aver, that at any time during the second period, the restriction which had been originally imposed upon your Lordship was renewed; or that any other existed, except that which your Lordship had imposed upon yourself, and which was therefore no longer binding upon your Lordship than while you might yourself be willing that it should bind you.

(*To be continued.*)

COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF State Trials:

The Fourth Volume is ready for delivery.

LONDON:—Printed by T. C. HANSARD, Peterborough - Court, Fleet - Street;
Published by R. BAGSHAW, Brydges-Street, Covent - Garden:—Sold also by J. BUDD, Pall-Mall.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 23.] LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1809. [Price 1s.

"When a large country is not fortified in the swords, and in the hearts of its People, it cannot be defended."—MAJOR CARTWRIGHT. *Ægis*, Vol. I. p. 114.

865]

[866

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

DANGER TO IRELAND (*continued from p. 841*).—In the article here referred to, I entered upon the subject of the danger, from an invasion, to which this kingdom must soon be exposed, upon the supposition that the Emperor Napoleon made himself master of the Southern Peninsula; and, I endeavoured to point out the causes of particular danger to Ireland.—Let me beg the reader's leave to recapitulate the substance of what was then said. It was this: That, it was in the very nature of things that Napoleon should possess an increased desire of conquering this kingdom;—that it was manifest that he would possess infinitely greater means of conquering it than he possessed in 1803, when we thought it necessary to make preparations for fortifying London;—that it is possible, at least, for him, in the course of a year, to send forth a powerful armament from nine or ten different ports at the same time;—that this is not to be prevented by any system of blockade;—that, the chances are many to one, that some one or more of such armaments, each consisting, perhaps, of from twenty to forty thousand men, would reach Ireland in safety, if such were their destination;—that, if Ireland were subdued, the consequences to England must be terrible;—that, therefore, it became us seriously to consider, *how, in such a crisis, the people of Ireland would be likely to act.*—I did not enter into this last question, and proposed, without entering into it, to show, in this present sheet, how the people of Ireland might, in one respect, at least, be *conciliated*, aluding to the measure against which the abominable cry of "*No-Popery*" was raised. But, upon re-considering the matter, I think it best, before I come to this latter topic, to give the English reader a view of the actual situation of the people of Ireland, I mean their situation so far as relates to what may be supposed to have an influence upon their conduct in case of invasion by the French.—It is a great misfortune to this kingdom in general,

that Ireland is separated from England by water; because, besides many other evils, it is productive of this, that the people of England are not only, generally speaking, ignorant of what is passing in Ireland, but they, at best, seem to *care* but little about the matter, too many of them looking upon the Irish as scarcely being countrymen, not a few considering them as an inferior race of beings, and almost the whole regarding the interests of Ireland and those of England as being perfectly distinct. There are, indeed, but few amongst us, who do not perceive; who have not great misgivings, that, if Napoleon were master of Ireland, England would be in danger, and, indeed, that England must, in all human probability, soon experience the fate of Ireland. Yet, strange to say! the feeling excited by this reflection is, in but too many instances, that of *anger* against the people of Ireland.—Nothing can be more *unjust* than this way of thinking; but, still, the *folly* of it surpasses its injustice. *Angry* with the Irish, because because what? Why, because their existence endangers our safety! *Angry* with them because they are alive, and have a desire to enjoy life! *Sad* dogs those Irishmen must be to desire to keep alive, when to keep alive may be dangerous to us!—Be our notions, however, what they may; to whatever lengths our vanity, self-conceit, folly, or injustice, may lead us, we shall, at last, find, that, if Napoleon should land a considerable army in Ireland, it will depend *solely* upon the disposition of the *people* of Ireland, whether that army shall succeed in its object there, and *here* also; for, it is not to be credited, that even the most stupid of the No-Popery clan, can entertain the slightest hope of England's escaping subjugation, should Ireland once fall into the hands of the enemy.—It is, therefore, of the greatest importance, that we now form correct notions as to what the *disposition* of the *people of Ireland* is, in case of invasion by the French, *likely to be*; and, in order thereunto, let us now see what is the situation of the people of Ireland; let us see, whether that situation be such as to *fortify* their

hearts in defence of their country; let us see, whether they are in the possession and enjoyment of blessings, flowing from government, rather than risk the loss of which men will naturally venture their lives.—— The political state, the state of the *persons*, of the people of Ireland is as follows.—— There is a law, passed just after the present ministry came into power, in 1807, which law enables the Lord Lieutenant, upon receiving a memorial of the *magistrates* of any county, stating that *disturbances* exist therein, to *proclaim that county to be in a disturbed state*. Proclaiming a county to be in a disturbed state does not seem, at first sight, to be a very harsh measure. But, stop a bit, and you shall see what are the consequences of such proclamation.——The moment this proclamation has taken place, the law compels every man, woman, and child in that county, to remain *within their houses from sun-set to sun-rise*; shut up, absolutely enclosed within walls, cut off from all communication with neighbours, friends, relations (sick or well) for one half of every twenty-four hours. It is well known, that a considerable portion of agricultural labour ought to be performed between sun-set and sun-rise. But, why need I descant upon the vexations of such a state? The reader, be his rank of life what it may, has only to *make the case his own*; has only to consider *himself* in the place of one of the people of Ireland; and he will want no detail of the hardships which must accompany such a state of life.—— Well, but being shut up in this manner is a mere trifle; it is not worthy of mention; it sinks completely out of sight, when compared with other parts of the law in question.——The *magistrates*, that is to say, persons appointed by the government, are first to call upon the Lord Lieutenant to proclaim a county, and, when that is done, these same magistrates have the authority, either by *themselves* or their *officers*, to make *forcible entry, at any time in the night*, into any house, to *see whether its inhabitants be at home*, and to take up and imprison all those who may be caught out of their houses.——When this bill was before the House of Commons, it was proposed, by Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Brand, Sir John Newport, and others, to qualify the clause giving this terrible power, so as to give the poor alarmed wretches *within, ten minutes* to prepare for the visit; because, even decency required, that women should have time to rise and dress themselves.

This proposition was, however, *rejected*, and the words "*reasonable time*" inserted instead of *ten minutes*; leaving, as the reader will perceive, the magistrates or their officers, to *be the judges* of what time was *reasonable*.——Reader, what do you think of this sort of life? How should you (no matter where you live) like to be shut up in your house from sun-set to sun-rise, every twenty-four hours of your life, and, while so shut up, be liable to have your house entered by *force*, at any hour of the night, by your neighbouring magistrates, or their officers? How should you like it? How should *you* like it, I say? Pray, do not answer me by talking about the *necessity* of such laws: that we will talk of by-and-by. What I want to know of you, at present, is, how you should like to live this sort of life. How you think you should feel disposed, in such a situation? Whether you would hazard much rather than lose the enjoyments of such a state?——But, you have, as yet, but half a sight of the law, under which the Irish live. You must, to be a judge of the state, and of the *feelings*, of the Irish, see the part of the bill in question, which sets aside the common-law, *as to redress against the magistrates and others*, in cases where they may, under colour of this act, be guilty of *unlawful violences against the people*. Magistrates and others are, according to the law of the land, liable to be sued and to be punished for an abuse of their power and authority; and very necessary it is that they should be so liable, because, if they were not, there would be no end to their oppressions. The king, or rather his *ministers*, appoint the magistrates; but, then, the people, if these magistrates abuse their power, can bring their conduct before a *jury*. This is our protection; this is what we have to *rely on*; this is the source of our security against magisterial insolence and oppression. Any man of us can bring an unjust magistrate before a jury to answer for any injury, of any sort, that he may have done us.——But, how are the Irish situated in this respect? What protection have *they*, under the law before us, against any abuse of power committed by the magistrates and others? "Why," the reader will say, "they can surely bring their action against such magistrates?" Oh, yes! They can bring their action; the bar would fain lose none of its profits; but, what is to take place in case of a verdict for the *plaintiff*? Ah! reader, you never would guess it, if you

were to guess for a thousand years. Lest you should not believe my account of it, you shall have it in the words of the act itself:—"Provided always, and be it further enacted, That when a verdict *shall be given for the plaintiff* in any action to be brought against any justice of the peace, peace officer, or other person, for taking or imprisoning or detaining any person, or for seizing arms, or entering houses under colour of any authority given by this act, and it shall appear to **THE JUDGE OR JUDGES** before whom the same shall be tried, that there was a PROBABLE CAUSE for doing the act complained of in such action, and the judge or court shall certify the same on record, then and in that case the plaintiff shall not be entitled to more than *sixpence damages, nor to any costs of suit*: provided also, that where a verdict shall be given for the plaintiff in any such action as aforesaid and the judge or court before whom the cause shall be tried, shall certify on the record that the injury for which such action is brought was wilfully and maliciously committed, the plaintiff shall be entitled to treble costs of suit."—Thus, then, though a man, injured by the magistrates, or their officers, should obtain a verdict; should have the decision of a jury in his favour, the judge may, at his pleasure, nullify that decision, and the injured person, by way of redress, may have to pay his own costs!

—I ask you, English reader, how you should like that? How you should relish such laws? How you should feel disposed, if you were living under such laws? To what extent you would go in the way of hazarding your life, rather than lose the enjoyments belonging to a state of life like this? I put these questions to you, and beg you to put them home to your bosom; for, be assured, that, if the Southern Peninsula falls completely under the sway of Napoleon, you will soon find, that these questions are of vital importance to you. You may be angry with the Irish, because they are alive, because they may be a source of danger to you; yes, you may curse the Irish; but, that will do you no good, if Buonaparté should succeed in landing forty or fifty thousand men in Ireland, and should (which God forbid!) find a very considerable part of the people ready to join him, instead of being ready to shed their blood in opposing him.—Of the clause, which I have just quoted, SIR ARTHUR PICOT, the

late Attorney General, said, "that first, this most extraordinary bill gave extraordinary powers to magistrates, and then, after they had exceeded the powers given them, they were, by this same bill, to be protected against the verdict of a jury. It is," added he, "*a mockery to continue the Trial by Jury*, and yet to deprive an injured person of the effect of a verdict after it had been given in his favour."—One of the arguments, used in defence of this clause, was, that the Judges of Ireland were impartial and upright. Of the fact here stated I choose to say nothing; but, the argument, if good for any thing at all in this case, would be, at least, equally good as applied to England, where the Judges are not certainly less impartial and upright than they are in Ireland. Yet, English reader, are you prepared to resign the Trial by Jury? Are you prepared to be content to leave it to the Judge to say, whether you shall, or shall not, have the benefit of a verdict in your favour, when you complain of injuries sustained from magistrates and others, acting under the pretence of law? Would you be content to live in such a state? Would you risk your life, rather than lose the enjoyments of such a state? Answer me not, I beseech you, by urging the necessity of the law. That is a matter yet to be discussed, and then we shall inquire whence the dire necessity has arisen. But, I am now merely describing the state, the actual state of the people of Ireland, in order that we may form a correct judgment as to what would be likely to be their line of conduct in case of an invasion of their country by a French army. And I ask you how you think you should feel, if you were living in such a state?—Upon the clause, intended to protect the magistrates against the verdict of Juries, SIR JOHN NEWPORT related two instances of the conduct of the persons in authority in Ireland, which will bring the scene a little closer before our eyes. "The one," he said, "was that of a merchant who was taken up on suspicion, 100,000*l.* bail was offered for his appearance at the necessary time; this was refused, the man's business was ruined for want of his own presence to conduct it, and he became a bankrupt. He afterwards went out to America; he carried with him the disease of the mind which had thus been occasioned, he came melancholy, his senses were deranged, and he made an attempt upon his life. Another person was appre-

2 E 2

"hended in the county of Tipperary, because he was guilty of having *a piece of French manuscript in his pocket*, and by order of the Sheriff he WAS FLOGGED, because the Sheriff in his extreme *loyal zeal* concluded that the manuscript must be seditious, or it would not have been written in French, *a language which he did not understand*. He therefore instructed gentlemen to look a little at the other side; to feel a little for the injured individual as well as for the erring magistrates."—These are SIR JOHN NEWPORT'S own words, uttered in the House of Commons. The two sufferers he declared to be "*worthy individuals*."—Now, then, English reader, I will not ask you how you would like this, for there is no man who can like to be *flogged*; but, I will ask you, how you would like to be *liable* to it? I will ask you how you think you should feel disposed, if, upon complaining of treatment of this sort, a jury were to give a verdict in your favour, and the judge were to nullify that verdict, it appearing to him that there was "*probable cause*" for flogging you?—No, no; I retract: I do not ask you this question. I will not insult you by asking you *how you should feel* upon an occasion, the very idea of which now makes my own blood boil in my veins.—It is odd: it will scarcely be believed that the coincidence is not feigned; but it is really so, that *at the very moment* when I was finishing the last sentence (Wednesday, 12 o'clock), a letter from London informed me of the result of the Trial, in the action of MR. CLIFFORD against BRANDON for false-imprisonment; and informed me also of the *singular circumstances* (which will, I trust, be published at full length) of that Trial.—Now, English reader, how do you think that Irishmen, upon hearing these circumstances related, must feel? Will not the result of this trial, considering its peculiar circumstances, revive in their minds "thoughts that *burn*?" How should you feel, if you were in their situation?—Such, then, is the state of Ireland. It is useless to dwell longer upon this part of the subject. Having described *the law*, under which the people of Ireland live, the English reader will want nothing more to enable him to judge of the nature of their situation; and, then, he has next to consider, how the people of Ireland, while in such a state, are likely to act, in the case of an invasion of their country, on the part of the French.

—It was, when this law was passed, as-

serted, in the House of Commons, that there was a *French party* in Ireland. If that was really the case, there can be no doubt (if the said party be still in existence) how a part, at least, of the people of Ireland would act. But, the question I wish to put to my readers is this: whether they think that the people of Ireland, in general, *will*, or *will not*, feel disposed to fly to arms, and to risk their lives, in defence of that state of things, in which they now live?—To those, who answer in the affirmative; to those who think it likely, that the people of Ireland would venture their lives in defence of what I have been describing, lest worse should fall upon them; to those, who think thus, I have nothing further to say, except, indeed, this, that the law, of which I have been speaking, must be *unnecessary*, seeing that even it is not regarded as sufficient to induce the people to join the army of an invader. But, to those, if there be any such, who fear, that all is not *quite sound* in Ireland; to those who fear, that there are, notwithstanding the smooth surface of the political sea, all the materials of a storm in existence, and that those materials are daily and hourly increasing in quantity and in their destroying powers; to those who fear, that, if an invasion by the French were to take place, such invasion would, as things now stand, meet but with a faint resistance, at best, from the great body of the people, who, be it observed, are, by law, liable to have their arms taken from them by the magistrates; to those, who may fear, in short, that Ireland is not "*fortified in the swords*, and in the "*hearts*, of her people;" to such persons, if any such there be, I have some observations to offer, FIRST, as to the constantly pleaded *necessity* of the rigorous laws, of which I have been speaking; and SECONDLY, as to the means of removing such necessity, supposing it to exist, and thereby of fortifying Ireland in the swords, and in the hearts, of her people.—*Whence*, then, has this dire necessity arisen? The present set of ministers and their predecessors of the Pitt school have had the management of the nation's affairs for the last nearly thirty years. They have, except for about fifteen months, never experienced any interruption. They have done with the whole of our means what seemed good to them; and, therefore, upon all sound maxims of politics, we have a right to look to *them* for the cause of this at once shameful and dangerous necessity. It is

sometimes pretended, that the law, of which I have been speaking, is levelled solely at certain desperate individuals; and, that the great body of the people of Ireland are perfectly loyal and well-disposed; but, that this is not sincerely said is but too manifest from the provision relative to the *verdict of juries*; for, the *odiousness* of that clause was confessed by Mr. Perceval himself, though he still contended for its necessity. And, such was the opinion entertained of *juries*, that it was flatly stated, that "*if this clause was omitted, the whole of the bill might as well be thrown out.*" Now, it must be clear to every one, that, if this was the case, the opinion must have been, that a very large portion of persons in the middling ranks of life was infected with dangerous principles and designs. Indeed, nothing short of such a persuasion could have induced any minister to think of such a measure, which measure must, of itself, operate as a most powerful encouragement to any enemy, entertaining intentions, or wishes, to invade the country. What must necessarily have been the opinion of Napoleon, as to the state of Ireland, as to the disposition of the people of Ireland, when he read the law, of which we have been speaking, and the parliamentary debates connected with that law? Indeed, he has taken care not to keep his opinion, upon this subject, a secret; for, in answer to Mr. Canning's paper about Spain, he most significantly observes, That we have no more to do with his measures with regard to the people of Spain, than he has to do with *our measures with regard to the people of Ireland.* He did not lose, I'll warrant him, one word of what was said in parliament about the *French Party* in Ireland; and, he is too wise not to know, that his astonishing victories, and the other events that have occurred within the last two years, are not of a sort to work a diminution, either in the numbers or the hopes of such party. — What, then, is to be done? Do we hope, that Ireland can be kept in this state until peace is made? What folly! Just as if the enemy, in making peace with us, would not take into account this very situation of Ireland. Just as if, in all his calculations respecting our means, he did not look upon Ireland as a burden, rather than as a source of strength. Just as if, in short, he did not look upon Ireland as one of his best allies. He might find himself deceived; but that this is his opinion is very clear; and, it is not less clear, that,

while Ireland remains in its present state, there can be no hopes of any peace with Napoleon, that shall not be fuller of danger than a continuance of the war. — We may, as I before observed, be *angry* with the Irish *because about five millions of them continue to be alive*; we may hate them and curse them; we may wish their island sunk to the bottom of the sea; but, still they live, and live they will. We cannot annihilate them; we cannot get them out of the way of the French; no, nor can we, by all the means that we are masters of, prevent them, in case of an invasion of their country, from taking that side, to which their opinions, or their feelings, invite them. It is, therefore, as useless to be angry with them as it would be to be angry with thunder and lightning. Our anger can have no good effect, and it may have a bad one. But, from whatever cause it has proceeded, so it is, that, in all the countries of the continent, threatened by the French, every means of defence has been resorted to, save that of *conciliating the people*. In all these countries immense armies, magazines; all sorts of fortifications; every thing is provided, except the good will of the people; the defenders have had every thing for them, except the *hearts of the persons to be defended*. The governments of these several states having numerous armies, have not only disregarded the feelings of the people, but seem to have studiously sought means of exciting those feelings against them. Upon the fall of Louis XVI. of France, the advocates for "strong government," alias, despotism, soon found out, that the unfortunate Louis owed his ruin to the *mildness* of his government and the *kindness* of his own disposition; and, of course, that the way to prevent revolutions, was not to have a mild government or a kind prince. Upon this maxim most of the old governments seem to have acted. The consequences are before us. Experience has, at last, convinced all those, who are not quite blinded by their selfish passions, that the people of no country are in love with despotic sway; that, as often as occasion offers, they will gladly rid themselves of such sway; and that, in the words of my motto, a large country, not fortified in the swords, and in the hearts, of the people, cannot be defended. SIR WILLIAM TEMPLE, one of the most worthy as well as most wise men that this country can boast of having given birth to, tells us, that "standing forces, or guards in con-

"stant pay, were no where used by law-ful princes in their native or hereditary countries, but only by conquerors, in *"subdued provinces, or usurpers at home;"* and were a defence against SUBJECTS, "not against ENEMIES." Lord BACON has the same sentiment. He tells us, that "A mercenary army is the fittest to invade a country, but a militia" (an arming of the people in his time) "the fittest to defend it; because the first have estates to get, and the latter to protect." How strongly have the maxims of these great men been verified in the events of the last eighteen years! The whole of the military powers of Europe fell upon France at once, while we assailed her on her shores, and this, too, at a moment when her government was broken up, and her army dissolved. Yet did France, "fortified in the swords, and in the hearts, of her people," defend her territories against all her numerous assailants; whom she with her raw militia, not only repulsed, but, become assailant in her turn, finally subdued. She defended herself without the aid of scarcely any regular forces; and her soil was never dishonoured by the feet of foreign mercenaries. But, in her works of *invasion*, she has employed men of all nations; and, she has, I dare say, found them to be the fittest for the work.—Is it not, then, madness to the last degree, to suppose, that, in an hour of invasion, Ireland can be defended, unless in that defence, the hearts of the people are engaged? Is it possible for any man to believe, that, if Ireland were invaded by only thirty thousand French, our troops would be able, at once to beat those French and to keep the people in awe, if the latter were to prove disaffected? No man can believe this. Seeing, then, that, as things now stand, an invasion of Ireland by the French might be productive of infinite injury to England as well as to Ireland, and might, indeed, be the cause of our utter extinction as an independent people; and, seeing that this danger is not (if what has been said above be correct) to be avoided by rigorous measures towards the Irish, let us seriously consider what can be done, in order to do away the "French party" by means of *conciliation*.—In my last, at p. 840, I expressed my intention to show, in the present Number, how, in one respect, the Irish people might be conciliated, alluding to the adoption of the measure, proposed by the late ministry,

of opening all the ranks of the Army to our Roman Catholic fellow-subjects. I did not, however, mean to confine myself within the very narrow bounds of that measure; for, it appears very clearly to me, that much more than is contained in that measure ought to be done. I think that all disabilities whatever ought to be removed from the Roman Catholics of the whole kingdom; that they ought to be capable of being Judges, Privy-Counsellors, Members of both Houses of Parliament, and, in short, ought to be placed upon the same footing as the *Presbyterians*, who, it is very well known, fill, by means of an annual bill of indemnity, any of these situations. It needs no reasoning to convince us, that the people of Ireland, five-sixths, perhaps, of whom are Roman Catholics, must feel sore, that they will feel sore, that they will and must look upon themselves as an injured people, and that their conduct will be that of a people who think themselves injured, as long as this system of exclusion shall be adhered to; and especially now, when they see, that what has been *positively refused to them*, solely upon the alledged ground of their being Roman Catholics, has been granted to *Germans*, and to other *foreigners*, notwithstanding *their being also Roman Catholics*. This is so manifest; this is so palpable; this carries conviction so directly to every mind; that it is impossible for it not to excite in the Irish Roman Catholics feelings much easier to participate in than to describe. Let the English reader, for one moment, place himself in the situation of an Irish Catholic; let him consider himself and his family excluded from all military honours, on account of his being a Catholic, while he is taxed to pay foreign Catholics in our military service; let the English reader but so consider himself for one moment; let him put himself, in this respect, in the place of the Irish Catholic; and then let him say, how he should feel disposed, in case of an invasion of Ireland by the French.—What, then, is the cause of this system of exclusion? Why are we exposed to such danger, from an invasion of Ireland? For what is it that we are obliged to keep so great a force in Ireland? What is the real cause of this our enormous expence, and our danger from within as well as from without?—The cause is, that the people of Ireland are in the state above described; but, what is the cause of that? The cause of that is, that, as it was alledged in parlia-

ment, there is a *French party* in Ireland? And, as love of the French is, in this case, synonymous with hatred of their present government, is it not reasonable to suppose, that one, at least, of the causes of that hatred, is, the system of exclusion; that system, which so cruelly wounds the feelings of all ranks of the Catholics, who do, in fact, compose the people of Ireland?—How happy would that day be, both for England and Ireland, which should see removed this endless source of envy, hatred, and malice; which would unite all hearts in defence of the country; which would put an end to all civil broils; and which would render unnecessary one half, or more than one half of our military force, *more than one half* of that force, which now costs us twenty millions of pounds sterling a year! And why does not this day come? Why should it not be the first, the very first, day of the next session of parliament? *Why* should it not?—In discussing this question, we must go back to the epoch of Lord Howick's Bill; that is, to the spring of 1807. Upon the subject of that bill, and in answer to the truly hellish howl of "*no Popery*," I addressed two letters to Mr. PERCEVAL. Part of what was said in those letters I shall now repeat, without much alteration, to which I shall add such observations as seem to be called for by the circumstances, in which we are now placed, and which differ from the circumstances of 1807, only as they more loudly call for measures of conciliation.—At the epoch now referred to, the ministry had just been changed, a dissolution of parliament had taken place, a new parliament had met, a Speech from the throne had been made, and in that Speech, as well as in divers Addresses sent to the king, great stress had been laid upon certain "*OBLIGATIONS*," under which the family on the throne possessed that throne. The object of this was to create and spread abroad, a belief, *that the king could not give his consent to the proposed measure in favour of the Irish Catholics, without violating the compact, in virtue of which his family was exalted to the throne of this kingdom.* This notion was inculcated with all imaginable zeal and activity by the faction which had just then succeeded to the offices and emoluments of the state. How false the notion was; how hypocritical the conduct of those by whom it was propagated, we shall now see; and, I trust, the reader will be convinced, that there never did

exist any obligation to prevent the king from giving his assent to that measure of conciliation for which I am an advocate, and which, I am satisfied would enable us to dispense with one half of our present military force.—Of the *obligations*, under which the crown is held, we have, in varying phraseology, heard much, from different descriptions of men, since the agitation of the question respecting the Catholics. The course of reasoning with all of them is this: "That the placing of the crown upon the heads of His Majesty's illustrious family was, at the time, and has been and will be, in its consequences, the greatest of national blessings; that the only principles which produced that inestimable blessing were, the maintenance of the predominance of the Church of England, as by law established, and the preventing of every thing tending to re-exalt the Roman Catholic Church; that Lord Howick's bill would have tended to re-exalt the Roman Catholic Church, and would thereby have sapped the predominance of the Church of England; and, therefore, that Lord Howick's bill was contrary to the principles, which placed the crown upon the heads of His Majesty's illustrious family;" a conclusion perfectly correct, and indeed self-evident, if we admit the premises; but, except as far as is contained in the first proposition, (with which I presume not to meddle) all those premises I think that even I am able to disprove. Who that was a stranger to our laws and history, would not, upon hearing the language of the Speech, and of the divers addresses to the King, recently delivered,* imagine, that, when the crown of this kingdom was transferred from the Stuarts to the Guelphs, the sole condition with the latter was, *that they should suffer no relaxation in the then existing laws relating to the Roman Catholics?* To hear these addresses, and, indeed, to hear the language of all those that opposed the late ministry, or that intend to support the present ministry, who would not suppose, that the revolution in the reign of James II., was produced by a dispute about religion solely; and, that the crown was transferred to the present family merely for the sake of preventing the return of papal power or influence? Yet nothing can be further from the truth, Popish bigotry was only a part, and a

* May, 1807.

very small part, of the objections which the people of England had to that king, who was a wilful obstinate tyrant, without the cunning, which some tyrants of more inveterate baseness, have to disguise their rapacity and their cruelty. That he was a real bigot and no hypocrite, there can be little doubt; and, the nation would have done well in getting rid of him, if he had had no other fault; for he was beginning to crowd his court and the country with greedy foreigners, under the name of priests, and under whatever name they might come, they were, and in all cases must be, a grievous curse to any nation. But, that his crimes were not confined to tyranny in religious matters, will manifestly appear from the following List of them as recorded in that famous act of parliament, which was passed in the first year of the reign of William and Mary, and which is commonly called the *Bill of Rights*.

“Whereas the late King James the Second, by the Assistance of divers evil Counsellors, Judges, and Ministers employed by him, did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the Protestant Religion, and the *Laws* and *Liberties* of this Kingdom.

“I. By assuming and exercising a Power of *dispensing with* and *suspending of Laws*, and the Execution of Laws without Consent of Parliament.

“II. By committing and prosecuting divers worthy Prelates, for humbly petitioning to be excused from concurring to the said assumed Power.

“III. By issuing and causing to be executed a Commission under the Great Seal for erecting a Court, called, The Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes.

“IV. By *Levying Money* for and to the Use of the Crown, by Pretence of Prerogative, for other Time and in other Manner, than the same was granted by Parliament.

“V. By raising and keeping a Standing Army within this Kingdom in Time of Peace, without Consent of Parliament, and quartering Soldiers contrary to Law.

“VI. By causing several good Subjects, being Protestants, to be disarmed, at the same time when Papists were both armed and employed contrary to Law.

“VII. BY VIOLATING THE FREEDOM OF ELECTION OF MEMBERS TO SERVE IN PARLIAMENT.

“VIII. By Prosecutions in the Court of King’s Bench, for Matters and Causes cognizable only in Parliament; and by divers other arbitrary and illegal Courses.

“IX. And whereas of late years partial, corrupt, and unqualified persons have been returned and served on Juries, and Trials, and particularly divers Jurors in Trials for High Treason, which were not Freeholders.

“X. And excessive Bail hath been required of Persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the Benefit of the Laws, made for the Liberty of the Subjects.

“XI. And excessive fines have been imposed; and illegal and cruel punishments have been inflicted.

“XII. And several Grants and Promises made of Fines and Forfeitures, before any Conviction or Judgment against the Persons, upon whom the same were to be levied.

“All which are utterly and directly contrary to the known Laws and Statutes, and Freedom of this Realm.”

Such were the crimes of James II: Whether, in any other reign, laws have been dispensed with, or suspended: whether, in any other reign, money have been levied, or expended (which is exactly the same thing) for other purposes than those for which it was granted; whether the freedom of elections of members to serve in parliament has, no matter how, been violated; whether there have been any packed juries, especially for the trial of those who were charged with crimes connected with politics; whether the laws for the protection of personal liberty have been eluded, and men kept in prison for years without any trial, from first to last; whether fines and forfeitures have been held out as inducements to every man to betray and to swear against his neighbour; whether these things have taken place in any other reign, I must leave those who are better acquainted with such matters than I am, to say; but, I think, it must be allowed, that, when we see they existed in the reign of James II, we need seek for no other cause of his being driven from his throne. That he was a bigot, and that the church, so soon after the days of popery, were justly alarmed, is true; but, that his other crimes were of a much greater magnitude, we need only read the list of them to be satisfied. And, as to the *Declaration of Rights*, which follow the above list of crimes, not a single word

do they contain upon the subject of religion.

" I. That the pretended Power of suspending of Laws, or the Execution of Laws, by regal Authority, without consent of Parliament, is illegal.

" II. That the pretended Power of dispensing with Laws, or the Execution of Laws, by regal Authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal.

" III. That the Commission for erecting the late Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical Causes, and all other Commissions and Courts of like Nature, are illegal and pernicious.

" IV. That levying Money for or to the Use of the Crown, by Pretence of Prerogative, without Grant of Parliament, for longer Time, or in other Manner than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal.

" V. That it is the Right of the Subjects to petition the King, and all Commitments and Prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.

" VI. That the raising or keeping a Standing Army within the Kingdom in time of Peace, unless it be with consent of Parliament, is against law.

" VII. That the Subjects which are Protestants, may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed by Law.

" VIII. That Elections of Members of Parliament ought to be free.

" IX. That the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament.

" X. That excessive Bail ought not to be required, nor excessive Fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted.

" XI. That Jurors ought to be duly impannelled and returned, and Jurors which pass sentence upon Men in Trials for High Treason ought to be Freeholders.

" XII. That all Grants and Promises of Fines and Forfeitures of particular Persons before Conviction are illegal and void.

" XIII. And that for Redress of all Grievances, and for amending, strengthening, and preserving of the Laws, Parliaments ought to be held frequently."

These were the principles, which produced the revolution of 1688; and, though

the maintenance of the protestant established church makes a part of them, it is, as I said before, a very inconsiderable part. The people of England saw, that, unless they overset the power of James II, they must become slaves, and, therefore, they drove him, and most justly, from the throne. Whether they acted wisely as to the appointing of his successor, is a question which I pretend not to discuss.—

Out of these principles grew the *Act of Settlement*, as it is usually called, which was passed in the second year of the reign of William and Mary, and which was occasioned by the prospect of a total want of heirs to the crown from either Queen Mary or the Princess Anne, afterwards Queen Anne. By this act, which is entitled an act for *limiting* the crown, it was placed upon the heads of his Majesty's family; and, let us see, therefore, what were the principles by which it was so placed, and what were the conditions, and "*obligations*," to use the word of the Speech, under which it was to be held. Let us see if there was any obligation, either expressed or implied, that no relaxation should, thereafter, take place, under any circumstances whatever, in the laws and regulations relative to the Roman Catholics; but, first, let us fix well in our memory, that the act we are about to quote was, "an act for the further *limitation of the crown, and better securing the rights and liberties of the subject*," saying, in its title at least, not a single word about either the protestant or the popish religion. This act, after providing, that the king or queen in future should take the coronation oath, as prescribed by a former act of parliament, of which oath I shall speak by-and-by, it proceeds to make the following further provisions for "securing the religion, laws, and liberties of the kingdom."

" That whosoever shall hereafter come to the Possession of this Crown, shall join in Communion with the Church of England, as by Law established.

" That in case the Crown and Imperial Dignity of this Realm shall hereafter come to any Person, not being a Native of this Kingdom of England, *this Nation be not obliged to engage in any War for the Defence of any Dominions or Territories which do not belong to the Crown of England, without the consent of Parliament.*

" That after the said Limitations shall take effect as aforesaid, *no Person born out of the Kingdoms of England, Scotland, or Ireland, or the Dominions thereunto be-*

"longing (although he be naturalized or made a Denizen, except such as are born of English Parents) shall be capable to be of the Privy Council, or a Member of either House of Parliament, or to enjoy ANY OFFICE OR PLACE OF TRUST, EITHER CIVIL OR MILITARY, or to have any Grant of Lands, Tenements, or Hereditaments, from the Crown, to himself or to any other or others in Trust for him.

"THAT NO PERSON WHO HAS AN OFFICE OR PLACE OF PROFIT UNDER THE KING, OR RECEIVES A PENSION FROM THE CROWN, SHALL BE CAPABLE OF SERVING AS A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

"And whereas the Laws of England are the Birthright of the People thereof, all the Kings and Queens, who shall ascend the Throne of this Realm, ought to administer the government of the same according to the said Laws, and all their Officers and Ministers ought to serve them respectively according to the same."

These were the principles which placed the crown upon the heads of his Majesty's family; and here, and no where else, are we to look for the "obligations," under which, as it is said in the Speech, the crown is held. It is true, that one of these obligations is, that the king shall join in communion with the church of England; but no obligation is there expressed; no obligation is there implied, that the king shall refuse his assent to any law for bettering the condition of his Roman Catholic subjects.—I have distinguished certain parts of this quotation by italic characters; and I ask, *whether this nation has not been obliged to engage in wars for the defence of dominions which do not belong to the crown of England, without the previous consent (for any other consent is absurd) of even modern parliaments? I ask, whether foreigners have not been suffered to fill offices of trust, and of emolument, civil and military? I ask, whether no person who has an office or place of profit under the king, or receives a pension from the crown, is capable of serving as a member of the House of Commons?* I shall be told, that this latter part of the provisions above quoted has been repealed by a subsequent act of parliament; but this only shews, that, *unless the repeal was a most daring violation of the rights of the people, the repeal of no law relative to the Roman Catholics can be held as any very daring vio-*

lation. If this, the far most important, in my opinion, of all the "obligations," under which the crown was held, could be done away by an act of parliament, why could not any other of the obligations be done away by the same authority? There is, neither in the Act of Settlement, nor in any act of parliament now in existence, or that ever was in existence, no prohibition, no restriction whatever, with respect to a relaxation of the laws relative to Roman Catholics. Upon what ground then, is it pretended, that the enabling of the king legally to promote Roman Catholics to any ranks in the army and navy, would have been contrary to the "obligations," under which his crown is held?—Now, after what has been said here, what are we to think of those persons, who pretend, that the king's conscience would have been wounded, if he had given his consent to the measure of Lord Howick? To be sure, it is hardly possible to form an idea of any thing so base as this pretence. The heart in which it was engendered is equal to any thing, equal to any species and any extent of baseness.—But, there was another cry set up: "*the CHURCH*" (good old Mother Church) "*was in danger.*" This infernal howl rang through the country; and the most ignorant part of the people were made to believe, that the "*papishes*" were coming to re-kindle the fires in Smithfield? I am not much of a theologian; not much skilled in the classification of sins; but, in my judgment, if any act of man entitles him to everlasting torture, it must be such an act as that of which the "*No Popery*" crew were guilty in 1807. The Church in danger! The Church is in much more danger from the refusal to conciliate the Catholics, than from the adoption of the measure proposed.—Let us, however, examine this matter more closely. Let us expose the hypocrisy of this cry, in doing which I have merely to repeat the substance of what was before said upon the subject.—But, first of all, let me observe, that there is one question, very material in this discussion, which seems to have been entirely overlooked, namely, *whether the sapping of the predominance of the Church of England would be a national evil?* I, for my own part, should regret to see it sapped, and overthrown, because I am persuaded, that it might easily be restored to its former purity and utility; but, when we see in what manner its benefices are but too generally bestowed; when we look at the

endless list of non-resident incumbents; when we see the fruits enjoyed by those of its ministers who perform none; or very little of the labour; when we compare the solemn promises of the incumbents with their subsequent practice; when we see more than half of the people, who frequent any place of worship at all, turning from the church to the meeting-house: when we see all this, we must not be very much surprized, if there should be found many persons, who entertain doubts, at least, upon the question above stated; and, therefore, previous to the clamour against Lord Howick's bill, as tending to sap the predominance of the church, those doubts should have been removed.—Viewing the church establishment as connected with the political state of the country, it should, in like manner, have been previously shown, that this establishment has been, and is, conducive to the greatness of the nation, the permanence of the throne, and the freedom and happiness of the people. It should have been shewn, that the several persons embodied under the church establishment, are more jealous of the national character, than a Roman Catholic clergy would have been; we should have been referred to a time when the Roman Catholic clergy taught political doctrine more slavish than that which has been, and is, taught by the clergy of the present day; we should have been convinced, that, if the Romish church had been re-exalted, its priests would, in general, have exceeded our priests in political sycophancy and election jobbing; we should have been assured, that an instance, *of which I myself was a witness*, of a Doctor of Divinity offering for sale *two seats in parliament*, if not previously disposed of, *as the price of some dignity in the church*, is only a specimen of what we should have seen in gross under the re-exaltation of the Romish church; we should have been reminded of a time, when, under a Romish hierarchy, a state of parliamentary representation surpassing the present, existed, bearing in mind the fate of *Mr. Madocks's motion*; something should have been said, some effort should have been made, to prove to us, either from experience or from reason, that, under a Romish hierarchy, Englishmen would have experienced something more than the income tax, than the seven-years suspension of the Habeas Corpus act, than the introduction of foreign troops, something more than what, for these twenty-three years past, they have experienced; it

should, if possible, have been shewn, that, at some time or other when England was under a Roman Catholic church, England was in greater peril from without, or in greater misery within, than she is at this moment. All this, or some of it, at least, should have been shewn, previous to the raising of an outcry against Lord Howick's bill, as a source of danger to the church; because, to put reasonable men on the side of its opponents, it was necessary to convince them, that the thing, said to be in danger, was a thing the protecting and preserving of which was of some importance to the good of the nation.—Taking it for granted, however, that the church establishment, even as it now stands, with all its pluralities and absentees, is a thing worth contending for, I cannot see how that establishment could possibly have been affected by Lord Howick's bill, if that bill had passed into a law. It is now matter of general notoriety, and it is matter of fact not to be denied, 1st, that in 1793, the power of granting commissions to Catholics, in the Irish army, was, by law, given to the king, and that this law was passed with the approbation of Mr. Pitt, and of almost the whole of those who are now in the ministry: 2d, that in 1801, Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas went out of office, being followed by Mr. Canning, Mr. Rose, and others now in the ministry, because the king would not consent to the bringing in of a bill, intended to give the Roman Catholics even seats in parliament, upon the bench, and in the privy council; 3d, that in 1804, a law, brought in by Mr. Pitt, was passed, authorizing the king to raise regiments of Roman Catholic *foreigners*, to grant commissions to *foreign* Roman Catholic officers, to dispense with all oaths from them, except a simple oath of fidelity, and to quarter and station these regiments in the heart of our country; 4th, that *all this the king had done without any act of parliament to sanction it*, and that the act of 1804, was, in part, an act to indemnify those who had advised him so to do; 5th, that, at the time when this bill passed, every person now in the ministry was in power, and that you as attorney general (MR. PERCEVAL), must have examined, if not actually have drawn up, that bill. Greatly puzzled, therefore, must the world be to discover any thing in the bill of Lord Howick more dangerous to the church than what was contained in the bill actually passed with you and your present colleagues approbation. Am I told, that,

to admit Roman Catholic *foreigners*, was not dangerous, because they could have no connection, or community of interests, with the Roman Catholics, whether priests or laity, in this country? My answer is, that this distinction is done away by the act of 1793, which authorised the king to grant commissions to Roman Catholics serving in the *Irish* army; so that, if the acts of you and your colleagues were not hostile to the established church it is impossible that the bill of Lord Howick could have been so.—But, waiving all argument drawn from the example of Pitt and of yourself, what did Lord Howick's bill propose to do? To render it *lawful* for the king to grant, *if he pleased*, commissions to English and Irish Catholics, through the whole of the several ranks of the army and the navy, and to insure, by law, the free exercise of his worship, to every Roman Catholic soldier or sailor. It is, Sir, beyond my powers of penetration to discover any danger, even the most remote, that could, from such a law, have arisen to the church of England; and, especially when I take into view the well-known facts, that the king, without any such law, has long granted commissions to his Roman Catholic subjects, and that the Roman Catholic soldiers and sailors are, and long have been, freed from all restraint as to the exercise of their worship. Besides, suppose the bounds to have been extended by this law, *it rested wholly with the king*, to appoint or not appoint, to promote or not promote, to cashier or not cashier, any, and every, Roman Catholic, either in the army or the navy; so that, if there was any danger at all in the extension, it must have consisted solely in the possibility of the king's not being guided by wisdom in the choice and promotion of his officers. But, even in this case, where shall we look for the source of danger to the church? In what way could this bill, a bill intended merely to extend the operation of the king's pleasure, as to promotions in the army and navy, or rather, to render the operation of that pleasure legal; in what way could such a law endanger the safety of the church establishment? It gave nothing to the Roman Catholic priests or bishops, either in authority, in name, or in money. It took nothing, either of power or emolument, from the church of England. It left both churches just as they were before; and, if the church of England has experienced any danger from it, or does experience any danger from it, it is that danger which a

false and hypocritical clamour seldom fails, first or last, to bring down upon the heads of its inventors and promoters.—“What, then,” some one will say, “induced so many of the clergy of the church of England to send addresses against Lord Howick's bill?” That, Sir, which induces the crowds, that beset Whitehall, to address letters to the minister of the day: a desire to obtain money for doing nothing. If the motive had been other than this; if any thing but the goal of preferment had been in view, the clergy would not have been so tardy in their opposition to the bill. If they had been animated by an anxiety for the preservation of the church, and had regarded the bill as dangerous to it, how came they not to petition the parliament the moment the bill was brought in? They never thought of any such thing. They let the bill go quietly on; nor was it until the bill had been withdrawn, that they began to issue their godly fulminations against it. Nay, Sir, even this was not enough to overcome their propensity to be cautious; for they saw the ministry safely turned out, and even after that *they waited to see you with a majority on your side*, before they ventured to address their gracious and pious sovereign for his care in preventing the overthrow of the church. It would be curious enough to see the list of those, who took the lead in these addresses; but, there needs no such list to make their motives evident to the world.—Hypocrisy, detestable in any man, is peculiarly so when met with under the garb of a minister of religion; and, therefore, the cry of “NO POPERY,” set up, or propagated, by too many of the clergy, must, first or last, receive its just reward, in the natural consequences of general detestation. This is not the first set of priests, who have kindled a flame in the multitude; and, as the usual consequence has, heretofore, been the destruction of the kindlers, let them beware! —Here I stopped in 1807. *Let them beware!* I then said; and, I am very much deceived, if they will not very soon see reason to think, that my advice was sound. —It is, then, I think, clear, that there was no obstacle to the measure proposed by the late ministry, other than the political intrigues of those, who wished to have their places. It is quite clear, that there was nothing in that measure, hostile to the principles, which placed the king's family upon the throne; that it had in it nothing dangerous to the Church; and, in show,

that so far from granting too much to the Catholics, it contemplated the grant of but a very small part of what might be safely granted to them.—There are, perhaps, other causes of discontent amongst the people of Ireland; but, we, surely, in our search after causes, need go no further than the *system of exclusion*; that odious and invidious system, under which it is *impossible* that they should be content. But, if this system was odious before, if it was grating to the souls of the Catholics to see Presbyterians, and all others but themselves, admitted to a share in all the offices and powers and authorities of the government; if it was grating before, what must it be *now*, when they see, not only a *law* passed, permitting the king to admit Roman Catholics, provided they be *foreigners*, into the army, and to give them *rank to any extent*; but, when they see, that he has so admitted them, and has been promoting and giving them honours in the service, without exacting from them that oath of abjuration, which is so rigorously exacted from the Irish Catholics? What must be the feelings of an Irish Catholic upon contemplating this distinction?—Reader, can you conceive *why* this distinction was made, and *why* it is adhered to? The king's *conscience*, we were told, by the precious hypocrites of 1807; the king's conscience would not permit him to give his assent to a law, enabling him to *exercise his own pleasure* in the promoting of his Roman Catholic Subjects in the army; his *conscience*, they told us, would not permit him to do this; when (Oh! the matchless knaves!) there was, at that same time, in existence, a law, to which *the king had given his assent*, enabling him to employ and give rank to German (aye, to *German*!) and other foreign Roman Catholics in that same army, upon which law he had cheerfully and cordially acted. Now, then, I leave you to say, if any thing ever was so detestable as the conduct of those men, who, in 1807, pretended that the late ministry made an attempt upon the *conscience* of the king; and, it is, I think, impossible, that, sooner or later, that conduct should escape punishment.—It is an insult to the king, of the most outrageous description, to suppose, that "*scruples of conscience*" prevented him from giving his assent to a law, which was to open the door of promotion in the army to Roman Catholics who were his *own subjects*, when he had already given his assent

to, and was acting upon, a law which had opened that door to Roman Catholics who were *foreigners*. Talk of *disloyalty*, indeed! In what light more odious than this is it possible for disloyalty, however inveterate, to place the conduct and disposition of the king? But, this, as it has been well-observed in the *EXAMINER* of last Sunday, is after the manner of these men, who always lug in *the king*; who always endeavour to make him a *party with them*; and who thus, by implication, *identify opposition to themselves with disloyalty to the king*. Yet, this device is not original; for the reader will find, by a reference to the *Parliamentary History*, in the reign of Charles II., that just so; exactly in the same manner, acted those men, who by an abuse of the king's name, prepared the way for the expulsion of the family of STUART. They, too, called themselves exclusively, "*the king's friends*," and, indeed, they practised all those arts, which have, of late years, been so much in vogue, and which have brought us into our present perilous situation.—Enough has now, I think, been said to convince any impartial man of the necessity of conciliatory measures towards the Irish Catholics, as the only means of obtaining a *sure defence* for that now-vulnerable part of the kingdom. In estimating our dangers, how large a part of them arises from Ireland every man capable of reasoning must perceive. In estimating our wants of force, Ireland is the grand item. In estimating our annual expences, Ireland again stands foremost upon the list. Ought not some attempt to be made, then, to change the situation of Ireland? And, will the intriguing hypocrites still tell us, that the *king's conscience* stands in the way of such change?—My object, for the reasons I have already stated, is not to promote a desire to see a change in the *ministry*, about which, unless a change of system be first openly avowed, I am quite indifferent; but, at any rate, I wish to see Ireland conciliated, and that speedily; for, without that, I am thoroughly convinced, there can be no safe defence, for any part of this kingdom, against the long-planned and persevering attempts of our enemy.

COVENT GARDEN THEATRE.—Two reasons have hitherto prevented me from making the scenes at this place a subject of remark: the *first*, that the REGISTER has never meddled with theatrical matters; and, the *second*, that to obtain, at this dis-

stance, correct information was difficult. —The first impression upon my mind was, that the demand of *Old Prices* was unreasonable, seeing that all things have so much advanced in price; and, besides, it appeared to me to be a *violation of the rights of property* to attempt to compel people to sell *entertainment at the price pointed out by the purchaser*, who was at liberty to leave the commodity to others, if he did not choose to take it at the seller's price.

—The argument of *monopoly* had some weight against this reasoning, though it did not appear to me conclusive against the Proprietors; nor did I care a straw about their account that was published, because whether they got more than six per cent., or not, appeared to me to have nothing at all to do with the matter. —As to the *private boxes*, considered as a source of *immorality*, I do not think much of that, being of opinion, that the quantity of immorality will be the same, whether those boxes be private or public. But, if it be correct (of which I can hardly doubt now) that the construction of the House pens up, *drives back*, and *degrades*, the middling class of people, that appears to me to be a solid ground of objection; and a ground, too, upon which the audience have a full and complete right to make a stand; because, the liberty to act plays is not given for the *private advantage of the players*, but for the *entertainment of the public*; and, it appears to me, that those who act under the patent, have no more right to drive back and degrade the people, than has the minister of any church, by appropriating all the convenient and comfortable and conspicuous parts of that church to the exclusive use of the rich. —To this distribution, therefore, of the room in the theatre, I should have objected, even if the price of admission had been but half what it formerly was; and, if the description given me be correct, I must say, that the proprietors do seem to have lost sight of that respect, which it is always their duty to show towards the public at large. I am willing to suppose, that they meant no disrespect; but, certainly, such is the appearance. —But, I might have got over this; I might even have wished to forget the employment of the Jews and Bruisers; but, how is it possible ever to forget the attempts that have been made upon the *personal liberty* of so many of the people? Here the matter becomes a *political* one, and a matter, too, of far more interest to us, than the result of the war in Spain and Portugal, adding thereunto the

result of our garrisoning of the island of Sicily. The movements of Messrs. READ and GRAHAM are of infinitely more interest to us, than the movements of Baron Dourou and the Duke of Dalmatia; and the victory of MR. CLIFFORD a thousand and a thousand times repays us for the loss of the battle of Wagram, which produced the fall of Austria. —In my next, I will put upon record an account of this Trial; but, in the meanwhile, let me not omit to express my admiration of the *conduct of the Jury*, and particularly of the answer, which they gave to the Judge, when they said, that they thought it *very harsh* to construe so slight a matter into an act of riot. There spoke the good sense of Englishmen; there breathed the mild spirit of English law! *Rioting* indeed! Had there been a spirit of *rioting*, would there now have been a bench or a door or any moveable thing in the House? Yes, it is indeed, "very harsh" to call what is passing at the theatre *rioting*; it is carrying the terrors of criminal law into places of amusement. —I have not time for further remarks, at present; but, I cannot refrain from expressing an earnest hope, that the Proprietors will adopt, *without loss of time*, MEASURES OF CONCILIATION. Other measures, of almost every sort that has a name, they have tried in vain; and, therefore, I hope they will now try what CONCILIATION will do. —N. B. I wish very much to be furnished with a correct account of all the instances in which *baill* has been required at Bow Street, and the circumstances of the parties from whom demanded. — This is a very important matter.

W^M. COBBETT.

Botley, 7th Dec. 1809

EDINBURGH REVIEW,

On the Conduct of the War, and Parliamentary Reform.

[To the MORNING CHRONICLE I am indebted for an earlier sight of the following article than I should otherwise have obtained. I, therefore, insert the Introduction used by that print.]

The article in the last number of the *Edinburgh Review*, entitled, "The Conduct of the War," contains an excellent view of the proceedings of the army under Sir John Moore, in the North of Spain, founded upon a careful examination of all the documents and publications which have appeared on this subject. The following short but elo-

quent tribute to the memory of the Hero of Corunna, will not be read without interest :

"The battle which he fought at the end of this memorable retreat, and which closed the sufferings of his followers, and his own career of glory, will live, for ever in the recollection of his grateful country. But it is not this last scene of his triumph alone that will claim the lasting regards of England. She will proudly remember that his judgment and skill were only surpassed by his unconquerable valour ; she will fondly dwell upon that matchless self-denial which subjected all his interests to her weal, as it devoted all his faculties to her service ; she will hold him up to her most famous warriors in after times, when the envious clamours of the hour are hushed, and the minions of present power are forgotten, as a bright example of that entire forbearance,—that utter extinction of every selfish feeling,—that high and manly sacrifice even of the highest and manliest of passions,—that severe mortification of ambition itself, which she has a paramount right to require from him to whom she yields the guidance of her armies ; and, while she records that the hero of Corunna fought *no vain battles,—courted no vulgar applause in rash and senseless marches,—lost no trophies, no captives,—abandoned no hospitals to the enemy, and yielded no post of danger to feeble allies,—*she will pronounce the name of MOORE, to blight those un-hallowed laurels which are won by the wasted blood of her children, and the tarnished honour of her arms."—This is succeeded by a perspicuous and impressive historical summary of the measures pursued by Government in the subsequent prosecution of the war. It concludes with the following observations, which are worthy of particular attention :—"The Parliament of England is about to assemble once more ; and the authors of our calamities cannot prevent their conduct from being at least brought before that illustrious tribunal. Hitherto they have not made any defence ; nor have they even hinted that they had any to make. They have admitted all their failures to be complete and fatal ; they have confessed, that the opportunities which they have lost will in all likelihood never return. After a few wretched attempts to divide the blame among themselves, in shares different from

"those in which the country is disposed to apportion it, they have been compelled to allow that among themselves it must all be divided, and upon them alone must the responsibility rest. They have not dared to deny, that the prospects of the Continent are become more dismal than ever ; that its confidence in England is gone ; that the map of Europe, from Moscow to Paris, and from Lapland to Calabria, offers to the eye only a collection of States, aggrandised by her hostility, or ruined by the perilous bounty of her alliance. Abroad and at home—which way so ever the eye can turn, our rulers have amply admitted, that our affairs are only not desperate, and have themselves come forward to declare, that the empire is reduced to a state of difficulty, from which there can be at least no precedent of its ever having escaped in former times. And after all these confessions, their only excuse, the only attempt they make to regain the confidence of the people, is to tell us, *"that the King has reigned fifty years."* They have ruined our allies ; they have failed in every plan : they have brought us through slaughter and disgrace, loaded with ignominy, and weighed down with almost intolerable burdens—to the very brink of destruction :—'but the King is very old,' and 'he has reigned above half a century.'—It now remains to be seen, *whether that PARLIAMENT, which stands in no need of reformation—which is a fair representative of the people of England—which speaks the sentiments of the country*—will be satisfied with this set off ; and once more acquit the Ministers of all blame for their recent mismanagement. Holding, in common with the Parliament itself, the doctrine of its purity and of its sufficiency to save the State, we cannot anticipate such a decision. But if, unhappily, we should find ourselves mistaken ; if, again, every measure and every minister be covered over with its approbation, *then we will venture to predict, not that the Government is acquitted, but that the Parliament stands condemned ; and we shall most unwillingly be compelled to appear in the foremost rank of those who must acknowledge that they are convinced and converted.* For it is needless to disguise the matter. A refusal to punish the authors of our misfortunes can only mean one of two things—either that there has been no blame incurred—or that it is inexpedient to declare it, be-

"cause such a resolution would drive the guilty persons from the Government. In the one case, the Parliament will show that it is not the Representative of the Country; in the other, we shall have a conclusive proof that the Ministers of the Crown are irremovable. The responsibility of our rulers, that fairest feature in the theory of the Constitution, will be no longer even a name, wherewithal to round parliamentary periods; and the people will thenceforward recognise, in the great Council of the Nation, not the guardian of their interests, and the champion of their rights, but a well contrived instrument of taxation.—The consequences of such a decision, therefore, will be productive of incalculable mischief; it will complete the alienation of the Country from the Government, and shame away the boldest defenders of the present system. In the mean time, the pressure of the war, and of the public burthens, will rapidly increase. The scene of hostilities will approach to our own shores; and the taxes, which, like the war, have as yet only been felt at a distance, will at length come home to every man.* This truth will then break upon the minds of all, even of the most confiding and inconsiderate,—the truth with which we opened the present discussion—that there is an intimate and necessary connection between the foreign policy of the State, and the happiness of each individual within its boundaries; that every man who pays taxes—every man who values the security of his property, or his own future safety from foreign dominion, is immediately affected by the mismanagement of the war; that not a plan falls to the ground, not a bad appointment of Commander or Ambassador is made at Court, not an opportunity of beating the enemy in councils, or in arms, is lost, without our being, a little sooner, or a little later, indivi-

* We do not mean to blame the additional rigour with which the taxes, especially that on property, are now levied; because it is undoubtedly fair that defaulters should be made, as far as possible, to contribute; and we only fear, the utmost ingenuity of the collectors will still be eluded by the mercantile classes. But we simply state the fact, that the country scarcely knows the weight of those taxes.

"dually sensible of it. *What will then remain for the people to do, we need scarcely point out.* If they value their personal happiness and national independence, they will watch over their rulers with redoubled jealousy, and never rest satisfied until their efforts shall have restored the indisputable connection between misrule and retribution."

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

ITALY.—*Proclamation issued by Eugene Napoleon, Arch-Chancellor of State of the French Empire, Viceroy of Italy, Prince of Venice, and Commander in Chief of the Army of Italy, to the People of the Tyrol, dated, Head Quarters, Villach, Oct. 26th, 1809.*

Tyroleans! Peace is concluded between his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, my august Father and Sovereign, and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria.—Peace therefore prevails every where, except among you—you only do not enjoy its benefits.—Listening to perfidious suggestions, you have taken up arms against your laws, and have subverted them, and now you are gathering the bitter fruits of your rebellion; terror governs your cities; idleness and misery reign in you; discord is in the midst of you; and disorder every where prevails. His Majesty the Emperor and King, touched with your deplorable situation, and with the testimonies of repentance which several of you have conveyed to his throne, has expressly consented, in the Treaty of Peace, to pardon your errors and misconduct.—I then bring you peace since I bring you pardon. But I declare to you, that pardon is granted you only on the condition that you return to your obedience and duty, that you voluntarily lay down your arms, and that you offer no resistance to my troops.—Charged with the command of the armies which surround you, I come to receive your submission, or to compel you to submit.—The armistice will be preceded by Commissioners appointed by me to hear your complaint, and to do justice to the demands you may have to make.—But know that these Commissioners can only listen to you when you have laid down your arms.—Tyroleans! If your complaints and demands be well founded, I hereby promise that justice shall be done you.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 24.] LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1809. [Price 1s.

"Every point of *law*, that is accidentally *intermixed with matters of fact*, in the complicated issue, or "question, referred to the determination of a Jury, is *within their cognizance*."—LITTLETON.

697]

[895

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

MR. CLIFFORD'S Action against BRANDON.

—The issue of this action is of a good deal of importance as relating merely to the conduct of the proprietors of the theatre, on the one part, and to that of the audience, on the other part; but, when considered in its probable influence upon the general freedom, and the personal safety, of the people, it is of a degree of importance not easily to be described. Viewing it in this light, I must, of course, think it my duty to put upon record a short account of the Trial, having first stated the grounds upon which the action was brought. For many weeks past, the audience at the new-built theatre of Covent Garden, have, by noises of various sorts, by the exhibition of placards, cockades, medals, and by other means, expressed their disapprobation of the advance which the proprietors have made on the former prices of admission, and also of the construction of the interior of the house, by which, it appears, that the middling class of the people are shut out from their usual chance of obtaining comfortable and respectable seats. Various are the means, which, it seems, the proprietors have resorted to, in order to stifle this opposition. Amongst others, the causing of persons to be seized, the causing of persons *composing part of the audience*, to be seized as *criminals*; to be dragged before the Police-Magistrates, who are justices of the peace receiving a salary from Government, and removable at the pleasure of the minister of the day; to be, by the said magistrates, held to bail, or committed to prison; and, it appears, that many very respectable persons, not happening to have bondsmen immediately at hand, have been committed to prison, and to a prison, too, chiefly used for the confinement of the worst and lowest of wretches. One of the persons, thus seized, some few weeks ago, was MR. HENRY CLIFFORD, a barrister of great eminence for talent in his profession, and not less distinguished for the soundness of his political principles and his attachment to the cause of English

freedom. This gentleman having been, one evening, in the Pit of the Theatre, and having, amongst the other marks of his disapprobation of the conduct of the proprietors, put in his hat a paper with the letters O P, which have been used as a sign of opposition, being the initials of the words OLD PRICES; this gentleman, for having thus acted, was, after the play was over, and as he was going along the passage from the interior of the play-house, seized, without any warrant, by a police-officer, who acted under the express orders of a MR. BRANDON, a servant of the proprietors, who appears to have had the chief management in these arrests. Mr. Clifford was, it appears, dragged, in the usual way, from the Theatre to the Police-Justice's office at Bow Street, where it was not thought wise, it seems, either to force him to give bail, or to send him to prison. He was, therefore, discharged; whereupon he brought his action against Mr. Brandon for *false imprisonment*, which action was tried, in the court of Common Pleas, before SIR JAMES MANSFIELD, the Chief Justice of that court, on Tuesday the 5th instant. Mr. BRANDON's plea was, that what was passing at the Theatre, on the evening when Mr. Clifford was seized and dragged to Bow Street, amounted to a riot; that Mr. Clifford had *taken part in that riot*; and, that the seizure was made *legally*. Mr. Serjeant BEST, who was counsel for Mr. Clifford, contended, that all this was false; that what was going on at the theatre was *not a riot*; that, if it was, Mr. Clifford had *no hand in it*; and, that if it had been a riot and he had a hand in it, still the arrest was illegal, because, the pretended riot was *at an end* when the seizure was made, and that, therefore, the seizure was *illegal*, and the imprisonment *false*, there having been *no warrant* granted for making the seizure. MR. SERJEANT SHEPHERD, counsel for Mr. Brandon, took, of course, the exactly opposite assertions. It would be useless to attempt any analysis of these speeches; but, there is one point of Mr. Shepherd's doctrine, relating to the functions of *juries*, that ought not to escape

particular notice, and, indeed, marked reprobation.—The report of his speech makes him say :—" Whether, under " the circumstances of the case, as they " had been detailed in evidence, the Defendant was justified in *point of law*, for " having ordered the seizure of Mr. Clifford, the Jury must decide. They must " decide this question, according to the " *principle of law*, which in that, as in " other cases, he hoped, they would receive " from the directions of his Lordship; because, if his Lordship, or any other " learned Judge, should happen to mistake " the law, any advocate for the person, to " whose disadvantage the misdirection " had been given by any such Learned " Judge, thank God, had another Court to " apply to, so as to have any error, if such " should be found, corrected. The Jury, " he was sure, would see, that it was fit, " the law in this, as in all other cases, " should be laid down by those, who are " the Judges of the land; and, that it " should not vary, from day to day, with " the opinions of Gentlemen who are " summoned, from time to time, to perform the functions of jury-men. *Me-lancholy*, indeed, would it be for the " Constitution, and for this, or any other " country, governed by law, were there " not a tribunal, composed of persons competent to decide upon all questions of " law—men, whose lives had been dedicated " to the study of the law, the former part to " the practice, and the latter part to the " honest, upright administration of that " law."—I never heard of any thing like this before. It argued a strong misgiving, in the mind of the Serjeant, that the Jury was not on his side and that the Judge was. But, it is the *argument*; it is the *reasoning*, which I wish to point out to the reprobation of the reader. We have often seen attempts to chip away the functions of jury-men, and I wish I could say, that they had been made in vain; but, here is an attempt to nullify their functions altogether; and to hold them forth to the country as being no longer of any use.—This was precisely one of the cases contemplated in the words of my motto. *Points of law* were here intermixed with matters of fact; but, Serjeant Shepherd would have the Jury not think of meddling with the law, though, if they so acted, they might as well have left the whole to the Judge. There was no question about the fact of Mr. Clifford's having been in the Theatre or his having worn

the O P. There was no question at all about this; and, therefore, if the Jury were not to exercise their judgment upon the question of *law*, if they were not to judge, whether what took place at the theatre was a riot; and, supposing it to have been a riot, if they were not to judge, whether the conduct of Mr. Clifford amounted to a participation in that riot; and, again, if they were not to judge, whether (supposing there to have been a riot) the riot was at an end when Mr. Clifford was arrested; if they were to judge of none of these things; if all these points were to be left to the Chief Justice, what was the use of the Jury? What possible use could it be to impanel twelve men upon such a matter, when Mr. Clifford himself stated his having been at the Theatre and acknowledged his having worn the O P, and when the defendant acknowledged his having ordered Mr. Clifford to be seized? The truth is, that, in this case, as in most other cases of a similar nature, there was nothing in dispute, and, of course, nothing to decide upon, but the points of law; so that, if Serjeant Shepherd's doctrine had been sound, it must have been mere mockery to submit the case to a Jury. What were the questions?

1. Whether Mr. Clifford was at the Theatre.
2. Whether he wore the O P.
3. Whether there was a riot at the Theatre.
4. Whether Mr. Clifford's conduct amounted to a participation in it, if it was a riot.
5. Whether the riot, if it was one, was still going on when he was seized without a warrant.

The first two, which the Serjeant would call questions of *fact*, were of no importance; and those the Jury might decide upon. But, as to the other three, they were to be decided upon by the Judge. As to these questions, upon which alone any doubt could possibly have existed, the Jury were, according to Serjeant Shepherd's doctrine, to be no more than the mere mouth-piece of the Judge, and the functions they were to perform might have been performed full as well by the Crier of the Court.—Talk of *law* and of *fact*, indeed! Why, what are these questions of fact? Or, at least, the question of fact is so interwoven with the question of law, that there is no such thing as

separating them.—This reasoning of Serjeant Shepherd applies to all cases ; to all possible cases. To cases of treason, for instance. Suppose a man to be arraigned for treason, upon the ground of his having written a certain paper and sent it secretly to other persons, which acts are asserted by his accusers to come under the legal definition of compassing the death of the king. If, in such a case, the accusers are prepared with proof of the accused person having *written and sent the paper*, they know, beforehand, if the Serjeant's doctrine be sound, that *the jury will have nothing at all to do with the decision* ; and thus the man is not found guilty by *his peers*, but by the Judge alone.—There is nobody who denies, that Judges have more knowledge of the law, than juries can be expected to have ; but, it does not hence follow, that the life, fortune, or fame, of any man ought to be left to the judge, in any case whatever ; and, it is plain, that, if in this case, the jury was to follow implicitly, and to decide upon, the opinion of the judge because he was a man who had made the law his peculiar study, there is no case in which they ought not to decide upon the same principle ; and that, of course, there is no case wherein a jury can be of any use whatever, except as mere instruments in the hands of the judge, and that the old idea of a man's being *tried by his peers* is perfect nonsense.—This doctrine of Serjeant Shepherd did formerly prevail, and was, by wicked political judges, acted upon in *cases of libel* ; but in 1792, this doctrine, which had long disgraced our courts of justice, was extinguished by an act of parliament, brought forward by Mr. Fox, and passed for the express purpose ; and which act of parliament declares, that, in cases of libel, *as in other cases*, the jury shall judge of and decide upon *the law as well as the fact*. Before this act was passed Lord Mansfield and some other judges had acted upon the contrary maxim ; but, it ought to be observed, that this maxim had been repeatedly condemned by the great LORD CAMDEN, who was certainly one of the most honest lawyers as well as one of the most wise men, that this country ever knew.—Serjeant Shepherd allowed, that it was possible for the Judge to *misdirect* the jury ; for him to lay that down as law, which was not law. But, said he, “ in such case, *thank God*, there is *another court*, to which the party, against whom

“ such misdirection may operate, may appeal, and to which court, in such case, his counsel will advise him to appeal.” The Serjeant does not appear to have named this other court ; but, he could mean no other than the *House of Lords*, the probable *expense* of appealing to which court the Serjeant forgot to mention ; or, perhaps, he thought that that formed no objection to such a mode of proceeding. No, Mr. Serjeant, we have been taught to look for protection to a jury of our equals ; and, whatever may be your taste, there are very few of us who are in love with “ *the law's delay*,” one of the things, which the great studier and master of human nature has reckoned amongst the causes of self-murder. Observe, too, that, beside the delay of the law, how it must, in such case, operate in favour of the *rich* and against the *poor*. If the judge misdirect the jury against a rich man, he can appeal ; but, how is it possible, be the case ever so gross, for a poor man to appeal to the House of Lords ? What man even in middling circumstances, ever did make such an appeal ? Does the Serjeant recollect one ? If he does let him name him.—Having remarked upon this doctrine, manifestly having in view the object of preventing the jury, in this case, from deciding upon their own opinion, let us see what was the result.—The Chief-Justice, according to the printed reports of the Trial, gave it as his opinion, that what was going on at the Theatre, on the evening when Mr. Clifford was seized, was a *riot* ; it appeared, too, that he thought that acts of Mr. Clifford made him a *participator in the riot* ; and it also appeared, that he *did not consider the riot at an end*, when Mr. Clifford was seized.—The jury, however, notwithstanding the above doctrine of Serjeant Shepherd, gave a verdict for *the plaintiff*, Mr. Clifford, with damages of FIVE POUNDS.

JURORS' NAMES.

STEPHEN PITT, Church-street, Kensington, Esq.
EDWARD JENNINGS, Young street, ditto, Esq.
WILLIAM DAY, Brook Green, Esq.
GEORGE SCOTT, Upper Mall, Hammersmith, Esq.
THOMAS ROGERS, York Buildings, Esq.
The above were the only five of the Special Jury.
THOMAS GREENWAY,
RICHARD NORTIN,
GEORGE READER,
JOHN SEYMOUR,
THOMAS RYAN,
WILLIAM BEST,
MARK COOK,

Tales Men from the
Common Pannel.

Before the jury retired, the judge had desired them, if they should find for Mr. Clifford, to state upon which of the two grounds they gave their verdict: whether upon the ground of *Mr. Clifford's not having been guilty of a riot*; or, upon the ground of his having been apprehended *after the riot was over*. When, therefore, the jury returned, and gave their verdict, the judge is reported to have asked them for an explanation of the ground, upon which they gave it. But, I shall now insert this part of the report, as I find it in the newspapers, it being of the utmost consequence, that no misrepresentation of what passed should take place.

"SIR J. MANSFIELD then requested the Foreman to acquaint him with the ground on which their verdict had been given with reference to what he had referred in his charge, whether they found for the Plaintiff upon the *illegality of the Arrest*, or upon the ground that Mr. Clifford had *not been guilty of a riot*.

"THE FOREMAN replied, that on the illegality of the arrest, they were unanimous. With respect to the question of Mr. Clifford having been concerned in a riot, there was a difference of opinion. That question had not, however, been decisively discussed, as the Jury was unanimous in their verdict on the first principle.

"SIR JAMES MANSFIELD—I am sorry that that question was not decided, for it leaves the thing which I wished to be decided as equivocal as ever. I am indeed very sorry that the Jury did not agree on the distinct grounds of the verdict, for this shocking mistake of the public will still go forth, and public outrage may be continued by a *furious mob*—it deserves no better name—they may think themselves authorized to take justice into their own hands, and gratify their revenge by violence and outrageous conduct, even, perhaps, to the *ruin of their country*. What may be the consequence of such a spirit, it is impossible to foresee, but certain I am, that it leads to *every kind of horror*—possibly to the *subversion of Government*, certainly to great evils, perhaps the *worst that can be endured by a nation*.

"JURYMAN—We found the verdict on the ground that the Plaintiff was *illegally apprehended*.

"SIR JAMES MANSFIELD—That's *equivocal*, and decides nothing—for he might be a rioter, and yet illegally ap-

prehended by being taken after the thing was over.

"JURYMAN.—It was generally thought rather harsh to construe wearing O P into an act of riot, and by some, that it would be *inconsistent with the rights of Englishmen*."

With respect to Sir James's apprehensions of *great national danger* from what is going on at the Theatre, I must say, that I do not participate in them. I have seen nothing, in any of the accounts that have reached me, that would induce me to suppose, that the Opposition at the Theatre has been at all marked with a *mobbish character*. We see, that scores of the oppositionists are seized, even in the midst of their companions, and dragged off to the office of the Police-Justices, where neither those justices, nor any of their officers, meet with any insult or hindrance in the execution of their office. They demand bail, they send to prison, and no sort of resistance is made. It is remarkable, too, that of the wounds said to have been received in the several scuffles, almost the whole have been received by the oppositionists. Scarcely a man on the other side has received a personal injury. Besides, it has been proved, under the hands of very respectable men, that *common brutes* had had *free admissions*, not only for themselves, but also to give to others; and, I cannot help thinking, that it will be finally made to appear, that, in measures of *force*, the managers set the example. I cannot, therefore, see much ground for Sir James Mansfield's political fears; I cannot see in the conduct of the O P's any thing that appears to me to threaten the *subversion of the government*, or even the *ruin of the country*. We have before heard of the ruin of the country; it is a very common phrase; it has been apprehended from various and innumerable causes; but, really, I should not have apprehended it from hissing, hooting, and groaning at the Theatre, however often repeated; I should not have supposed, that, even the pelting of all the players off the stage with orange-peel and rotten apples, was any indication of *national ruin*.—Indeed, I for my part, should be much more apprehensive of national ruin from doctrine like that of Serjeant Shepherd; for, if that doctrine, such as it is described in the report, were once to be generally acted upon, there would be an end of the main object for which we are now disposed to fight in our country's defence: *namely, the Trial by Jury*. If that

doctrine had been acted upon, in the case of the seven Bishops, in the reign of JAMES II. those Bishops would have been found guilty, and, of course, punished. If, in short, that doctrine had been acted upon, neither of the villains, SCROGGS and JEFFREYS, would ever have been accused of *tyranny towards juries*, for they never would have met with any opposition, but, on the contrary, would have found juries to be a most convenient sort of 'scape goat. Juries, like all the other institutions, intended as safeguards of freedom, become, if perverted from their purpose, not only no safeguards at all, but the instruments of greater tyranny than would have been practised, if they had not existed. A judge, with the eyes of the public fixed upon his decisions, would be more likely to be cautious how he lent himself to the abuse of law, than if those decisions, though really his, passed for the decisions of juries. We cannot, therefore, too often, or too strongly, repeat our abhorrence of this doctrine, which, if acted upon, would make juries nothing more than the means of screening the misconduct of judges from public hatred and indignation.—In some of the reports of this Trial, Mr. SERJEANT LENS is represented as urging the Judge to call upon the jury for a statement of the reasons, upon which they founded their verdict. This does not appear to have been done by the judge, who merely asked them to say, upon which of two distinct grounds they founded their verdict; which, though new to me, was very different indeed from calling upon the jury for their reasons generally, which, in my opinion, would be a most daring violation of the rights of juries. A man may be very capable indeed of forming a correct conclusion, and, from various causes, very incapable of clearly stating his reasons, especially before a numerous assembly, who, from the very nature of the circumstances, must be watching every word that he utters. Besides, is it not manifest, that, in one and the same case, different men may come to the same conclusion upon different grounds? Nay, must it not necessarily happen, in many cases, that the jury are not, at first, unanimous, and that their verdict is the result of some giving up their opinions to others? Into what endless labyrinths, then, would every case lead the persons impannelled as well as the court, were it to become customary to ask jurors the reasons for their verdict?—Serjeant Shepherd talked of the mis-

chiefs that must arise from jurors not taking the law of every case implicitly from the judge; and, amongst those mischiefs he stated that of the law's changing continually, with every change of jurors. This is the old argument of SCROGGS and JEFFREYS, but it is not the more amiable or convincing for all that.—If laws were all written; if all possible cases were provided for in a manner so clearly as to leave nothing to be supplied by reasoning or construction; and if we had a security from Heaven for all judges being honest and impartial; then (though, by the bye, it would be quite fatal to the Serjeant's profession) I should say, leave the law to the judge, for he has spent his life in reading the law, and the jury have not. But, the fact is, that there is not one case out of one thousand which the law has so clearly provided for as to leave nothing to be supplied by construction; and, there is, in almost every case, especially of the sort of that now before us, so much depending upon the views and intentions of the parties, and the character of the act depends so much upon those circumstances, the true weight of which can be felt only by men who are taken from amongst the people, that I have no scruple to give it as my decided opinion, that a jury of twelve honest and impartial men, are, leaving all other considerations out of the question, more likely to come to a just decision than any single judge that ever sat even upon the English bench. The Serjeant, however, should have remembered, that the institution of juries grew out of a scrupulous regard for the safety of the persons and the property of the people against the arm of encroaching power; and that the great maxim of our benign law is, that it is better for a hundred times a hundred guilty persons to escape punishment, than that one innocent person should suffer. The laws have all been grounded upon the known existence of the power of juries to interpret those laws; and, therefore, if this power of juries be taken away, or, which is the same thing, suffered to remain only in name, you, do, in fact, change the nature of those laws.—I do not wish to inculcate an idea, that our judges are fickle in their interpretation of the law; but, surely, Mr. Serjeant Shepherd will not pretend to say, that different interpretations have not been given by different judges, of the same law; nay of the same clause of the same written statute; and that, of course, different decisions have taken place upon evidence of

the same facts, or facts of exactly the same description, produced in different cases? When the Serjeant was a young man, he must have seen the delightful puzzling that this created amongst the wisecracks at a Quarter Sessions. Our judges are, and have been, for many years past, as good, perhaps, in every respect, as judges ever were; but, still they are no more than men, and no men are perfect. It is neither the wisdom or the integrity of the judges that I should distrust; but, the power which Serjeant Shepherd contends for is, as SIR ARTHUR PIGGOT said in the debate upon the Irish Insurrection Bill, "a power that I would give to no man." In short, the Serjeant's doctrine would, if acted upon, render juries totally useless; and we might as well consent, at once, to the revival of that infamous instrument of tyranny the *Court of Star-Chamber*, which was established for the purpose of inflicting punishments upon persons, whom juries could not be prevailed upon to find guilty.

EDINBURGH REVIEWERS.—It will be remembered, that these gentlemen have, in their justly celebrated work, lately endeavoured to maintain, *that the House of Commons stood in no need of a Reform*. Much ingenuity was employed in this endeavour, and, it may easily be supposed, that some effect was produced by it. Events have, however, since the writing of that article, occurred, sufficient, it appears, to shake the opinions of its authors.—Amongst the reasons why a Reform should take place, we always mentioned, the want, as things now stand, of any *real responsibility* in the ministers, be their conduct what it might. Now, in their Number for October 1809, the Edinburgh Reviewers, after taking a view of the Conduct of the War, and particularly of the ruinous and disgraceful Expeditions to Spain and Holland, declare, that, if the House of Commons do not make the ministers really responsible for these failures, they (the Reviewers) will join us in calling for a Parliamentary Reform, as the only means of saving the nation from utter ruin.—It is best to insert their *own words*, to avoid the possibility of a charge of misrepresentation.—"It now remains to be seen, *whether that PARLIAMENT which stands in no need of reformation—which is a fair representative of the people of England—which speaks the sentiments of the country*—will *once more acquit the Ministers of all blame for their recent mismanagement.*

"Holding in common with the Parliament itself, the doctrine of its purity and of its sufficiency to save the State, we cannot anticipate such a decision. But if, unhappily, we should find ourselves mistaken; if, again, every measure and every minister be covered over with its approbation, *then we will venture to predict, not that the Government is acquitted, but that the Parliament stands condemned*; and we shall most unwillingly be compelled to appear in the foremost rank of those who must acknowledge that they are convinced and converted. For it is needless to disguise the matter. A refusal to punish the authors of our misfortunes can only mean one of two things—either that there has been no blame incurred—or that it is inexpedient to declare it, because such a resolution would drive the guilty persons from the Government. In the one case, the Parliament will shew that it is not the Representative of the Country; in the other we shall have a conclusive proof that the Ministers of the Crown are irremovable. The responsibility of our rulers, that fairest feature in the theory of the Constitution, will be no longer even a name, wherewithal to round parliamentary periods: and the people will thenceforward recognize, in the great Council of the Nation, not the guardian of their interests, and the champion of their rights, but a well contrived instrument of taxation.—The consequences of such a decision, therefore, will be productive of incalculable mischief; it will complete the alienation of the Country from the Government, and shame away the boldest defenders of the present system."—Here then, we have a distinct pledge; that unless the parliament punish the present ministers for their management of the war; we have a distinct promise, that, unless the parliament, at its meeting, does this, the Edinburgh Reviewers will join us, nay, will place themselves at our head, and be our leaders in all lawful endeavours to obtain a Reform of the Parliament.—I cannot help thinking, that the writers of this work do now perceive, that the nation is not to be saved without a Reform of the Parliament, and that this is only a decent way of accounting for the change of sentiment, which upon this subject, they now mean to discover.—A correspondent, in a letter inserted below, supposes, that the article against Parliamentary Reform was written by a person, now no longer one of the

writers in the Review. I should have guessed it to be the production of LORD SELKIRK; and, indeed, I believe him to be the author of it. Persons, conducting such publications, are but too apt (without any corrupt motive) to suffer rank and wealth to usurp their pages. This would be of no consequence at all, if the authors were to put their *names* to what they write; but, it is of great, and may be of mischievous, consequence, when their writings go forth to the world as the writings of the editors, or conductors, of a celebrated work.—At any rate, we have now the pledge of the conductors, and to that pledge, we shall, I trust, find them adhere.

CONDUCT OF THE WAR. — The mismanagement of the war is now denied by no man. The very hireling news-papers confess that it has been mismanaged; or, at least, they have not the effrontery to deny the fact.—Let us now see, then, *what the parliament will do*. The public must remember, that, after all thoughts of an attempt upon Antwerp had been given up, the hirelings of the press told us, that *the island of Walcheren was invaluable*; that it was a most important post for us to hold; and that it was well worth all the expence and all the loss of lives, which the capture of it had occasioned. Nay, it will be remembered, that, these assertions were not confined to the hireling prints; for that Lord Chatham himself, when he communicated to the ministers (in a dispatch that was published) his intention not to proceed up the Scheldt, did not fail to tell them what a "*valuable possession*" the country would find in the Island of Walcheren.—Long before that time, and at that time, I endeavoured to convince my readers of the impossibility of our holding Walcheren for only one winter. For these endeavours I was most outrageously abused by the hirelings. I was represented almost as a traitor, because I advised the ministers to evacuate the island with all possible speed; and, because I repeated my remonstrances against keeping, or attempting to keep, the island, or any part of it, the Nabob's Gazette lamented that I was not "*silenced*."—Well! we now see, that, if my advice had been followed, how much loss, how much disgrace, this nation would have avoided!—I am, for my part, quite at a loss to discover, upon what grounds the ministers will, or can, attempt to defend their warlike measures. Any man, or set of men, may err. This is very

true; but, it is nothing at all in the way of justification of those, who have taken upon them to manage the affairs of a nation. I am at a loss to discover what sort of *apology* even, can be offered, not for the *failure* but for the *undertaking*, of either of the expeditions. I regard that in Spain to be the worst, after all; especially as it was undertaken with the sad experience of Sir John Moore before the eyes of the ministry as well as the commander. I do not agree with the Edinburgh Reviewers in all they say of Sir John Moore, or of his conduct in Spain. I believe him to have been much to blame, but the ministry and their agents to have been more to blame. His retreat was too precipitate. It was a flight, and a flight it need not have been, if the necessary precautions had been taken at several of the passes in the mountains, and at two or three of the bridges. This, however, has nothing to do with the present question. And, again, I say, that I am totally at a loss to discover, what sort of apology can possibly be found for the undertaking of either of those ruinous expeditions.—I have, however, no notion, that the matter will be taken up in the manner that it ought to be, when the parliament meets. And, yet, all other motives aside, it is strange that a motive of *self-preservation* should not impel men of property all to join in their endeavours to prevent a repetition of such waste of the national means; to prevent a repetition of measures, so manifestly tending to the downfall of the state. But, it has in all nations been thus. There appears, under such circumstances of public danger, the same sort of infatuation always to have prevailed; and, the truth is, perhaps, that such infatuation is a necessary consequence proceeding from the same cause as the danger itself. It would seem that the blows, which cripple a nation, do, at the same time, deprive it of its senses.—I cannot bring myself to entertain the terrible idea of England's becoming a dependence of France, an idea not less fearful than that of death itself; but, still, if things go on in their present course, I cannot see, *how* we are to escape this dreadful end. If our affairs are to be exposed to the natural and inevitable consequences of continual bickerings and intrigues, if self-interest, if grovelling passion, are to bear sway, reason says we must fall, and fall we shall.

CITY OF LONDON.—I am happy to see, that the *Citizens of London* are, at last, *alive*. The proposition for calling a meeting of the Common Council for the purpose of rescinding the motion, carried at the last meeting, seems to have roused the separate *Wards*, most of whom have instructed their representatives to support that motion.—This does not appear to have been expected by the *courtiers*; that is to say, by the Contractors, Jobbers, Loan-Jews, and all the train of “blood-suckers,” as the Great Lord Chatham used most significantly to call them. It will, I hope, lead to good. The day for electing Common-Council Men is approaching; and, it is to be hoped, that the people of London, who really do, in this respect, enjoy the Constitution unimpaired, will show the whole nation, that it is of *some use* to enjoy the Constitution.—The old cant of *leaving the matter to parliament* was again brought forward at the last meeting of the Common-Council. To *defend* what the ministers do is the first thing, with the harpies; to *apologize* for it is the next; to *insist that inquiry will do no good*, the thing being past remedy, is the next; to cry *jacobin*, and make no other answer, except by a vote, is the next; but, when none of these will do, then comes the pretence of *leaving the matter to the parliament*, that is to say, to an assembly, in which it is notorious, in which it is known to every link-boy, that the ministry, whose conduct is the object of inquiry, *have a decided majority*!—Was there ever any thing in the world so impudent as this? Yet, by tricks like this, have the citizens of London, formerly so renowned for their opposition to every species of misrule, been, for above twenty years, led along from one act of absurdity and meanness to another, till, at last, the minister of the day seemed to doubt, whether a vote of approbation from them would not be injurious to his cause! Let us hope, that better times are approaching.

COVENT GARDEN THEATRE.—In my last sheet, at page 892, I recommended to the managers of this great scene of public amusement *measures of conciliation*. A correspondent, who says that he agrees with me in opinion as to all the points upon which I touched, in the article referred to, begs of me, in a very earnest manner, to state the *terms*, upon which I think, peace between the managers and the public ought to take place.—It reasonably may, and I am afraid it will, appear

presumptuous in me, who live at such a distance from the spot, who have never seen the Theatre, who am not likely ever to frequent it, and who, of necessity, must be greatly deficient as to many points of information upon the subject; I am afraid, that, under these circumstances, it may be thought presumptuous in me to put myself forward as a *mediator* upon this occasion. Yet, I must confess, that I am very anxious to see an accommodation take place, and chiefly, because I am persuaded, that, in the end, it must take place, and that, as long as the dispute lasts, it will only serve to withdraw the attention of the public from matters of greater importance; and, if I am deficient in point of information; if, in some respects, I want the advantages that my brother journalists in London possess; on the other hand, my distance from the scene has prevented me from being personally a party in the contest, from receiving hasty impressions, and from having my opinions tinged with resentment; while it so happens, that I am totally unacquainted with either of the managers, and, as far as I know, with any individual having the smallest share of property in the theatre. When, in the year 1800, I was proprietor of a daily paper, I had a free-admission card sent me, as was, and is, the custom with respect to persons in that situation, which card has been continued ever since, as is also the custom. But, for the last five years, I have not entered a theatre; I have not, that I know of, ever seen either Mr. HARRIS or his SON; nor have I, off the stage, ever seen Mr. KEMBLE but once, which was in the year 1800; and with neither have I ever had any communication whatever, in any way, or upon any subject.—It is, however, after all, with great diffidence, that I offer my opinion as to what ought to be the *terms* of accommodation; nor should I attempt it, were it not quite impossible to make things worse than they now are.—In this case, as in all others where there are numerous parties, and where the quarrel is of any length of duration, the grounds of the quarrel change; and at this moment, the O P means no *hired bruisers*, no *legal persecution*, much more than it means *Old Prices*. The advance of price has been lost sight of amidst the scuffles in the pit, the examinations at Bow-street, and the commitments to Bridewell. These are what the public now complain of, nor will it be very easy to wear them from

their minds. The number of those, who have now had a relation, a friend, an acquaintance, or a neighbour, dragged by thief-takers before Police-Justices, and by those Justices dealt with, is now not small; every day it must become greater; so that, if the dispute continue much longer, inevitable ruin must fall upon the theatre.

—There appeared to me to be something very unwise, on the part of the managers, at the first starting off. To show the *water-engines* to the audience; to treat them with such inexpressible contempt, and especially before it was possible for them to be met for the purpose of opposition, was, to say the least of it, extremely unwise. This unequivocal mark of contempt, together with the construction of the house, by which the middling class of people were shut out from their usual chance of comfortable and conspicuous places, seems to have been the great cause of an opposition to the thing, blended with resentment against Mr. Kemble, who appeared, of course, to be the author of the unmerited indignity. After this it was no wonder, that he became the great object of attack; that he became more obnoxious than all other persons and things put together; that neither his person, his character, or his family, was spared. I was very sorry to see this; because I remember, and the *Electors of Westminster* will, I am sure, when I remind them of it, have the justice to acknowledge, that, during our long and arduous and anxious struggle, in 1806, the whole of the players, all the persons, of any note, belonging to both theatres, were at work against us, *the Kembles excepted*. Indeed, it was, in great part, owing to the dirty tricks and villainies of the theatres, that Mr. PAULI, whose fate I shall ever lament, lost his election. But, it was remarked at the time, that, in no instance whatever, did any one of the Kembles interfere. It has, therefore, I must confess, a good deal vexed me, to see this family become the object of popular indignation, while praises have been bestowed upon others, who, at the time referred to, took an active and most wicked part against popular rights, and who, if the opportunity offered, would, I doubt not, do the same again to-morrow.

—When people are angry with one another, when their minds are completely embittered, they view one another's actions and character through a false medium, and very often they condemn that which, at other times, they would applaud.

Hence the charges of *pride* and *haughtiness* preferred against Mr. Kemble. Now, the fault of those, whose calling it is to afford amusement to the public, generally is, that they are too supple, slavish, and base. It must be remembered, that the attack upon the Prices and upon the Private Boxes was accompanied by an attack upon Mr. Kemble. The names and epithets bestowed on him that evening cannot have been forgotten. Well, what was he to do? Was he to have *no feeling*? Would an audience of Englishmen have liked to see him come and *crouch* down before them, like a Russian or Prussian peasant before his owner? Is there any man of us, who would have done it? Let us put ourselves in Mr. Kemble's situation, and then see what our judgment will be upon his conduct. The truth is, that, in shewing that he felt resentment, he appears to me to have shewn much more respect for the audience, than he would have shewn, if he had discovered no feeling at all; for, then, it would have been impossible to ascribe his conduct to any thing but contempt. Besides, though Mr. Kemble is a *player*, still he is not to be supposed to be upon a level with every man who acts upon the stage. When we are angry with him, we may ridicule his black-letter taste and his pedantry of pronunciation; but, surely, there is some difference between Mr. Kemble and such a man (I forget his name) as I saw once or twice in the character of Sir somebody, in a sort of crying farce, called *Speed the Plough*. Yes: I am sure an English audience, if they will but take time to cool, have too much discrimination and too much justice to deny, that there is some difference between Mr. Kemble, the faithful representative of Hamlet, Henry IV, and so many other finely drawn characters; that there is some difference between Mr. Kemble and such a man as I have just spoken of, whose chief merit appeared to consist in his wonderful powers of moving up and down the skin of his forehead, and of drawing his eye-brows down upon his cheek or tucking them up under his wig. Yes; (and, I am sure, that no man, whose candour is not stifled by passion, will deny it) there is some difference between Mr. Kemble and an actor like this; and it is not to be supposed, that Mr. Kemble's feelings, upon such an occasion, would be, or ought to be, the same as the feelings of a mere gesticulator, a mere maker of mouths.—It has been urged

against Mr. Kemble, that he has been *enriched by the public*, and that, therefore, his present conduct is marked with *ingratitude* as well as with contempt.—Reader, divest yourself of passion here, or it will be useless to proceed. Now, then, *make the case your own*; suppose yourself of any trade or profession, and that you have acquired a fortune thereby; do you not look upon that fortune as *your own*? Do you consider it as the well-earned wages of your labour, your study, the exercise of your skill; or do you consider it as a *boon* from your several employers or customers? Do you, if you are now retired from business, in looking over your gardens and fields, consider yourself as under a debt of *gratitude* for them? Do you, if you are now labouring for a fortune, consider yourself as labouring to incur a debt of *gratitude*? And, if not; if you look upon *your earnings* as your own; as the fruits of your industry and talents; I put it to your candour to say, whether it be just to consider Mr. Kemble as owing a debt of gratitude to *his* employers, or customers, as having, in short, received his fortune in the way of a boon?—Amongst the terms of reproach, which Mr. Kemble has, through his want of discretion at the outset, brought upon himself, is that of *upstart*. So true it is, that when once people are thoroughly angry, they never think of what they say.—Mr. Kemble and his Sister have been celebrated as players for upwards of *twenty years*, I believe. And, ought they, at the end of twenty years of a life of such labour, to be called *upstarts*, because they are said to possess considerable fortunes? How would any man who, by his industry, or talent, has acquired a fortune, like to be, on that account, called an *upstart*? No man would like it; and, really, I am afraid, that this treatment of the Kembles, if it be persevered in, must have the effect of preventing, in future, any very great endeavours to arrive at excellence in acting. It must have a tendency to degrade the whole thing, and to make stage-playing little more than grimace and buffoonery.—In any thing that I have said here, I, by no means, wish to justify, or apologize for, the conduct of Mr. Kemble, if he is to be considered *the author* of any of the insults offered to the public, and especially of the measure of seizing people, *seizing part of his audience*, by the hands of *thief-catchers*, dragging them before a police-justice, causing them

to give bail, and some of them to be committed to a prison amongst vagabonds and thieves; and all this for having committed no greater offence than that of hoisting a sign of disapprobation, or making a disapproving noise. The employment of the *bruisers* and *jews* was bad enough; but, it was a more *manly* mode of proceeding. I could easily have forgiven this. It is the employment of the thief-takers, and the endeavour to introduce into the theatre the terrors of *criminal law*; the mischievous, and I can hardly forbear calling it the *malicious*, attempt to brand and to prosecute as *rioters*, persons who expressed their disapprobation, in a place where to express disapprobation, without any limit, had always been the custom. It is this that sticks with me, and this it evidently is, which sticks with the public; or, at least, with every man, who knows how to estimate injuries.—Nevertheless, when I consider how greatly the English stage is indebted to Mr. Kemble; when I consider how much he has done towards preventing mock-sentiment and senseless sing-song from totally usurping the stage; when I reflect, that there is in this whole nation, hardly any person arrived at the years of maturity, who has not derived pleasure from the performances of the Kembles; and, when I consider the character of the English public, in whom vindictiveness was never yet even found towards their most cruel persecutors, I cannot help thinking, that a declaration on the part of Mr. Kemble, that the absolute right *without limitation*, of expressing disapprobation, shall never again be disputed, would become the ground of reconciliation and harmony.—There are, however, other points in dispute, and, upon these I shall now proceed to offer my opinion, repeating my observation, that I do it with very great diffidence, unacquainted, as I must be, with many of the circumstances, and that I should not venture to offer any opinion at all upon the subject, were it not quite impossible for me to make matters worse than they are.—First, as to the *Prices*, though the initials of Old Prices have become the signal of opposition, it is manifest, and was so from the beginning, that, if the *public*, properly so called, had had their fair share of the room in the House, the opposition on account of prices would very soon have ceased. It is, however, since the question has been so much agitated, worth while to inquire a little into the soundness of this ground of objection.

—From the first it struck me, as I observed in my last number, to be a violation of the rights of property *to attempt to compel people to sell entertainment at the price pointed out by the purchaser.* In a common case, there is no doubt at all that it would be so; but, then, in this case, comes the argument of the *patent* and of the *monopoly*. But, though this has weight; though it forms a distinction between this and common cases, it does not, after all that I have, since last week, attentively read upon the subject, appear to me to be conclusive against the managers. —A *monopoly* always means an *exclusive* leave to do whatever the grant allows of. Now, this is not the case in the present instance; for, not only *may* others obtain permission to act plays, but plays are actually exhibited by other persons at this very time, and in the same metropolis. —I shall be told, that the other persons have not such *convenient places* and such *good actors*; but, really, I cannot believe, that this will be seriously urged against the charge of a *shilling* more for the boxes, and *six-pence* more for the pit, at Covent Garden theatre; I cannot believe this at any rate. —It has been said, that there is now *only this one* theatre, worthy of the name, and, that, therefore, the public have *no choice*. But, whose fault is that? There is a patent for the other theatre. Why is not that rebuilt? And, if Covent Garden has, by accident, a real monopoly of the profit, it has also had a monopoly of the *expense*. It is impossible not to admire the exertions, which must have been made to rebuild that theatre in so short a space of time; and shall this nation, always so ready to extol and reward industry and enterprize, deny the merit upon this occasion? The *monopoly*, of which so much has been said, does, in fact, arise from the superior industry and enterprize of the managers of this theatre, and were it not for that industry and enterprize, the metropolis would now have no theatre at all. It often happens, that, of two persons of the same profession, or trade, living in the same place, one has all the business and the other none; but, would you, therefore, accuse the first of being a monopolist? —As to the *amount* of the advance in the price, it is really not worth attention. There is no person, who goes into a box, that can possibly think any thing of a *shilling*, nor can *sixpence* be worth a thought with any one going into the pit; and, as to what has been some-

times said about *the hardness of the time and the pressure of the taxes*, Good God! do not the managers and the proprietors of the theatre feel these in common with the rest of us? —It is notorious, that within the last 19 years almost every thing has doubled in price; and, though I allow, that the extension in the space of the theatre, and the consequent increase in the number of the audience, make up, in some degree, for alteration in the value of money; still, while *every thing* else is advancing in price, it does appear to me unreasonable, it does appear to me not like Englishmen, for us to object to so trifling an advance of price at the theatre. —Since the last nine or ten years the journeymen printers have made a stand for a rise in their wages. I have always said to my printers; "Get me my work done; if your journeymen will not work "at one price, give them another." I have always been against all measures of force, intended to prevent any man, or set of men, from getting what they can for their goods, or their labour, being convinced that every evil of that sort that every system of overcharge will soon be destroyed by its own hands. —I think, that the public have no right to inspect the *accounts* of play-house proprietors, any more than the accounts of any tradesman, who opens his shop door to all customers promiscuously; and, it was excessively foolish in the managers to make a *shew* (for it was nothing more) of exhibiting their accounts. I could not help thinking, upon seeing the name of Sir FRANCIS BARING in the list of inspectors, how evident it was that the *public* had at least *as good* a right to demand a look at *his accounts* for the last twenty years; to overhawl all his loans, &c. &c. when, I believe, they would find, that with much less labour, and with about a thousandth part, perhaps, of the intellect, of Mr. Kemble, he has amassed a great many more guineas than Mr. Kemble has faithings. —Oh! it is not; say what you will, in your anger; it is not, and you will not say that it is, just; that it is common sense; to grudge this gentleman, the comparatively trifling sum that he has so hardly earned, while you say not a word against masses of wealth, which the contractor, without any labour whatever, has derived from the public. —That *any* description of persons *in business*, persons who are daily conversant in buying and selling, should have objected to so trifling a rise in the

prices at the theatre, would have surprised me ; but, I was beyond measure surprised to see that objection made by the *proprietors of news-papers*, speaking in their own persons; because the year has not gone round yet, since we *raised the price of our papers*, upon the very grounds on which the Covent-garden managers have raised the price of their seats. We never thought of exhibiting our *accounts* to the public; nor did any man of us ever dream, that he had incurred any debt of *gratitude* to the public for whatever share of fortune he might have been able to amass.—These are my reasons for thinking, that, if certain other points were conceded by the managers, it would be unreasonable and unjust to endeavour to compel them to withdraw their New Prices. The advance is, in fact, beneath notice; and, I cannot help thinking, that, when the public give themselves time to reflect, there will no longer be any opposition upon this score.—But, with respect to that part of the *construction of the house*, which shuts out, drives back, and *degrades*, the people, that ought to be done away, and, notwithstanding Sir James Mansfield's opinion upon the subject, I think, that the audience have just as much right to hiss and to hoot at it as they have to hiss and hoot at a play or a performer or a scene that they dislike. It is an *innovation*, and an innovation, too, which must be offensive to the best description of people. It is an erection of distinctions, which did not before exist. This ground of objection ought, therefore, to be completely removed, and, until it be, the opposition will, in my opinion, be not only justifiable, but laudable.—1. Then the circle of *private boxes* should be done away, and the whole of the space thrown open to the whole of the public, as in the old theatre. 2. The "*pigeon holes*," as they are called, should be done away, and the shilling gallery thrown open.—3. All the *actions and prosecutions*, arising out of the row, should be dropped instantly.—4. A declaration from Mr. Kemble, in person, on the part of the whole of the managers, that they recognize in the fullest sense of the words, an absolute right in the audience or in any part of the audience, assembled at the theatre, to express, either by signs or noises of any sort, their disapprobation of any person or of any thing within the theatre.—This is what I think the managers ought to do; and, if they express their readiness to do all this, I am sure, that the opposition to the

prices will soon dwindle into nothing. Indeed, the whole thing will have been changed; for, the theatre will not, in fact, be the same; and therefore an advance of price may be very consistently justified, in this case, though, in the opinion of some persons, it could not be justified before.—Amongst the "*terms of peace*," as they were called, proposed some time ago, were included a *BEGGING OF PARDON* on the part of Mr. Kemble, and the *DISMISSION* of Mr. Brandon. This was excusable, perhaps, under the circumstances of the moment; but, I am sure, or, at least, I hope, that there is no Englishman, who, upon cool reflection, would propose such a thing. There is a meanness in the idea of inflicting vengeance upon Mr. Brandon, and especially as the party inflicting it would be always hidden from the party on whom it would be inflicted. And, as to bringing Mr. Kemble forward for the *express* purpose of *begging pardon*; to compel him to come forth like a culprit, and humble himself before a promiscuous assembly, including, no doubt, all his private enemies; to insist upon degrading any human being in such a way, as I am sure it is what no man with a drop of English blood in his veins would demand, so I hope, that, for the credit of the English stage, for the honour of theatrical talent and of literature, it is what nothing upon earth would induce Mr. Kemble to submit to.—Such is my view of this matter. As I said before, I must necessarily be greatly deficient in information, as to many points. I may be wrong in my judgment. But, of one thing I am certain, that it is impossible for the subject to be taken up by one with a mind more unbiassed. I will confess, that I am very anxious to see the row and turmoil put an end to. Its continuance can do no good, while by directing the public attention from more important matters, it may do, and is doing, much mischief. I wish most anxiously to see the matter settled by the good sense and justice and forgiveness of the people, and, above all things, that the *law* may have nothing to do with the matter. At any rate, as I said before, if the communication of my opinions, upon the subject, does no good, it cannot possibly do any harm.

MR. WARDLE.—I have not time to remark, at any length, myself upon the Trial (a report of which has just reached me) of MRS. CLARKE and the two WRIGHTS for a conspiracy against this gentleman; but, I cannot refrain from inserting the

following remarks, from the *Times* newspaper, which, upon this subject, expresses my sentiments.—The evidence on the Trial, instead of doing injury to the character of Mr. WARDLE, must entirely remove those doubts, with respect to his conduct, which some persons might before entertain.—The only thing for which Mr. Wardle is to blame, is, having ever suffered himself to be drawn into the meshes of the *law*, whose “glorious uncertainties” are, in some places, a standing toast.—Mr. Wardle, in getting into the secrets which he brought before the House of Commons, got, at the same time, into bad company. It was impossible to avoid that. The one was a consequence of the other; and the subsequent consequences have all been natural enough.—It is hard to convict of a *conspiracy*, which is mostly a sort of *constructive* crime; and, therefore, though I retain my former opinion of Mr. Wardle’s integrity, and think him now, more than ever, an object of public support, I agree with the *Times*, that the verdict of the jury appears to have been right. The jury were not to found their verdict upon their opinion of Mr. Wardle, but upon the *evidence* they received.—Let us now hear *THE TIMES*.—“In the most important Trial published in our Paper of yesterday, of the two WRIGHTS and MRS. CLARKE, for a conspiracy against Colonel WARDLE, a verdict was, as the country now knows, found for the Defendants. The attentive perusal of that Trial will enable any rational and candid man to form the most correct notion possible of the situation in which Colonel WARDLE is placed by the result of it. Before we enter briefly as we shall do into the consideration of the general merits of the cause, we shall observe upon a collateral circumstance; that Colonel WARDLE’s apparent inconsistency in subpoenaing Major Dodd upon the former Trial, then leaving the propriety of that Gentleman’s examination to the consideration of his Counsel, and afterwards complaining that he was not examined, is now satisfactorily explained. The Colonel was induced to dispense with the examination, from an assurance that his Counsel was of opinion that the Jury were with him, and that they would not find a verdict upon such evidence as that of Mrs. Clarke and Daniel Wright. Learning, however, afterwards, that Mrs. Clarke had sworn that

“Major Dodd was present when he (the Colonel) agreed to pay Wright, Mr. Wardle instantly revoked his consent to the dispensing with Major Dodd’s evidence. “But this change of circumstances not being sufficiently adverted to, the Major was not called, who would otherwise have sworn, as he has since done, that Colonel Wardle did *not*, in any way whatsoever, make himself answerable for Mrs. Clarke’s furniture. Having disposed of this subordinate circumstance, we now proceed to the merits of the question at large.—Colonel Wardle, by prosecuting (with the advice of his Counsel) the two Wrights and Mrs. Clarke for a conspiracy, certainly deprived them of the benefit of each other’s evidence; but it will be pretty clear that he did not gain much by this, as their previous testimony was unquestionably taken into consideration: and the state of the case, exclusive of Mr. Stokes’s evidence (which we shall consider by and bye), is precisely this, that we have on the one side the swearing of the two Wrights and Mrs. Clarke, that Colonel Wardle *did* make himself responsible for the goods in question; and on the other, the swearing of the Colonel himself, of Major Dodd, of Mr. Glennie, and of Sir Richard Phillips, that he did *not* make himself responsible. On which side the credibility of the evidence preponderates thus far is unquestionable. Colonel Wardle, Major Dodd, Mr. Glennie, &c. &c. to Mrs. Clarke and the two Wrights; the first, what we will not name, and the others, one, or both of them, of a character to *avow her respectability to brother tradesmen*.—The cause, however, henceforth assumes a different aspect: Mr. Stokes, the acting Attorney of Mrs. Clarke, who had advised Colonel Wardle to withhold Wright’s evidence from the House of Commons, because, as he himself says, he did not think Wright would *conceal* the truth; and, that even if he would, he did not think he had head enough to *evade the question*—this Mr. Stokes, and Colonel Wardle had an interview, from which interview they come away directly swearing in positive contradiction to each other. One of them is, therefore, certainly perjured; and there being no creature present but themselves, at this their conversation, that Being only who is present every where, knows which of them it is that speaks the truth. The

"Jury, however, in deciding between them, have, by their verdict, assigned the greater credit to Mr. Stokes: and we will add, too, that it is with the strictest legal propriety that they have done so: because being obliged to assign credit to one or other of the two, their relative situations must be taken into consideration. Who had the greatest interest to swerve from the truth? In every ostensible view, Colonel Wardle: of whose evidence, therefore, it was the lot, as both could not be believed, to be by the Jury rejected. But if he has been unfortunate upon the general issue, he has, at least, vindicated his character from a thousand slanders by which it has been aspersed. His evidence was given in the most manly, direct, and unembarrassed manner. For many months past, his enemies and their emissaries have been every where publishing the most atrocious falsehoods against him: he was to stand self-condemned of the grossest prevarication; of suborning evidence against the Duke of York, together with a variety of other calumnies. But where does any thing of this kind appear? The sum of his offending is this, that he has failed in his endeavours to prove the conspiracy against Mrs. Clarke and her upholsterer, by the unexpected production of the evidence of her Attorney.—Before we conclude these remarks, we shall make an observation or two upon the different degrees of credibility supposed to be assigned, by Colonel Wardle's friends, to Mrs. Clarke's evidence, as given in the House of Commons against the Duke of York, and in a Court of Justice against the Duke of York's accuser. The truth is, as Mr. Whitbread stated, that for this woman's evidence in the House of Commons there was not the least occasion, if her written documents, of *uncontradicted authenticity*, could have been obtained without her personal production of them. With these documents, the Charges against his Royal Highness would have been just as fully substantiated as they ever were substantiated, *even supposing she had never spoken a word.*"—I cannot help adding one remark. What a subject of joy it must be to the friends and defenders of the Duke of York, that, according to their own opinions, real or affected, they have now **PROVED Mrs. Clarke to be a most excellently TRUE WIT-**

NESS! What a subject of joy to them and their royal patron! This is the very woman, who, in the House of Commons, the Attorney General declared not to be believed upon any account whatever! It must be very consoling to his Royal Highness to see, that his *Darling*, who was, by his friends, called by all manner of foul names, is now become a woman of *undoubted veracity!* We, who were looked upon as political enemies of the Duke, only insisted, that her evidence was entitled to some weight, when strongly corroborated by *indubitable* testimony; but, his friends have now made her out a good witness of herself. It is time, therefore, for us to read her evidence before the House of Commons over again. It is valuable now. It cannot now, by the friends of the Duke, be called in question.—The payment of 10,000 pounds for the suppression of *her book* was asserted by the counsel. In fact, this is pretty notorious; and it follows, of course, that she is now in *friendship* with those who gave her that *ten thousand pounds*. Lord Ellenborough is reported to have found fault with the counsel for saying that the *ten thousand pounds* came out of the *public money*, because no *proof* of it was brought forward. Very good; but, if it be true, that ten thousand pounds were given her, what sort of people must those be, who would give her the sum; what must their actions have been; and at what would they stick?

—W^M. COBBETT.

Botley, 14th Dec. 1809

* * I am happy to hear that a Public Meeting will be held at the Crown and Anchor Tavern, Strand, on Monday next, for the purpose of expressing the sense entertained of the many, independent and undaunted conduct of Mr. Wardle, and to consider the propriety of immediately entering into a Subscription to indemnify him against all losses, charges, expences he may have sustained, or liable to, in consequence of his exertions in the public behalf, during the last Session of Parliament.

CHANGE OF MINISTRY.

SIR; It is not an uninteresting subject of speculation, to remark the abatement to which men of talents sometimes bring themselves to be led. This is remarkable in every department of s

but still more so in politics. Where these errors are involuntary, they are to be lamented; but where they are spread for the purposes of faction, they are utterly detestable.—I have been led into this train of thinking, Mr. Cobbett, by reading your observations, in your Register of last week, in reply to the Editor of the Morning Chronicle. If you can apply them to yourself, you are at full liberty. You conclude the observations in question, by saying, you pause for a reply. Mr. Cobbett, you shall have it; and if, as you assert, you have the fairness to give to the public the reasonings of your adversary, I shall make your own Register the vehicle of your refutation.

To such individuals as take the trouble of thinking for themselves, the fallacy of your assertions will require no exposure; they can tear off the gloss with which you have covered them, and view your errors in their native absurdity. But your Register is read by too many, who are content to take both facts and reasonings upon trust; and who are, therefore, apt to be deluded by bold assertion and shallow sophistry. In attempting to prove that a Change of Ministry would be of no real benefit to the nation, you dogmatically lay down ten questions, to which you demand a categorical reply, and which contain the ostensible grounds, upon which you form your conclusion. I shall waive my power of putting a simple "negative" upon your right, as an individual, to propose such questions. I shall likewise make no observations upon the fairness of your summary method of proceeding, in condemning the motives of high and honourable men, from the unauthorised answers of the editor of a Newspaper. The questions you propose are, at all events, of so complicated a nature, that the answers to them would be more voluminous than either the limits of your Register or of a Newspaper would admit of. But, Sir, who constituted these questions the criterion of the utility of these men to their country? Or even supposing a negative put upon the whole of them, shew that a Change of Ministry can be of no benefit to the nation. This link in your argument you have unluckily neglected to fill up; but, until it is supplied, your conclusion cannot be legitimate. But surely you could not be serious, Mr. Cobbett, when you proposed such questions to the Editor of the Morning Chronicle. You must, I think, have been sensible that they

are questions to which neither he nor any other private individual could reply. They should have been addressed to those to whose principles and conduct they relate, and to which they only could reply, collectively and in a body. Though I thus profess not to answer the questions you have proposed, you will find I touch, in the following observations, upon some of the subjects to which they relate. Before, however, I proceed further, I shall state how far we are agreed.—We both of us admit, that the present ministry are a body of men, who derive respectability neither from rank or talents: that their principles are as abominable as their imbecility contemptible: that their policy has been ruinous to the country, and has rendered us in several instances the laughing-stock of Europe; that they have proved themselves incapable, by their want of the necessary qualifications, of guiding with wisdom and decision, the affairs of the nation at a crisis like the present: and that they are worthy, from their principles and their conduct, of being driven forth from their situations, with the scorn and indignation of the country. But you assert, that though their opponents be men of more enlarged views, and infinitely superior in talents to the present ministry; their principles are at bottom equally depraved, and they will do nothing for the real benefit of their country; or, for the sake of accuracy, to state your proposition in your own terms, you maintain that "with respect to their views and intentions, as to all those matters in which the people have an interest, the two factions are perfectly upon a level; and that, therefore, any Change of Ministry, which should produce merely the shifting the salaries from the Ins to the Outs, would be useless to the nation." It certainly is, Mr. Cobbett, an intuitive proposition, that the mere shifting of salaries is of no importance to the nation; and, in this view, few will be so bold as to put a negative upon so well-founded an assertion. But, in the present instance, I insist this would not be the case; and that the nation, by the Change of Ministry, would enjoy many and important advantages. A few of these I shall proceed to point out. The nation might depend, in the first place, on an entire change of the external policy by which the present cabinet has been, and still continues to be guided. We would not have so constant a succession of Secret Expeditions, nor have these expeditions so

constantly ending in disaster and disgrace. We would not have the resources of the country so shamefully misapplied, nor our brave soldiers exposed to a pestilence, more destructive than the sword. They would ever keep in mind, that the object of all war was peace, and would not blindly prosecute a hopeless or unprofitable hostility. With regard to your questions, Mr. Cobbett, relative to the diminution of the taxes, the present situation of our affairs is not such as to admit of it. The ministry may find it necessary to equip fleets, and fit out armaments; and in that case, from the complicated expences such equipments involve, I believe no serious diminution could immediately take place. But happy, Sir, is the people, who can buy with their money, that safety which other nations purchase with their blood; and who, by a per centage on their income, enjoy a cheaply bought security. On this we might depend, that should our rulers find it practicable to obtain the blessings of peace, we should then have a diminution of our burdens; but should war still continue, we would be able proudly to say, in your own words, "That, though the loss and sufferings of our army have been great, they have not fought and bled and suffered in vain. They have returned, though few in number, perhaps, covered with glory, not with disgrace. The King of Great Britain may hold up his conquests, as the price of his peoples' sacrifices. He may say to them that, if he has called upon them for great services, he has given them in exchange perfect security. The people of Great Britain dread no enemy; they are haunted by no fears of invasion; they are in a settled state of things." These, Mr. Cobbett, are the glowing colours in which you have portrayed the situation of the people of France; and a Change of Ministry is the only means by which these advantages can be rendered our own. The safety of the nation would be rendered more secure, by bestowing on the Catholics, those privileges which, as citizens and freemen, they have a right to demand. And were they, in the whole course of their administration, to achieve nothing but this single act, the nation would derive (deny it, Mr. Cobbett, if you can) material and important advantage, from a Change of Ministry. I shall proceed but little further. I have already pointed out some benefits, and could anticipate many more, to be derived from the expulsion of the No-Popery gentlemen

from office. What their conduct would be, in any of the instances you choose to mention, it is not incumbent on me to point out; suffice it to say, we should be governed by men with wisdom to discern, and uprightness to carry into execution, those measures that would ensure the prosperity of the country. We should find among them no Wellesleys, no Castlereaghs. Ministerial influence would not shelter corruption, nor the great ends of justice be baffled by a ministerial majority. If these advantages are worth nothing, your conclusion is just; if they are of importance to the people, it is erroneous. I, too, pause for a reply. PHOCION.

30th Nov. 1809.

TO MAJOR CARTWRIGHT.

From the Author of "An Impartial Examination of Sir Francis Burdett's Plan of Parliamentary Reform."

Sir;—You did justice to my sentiments when, in your letter published in Mr. Cobbett's Register of the 14th of October, you expressed a belief, that you would ensure my thanks by convincing me I had misunderstood a fundamental principle of the British government. Unconnected with any party, and, as I hope, superior to the little vanity which is offended at being taught, I feel, and at all times am ready to express my obligation to those who would rectify my mistakes, or extend my knowledge: while as yet but little known to fame, and almost at the commencement of my political career, I cannot but feel gratified that Major Cartwright should, through the medium of a widely circulated, and justly celebrated journal, have publicly addressed me on the important subject of Parliamentary Representation. These being the sentiments by which I am actuated, I feel confident you will do me further justice to believe, that it is no adherence to a sect, no sentiment of humbled self-importance closing my understanding at the truth, which renders me, notwithstanding what you have urged, the unsolicited advocate of Triennial Parliaments.

From what you have urged, it does indeed appear, that annual Parliaments conformable to the spirit of our ancient laws. But the question rests not there. The ancient laws which compose the British Constitution possess no intrinsic, or mystical excellence—they are but a

to an end, they are valuable only as they conduce to human happiness. Hence, in every question of Political Reform, the statute book is not our ultimate appeal—it derives its authority from public good, and this good, as I shall now endeavour briefly to explain, requires that we should prefer Triennial Parliaments.

And first I must remark that Parliamentary Representation and Political Liberty are by no means convertible terms—they stand for ideas which are not only perfectly distinct, but which have no necessary connexion with each other. Political Liberty, is, “the freedom from all restraint except what redeems its partial inconvenience by a balance of public benefit.” Parliamentary Representation is something very different—something which may be conceived to exist, in the utmost perfection, where liberty is infringed by a thousand unnecessary institutions. In a country where suffrage should be universal, and elections annual, the predominant religious sect might (and in an age of bigotry certainly would) load their fellow citizens of an opposite persuasion with the most oppressive exclusions and inquisitorial pains; while if the science of wealth was ill understood, a few interested traders, under the pretence of encouraging commerce, might obtain a monopoly against the public. On the contrary, in an absolute monarchy, a prince of patriotic feelings, and enlightened understanding, might establish perfect toleration, and abolish most of those regulations, which without benefiting the public, fetter the exertions of individual man.—Thus we see that oppression may exist in conjunction with the most perfect system of representation, and that a considerable share of liberty may obtain where representation is unknown.

But though Parliamentary Representation is not identical with Political Liberty, it is, particularly in great communities, the means by which liberty can best be perfected and secured. Now it is evident that liberty will ever be secured and perfected, in proportion as those, to whom the legislative functions are deputed, possess wisdom to discover, and virtue to abolish the restraints which fetter the individual without benefiting the public. Hence the great end of representation is to return talent and integrity to the legislative assembly: and if it can be proved that this end would be better attained by triennial, than by annual parliaments, then triennial ought to be preferred.

If Parliaments were rendered annual, the representative would be brought more under the controul of his constituents. Now as it is impossible that a representative should, on every political question, coincide in opinion with those by whom he is returned, bringing him so completely under their controul would hold out to him a perpetual temptation to speak and to act, not in conformity to his own sentiments, but in compliance with the prejudices of those whose votes were to be conciliated against the approaching election. The moral conduct of men is influenced more by the temptations, than by the duties of their stations. Though some might be found, whom no fear of losing their seats could induce to surrender their principles, yet, if members sat but for a twelvemonth, the great majority would, in the senate, have an eye to their next return, and deliver electioneering harangues rather than deliberate for the good of the country.

To talent annual parliaments would be still less friendly. The person who compromised his sentiments, in order to conciliate his constituents against the next election, would gradually impair the powers of his understanding, and yield credence to the prejudices, and contracted notions which he habitually espoused; while he who gave utterance to the deductions of an enlightened mind, and unfolded those liberal principles, on the observance of which the prosperity of nations depends, would shock the prejudices of the ignorant, encounter the hostility of those who profit by monopolies and exclusions, and, on the next election, would be sent back to a private station.

In triennial parliaments these evils would be in a great measure obviated. Freed from a perpetual dependance on their constituents, representatives would have fewer temptations to surrender their principles, in order to secure the ensuing election: while the length of time between each election, would allow passion to cool, and prejudice to loose its hold; would enable electors to experience, before the next return, the benefits of those measures, which at first their ignorance condemned; and would thus preserve them from the pernicious, and degrading mistake, of preferring the turbulent adventurer to the enlightened master of legislative science. Triennial parliaments would not, indeed, bring with them that visionary perfection which no human institution is permitted to

2 G

attain. They would not entirely remove the temptation to sacrifice principle at the shrine of prejudice, nor, in every instance, ensure the election to political wisdom; but they seem to constitute the middle path between two destructive precipices; to be the only means of avoiding, on one hand, that devotion to the court, which, when parliaments are septennial, enables a minister, however incapable and corrupt, to command a majority in the House of Commons; and, on the other hand, of shunning that excess of popular influence which would exclude, as we are told is the case in America, integrity and talent from the administration of public affairs, and return to the legislature whatever passion or prejudice happened to be the epidemic of the day.

Thus, Sir, I have stated, as clearly as I am able, my reasons for preferring triennial parliaments. Should you have any thing to urge, either against the soundness of the principles I have assumed, or the justness of the conclusions I have drawn, your objections shall be weighed with the patient impartiality natural to one who is solicitous to ascertain the truth, and impressed with the importance of unanimity of sentiment among those who advocate reform.

London, 30th November, 1809.

THE EDINBURGH REVIEW.

SIR,—You and your Correspondents have treated an article in one of the late numbers of the *Edinburgh Review* on the subject of the Reform of Parliament with a severity not more than it apparently deserves. I am convinced, however, that you were wrong in supposing it written to serve the party you conceive the author of that work to be attached to. I believe it to contain the genuine sentiments, or more properly the dreams, of the gentleman who wrote the article. It appears, I grant, most extraordinary at first sight, that a man of education and abilities (and such the writer certainly is) should at this time, lay down such positions as, That the government of this country is now substantially vested in the House of Commons; that the house is composed of those distinct classes sufficiently balanced who represent, 1. The King, or the executive government, 2. The Aristocracy, and 3. the great body of the people. And though this be not according to the original principles of the constitution, happily all that is good in

those principles is preserved and subsists; nay, the voice of all ranks of the community is now heard in the house of commons to better effect than according to the old way of keeping the several branches of the legislature distinct. The wonder, that such a man should write and think thus, ceases, when we reflect that one may have had the best education and possess great abilities, while he is completely ignorant of what is passing in the world. It is impossible that any man of honesty and common sense, who had paid attention to the proceedings of the house of commons for the last ten or twenty years, could have written the article in question, which betrays the most extreme ignorance and self-conceit. In opposition to the theory he considers so beautiful, may it not be said, that though the voice of the people sounds, it is not listened to, and is often drowned. It is strongly suspected (though our theorist seems not to be aware of it) that, besides his three classes, there is a fourth, and not the least numerous, which cares neither for king nor lords nor people in the aggregate, thinking only of themselves and their own selfish views; and as these can be promoted only by the ministers for the time being, it gives the executive government a preponderance which sinks the party of the people to nothing. The way by which this class procure access to the house is very apparent, and the first object of the reformers is to exclude it. Granting that there is such a class, the *Edinburgh Reviewer* on his own principles must be for excluding it. Instead, therefore, of a fanciful system, the Reviewer should attend to facts, but that is not the custom of fine writers like him. How destructive of his fine spun work would it be to give a list of the members of the house of Commons who voted in the case of the Duke of York?—But you are wellaware, Mr. Cobbett, that a Review cannot be the work of one man; and that one article must not be in flat contradiction to another; yet, if you carefully attend to the *Edinburgh Review*, I believe you will discover that there are gentlemen concerned in it, who entertain very different sentiments from the author of the article you have commented on, with regard to the house of commons. In the last number, is an article on the Conduct of the War, from the most masterly pen, and lest you should not have the work before you, I beg leave to transcribe part of the conclusion, believing you will agree

with me, that it cannot have too much publicity: and, therefore, that you will give this a place in a work so universally read as your Register.—After stating the particulars of our famous expeditions to Spain and Walcheren during the present year, the writer says: “After all these failures, “confessed, the only excuse of ministers, “the only attempt they make to regain “the confidence of the people, is to tell “us, ‘That the king has reigned fifty “years.’ They have ruined our allies; “they have failed in every plan; they “have brought us through slaughter and “disgrace, loaded with ignominy and “weighed down almost with intolerable “burdens, to the very brink of destruction, “but ‘the king is old and has reigned “‘half a century.’—It now remains to “be seen whether that parliament which “stands in no need of reformation, which “speaks the sentiments of the country, “which is a fair representation of the people of England, will be satisfied with this “set-off, and oncemore acquit the ministers. “We cannot anticipate the decision, but “if unhappily every measure and every “minister should again be covered by the “approbation of parliament, then we venture to predict, not that the government “is acquitted, but that parliament stands “condemned, and we should most unwillingly be compelled to appear in “the foremost ranks of those who acknowledge that they are convinced and converted. It is needless to disguise the matter; a refusal to punish the authors “of our misfortunes can only mean one of “two things, either that there has been no “blame incurred, or that it is inexpedient “to declare it, because such a resolution “would drive the guilty persons from the government. In the one case the parliament will shew, that it is not the representative of the country; in the other, “we shall have a conclusive proof that “the ministers of the crown are immoveable. Responsibility will be no longer “even a name, and the people will thenceforth recognize in the present council of “the nation, not the guardian of their interests, and the champion of their rights, “but a well contrived instrument of taxation. The consequences of such a decision will be productive of incalculable “mischief; it will complete the alienation “of the country from the government, “and shame away the boldest defenders “of the present system.”—I am yours,
Nov. 30, 1809. T. R.

SPECIAL JURIES.

Sir; As every topic which relates to the jurisprudence of this country, must be regarded of serious import, I should feel myself inexcusably negligent, were I to pass over lightly any thing affecting so interesting a subject as Trial by Jury; I therefore sit down to answer the observations which your correspondent, S: has made upon my letter of the 30th September. Though I do not discern any argument of your ingenious correspondent, which at all inclines me to alter the opinion I had formed and expressed respecting the present organization of Special Juries, I am glad the discussion has been renewed, because I am satisfied that nothing so effectually tends to the correction of abuses, as the frequently bringing them under public consideration. What I have stated in my former letter, appears to me, and I think I shall satisfy your correspondent, is strictly tenable. In insisting that the persons composing ordinary Juries, are not of the description intended for the office of Special-Jurymen, I ought not, and I trust am not considered, to be aspersing or complaining of Common Juries; I merely wish to discuss the subject upon principle, and upon that distinction which I contend the constitution has pointed out; and in so doing, I disclaim all intention of maligning any class of persons. I mention this to prevent an unfair prejudice being excited, at the expence of the understanding. I must again premise, that from time immemorial it has been a custom in this country to try causes of nicety before a select tribunal, called a Special Jury; and that this privilege, which it depended upon the discretion of judges to grant, though seldom or never refused, was by an act of the legislature given to the subject as a matter of right, and that it is therefore a part of the constitution, that every man, who so chooses, shall have his cause tried by a Special Jury. The expence attending the exercise of this right, including the sum paid to the jurymen for their attendance, is, I believe, about ten pounds. The question, therefore, to be solved, is, what class of persons the legislature intended should compose a Special Jury; it being perfectly clear, that such class is to be contra-distinguished from the persons serving on Common Juries. Now, Sir, shopkeepers, among others, are called upon to perform the functions of ordinary Jury-

men. Will your correspondent contend that property alone will qualify a common Jury-man for discharging the office of a special-one; and that the mere adventitious circumstance of his having by his own industry, or the liberality of others, acquired a freehold estate of the annual value of 20*l.*, creates in him immediately all the necessary qualifications for the exercise of such a duty. If your correspondent cannot successfully so contend, then is it clear, that a shopkeeper with such an appendage of property, is not the person qualified for, or intended to be, a Special Jury-man. But, Sir, if this question could be considered still problematical, it would cease to be so, when it is remembered, that Special Jury-men are denominated esquires, and that a tradesman with the before mentioned acquirement, is not entitled to such an appellation. We are not now regarding the daily abuse of titles in common life, but an esquire according to its legal import and definition. This brings me to the position which I contended for in my former letter, viz., that it is an abuse of office to class as Special Jury-men, such persons as I have already noticed: and I repeat, that if sheriffs continue such a mal-arrangement, as the continuance of the usage of their predecessors, I hold it to be an imperious duty in them, to add to the names of the Jury, their respective trades, and the places where such trades are carried on. If such persons are to fill the office of a Special Jury, it is at least fitting that every man should know who he is selecting for superior probity, nicer talents, and more refined sentiments of honour and virtue, should such be his object in choosing such a tribunal. Your correspondent objects, Mr. Cobbett, that my observations are not well founded, and that I have not considered the subject deep enough, because, as he asserts, the trading part of the community is by far the most enlightened and the most moral; and that their verdict upon all occasions, will be more satisfactory than the verdict of such persons, as I have contended ought to be summoned on Special Juries. To meet the arguments of this gentleman, the subject must be divided into two branches; the first, comprehending the intention of the legislature in respect of the organization of Special Juries; and the second, how far the privilege afforded the subject, can be said to be beneficial to him. Upon the first division of the subject, I have al-

ready stated my sentiments fully, and I should hope satisfactorily; I shall now shortly say a few words upon the second. Your correspondent complains of the depravity of the men of fortune of the present day; and he contrasts the qualifications of a modern gentleman, with those of a man formed under the admirable precepts of Mr. Locke, as given in his Treatise on Education. I lament, Mr. Cobbett, equally with your correspondent, that a finished education, and the manners of a gentleman, should be yielded victims to the "parade and pageantry of a Whip-Club," and "the attitudes of a Bruiser." I exceedingly lament, Sir, that your correspondent, in such language, should have so pertinently described the inglorious pursuits of the age in which we live; but, Mr. Cobbett, much as I am reluctantly compelled to accede to the censures of your correspondent, I cannot go along with him so far as to imagine for an instant, that 48 men of fortune cannot be found in so populous a county as Middlesex, or indeed in any other, of superior education, talents, probity, and domestic virtues, to so many shopkeepers. I cannot for one moment imagine this, nor do I think the fact will at all bear out your correspondent in the observation. However the habits and amusements of modern life may tend to corrupt the morals, and depreciate the understanding, it must not be forgotten, that the son of a man of fortune has at least the ground-work, the elements of an education; which it is the lot of very few, indeed, of the inferior classes of society to possess: It must not be forgotten, that he is, in his early life, disciplined under masters of acknowledged abilities, and unsullied virtue; and that he has instilled into him from the earliest period, by the perusal of scholastic treatises, sentiments both honourable and liberal: that he has at least a foundation laid, upon which to raise a most admirable and finished superstructure; and when we consider, that it is not the quality of human nature to be suddenly and easily vitiated; that "*nemo repente turpissimus*;" I cannot coincide in the sentiment, which would exclude the utility of a Special Jury, and contend for so valuable an institution being worse than obsolete, on the sole ground of there being none qualified to fill the office. For these reasons, Sir, it is I contend, that the Trial by a Special Jury, will be found, in many cases, to promote, better than by any other, the ends of justice; and that the pre-

sent organization is not according to the spirit of the constitution, but defeats every useful purpose for which a Special Jury is chosen. I do not, Sir, impute any thing interested in the observations of your correspondent, and I am persuaded an equal degree of ingenuousness will preclude him from entertaining such an opinion of mine. I am, Sir, &c., W. F. S.
Lincoln's Inn, Nov. 30.

ON BANKING.

SIR; I make no apology in addressing you upon this subject, because I know it is exceedingly interesting to you, and to the public. To reach their eyes, the *Weekly Register* is probably the best medium. I shall be very concise, although the consequences of this system requires great amplification and illustration. I shall state the advantages, the disadvantages, and how the present evils of it may be remedied.—I. The first and greatest advantage is the substitution of a paper medium for one of gold and silver; a very cheap instrument for a very costly one. The substitution of paper for the precious metals, when Banks are under proper regulations, does not add to the amount of money in circulation, but acts altogether as a substitute for gold and silver, and is not super-added to what previously was in circulation. By this substitution the precious metals have become useless, as an instrument of circulation at home, and are therefore sent abroad as an article of merchandize; and, in returns, are added to the active capital of the country. This, no doubt, constitutes no small part of the national wealth. This accession, however, of active capital, through the exportation of specie, has been pushed too far. The security of the paper is lessened by it; but the evil is capable of a remedy, as I shall shew hereafter.—II. The second advantage arising from this system is, that industry and commerce is greatly promoted, both by the Bank of England and the unincorporated Banks, by making judicious loans to deserving men, who sometimes, with little or no capital, have, by a proper use of such credits, advanced their own, and the national wealth. It is owing to this advantage, in conjunction with the preceding, that has enabled the merchants of the United States to extend their commerce, and acquire that wealth, which they so suddenly have done; and not, as the author of "*War in Disguise*" attributes

it, to the covering of neutral property.—III. A third advantage, which is practised in Scotland, and probably by most of the unincorporated Banks in England, is the allowance of interest on deposits. This enables the merchant to do more business, as well as the Banks, because they, by this means, receive greater deposits; and the expence of the merchant being less, he can afford to extend his trade; he need not keep money by him unemployed to answer occasional demands.—IV. Under judicious regulations, a fourth advantage to this system arises by permitting a free competition, with the same advantages to all. By a free competition, greater security is given to all; for no one will then be able to extend their notes in circulation out of a proper proportion to their capital. Whereas, if the whole business were confined to one institution, that institution, with a small capital, might fill the whole circulation; and if, in addition to that, parliament makes a statute, which enables this institution to dispense with answering their notes with the precious metals, it can do the whole business with no capital at all; and, consequently, with no security at all.—The disadvantages of the Banking system are: I. That when Banks are unrestrained in the emission of notes of all descriptions, they will necessarily banish all the precious metals from circulation; and becoming useless for that purpose, are sent abroad. This is the cause of the embarrassment the country now suffers under from these institutions; it is the cause of the depreciation of the circulating medium; there is not specie enough to answer occasional demands.—II. A second disadvantage is, that when Banks are under even the best regulations, the paper medium cannot, in the nature of things, be so perfectly secure as the precious metals; the effect being to banish them, they cannot instantaneously be recalled. To do this, it is necessary to wait the slow operation of commerce. A country, by wanting this security, might suffer infinitely more than the acquisition of active capital has been of advantage. The idea of preventing the exportation of specie by statute is perfectly absurd and impossible, and unworthy of an enlightened legislature.—III. In time of war especially every wise government ought to have its wealth and credit and the property of every individual supported by the best possible basis; and undoubtedly a nation so very wealthy as this country ought to

have none other than a gold and silver circulating medium, even in times of peace. It is an object of the first consequence to consolidate its wealth; to be prepared to meet events, especially in time of war; to prevent fluctuations in exchanges; and, indeed, to give a stable price to every article of exchange, of commerce.—The depreciation of the circulating medium may be dated from the time the Bank of England was dispensed from the payment of specie for their notes; from that moment the decline has indeed been slow but certain. This was done in the administration of Mr. Pitt, and was equally a proof of the temerity and ignorance of that minister in this branch of political economy. That crisis was brought on by the Bank's issuing too much paper, and the most obvious of all remedies was to oblige them to call a part of it in again, and to restrain certain notes from being again issued. To remedy the evils of the present circulating medium is certainly possible, and very important; for, unless a remedy is applied, it is difficult to perceive how the credit of Bank paper, or that of the nation, can be supported. I will not say it is not possible; but I am much mistaken if that of the nation is not now supported by the Sinking Fund. In proportion to the depreciation of paper will be the increase of emission, until the depreciation will be as great as that of Denmark, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and will end as they will probably end: the immediate cause of their depreciation, is the overflowing the circulation, without there being provided any means of redeeming any part of it, as is the case in this country with the Banks; and when our government redeems any part of its debt, it is altogether impossible to realize it in specie. It is worthy of remark, in this place, that the government of France sees the errors of its neighbours, takes advantage of them, and avoids them. That government appears to possess all the intelligence, and all the wickedness, of all the governments that have ever existed. It has never been remarked by our statesmen, but undoubtedly one of the principal causes of the success of the French arms, has been the wretched state of the circulating medium of those nations which France has combatted. Paper, to any amount, is issued to supply the necessities of their governments; no method arranged for its redemption, or to controul its depreciation. The faith of their governments is

sufficient, in time of peace, to give it some value. A war with France is threatened; to prepare for this event, great issues are necessary. A battle ensues, and, as has been commonly the case, the arms of France bear off the victory. Immediately the credit of the circulating medium is nearly destroyed; gold and silver are banished; the revenues and loans and resources of the country being payable only in this paper, is of no value. The government consequently cannot rally its army; they have no supplies, or if rallied, so feebly is it done, that it is only to be defeated again. It was so, this present year, with Austria. It was so, in 1806, with Prussia; the Obligations of that government fell 90 per cent. under par after the battle of Jenna. The currency of Denmark is now 75 per cent. below par; the French, in a single battle, would overthrow that monarchy. In Russia, an empire whose natural resources are second to none on earth, the silver ruble is worth three paper ones of the same nominal amount; and scarce a silver one to be seen. In 18 months, in all probability, the paper ones will be worth nothing; and when they are so, Napoleon will soon seek an apology for war with Alexander; and Russia is found without resources. Alexander is sent to Moscow. The government of that country appear to be too ignorant to see the evil, or, at any rate, to remedy it; and probably, if they had the wisdom to do it, Napoleon would enjoin a different project. Amidst this wretched state of the currency of the Continent, France and Holland have theirs of the precious metals; subject to no mismanagement or depreciation. Will not England take warning of her neighbours? Is not this a lesson for our government? The exchange between this country and Ham-burgh has been from 20 to 30 per cent. against us, for the last seven months. This must be certainly owing to the depreciation of our currency; for our exports to the continent have been many times greater than our imports. The quantity of colonial produce and British manufactures smuggled from Heligoland to the continent has been truly astonishing. Instead, therefore, of the exchange being against us, it ought to have been in our favour; and no doubt would have been so, had the currency of this country maintained its nominal value. It is true, the remittances, in aid of Austria, have had their influence on the exchange; but these would never have

been made to the disadvantage of the country, had our currency been of the precious metals, or had there been no depreciation of paper. At this moment the exchange is getting better, but this must be attributed to the remittances made by the Americans, who have got their cargoes into Tonningen, and so to Hamburg; of which there has been between one and two hundred sail. Those persons who wish the national debt dissolved, will probably be gratified, if the present state of the Banking system goes on several years longer; and if this was the only evil to be apprehended, this prospect might honestly be a source of sincere congratulation. But it must be remembered, that not the national debt only would become of nominal value, but the circulating medium, the representative of the whole wealth of the empire, would become so; it could no longer perform its functions. There would be no substitute; the precious metals are abroad, and can only be recalled by the slow operations of commerce. In the mean time we have an enemy thundering at the gates; he has nine times the physical strength that we have. We are become his only enemy. He has been watching for this crisis. He knows the destruction of this country is the only way to consolidate the present order of things in France; this alone will give perpetuity to his usurpation. But while this empire remains unimpaired, his death will be the signal for another revolution. In the distracted state of the finances of this country, which seems to be threatened, all his energies will be put forth. Confidence among ourselves, how could it continue? The body-politic in a convulsion, without nerves! and more than this, I leave for the imagination of your readers.—The declension of our commerce abroad has been certain, but the depreciation of our currency has been greater; and, therefore the nominal amount of the revenues have increased, while the real value has diminished. The government and the nations are under this delusion, they think we are prospering while we are declining. It is analogous to the patient under a consumption, he believes, till the moment of his death, he is getting better and better. While every mail brings us accounts of new obstructions to our commerce, the government certainly ought to second the drawing in of so much of it (since there are new hazards to its ex-

tension,) as will place our national wealth upon its surest possible basis, which can only be done by substituting the precious metals for the present currency. This brings me to the last consideration, the remedy to be applied to heal the present evils; or rather the mode best adapted to restore to the country the precious metals, or to make paper have the true representation of them.—To expect to abolish the monopoly of Banking, and to have established a regular competition in incorporated companies, is certainly absurd to calculate upon; nor do I know, since the competition is already very great from the unincorporated companies, which must be nearly as efficient, that it is indispensable. Indeed I think it is not.—It is evident, that as the precious metals are banished abroad, should Parliament pass an act obliging the Bank of England to answer their notes with specie, it would be altogether impossible for the Bank to comply. To oblige them, and all other Banks, to curtail their emissions, would be a law, that might so easily be evaded and so difficult to enforce, that this likewise would be inoperative; nor if it could be enforced, would it probably answer the purpose of recalling the precious metals into the country. The only judicious remedy then, is to prescribe by act of parliament, the circulation first of notes of certain descriptions. It must not be by obliging the Banks to call in their largest notes; for this would be making way only for those of other denominations. But it could not be so, if it were enacted that first one pound notes and under should no longer circulate; for then, that part of the currency which is now of necessity filled with notes of this description, must of necessity be filled with specie. It is very probable that half the money in circulation is money of this denomination; but no doubt a great part of it acts in the office of notes of a higher denomination; of course notes of a higher denomination would be immediately issued, to fill the void occasioned by drawing away the one pound notes; but for all that sum which circulates of necessity in the office of one pound notes, must be, could only be supplied by specie: and no doubt this sum is immense, probably it may be one quarter of the whole circulation. The Banks would be compelled to curtail their discounts, to answer for the one pound notes flowing in upon them. The merchants would certainly be distressed

for money; but this is the gentlest remedy the disease admits of; and perhaps it would be necessary for the government to stand and aid the Bank with new coined guineas to relieve the pressure; and in doing this they would have no cause to fear the guineas would be sent abroad, for they would instantly be absorbed into the circulation to take the place of the one pound notes; from which it will be difficult, nay impossible to draw them. After the community had recovered a little from this distress, which might perhaps be 3 or 4 months; then let the act proscribe two pound notes in like manner; again, after a suitable season, three pound notes; then four, and so on to at least twenty-five pound notes, and all between these and fifty, &c. &c. So that there must be restored to the circulation all the specie necessary to make exchanges with under twenty-five pound notes. It would probably take twelve months, with successful foreign commerce, to relieve this absorption of so much of the real, for the factitious, wealth of this country. After this quantity of specie got into circulation, no doubt the Bank of England would find no difficulty in answering with specie all the demands that would be made upon them; and consequently all other Banks could do so too. When, therefore, they should be obliged to resume their answering all demands in this way, there would then be no difference between the value of paper and bullion, because bullion could instantly be realized for it. The exchange between London and Hamburg would without doubt be in favour of England. This then, in time of peace, would be a happy state of the currency of the country. It might with great safety rest here. But a country so wealthy as this, and so frequently at war, ought to have no paper circulation. The immense demand for specie to support foreign expeditions, will occasionally cause paper credit to vibrate, and sometimes weaken it; but if there were no paper in circulation, of course all the revenues of the country would be received in specie, and the government in consequence would find no embarrassment in collecting what would be wanted to support these expeditions, and the banks would feel nothing of them. Is not this a most desirable state of things? Is it not, in these evil times, the first obligation of the Government thus to consolidate the national wealth? The energies of the country could not then be shaken. It

is true it could only be done by diminishing in a like degree, the active capital of the country; but what would be lost to commerce would be of small consideration, when compared to the greater additional security and strength the country would derive from it. If this remedy be not pursued, it needs no great perspicuity to see that the present currency must suffer a continued depreciation, and what is lost by depreciation must be supplied by additional emissions until * * * * *

* * * I have extended these observations much beyond my intention when I commenced. A great deal yet remains to be said; but I shall suspend them, at least for the present.—AN OECONOMIST.

Nov. 30th, 1809.

PAPER-MONEY.

SIR; Your correspondent W. F. S. appears to me to object, on just grounds, to Mr. Bernard's inference, that "Bank Notes are depreciated, because Guineas will pass for a greater value on the continent than they do here." After, however, premising that I also am but a Tyro, and shall be open to conviction, he will excuse me if I cannot at present coincide with him in all his ideas respecting a circulating medium.—It will be admitted, that this medium, in all countries, consists of materials intrinsically of little value, and unlikely to be largely diverted by the holders from a use wherein their relative value is so great. An increase or diminution of the currency must therefore always affect the nominal value of every article of commerce. Its increase will be attended, or soon followed, by an advanced price of commodities; its diminution by a reduced price. But where this is confined to a particular state, both cause and effect will be of short duration: for such part of the circulating medium of a country, as is in equal use with neighbouring states, will, in the former instance, soon find its way into those states, where it will now purchase a greater quantity of the produce of the soil and of industry, than in that whence it comes, till each state has a share of the aggregate amount of the currency of all, proportioned to its share of the whole produce; on the other hand, where the circulating medium is diminished, there will be an influx of the precious metals, as they are called, or of whatever may be the general commercial medium from abroad, till the same equal distribu-

tion has been effected. A part of the circulating medium of a commercial state ought to be of a nature common with that of the countries with which it trades, not only on account of the facilities thereby afforded to its foreign traffic generally, but because many valuable branches of such traffic cannot be carried on without it at all. Were such a state so imprudent as, at any time, to increase that part of its currency, bearing credit exclusively at home, till it became alone equal to its just proportion of the general currency of the great commercial republic; the consequences would doubtless be the total disappearance of the specie of that state, and a dangerous blow to the prosperity of its foreign trade; for it is evident, from what has before been said, that the merchandize hitherto procured only in exchange for the precious metals, will no longer be within its reach at all by a direct trade, whilst its general foreign commerce will lie under great disadvantages. But were its Paper Currency further increased, the evil consequences would be incalculable. All its manufactures and its natural produce necessarily rising in nominal value with the increased currency, and then people, with equal ingenuity and industry and equal advantages of climate and soil, will be enabled to undersell it in every article not the exclusive produce of its own territory; and will continue to do so, till the superfluity of its Paper Currency is withdrawn from circulation. Individuals, indeed, might benefit by the misfortunes of the community in this case as well as in others. The banker, I suppose, first; next the farmer at rack-rent, who would now pay his rent with a smaller proportion of his produce, and his smith's, wheelwright's, and draper's bills with the same proportion as before: in a less degree lessees generally. But the lessor, the annuitant, the merchant, and, above all, the manufacturer, would suffer severely or be totally ruined; and with them the revenues of the state. On the other hand, were there a great and undue diminution of the currency, the chief sufferers in the former case, would in this, generally, become opulent, but with very great distress to the rest of the people. The evil from this cause would, however, commonly soon work its own cure; but it might not always do so. For instance, in the case of large loans or subsidies to foreign powers, and of extensive expeditions, were the whole or even a large part of the specie

required raised out of the circulating currency, not only would so great and sudden a reduction of the currency cause embarrassment and distress to the people, but soon, (through their inability to pay the taxes), in all probability to the government also. And this evil might be lasting: for War, that caused it, is likely to impede its cure. With us this evil is obviated by a chartered Bank, wherein is deposited the superfluous currency, and whence on emergency it is drawn for the service of the state; the revenues being pledged to the Bank proprietors for the due payment of the interest, and the privilege of keeping in circulation, as a legal substitute for the coin of the state, an untaxed paper currency to a certain amount, being also granted them in return for the occasional accommodation, and the better to enable them to continue it.—The present condition of our commerce gives no cause for apprehension that the paper currency of this country has yet reached a very dangerous extent; and it is to be hoped that our legislature has still virtue and wisdom enough left to prevent its doing so: but I cannot help observing that I know of no law for limiting the issue of Country-Bank Notes, and that this subject seems to merit peculiar attention.—So much for a circulating medium in general; now for the proportional value of gold to silver—of a guinea to a shilling—a question of comparatively small importance. Were coin allowed to be freely exported, the consequence would be that at home, where the laws (and wisely) have fixed their relative value, we should have a greater proportion of gold than of silver in circulation, when the relative value of gold to silver is higher here than abroad; and a greater proportion of silver when the relative value of silver is higher. In other words; when our neighbours on the Continent would give us two or three and twenty shillings for a guinea, we should export gold and import silver; would they return us our guineas at the price of nineteen or twenty shillings each, we should export silver and import gold; till in either instance the currency of the country consisted of a much greater proportion of one metal and a less of the other, or possibly of one of them exclusively. Part of the exported coin will in each case be applied to the purchase of merchandize of intrinsic value; such application naturally arising from the superfluity caused by the advantageous exchange. This should seem to

be a real benefit to a country, and with certain regulations to the traffic it undoubtedly would be so: but the exportation of gold and silver uncoined should alone be permitted, and our own coin the only coin admitted as a legal tender at home, for the currency of the country would otherwise very soon consist of an almost endless variety of foreign coins, mixt with and perhaps almost superseding our own; whereby our domestic trade would suffer considerable embarrassment. Our legislature has accordingly attached severe penalties to the exportation of coin, and has moreover endeavoured to prevent the temptation, by making its standard, as to weight and purity, something inferior to the quantity and quality that each coin will, on the average of the market for several years, purchase in the same metal. A crown will generally purchase more than its weight in silver—a guinea more than its weight in gold of equal fineness with itself respectively. But this latter measure cannot be carried to an extent that will guard against every variety of the market without holding out too great temptation for a fraudulent imitation of the coin; the laws against its exportation are consequently not thereby rendered unnecessary; so far from it that both precautions jointly at times prove insufficient.—Possibly it may be asked: how then is a coinage attended with loss to governments? I answer: not in the exchange of gold and silver coin, for their uncoined materials: but in that of new coin for old of the same denominations, and in equal numbers; which is occasionally rendered necessary by the reduction in weight of the old coin, through use, and the consequent temptation for fraudulent imitations. It may not be amiss to make a few observations respecting forgery, whether of the coin or paper of a state, though this is not strictly the proper place. First, of coin. The circulation of false coin would in the first place, impede traffic by the attention necessary from individuals to the examination of the specie offered to them in the course of business: but, were the circulation of base coin to become very extensive, it would, in addition to this evil, be attended with all the fatal consequences above enumerated in speaking of a superfluity in the paper currency, without the temporary accommodation which the state might have experienced by an increased issue of its own paper. A remedy for this can only be found in the

detection of the false coin and the withdrawing it from circulation: a measure attended, perhaps, with the ruin of many innocent individuals, but with unqualified advantage to the state, which is under no obligation to remunerate them for their loss. The same observations will apply yet more forcibly to the forgery of state paper, but in this case, as the temptation is greater on account of the worthlessness of the materials, it becomes a duty of every government to render the imitation proportionably more difficult. — I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
Z.

Near Peterborough, 19th, Nov. 1809.

MR. CANNING'S STATEMENT.—(*Concluded from p. 861.*)

Of the extent to which this *self-imposed* restriction appears to have gone, I had not any suspicion. I knew indeed that your Lordship had stipulated to keep the time of the disclosure to Lord Castlereagh in your own hands; but subsequently to my being made acquainted with that stipulation, I had received the assurances, which I have already described, on behalf of "Lord Castlereagh's friends;" and had relied upon those assurances.

It was not till the 6th of September that I learnt that those assurances had not been carried into effect. It was not till the 19th of September that I learnt that your Lordship had been no party to them. Then indeed I learnt that your Lordship had not only "*not engaged*" to make the communication previously to the "issue of the Expedition being known here"—but that in July you had "*stated to one of our Colleagues*," (not the Duke of Portland)—"*who was urging an earlier communication*," that the "*time of communication*," so far as you were concerned, was for "*you to decide*;" but that no one had a "*right to say you did not perform that part in the transaction in which you were concerned, if you did not open your lips to Lord Castlereagh before the issue of the Expedition was known here.*"

This information I received from your Lordship, in a letter dated the 19th of September. It was then perfectly new to me.

I leave your Lordship to judge what must have been my surprise, when, after receiving from your Lordship, on the evening of the 19th of September, this frank avowal of the real origin of the concealment maintained, during this latter and most important—

ant period, towards Lord Castlereagh, I received on the following morning Lord Castlereagh's Letter of the same date, making me responsible for that concealment.

I have not to trouble your Lordship with any farther observations.

I have confined myself to matters growing out of Lord Castlereagh's Letter, and out of your Lordship's Statement: on those alone have I any right to claim your Lordship's attention.

To this Address to your Lordship I have been compelled to resort, however reluctantly, to vindicate my private honour. As to any charges against my public conduct—this is not the mode to reply to them. If any such shall be brought against me, at the proper time and in the proper place I shall be prepared to meet and to repel them.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, My Lord; Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

SWEDEN AND RUSSIA.—*Treaty of Peace between Sweden and Russia. Dated 5-17th Sept. 1809.—(Concluded from p. 832.)*

----- All sequestrations of property or revenues shall in consequence be immediately removed, and the property shall be reserved to the owners; it being well understood that such as become subjects of either of the two Powers, in virtue of the preceding Article, shall have no right to claim from the Sovereign, of whom they have ceased to be a subject, the annuities or pensions which may have been obtained in virtue of acts of grace, concessions, or appointments, for preceding services.

XII. The titles, domains, archives, and other documents, public and private, the plans and charts of fortresses, towns, and territories, devolved by the present Treaty to his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, including the charts and papers which may be deposited in the Surveyor's Office, shall be faithfully delivered up, within the space of six months; or if that period should be found too short, at the latest within one year.

XIII. Immediately after the exchange of the ratifications, the High Contracting Parties shall remove all sequestrations which may have been placed on the pro-

perty or revenues of the respective inhabitants therein situated.

XIV. The debts, both public and private, contracted by the Fins in Sweden, and vice versa, by the Swedes in Finland, shall be discharged on the terms and conditions stipulated.

XV. The subjects of either of the High Contracting Parties, to whom inheritances may fall in the States of one or the other, may, without obstacle, take possession of the same, and enjoy it under the protection of the laws. The exercise of this right, however, in Finland, is subject to the stipulations of Article X. in virtue of which the proprietor shall either fix his residence in the country, or sell the inheritance within three years.

XVI. The duration of the Treaty of Commerce between the High Contracting Parties being limited to the 17th (29th) Oct. 1811, his Majesty the Emperor of Russia consents not to reckon its interruption during the war; and that the said Treaty shall continue in force until the 1st (13th) February, 1813, with respect to every thing not contrary to the dispositions of the Commercial Manifesto issued at St. Petersburg, Jan. 1st, 1809.

XVII. The territories incorporated with the Russian Empire, in virtue of this Treaty, being attached to Sweden, by commercial relations, which long intercourse, neighbourhood, and reciprocal wants have rendered almost indispensable, the High Contracting Parties, desirous of preserving to their subjects these means of mutual advantage, agree to make such arrangements as may be necessary for consolidating them. In the mean time, until they come to an understanding on this subject, the Fins shall have the power of importing from Sweden, ore, smelted iron, lime, stones for building, smelting furnaces, and in general all the other productions of the soil of Sweden.—In return the Swedes may export from Finland, cattle, fish, corn, cloth, pitch, planks, wooden utensils of all kinds, wood for building, and, in general, all the other productions of the soil of the Grand Duchy.—This traffic shall be re-established and maintained to the 1st (13th) of October, 1811, precisely on the same footing as it was before the war, and shall be liable to no interruption or burden, with the reservation of such restrictions as the political relations of the two States may render necessary.

XVIII. The annual exportation of 50,000

schetwerts of corn, purchased in the ports of the Gulph of Finland, or of the Baltic, belonging to Russia, is granted to his Majesty the King of Sweden, free of the export duty, on proof being shewn that the purchase has been made on his account, or in virtue of his authority.—Years of scarcity, in which the exportation shall be prohibited, are excepted, but the quantity in arrear, in consequence of such order, may be made up when the prohibition shall be removed.

XIX. With respect to salutes at sea, the two High Contracting Parties agree to regulate them on the footing of the most perfect equality between the two Crowns. When their vessels of war meet at sea, the salutes shall take place in conformity to the rank of the Commanders, in such manner that he who holds the superior rank shall receive the first salute, which shall be returned gun for gun. If the commanders are of equal rank, no salute shall take place on either side; before castles, fortresses, and at the entrance of ports, the party arriving shall salute first, and the salute shall be returned gun for gun.

XX. Difficulties which may arise on points not determined by this Treaty shall be discussed and settled by Ambassadors or Ministers Plenipotentiary respectively appointed, who shall be guided by the spirit of conciliation which has dictated the Treaty.

XXI. This Treaty shall be ratified by the two Contracting Powers; and the ratifications exchanged in proper and due form, within four weeks, or sooner, if possible, reckoning from the day of the signature of the present Treaty.—In faith of which we, the undersigned, in virtue of our full powers, have signed the present Treaty of Peace, and have thereto affixed our seals.

Done at Friedrichsham, this 5-17th of September, in the year of Grace, 1809:

COUNT NICHOLAS DE ROMANZOFF.
DAVID ALOPEUS.
COUNT STEDINCK.
A. F. SKJOLDEBRAND.

Abstract of the New CONSTITUTION of SWEDEN.

§ 1 to 9.—The Government of Sweden shall be monarchical and hereditary, with limitation to the issue male. The King must be of the true evangelical religion, and must govern conformably to this Con-

stitution, and with and by the advice of a Council of State (Stats Rad) the members of which are to be appointed by the King, who is wholly exempt from responsibility, but the Members are responsible for their advice. The Members must be natives of Sweden, and of the true evangelical faith. The Council shall consist of nine Members, viz. the Minister of State for Judicial Affairs, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, six Counsellors, of whom three at least must be civil officers, and the Chancellor of the Court. The Secretaries of State shall have a seat in the Council, whenever any case belonging to their respective departments shall be under deliberation. A father and a son, or two brothers, cannot be Members of the Council at the same time. There are four Secretaries of State, namely, one for the Foreign Department, one for the Home Department, one for the Exchequer or Financial Department, and one for the Ecclesiastical Department. All the affairs of Government (except the diplomatic or foreign relations, and the immediate command of the army and navy) shall be submitted to the consideration and decision of the King, assisted by at least three Members, exclusive of the acting Secretary, which number is required to constitute a Council of State for the transaction of business. A minute shall be made of all the proceedings of the Council, every Member present shall be unconditionally bound to give his advice, but the privilege of deciding is vested in the King, who, by virtue of his prerogative, may assent or dissent from any measure, in opposition to the votes or opinions of all the Members. But in the possible event of the decision of his Majesty being repugnant to the constitution and laws, the Members are required by the most solemn obligation to remonstrate, and in case any Member's opinion shall not be duly recorded, such Member shall be deemed guilty of counselling and abetting the King in his unconstitutional decision.

§ 9 to 13.—Before any appeal can be made to the King in Council, it must be submitted to the Secretary of State, and a Council specially appointed for hearing it. Ministerial or political affairs are to be considered and decided by the King, who in the exercise of his prerogative must take the advice of his Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Chancellor of the Council, who are responsible for their advice. The King may conclude Treaties

with foreign powers, after consulting the said Minister of State, and Chancellor. The King, previous to his declaring war or concluding peace, must state to the Council his motive for so doing, and the members shall give their opinion on the subject under their own responsibility.

§ 13 to 15.—The supreme command of the navy and army is vested in the King; as also the ultimate decision in all matters relative thereto, assisted by the Minister of State for either service, who shall be responsible for their advice.

§ 16.—The King cannot deprive, or cause any subject to be deprived, of his life, liberty, honour, or property, without trial and judgment, nor can he harass or persecute any person for his religious opinions, provided the promulgation of them, or the exercise of his religion, be not injurious to the community.

§ 16 to 27.—Relate to the constitution of a Council of Justice, which is to consist of six Noblemen and six Commoners, who are to decide in Judicial affairs. The King has also two votes, and may pardon criminals, and mitigate or commute punishments.

§ 27 to 31.—The King, in the Council of State, is to appoint persons to Civil and Military Offices; as also the Archbishop and Bishops in the manner formerly done.

§ 32.—Ambassadors, Envoys, &c. to Foreign Courts, are to be nominated by the King, in the presence of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Chancellor of the Court.

§ 32 to 35.—Describe the manner of appointing Civil and Military Officers, and what officers holding situations of ostensible trust and confidence, may be removed at the pleasure of the King, having previously signified his pleasure to the Council.

§ 35 to 38.—The King cannot remove a Judge from his office, except for just cause and proof of criminality. The King is to have the privilege of creating Noblemen, whose eldest sons and heirs only are to inherit the family title. All decrees must be countersigned by a Secretary of State.

§ 38 to 40.—The King shall not quit the kingdom without consulting the Council, who, in the event of his departure, is to govern in his absence.

§ 40 to 48.—Declare, that the Prince or King shall be of age at 21, and on his not having heirs male, the Diet shall be

assembled and choose a successor. No Prince of the Blood can marry without the King's consent; neither the Crown Prince, nor the other Princes can hold any hereditary office. The King appoints all his Officers of the Court and Household.

§ 49.—The States of the Kingdom are to be assembled every 5th year at Stockholm.

§ 49 to 90.—Regulate the mode of electing Members of the Diet.—The King cannot impose any taxes without the consent of the Diet, and the Bank is under the immediate controul of the States of the kingdom.—The King cannot negotiate loans within the kingdom, nor in foreign countries; nor can he sell, dispose of, or alienate, any province belonging to the kingdom, nor alter the value of the current coin.

§ 90 to 94.—Provide, That if the King continue absent more than a twelvemonth, the Diet must be assembled, and the King be informed thereof. That when the successor is not of age, the Diet must be assembled, and appoint a Regency to govern during his minority. When the King is eighteen years of age, he is to attend the several Courts of Justice, without, however, taking any part in the decisions.

§ 94 to 107.—Explain what is to be done, should the Members of the Council neglect assembling the Diet, or act contrary to their duty; and enjoins, that at each Diet a Committee shall be appointed for inquiring into the conduct of the Ministers, Council, and Secretaries of State.

§ 108.—Regards a Committee for superintending the Liberty of the Press.

§ 108 to 114.—State, That no Diet can be of longer duration than three months, except business shall require it. No man, while a member of the Diet, can be accused, or deprived of his liberty, for his actions or expressions in his respective State, unless the particular State to which he belong shall demand it. No Officer of the Crown must influence, by his authority, in the election of a Member of the Diet, &c.

SPAIN.—*MANIFESTO, fixing the days when the GENERAL CORTES of the Spanish Monarchy are to be convoked and held; Dated Royal Alcazar of Seville, Oct. 28, 1809.*

Spaniards!—By a combination of events as singular as fortunate, it has seemed good

to Providence, that in this terrible crisis you shall not advance a step towards independence without likewise advancing one towards liberty. A foolish and feeble tyranny, in order to rivet your fetters and aggravate your chains, prepared the way for French despotism, which, with the terrible apparatus of its arms and victories, endeavoured to subject you to a yoke of iron. It at first exhibited itself, like every new tyranny, under a flattering form, and its political impostors presumed they should gain your favour by promising you reforms in the Administration, and announcing, in a constitution framed at their pleasure, the empire of the laws.—A barbarous and absurd contradiction, worthy certainly of their insolence. Would they have us believe that the moral edifice of the liberty and fortune of a nation can be securely founded on usurpation, iniquity, and treachery? But the Spanish people, who were the first of modern nations to recognize to the true principles of the social equilibrium, that people who enjoyed before any other the prerogatives and advantages of civil liberty, and knew to oppose to arbitrary power the eternal barrier directed by justice, will borrow from no other nation maxims of prudence and political precaution; and tell those impudent legislators, that they will not acknowledge as laws the artifices of intriguers, nor the mandates of tyrants. Animated by this generous instinct, and inflamed with the indignation excited by the perfidy with which you were invaded, you ran to arms, without fearing the terrible vicissitudes of so unequal a combat, and fortune, subdued by your enthusiasm, rendered you homage, and bestowed on you victory in reward for your valour. The immediate effect of these first advantages was the re-composition of the State, at that time divided into so many factions as provinces. Our enemies thought that they had sown among us the deadly germ of anarchy, and did not advert that Spanish judgment and circumspection were always superior to French machiavelism. Without dispute, without violence, a Supreme Authority was established; and the people, after having astonished the world, with the spectacle of their sublime exaltation and their victories, filled it with admiration and respect by their moderation and discretion.

The Central Junta was installed, and its first care was to announce to you, that if the expulsion of the enemy was the first

object of its attention, the inferior and permanent felicity of the State was the principle in importance: to leave it plunged into the flood of abuses, prepared for its own ruin by arbitrary power, would have been in the eyes of our present Government, a crime as enormous as to deliver you into the hands of Buonaparté; therefore, when the turbulence of war permitted, it caused to resound in your ears the name of your Cortes, which to us have ever been the bulwark of civil liberty, and the throne of national Majesty, a name heretofore pronounced with mystery by the learned, with distrust by politicians, and with horror by tyrants, but which henceforth signify in Spain the indestructible base of the monarchy, the most secure supports of the rights of Ferdinand VII. and of his family, a right for the people, and the Government an obligation.

That moral resistance, as general as sublime, which has reduced our enemies to confusion and despair in the midst of their victories, must not receive less reward. Those battles which are lost, those armies which are destroyed, not without producing new battles, creating new armies, and again displaying the standard of loyalty on the ashes and ruins which the enemies abandon; those soldiers who, dispersed in one action, return to offer themselves for another; that populace which despoiled of almost all they possessed returned to their homes to share the wretched remains of their property with the defenders of their country; that concert of lamentable and despairing groans and patriotic songs; that struggle, in fine, of ferocity and barbarity on the one hand, and of resistance and invincible constancy on the other, present a whole as terrible as magnificent, which Europe contemplates with astonishment, and which history will one day record in letters of gold, for the admiration and example of posterity: A people so magnanimous and generous ought only to be governed by laws which are truly such, and which shall bear the great character of public consent and common utility—a character which they can only receive by emanating from the august assembly which has been announced to you. The Junta had proposed that it should be held during the whole of the ensuing year, or sooner, if circumstances should permit. But in the time which has intervened since this resolution, a variety of public events have agitated the minds of the people, and the difference of

opinions relative to the organization of the Government, and the re-establishment of our fundamental laws, has recalled the attention of the Junta to these important objects with which it has latterly been profoundly occupied. It has been recommended on the one hand, that the present Government should be converted into a Regency of three or five persons: and this opinion has been represented as supported by one of our ancient laws, applicable to our present situation. But the situation in which the kingdom was, when the French threw off the mask of friendship, to execute their treacherous usurpation, is singular in our history, and cannot have been foreseen in our institutions. Neither the infancy, nor the insanity, nor even the captivity of the Prince, in the usual way in which these evils occur, can be compared with our present case, and the deplorable situation to which it has reduced us. A political position entirely new requires political forms and principles likewise entirely new. To expel the French, to restore to his liberty and his throne our adored King, and to establish solid and permanent bases of good government, are the maxims which gave the impulse to our Revolution, are those which support and direct it; and that Government will be the best which shall most promote and fulfil these three wishes of the Spanish Nation. Does the Regency of which that Law speaks promise us this security? What inconveniences, what dangers, how many divisions, how many parties, how many ambitious pretensions, within and without the kingdom; how much, and how just, discontent in our Americas, now called to have a share in the present Government? What would become of our Cortes, our liberty, the cheering prospects of future welfare and glory which now present themselves? What would become of the object most valuable and dear to the Spanish Nation—the preservation of the Rights of Ferdinand? The advocates for this Institution ought to shudder at the immense danger to which they exposed themselves, and to bear in mind, that by it they afforded to the Tyrant a new opportunity of buying and selling them. Let us bow with reverence to the venerable antiquity of the Law; but let us profit by the experience of ages. Let us open our annals and trace the history of our Regencies. What shall we find?—a picture equally melancholy and frightful, of desolation, of civil war, of rapine, and

of human depravity, in unfortunate Castile.

Doubtless, in great states, power is more beneficially exercised by few than by many. Secrecy in deliberation, unity in concert, activity in measures, and celerity in execution, are indispensable requisites for the favourable issue of the acts of Government, and are properties of a concentrated authority only. The Supreme Junta has therefore just concentrated its own with that prudent circumspection which neither exposes the state to the oscillations consequent upon every change of Government, nor materially affects the unity of the body which is entrusted with it. Henceforth a section composed of the removeable members, will be specially invested with the necessary authority to direct those measures of the executive power, which from their nature require secrecy, energy and dispatch. Another opinion hostile to the Regency, equally contradicts whatever innovation may be attempted to be made in the political form which the Government has at present, and objects to the intended Cortes as an insufficient representation, if they are constituted according to the ancient formalities, as ill timed and perhaps hazardous, in respect to present circumstances; in short as useless, since it supposes that the superior Juntas, erected immediately by the people, are their real representatives. But the Junta had expressly declared to the nation, that its first attention in the great object would be occupied with the number, mode and class with which the meeting of this august assembly in the present situation of affairs should be carried into effect; and after this declaration it is quite superfluous, not to say malicious, to suspect that future Cortes are to be confined to the rigid and exclusive forms of our ancient ones. Yes, Spaniards, you are going to have your Cortes, and the national representation will in them be as perfect and full as it can and ought to be in assembly of such high importance and eminent dignity. You are going to have Cortes, and to have them immediately, because the urgent situation in which the nation is placed, imperiously demands it, and at what time, gracious God, can it adopt this measure better than at present? When an obstinate war has exhausted all the ordinary means; when the egotism of some and the ambition of others debilitate and paralyse the efforts of the government, by

their opposition or indifference; when they seek to eradicate the essential principle of the Monarchy, which is union; when the Hydra of Federalism, so happily silenced the preceding year by the creation of the Central Power, dares again to raise its poisonous head, and endeavours to precipitate us into the dissolution of anarchy; when the subtlety of our enemies is watching the moment when our divisions disunite us, to destroy the State, and to erect their throne on the ruin which our distractions afford them. This is the time—this, to collect in one point the national dignity and honour, and when the Spanish people may will and decree the extraordinary surplus which a powerful nation ever has within it for its salvation. It alone can encounter and put them in motion; it alone can encourage the timidity of some and restrain the ambition of others; it alone will suppress importunate vanity, puerile pretensions, and enflamed passions, which, unless prevented, go to tear in pieces the Government. It will, in fine, give to Europe a fresh example of its Religion, its circumspection, and its discretion, in the just and moderate use which it is about to make of the glorious liberty in which it is constituted. Thus it is that the Supreme Junta which immediately recognised this national representation as a right and proclaimed it as a reward, now invokes and implores it as the most necessary and efficacious remedy; and has therefore resolved that the General Cortes of the Monarchy, announced in the decree of the 22nd May, shall be convoked on the 1st day of January in the next year, in order to enter on their august functions the 1st day of March following. When that happy day has arrived, the Junta shall say to the Representatives of the Nation:—

Ye are met together, O Fathers of your Country! and re-established in all the plenitude of your rights, after a lapse of three centuries, when despotism and arbitrary power dissolved you, in order to subject this nation to all the evils of servitude. The aggression which we have suffered, and the war which we maintain, are the fruits of the most shameful oppression and the most unjust tyranny. The Provincial Juntas, who were able to resist and repulse the enemy in the first impetus of his invasion, invested the Supreme Junta with the Sovereign Authority, which they

exercised for a time, to give unity to the State and concentrate its power. Called to the exercise of this authority, not by ambition or intrigue, but by the unanimous voice of the provinces of the kingdom, the individuals of the Supreme Junta shewed themselves worthy of the high confidence reposed in them, by employing all their vigilance and exertions for the preservation and posterity of the State. The magnitude of our efforts will be apparent from the consideration of the enormity of the evil which preceded. When the power was placed in our hands, our armies, half formed, were unprovided and destitute of every thing, our treasury was empty, and our resources uncertain and distant. The despot of France, availing himself of the tranquillity in which the North then was, poured upon the Peninsula the military power under his command, the most formidable that has been known in the most warlike legions, better provided, and above all more numerous than others, rushed on every side, though much to their cost, against our armies, destitute of the same expertness and confidence. A new inundation of barbarians who carried desolation through all the provinces of which they took possession, was the consequence of these reverses, and the ill closed wounds of our unfortunate country began painfully to open and pour with blood in torrents. The State thus lost half its strength; and when the Junta, bound to save the honour, the independence, and the unity of the nation from the impetuous invasion of the tyrant, took refuge in Andalusia, a division of 30,000 men repaired to the walls of Saragosa, to bury themselves in its ruins. The army of the centre being thus deprived of a great part of its strength, did not give to its operations that activity and energy which must have had very different results from those of the battle of Ales. The avenues of the Sierra Morena and the banks of the Tagus were only defended by ill armed handfuls of men, to whom could scarcely be given the name of armies. The Junta, however, by means of activity and sacrifices, rendered them such, so routed and dispersed in the two battles of Ciudad Real and Metellin, instead of despairing of the country, they redoubled their efforts, and in a few days collected and opposed to the enemy 70,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. (*To be continued.*)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 25.] LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1809. [Price 1s.

"I have never wished, my Lords, to conceal my opinion, with respect to the policy of sending a British army to Spain. I would have assisted them with money; I would have assisted them with arms: but I assert that, during last summer, there was no prospect that ought to have induced any reasonable man to send a British army into the interior of Spain. I am anxious not to be misunderstood upon this point. I do not mean to apply my observation to naval co-operation, to the mode of sending fleets with troops on board to annoy particular parts of the coast, to keep the enemy in a constant state of alarm, and obtain partial advantages that might be of the most essential service."—LORD GRENVILLE'S Speech, Jan. 19, 1809.

"My Lords, I do not say that assistance should have been wholly withheld; but we certainly should not have sent an army where we had not the necessary means to afford supplies to that army, or effectual assistance to those it was intended to protect: we ought rather to have given our assistance by money, by arms, and by the well-applied exertions of our naval force on the coast of Spain."—LORD GREY'S Speech, April 21, 1809.

961]

[962

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SPAIN.—The affairs of this country appear to be fast approaching to a crisis. It is, indeed, impossible, that things can long continue in their present state; nor is it desirable that they should; for, it would be better for the country to be conquered by Buonaparté at once, than that it should any longer be an object of contest between two masters. If Spain is not, in case of successful resistance of the French, to be free, I have no hesitation in saying, that I would prefer seeing it conquered; because, nothing could possibly be so bad as an event, which the enemies of freedom, here and every where else, would be able to cite as a proof of an enslaved people being able and willing to defend their country against an invader. This would be, indeed, a most mischievous example; and, were it to exist; were the people of Spain, without any change in their system of government having previously taken place, to drive the Buonapartés out of their country, we should soon hear the hirelings in England openly declaring, that despotism was the only means of protection against a powerful enemy; nor would it be long before they would put into form their propositions for the "suspension of the constitution," a thing, which they have frequently hinted at, within the last two years, in a manner too unequivocal to leave their meaning doubtful.—But, as far as we have yet seen, the example of Spain affords no encouragement for the adoption of such measures. There the spirit of resistance to the invader was, at first, strong and active, because the hope of freedom was strong. This spirit died away, as soon as the Supreme Central Junta began

to issue their edicts against the liberty of the press, and to put it under regulations after the manner of those established at Calcutta.—From that time the spirit of resistance has, until of late, evidently been upon the decline; and, unless it be revived by the recent changes in the government, and the hopes excited by the promised meeting of the Cortez, there can, I think, be very little doubt, that it will not require many months to establish the throne of Joseph upon solid foundations.—As to the recent defeat of the Spanish army at Ocana, though I believe it to have been much more severe than the Spaniards represent it to have been, I do not think much of it; nor should I think their cause desperate, if we were to hear of many such defeats. That our army, or rather the remnant of it, under my Lord of Talavera de la Reyna della Douro; that this remnant will be compelled to retreat into Portugal, and will be utterly unable to shew its head again in Spain, I have no doubt at all; but, from the first, I never did believe, that any force which we could send into the country, would be able to give much real assistance to the Spaniards. Look back into history, and you will find, that no nation, of any extent, was ever yet defended against an invader by the aid of foreign troops, unless the people themselves took the lead in the defence. When a people sees two foreign armies, hostile to each other, march into their country, they are very apt to fold up their arms and wait, with great composure, for the event; and this must necessarily be the case, when both armies are compelled to plunder the people. It was, and I always thought so, the worst possible thing for us to send an army into Spain. At best we could send but a

small numerical force. We could not send an army fit to meet that of Napoleon in the field. We could not make Spain the theatre of a war between us and France, except upon terms greatly disadvantageous to us. We could, in short, have no chance of final success in the field against Buonaparté single-handed; and, if our army acted in *conjunction* with that of the Spaniards, there was all the danger, from a thousand causes, of that *disagreement between the Commanders*, which has not failed to take place at and since the battle of Talavera, and from which disagreement the enemy has derived so much advantage.

—There has been much disguise as to the conduct of the Spanish people towards our troops. The truth, however, is, that our troops have, all along, been looked upon by the Spanish people, with an evil eye. And was not this natural? Is that man worthy of the name of *statesman*, who did not foresee that it would be so? The bigotry of the people of Spain may be matter of *ridicule* with the *philosopher*, but, not so with the *statesman*, especially when he is about to expose an army to the effects of that bigotry. From this cause has arisen a great part of the misfortunes and the miseries of our army. We had not the *hearts* of the people with us; and, our ministers ought to have known, *that this would be the case*. They are answerable for all the miseries which our poor unfortunate countrymen have undergone in Spain; because those miseries have proceeded from the want of wisdom in the employment of our armies. It is in vain, and, indeed, it is *unjust*, to throw the blame upon the *people* of Spain, or upon the *Spanish government*, for the coldness (to say the least of it) with which our army has been treated in Spain. It was in the *nature of things* that it should be so treated; and, the fault is solely in our ministers, who, it is now evident, wished to *cut a figure in the field*, and who, as I firmly believe, were the cause of a war being entered upon for a *choice of musters*, instead of suffering the thing to take its own course, in which case, it would have been a war of restored freedom against invading despotism. For these reasons, I do not think, that the retreat of our army ought to be looked upon as a thing at all unfavourable to the cause of Spain, while, I am very certain, that it ought to be looked upon as the best thing that can take place with regard to that army.—We are very apt to *speak of the fate of a nation* in war, as

we speak of the fate of a *fortress*; and to look upon the contest as at an end, when a great battle has been gained against the invader. In the present case, we seem to forget that Spain contains *ten or twelve millions* of people, inhabiting one of the strongest countries in the world. Never was such a people, so situated, conquered *against their own consent*. What is the loss of a battle, or of ten battles, if all be sound in the hearts and minds of ten or twelve millions of people, who have, and must have, all the resources of the country in their hands? Did the loss of a battle, or of ten battles, insure the subjugation of *America* or *France*? How often were we told that each of those nations were *done for*; that a few weeks would see them at our feet; and the like? They both triumphed in the end, and so will the Spaniards, if the cause become the cause of *freedom*, but they will fall, and to fall they ought, and I shall rejoice to see them fall, if they continue a contest for a mere choice of masters, and without any view to the restoration of that constitution, which their ancestors, for centuries, enjoyed. The assembling of the *Cortes*, that is to say, the calling together of the *Representatives of the People*, a measure which now seems to be resolved on, and to be actually about to be put in execution; this measure promises fair. And here I cannot help repeating my opinion, my thorough persuasion; that, if the Spanish people, and the *leaders* of the people, had been left to follow their own opinions and feelings, they would, at the outset, have done what they now appear resolved to do. It always appeared very evident to me, that the aid, tendered them by our ministers, was accompanied with a condition that the struggle should be for *king against king*, and not for *restored freedom*, against *invading despotism*. And, indeed, if this had not been the case; or, at least, if our ministers had not been extremely anxious to prevent a war for freedom in Spain, *why should they have sent an army thither*? For, they could not doubt, that, if the war became a war for freedom, *arms* and not *men*, would be wanted in Spain.—What losses; what disgrace; what miseries has not this policy, this bigotry, this inveterate policy created! The poor wretches of our army, who survived the battle of Talavera, having, at the end of that battle, been *two days without provisions*, had served out to them an allowance of *wheat*! Aye, of *wheat*; of raw wheat, just as it came out

of the sheaf! I speak this upon the authority of those who had to partake of this fare; and I cannot, while putting the fact upon record, help remembering, that this war, that the war which has produced miseries like these, was first proclaimed to the people of England amidst the plaudits, amidst the hiccupping and belching shouts, of the *Turtle Patriots*, assembled at the London Tavern. Yes; it was from that scene of gormandizing; that scene of greediness of purse as well as of maw; it was thence that first issued the yell of war for a choice of masters in Spain? and, from that moment, the *people of England* became cold spectators of what was passing in the Southern Peninsula.—After what has passed; after so many proofs of the folly of attempting to resist Buonaparté, unless the *people of Spain* be male parties *deeply interested in such resistance*, let us hope, that measures will be taken to make them parties in the contest. Without this, I am persuaded, that nothing at all is to be done; and that the struggle had better be given up at once. At any rate, we should not attempt to have an army *in the heart of Spain*. Flying squadrons round the coast, with detachments of foot-soldiers and artillery on board; alighting here and there as occasion might offer, and not sparing the coast of France at the same time: these are what the Spaniards want to assist them; such is the assistance they have always wanted; and such is the assistance, that the most sensible part of their leaders *have asked for*. It is by no means necessary, that the commanders of these squadrons and detachments should be members of the Society for the Suppression of Vice; that they should have so much conjugal affection as to induce them to take their wives to sea, and, perchance, retain their squadrons in port for some weeks in order to insure the attendance of an able accoucheur; that they should be sopious as to spend in prayer the time that might be devoted to watchings of a far different sort: that they should be full of that kind of religious deference and humility which induces men to leave the enemy wholly to the chastisement of Divine Providence in cases where one's bacon would be in danger. No: I beg leave to repeat, that it is by no means necessary, that the commanders of such squadrons and detachments should belong to this tribe of warriors. I do not give this as *my opinion*: I have heard Spaniards say so. I have

heard Spaniards distinctly aver, that they have no notion that a fortress, in the hands of the French, can be taken from them merely by a prayer, however long, or however sanctified by an utterance through the nasal organs; and that, though very partial to Saints themselves, they would much rather see a protestant commander discover temerity in attacking one ship or battery, than in kissing all the four Evangelists.—To about half a dozen Squadrons, such as I have here been speaking of, we should add an abundance of *arms and ammunition* and some officers of artillery and engineers, of *tried merit*. To these, perhaps, two or three hundred good *non-commissioned officers* who *have seen service abroad*, might be added. But, no English army *in the country*, who, we may be assured, will, and must, *eat up the country*, as far as they go, and will, of course, always leave discontent and resentment behind them.—The newspapers have, for some time past, represented the Spaniards as being in great distress for the *want of arms*, and this is the more surprising, as we have heard such pompous accounts of the shipments, *on the part of our government*, of arms for Spain. But, to be very plain upon this point, I *know*, as well, perhaps, as any man can know any thing, without being an eye witness of it, that the Spaniards are in the greatest distress for the want of arms, particularly *muskets*.—The following Advertisement, published yesterday, in the London papers, must have *proved* to the public two facts of great consequence at this time, namely, that the Spanish Government have engaged with an *individual* for the shipment of muskets for their use, and that that individual is now actually executing the engagement.

“ARMS FOR THE SPANIARDS.—Having entered into engagements for the Supply of Arms for the use of the SUPREME JUNTA OF SPAIN; and this being a time when the supply may be of most essential service to that gallant People, this is to give Notice, That any person or persons having a quantity of good Proof Muskets, whether that quantity be large or small, will, upon an application to JOHN TUNNO, Esq. of Old Broad-street, receive his proposals for the purchase of the same on my account; and upon furnishing the Arms will receive payment in Cash.

“*Portsmouth, Dec. 18, 1809.*

“A. COCHRANE JOHNSTONE.”

It was, I believe, about six months since Mr. Johnstone entered into these engagements, which, not only from considerations of rectitude, but from motives of sincere attachment to the cause of Spain; I know him to be most anxious to fulfil. Here are no loose professions, on his part; but a real offer to purchase arms, for the doing of which he holds the means, which means belong to the Spanish Government.—It is said, that our government have always had objections to leave this business of supplying arms to any individuals, having themselves found it so difficult to *insure the delivery* of them into the proper hands. But, in this ease, they may have the best security; for, not only is Mr. Johnstone ready to purchase the arms and pay for them; but to go out to Spain with them in person, to deliver them to the Junta, and to bring back a certificate from the Junta, that he has made such delivery. He, indeed, has already *actually purchased* a considerable quantity of arms; he *has them ready to ship off*; he is ready to enter, if required, into a bond for their being sent to the Junta; and, under these circumstances, there can, I should suppose, be no doubt of his obtaining the necessary permission from our own government. In short, it really appears to me, that our conduct in this case will be to the Spanish Government and the people of Spain a very good criterion of our *sincerity*; for, what must that government and people think of us, what must they think of our regard for their cause, if, when it is notorious that they have not a musket amongst ten thousand men, we will not suffer Mr. Johnstone to send to them, or to carry to them, under all possible security for safe delivery, a quantity of muskets, purchased with their own money? If we will not suffer this, what must be thought of us by the government and the people of Spain? Mr. Johnstone is authorized to purchase, on account of the Spanish Government, *a hundred and fifty thousand* stand of arms; and if the government here has that quantity, or any part of it, to spare, *he is ready to pay for them*. No difficulty, therefore, can possibly exist, if there be arms to be had in this country; and, would it not be scandalous, if, under such circumstances, arms were not permitted to be sent out? —I have taken for my motto to this sheet, two passages from the speeches of Lord Grenville and Lord Grey, upon this subject. Certainly theirs was, as to this

matter, the opinion of every man of sense, with whom I ever conversed upon the subject: But, our ministers, instead of sending the Spaniards arms, wherewith to drive out their devourers, have always been sending troops, who, though, under proper orders, they might have aided them, must necessarily assist to *eat them up*. —It is a poor excuse to say, that the arms, which our ministers have sent out, *have not been safely delivered*; for, *why* have they not? Had we not a fleet to send them out by? Has it cost us no hundreds and hundreds of thousands of pounds for government agents in Spain? Has expense been wanting? But, whatever has been, I repeat, that Mr. Johnstone's offer *removes all risk*, other than that of *the sea*, from which nothing in such a case can be exempt; and, really, if he be not permitted to send or to carry out arms, upon the conditions offered by him, there will be (unless better reasons for a refusal be offered than I have yet heard of) but too much reason to suspect, that the measure of *assembling the Cortes*, and the consequent prospect of a *struggle for freedom* in Spain, has produced, in the minds of our ministers a change by no means favourable to the Spanish cause.

OXFORD CHANCELLORSHIP.—On Thursday, the 14th instant, the election of a Chancellor for the University of Oxford, in the room of the Duke of Portland, deceased, took place; and, upon the close of the poll, the following were the numbers:

For Lord Grenville - - - -	406
Lord Eldon - - - -	393
Duke of Beaufort - - - -	238

Lord Grenville was, of course, duly elected, after a struggle unparalleled in the history of the University.—Looking, as I do, upon these schools for full grown boys to be of no use whatever; having seen so many of the big fellows coming from these schools with such very empty heads; having, in short, no sort of respect for any part of the huge establishment, which I regard as detrimental to morality as well as to genius, and more especially to that independence of mind in political matters, which is now so necessary to the very existence of the country: this being my opinion of the University, regarding it as the mortal enemy of youth, the great destroyer of time and of talent, I should have taken no more notice of an election of a Chancellor of the University, than I should of that of a parish beadle, had it

not, accidentally, been closely and obviously connected with a most interesting and most important question in politics; namely, the question (agitated a fortnight ago in the Register) relative to the Roman Catholics of this kingdom; in which question, agreeably to my opinion then expressed, is involved the nation's safety. —The triumph of Lord Grenville must be pleasing to every just mind, because it is the triumph of reason and truth over the senseless and hypocritical cry of "*No Popery*;" the "*miscarean*" cry of no-popery; that howl of bigotry; that most scandalous, malicious, and seditious yell, for which there can be no pardon in this world. I remember, at the canvas of 1807, telling the late Sir Harry Mildmay, that I looked upon the cry of No-Popery to contain the most wicked sentiment that ever issued from the lips of man; and, I must do him the justice to say, that he did openly disclaim it, though it was trumpeted about the streets of Winchester. Every man of any principle was ashamed of it. Its propagation was left to those only, who were lost to all sense of shame as well as all feelings of conscience. —It is, I see, attempted to be maintained, that the election of Lord Grenville is no proof of the triumph of tolerant principles with regard to the Roman Catholics. This is the sort of reasoning employed for this purpose:—Lord Eldon's and the Duke of Beaufort's principles, as to the question of the Catholics, are the same; and, therefore, the poll presents 631 for *no-popery*, and only 406 against her. But, this is fallacious; for, it is very evident, that the votes for the Duke of Beaufort, were those which it was impossible to get for Lord Eldon; the votes of those persons who could not be prevailed upon to side openly with *no-popery*. The Duke being decidedly of the same political party with Lord Eldon, it is not, for one moment, to be believed, that one or the other of them would not have given up his votes, in order to beat Lord Grenville, if that had been practicable; but, the fact is, that the Duke was set up for the purpose of drawing off votes from Lord Grenville; for the purpose of furnishing a candidate for those who could not be prevailed upon to vote for Lord Eldon. So that, when viewed in the true light, the triumph of tolerant principles over hypocrisy and bigotry is much greater than, at first sight, it would appear to be. —The hirelings are beginning their former cant about "*troubling the conscience of the king in his old age*," than

which it is, in my mind, impossible to form an idea of any thing more base, or more really disloyal, more directly tending to throw odium upon the character of the king. I have, in the article of the 9th instant, observed, that the king has given his consent freely to the granting of those privileges to foreign Catholics in his service, which it is asked to grant to his Catholic subjects. How, then, can conscience oppose itself to the latter? Policy possibly may oppose it. I am ready to prove, and, indeed, I have proved, that sound policy does not oppose it. But this question the hypocritical hirelings save us the trouble of discussing, by pretending, that there exists an obstacle in the scruples of the king's conscience. In this case, however, as in all others, where they have an opportunity, the pretended friends of the king shew themselves to be, in reality, his very worst enemies; the worst enemies he or his family can have, by pushing him forward, by using his name, by exposing him to bear whatever they think would fall with dangerous weight upon themselves. —I do wish, that His Majesty could be prevailed upon to read, in the PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, Vol. IV, page 1268, Mr. BOOTH's Speech upon the subject of "*court favourites*." He would there see what were the sentiments of English Gentlemen, in the reign of Charles the Second, as to that description of persons, who then took to themselves the exclusive appellation of "*King's Friends*;" and who then had the impudence to attempt to ride off upon the shoulders of their master. His Majesty would there see what sort of men those were, who, while they affected to brand all those with disloyalty who were not of their own faction, were laying the sure foundations of the expulsion of the family of Stuart. —There can, in my opinion, be nothing so injurious to the king as this plea, made use of by his pretended "*friends*," of his scruples of conscience. When we alledge, that the measure of Catholic claims is just, that it is not only just but expedient, that it is necessary to the happiness of his people, and to the safety of his dominions against the meditated attacks of a most powerful enemy; when we make these allegations and produce arguments in support of them, what is the answer of these pretended "*king's friends*"? Why, that the king is very aged, and that we ought not to war against his scruples of conscience! Can any thing be more base than this? Can any

thing be more unfriendly? Can any thing be more cruel? Is not the *conclusion*, to which it points, too clear not to be disguised? Is not the *wish* that it must, if believed, suggest, too manifest not to be at once perceived? Is it not, in fact, saying to the people: "well, it is a sorrowful thing, but the day must come *when those scruples will no longer be a bar to your happiness and your safety?*" If any thing in the world can be more base than this, if any thing more mischievous can be thought of by the bitterest enemy of kingly government, I know not how to calculate upon the most ordinary operations of the human mind. Therefore, have I never, in my political life, felt indignation so great against any description of politicians, as against those, who, to answer their own selfish purposes, to screen themselves against the force of reason and of truth, have had the shameless hypocrisy to set up this plea, the merciless perfidy thus to attempt to save their own reputation, by thrusting forward the name of the king; by falsely pretending that it was the king alone from whom arose the opposition to a measure, the *necessity* of which, to the happiness and safety of the people, they attempted not to deny.—These pretended "king's friends" have, however, now received, in the preference which the University have given to Lord Grenville before Lord Eldon, a check which they will find it difficult, with all their address, to overcome. Even their cunning, their craft, their consummate skill in the arts of disguising and deceiving, will hardly now serve their turn.—The victory of *Lord Grenville* is nothing to me: it is the victory of sense over folly, of piety over cant, of toleration over intolerance, of sincerity over hypocrisy, of truth over falsehood; this is the victory at which I rejoice. The hypocrites of the no-popery faction obtained their object for a while; they deceived the nation with their cry of *no-popery*; they were hugging themselves in the success of their fraudulent dealings, when, from that quarter, whence, of all others, they least expected it, they receive undeniable proof that the nation has discovered the cheat, and that they are seen in their true colours. So true it is, as MILTON observes, in his Treatise upon the Liberty of the Press, that if you leave truth to combat, unshackled, against falsehood, the latter, though she may make head for a while, is sure, in the end, to be subdued.—The nation has had time to reflect. The ex-

perience of two years, and especially the great dangers to which the country must now be exposed by an adherence to the principles of *no-popery*, have brought people to their senses. The opinion of the nation is; the *wish* of the nation is, that the *Catholic claims should be granted*; and that wish has been now clearly expressed at Oxford.—It is not a triumph over *Lord Eldon* at which I rejoice. On the contrary, in many respects I like him better than his rival. I do not look upon the triumph over him, personally, as being of any consequence at all. It is the triumph over the principles of those who voted for him, and who, whether truly or not, looked upon him as the advocate of intolerance; it is this triumph, at which I rejoice.—And in this respect, say the hirelings what they will, the triumph is complete. Not only was Lord Eldon one of the ministry; not only was the interest of the ministry with him; not only was there the general weight and power of government on his side, but, he, being Lord Chancellor, had, in his own absolute gift, no small part of the whole of the Church preferment. So that, as far as the temptations of *patronage* and of *interest* could go, a more formidable candidate could not have been opposed to Lord Grenville, who was out of place, and who has never been in any place, except for about fifteen months, which gave him the power of bestowing preferment in the Church.—The *Courier* news-paper, and the other hired prints, are outrageous in the invectives against the University and against the Clergy in general, upon this occasion, whom, if they do not call them knaves, they scruple not to bestow upon them every epithet and appellation descriptive of a want of intellect. Now, it appears to me, that one may, at any rate, give the clergy credit for the possession of *mere common sense*; and certain I am that it required nothing more to make them act as a majority of them have done in this case. At other seasons, to rail against the Catholics might be good pastime; but, the question now is whether the Catholics shall have their just claims granted them, or whether by obstinately rejecting those claims, the whole kingdom, and the *Church*, of course, shall be exposed to danger so imminent, as to leave nothing more than a bare *chance* of escape.—This is now the question, and the Clergy in general appear to have the sense to perceive, that it is their interest as well as their duty to

prefer the safety of the country to the gratification of the insolent ambition of a set of upstart political intriguers.

MR. WARDLE.—In my last, I took notice of the result of the Trial in the Court of King's Bench, in which this gentleman was the Plaintiff against Mrs. Clarke and her upholsterers.—I was then fully convinced, that the *integrity* of Mr. Wardle remained unimpeached, and every thing which has since come to my knowledge, confirms me in that conviction. It was, therefore, with great pleasure, that I perceived, that a meeting had been held at the Crown and Anchor, for the purpose of devising the means of raising a fund to indemnify Mr. Wardle for the losses and expences to which he has been exposed, *in consequence of his having succeeded in his endeavours to serve the public.*—Before I proceed any further, I will insert, for the purpose of having them upon record, the Resolutions, passed by the meeting above-mentioned.

"At a Meeting convened by Advertisement in the Public Papers, held at the Crown and Anchor Tavern, in the Strand, on Monday, the 13th day of December, 1809.

"PHILIP MALLEY, Esq. in the Chair.

"It was Resolved unanimously,

"That G. L. Wardle, Esq. by bringing the Inquiry, respecting "the late Commander-in-Chief, before the Commons' House of Parliament, and by the manly, firm, and independent manner in which he conducted it, amidst great discouragements, undaunted by threats of infamy, and heavy responsibility, equally unconnected with, and unsupported by party," and for which he received the thanks of upwards of fifty counties, cities, boroughs, and towns, has merited the gratitude of his fellow citizens.

"That G. L. Wardle, Esq. in his endeavours to obtain substantial justice for the People of England, has, in addition to the anxiety caused by an unprincipled and harrassing opposition, sustained many heavy expences.

"That G. L. Wardle, Esq. besides hazarding his private fortune, has given numerous proofs of the purity of the motives by which he has been actuated, and is now, more than ever, entitled to the praise and support of every honest and independent man.

"That G. L. Wardle, Esq. having honourably persevered in performing his part towards the People, this Meet-

ing declare it to be their bounden duty to call upon the public to indemnify him against all losses, charges, and expences, he may have incurred, or be liable to, in consequence thereof.

"That a Subscription for this purpose be immediately entered into.

"That the following Gentlemen be requested to form a Committee (with power to add to their number) to manage the Subscription, which they are directed to pay, from time to time, into the hands of Messrs. Drummond, Bankers, in the name and for the use of Col. Wardle, viz. Messrs. Philip Mallet, Chairman; Timothy Brown, Samuel Brooks, John Cartwright, William Cobbett, Henry Clifford, the Rev. Mr. Draper, Samuel Favell, William Friend, Alderman Goodbehere, James Griffiths, John Hoppe, Edward Langley, Samuel Miller, John Pook, William Sturch, John Slater, Henry Hare Townshend, Mr. Sheriff Wood, Robert Waithman, and Andrew Wilson."

The king has not, in his gift, any honour that I should value half so much as I do the honour of having my name in this list; and I only regret, that, from my local situation, it will be impossible for me to make exertions proportioned to my wishes.—As to the *principle* of these Resolutions, nothing can be more just, or wise. It is, indeed, a principle dictated by self-preservation. What sums do we see expended in rewards to those who serve OTHERS? and shall we not have the sense, the very plain common sense, to stand by and to uphold, or, at least, to compensate, the man who has risked, and who has actually lost so much in serving us? MR. GRATTAN and the younger MR. BURKE received, each of them, a large sum of money for their exertions in behalf of the Irish Catholics. MR. WARDLE would accept of no such thing. But, it is our duty to see, that he does not lose by his exertions in our behalf; it is our duty to see, that he and his family bear not the marks of public ingratitude; of the ingratitude of those, who have so unequivocally acknowledged their obligations to him.—Our enemies never fail to stand by those who *serve them*, and hence it is that they find so many to serve them; hence it is that they meet with so much courage in their adherents, who, let what else will happen, are sure to be, at the very least, amply indemnified for all their labour and their loss.—The sin of MR.

Wardle is, that he has exposed offences against the people; that he has brought to light what no man else ever attempted to bring to light; that has made a rent in the veil, which covered so many iniquities: this is his sin, and a sin, which, in the eyes of our enemies, is far greater than all the sins forbidden in the decalogue. I give it as my sincere opinion, that they would sooner forgive him for murdering their own mothers, for sticking a dagger into the breasts whence they had drawn the first means of supporting life, than for having done what he has done. I give this as my firm persuasion.—We need wonder, therefore, at no exertions that have been made against him by these our enemies, of whose *means* of mischief we have a pretty satisfactory criterion in the fact (which now appears to be undoubted) that *ten thousand pounds sterling together with an annuity of 400*l.* a year with remainder to her children*, was given to Mrs. CLARKE for putting a stop to the printing of a book which she had in the press last spring. *What*, I leave the reader to judge, must have been the nature of this book; what sort of persons must those have been, who could use such means; and, at what means would they stick for the ruin of Mr. Wardle?—Mr. Wardle is blamed for his having got into these legal disputes, and *justly* blamed too; but, *who is always* upon his guard? Nothing could our enemies wish for more than to see him entangle himself in the meshes of the law. It was precisely what they must have wished, and especially to see him plunging about, as if his desire had been to destroy himself. But, even in the *kind* of his indiscretion there is a strong presumptive proof of his consciousness of being right; because, a man who had felt conscious of being wrong would never have *so persevered*.—In the whole of his proceedings, after the first trial, Mr. Wardle has been *indiscreet*, and especially in writing, without taking a moment's time to reflect, the Letter which appeared in the Statesman of the evening of the trial. But, your men who *never do any thing wrong* are good for nothing. You cannot have qualities such as these, which induced Mr. Wardle to bring forward, and persevere in, the investigation into the conduct of the Duke of York; you cannot have such qualities without having those occasional indiscretions, which seldom, or never, fail to accompany them.—There is nobody; there is not a soul in the country, who

thinks that Mr. Wardle has done any thing dishonourable. It is the *laugh*; that is what he has to withstand, and that is the fruit of his indiscretion. But, we whom he has so effectually served; for whom he has done more than any other man ever did; we are bound to use our utmost endeavours to prevent him from suffering from that cause. To him we owe the *Darling Letters*, the History of O'Meara and the *celestial unction*; to him we owe the history of Donovan, French, Sandon and Parson Williams; to him we owe Clavering's letters and confinement in Newgate; to him we owe the neat little *Note to Tony*, including the conduct of Hamilton, Sandon, Mr. Perceval and Mr. Adam, respecting that Note; to him we owe Mrs. Clarke's letters to Sandon, asking this respectable personage to "*get her votes for 'Pitt'*" in the House of Commons; to him we owe the exposure of the tendered bribe of the Rev. Mr. Beazley, who had written a *no-popery* pamphlet, and of whom, by the bye, *I have heard nothing since*, though the case was much worse, than that of the Tinman; to him we owe the discoveries about the sale of Writerships and Cadetships, which though going on for years, and declared to be illegal and very mischievous, had never before been brought to light; to him we owe the discoveries, relative to the swapping and selling of offices and seats in parliament, and the knowledge of, all about Mr. Perceval and Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Reding and Lord Clancarty; to him we owe, and we shall always owe, that upon these points, the House of Commons was **PUT TO THE TEST**; that that House was **WEIGHED IN THE BALANCE**. To Mr. Wardle we owe all this, and a great deal more; and, therefore, whatever may have been his indiscretion in entangling himself in the nets of the law, it is our duty to show, by acts as well as by words, that we were not unworthy of the exertions which he made, and *successfully* made, to serve us. What he did for us, let it be well observed and remembered, **NOTHING CAN UNDO**. No: not even a law to burn all the books and records in existence; unless, at the same time, our *memories* could be destroyed as far as related to the discoveries he made, or caused to be made. To him we owe a stock of information, which has created a *new mind* in the country; to him we owe, not the *possession* of Mrs. CLARKE'S BOOK (that is yet to come), but we owe her

having written a book, which was suppressed at the expence of *ten thousand pounds*, cash upon the nail; and to him we owe the *well-founded suspicions* that arise from this undoubted fact. We owe him all this. We owe him more than any other man, and than all other men put together, and, if we do not stand by him, we shall justly be considered, in future, as unworthy of any exertions being made in our favour, and richly deserving of all those political evils, of which we now so bitterly and so justly complain.

WM. COBBETT.

TO THE AUTHOR OF

"An Impartial Examination of Sir Francis Burdett's Plan of Parliamentary Reform."

Enfield, 17th Dec. 1809.

Sir;—I have read your letter to me, in the Political Register of yesterday. It is in reply to one of mine to you, inserted in the same Register on the 14th of October. What, Sir, were the objects of that letter? to "convince you that, in one very important particular, you have not only "misconceived the meaning of the baronet, but have likewise misunderstood a "fundamental principle of the English "Constitution."—As your letter, Sir, although in reply to mine, attempts not an answer to these objections to your book, I certainly am not called upon to controvert your present reasoning. I am not now to learn, that those who look not for a foundation of political reasoning, to the principles of free government, or of our constitution, can as fluently talk about the expediency of "triennial parliaments," as on the advantage of placemen in the House of Commons, or any other deviation from principle. Instead of three columns of Mr. Cobbett's Register, you might, for aught that I can see to the contrary, have written three volumes in folio on the same topic, and still have been as wide of the truth, as you now appear to me to be.—It was to guard the question against this rambling mode of discussion, that I had carefully explained the principle of the English Constitution on the point in question, as well as given a demonstration of the principle of free government, with which that constitution on this point is in strict unison. I must therefore needs think, that no one is entitled to call upon me to attend to arguments inconsistent with these principles, until he have first proved to me that on

the principles themselves I am in error. For it is a maxim that "against him who "denies (or regards not) principles, dispute is useless."—As you admit, Sir, you are "almost at the commencement of "your political career," and appear desirous of arriving at truth, I cannot but recommend it to you, to be above all things attentive to fundamental principles. Unless you build upon these, your superstructure, how beautiful soever it may be in your own imagination, will have neither stability, nor use. As you have not even ventured to question the correctness of my demonstration, from which demonstration it follows, as a necessary conclusion, that a "triennial parliament" would be "a gross violation of the constitution," I cannot, I confess, understand, how you are authorized in saying that notwithstanding what I have urged, you are still "the unshaken advocate of Triennial Parliaments."—But, Sir, let us return to the point from whence we set out. Your book assumes that "triennial parliaments" make a part of Sir Francis Burdett's Plan of Parliamentary Reform." To deny the fact, is a main object of my letter to you. On this point you make no answer. I was warranted in my denial of this assumed fact, on two grounds. 1st, Sir Francis proposes that parliaments be brought back to a "constitutional duration," and I demonstrate that such a duration cannot exceed one year. 2nd, It happened to me to know, that such is the view of Sir Francis himself on the point in question; for I was with him at the time he wrote down the propositions which, in the course of a day, or two afterwards, he moved in parliament; on which occasion, he took from its shelf a book, to show me high constitutional authority for the opinion he entertained, on what was the "constitutional duration" of parliaments; from which authority it appeared, that a parliament of more than one year's duration could not be constitutional.—You say that "annual "parliaments are conformable to the spirit of our ancient laws. But the question rests not here. The ancient laws "which compose the British Constitution "possess no intrinsic, or mystical excellence, they are but a means to an end, "they are valuable only as they conduce "to human happiness."—This short passage appears to be crowded with misconceptions and errors. 1st, No "laws" either antient or modern "compose the British Constitution," or any "constitu-

tion." 2d, My references had been to the English Constitution. 3d, A "British Constitution," is a non-entity, which never had existence. England and Scotland are to this day governed by systems of laws radically different one from the other; as following of course from different constitutions. We may recollect, when Lord Melville threatened us with the introduction into England, of the constitution and law of Scotland, as better adapted to the arbitrary purposes of himself and the late Mr. Pitt. 4th, My references to the Statutes of the 4th & 36th of Edw. III. were not as "composing" the constitution; but merely as evidences of what, in those days, our ancestors conceived the constitution to be touching the "duration" of parliaments. 5th, Our ancestors of that period had no conception of what is now meant, when we speak of "annual parliaments."—A moderate degree of attention to my letter should seem to have been sufficient for preventing such errors as these.—When you denied my proposition that "Parliamentary Representation and "Political Liberty are convertible terms," I was prepared to discover that I had been mistaken, and equally prepared on such a discovery to have confessed my error: but the effect of your remarks, instead of shaking that opinion, have confirmed me in it.—You observe that "Parliamentary Representation may be conceived to exist, "in the utmost perfection, where liberty "is infringed by a thousand unnecessary "institutions."—Had you indeed proved this, it would not only have abated my ardour as a parliamentary reformer, but it would have convinced me, that I had for thirty years been pursuing a shadow. Now, Sir, for your proof—"In a country, "where suffrage should be universal, and "elections annual, the predominant religious sect might (and in an age of bigotry certainly would) load their fellow citizens of an opposite persuasion with "the most oppressive exclusions and inquisitorial pains."—Stating this situation of things, as your idea of representation "in the utmost perfection," and as what you conceive might possibly be the effect of it, does it amount to any thing else than this, that, under such a state of representation, the majority of the nation, if they had any disputes, would prevail in the legislature over the minority? and is not this political liberty "in the utmost perfection?" It is no part of the definition of liberty, that a nation shall not be capa-

ble of folly.—Under such a system of "representation in the utmost perfection," or, as I should say, political liberty in the utmost perfection, (for I still hold them to be convertible terms) it is not unreasonable to suppose, that all those "institutions" which embitter one religious sect against another, would soon be brought into such a complete subjection to the civil state, as to produce, not "toleration," but real religious liberty; so that every citizen should be perfectly free to worship God according to his own creed, without any persons feeling an interest in persecuting him. Is not this the case in America at this day? And is it not the natural effect of a representation nearer to perfection than any nation ever before practically enjoyed; not excepting that from which they derived the representative parts of their constitutions?—Remember, Sir, I am endeavouring to shew what is "political liberty;" not what use men will, or will not, make of that liberty. And as I do not accede to your definition of political liberty, which is not definite enough to please me, and very inferior to what you will find given by Doctor Price, so I am as little inclined to resort to the means you seem to have discovered, for correcting those evils which you are so apprehensive must arise from "Representation in the utmost perfection."—Having pointed out, specified particular evils, as what in such a state of society, might be naturally expected, you say, "On the contrary, in "an absolute monarchy, a prince of patriotic feelings, and enlightened understanding, might establish perfect toleration, and abolish most of those regulations, which, without benefiting the public, better the exertions of individual man. Thus we see that oppression may "exist in conjunction with the most perfect system of representation, and that a "considerable share of liberty may obtain where representation is unknown."—Here, Sir, are glaring inconsistencies, into which you could not have fallen, had you been acquainted with the principles of the science you are writing upon, or, in other words, had you acquired accurate notions of liberty; the most concise definition of which, whether it relate to a state, or to an individual citizen, is, that it is the power of self-government. Is it not self-evident, that in a state which enjoys "representation in the utmost perfection," there must reside "in the utmost perfection" self-government, or

liberty? And is it not equally self-evident, that in "an absolute monarchy," which in terms describes a government at the will of one man, or a perfect despotism, there can be no "liberty" whatever?—A state, or an individual man, possessing self-government, or liberty, may doubtless make an ill use of it; but, be such folly what it may, I do not apprehend that the proper corrective is a deprivation of liberty; for that very deprivation must either abridge, or destroy, the power of amendment, when reason or experience shall have convinced the state or the individual of its or his error. And as to your palpable inconsistency, in supposing "that a considerable share of liberty may obtain where representation is unknown;" it arises from your mistaking the protection, or favour, or indulgence of a despot, who can withdraw the same at any moment, for liberty, which is the power of self-government, independent of the prince or magistrate.—Having thus, Sir, shewn that on neither of the topics, which were the objects of my former letter to you, have you given the smallest answer; and that I cannot discover any principles of free government, or of the English Constitution, from which you argue in favour of "triennial parliaments," which therefore appear to me a superstructure without a foundation, that alone seems to be a very sufficient reason for my not replying to your arguments in favour of them, after what I have already advanced against them in my former letter.—I once, Sir, had put into my hands by a friend, a very bulky volume of Swedenbourg's Works, in order to convert me to the baron's opinions in religion; but finding in the first page, the fancies which he had taken for his foundations, and being convinced of their fallacy, I excused myself from reading farther, as I was not in quest of amusement, but truth. I have, however, read your letter to the end; and having already shewn how much I differ from you in fundamentals, it would be idle to multiply words in controverting your conclusions.—I shall only shortly observe, that your arguments for preferring, in the teeth of demonstration as to the principle, triennial to annual parliaments, appear to me to be the effect, rather of errors derived from an observation of corrupt and erroneous practice, than of a contemplation of the nature of election properly regulated. If we are not to be guided by the principles of reason, and the laws of nature, in

vain hath the Deity furnished us with either moral or intellectual guides.—I believe, Sir, that where political liberty shall be enjoyed "in the utmost perfection," there will "wisdom" and "virtue," "talent" and "integrity," be most likely to find their way into a representative legislature; and to think otherwise, appears to me an unintentional satire on the Author of Nature.—Still, Sir, respecting your endeavours to promote the liberties of your country, I remain your obedient servant,
JOHN CARTWRIGHT.

HIGH PRICES.

SIR; In the Supplement to No. 18. of Vol. xvi. of your Register, is a Letter on the High Price of Provisions; on which, with your permission, I will make a few remarks. The writer begins by deploring the effect of the Duke of Portland's Proclamation in 1799; by which the miseries of the people were greatly aggravated; insomuch that the advance of price was 125 per cent., when the real deficiency of crop was only 25 per cent. With this fact before him, he proceeds to give us the information contained in the following paragraph. "The recent and rapid advanced price of corn, must either be or be not the measure of the scantiness of crop, to which it is ascribable. If it be the measure of it, then the scarcity amounts to one third of last year's crop, for the price has advanced or will soon advance in that proportion to last year's price. And if it be not the measure of it, then it is not the corn that has advanced a third in price, but the money that has retreated back to two thirds of its last year's exchangeable value." A set of "long faced farmers with scanty samples," "filching dealers and greedy bankers," have performed this wonder in the space of six short weeks; all the rag merchants and paper makers in the united kingdom, having been put in requisition.—I think it right however to inform this gentleman, (what I believe no other person who has thought on the subject need be told), that an apprehension of scarcity, in articles of the first necessity, enhances the demand, and consequently the price, much beyond the occasion: That the produce of our own harvest, is, on an average of years, barely sufficient to feed us; therefore if our crop fall, in any degree, short of the average, we must depend, in that degree, on other countries for our

subsistence. Now, if the public have let in a notion that the crop of this year is somewhat below par, that notion, joined to another on the uncertainty of a foreign supply, may account for the advance in price, without supposing a sudden exacerbation of avarice in the farmers, dealers and bankers. A circumstance, that, I am happy to assure your correspondent, has not occurred within my observation, which is pretty extensive among these classes of the community.

I am, Sir, Yours, &c. M. B.
Dec. 10, 1809.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

CITY OF LONDON ADDRESS, Dec. 20, 1809.

To the King's Most Excellent Majesty,
The humble, loyal, and dutiful Address and Petition of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the City of London, in Common Council assembled.

Most gracious Sovereign;

We your Majesty's most faithful, loyal, and dutiful subjects, the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the City of London, in Common Council assembled, most humbly approach your Majesty's sacred person, in the perfect assurance that your Majesty will graciously condescend to receive the suggestions of your faithful and loyal Citizens, on subjects which seriously and deeply affect their interests, in common with the rest of your Majesty's people.

We have witnessed with deep regret the disastrous failure of the late Expedition, as the magnitude of its equipment had raised the just hopes and expectations of the Country to some permanent benefit.

And we cannot avoid expressing to your Majesty the sorrow and indignation with which we are affected, by the unhappy dissensions that have prevailed among your Majesty's Ministers, and our fears that such dissensions may prove eminently prejudicial to the best interests of the Nation.

Your Majesty's faithful Citizens, actuated by loyal attachment to your Sacred Person and Illustrious House, and solicitous for the honour of your Majesty's arms and the dignity and solidity of your Majesty's Councils, are deeply impressed with the necessity of an early and strict Inquiry into the causes of the failure of the late

Expedition, therefore pray your Majesty will direct Inquiry to be forthwith instituted, in order to ascertain the causes which have occasioned it.

Signed by Order of Court,
HENRY WOODTHORPE.

To which Address and Petition His Majesty was graciously pleased to return the following Answer:—

I thank you for your expressions of duty and attachment to me and to my Family.—The recent Expedition to the Scheldt was directed to several objects of great importance to the interests of my Allies, and to the security of my dominions.—I regret, that of these objects a part only has been accomplished.—I have not judged it to be necessary to direct any Military Inquiry into the Conduct of my Commanders by Sea or Land in this conjoint Service.—It will be for my Parliament, in their wisdom, to ask for such information, or to take such measures upon this subject as they shall judge most conducive to the public good.

SPAIN.—MANIFESTO, fixing the days when the GENERAL CORTES of the Spanish Monarchy are to be convoked and held;
Dated Royal Alcazar of Seville, Oct. 28, 1809.—(Concluded from p. 960.)

----- These forces have since fought, it is true, with ill success, but always with gallantry and glory. The creation, the reparation, and the subsistence of these armies have more than absorbed the considerable supplies which have been sent us by our brethren in America. We have maintained in the free Provinces unity, order and justice, and in those occupied by the enemy we have exerted our endeavours to preserve, though secretly, the fire of patriotism and the bounds of loyalty. We have vindicated the national honour and independence in the most complicated and difficult diplomatic negotiations; and we have made head against adversity, without suffering ourselves to despair, ever trusting that we should overcome it by our constancy. We have, without doubt, committed errors, and we would willingly, were it possible, redeem them with our blood: but in the confusion of events, among the mountains of difficulties which surrounded us, who could be certain of always being in the right? Could we be responsible because one body of troops wanted valour, and another confidence; because one General

has less prudence, and another less good fortune? Much, Spaniards, is to be attributed to our inexperience, much to circumstances, but nothing to our intention. That ever has been to deliver our unfortunate King from slavery, and preserve to him a throne for which the Spanish people have made such sacrifices, and to maintain it free, independent and happy. We have, from the time of our institution, promised him a country; we have decreed the abolition of arbitrary power, from the time we announced the re-establishment of our Cortes. Such is, Spaniards, the use we have made of the unlimited power and authority confided to us; and when your wisdom shall have established the basis and form of Government most proper for the independence and good of the State, we will resign the authority into the hands you shall point out, contented with the glory of having given to the Spaniards the dignity of a nation legitimately constituted. May this solemn and magnificent assembly be productive of efficacious means, energy, and fortune; may it be an immense inextinguishable volcano, from which may flow torrents of patriotism to revivify every part of this vast monarchy, to inflame all minds with that sublime enthusiasm which produces the safety and glory of nations, and the despair of tyrants; and yourselves, noble Fathers of the country, to the elevation of your high duties, and Spain exalted with you to an equally brilliant destiny, shall see returned into her bosom for her happiness, Ferdinand 7th, and his unfortunate family; shall see her sons enter on the path of prosperity and glory which they ought henceforth to pursue, and receive the crown of the sublime and almost divine efforts which they are making.

Marquis of ASTORGA, President.

PEDRO DE RIVERO, Sec.-Gen.

FRANCE.—*Speech of the Emperor Napoleon, at the opening of the meeting of the Legislative Body. Dec. 3, 1809.*

Gentlemen Deputies of Departments to the Legislative Body.—Since your last Session I have reduced Arragon and Castile to submission, and driven from Madrid the fallacious Government formed by England. I was marching upon Cadiz and Lisbon, when I was under the necessity of treading back my steps, and of planting my eagles on the ramparts of Vienna. Three months have seen the

rise and termination of this fourth Ponic War. Accustomed to the devotedness and courage of my armies, I must nevertheless, under these circumstances, acknowledge the particular proofs of affection which my soldiers of Germany have given me.—The genius of France conducted the English army—it has terminated its projects in the pestilential marshes of Walcheren. In that important period I remained 400 leagues distant, certain of the new glory which my people would acquire, and of the grand character they would display. My hopes have not been deceived—I owe particular thanks to the Citizens of the Departments of the Pas de Calais and the North. Frenchmen! Every one that shall oppose you shall be conquered and reduced to submission. Your grandeur shall be increased by the hatred of your enemies. You have before you long years of glory and prosperity. You have the force and energy of the Hercules of the Ancients.—I have united Tuscany to the Empire. The Tuscans were worthy of it by the mildness of their character, by the attachment their ancestors have always shewn us, and by the services they have rendered to European civilization.—History pointed out to me the conduct I ought to pursue towards Rome: the Popes, become Sovereigns of part of Italy, have constantly shewn themselves enemies of every preponderating power in the peninsula—they have employed their spiritual power to injure it.—It was then demonstrated to me that the spiritual influence exercised in my States by a foreign Sovereign, was contrary to the independence of France, to the dignity and safety of my throne. However, as I acknowledge the necessity of the spiritual influence of the descendants of the first of the pastors, I could not conciliate these grand interests but by annulling the donative of the French Emperors my predecessors, and by uniting the Roman States to France.—By the Treaty of Vienna, all the Kings, and Sovereigns my allies, who have given me so many proofs of the constancy of their friendship, have acquired and shall acquire a fresh increase of territory.—The Illyrian Provinces stretch the frontiers of my great Empire to the Save. Contiguous to the Empire of Constantinople, I shall find myself in a situation to watch over the first interests of my commerce in the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, and the Levant. I will protect the Porte, if the Porte withdraw herself from the fatal in-

fluence of England. I shall know how to punish her, if she suffer herself to be governed by cunning and perfidious counsels.—I have wished to give the Swiss Nation a new proof of my esteem, by annexing to my titles that of their Mediator, and thus putting an end to all the uneasiness endeavoured to be spread among that brave people.—Holland, placed between England and France, is equally bruised by them. Yet she is the *débouché* of the principal arteries of my empire.—Changes will become necessary; the safety of my frontiers, and the well understood interests of the two countries, imperiously require them.—Sweden has lost, by her alliance with England, after a disastrous war, the finest and most important of her provinces. Happy would it have been for that nation, if the wise Prince that governs her now had ascended the throne some years sooner? This example proves anew to kings that the alliance of England is the surest presage of ruin.—My ally and friend, the Emperor of Russia, has united to his vast empire, Finland, Moldavia, Wallachia, and a district of Galicia.—I am not jealous of any thing that can produce good to that Empire. My sentiments for its illustrious Sovereign are in unison with my policy.—When I shall shew myself beyond the Pyrenees, the frightened leopard will fly to the ocean, to avoid shame, defeat and death. The triumph of my arms will be the triumph of the genius of good over that of evil; of moderation, order, and morality over civil war, anarchy and the bad passions. My friendship and protection will, I hope, restore tranquillity and happiness to the people of the Spains.—Gentlemen Deputies of Departments to the Legislative Body—I have directed my Minister of the Interior to lay before you the history of the legislation, of the administration, and of the finances of the year just expired; you will see that all the ideas I had conceived for the amelioration of my people, have been followed with the greatest activity—that in Paris, as in the most distant parts of my empire, the war has not produced any delay in the public works. The Members of my Council of State will submit to you different projects of law, and especially the law upon the Finances; you will see in it their prosperous condition. I demand of my people no new sacrifice, though circumstances have obliged me to double my military means.

FLUSHING.—Sentence against General Monnet.

Dec. 9.—The Council of Inquiry appointed by his Majesty the Emperor and King, convened by his Excellency Count De Huneburgh, Minister at War, in obedience to his Majesty's Orders, dated Schoenbrunn, Sept. 7, 1809, and assembled at the General Military Depot, closed on the 25th of last month its deliberations, and pronounced the following Sentence:—That General Monnet, contrary to his duty, did not fulfil the orders of his Imperial Majesty, in case of his being pressed hard by the enemy, to cut the dykes rather than surrender.—That he surrendered the fortress at a time when it had only sustained a bombardment of thirty-six hours, when the garrison was still composed of more than 4,000 men, when no breach was made in the rampart, and the enemy was yet more than 800 metres distant from the fortress, and when our troops were yet in possession of the outworks, and when, consequently, the place was not really besieged.—That the General is therefore guilty of gross misconduct, which cannot be attributed to any other motive than cowardice and treason. And the Council declares, moreover, that the General is guilty of extortion and embezzlement, since it appears in evidence, that he did receive, or caused to be received, for his own private benefit and use, from the year 1803 to the year 1806, the sum of ten Dutch stivers, or twenty sous 'Fournois for each half ankar Geneva which was exported.

(Signed) Count RAMPON.
Count d'ALZVELLE, Vice-Ad.
HERENOUD.
Counts SONGER & BASSON.

The above Sentence was confirmed by the Emperor and King on the 6th instant, and ordered to be transmitted to the Minister at War, for the purpose of being carried into execution against the delinquent.

BATTLE OF OCANA.—Report from the Duke of Dalmatia to his Excellency the Minister at War; dated Das Barrias, Nov. '19, 1809.

The troops of his Imperial Majesty have gained a signal victory. The battle was fought in the vicinity of Ocana, where the insurgents had assembled a force of 55,000 men, 700 of whom were horse, with

a numerous park of artillery. The 4th army joined by the 5th under the orders of Marshal Duke of Treviso, the division of dragoons commanded by Gen. Milhaud, the division of light horse under the command of Gen. Beauryant, and the brigade of light horse of Gen. Paris, the Royal Guards, and two battalions of Spanish troops, marched yesterday to meet the enemy, who, according to every intelligence received, had taken post at Ocana. About nine o'clock this morning our advanced parties came in sight of the enemy's army. At eleven o'clock the action commenced, and in two hours it was decided in our favour. The Spaniards, encouraged by their superiority in numbers, made a vigorous resistance; but they were attacked with such irresistible valour by our troops, that they soon gave way; their position was carried, and they were thrown into the utmost confusion. All their artillery and field equipage fell into our hands; more than 50 pieces of cannon have already been brought in, 15 stand of colours, and numerous prisoners have been taken, among whom are 3 Generals, 6 Colonels, and 700 inferior officers. The ground is covered with the slain, and with more than 40,000 muskets. They who escaped took to flight, without arms, and without knowing whither to direct their steps. This morning the King gave the command of the cavalry to General Sebastiani, and the admirable manner in which he manœuvred and made his charges, fully justified his Majesty's choice. General Milhaud also greatly distinguished himself; and all the different commanders of horse displayed the utmost intrepidity and valour. The Marshal Duke of Treviso commanded the infantry of the 4th and 5th corps; it is utterly impossible to behave in a more gallant manner than he did. He received a contusion in the arm; but this did not prevent him from continuing the command. Our loss does not in my estimation exceed 400 men. The Marshal Duke of Belluno is ordered this morning to cross the Tagus, between Villamarique and Fuente Duenar. He is to attack the enemy in the position he has taken up at Santa Cruz, and pursue in whatever direction he may choose to retreat. He was this morning informed by letter, that the enemy had concentrated his force near Ocana, and ordered to direct his march to that point. As he had to perform a very long march, he could not arrive sufficiently in time to share in the action; nay the King did not receive

any intelligence from him the whole of the day, and his Majesty is, therefore, perfectly ignorant of what the Duke of Belluno has been doing. I shall however have to make my further report on this subject as soon as possible.—Please to lay my report before his Imperial Majesty, and to accept the assurance of my high consideration.

Marshal DUKE of DALMATIA,
Major-Genéral.

SPAIN.—*From the Government Gazette extraordinary of Nov. 23.*

Two dispatches have just been received from the General Don Juan Carlos de Areizaga, dated 19th and 20th, in Turleque and Daimiel, both of which arrived at the same time.

In the first he states, that the enemy having attacked our army in the centre and on the flanks at Ocana, but making their principal effort against our right, with a view to turn it, an obstinate resistance was made for three hours, when they were repulsed by the division of the gallant Brigadier Lacey; but the superiority of the enemy's artillery caused a dispersion, which obliged our army to retreat under cover of our vanguard, and 6th division; that our loss is considerable, but the enemy's not less so, as he was repulsed several times by our infantry, and the brisk fire of the artillery.

The Dispatch of the 20th is as follows:

Excellent Seigneur—I arrived here this night, and to morrow I shall proceed to Santa Cruz, where I have directed the infantry should join, and the cavalry of this dispersed army will join in Manzanares, with the exception of a part of the second division, under the command of Brigadier Don Gaspar Bigodet, in order to check the enemy (whose advanced posts have this day reached Madridejos, and of whose main body I know nothing), not to permit his drawing near the Sierra Morena, and to preserve my supplies from La Mancha. Then, should it be possible for me, I will give your Excellency an account of our loss. I can, however, in the mean time, inform your Excellency, that it has been very considerable in good Generals and Officers, which is the best proof that these have distinguished themselves on this occasion with the greatest honour; following the example of the Generals of Divisions, who have given proofs of their skill in their good dispositions, and of their charac-

teristic intrepidity.—God preserve your Excellency.

(Signed) JUAN CARLOS DE AREIZAGA.

Head-quarters, Daimiel, Nov. 20, 1809.

PROCLAMATION OF THE JUNTA, *dated Royal Alcázar of Seville, Nov. 21, 1809.*

Spaniards!—Our enemies announce, as positively certain, a peace in Germany, and the circumstances which accompany this notice give it a character of truth which leaves little room for doubt. They already threaten us with the powerful reinforcements which they suppose to be marching to complete our ruin; already, probably elated with the favourable aspect which their affairs in the North have assumed, they insolently exhort us to submit to the clemency of the Conqueror, and tamely bow our necks to the yoke.—No, servants of Buonaparté! [the Address afterwards continues,] placed as we are by your baseness, between ignominy and death, what choice would you wish a brave nation to make, but to defend itself to the last extremity? Continue to rob, murder, and destroy, as you have done for these twenty months past; increase that incessantly eternal hatred and thirst for vengeance which we must ever feel towards you. Shall we fall at the feet of the crowned slave whom Buonaparté has sent us for a King, because he burns our temples, distributes our virgins and matrons among his odious satellites, and sends our youth as a tribute to the French Minotaur!—Think not, Spaniards, that the Junta addresses you thus to excite your valour by the arts of language.—What occasion is there for words, when things speak so plainly for themselves? Your houses are demolished, your temples polluted, your fields ravaged, your families dispersed, or hurried to the grave.—Shall we consent to the total destruction of our holy religion in which we were born, and which we have so solemnly sworn to preserve? Our country is laid waste, and we are insulted, and treated as a vile herd of cattle, which are bought and sold, and slaughtered when our master pleases. Remember, Spaniards, the vile and treacherous manner in which this Usurper tore from us our King.—He called himself his ally, his protector, his friend; he pretended to give him the kiss of peace, but his embraces are the folds of the serpent, which twine round the inno-

cent victim, and drag him to his cavern. Such perfidy is unknown to civilized nations, and scarcely practised among the most barbarous. The Sovereign we idolize is condemned to groan in solitude, surrounded by guards and spies. Amidst his sufferings, he can only silently implore the valour of his beloved Spaniards for liberty or vengeance.—There can be no peace while these things subsist. That Spain may be free, is the universal wish of the nation. That Spain may be free, or that it may become an immense desert, one vast sepulchre, where the accumulated carcasses of French and Spaniards shall exhibit to future ages our glory and their ignominy. But this wretched fate is not to be feared by brave men. Victory, sooner or later, must be the reward of fortitude and constancy. What but these defended the small republics of Greece from the barbarous invasion of Xerxes? What protected the capitol when assailed by the Gauls? What preserved it from the arms of Hannibal? What in more modern times rescued the Swiss from German tyranny, and gave independence to Holland? What, in fine, inspires at present the Tyrolese with such heroic resolution, that, though surrounded on every side by enemies, and abandoned by their protectors, they take refuge in their rocks, and on the summits of their mountains, and hurl defiance and defeat on the battalions of the conqueror of Dantzic. The God of armies, for whom we suffer, will give us success, and conduct us through all the dangers that surround us to the throne of independence.—Spaniards, the Junta announces this to you frankly, that you may not for a moment be ignorant of the danger which threatens your country; it announces it to you, with confidence that you will shew yourselves worthy of the cause which you defend, and of the admiration of the universe.—[The Address goes on to exhort the Spanish nation to submit to every privation, and make every sacrifice to save the State.]—When the storm rages, the most valuable treasures must be thrown into the sea to save the vessel from sinking.—Perish the man whose selfishness can render him wanting in his duty, or induce him to conceal what is necessary to be distributed among his brethren, for the common defence! —

(To be continued.)

LONDON:—Printed by T. C. HANSARD, Peterborough-Court, Fleet-Street;
Published by R. BAGSHAW, Brydges-Street, Covent-Garden:—Sold also by J. BUDD, Pall-Mall.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVI. No. 26.] LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1809. [Price 1s.

"It cannot be imagined, that any bill from hence will ever *destroy the legislative power*. Therefore, "there being no need of this proviso, pray lay it aside."—SIR CHRISTOPHER MUSGRAVE'S Speech upon "the Bill for establishing the *Coronation Oath*. See Parl. History, Vol. V. p. 208.

993]

[994

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CATHOLIC CLAIMS.—I am now at the close of the *eighth year* of the continuation of this Work. Many are the subjects which have been discussed in it; but, I can safely say, that no subject, in the discussing of which I have taken a part, has ever excited so general and deep an interest, as appears to have been excited by the subject of Catholic Claims, as placed before the eyes of my readers in the Number of the 9th of this month, page 865.—TRUTH has two great and frequently mortal enemies; 1st, *the power of punishing men for speaking or writing what is true*; 2nd, the using of *a multitude of words*. By the first she is caught by the throat, and strangled; by the second she is overlaid. The causes of her suffering are somewhat different; but the effect, in both cases, is precisely the same. How many, how many many scores, are the instances, wherein I have observed the enemies of truth, when, from the nature of circumstances, they have found themselves unable to succeed by the way of strangle, have resorted, and with complete success, to the not-less-effectual mode of overlaying!—In no instance, however, do I recollect truth to have suffered more, from this latter mode of attack, than in the instance of the Catholic Claims; and, as is frequently the case, the attack has been, on the part of her friends, not a bit less formidable than on the part of her enemies. The cause of the Catholics was so good, the reasoning, necessary to maintain it, lay in so small a compass, and was so well supported by undeniable facts, that its advocates need only have made *a short and plain statement of the case*, and, in answer to the long-winded and bewildering speeches and publications of their opponents, have merely repeated *that statement*. But, from the prevalence of the fashion of much-speaking; from the vulgar notion, that great talent consists in the facility of pouring out, at will, a multitude of words; and, from want of due reflection upon the

consequences of never-ending (I do not mean *never-dying*) speeches and pamphlets; from these causes, discussions upon the Claims of the Catholics have grown into such a length, have assumed a form so hugely voluminous, that the very bulk of them is enough to fill with despair the heart of any reader not endowed with more courage than generally falls to the lot of man.—Such being my opinion, I shall not, upon this subject of Catholic Claims, insert, come whence it will, any thing of considerable length, persons, who have a taste for overlaying matter, having already an ample supply in the dozens of volumes, which, at less than half-price, the booksellers of London and Westminster will be glad to part with. Indeed, I should not think it necessary to say one more word upon the subject, except in the way of *re-publication*. I am firmly convinced, that it is impossible for any advocate of No-Popery to make any answer, worthy of a moment's attention, to the article above-mentioned, published in the Register of the 9th instant. But, two or three of my correspondents express a wish to hear something upon the *Coronation Oath*, as connected with the Catholic Claims. Good God! That Oath has no more to do with those Claims than it has to do with Mr. Bagshaw's claim upon any of his customers for the amount of the Register that I am now writing. Nevertheless, as it is possible that many persons may entertain some doubts upon the subject; as the words of this Oath are in the possession of so comparatively small number of persons; and, especially as I recollect, that, in the year 1801, I myself, taking upon trust what I heard from others, sincerely believed, that a compliance with the wishes of the Catholics would amount to a violation of this Oath, I will here endeavour to place the matter in so clear a light, that the most crafty shall not, with respect to it, have it any longer in their power to impose upon the most ignorant or most unwary.—Before we go any further, it may not, with a view to perspicuity, be amiss for us to re-

state the question; for, however contrary it may be to the fashion of the times, it certainly does seem consonant to reason, that, before men talk much, they should come to an understanding as to *what they are talking about*.—My Lord Howick's Bill, in 1807, contemplated a relaxation in the laws respecting the exclusion from military, and, I believe, naval, offices, of our Roman Catholic fellow subjects. As the law now stands, the king cannot legally appoint Roman Catholics to the *higher* ranks, at least, in the army or the navy. My lord Howick's Bill did not go to give the Catholics a right to *demand* of the king any promotion at all; but, to enable the king to *use his pleasure* as to such promotion.—It does appear perfectly monstrous, and, at a future day, it will hardly be believed, that the proposing of this bill should have been represented as an *attempt upon the king's conscience*; as an attempt to entrap him, or to enforce him into a *violation of his coronation oath*; and especially, when it will be seen recorded in the statute book, that, three years before, the king had voluntarily given his consent to an act, which enabled him to employ and to promote (without any limitation whatever) *foreign* Roman Catholics, in the army. It is to be observed, too, that this act was well known not to be intended as a mere matter of form, but was to be acted upon, and immediately too, and to a very considerable extent. After this, it does appear monstrous, that the Bill of Lord Howick should have been represented as an attempt to force the king to *violate his coronation oath*, which, if the bill could have produced a violation of it, had been voluntarily violated by the king three years before.—Yet, incredible as this will and must appear to posterity, such was notoriously the fact; and, it is still fresh in our memories, that the proposing of this Bill was made the ground of dismissing the late ministry, against whom, from one end of the kingdom to the other, their opponents had the address to raise the cry of "*No-Popery*," which words conveyed a charge of their having attempted to re-establish, in this kingdom, the popish religion. Of folly so completely brutish as this, history, as far as I am acquainted with it, furnishes no example.—From the very words of the Coronation Oath, it is evident, that the measure proposed could have produced no violation of it. We will now see what those words are; and, that we may have the thing fully before us, let us take them

together with the rest of the Act of Parliament, of which they make a part, the title of which Act is: "*An Act for establishing the Coronation Oath*," and which Act is the VIth Chapter of the first session of the first year of WILLIAM and MARY.

"WHEREAS by the Law and antient Usage of this Realm, the Kings and Queens thereof have taken a solemn Oath upon the Evangelists at their respective Coronations, to maintain the Statutes, Laws, and Customs of the said Realm, and all the People and Inhabitants thereof, in their Spiritual and Civil Rights and Properties; But forasmuch as the Oath itself on such Occasion administered, hath heretofore been framed in doubtful Words and Expressions, with relation to ancient Laws and Constitutions at this Time unknown:" To the end therefore that one uniform Oath may be in all Times to come taken by the Kings and Queens of this Realm, and to them respectively administered at the Times of their and every of their Coronation; may it please your Majesties that it may be enacted;—II. And be it enacted by the King's and Queen's most Excellent Majesties, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That the Oath herein mentioned, and hereafter expressed, shall and may be administered to their most Excellent Majesties King *William* and Queen *Mary*, (whom God long preserve), at the Time of their Coronation, in the presence of all Persons that shall be then and there present at the solemnizing thereof, by the Archbishop of *Canterbury*, or the Archbishop of *York*, or either of them, or any other Bishop of this Realm, whom the King's Majesty shall thereunto appoint, and who shall be hereby thereunto respectively authorized; which Oath followeth, and shall be administered in this Manner, that is to say,

The Archbishop or Bishop shall say,

"III. Will you solemnly promise and swear to govern the People of this Kingdom of *England*, and the Dominions thereto belonging, according to the Statutes in Parliament agreed on, and the Laws and Customs of the same?"

The King and Queen shall say,

"I solemnly promise so to do."

Archbishop or Bishop.—"Will you to your Power cause Law and Justice, in

"Mercy, to be executed in all your Judgments?"

King and Queen.—"I will."

Archbishop or Bishop.—"Will you to the utmost of your Power maintain the Laws of God, the true profession of the Gospel, and the Protestant Reformed Religion established by Law? And will you preserve unto the Bishops and Clergy of this Realm, and to the Churches committed to their Charge, all such Rights and Privileges, as by Law do or shall appertain unto them, or any of them?"

King and Queen.—"All this I promise to do."

After this, the King and Queen laying his and her Hand upon the Holy Gospels, shall say,

"The things which I have here before promised, I will perform and keep. So help me God."

Then the King and Queen shall kiss the book.

IV. And be it further enacted, That the said Oath shall be in like Manner administered to every King or Queen, who shall succeed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm, at their respective Coronations, by one of the Archbishops or Bishops of this Realm of *England*, for the Time being, to be thereunto appointed by such King or Queen respectively, and in the presence of all Persons that shall be attending, assisting, or otherwise present at such their respective Coronations, any Law, Statute, or Usage, to the contrary notwithstanding.

Now, reader, do you see any thing here that forbids the king to give his assent to any measure whatever tending to relax the laws against Roman Catholics, and especially a measure, which had in contemplation merely to open to them the door of *military and naval promotion*? On what sentence, on what phrase, on what word, is it that craft can affect to found such an interpretation?—Did the proposed measure tend to cause the king to govern the people contrary to the statutes in parliament agreed on and the laws and customs of the land?—Did it tend to induce the king not to cause law and justice, in mercy, to be executed in his judgments?—Did it tend to induce him not to maintain the protestant religion as established by law?—Did it strike at any right or privilege, which, by law, did or do, belong to the Bishops and Clergy of

the established Church?—To each of these questions common sense gives, without a moment's hesitation, a decided negative.—On what, then, is it, that political craft and intrigue have founded this pretended charge of attempting to entrap the conscience of the king and to induce him to violate his coronation oath? Why, it is this; that the king has sworn to maintain the protestant religion, as by *law established*; that these last words meant the law as it then stood; and that, if he assent to any law altering the situation of the Catholics, such assent will be a violation of his oath.—But, in 1793, the king gave his assent to an act, authorizing him to grant commissions to Roman Catholics in the Irish army, and, in 1804, he gave his assent to an act, authorizing him to grant commissions, to any extent, in any part of his army, *though serving in this country, to Roman Catholic foreigners*. Where, let me ask, was his conscience then, if to assent to the measure proposed by Lord Howick, be now to violate his oath?—There is, however, in this interpretation of the oath, something so shockingly impudent, that I cannot dismiss it without further exposure.—In the first part of the oath, the king swears to govern the people of this country, "according to the statutes in parliament agreed on, and the laws and customs of the land." Now, when the king was crowned, no Englishman had ever yet dreamed of a law to take from him, in one direct tax, a tenth part of the whole of his income, by the authority of commissioners appointed by the ministry, and without leaving him, in case of over charge, any appeal to a JURY, though Magna Charta and the laws and usages of the land forbade that any man should have his property, or any portion of it, taken from him without the benefit of such appeal. Yet, whatever else we may think of this measure, no one ever was so absurd as to say, that, in giving his assent to it, the king violated his coronation oath.—When the king was crowned "the Statutes in Parliament agreed on" declared, that no person, born out of the kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland, or the dominions thereunto belonging (although he be naturalized or made a denizen, except such as are born of English parents) shall be capable to be a privy counselor, or a member of either House of Parliament, or to enjoy any office or place of trust, either civil or military." But, do we not now see foreigners, numerous fo-

reigners in offices of trust, especially military; and, indeed, do we not see a German general *upon the Staff in England*, commanding a *district of England*, and having under his command English generals? Nay, we have, in arms and command, even in the bosom of our country, numerous foreign officers in places of great military trust. The law now, the law since a few years past, allows of this, I am aware; but, observe, the king gave his assent to this law, and, no one, however he might detest the measure, ever thought of regarding that assent as a *violation of the king's coronation oath*.—Again, and to come, if possible, still more closely to the point, “the Statutes in Parliament agreed ‘on,’ did, at the time when the king was crowned, nay they *do now*, prohibit *any one* from holding any place of trust, civil or military, unless he take the sacrament according to the rites and ceremonies of the Church of England. Yet are places of trust, both civil and military, daily filled by persons who never take this test, and to screen whom from punishment a bill of indemnity is annually passed; the king gives his assent *every year*, and, of course, has given it forty-nine times, to a bill the use, and the sole use, of which, is to screen from penalties those who violated a statute, which was not only in existence when he was crowned, but which is still in existence, and which was made for the purpose of securing the predominance of the “Protestant religion as by law established.” Yet, no one, that I have ever heard of, has, at any time, pretended, that the king, by giving such assent, *violated his coronation oath*.—Hundreds of instances might be cited; but, there certainly is no one so striking as that relative to the employment of *foreign troops*, in England, and the giving of high military commands to *foreign officers*. Good God! If our grandfathers could look out of their graves, what would they say to us? If there be any subject, upon which more than upon any other, they were anxious to leave to posterity a clearly expressed opinion, it is the subject of a *standing army*; and, as to a standing army of *foreigners*, kept up in England, what they would have said to that any one may gather from their speeches against the handful of Dutchmen, who came over with William III. King William was a great favourite; the nation called him their *deliverer*; these Dutch soldiers had come over with him, and had, of course, assisted the nation in shaking off the yoke

of the bigotted and tyrannical James II. But, notwithstanding these circumstances, our *grandfathers* would not suffer those Dutchmen, or any part of them, to remain in arms in England; and the king never had peace or rest, until he had sent them away.—Upon almost all *other subjects* I have found some one correspondent, at least, to differ from me in opinion; but, upon this subject of foreign troops, I have never found any one, either under a real or a feigned name, to differ from me. Yet, having digressed, I will trespass a little further, especially as this matter is very closely connected with that of the dangers to Ireland. We have in this kingdom, at this time, a number of foreign troops equal, I believe, to that of the whole peace establishment in the reign of the late king. We maintain, in fact, an army of foreigners; The “*German Legion*,” as it is called, consists of *horse, foot, artillery, and engineers*. The several corps of this army have, each of them, its *foreign commander*. We have, as I before observed, seen a *district of England*, that is to say, several counties of England, under the military command of a *foreign general*, which district is, I believe, still under his command. Now, let us consider in what a situation we stand, supposing the country to be *INVADED*. What are the specimens which we have had of the *bravery* of this German Legion shall, hereafter, be a subject of remark, upon some occasion when it may be proper to give an account of *what passed at the battle of Talavera*. But, as to the question of *fidelity*, ought not the king's advisers, in as well as out of parliament, to reflect long and seriously? The whole of the history of the wars upon the continent, for the last seventeen years, abounds with instances of battles lost, of towns and provinces subdued, through the want of fidelity in the troops of the vanquished; and, I appeal to the reader's bare memory for the numerous instances, in which such want of fidelity has appeared amongst troops who were *not natives* of the soil they were employed to defend; nay, are we not daily told of the desertion of the Poles and Swiss and Germans from the ranks even of Buonaparté, where there is such a harvest of *plunder* continually going on? And, what assurance have WE that *foreigners*, employed to defend England or Ireland, would be faithful? They might *possibly* be faithful; but, in so serious a concern, ought we to leave any thing *doubtful*? It will be, and,

indeed, it has been, observed; the people of England have well observed, that no part of this German Legion, or army, is ever sent to the *East or West Indies*, nor to any of the king's *distant dominions*. Now, either these troops are *necessary* to the defence of this kingdom, or they are not; if they are not, *why were they raised, and why are they kept up, at such an enormous expence?* And, if they are, then is it declared to the world, that England, that this Queen of Isles, that this mistress of the Ocean, that Britannia, the ruler of the Waves, does, at last, *stand in need of foreign troops to defend her shores.*—

When the reader has taken time to let his blood cool (for boil it must if he has any in his veins) we will draw off again to our subject of the Coronation Oath.—Well, then, when the king was crowned; when the king took the coronation oath, “the statutes in parliament agreed on,” forbade, in the most clear and positive terms, the committing of *any office of trust*, either *civil or military*, to the hands of any foreigner whatever, except born of English parents. Such was the language of the law, and that law was, too, *made with a view to the king's family coming to the throne of this kingdom*, which is a circumstance very material. Let us now hear, then, what the Commentator upon the laws of England says, as to this point.—“Nothing,” says BLACKSTONE, Book I. Chap. 13. “Nothing ought to be more guarded against, in a free state, than making the military power when such a one is necessary to be kept on foot, a body too distinct from the people. *Like ours*, therefore, it should *wholly* be composed of NATURAL SUBJECTS. No separate camp, no barracks, no inland fortresses should be allowed, &c. &c. &c.”—What would Judge Blackstone have said, if he had lived to see the German Legion (horse, foot, artillery, and engineers,) and if he had seen, not only the immense barracks all over the country, but, if he had seen whole regiments of Englishmen with WHISKERS on their faces, and left with nothing about them having the look of Englishmen?—To be sure, the law has, within the last ten or twelve years, been *altered*, in respect to the employing of foreigners in our military service. I do not pretend that there is not now law for what has been done in this way. On the contrary, I know that there is law for it. But, if the altering of this law; this great con-

stitutional law; if, to alter this law was NO violation of the Coronation Oath (and I agree that it was no such violation,) is there yet a hypocritical knave to affect to believe, that the king's giving his assent to a relaxation of the excluding statutes against his suffering Roman Catholic subjects, would be a violation of that oath? Is there, I say, yet a hypocritical knave; is there yet, in the kingdom, a man so lost to all sense of shame, as well as of principle, as to affect to believe this? I will not now believe, that any thing further is *necessary* to be said upon this subject. Yet, I cannot refrain from inviting the reader to one other view of it.—It has been already observed, that, the crafty knaves, whose object it was to deceive the unwary, have raised a cavil upon the words “*law established*,” and, it has also been shown, from reason as well as from actual practice, that those words must mean, *the law as it should at any time stand*. But I now wish the reader to look back to the time, when the above-cited Act, establishing the Coronation Oath, was passed, and see in what sense those, *who passed the law*, understood the words in question.—There appears never to have been, for one moment, in existence, amongst those who passed this law, the smallest doubt, that the Oath left the king at perfect liberty to give his assent to any act for relaxing the then existing laws relative to any religious sect of his subjects. But, there did arise doubts as to whether the words, “maintain the Protestant reformed Religion as by *law established*,” would leave the king at liberty to give his assent to any bill for *altering any form or ceremony* in the established church. This became a question; upon this question the leading members gave their opinions; and, it will be found, that those opinions exactly apply to the case before us.—See the PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, Vol. V. p. 208 and the following.—There it will be seen, that there existed a *doubt* whether the words, “*as by law established*,” might not mean, that the king would violate his oath, if he ever gave his assent to an alteration of the law then especially in view. To remove this doubt, MR. PELHAM offered a PROVISIO, by way of rider to the Bill, which proviso was in the following words:—“*Provided always, and be it hereby declared, That no Clause in this Act shall be understood so, to bind the kings or queens of this realm, as to prevent their giving their royal assent to any Bill, which shall be at any*

"time offered by the lords and commons as-
sembled in parliament, for the taking away
"or altering any Form or Ceremony in the
"established Church, so as the Doctrines of
"the said Church, a public Liturgy, and
"the Episcopal Government of it, be pre-
served."—This proviso was finally re-
jected; but, the reasons for the rejection

are what we want to see. There were MR. GARROWAY, SIR HENRY GOODRICK and one or two more who were for the proviso, being of opinion, that it made the matter plainer, that it more fully expressed the meaning of those who were enacting the Oath; but, those, who opposed the proviso, said, that it was unnecessary; that the sense of it was understood; and that, to pass it would be to create doubts as to the right of the parliament to alter laws at its pleasure.

Let, us have their own words.—SIR CHRISTOPHER MUSGRAVE said; There is no occasion for this proviso. It cannot be imagined that any bill from hence will ever destroy the legislative power. Therefore, there being no need of this proviso, pray lay it aside.—SIR ROBERT SAWYER said: This is the first proviso of this nature that ever was in any bill. It seems to strike at the legislative power.—SIR ROBERT COTTON said: Though the proviso looks well and healing, yet it seems to imply a defect, not able to alter laws as occasion requires.—

MR. FINCH (who was afterwards Lord High Chancellor I believe) said: I am against this proviso, when I consider it will not have the effect proposed, but quite the contrary. The proviso comes in to help the clause in the Oath, "to maintain the religion established by law." Now, these words, "established by law," HINDER NOT THE KING FROM PASSING ANY BILL FOR EASE OF DISSENTERS.—SIR WM. WILLIAMS, who was for the proviso, said: When the king swears to govern according to law, if a relaxation to dissenters, the king may do it by law.—SIR GEORGE TREBY, who was for retaining the proviso, since it had been introduced, said: It is agreed to be the sense of the House, that these words ("established by law") do not bar the king from any alteration. When you say, the Protestant religion, as by law established, it must be with the ceremonies and government, by law established. Therefore, that you mean that the government is alterable, is agreed by all.—After observations to the same effect from SIR JOSEPH TREDENHAM and SIR THOMAS LEE, the Proviso was withdrawn, and the bill passed in its present

shape and words.—What remains to be said will lie in a very small compass. I have now shown most clearly; I have now proved beyond all dispute; I have now put it out of the reach of cavilling knavery, that in no sense whatever, can it be supposed, that the king, in giving his assent to the bill of Lord Howick, or to any other measure of relaxation of the laws excluding his Catholic subjects from offices of trust, civil or military, would violate his Coronation Oath. Nay, it must be evident, to every man of common sense, that the king himself must know, that, if so to act would be to violate his oath, that oath has been, by him as well as by his predecessors of the Brunswick family, repeatedly violated. What a shame is it, then; how injurious to the character of the king is it, for any man or any party, to pretend that he has "scruples of conscience" upon this head! These are the real enemies of the king, of his family, and of the kingly government. It is a faction, and not the king; it is the interests of political intriguers, and not the conscience of their sovereign, that stand between the people of Ireland and the granting of their just and reasonable requests: and, it is these interests, these miserable interests, that stand between this nation and its safety as far as relates to the disposition of the Irish.—It is not to be doubted, that if, in the present state of Ireland, Buonaparte were to effect a landing in that country, the fate of the whole kingdom would become very precarious; or, at least, that the whole kingdom would be thrown into the utmost confusion. If, in the year 1797, the landing of two or three hundred Frenchmen in Wales produced the stoppage of cash payments at the Bank, and gave rise to that redundancy of paper-money, which is now, of itself, become a matter of very serious concern to every man endowed with the slightest capacity for thinking, what must be the effect of an invasion of Ireland, that country having, as was declared in parliament, "a French party" in its bosom, and living under laws founded upon that declaration? Talk of peace, indeed, what terms of peace have we to expect, while our enemy knows, that this is the situation of a part of this kingdom, detached from the rest, and containing one third part of its whole population? Can it be doubted, by any man in his senses, that, if, in the present situation of Ireland, only twenty thousand French were to make good a landing, what is called public credit

would experience a blow that it never before felt? And, if the enemy were not *instantly repulsed*; if the people of Ireland were merely to *stand still*; what must be the inevitable consequences to public credit, and indeed, to credit of every sort, in every part of the kingdom?—From men of sense and independence, I want no answer to these questions; but, I should really like to hear what men of a different description have to say in answer to them. —The hirelings of the press in London frequently observe, in answer to our apprehensions with respect to Ireland, that *the Irish themselves do not complain*. Insulting observation! Observation which nothing but the most cold-blooded cruelty could possibly have suggested. Why, what have we to do, in answer to this observation, but to remark, that *the French and the Dutch themselves do not complain*; yet we say, that the French and the Dutch have very good reason to complain; and it would be looked upon as almost disloyal to say, that the French and the Dutch were not oppressed people. Read the Register of the 9th instant; look at the state of the people of Ireland; and when you have done that, you will want no further explanation of the cause of *the Irish themselves not complaining*.—People of England! you have now the whole matter before you; and to your good sense and your well-known love of justice I leave the cause of the unfortunate people of Ireland,

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, 28 Dec. 1809.

TO THE INHABITANTS OF SOUTHAMPTON.

FELLOW CITIZENS;—About eight months ago, with a spirit not anticipated either by the friends or the enemies of the measure, you came independently forward with a vote of your unanimous thanks to Colonel Wardle, for his patriotic, firm, and courageous perseverance in exposing a system of gross and notorious corruption in the most important department of government. It would appear however, that this was a service which was not grateful to, or esteemed meritorious by, either your actual representatives, or by the majority of the House of Commons, who, though usually liberal in giving, gave Colonel Wardle no thanks, and upon the whole, rather had encouragement; so that Colonel Wardle can boast only of having received nearly the unanimous thanks of THE PEOPLE OF

England!—Since the above period, nothing has occurred which at all bears upon the merits of that case, except the admission, before the highest ordinary tribunal in the country, of the competence of one of the principal witnesses brought forward by Colonel Wardle in substantiation of his charges.—But although nothing has occurred which bears upon the case, a good deal has occurred which bears upon Colonel Wardle. He has been the victim of an expensive and vexatious prosecution, for the value of goods *delivered to, and for another*, and debited to him, not in consequence of his written order, not in consequence of his verbal order, but in consequence of his having held his tongue; And the demand was entertainingly enough supported by the witness before alluded to, who was held adequately credible in a case against Colonel Wardle, who had had no credit at all allowed her in the case against the Duke of York.—Fellow Citizens, I will not abuse your attention by pursuing the ramifications of this business further than just to remind you, that Colonel Wardle, feeling the evidence to be what I sincerely also believe it to have been, did, at the time, give a pledge to the People of England, that he would duly come forward with his proofs of its having been so: and Colonel Wardle, fellow Citizens, as I esteem, has honourably redeemed his pledge.—It is not our business to animadvert at any length upon the late Trial; but it requires only a slight perusal to see, that the cross examination of Colonel Wardle, was less directed to get at the truth of the point at issue in the King's Bench, than at something which might criminate his motives or his conduct, upon the past investigation before the House of Commons; and, if the published report of Lord Ellenborough's charge be correct, (which I have so high a respect for him, that I will not believe) his animadversions upon the moral colour and quality of the act of Col. Wardle, in having given 120*l.* to Mrs. Clarke, (which had little reference, if any, even to the merits of the investigation before parliament, where the truth of the facts was the question, and not the mode in which the evidence had been obtained, and none at all to the merits of the cause then before the court,) were irregular, extrajudicial, and a travelling out of the issue; and the impression of which, although not intended, must have been to vilify and discredit to the Jury, upon that cause, the character of the prosecutor,

(who was also a WITNESS,) in respect of a transaction not before the court, and with which consequently it had no concernment. I therefore again say, I do not believe it to have been a correct report of Lord Ellenborough's charge.—A word of our own, now, on this alleged subornation of Mrs. Clarke,—who, by the bye, seems to have brought her evidence to a pretty good market; where she sells the *production* of a part to one, and the *suppression* of the remainder to another: in which traffic the latter buying *refuse*, at an enormous price, certainly made by far the worst bargain.—But the idea of *subornation* is ridiculous. Why Col. Wardle merely bought the production of *what existed* (of PAPERS); not the fabrication of what *did not exist*, that is, of falsehoods; and which constitutes subornation. In a word, if there was a crime in purchasing the production of *existing evidence* on behalf of the public at the price of 120*l.* what shall we say of the purchasing the suppression of it at 10,000*l.*—Fellow Townsmen, it is scarcely necessary, now, for me to point out to you, that whatever hostility, persecution, or vexation Colonel Wardle has been exposed to, it is the services which he has rendered you that have exposed him to them. Neither on account of Mrs. Clarke's upholsterer's bill, nor on any other account, would Colonel Wardle's character have ever been the subject of obloquy, but for his attempt to serve you. Colonel Wardle's character through life has been not only unblemished but bright; and we may be assured that those vilifications of it are an attempt to wound the great cause of the country through his side. But even had his private character been different, let it have been what it might, we have nothing to do with it. We must take men as we find them, since we cannot make them what we wish.—Colonel Wardle's is the second great attempt within a short period made by a public spirited man to serve your essential interests and to save the country. If you abandon him you never will have, and you never will deserve, another. Eight months ago, fellow Townsmen, Colonel Wardle received your unanimous thanks as the undaunted investigator into public corruption: and animated by your approbation he has never relaxed; on the contrary he has redoubled his exertions. Those who thrive by these corruptions have marked him as the victim, whose sacrifice is *indispensable* to their security.

He now stands, therefore, if you pretend to any character or any consistency, doubly entitled to your protection; you animated him to the battle, and he bleeds in your service. He is at length not only the Advocate, but the Martyr for the cause of the people.—One more remark, in concluding, which I hope will not be irrelevant. Colonel Wardle's prosecution of the late Commander in Chief stands honourably contrasted with almost every other similar recorded proceeding; for neither malevolent ingenuity, nor cross examination, nor bold invention, have ever been able to disclose or assign any motive but a public and honourable one for his conduct. Not a malicious insinuation to the contrary purport has been even breathed in the air.—The man, and his motives, fellow Townsmen, in short, and more than in any instance I ever heard of, have belonged exclusively to the people; the cause is your own, and YOU OUGHT TO SUPPORT IT.

JOHN COTTON WORTHINGTON.

Southampton, Dec. 22, 1809.

SCARCITY OF GOLD.

SIR;—I have been an attentive reader of all that has appeared in yours and other papers on the redundancy of Bank Notes and the scarcity of Gold. But among all the various and contradictory, though sometimes ingenious arguments adduced, what appears evidently to me as the only cause of the scarcity alluded to, has been merely once or twice hinted at, and in no degree developed. Of all the writers that have appeared, no one seems more at variance with himself than the "Economist" in your Register of the 16th. In considering the nature of Banking Institutions, his reasoning is in part predicated on assumed data, which are at least of doubtful validity; namely, that the value of Bank Notes is at this moment depreciated, and that the quantity of those notes in circulation is the cause of the scarcity of specie now so much complained of.—I shall leave it to others to combat the hypothetical doctrine of depreciation, and confine my observations to the scarcity of Gold. I cannot refrain, however, from contrasting beforehand some sentences of that writer, merely to shew that he partakes, in some degree, of the peculiar indistinctness of ideas prevailing on this subject. In enumerating the advantages of Banks, he considers as the greatest, the power of

substituting Paper for Gold ; a cheap instrument for a costly one ; and yet he says afterwards, that a nation, so rich as this, ought to have no other circulating medium but Gold and Silver, which leads to this curious inference ; that a rich nation ought not to avail herself of all the advantages in her power ! He affirms, page 938, that unrestrained emissions of paper necessarily banish specie ; and yet denies, page 942, that, to curtail these emissions, would have any effect to recall it ; notwithstanding which denial, however, he proposes calling in small notes as the best means of bringing specie again into the country. Besides such inconsistencies as these, he seems to entertain some notions equally novel and incorrect. He makes a curious distinction between Gold, as acting in the office of small notes, or of large ones ; and says, that, in the former case, it would be impossible to draw it out of circulation ; just as if the exporters of Gold (whatever be their object) would stop to enquire what particular sized notes it was intended to substitute. He seems to consider a depreciated currency as the cause of weakness in a state, and instances Prussia and Austria. Whereas, it is, in fact, only an indication of weakness already brought about by other causes ; even as an indication it is uncertain. Witness the depreciation and failure of Assignats in France, which did not at all impair the political or physical strength of that nation. It was, Sir, a want of resources, that made emissions of paper money necessary, and not a depreciation in the money itself that rendered Austria an easy conquest.—To return, however, to the scarcity of specie. It is really a whimsical as well as absurd idea which that writer entertains in common with many others, that the redundancy of Bank Notes banishes specie ; that there exists a repulsive power between Paper and Gold ; that Guineas will not stay in one pocket, while the other is filled with Bank Notes. Pray, do those who send specie abroad, give as a reason for it the abundance of paper in circulation ? Who is it that pays them for thus disencumbering the country of so useless a medium ? Or do they do it merely from patriotic motives, and without being paid ? No, Sir, they do not. Those who send Gold to the continent have an object in it ; that object is, to pay for old importations or provide for new ; and, it is very evident, they would in neither case send Guineas, at the risk of total loss by seizure,

if merchandize of any kind could be got over in sufficient quantities to pay for those imports. The fact is, it is found to be impossible to smuggle into the continent a quantity of merchandize any thing like adequate to the purchase of such immense stocks of Russian and French products as the wants and luxury of this country require. This excess of value in our imports above our exports, produces a state of exchange very much against England ; and, whenever that is the case, specie naturally flows out of the country ; and this it would do, if the quantity of notes in circulation was only one-tenth part of what it now is, or was it ten times as great. It is the state of foreign trade alone that has an influence on specie.—The “Economist,” however, asserts, in opposition to every individual opinion I have before heard expressed, that our exports to the continent greatly exceed our imports from thence. As that writer and myself differ entirely on this most important point, upon which, in fact, the whole argument turns, I shall offer some considerations in support of my opinion. In the first place, the prodigiously advanced prices which our exports, particularly our manufactures, bear on the continent, shew satisfactorily to my mind, that the quantity is by no means equal to that of our imports, which are here, comparatively, at a small advance above the prices of common times. In the second place, a view of the trade we carry on with each continental country, leaves a strong presumption in favour of that opinion. Let us look into it for a moment. With Spain and Portugal our trade for 18 months past must have been nearly equal as to the value of imports and exports ; or must have been equalized by specie. I say must have been, and necessarily so, because, as there has been, during that time, no commerce and no exchange between those and any other countries on the continent, their trade with us must have balanced itself. The same observations apply to Sweden. With the kingdom of Denmark, what little there is, may also be nearly reciprocal. With Russia, France, and Italy, our trade is almost altogether a trade of imports : thus, leaving Holland, including the German coast, as the only country to which our exports preponderate. How much they surpass in value our imports from thence, (which are of themselves very considerable,) it is difficult to say. But, Sir, is there any

man who can believe that merely the excess of our exports to that one country is sufficient to pay for the enormous quantities of hemp, tallow, duck and iron from Russia; and of wines, brandies, and grain from France? I cannot think there is any man, and certainly no merchant, who would take such a magnified view of our smuggled exports to Holland. I consider it, therefore, as established, though not by demonstrative, yet by presumptive proof, that there remains a considerable portion of our imports uncompensated for. Trade being thus against this country, exchange is so too; and, as before observed, whenever this is the case, the precious metals naturally, if not necessarily, flow out of it.—This balance of trade however, is nothing new; it has been the case for years past, before as well as since the Orders in Council. But, until that period (which forms an epoch in our commercial history) it was compensated by funds deposited on the continent by the Americans, over and above what was wanted for return cargoes to the United States.—Who, Sir, is so ignorant of our commerce, as not to know that millions of American funds were annually left on the continent and remitted to this country through the medium of exchange? thereby answering the double purpose of paying our balance there, and an American balance to us.—Down to that period, the state of trade was simply this; we were annually large debtors to the continent; the United States were equal debtors to us; and the continent in its turn to the United States: it only required the intermediation of exchange, and all these balances were settled. The Orders in Council however, unfortunately (and as the result proves) impolitically obstructed the natural channel in which commerce then flowed, the effect of which obstruction is this: we have still the same surplus imports from the continent, without any surplus exports to the United States, the Americans now incur annually no debt to us; nor if they did, could they pay for it while these Orders last? This, Sir, is a candid history of our commerce before and since the Orders in Council of November 1807.—As I have before observed, it is questionable with me if our paper currency is really depreciated; if it is, the proximate cause is without doubt the scarcity of specie; but the remote and original cause is proved, I think, to be the peculiar state of our trade. But, although the depreciation

of paper be not proved, yet the mere circumstance of its being doubtful is in my mind a sufficient cause for alarm. It would not be easy to foretell the consequences, if the idea was once general among the lower classes that the money received for their daily labour was of doubtful value. This point cannot possibly require illustration.—To conclude, Sir, I think from what has been stated it may be fairly inferred, that it is of the very first importance to remove every shadow of doubt as to the soundness of our paper currency; that the most likely way to do this is by recalling specie into the country; and lastly, that as this depends entirely on the balance of our foreign trade, it can only be done either by curtailing our imports from the continent, or (which is more natural) by restoring those means of compensation which existed antecedent to the Orders in Council.—Yours, &c. H.
London, Dec. 26th.

EDINBURGH REVIEW.

Sir;—Perfectly agreeing with you in the satisfaction which you express at the cause of moderate and constitutional Reform receiving the powerful support of the *Edinburgh Review*, I wish, in justice to that celebrated Journal, to direct your attention towards a very material circumstance. I lamented as much as any man the fine-spun and most unsatisfactory, though ingenious, article upon that important subject in the 28th Number. You appear to consider the article On the Conduct of the War as in some sort a variation from the doctrines of the former paper; and one of your correspondents has suggested that the two pieces are from different hands. This is very possible; but I wish to observe, that in the very same Number in which the article on Reform appeared, viz. in No. 28, there is an elaborate discussion of the foreign affairs of this country, and the interest which the people have in the right management thereof; and in that article, you will find sentiments as warm in favour of every species of constitutional reformation as you or I could desire to see. The detection of abuses and the repression of corruption among the higher orders is there amply enforced, and a long and striking statement is made of the possibility of relieving much of our present load of burthens by salutary reforms in the management of the public purse. Let me recom-

mend this article, I mean the concluding part of it, to your particular attention. A fuller or a flatter contradiction could not have been given to the sceptical Remarks on Economy contained in the first article of the same Number. Professing my satisfaction in agreeing with the author of the one paper, and in believing him to have completely refuted the author of the other, I remain your constant reader

London, Dec. 19th,

A. B.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PROCLAMATION OF THE JUNTA, dated Royal Alcazar of Seville, Nov. 21, 1809. (*Continued from p. 992.*)

----- Perish a thousand times the wretch who can prefer his own interest to the delivery of his country! All such the State will severely punish. Our enemies omit no means which can be employed for our destruction, and shall we neglect any which can conduce to our preservation? There are provinces which have driven out the enemy from among them, and shall not those, who have not yet suffered from such a scourge, sacrifice every thing to preserve themselves from it. Our brave soldiers endure the rigours of winter, and the scorching heats of summer, and nobly encounter all the dangers of battle; and shall we, remaining quietly at our homes, forgetful of their incalculable fatigues, think only of preserving our wishes, and refuse to resign even the least of our luxurious enjoyments.—The victory must be ours, if we continue and conclude the great enterprize we have undertaken with the same enthusiasm with which we began it. The colossal mass of force and resistance which we must oppose to our enemy, must be composed of the forces of all, of the sacrifices of all; and then what will it import, that he pours upon us anew the legions with which he has been successful in Germany, or the swarm of conscripts he endeavours to drag from France? The experience we have obtained in two campaigns, and our very desperation, will consign these hordes of banditti to the same fate which the former have suffered. If some of the Monarchs of the North have consented to become the slaves of this new Tamerlane, and at the expence of ages of infamy have purchased a moment's respite till their turn shall come to be devoured, we are resolved to perish or triumph. The alliance we have contracted with the British nation continues and will continue.

That nation has lavished for us its blood and its treasures, and is intitled to our gratitude, and that of future ages.—[The Address thus concludes]—Here was drawn, never to be sheathed, the sword of eternal hatred to the execrable tyrant; here was raised, never to be lowered, the standard of independence and justice. Hasten to it all ye who wish not to live under the abominable yoke, ye who cannot enter into a league with iniquity, and ye who are indignant at the cowardly desertion of deluded Princes, hasten to us. Here the valiant shall find opportunities of acquiring true honour; the wise and virtuous obtain respect, and the oppressed find an asylum—our cause is the same, the same be our danger, the same our reward. Come hither, and in despite of all the arts, and all the power of this inhuman despot, you shall witness how we will render dim his star, and be ourselves the creators of our own destiny.—(Signed) THE ARCHBISHOP OF LAODICEA, President. PEDRO DE RIVERO, Secretary.

BRAZILS.—PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT.—
Decree of the Prince Regent of Portugal, dated Rio Janeiro, July 9, 1809.

Governors of the Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarves, Friends!—I, the Prince Regent, send unto you greeting, as unto those whom I love and prize. It being my principal care to secure, by every means possible, the independence of my dominions, and to deliver them completely from the cruel enemy who so inhumanly, and contrary to the good faith of treaties, has invaded the States of my Crown in Europe, and has never ceased making upon them the most unjust war; and as it is, on the one hand, acknowledged that, in such a difficult crisis, nothing can more contribute to the defence of the kingdom than a Government composed of a small number of individuals; and as, on the other, it is indispensable to preserve, with my ancient and faithful ally, the King of Great Britain, not only the best understanding, but likewise to prove to him, in the most evident manner, that my intentions are not different from those by which he is animated in the promotion of the common cause, that his Britannic Majesty may continue, in the same efficacious manner, to succour Portugal and the whole of the Peninsula; and as it cannot be doubted that this glorious purpose, which I so ardently desire to effect, can

only be attained by the most extensive, firm, and reciprocal confidence; and his Britannic Majesty having made known his principles on this subject, and what he judges will most contribute to a happy result, and is most essential to the defence of the kingdom and of the peninsula; I have seen fit to order that you shall be immediately reduced to the number of three, or two Governors, having a deliberate vote on all objects of the public administration, and that these shall be—the Patriarch Elect of Lisbon, the Marquis das Minas, and the Marquis Monteiro Mor, President of the Board da Consciencia e Ordens, Don Francis Xavier da Cunha e Menezes, performing the functions of President of the Privy Council, to which place he is appointed by the present decree. It is further my pleasure to direct you to acknowledge Sir Arthur Wellesley as Marshal General of my Armies, as long as he shall continue in the command of the allied Portuguese and English forces, taking then his rank over Marshal Beresford, as commander in chief; and as soon as he shall have been recognized as such, you will invite him to all the sittings of Government, in which matters come under discussion which concern the organization of the army, or important determinations, whether financial or others, which it may be necessary to adopt for the defence of the kingdom and of the whole peninsula; taking his opinion and advice on all subjects of that nature; and should he be absent in such cases, and not be able to assist at your deliberations, you are to apply for his advice in writing, if possible, giving him full information on the subject under discussion, in order that he may be perfectly acquainted with your discussion and determination of matters of the above description. In this manner the affairs of Government shall be conducted with the utmost energy and harmony, as long as unfortunately it shall not be possible to conclude a permanent and general peace. His Britannic Majesty will thus be convinced that it is my earnest wish to eradicate the general vice of difference of opinion between the Powers who make common cause; and he will be made perfectly acquainted with the orders which I have given, and shall continue to give, that the most strenuous efforts shall be made to attain that safe and permanent peace which is universally desired, by means of a grand display of all the forces and resources of my kingdom, which I

can only flatter myself completely to recover by the most powerful means and exertions.

THE PRINCE.

FRANCE.—*Divorce of the Empress Josephine, From the Moniteur, Dec. 17, 1809.*

By desire of his Majesty the Emperor, all the Members of the Senate assembled yesterday, at eleven o'clock in the morning, in full dress, in the hall of their usual sittings. The sitting of the Senate yesterday, at which the Kings of Westphalia and Naples, Grand Admiral the Prince Viceroy of Italy, the Arch Chancellor of State, the Prince Vice-Grand Constable, and the Prince Vice-Grand Elector assisted, and at which the Prince Arch-Chancellor of the Empire presided, will form, on account of the importance of the subjects which were discussed, an epoch in the annals of France.—On that day was presented to the Senators, a *Projet* of a *Senatus Consultum*, respecting a Dissolution of the Marriage between the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress Josephine. This dissolution of marriage, required by the two high parties, and approved of by a Family Counsel, at which all the Princes and Princesses of the Imperial Family, present at Paris, assisted, received, the same day, the assent of the Senate, after having been the object of examination of a Special Commission named for this purpose. After having read the contents of the Imperial Decree, which enacts the convocation of the Senate; and of that which directs that it shall be presided by the Prince Arch-Chancellor, and that the Princes of the Imperial Family, hereafter named, should be present in the Senate, the official Journal gives an account of this memorable sitting in the following terms—[Here follows a speech from the Arch-Chancellor of State, the Prince Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, President, and the Duke of Parma.]—The Count Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely laid before the Senate the *Projet* of the *Senatus Consultum*, and explained the motives of it, which are, that they mutually sacrifice their conjugal happiness to the welfare and interest of their country.—[Here follows a speech from the Prince Viceroy of Italy; after which, the Count Garnier, Annual President, proposed to refer the *Projet* of the *Senatus Consultum* to the examination of a Special Commission of nine Members, which was named, and made its Report during its

sitting.]—At half past four, the Senate resumed its sitting, and Count Lacepede, one of the Members of the Special Commission, made the Report, which terminated in proposing the adoption of the Project of the *Senatus Consultum*; and also the adoption of two Addresses—one to the Emperor, and the other to the Empress.

Extract from the Register of the Conservative Senate, of Saturday, the 16th Dec. 1809.

The Conservative Senate, assembled to the number of Members prescribed by Art. the 90th of the Act of the Constitution, and dated the 12th December, 1799, having seen the Act drawn up the 15th of the present month, by the Prince Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, of which the following is the substance:—

“In the year 1809, and the 15th day of Dec. at nine o'clock in the evening, we, Jean Jaques Regis Cambaceres, Prince Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, Duke of Parma, exercising the functions prescribed to us by Tit. 2, of Art. 14 of the Statute of the Imperial Family, and in consequence of orders addressed to us by his Majesty the Emperor and King, in his private letter, dated that day, of the following tenor:—
‘My Cousin;—Our desire is, that you repair this day, at nine o'clock in the evening, to our grand cabinet of the palace of the Thuilleries, attended by the Civil Secretary of State of our Imperial Family, to receive from us and from the Empress, our dear consort, a communication of great importance; for this purpose, we have ordered that this present private letter should be sent to you. We pray God to have you my Cousin in his holy and blessed keeping. Paris, 15th December, 1809.’—On the back is written—‘To our cousin the Prince Arch-Chancellor Duke of Parma.’—We accordingly proceeded to the Hall of the Throne of the Palace of the Thuilleries, attended by Michel Louis Etienne Regnault (de St. Jean d’Angely) Count of the Empire, Minister of State, and Secretary of State to the Imperial Family. A quarter of an hour afterwards we were introduced to the Grand Cabinet of the Emperor, where we found his Majesty the Emperor and King with her Majesty the Empress, attended by their Majesties, the Kings of Holland, Westphalia, and Naples; his Imperial Highness the Prince Viceroy, the Queens of Holland, Westphalia, Naples, and Spain; Madame, and her Imperial Highness the Princess Paulina.—His

Majesty the Emperor and King descended to address us in these terms:—
‘My Cousin Prince Arch-Chancellor— I dispatched to you a private letter, dated this day, to direct you to repair to my Cabinet, for the purpose of communicating to you the resolution which I, and the Empress, my dearest consort, have taken. It gives me pleasure, that the Kings, Queens and Princesses, my brothers and sisters-in-law, my daughter-in-law, and my son-in-law, become my adopted son, as well as my mother, should witness what I am going to communicate to you.—The politics of my Monarchy, the interest and the wants of my people, which have constantly guided all my actions, require, that after me I should leave to children, inheritors of my love for my people, that throne, on which Providence has placed me; notwithstanding for several years past, I have lost the hope of having children by my marriage with my well-beloved consort, the Empress Josephine. This it is, which induces me to sacrifice the sweetest affections of my heart to attend to nothing but the good of the State, and to wish the dissolution of my marriage. Arrived at the age of 40 years, I may indulge the hope of living long enough to educate, in my views and sentiments, the children which it may please Providence to give me. God knows how much such a resolution has cost my heart; but there is no sacrifice beyond my courage, when it is proved to me to be necessary to the welfare of France. I should add, that, far from ever having had reason to complain, on the contrary, I have had only to be satisfied with the attachment and the affection of my well-beloved consort. She has adorned fifteen years of my life, the remembrance of which will ever remain engraven on my heart. She was crowned by my hand. I wish she should preserve the rank and title of Empress; but, above all, that she should never doubt my sentiments, and that she should ever regard me as her best and dearest friend.’
“His Majesty the Emperor and King having ended, her Majesty the Empress Queen spoke as follows:—‘By the permission of our dear and august consort, I ought to declare, that not preserving any hope of having children, which may fulfil the wants of his policy and the interests of France, I am pleased to give him the greatest proof of attachment and devotion which has ever been given on

'earth. I possess all from his bounty, it was his hand which crowned me, and from the height of this throne I have received nothing but proofs of affection and love from the French people. I think I prove myself grateful in consenting to the dissolution of a marriage which heretofore was an obstacle to the welfare of France, which deprived it of the happiness of being one day governed by the descendant of a great man, evidently raised up by Providence to efface the evils of a terrible revolution, and to re-establish the altar, the throne, and social order. But the dissolution of my marriage will in no degree change the sentiments of my heart; the Emperor will ever have in me his best friend. I know how much this act, demanded by policy, and by interest so great, has chilled his heart; but both of us exult in the sacrifice which we make for the good of the country.'

"After which their Imperial Majesties having demanded an act of their respective declarations, as well as of their mutual consent contained in them, and which their Majesties gave to the dissolution of their marriage; as also, of the power which their Majesties conferred on us to follow up, as need shall require, the effect of their will, we, Prince Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, in obedience to the orders and requisitions of their Majesties, have given the aforesaid act, and have in consequence executed the present *proces verbal*, to serve and avail according to law, to which *proces verbal* their Majesties have affixed their signautre, and which, after having been signed by the Kings, Queens, Princes, and Princesses present, has been signed by us, and countersigned by the Secretary of State of the Imperial Family who wrote with his own hand.

"Done at the palace of the Thuilleries, the day, hour, and the year aforesaid;

"(Signed) NAPOLEON.
JOSEPHINE.
MADAME.
LOUIS.
JEROME NAPOLEON.
JOACHIM NAPOLEON.
EUGENE NAPOLEON.
JULIE.
HORTENSE.
CATHERINE.
PAULINE.
CAROLINE.

CAMBACERES, Prince Arch-Chancellor.
Count REGNAULT, (de St. Jean d'Angely.)"

Having seen the *Projet* of the *Senatus Consultum*, drawn up in the form prescribed by the 57th Article of the Act of the Constitutions of August 4, 1802; after having heard the motives of the said *Projet*, the Orators of the Council of State and Report of the Special Commission appointed in the sitting of this day; the adoption having been discussed by the number of members prescribed by the 56th Article of the Act of the Constitution of August 4, 1802;

DECREES,

Art. I. The marriage contracted between the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress Josephine is dissolved.

II. The Empress Josephine shall preserve the title and rank of Empress Queen crowned.

III. Her dowry is fixed at an annual income of two millions of francs, on the revenue of the state.

IV. All the assignments which may be made by the Emperor, in favour of the Empress Josephine, on the funds of the Civil List, shall be obligatory on his successors.

V. The present *Senatus Consultum* shall be transmitted by a message to his Imperial and Royal Majesty.

The two Addresses proposed by the Commission were afterwards put to the vote, and adopted.

CONSERVATIVE SENATE.

Sitting of the 16th Dec. 1809.

At eleven o'clock in the morning, the Members of the Senate assembled in full dress, in their palace, in virtue of the Act of Convocation:—His Serene Highness the Prince Arch-Chancellor of the Empire was received with the usual honours. His Majesty the King of Westphalia, his Majesty the King of Naples, Grand Admiral his Imperial Highness the Prince Viceroy of Italy, Arch-Chancellor of State, and their Serene Highnesses the Prince Vice-Constable, and the Prince Vice-Grand Elector, were present. The sitting was opened by reading the Act of Designation.—The Prince Arch-Chancellor of State had the parole to take the oath of Senator. His Imperial Highness, previous to that ceremony, expressed himself as follows.—"Prince, Senators—From the time when the goodness of his Majesty the Emperor has called me to sit among you, testimonies of his confidence have

kept me continually distant from Paris, and I have, this day, for the first time, the pleasure to appear in the midst of you. I am happy in being able to say, that among the benefits which his Majesty has incessantly showered upon me, I have been particularly sensible to the honour which was granted me, of forming a part of the first public body in the Empire. Accept Senators, this expression of my feelings, and my assurance of the happiness I experience in pronouncing, in the midst of you, this oath, which is to me that of duty, of love, and of gratitude. I swear obedience to the constitutions of the Empire, and fidelity to the Emperor."

The Prince Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, President, replied as follows to the speech of the Prince Viceroy:

"Prince—When his Majesty the Emperor and King conferred on you the high dignity, whereof you have just exercised one of the most essential prerogatives, the Senate applauded this act of justice. They congratulated themselves on counting among their members a Prince, whose brilliant qualities excited such just hopes. Now that these hopes are realized by the glory of your last campaigns, and by the wisdom of your Administration, the Senate experiences great satisfaction in seeing you in its bosom, to concur in the important deliberation it is about to enter upon. You shew yourself truly the adoptive son of the hero who governs us; in like him silencing private affection, before the interests of nations. Your first steps within these walls could not be more worthily signalized, than by this great testimony of patriotism, of devotion, and of fidelity. I rejoice in being the organ of the sentiments of the Senate towards your Imperial Highness, and in expressing to you their wishes for your prosperity."

The Orators of the Council of State, Counts Regnault (de St. Jean d'Angely), and Defermont, Ministers of State, Members of the Council of State, being introduced, the Prince Arch-Chancellor, President, spoke as follows:—

"Gentlemen—The *Projet*, which will, in this sitting, be submitted to the deliberation of the Senate, contains an arrangement which embraces our dearest interests. It is dictated by that imperious voice, which apprises Sovereigns and nations, that, to secure the safety of States, we must listen to the counsels of a wise foresight, incessantly recal to mind the

past, examine the present, and extend our views to the future. It is under such high considerations, that in these ever memorable circumstances, his Majesty the Emperor has caused all personal considerations to disappear, and silenced all his private affections. The noble and affecting conduct of her Majesty the Empress, is a glorious testimony of her disinterested affection for the Emperor, and secures to her an eternal right to the gratitude of the nation."

Count Regnault St. Jean d'Angely submitted a *Projet* of a *Senatus Consultum*, dissolving the marriage between the Emperor Napoleon and the Empress Josephine. The orator explained the motives of this *Projet* as follows;—

"My Lord, Senators—The solemn act fully set forth in the *Senatus Consultum* now read, contains all its motives. What words could we address to the Senate of France, but would be far below the affecting sounds received from the mouth of these two august consorts, of whom your deliberations will consecrate the generous resolutions? Their hearts have coincided in making the noblest sacrifices to the greatest of interests. They have coincided to make policy and sentiment speak language the most true, the most persuasive, the most adapted to move and to convince. As sovereigns and as consorts, the Emperor and Empress have done all; have said all. There only remains for us to love, to bless, and to admire them.—'Tis henceforth for the French nation to make themselves heard. Their memory is faithful as their heart. They will unite in their grateful thoughts the hope of the future with the remembrance of the past; and never will Monarch have received more respect, admiration, gratitude, and love, than Napoleon, immolating the most sacred of his affections, to the wants of his subjects; than Josephine, immolating her tenderness for the best of husbands, through devotion for the best of Kings, through attachment to the best of nations. Accept, Gentlemen, in the name of all France, in the sight of astonished Europe, this sacrifice, the greatest ever made on earth, and, full of the profound emotion which you feel, hasten to carry to the foot of the throne, in the tribute of your sentiments, of the sentiments of all Frenchmen, the only price that can be worthy of the fortitude of our Sovereigns, the only consolation that can be worthy of their hearts."

The Prince Viceroy (the son of Josephine) spoke as follows:—

“Prince, Senators—You have heard the Project of the *Senatus Consultum*, submitted to your deliberation. I feel it my duty, under these circumstances, to manifest the sentiments by which my family are animated.—My mother, my sister, and myself, owe all to the Emperor. He has truly been to us a father. He will find in us at all times devoted children and obedient subjects.—It is important to the happiness of France, that the Founder of the Fourth Dynasty should, in his old age, be surrounded by direct descendants, who may prove a security to all, and a pledge of the glory of our country.—When my mother was crowned, before the whole nation, by the hands of her august consort, she contracted an obligation to sacrifice all her affections to the interests of France. She has fulfilled, with fortitude, nobleness, and dignity, this first of duties. Her soul has often been moved at beholding exposed to painful struggles, the heart of a man accustomed to conquer fortune, and advance with a firm step to the accomplishment of his great designs. The tears which this resolution has cost the Emperor, suffice for the honour (*a la gloire*) of my mother.—In the situation she will now fill, she will be no stranger, by her wishes, and her feelings, to the new prosperities which await us: with a satisfaction mingled with pride, that she will behold the happiness her sacrifices will produce to her country and to her Emperor.”

FRANCE.—*Exposé of the State of the French Empire, to the 1st of December 1809.*

Paris, Dec. 13.—In the Sitting of yesterday, M. Montalivet, the Minister of the Interior, pronounced the following *Exposé* of the Empire, to the 1st of December, 1809:

Messieurs: Every time that the situation of the empire has been stated to you, the French nation has reckoned new triumphs. Brilliant victories, generous treaties of peace, the results of the most profound political combinations, great works undertaken, the order of the interior maintained—such is the picture that all my predecessors have had to trace, and it is that which forms the history of the year that has just elapsed.—The return of this enumeration of prosperities, acquires every day a more glorious character.—The me-

morable facts of one year may appertain to fortune, to what is called chance, to a will of which nothing has yet shewn the force, or the constancy, the weakness, or the versatility; but those which return perpetually, the same are necessarily the work of a genius and an arm equally powerful. The former may transitorily appertain to any time; the others fix those eras which divide the course of ages, and which subject a long series of years to every epoch which changes the face of the world.—In the course of the last session you had concurred to give a new criminal code to France, and, adopting the plans prepared by the Council of State, and immediately under the eyes of his Majesty, the necessary source of all laws; and then the Emperor himself, as he had announced to you, had replaced on the throne of Madrid his august brother; he forced the English to precipitate themselves towards their ships, and only ceased to pursue them, that he might return to the centre of his dominions, to observe and arrest the projects of Austria.

PUBLIC WORKS.

The stay which his Majesty then made at Paris was distinguished by the care which he took to regulate all the parts of the vast administration of his empire. His orders gave a new activity to the immense labours, which no period of peace ever saw undertaken in such great numbers, nor followed with so much ardour. Prisoners of war, from different nations, sent by victory, have finished the canal of St. Quintin. Two leagues of an imposing subterraneous passage open a communication between the rivers and seas of the north of the empire, and the rivers and seas of the south.—Seven thousand workmen have not ceased to labour on the Canal of the North, and nearly eight leagues of this new way opened to the Rhine, and the Meuse, to bring their conjoined waters to Antwerp, without quitting for a moment the soil of France, have been executed. This canal, so important to commerce, will not be a less benefit to agriculture; lands equal in superficies to several departments, will be peopled and fertilised. The peaceable conquests of agriculture will soon augment both our riches and our prosperity.—Two millions have been usefully expended, in 1809, on the Canal of Napoleon, which will unite the Rhone to the Rhine. Marseilles, Cognac, and Antwerp, will soon be washed by the same waters. This canal will be made to

communicate with the Seine, by that of Burgundy, the works of which, abandoned by the old government, have received anew the greatest impulse: already the navigation is complete from Dole to Dijon; they are at present working between Dijon and the bridge of Pany, between the Yonne and Saint Florentin.—Several important locks upon the Seine, the Aube, and the Somme, have been finished in 1809. Every where the plans which tended to improve former navigations, to extend them, or to create new ones, have been undertaken, or continued with activity.—The maritime works have made the greatest progress. Those of Cherbourg already present to the astonished eye an immense port hollowed out of the rock. Its depth has been this year carried to 33 feet below the level of high-water. It is defended by a pier, the execution of which has been as perfect as the idea has been bold.—Facings of granite give to the port and its quays the most imposing character of grandeur and duration; the excavations will descend sixteen feet lower, so that there will remain in the port of Cherbourg 26 feet water at low water.—The sluice at Havre is nearly finished; it will secure, from the middle of the next campaign, the constant entrance of vessels into the channel. At Dunkirk, an octagon sluice, which will drain valuable lands, and secure an easy navigation, has been finished this year. The basin of Antwerp is excavated in all the interior part, and the sluice of the sea is raised above its foundations. The port of Cetté has been deepened. The port of Marseilles offers a more easy anchorage than ever.—The roads of Mount Cenis, of the Simplon, those which traverse the Alps, the Apennines, and the Pyrenees, in every direction, have received a new degree of advancement, or are completed. Roads, equally beautiful and easy, lead from Alexandria to Savona; from the banks of the Tanaro and the Po, to the nearest shores of the Mediterranean.—The grand drainings of Bourgoin, of Cotentin, and Rochefort, have already changed sterile marshes into fertile lands, and their

results have drawn upon the Government the blessings of the people, astonished at not having suffered any of the evils, however transitory, which they had been made to dread.

WORKS OF PARIS.

Paris becomes every day, by its works, more worthy of being the metropolis of one of those empires, around which are grouped, in the history of the times, all that is contemporaneous. In its vicinity, the bridges of Bezons, Choisy, and Sevres, have been begun; that of Charenton has been re-established; that of St. Cloud, restored. The beautiful bridge of Jena has been conducted to the raising of the arches; that of Saint Michael has been freed from the houses that obstructed it; the Quay Napoleon, and the Louvre, have been finished; that of Jena has been carried beyond the esplanade of the invalids; the port of la Rapé has been executed on a great and beautiful plan. Plentiful granaries have been founded. Every disposition for the construction of an immense abattoir has been made near the barrier of Rochechouard; the ground is levelled, and the foundation prepared.—A provisory establishment for an exchange has been formed, till the time when the magnificent edifice intended for the purpose, and which is already begun, will be finished.—The Temple of Glory occupies a great number of workmen: it will be worthy of its noble destination. Four massy pillars, faced with a stone equal in hardness and grain to the finest marble, intended to support the triumphal arch of l'Étoile, are nearly completed.—The Column of Austerlitz is adorned, for half its height, with bronzes, which will eternize the great achievements of our warriors. The arch of the Carousel, which is finished, unites taste and magnificence. The façade of the building in which you meet is finished. The Louvre displays new beauties in the rapid progress of its restoration; the gallery which will complete its junction with the Thuilleries, astonishes, by its progress, the inhabitants even of this city.—Already the capital enjoys a part of the waters which will be

2 K

DIRECTIONS TO THE BOOK-BINDER.

It is to be observed, that this sheet, which is the last of Volume XVI., should not be cut open by the Reader, but should be left to the Book-binder, who will perceive that the first half, viz. p. 1025 to 1040, (of which this page makes a part,) comes at the end, and that the rest of the sheet, containing the Title Page and Table of Contents, &c. &c. is to be cut off, and placed at the beginning of the Volume.

SUPPLEMENT to No. 26. Vol. XVI.—Price 1s.

brought to it by the canal of Ourcq; while the basin of La Villette, and the fountain of Innocents, present to it works as beautiful as they are useful.—In this long enumeration, I am only able to point out the least part of the works completed or continued in the course of this year; but each of you is witness to their development, since there is not a part of France to which they do not extend. Among these grand constructions, there are some more particularly consecrated to public order and benevolence.

ESTABLISHMENTS OF BENEVOLENCE.

The Emperor has ordered the establishment of forty-two depots of mendicity, and secured to them the necessary funds for their maintenance. Thus will be healed the most hideous wounds of policed States; thus the public manners and industry will profit by a regulation which will snatch from misery and depravity a number of beings, who seemed condemned to them without resource. Several of these establishments have already been completed.—His Majesty has bestowed immense benefits on those of his subjects who have suffered great calamities. The banks of the Rhine had been ravaged by inundations; the inhabitants have received nearly \$ million, either for indemnities, or to be employed in reparations, and useful labours.—The countries which have suffered by storms, or fire, have received succours. His paternal care has furnished a great number of cities with supplies of bark, which they have punctually received.—Depots for Vaccination have been established; they secure to families the certain means of never wanting an invaluable preservative, which useful and true friends of humanity have made known to all the classes of our numerous population.—Among those of the wants of the French, which have fixed the attention of the Sovereign, the cultivation of the moral qualities, that of the mind, that of the arts of imagination, have continued to hold one of the first rank.

PUBLIC INSTRUCTION.

The Imperial University has entered on its functions. It has collected information concerning all the houses of education in the empire. Academies are forming, the faculties establishing. The Lyceums continue to furnish numerous pupils to the Polytechnic School and that of St. Cyr. The former has always been the nursery of persons distinguished by their know-

ledge and their conduct. At St. Cyr is perpetually renewed that hardy race of youth, equally well exercised, courageous, and zealous; who, when they arrive under their standards, will shew themselves worthy to march with our ancient heroes.

SCIENCES, LITERATURE, AND ARTS.

Every species of encouragement is given to the Sciences, to Literature, and to the Arts. Honours, rewards, useful employments, confided to Artists that distinguish themselves, nothing is neglected. But the first of those memorable epochs, formed to exalt the noblest emulations, is arrived: the decennial prizes are about to be distributed by the hand of him, who is the fountain of all true glory. They would have been distributed, this day, could the Jury have completed their labours. His Majesty wished no species of merit, whether literary, or belonging to the sciences and arts, to be unrewarded. The Decree of 24th Fructidor, of the year 12, has been regarded by the Emperor merely as an expression of a general sentiment. That sentiment has just received a full development by a late Decree, augmenting the number of prizes. New examinations and new adjudications are become necessary. The Emperor wishes to be certain, that they shall express the sentiment of an enlightened public opinion; and, to acquire this certainty, he has ordered that the works honoured by these adjudications, be subjected to a solemn discussion; a distinction highly flattering to those whose works are judged worthy of the prizes.—The Museum of Natural History has been increased; that of the Arts has received new riches by the acquisition of the *chefs d'œuvre* of the Borghese Gallery.

AGRICULTURE.

The propagation of the culture of improved wool has made new advances, arising in a great measure from the importations of Spanish and German flocks.—Twenty thousand choice mares have been presented to the twelve hundred stallions collected in our studs and depots. Premiums have been distributed to the proprietors of the finest breeds.—The cultivation of cotton in our Southern Provinces has hitherto afforded nothing but hopes. These have not been destroyed by the two extraordinary seasons of 1808 and 1809; and that is a great point gained.—Attempts have been made to naturalize indigo.—France produces grain and wine far be-

yond her consumption. As to wine of the first quality, this has been a well-known fact. But our dependence on foreign countries for grain has always been considered as an established truth. How valuable then the experiment we are now making.—Some districts indeed find it impossible to sell their corn. This is a momentary misfortune; but what a source of security for the future! The scarcities most frequently depended merely on opinion: it was only requisite to enlighten this, and France, henceforth secure of producing an excess beyond her consumption, can no longer be in fear of want.—The Emperor has, however, devoted all his solicitude to the present circumstances. Exportation of corn is permitted from a great number of points of our frontiers, both maritime and terrestrial, provided always, that the price exceed not certain rates in the neighbouring markets.

MANUFACTURES AND INDUSTRY.

Industry increases the value of raw materials by manual labour, and frequently in proportions that may be termed infinite. It has constantly occupied the attention of government. But here the effect of authority cannot be a direct influence. Encouragements granted, modifications introduced into the tariffs of the custom-houses, whether national or foreign, such are its means, and such have been its measures. It has further watched, with redoubled care, over the school of arts and trades at Chalons, of which the good effects continue to be felt.—M. Richard, Messrs. Ternaux, M. Oberkampft, M. de Neufelize, and many others, have continued, in their valuable establishments, a degree of activity, an organization, and means of improvement, which render them worthy to be cited. They do honour to the nation, and contribute to its prosperity.

MINES.

The mines conceal riches, which, without industry, would remain buried in the earth. A legislation for the mines, positive and clear, will be completed in the course of your session. Means for deriving from it the earliest benefits are prepared. France possesses a great number of valuable coal-mines, which secure us from all fear of ever wanting fuel.—Mines of copper, lead, and silver, are now working: others are objects of search and experiment.

COMMERCE.

Commerce is employed generally in deriving the greatest possible advantage

from the products of agriculture and labour. Ours undoubtedly suffers from the extraordinary state of affairs, which, forming as it were two masses, one of the Continent of Europe, the other of the seas, and the countries from which those seas divide us, leaves them without any permitted communication. Nevertheless, the home consumption, in which a much larger number of individuals participate, since plenty (*l'aisance*) is known to classes hitherto strangers to it, and our connections with our neighbours maintain a great activity in a trade of barter. Our connections with the United States of America are suspended; but, formed by mutual wants, they will soon resume their course. Lyons beholds the prosperity of her manufactures revive, and receives the orders of Germany, Russia, and the interior.—Naples furnishes us cotton, which her soil daily produces with increasing abundance, and which diminishes the more distant importations.

FINANCES.

The connection of commerce with public credit, will naturally lead your attention to a phenomenon which strikes us less at present, because each year re-produces it: the exactness of all payments, without new contributions, without loans, without anticipations, and in the midst of a war for which, at any other time, the most extraordinary efforts would have appeared below what such enterprizes required; the admirable effect of the simplicity of springs and movements of a rigorous order; and the exactness of calculations, into which his Majesty has not disdained to enter himself. The register of landed property is continued: its advantages are found in the sub-repartition of a great number of cantons and communes; we shall soon derive from it the general amelioration of the land tax, and the just proportion of the contribution to the products.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERIOR, AND JUSTICE.

The Administration of the Interior, in 1809, has followed the same progress as in the preceding years. Order and tranquillity have been maintained; justice has been promptly and equitably administered; the name of the Emperor, has been blessed in the bosoms of families, rendered happy by interior peace. The departments of Tuscany have received the benefits of general organisation.

RELIGIOUS WORSHIP.

The Government, in its respect for conscience, has not deviated from the line

which it had traced out to itself. Its principles, with respect to religion, have had their application, this year, as in the preceding. It does not confine itself to the toleration of all kinds of religious forms of worship, it honours and encourages them. The different sects of Christianity, founded on the morality of the Gospel, are all useful to society. The Lutherans of the Fauxbourg St. Antoine, whose number amounts to 6,000, had no temple, and, from time immemorial, exercised their worship in the Swedish chapel. Their church has been acknowledged; their Ministers have been appointed by the Emperor, and are maintained at the expence of the State.—A School of Calvinistic Theology has been established at Montauban.—As to the religion which is that of the Emperor, of the Royal Family, and of the immense majority of the French, it has been the object of the most assiduous cares of Government. New seminaries have been formed; in all, funds have been created for the youth destined for the church; the edifices for public worship have been repaired; and the number of *succursales* augmented. The public treasury, by taking on itself to pay the Ministers, has honourably exonerated them from being dependent on the Communes. A subsistence has been secured, with liberality, to Curates and Ministers, when age and infirmities may render them necessary. In fine, his Majesty has summoned several Archbishops and Bishops to the Senate and Council of the University. He proposes to summon them to his Privy Council (*Conseil d'Etat.*)—His Majesty has had some differences with the Sovereign of Rome, as a Temporal Sovereign. Constant in his resolutions, the Emperor has defended the rights of his crown, and of his people. He has done what is required by the great political system which is regenerating the West; but without touching spiritual principles.—Every one knows the evils caused to religion, by the temporal sovereignty of the Pope! Without this, half Europe would not be separated from the Catholic Church.—There was but one mean of saving her for ever from such great dangers, and of reconciling the interests of the State, with those of religion. It was needful that the successor of St. Peter should be a pastor like St. Peter, who, solely occupied with the salvation of souls, and with spiritual interests, might cease to be agitated by worldly ideas, by pretensions to sovereignty, and by disputes concerning bound-

aries, territories, and provinces.—'Tis a benefit, then, to separate religion from what is a stranger to her, and to have replaced her in her state of evangelical purity.—This Concordat, which established the religion of France, was faithfully observed; nay, the Emperor went beyond his engagements. The Pope should, therefore, have on his part also fulfilled its conditions.—Whenever no personal blame attached to the Archbishops and Bishops, named by the Emperor, he should have installed them without delay. This condition not being complied with, the Concordat became void, and we were replaced in the same situation as we were previous to the Concordat of Francis I. and Leo X.; this situation or regimen is founded on the Pragmatic Sanction of St. Louis, so much regretted by our churches, by the College of Paris, and by the Parliaments.—Incendiary writings and bulls, inspired by ignorance, and the most criminal dereliction of the principles of religion, were hawked about in different parts of the empire. These productions were every where received with contempt and disgust. The facts spoke too loud for themselves; thirty millions of Frenchmen, eighteen millions of Italians, and so many people on the banks of the Vistula, the Elbe and the Rhine, bear witness to the solicitude with which the French Government protects the religion of our fathers.—The foresight and wisdom of our ancestors sheltered us from the infringements of Gregory VII. and of those who cherish his opinions. The Sorbonne, the College of Paris, and the Gallican church, never acknowledged any of those monstrous principles.—Kings are only accountable to God; and the Pope must, according to the principles of Jesus Christ, give, like others, to Cæsar, what is due to Cæsar. The temporal crown and the sceptre of this world were not put into his hands by him whose will it was that he should call himself the servant of the servants of God, and who recommended to him at all times, charity and humility.—As ignorance favours fanaticism, his Majesty has ordered, that the principles of the College of Paris, and of the declaration of the Clergy of 1682, shall be taught in the seminaries. He wished to oppose the influence of a sound doctrine to the tendency of the weakness of man, which induces him to turn the most sacred things to the advantage of the vilest interests.—His Majesty has done much for religion; his

intention is to do still more ; and, according as the thirty millions of ecclesiastic pensions become extinct, he intends to devote that sum to the benefit of the church. One sole obligation has been imposed by the Divine Law, which is, that priests should live by the altar, and be attentive to such things only as concern their holy functions.

WAR.

While the Emperor was thus preparing all the improvements, which every year of his reign secures to France: while the annual execution of the laws, which relate to the conscription, without any difficulty or obstruction, kept our legions complete ; our enemies, who are his, were about to try his gigantic efforts. But we have already called it to your recollection, that shortly after having opened your Session of 1808, the Emperor defeated the Spanish armies, entered Madrid, and placed his brother on the throne. By a sudden and skilful march he induced the English troops to advance, and then pursued them without allowing the least breathing time to the frontiers of Galicia, made a great number of prisoners, and took their hospitals, baggage and ammunition. He then obtained the knowledge of the treaty, by which the Court of Vienna engaged to supply the Juntas of the insurgents with 100,000 stands of arms. He also learned that Austria was taking up arms, and that her armaments had already spread the utmost consternation through the States of the Confederacy. He immediately suspended his triumphant march, left his armies in Spain, and thought that his presence would be sufficient to destroy his enemies.—Surely, his Majesty never gave to Europe a more striking proof of the greatness of his character, and the power of his genius. Eighty regiments of those veteran troops, who had conquered at Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, remained in Spain, and he put himself at the head of the troops of his allies, and his recruits.—You recollect, Gentlemen, the uneasiness, which we all felt, and which gained so much ground, when Europe supposed, for a moment, that a nation, which had been so frequently defeated, and which owed its existence to the generosity of our Sovereign, would defeat our allies, and penetrate into our territory. The Emperor of Austria, with an army of 500,000 men, the prodigious and miraculous effort of paper money, fancied he was marching to a certain victory. Bavaria

and Italy were invaded, without any declaration of war, and men were slain without knowing that they had enemies to combat ; a conduct, which will be branded with the severest censure by posterity.—The Emperor left Paris on the 18th without guards, without equipage, and without troops ; his armies, hastily assembled from the different parts of Germany, fled astonished at the unforeseen aggression, and at the multitude of enemies who surrounded them on all sides. Ratisbon had been taken, with one of the finest regiments of the army ; but the news of his Majesty's arrival reached the troops, and flew through all the ranks. The Emperor having, by his accustomed manœuvres, separated two corps of the enemy's army, and beaten them on the 20th, near Abensberg ; on the 21st he marched against Landshut, rendered himself master of that town and of the bridge across the Iser, the headquarters and central point of the enemy's operations ; intercepted by this movement the communication of the enemy's army, and took his baggage, his pontoons, and his hospitals. On the 22d, he marched to Eckmühl, turned the left of the Archduke Charles's army, reduced to four corps by the separation of the two others, routed that army, took 30,000 prisoners with two pieces of cannon, and the same evening arrived in the plain of Ratisbon, where he rested in the head-quarters of Prince Charles. On the 23d, he closely pursued the enemy, destroyed the Austrian horse, and took Ratisbon and the 12,000 men whom the enemy had left in that place.—In 48 hours, the Austrian army, struck as it were by a thunderbolt, saw its fate decided. Of six corps, which composed it, each 40,000 strong, five were already defeated, reduced to half their number, and separated from each other. The remains of the four corps were driven to the Danube, and the two others to the Inn, without bridges, without magazines, and without hospitals. The rumour of these disasters soon reached the ears of the Sovereign of Austria, and in less than two days the most profound consternation succeeded the most foolish presumption. In the mean time the 8th and 9th corps, which formed the Austrian army of Italy, had surprised our troops, who were far from expecting such treacherous proceedings, blockaded Palma Nova and Venice, and reached, on the 28th of April, the Adige.—The Emperor's plan was no longer doubtful ; af-

ter having defeated the grand army of the Archduke Charles, and driven four of his corps to Bohemia, he pursued the two corps, which fell back to the Inn, marched to Salzburg, Lintz, Upper Austria, and Styria, in order to turn the Austrian army of Italy, and secure his own army and his dominions in Italy, which are so dear to his heart.—One month had scarce elapsed, since the unjust aggression of the Austrian army, when Vienna was bombarded, and compelled to open its gates and bow to our victorious arms.—The Austrian army of Italy soon perceived, that its flanks were uncovered, and felt the necessity of falling back; the Viceroy, who defeated the enemy on the banks of the Piave, on the Noric Alps, and in Carniola, pushed on to the frontiers of Styria, and formed a junction with the grand army. Shortly after he defeated the enemy in the interior of Hungary. The battle of Raab was the celebration of the memorable anniversary of Marengo, and Friedland; which induced the Emperor to write to his adopted son—‘Your victory is a grand-daughter of Marengo.’—The scattered remains of the different enemy’s corps could not have rallied, and would have been taken and disarmed, had not a fortuitous event, the rise of the Danube, which overflowed its banks, arrested the French army. The genius of war, and the efforts of art, overcame those unforeseen obstacles. In the profession of arms, it is at times necessary to join the courage and force of the lion to the cunning and prudence of the fox.—The battle of Wagram, followed by the armistice of Znaim, made the arms drop from the hands of the enemy; he had no other hope left than the generosity of the conquerors, which he had so often slighted.—By the peace of Vienna, France and her allies have obtained considerable advantages, and the Continent of Europe has regained tranquillity and peace. Let us hope that this peace will be more permanent than that of Presburgh, and that the men who deluded the Cabinet of Vienna, after the peace of Presburgh, will not succeed in deceiving it again after that of Vienna. They would pronounce the doom of their master; for France, ever great, powerful and strong, will always know how to destroy and counteract the combinations and intrigues of her enemies.—England has wasted considerable treasures; she has lost the flower of her army; she has revealed to the English nation the secret of the sentiments

which attach the French to their Government and their Emperor. These are the only fruits of her foolish enterprise. Among the departments of ancient France, those of the Channel and the North, and among the new departments, that of the Lys, have distinguished themselves. Some districts of the Sarre only shewed a different disposition, instead of hastening to defend their country, they rose in open rebellion. His Majesty has ordered military commissions to try those evil-disposed citizens. A Counsellor of State has been sent thither to take the necessary depositions. The commune and private individuals who have thus misconducted themselves, shall be for fifteen years deprived of their rights of citizens, and shall be subjected to a double contribution; over their doors shall be written—‘This is not a French Commune.’—His Majesty has also ordered plans to be laid before him of monuments, to be erected at Arras, Banger, and Lisle, tending to preserve the memory of sentiments, which have given him so much satisfaction.—But the momentous influence of the events of the year 1809, on the face of the world, attracts all our attention.

POLITICS.

The Duchy of Warsaw has been enlarged with a part of Gallicia. It would have been easy for the Emperor to unite all Gallicia with that state; but he would not do any thing which could excite the least uneasiness in the mind of his ally, the Emperor of Russia. Nearly all Gallicia of the first partition has been left to Austria. His Majesty never entertained the idea of restoring the kingdom of Poland. What the Emperor has done for New Gallicia was prescribed to him by sound policy as well as honour. He could not surrender to the vengeance of an implacable Prince, people who had displayed such fervent zeal for the cause of France.—A young Austrian Prince, the same who commanded in Ulm in 1805, as arrogant as he is ignorant and unacquainted with the art of war, did only know how to get himself defeated, with 40,000 men, by Prince Joseph Poniatowsky, who had only 13,000 under his orders. Through the unskilful combination of her General, Austria lost West Gallicia; the inhabitants of which shook off, with enthusiasm, the iron yoke which bore them down. It was the Emperor’s duty not to subject them to it again. It is His Majesty’s wish, that, under the wise Government of the King of Saxony, the

inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw secure their tranquillity, and enjoy their fortunate situation, without giving their neighbour any cause of uneasiness.—The Kings of Bavaria, Westphalia, Wurtemberg, and the rest of the Princes of the Confederation, will all obtain an accession of territory. It would undoubtedly have been easy for France to extend her frontiers beyond the Rhine; but that river remains the invariable limit of the neighbouring states and of her empire.—The Hanse Towns shall preserve their independence; they shall serve as a medium of the reprisals of war, with regard to England.—Peace shall immediately be concluded with Sweden. Nothing shall be changed in the political relations of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the Helvetic Confederacy. For the first time, since the days of the Romans, all Italy will again be subject to the same system. The re-union of the estates of Rome was requisite to effect this measure. They intersect the Peninsula from the Mediterranean as far as the Adriatic Sea; and history has evinced the importance of an immediate intercourse between Upper Italy and the kingdom of Naples.—Three centuries ago, whilst Charles VIII. was effecting the conquest of this kingdom, the Pope suddenly changing his opinion, formed a formidable league against him. The retreat of the King being intercepted, he could only return to France, by marching over the necks of the confederates, headed by the Pope.—But wherefore should we seek for examples in the history of Charles VIII.; of Louis XII.; of Francis I.? Have we not seen, in our days, the Pope protecting the English in his capital, who from this asylum, were agitating the kingdom of Naples, and the kingdom of Italy; distributing money and poignards to the assassins who slaughtered our soldiers in the vallies of Calabria? The Emperor has demanded of the Pope to shut his ports against the English; who could have thought that the Pope would have rejected his demand? He has proposed to him to form a league, offensive and defensive, with the kingdom of Naples and that of Italy. The Pope has rejected this proposal. No circumstance has occurred since the peace of Presburg, wherein the Court of Rome has not evinced its hatred against France. Whatever power happens to preponderate in Italy becomes immediately her enemy, hence before the battle of Austerlitz, before that of Fried-

land, the Emperor received from Rome briefs replete with acrimony.—We next beheld the Pope complaining of the principles of toleration, sacred by the code of Napoleon; we beheld him rise against the organic laws which governed the interior of the empire, and in which, under no title whatever, had he any right to interfere; we saw him cast firebrands in our provinces, and thus endeavour to occasion divisions in, and to shake the great empire; and it is not to be doubted what he would have done, had any important battle been lost. The Court of Rome has unveiled its secret sentiments too much. She has not been able to disown the services rendered by the Emperor to religion; but this motive of acknowledgment, which should have been so powerful over the Chief of the Church, could not overcome the hatred of the temporal sovereign. Convinced of these truths, sacred by the history of former times and by our own experience, the Emperor had only two ways to chuse—either to create a patriarchy, and separate France from every relation with a Power inimical to her, and which endeavoured to annoy her, or to destroy a temporal sovereignty, the only source of the hatred of the Court of Rome against France. The first measure would have occasioned dangerous discussions, and alarmed some consciences. The Emperor has rejected it. The second was the exercise of rights which are inherent to his Imperial Crown; and for which the Emperor is accountable to no one. The Emperor has adopted it. Neither the Pope, nor any other priest in the empire, ought to enjoy any temporal sovereignty. Never shall the Emperor acknowledge the right of the triple crown; he acknowledges only the spiritual mission given to the pastors of the church by Jesus Christ, and which St. Peter, and his pious successors, have so holily filled, to the great advantage of religion.—The kingdom of Naples, during the present year, has acquired a new consistency. The King has evinced peculiar attention in the organization of his dominions. He has re-established order in all the branches of administration. He has repressed speculation, and his people, from the highest class to the lowest, have manifested sentiments, which constituted their praise, and, at the same time, the praises of their Sovereign. The Clergy of Naples, composed like that of France, of enlightened men, has deserved the esteem of the


Emperor. The Archbishop of Naples has been the only ecclesiastic who refused the oath which he owed to the Sovereign. In vain have the Theologians endeavoured to convince him; he has persisted in his error. His uncommon ignorance has been the subject of satire among those by whom he had been raised to so elevated a rank.

—Holland is, in fact, but a portion of France. This country is defined by saying that it is the *Alluvion* of the Rhine, of the Maese, and of the Scheldt; that is to say, of the main arteries of the empire; the nullity of its custom-houses, the dispositions of its agents, and the spirit of its inhabitants, which tends continually towards a fraudulent intercourse with England; all have combined to render the interdiction of the traffic of the Rhine and of the Weser, a duty. Holland, thus bruised between France and England, is deprived, both of the advantages contrary to our general system, and which she must renounce, as well as of those which she might enjoy. It is time that all this should be restored to its natural order. His Majesty has been pleased to insure also, in a conspicuous manner, the advantages of the Act of the Helvetic Confederacy, by annexing to his other titles, that of Mediator of Switzerland. It is enough to say to the Swiss, that happiness will be lost to them the moment that they touch this *Palladium* of their independence. The Pont de Bale has given frequent opportunities to the French troops for violating the Helvetic territory. It was necessary to them, in order to cross the Rhine. His Majesty has just ordered the building of a permanent bridge at Haningue. The Illyrian provinces cover Italy, afford it a direct intercourse with Dalmatia, procure us a point of immediate contact with the empire of Constantinople, which, for so many reasons, and ancient interests, France was desirous of maintaining and protecting. Both Spain and Portugal are the theatre of a furious revolution; the numerous agents of England stem and feed the fire which they have lighted. The strength, the power, and the calm moderation of the Emperor, will restore to them days of

peace. Should Spain lose her colonies, will be through her own inclination. The Emperor will never oppose the independence of the continental nations of America; this independence belongs to the necessary order of events; it is connected with justice; it is connected with the interest, well understood, of all the powers. France has established the independence of the United States of North America. France has contributed to its augmentation of several provinces. She will be always ready to defend her work; her power does not depend on monopoly; she has no interest contrary to justice; nothing that can contribute to the happiness of America, can be against the prosperity of France, who will always be rich enough when she will see herself treated upon an equal footing by all nations, and in all the European markets.—Whether the people of Mexico and Peru wish to be united to the metropolis, or whether they desire to erect themselves into an exalted and noble independence, France will never oppose it, provided these people do not form any connection with England. France has no need to vex her neighbours, nor to impose tyrannical laws on them, to ensure her commerce and prosperity.—We have lost the colonies of Martinique and Cayenne. They have both been badly defended. The circumstances which have deprived us of them, are an object of a severe inquiry; not that their loss is of any weight in the scale of general affairs, for they will be restored to us, in a more flourishing condition, at the time of peace, than they were at the time when they were taken.—To conclude, peace has brought back again the Emperor among us. All the Estate-bodies have laid down their homages at the foot of his throne. His answer is engraved on your hearts. That Monarch, who excites the greatest admiration, the greatest enthusiasm, is he who is also worthy of more love. He has said so to us; He places, on that which he inspires, all his hopes of happiness. Frenchmen, he, then, has once been deceived, when he has asserted, that other princes had been happier than he.

END OF VOL. XVI.

LONDON :—Printed by T. C. HANSARD, Peterborough - Court, Fleet - Street;
Published by R. BAGSHAW, Brydges-Street, Covent - Garden :—Sold also by J. BUDD, Pall-Mall.



UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
walt.cls v.16

Cobbett's weekly political register (Lon
Cobbett's weekly political register.



3 1951 000 968 124 S

**WILSON
ANNEX**

SITY OF MINNESOTA

political register (Lon
political register.



000 968 124 S

WILSON
ANNEX

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
walt,cls v.16

Cobbett's weekly political register (Lon
Cobbett's weekly political register.



3 1951 000 968 124 S

**WILSON
ANNEX**